

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Chron File - May 1994 #1 [7]

Staff Office-Individual:

Defense Policy-Bell, Robert

Original OA/ID Number:

264

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
31	3	4	2	V

TO: HATCH, ORRIN G

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 16 MAY 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE BUDGET

CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR FM SEN HATCH RE DEPOT MAINTENANCE TASK FORCE RPT TO CONGRESS

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 15 APR 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
WH STRIPPING DESK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BELL
JONES
NSC CHRON
ROSNER

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9402803

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 HAHN	Z 94041211 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
002 LAKE	Z 94042919 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR SIG
002 JONES	Z 94050415 FOR REDO
003 PRESIDENT	Z 94051619 FOR SIGNATURE
004	X 94051619 PRESIDENT SGD LTR
004 WH STRIPPING DESK	X 94051619 FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

004	940516	HATCH, ORRIN G
004	940516	WH STRIPPING DESK

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 16, 1994

Dear Senator Hatch:

Thank you for your letter regarding the Department of Defense Depot Maintenance Task Force Report to Congress.

I appreciate your concerns and understand the need to ensure that proper depot maintenance is available to support the readiness and sustainability requirements of our military forces. At the same time, force structure reductions have created excess capacity that must be reduced.

As you are aware, the Deputy Secretary of Defense recently forwarded the Depot Maintenance Task Force Report to Congress. In his cover letter the Deputy Secretary addressed one of your concerns by directing that "CORE" depot work would be retained as a DoD-wide program in order to provide greater flexibility to eliminate duplicate resources and promote interservice efficiencies.

Your other concerns regarding competition, including some which were echoed by the Air Force, were thoroughly and objectively addressed by the Task Force. I believe the Task Force provided a fair and balanced set of recommendations regarding necessary changes to our depot maintenance infrastructure.

The Defense Department and the Defense Depot Maintenance Council are continuing to study several of these recommendations, including those regarding competition. I welcome your continued interest and views regarding this important aspect of our defense infrastructure.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Tim Clinton", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

ORRIN G. HATCH
UTAH

WENDY J. HIGGINBOTHAM
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

135 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
TELEPHONE: (202) 224-5251
TDD: (202) 224-2848

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4402

059100
COMMITTEES:
JUDICIARY
LABOR AND HUMAN
RESOURCES
FINANCE
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT

2803

March 31, 1994

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The Depot Maintenance Task Force Report to Congress, which will be briefed to the White House staff before formal release, carries severe, adverse consequences for our national security, our defense industrial base and our defense depot workforce.

The report purports that a substantial improvement in readiness would occur by maximizing the transfer of depot-level maintenance workload from defense depots to the private sector. The argument is irrational.

In the express case of tactical fighter aircraft, for example, the private sector is undergoing massive reconsolidation, making it patently unclear as to whether private depot capacity would even be available when needed. Nor can private depots assure cost-effective service. I refer to Grumman's unsuccessful bid for F-14 work, at \$120,000 per aircraft compared to the \$28,000 cost at the Navy's Norfolk Depot. Regrettably, neither Grumman, nor five other major manufacturers remain in the air frame business, leaving the sector to McDonnell-Douglas and Lockheed.

A second flaw in the report urges that each military service should identify and husband "core" workloads. This recommendation masks inefficiencies and raises costs to the taxpayer, continuing the report's thread of irrationality. It is undeniable that certain core activities are best performed by some services: tactical vehicles by the Army, ships by the Navy and fixed-wing aircraft by the Air Force, for example. But it is more sensible to establish such core functions as DOD centers of excellence, and to commit all service work peripheral to the narrowed core concept to such centers: all fighter aircraft to Air Force depots, and all ground vehicles to the Army, for example.


March 31, 1994
Page 2

A third, and related flaw is reduced competition between the public and private sector, as well as between depots. The Air Force saved \$350 million during the last two fiscal years through competition. But the Task Force sees public-private competition as inherently unfair to the private sector, despite the long-standing availability, acceptability and use of the DOD Cost Comparability Handbook which puts public and private cost accounting on the same footing. This recommendation, Mr. President, cheats the taxpayer.

Finally, the report erroneously - if not egregiously - attacks the Air Force for attempting to "justify maintaining their current infrastructure of five air logistics centers by obtaining adequate work through the competition process to keep them viable." First, the statement is untrue. The Air Force urges full, free and open competition, in the true spirit of the Competition in Contracting Act and the Federal Acquisition Regulations, to compete as much as possible so as to let the hand of the marketplace decide which installations merit retention. Second, the spectacle of the Task Force, composed of private sector as well as Defense Department leaders, attacking the very spirit of competition suggests an insidious mindset that is as humorous as it is dangerous to our fundamental economic philosophy.

Mr. President, I respectfully urge your rejection of the report. I have too much respect for your wisdom and leadership to subject you to the ridicule that it will enjoy at the hands of Congress.

Very Respectfully,



Orrin G. Hatch
United States Senator

OGH:bl



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

17 APR 1994

Honorable David R. Obey
Acting Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-6015

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter forwards a report by the Defense Science Board Government/Industry Task Force on Depot Maintenance Management. The report presents the results of an assessment of the overall performance and management of DoD depot maintenance activities as required by Section 341 of the FY 1994 National Defense Authorization Act. It addresses the nine specific tasks in the Act (see enclosure 1) and includes recommendations for legislative and administrative actions.

In order to gain the benefits and advice from both the government and industry, a task force of senior representatives from both sectors was assembled. The Task Force was supported by essentially full time staff from government and industry. Four Task Force panels were formed (fixed wing, ship, ground forces and equipment, and missiles and electronics) to address unique commodity considerations. Each of these panels was headed by co-chairs from government and industry. Faced with an extremely difficult challenge, the Task Force has produced a thorough, and responsive report. Their findings and recommendations are summarized in enclosure 2.

The Task Force found that the existing DoD depot maintenance "CORE" concept i.e., organic capabilities supported by requisite workload, is valid. The Military Services are already in the process of applying this concept and the associated DoD policy to determine their CORE depot maintenance requirements. The Task Force, however, recommends a modification to the concept and policy, calling for application on a Service specific basis as opposed to DoD-wide. Our evaluation suggests that a DoD-wide CORE provides greater flexibility to eliminate duplicate resources, increase interservicing, and implement efficiency measures. Therefore, we have decided to retain CORE as DoD-wide.

The Task Force's principal recommendation for legislative action concerns the limitations on the performance of depot-level maintenance contained in Title 10 United States Code. These provisions include the requirement that the Military Departments not contract for the performance by non-Federal Government personnel of more than 40 percent of their depot-level maintenance workload. The Task Force concluded that relief from existing legislation is needed to provide an orderly approach for sizing the depot infrastructure so as to be compatible with the force structure determined in the Bottom Up Review.


The Task Force concluded that the "best value" to the government can be achieved by reducing the existing infrastructure and its associated cost, as required to support the CORE concept, and competing the remaining work in the private sector. To that end, the Task Force recommends that public versus public and public versus private competition be discontinued. The basis for this recommendation is their conclusion that pitting Services against each other or against private firms that are also providers of logistics support to DoD is divisive and causes long term cooperative relations to disintegrate without commensurate financial return. The Task Force has also found that the Services' existing financial accounting systems do not adequately support the competition process.

The Task Force also recommends that design, development, manufacture, and the installation of major modifications and upgrades generally take place in the private sector and that the organic maintenance depots focus on routine repair and other readiness-oriented workloads. This will place reliance on the best and most appropriate capabilities of both the public and private sectors.

The Department believes this report is a constructive contribution to the problem of rightsizing the Depot infrastructure of the DoD for present and future national defense needs.

A copy of this report was also furnished to the Senate Appropriations Committee and the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.

Sincerely,



Enclosure

cc:

Honorable Joseph M. McDade
Ranking Member

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 25, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*
FROM: STEVEN R. JONES *S*
SUBJECT: Letter to President from Senator Hatch RE: Depot
Maintenance Task Force Report to Congress

Senator Hatch (R-Utah) has written the President (Tab C) urging him to reject the Defense Depot Maintenance Task Force Report recently sent to Congress.

U.S. military depot maintenance currently costs about \$13 billion a year. While depot maintenance support is critical to our military readiness and sustainability, force structure reductions have created excess capacity that must be reduced. Eleven depots have been closed in previous rounds of BRAC; 24 remain. Congress wants to protect depot workloads in home districts, OSD sees the 1995 BRAC round as an opportunity to cut excess depot overhead, and the private sector (currently performing about 30 percent of the depot work) would like to increase its share in a decreasing defense market. At the request of Congress, a DoD Task Force consisting of 42 members from public and private sectors was formed under the Defense Science Board to review further depot maintenance consolidation.

Senator Hatch (who represents two maintenance depots--Ogden ALC and Tooele AD--in Utah) is very harsh in his criticism of the Defense Science Board Task Force recommendations that promote the maintenance of "CORE" capabilities while competing work beyond "CORE" in the private sector and performing all major modifications and upgrades in the private sector. His arguments echo two dissenting Air Force positions documented in the Task Force report: that "CORE" requirements should be defined DoD-wide, and that public-private and public-public (interservice) competition is the most efficient and cost-effective means to allocate workload. The Task Force recommended that, because of divisiveness and inadequate accounting procedures, such competition be discontinued and that "CORE" workload be defined and distributed under the supervision of a strengthened Defense Depot Maintenance Council.

NSC, NEC and OMB staff were briefed on the Task Force conclusions prior to DoD's release of the report and found it in general to be an objective and balanced presentation of the depot issues. The Air Force dissenting positions, which Senator Hatch echoes in his letter, were fully represented in the Task Force report.

The Task Force recommendations are an important contribution toward depot maintenance "rightsizing" and support the continued refinement of these policies within a strengthened Defense Depot Maintenance Council. The recommendations also call for revising legislative requirements that cap non-Federal Government depot maintenance workload at 40 percent. It is expected that under these recommendations that total private sector depot work will perhaps approach 60 percent. The Task Force recommendations and "CORE" approach are intended to provide a baseline for further evaluation during BRAC 95.

The draft response to Senator Hatch thanks him for his letter, cites Deputy Secretary Deutch's support of DoD-wide "CORE" and expresses support for the Task Force effort as an objective and balanced approach.

③

That you and Susan Brophy forward the letter at Tab I to the President.

Tab I	Memorandum for the President
Tab A	Letter to Senator Hatch
Tab B	DepSecDef Letter Forwarding Report
Tab C	Incoming Letter from Senator Hatch

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

WASHINGTON

5/16/94

May 13, 1994 MAY 13 P4:31

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
SUSAN BROPHYSUBJECT: Letter from Senator Hatch RE: Depot Maintenance
Task Force Report to CongressPurpose

To respond to Senator Hatch's (R-Utah) letter urging you to reject the Defense Depot Maintenance Report recently sent to Congress.

Background

U.S. military depot maintenance currently costs about \$13 billion per year. While depot maintenance support is critical to our military readiness and sustainability, force structure reductions have created excess capacity that must be reduced. At the request of Congress, a DoD Task Force consisting of 42 members from public and private sectors was formed under the Defense Science Board to review further depot maintenance consolidation.

Senator Hatch, who represents two maintenance depots in Utah, is very harsh in his criticism of the Task Force recommendations. He challenges the recommendations promoting the "CORE" maintenance capabilities concept (the maintenance skills needed to meet readiness and sustainment requirements for mission-essential equipment used in JCS contingency scenarios). His arguments echo Air Force positions documented in the Task Force report regarding the use of competition to allocate work and that "CORE" be defined DoD-wide rather than allowing each Service to retain its own core capabilities.

Deputy Secretary Deutch, in his letter transmitting the report to Congress, adopted the Air Force (and Senator Hatch's) position that "CORE" work should be defined DoD-wide to promote greater efficiency. DoD is continuing to review the Task Force recommendations on competition.

The NSC, NEC and OMB staffs reviewed the Task Force report and found it in general an objective and balanced presentation of depot maintenance issues, including the dissenting opinions of the Air Force. The draft response to Senator Hatch thanks him for his letter, cites Deputy Secretary Deutch's support of the DoD-wide "CORE" concept and expresses support for the Task Force effort.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to Senator Hatch
Tab B	DepSecDef Letter Forwarding Report
Tab C	Incoming Correspondence

2803
ID# 059160

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: APRIL 07, 1994

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE ORRIN HATCH

SUBJECT: URGES THE PRESIDENT TO REJECT THE DEPOT
MAINTENANCE TASK FORCE REPORT TO CONGRESS

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION		
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
PATRICK GRIFFIN		ORG	94/04/07		C	94/04/07
REFERRAL NOTE:						
WILLIAM ITOH		RSA	94/04/08			
REFERRAL NOTE:						
REFERRAL NOTE:						
REFERRAL NOTE:						
REFERRAL NOTE:						

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____
MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

*ACTION CODES: *DISPOSITION *OUTGOING *
* * *CORRESPONDENCE: *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL * OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE *C-COMPLETED * CODE = A *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC * OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * * *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE * * *
*X-INTERIM REPLY * * *

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75,OEOb) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

SCANNED

TO: GROSSMAN, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 16 MAY 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: TURKMENISTAN

FOREIGN TRAVEL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NSC STAFF FORN TRAVEL

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 14 MAY 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: WITKOWSKY

LOGREF:

FILES: ADMIN

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
MANZANARES
NSC CHRON
WITKOWSKY

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJEB

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9420602

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SODERBERG
001
002

Z 94051608 FOR DECISION
X 94051608 SODERBERG APPROVED RECOM
X 94051608 KENNEY SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 940516 GROSSMAN, M

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

May 16, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: NSC Staff Foreign Travel

NSC Staff Member: Anne A. Witkowsky
Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control

Purpose of Travel: To deliver a keynote address on confidence building measures at CSCE Seminar on Regional Security.

ITINERARY

<u>Date</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Major Event/Meeting</u>
20-28 May	Ashgabat	Turkmenistan	Deliver address

for Kristie A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 11, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY E. SODERBERG

THROUGH: J. ROBERT MANZANARES *JRM*FROM: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*SUBJECT: Travel Request for Anne Witkowsky to Ashgabat,
Turkmenistan, 20-28 May 1994

Request travel to Ashgabat, Turkmenistan 20-28 May to deliver a keynote address on confidence building measures at CSCE Seminar on Regional Security. Anne will serve as head of U.S. delegation.

State Department has agreed to cover all costs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the requested travel and authorize Will Itoh to sign the NSC Travel Authorization Form and the State notification memo.

Approve *[Signature]*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Travel Authorization Form
Tab II Memo to State Department

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: ANNE WITKOWSKY
2. PURPOSE/EVENT (Include Dates): To deliver keynote address
at CSCE Seminar, 20-28 May 1994
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): _____
4. DEPARTURE DATE 5/20 RETURN DATE 5/28
DEPARTURE TIME PM RETURN TIME PM
5. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOVT. AIR _____ COMMERCIAL AIR x POV _____ RAIL _____
OTHER _____
6. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION _____ PER DIEM _____ OTHER _____
TOTAL 0
7. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC _____ OTHER x
IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: _____
State Department has agreed to cover all costs
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO x
IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid By
Traveler, Describe Source & Arrangements): _____
9. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ 0
10. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You
Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): _____
11. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Anne Witkowski
12. APPROVALS: Senior Director Robert A. Bell
Director of Administration J. Robert Maganville
Executive Secretary Kristie A. Perry

TO: PERRY, W

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 16 MAY 94
SOURCE REF: PD 94-24

KEYWORDS: THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE
JAPAN
KOREA SOUTH

NATO
ISRAEL
PD

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PD 94-24 RE THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION W/ ALLIES

ACTION: PRESIDENT SGD PD 94-24

DUE DATE: 10 MAY 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
ANDREASEN*
BELL
KRECKO
NSC CHRON
ROSNER

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY PA DATE 5/16 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 4 OF 4

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 16, 1994

Presidential Determination
No. 94-24

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Theater Missile Defense Cooperation with the
Allies

1. Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Public Law 103-160, I hereby certify that the Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, has formally submitted to representatives of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Japan, Israel, and South Korea a proposal concerning coordination of the development and implementation of U.S. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) programs with TMD programs of our friends and allies.

2. You are authorized and directed to notify the Congress of this determination and to publish it in the Federal Register.

William Clinton

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 13, 1994 **MAY 13 09:16**ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination Regarding Theater
Missile Defense Cooperation with the AlliesPurpose

To recommend your approval of the attached Presidential Determination regarding theater missile defense cooperation with the Allies.

Background

The proposed Determination at Tab A certifies that representatives of the United States have formally submitted to each of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to Japan, Israel, and South Korea a proposal concerning coordination of the development and implementation of U.S. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) programs with TMD programs of our friends and allies.

The Determination is required pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Public Law 103-160. Until such a determination is delivered, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is restricted to obligating not more than 80 percent of appropriated funds for TMD. BMDO projects reaching that limit by the end of the week.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Determination at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Determination

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 11, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*
FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN *SPA*
SUBJECT: Presidential Determination Regarding Theater
Missile Defense Cooperation with the Allies

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President recommending that he sign a Determination certifying that representatives of the United States have formally submitted to each of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to Japan, Israel, and South Korea a proposal concerning coordination of the development and implementation of U.S. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) programs with TMD programs of our friends and allies.

Until such a determination is delivered, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is restricted to obligating not more than 80 percent of appropriated funds for TMD. BMDO projects reaching that limit by the end of the week.

Concurrence: Jeremy Rosner Alan Kreczko *SPM*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Presidential Determination
Tab II Memorandum from Deputy Secretary Deutch

3572



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

- 5 MAY 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Presidential Certification of Proposal to Allies
Regarding Cooperation on Development of Theater
Missile Defenses (TMD)

The 1994 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 242, requires the President to certify in writing to Congress that U.S. representatives have formally submitted to each of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to Japan, Israel, and South Korea a proposal regarding cooperation on development of TMD. Until such certification is delivered, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is restricted to obligating not more than 80 percent of appropriated funds for theater ballistic missile defense. BMDO projects reaching that limit shortly after May 1, 1994.

On April 4, 1994, Lieutenant General Malcolm R. O'Neill, Director, BMDO, and his staff formally presented briefings concerning current programs and future plans for TMD cooperation with the Allies to representatives of the nations listed above. Representatives from thirteen of nineteen nations invited attended the presentation. These representatives also received a formal letter from LTG O'Neill emphasizing the desire of the U.S. Government to conduct cooperative TMD development with friends and allies. Those nations that were invited to, but did not attend the presentation were sent a similar letter with a copy of the briefing materials. These actions satisfy the requirement specified in the Congressional language.

Please accomplish those steps necessary to ensure that the Presidential certification requirement has been met and is returned to DoD. Attached is a draft proposed certification memorandum. If you have any questions, or require additional assistance regarding this matter, contact CDR Jim Cooper, BMDO/SRI, (703) 693-1080.

A large, stylized handwritten signature, likely of John L. White, is written over the bottom right portion of the page.

Attachment:
As stated

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Theater Missile Defense Cooperation with the
Allies

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Department of Defense Authorization Act for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1994, Public Law 103-160, I hereby certify that the Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, has formally submitted to representatives of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Japan, Israel, and South Korea a proposal concerning coordination of the development and implementation of U.S. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) programs with TMD programs of our friends and allies.

You are hereby authorized and directed to notify the Congress of this determination and to publish it in the Federal Register.

SEC. 242. COOPERATION OF UNITED STATES ALLIES ON DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICAL AND THEATER MISSILE DEFENSES.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Systems to provide effective defense against theater and tactical ballistic missiles that may be developed and deployed by the United States have the potential to make contributions to the national security interests of nations that are allies of the United States that would be equal to or greater than the contributions such systems would make to the national security interests of the United States.

(2) The cost of developing and deploying a broad spectrum of such systems will be several tens of billions of dollars.

(3) A truly cooperative multinational approach to the development and deployment of such systems could substantially reduce the financial burden of such an undertaking on any one country and would involve additional sources of technological expertise.

(4) While leaders of nations that are allies of the United States have stated an interest in becoming involved, or increasing involvement, in United States tactical missile defense programs, the governments of those nations are unlikely to support programs for theater missile defense development and deployment unless, at a minimum, they can participate in meaningful ways in the planning and execution of such programs, including active participation in research and development and production of the systems involved.

(5) Given the high cost of developing theater ballistic missile defense systems, the participation of United States allies in the efforts to develop tactical missile defenses would result in substantial savings to the United States.

(b) PLAN AND REPORTS.—(1) The Secretary of Defense shall develop a plan to coordinate development and implementation of Theater Missile Defense programs of the United States with theater missile defense programs of United States allies, with the goal of avoiding duplication of effort, increasing interoperability, and reducing costs. The plan shall set forth in detail any financial, in-kind, or other form of participation by each nation in cooperative efforts to plan, develop, produce, and deploy theater ballistic missile defenses for the mutual benefit of the countries involved.

(2) The Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the plan developed under paragraph (1). The report shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified versions, as appropriate, and may be submitted as a component of the next Theater Missile Defense Initiative report to Congress.

(3) The Secretary shall include in each annual Theater Missile Defense Initiative report to Congress a report on actions taken to implement the plan developed under paragraph (1). Each such report shall set forth the status of discussions between the United States and United States allies for the purposes stated in that paragraph and shall state the status of contributions by those allies to the Theater Missile Defense Cooperation Account, shown separately for each allied country covered by the plan.

(c) RESTRICTION ON FUNDS.—Of the total amount appropriated pursuant to authorizations in this Act for theater ballistic missile defense programs, not more than 80 percent may be obligated until—

(1) the report under subsection (b)(2) is submitted to Congress; and

(2) the President certifies in writing to Congress that representatives of the United States have formally submitted to each of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to Japan, Israel, and South Korea a proposal concerning the matters described in the report.

The President may submit with such certification a report of similar formal contacts with any other country that the President considers appropriate.

(d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that whenever the United States deploys theater ballistic missile defenses to protect another country, or the military forces of another country, that has not provided financial or in-kind support for development of theater ballistic missile defenses, the United States should consider whether it is appropriate to seek reimbursement from that country to cover at least the incremental cost to the United States of such deployment.

(e) ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN TMD PROGRAMS.—Congress encourages allies of the United States, and particularly those allies that would benefit most from deployment of Theater Missile Defense systems, to participate in, or to increase participation in, cooperative Theater Missile Defense programs of the United States. Congress also encourages participation by the United States in cooperative theater missile defense efforts of allied nations as such programs emerge.



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
7100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7100

SR

APR 4 1994

Rear Admiral Rudolf Lange
Defense Attache
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
4645 Reservoir Road, NW
Washington, DC 20007

Dear Admiral Lange:

Today the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has presented to allied and friendly governments a review of our near-, mid- and far-term plans for developing and deploying Theater Missile Defenses (TMD). While these programs provide protection for forward-deployed United States armed forces against a proliferating and evolving theater missile threat, they have potential to contribute to the national security of our allies and friends as well.

The United States believes that a cooperative multinational approach to the development and deployment of TMD supports U.S./Allied counterproliferation policies, could substantially reduce the financial burden of such an undertaking on any one country and would involve additional sources of technological expertise.


Cooperation with allies and friends in ballistic missile defense programs has significantly evolved since beginning in 1985. We have witnessed this valued cooperation shift from consultations and basic research projects to national requirements studies and programs to develop TMD capabilities. Some of these efforts are quite specific and advanced.

The TMD Program set forth in our presentation today, as described in the enclosed briefing charts, continues to respond to the ballistic missile threat to our homelands and deployed military forces. In connection with strong interest of our Congress in TMD cooperation, we will be submitting this briefing as a report required by the FY94 National Defense Authorization Act.

I trust that today's presentation as reflected in the enclosed materials, will refine your understanding of the Department of Defense missile defense program while reinforcing

our interest in TMD cooperation. As you review our materials, I look forward to continuing this dialogue, and the cooperative, cost-sharing programs that flow from this dialogue.

Sincerely,


MALCOLM R. O'NEILL
Lieutenant General, USA
Director

Enclosure:
As stated

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Program Plan Briefing For Allied Attaches

BALLISTIC *MISSILE* *DEFENSE* ORGANIZATION


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**LTG Malcolm O'Neill, USA
Director,
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization**


AGENDA

- **Situation**
- **Mission**
- **Execution**
- **Resources**
- **Issues**
- **Conclusion**

DISTANCES FROM NORTH KOREA



DISTANCES FROM IRAN



BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

Emerging Attack Capability From Third World Country

"...To Acquire Ballistic Missiles That Could Threaten The Continental United States. We Can't Give You A Precise Date – Whether It's Eight Years Or Ten Years Or Fifteen Years From Now. ...A Shortcut...Would Be...To Buy ICBMs Or Major Components..."

James Woolsey, Director, CIA, February 1993

"...It's Entirely Possible That Within A Year Or Two, We May Have Intelligence Information Which Leads Us To Believe That We Should Accelerate Our Efforts On National Missile Defense..."

William Perry, SECDEF, February 1994

Accidental Attack From FSU Or PRC

"The Possibility Of Accidental Or Unauthorized Launches Of (FSU) Nuclear Forces... Remains Highly Unlikely..."

Dr. Lawrence K. Gershwin, CIA, September 1992

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE KEY COMPONENT OF DoD DEFENSE STRATEGY

SECDEF's New World Dangers	BMDO Contributions
• Regional Aggression	• Protect Forces For Power Projection And Relief Operations • Coalition Flexibility / Stability
• Proliferation	• Support Defense Counterproliferation Initiative Develop Improved Ballistic Missile Defense
• Dangers To Democracy	• Cooperative R&D • Potential Multilateral Defense
• U.S. Economic Concerns	• Dual Use Technologies • Advanced Technology - Aerospace - Electronics • Commercialization Of Military R&D

BMDO MISSION

- **BMDO Shall Manage, Direct, And Execute The BMD Program To Acquire And Develop Systems And Architectures To**
 - **Enable Deployment Of A Theater Missile Defense Capability To Protect Forward-deployed Armed Forces Of U.S., Friends, And Allies**
 - **Develop Options For And Acquire When Directed, An Antiballistic Missile System That Is Capable Of Providing Highly Effective Defense Of The U.S. Homeland Against Limited Attacks Of Ballistic Missiles**
 - **Demonstrate Advanced Technologies For Near Term Insertion Options And Concept Development Of New Systems**
- **Program Shall**
 - **Be Conducted In Compliance With Existing Treaty Obligations**
 - **Utilize Nonnuclear Weapon Technologies**

BUR BMD PROGRAM GUIDANCE (1 SEP 93)

Priority	Program	Focus	Funding* (FY 95-99)
First	TMD	→ Acquisition Programs → • Core → Near And Midterm Capabilities • Advanced → Follow-on TMD Acquisition	\$12B
Second	NMD	→ Technology Readiness Program → • Emphasize Technology Long Poles • Maintain Contingency Options	\$3B
Third	Technology / R&S	→ Support Acquisition Programs And Provide Tech Base → • Near Term And Advanced Technology • Infrastructure / Personnel	\$3B

The Administration's Commitment To BMD Is Clear

* Subsequently Decreased \$1.1 Billion

TMD ACQUISITION APPROACH (Focus On Active Defense And C³I)

- **New Acquisition Approach To Provide Prototype Capabilities Early**
 - **Near Term TMD Upgrades Through CINCs' Experiments Program**
 - **Build On Existing Capability**
 - **Provide Early Contingency Capability**
 - **Encourage International Participation**
- **Low-To-Moderate Concurrency And Risk**

DELIVERABLES

What's In It For CINCs

When

- Quick Fixes To Existing Systems
- Faster Response In BM / C³
- Playing TMD In Wargames And CPXs

Today
(FY 94 - 95)

- Improve Engagement Of Short-range TBMs
- Wide Area Alerting

Near Term
(FY 94 - 97)

- Contingency Area Protection
- Protection Against Weapons Of Mass Destruction
- Initial Littoral Protection
- Significant Increase In Protected Area Against TBMs

Midterm
(FY 97 - 2002)

- Significant Increase In Range And Lethality Of Missile Against TBMs
- Can Engage TBMs In Boost And Post Boost Flights
- Enhance Protection For Maneuver Forces
- Reduce Strategic Lift For TMD


Advanced
(FY 2002+)

SUPPORTING THE WARFIGHTER TODAY

Program	Goal
• PAC-2 (Quick Reaction Program)	• Field Near Term Improvements In TBM Detection, Tracking, And Intercept
• TALON SHIELD / JTAGS / Radiant Ivory	• Provide TBM Warning Capability To Various CINCs
• CINCs' TMD Experiments	• Provide Opportunity To Exercise TMD Tactics, Warning And Cueing, Plans And Procedures
• Gaming (Example TMD Added To Yearly Newport Global Wargame And The Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab (APL) Warfare Analysis Lab Exercise)	• Highlights Awareness Of TMD Employment And Interoperability Issues

BALLISTIC
MISSILE
DEFENSE
ORGANIZATION

TODAY'S CAPABILITIES (FY 94-95)



WORKING NOW ON TMD WITH CINCS

P A C O M	U S A C O M	C E N T C O M	E U C O M	S P A C E C O M N O R A D
• CINC Experiments (ORNATE IMPACT) (SEP / OCT 93) - Voice Warning Net Through PACOM To USFK - 1st TBM Play For USFK CPX • Gaming Exercises (May / June 1993) • BMD Meetings (December 1993 - International Flavor) • TALON SHIELD *	• Gaming Exercises (June 1993) • BMD Meetings (November 1993) • <i>Fleet TMD Task Force (JTF - 95)</i> • Cooperative TMD Engagment Concept • TALON SHIELD *	• CINC Experiments (INTERNAL LOOK) Canceled Due To Somalla Situation, Next Scheduled Exercise Is FY 95 • <i>Drafting JTMD Functional Document</i> • BLUE FLAG (March 1994) • TALON SHIELD *	• CINC Experiments (OPTIC NEEDLE) (APR / MAY 93) - Tactical Surveillance Demo (TSD) Set Up And Operational • Gaming Exercises (December 1994) • TALON SHIELD * • <i>Ad Hoc Group On TMD for NATO</i>	• CINC Experiments (OPTIC NEEDLE And ORNATE IMPACT) (APR / MAY 93, SEP / OCT 93) - Passed TBM Data To EUCOM And Through PACOM To USFK • Cueing Mechanism To Other CINCs • Gaming Exercise (October / November 1993) • National Test Bed • <i>TALON SHIELD (In Use Today)</i>


* Can Be Called Forward By CINC

NEAR TERM CAPABILITIES (FY 94-97)

Program Area	What We Are In The Process Of Doing
• PATRIOT PAC-2 / Guidance Enhancement Missile (GEM)	• Improving Accuracy Against TBMs • Increasing Battlespace • Capability In FY 94 / 95 (Deploy FY 95-97)
• TPS-59 (Radar) / HAWK Upgrade	• Enhancing TBM Surveillance And Tracking For USMC HAWK Intercept • Cueing Other Theater Sensors • Capability FY 95 / 96 (Deploy FY 97)
• BM / C³ (DSP Data Dissemination)	• Expanding User Availability Of Early Warning Information • Capability FY 93 / 94

**BALLISTIC
MISSILE
DEFENSE
ORGANIZATION**


NEAR TERM CAPABILITIES (FY 94-97)



MIDTERM CAPABILITIES (FY 97-2002)

Program Area	What We Are Going To Do
• THAAD / TMD-GBR	• First Wide Area Protection Against TBMs • Provide Multiple Shot Opportunities • Enhance Protection Effectiveness • User Operational Evaluation • Contingency Capability (FY 97-00) • Objective Capability (FY 01-02)
• PATRIOT PAC-3	• Improve Lethality Against TBMs • Increase Protected Area • Provide Remote Launch Capability • Improve Discrimination • Improve Low Altitude Performance • FUE FY 98
• AEGIS / SM-2 Block IVA	• Improve Detection And Intercept Effectiveness • Improve Warhead Against Hard Targets • User Operational Evaluation • Two Ship Capability (FY 97-99)

MIDTERM CAPABILITIES (FY 97-2002)




ADVANCED CONCEPTS (FY 2002+)


Program Area	What We Are Going To Do
• Sea Based (Wide Area)TMD Interceptor*	• Significantly Increase Range And Lethality Of Missile • Provide Greater Defense In Depth • Increase Shot Opportunities = Higher Probability Of Kill
• Corps SAM*	• Provide Maneuver Forces TBM Protection • Counter Cruise Missile Threat • Increase Tactical Mobility • Decrease Strategic Lift Requirement
• Boost Phase Intercept*	• Kill TBM In Boost Phase (Counter Submunitions) • Defeat Deployed Countermeasures • Assure Shortfall Of Debris And Unexpected Munitions

*** These Programs Are Competing For Funds; TMD Program Only Funds A Single New System (FY 98 Start)**

ADVANCED CONCEPTS (FY 2002+)




NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE (NMD) TECHNOLOGY READINESS PROGRAM




ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY


Directed Energy Boost Phase Intercept



Advanced Sensor Technology And Demos




Kinetic Energy Boost Phase Intercept




- Builds Foundation For Future Systems
- Focused On BMD High Leverage, High Payoff Technologies
- Emphasizes Theater Boost Phase Intercept

International Cooperative Technology



Future System Foundation To Counter Evolving, Proliferating Threats

TOTAL BMDO PROGRAM



ISSUES

- **Need For Missile Defense**
- **Contingency *THAAD* To Reduce Risk In Midterm**
- **Inclusion Of *TMD In Planning* For Future Operations And Exercises**
- **Exclusion Of TMD Systems From ABM Treaty Coverage**
 - ***THAAD* (Being Looked At Now)**
 - **Advanced Systems (Navy Wide Area And Air Force Ascent / Boost Phase)**
- **Technology Readiness *Options for NMD***
- **BMDO *Focal Point* For BMD Advanced Technology**

CONCLUSION

- **Active Missile Defense Is An Essential Insurance Policy For Counterproliferation**
- **For Tactical / Theater Missile Defense, We Are Putting TMD "Rubber On The Ramp" Now And Throughout The 1990s**
- **For Strategic Missile Defense, We Have A Technology Program Which Will Protect The Option To Deploy**

**"Making Ballistic Missile
Defense A Reality"**

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE


**Plan To Coordinate Development And
Implementation Of Theater Missile Defense
Programs With Allies**

**BALLISTIC
MISSILE
DEFENSE
ORGANIZATION**

4 APR 94

**Dr. J. David Martin
Deputy For Strategic Relations
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization**


SCOPE OF PRESENTATION




- **Background: TMD Allied Participation**
- **Today's TMD Environment**
- **U.S. Congressional Perspective**
- **Plan To Coordinate U.S. TMD Programs With Allies**
 - **Objectives**
 - **Approach**
 - **Underway Now, Near / Mid Term, Far Term**
- **Summary**

FOREIGN PARTICIPATION

340 Contracts



\$1011.89 Million




MAJOR BMDO COST SHARE COOPERATION ARRANGEMENTS WITH ALLIES

Country	Program	\$ In Millions Value	U.S. / Ally Funding (Approximate)
UK	Data Fusion	26.00	42% / 58%
UK	2 Flight Trials	65.00	59% / 41%
UK	Extended Air Defense Test Bed	19.20	58% / 42%
UK	Artificial Intelligence	3.50	80% / 20%
Israel	Arrow Experiment	158.00	80% / 20%
Israel	Arrow Continuation Experiments (ACES)	322.00	72% / 28%
Israel	System Engineering And Integration	3.15	75% / 25%
Israel	Theater Missile Defense (TMD) Test Bed	33.00	72% / 28%
Israel	TMD Test Bed Enhancement	5.20	80% / 20%
Israel	TMD Test Bed Experiment Program	6.00	50% / 50%
Israel	Hypervelocity Launcher Program	4.06	75% / 25%
Israel	Boost Phase Intercept (BPI)	5.7	75% / 25%
Japan	Western Pacific Architecture Study	6.50	90% / 10%
France	Free Electron Laser (FEL) MOA	TBD	TBD
Netherlands	Hypervelocity Gun Test	17.25	30% / 70%
SHAPE	EADTB	32.3	59% / 41%
France	EADSIM	.68	35% / 65%

SCOPE OF PRESENTATION

- **Background: TMD Allied Participation**



- **Today's TMD Environment**

- **U.S. Congressional Perspective**

- **Plan To Coordinate U.S. TMD Programs With Allies**

- **Objectives**

- **Approach**

- **Underway Now, Near / Mid Term, Far Term**

- **Summary**

SCOPE OF PRESENTATION

- **Background: TMD Allied Participation**

- **Today's TMD Environment**



- **U.S. Congressional Perspective**

- **Plan To Coordinate U.S. TMD Programs With Allies**

- **Objectives**

- **Approach**

- **Underway Now, Near / Mid Term, Far Term**

- **Summary**

U.S. POLICY ON ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN TMD PROGRAMS

FY 94 National Defense Authorization Act

- **Allied Nations Are Encouraged To Participate In, Or Increase Participation In, Cooperative U.S. TMD Programs, Particularly Those Allied Nations That Would Benefit The Most From Deployment Of TMD Systems**
- **The U.S. Is Encouraged To Participate In Cooperative TMD Efforts Of Allied Nations As Such Programs Emerge**

TODAY'S TMD ENVIRONMENT

- **Allied And Friendly Nations Are More Aware Of Their Vulnerability To Ballistic Missiles**
- **Scope And Complexity Of ATBM Programs Argue For Combining Best Available Technologies**
- **Successful Tests And Technology Demonstrations Will Continue To Confirm Feasibility And Expand Interest And Participation**
- **Refocus Of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Program From Global, Space Based Orientation To Theater Missile Defense**
 - **Addresses More Immediate Requirements**
 - **May Afford A More Favorable Political Climate**
- **Declining Defense Budgets Will Promote More Cost Shared Joint Programs, Which In Turn, Will Expand Work Sharing And Opportunities For Domestic And Foreign Industrial Participation**

U.S. CONGRESS FY 94 DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

Language On Cooperation With Allies On Development Of TMD (Sec 242)


- **Findings**
 - **Deployed U.S. TMD Systems Can Contribute To The Security Of Other Nations**
 - **Cost Of Developing Such Systems Will Be Several Tens Of Billions Of Dollars**
 - **Cooperative TMD Development And Deployment May Reduce Financial Burden And Provide Technical Expertise**
 - **Allies Are Unlikely To Cooperate Unless There Is Meaningful Involvement Including R&D And Production**
- **Plans And Reports**
 - **DoD Should Develop A Plan To Coordinate U.S. TMD Programs With Allies To Avoid Duplication, Increase Interoperability, And Reduce Cost**
 - **A Report Of The Plan Will Have Actions Taken To Implement The Plan, Status Of Discussions With Allies, And Status Of Contributions By Allies**

SCOPE OF PRESENTATION

- **Background: TMD Allied Participation**

- **Today's TMD Environment**

- **U.S. Congressional Perspective**



- **Plan To Coordinate U.S. TMD Programs With Allies**

- **Objectives**

- **Approach**


- **Underway Now, Near / Mid Term, Far Term**

- **Summary**

OBJECTIVES FOR ALLIED PARTICIPATION

- **Strengthen U.S. / Allied Mutual Security Commitments**
- **Support U.S. / Allied Counterproliferation Policies And Strategies**
- **Help Underwrite A Portion Of The Cost Of TMD Development, Production And Operation**
- **Help Provide Protection For U.S. / Allied Forces**
- **Underpin U.S. / Allied Freedom Of Action In Crisis Situations**
- **Access Foreign Innovative Technologies, Systems And Unique Capabilities, e.g., Penaid's Design**
- **Facilitate Military Ties To Define Common Requirements, Help Ensure Interoperability, etc.**
- **Reduce U.S. / Allied R&D, Procurement And Operating Costs**

APPROACH FOR ALLIED PARTICIPATION

	<u>Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>
	Now	• Identify And Consolidate Current Studies, Plans, Programs
		
"Build Upon / Improve Existing Capabilities" • Incremental Enhancement • Interoperability	Near Term	• Pursue Improved Early Warning And Tracking Capability • Pursue Improved Communications / Data Transmission • Improve / Develop Lower Tier Defenses
		
"Qualitative New Capability" "Defense-in-Depth"	Longer Term	• Expand / Improve Lower Tier Defenses • Develop / Deploy Area Defense Capability

APPROACH FOR ALLIED PARTICIPATION NOW

- **Identify And Consolidate Current Studies, Plans, Programs**
 - **National Authorities And International Organizations, e.g., NATO, Have**
 - **Addressed Need For Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense Systems**
 - **Some Nations Already Have Initiated Or Completed Architecture Studies; Feasibility Studies; National Requirements For I-HAWK Replacement, PATRIOT Upgrades And Other Improvements In Early Warning, Command, Control And Communications**
 - **Bilateral Discussions And Multinational Meetings, e.g., NATO Ad Hoc Working Group On EAD / TMD, Are Ongoing To Harmonize Requirements, Identify Cooperative Opportunities**

APPROACH FOR ALLIED PARTICIPATION NEAR / MID TERM

- **Pursue Improved Early Warning And Tracking Capability**
 - **Delineate All Current Early Warning Capabilities**
 - **Identify U.S. And Allied Ground / Sea Based Theater Sensor Capabilities And Modifications For U.S. / Allied Integration And Provide Improved Missile Detection And Tracking For A Particular Region. Consider**
 - **U.S. AEGIS AN / SPY-1 Radar**
 - **Forward Deployed Ground Based Sensors, e.g., AN / TPS-59, FPS-117**
 - **Other National Or Alliance Air Defense / Missile Defense Surveillance Systems**
 - **Pursue Possible Modification Of Airborne Surveillance Systems, e.g., E-3 AWACS**
 - **Determine Adequacy Of Current Air Defense BM/C³ Systems And Planned Improvements, Such As NATO Airspace Command / Control System (ACCS), Standard Message Formats, Message Protocols**
 - **Identify Evolutionary Command And Control Concepts, e.g., Navy Cooperative Engagement Concept (CEC), And Their Potential For Integration Into Alliance Procedures**
- **Improve / Develop Lower Tier Defenses**
 - **TPS-59 / HAWK Upgrades To Achieve Interim And Point Defense Capability Against Short Range TBM Threat**
 - **Near Term Improvements For PATRIOT PAC-2, Planning For PAC-3 To Improve Accuracy And Increase Battle Space**
 - **Incorporating AEGIS Standard Missile Block IVA, Together With CEC, Into New Air Defense Frigates**

APPROACH FOR ALLIED PARTICIPATION FAR TERM

- **Expand / Improve Lower Tier Defenses**
 - **Build On Near / Mid Term Achievements To Further Enhance Lower Tier Capabilities**

- **Develop / Deploy Area Defense Capability**
 - **Develop Upper Tier, Wide Area Defense Capability, e.g., THAAD-like Systems, Necessary To Counter More Advanced Theater Missiles For Both**
 - **Defense-in-depth Of Military Assets**
 - **Territorial Defense**

SCOPE OF PRESENTATION

- **Background: TMD Allied Participation**
- **Today's TMD Environment**
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 - **Approach**
 - **Underway Now, Near / Mid Term, Far Term**



- **Summary**

SUMMARY

- **International Community Recognizes The Need For Anti-tactical Ballistic Missile Defense**
- **U.S. DoD, Through BMDO, Has Established A Sound Plan To Enable Evolutionary Improvement Of National Capabilities**
 - **BMDO Is Fully Engaged In International Discussions On Collaborative Opportunities**
 - **Actions Are Being Taken By International Community To Resolve Deficiencies In Response To The Threat**
- **Allied Participation In The Past Has Been Significant; Continued Participation Will Ensure Improved Missile Defense Systems At Reduced Cost And With Mutual Benefits**



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
7100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-7100

SR

April 7, 1994

Major General Olav Aamoth
Royal Norwegian Embassy
2720 34th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20037

Dear General Aamoth:

On April 4, 1994, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization presented to allied and friendly governments a review of our near-, mid- and far-term plans for developing and deploying Theater Missile Defenses (TMD). While these programs provide protection for forward-deployed United States armed forces against a proliferating and evolving theater missile threat, they have potential to contribute to the national security of our allies and friends as well.

The United States believes that a cooperative multinational approach to the development and deployment of TMD supports U.S./Allied counterproliferation policies, could substantially reduce the financial burden of such an undertaking on any one country and would involve additional sources of technological expertise.


Cooperation with allies and friends in ballistic missile defense programs has significantly evolved since beginning in 1985. We have witnessed this valued cooperation shift from consultations and basic research projects to national requirements studies and programs to develop TMD capabilities. Some of these efforts are quite specific and advanced.

The TMD Program set forth in our presentation today, as described in the enclosed briefing charts, continues to respond to the ballistic missile threat to our homelands and deployed military forces. In connection with strong interest of our Congress in TMD cooperation, we will be submitting this briefing as a report required by the FY94 National Defense Authorization Act.

I am enclosing the materials that we provided when we made our presentations on April 4. I trust these materials will refine your understanding of the Department of Defense missile defense program while reinforcing our interest in TMD

cooperation. As you review our materials, I look forward to continuing this dialogue, and the cooperative, cost-sharing programs that flow from this dialogue.

Sincerely,


MALCOLM R. O'NEILL
Lieutenant General, USA
Director

Enclosures:
As stated

TO: MCALEER, R

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 16 MAY 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MILITARY EXERCISES

HONDURAS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISE / FUERTES CAMINOS 94

ACTION: REED SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 14 MAY 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
HAHN
HALPERIN
NSC CHRON
ROSSIN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY RA DATE 5/16 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWF

CLOSED BY: NSKDB

DOC 3 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 16, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise FUERTES CAMINOS 94
SOUTH Phase II

The National Security Council staff concurs in the subject exercise.

 , COL, USA
for William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

May 11, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise FUERTES CAMINOS 94
SOUTH Phase II

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, concurring in military exercise FUERTES CAMINOS 94 SOUTH Phase II. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

FUERTES CAMINOS 94 SOUTH Phase II is an engineering exercise to be conducted in and around the vicinity of the Departments of Copan and Valle and outside the city of Tegucigalpa, Honduras. This exercise consists of the deployment, employment and redeployment of an engineering joint task force that will work with two Honduras engineer platoons. Exercise activity will include the building of four new schools, repairing a school and drilling twelve to fourteen water wells.

An earlier FUERTES CAMINOS exercise in Colombia was seen by some in that country as an affront to their sovereignty and was subsequently discontinued. The FUERTES CAMINOS series of exercises is designed to promote democratic institutions within the participating host nation and serves to assist the participating host nation in improving their engineering and humanitarian civic action capabilities while promoting their economic infrastructure development. This part of the exercise is scheduled for execution from July 1 to September 15. The critical cancellation date is May 18, 1994.

Concurrences by: *MR* Larry Rossin and Morton HalperinRECOMMENDATION

That you have Will Itoh sign the memorandum at Tab I concurring in the exercise.

Approve *Q* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301


10 MAY 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise -
FUERTES CAMINOS 94 SOUTH Phase II

The Department of Defense recommends NSC approval of the attached Significant Military Exercise Brief, Exercise FUERTES CAMINOS 94 SOUTH Phase II. The Department of State concurs with this recommendation.

Please note the critical cancellation date is 18 May 1994.


Robert P. McAleer
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

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JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER

IMMEDIATE ZYUW RHLBAAR0470 1192254

O 292000Z APR 94

FM USCINCSO SCJ3 QUARRY HEIGHTS PM

TO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JETD//

JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3-CNOD/J4/J5/PA//

INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:ISA/ASD:PA/SP/EP//

SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//PM-ISP/ARA/INM//

DIA WASHINGTON DC//JS-CAJIT-SC/CSP-1//

CMC WASHINGTON DC//PM-ISP//

USCINTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ3/TCJ4-ORX//

CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA//N3/N53/N422/J34//

CINCLANTFLT DET SO FT AMADOR PM//COM/NOO/N3//

USCINACOM NORFOLK VA//J3/J4LRC/J7//

MARFORLANT NORFOLK VA//G3//

USSOUTHAF DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ//A1-CEX/

AE-DOXE//

CINCLANTFLT DET SO FT AMADOR PM//N3//

COM SECOND NCB LITTLE CREEK VA//NB/PA//

USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ3-O/SOJ9-CSC/SOJ3-T//

CDRFORSOM FT MCPHERSON GA//AFOP-TX/AFOP-TI/FCPA//

CDRUSARSO FT CLAYTON PM//SOSCS/SOCM/SOOP//

COMJTF-B SOTO CANO AB HO

CDR MTMC FALLS CHURCH VA//MTOP-O//

COMSC WASHINGTON DC//N3/N81//

CDRUSAE MOBILE AL//CESAM-PM-MA//

CDR CORPS FT LEWIS WA

CDR864 ENGR BN FT LEWIS WA

COMMNCB 74 GULFPORT MS

CDR416 CES GRIFFIS AFB NY//CEX//

USSOUTHAF FWD HOWARD AFB FM//JM/AOC//

HQ AMC TACC COMMAND CENTER SCOTT AFB IL//

DOOX//

USTRANSCOM MACDILL AFB FL//MAC/MSC/MTMC//

AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA USMILGP TEGUCIGALPA HO

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SECTION 01 OF 02

SUBJECT: PART I SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISE BRIEF (SMEB) (U)

1. PURPOSE: TO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISE BRIEF

FOR FUERTES CAMINOS 94 SOUTH (PHASE II)-HONDURAS (FC94 S-HO).

2. EXERCISE NAME: FUERTES CAMINOS 94 SOUTH (PHASE II)-HONDURAS.

3. GEOGRAPHIC AREA: DEPARTMENTS OF COPAN AND VALLE AND OUTSIDE

THE CITY OF TEGUCIGALPA IN HONDURAS.

4. DATES: 01 JUL - 15 SEP 1994.

5. CRITICAL CANCELLATION DATE (CCD): 18 MAY 94.

NOTE: DUE TO CONTRACTING CONSIDERATIONS CCD IS FORTY-FIVE (45) DAYS

PRIOR TO EXERCISE START DATE.

6. TYPE: A JOINT/COMBINED EXERCISE, CJCS PART I, USSOUTHCOM SPONSORED, COMBINED/JOINT ENGINEERING FTX. PRIMARY EFFORT TO BE ENGINEER ORIENTED WITH PARTICIPATION FROM U.S. MILITARY ACTIVE DUTY UNITS OF THE ARMY, NAVY, AND AIR FORCE. THE EXERCISE CONSISTS OF DEPLOYMENT, EMPLOYMENT, REDEPLOYMENT OF AN ENGINEERING JTF WORKING WITH TWO (2) HONDURAS ENGINEER PLATOONS (24 PERSONNEL) TO BUILD FOUR

JOINT STAFF V1

ACTION J7-JETD(3) (U,6,7,8,F)

INFO SJS-N(1) CMAS(1) CJCS:PA-J(1) NMCC:CWO(1) J3(3)

NIDS(1) J4(5) J4:LPEILD3-J(1) J4:MILSEC-J(1)

J4:SMEDENG-J(1) J7(6) J4:SMEDSUST-J(1) J5(1)

J5:CBB-J(1) QUAL CONTROL(1) J7:JECG-J(1) J6E-J(1)

J33:CNOD-J(1) J6F-J(1)

+NEACP

SECDEF V2

ACTION (U,6,F)

INFO SECDEF-N(1) SECDEF-C(1) USDP:PL(1)

USDP:TWP(1) USDP:IA(1) USDP:DSAA(1) USDP:PPEAP(1)

NIA(1) USDP:EP(1) USDP:ISA(1)

+USDP:CCC

+SAFE

DIA V3

ACTION (U,6,8,F)

INFO SY-4D(1) DIA/MMRB(1)

+STOC

(4) NEW SCHOOLS AND REPAIR ONE (1) SCHOOL IN THE DEPARTMENT OF COPAN AND DRILL TWELVE TO FOURTEEN (12-14) WATER WELLS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF VALLE AND OUTSIDE THE CITY OF TEGUCIGALPA IN HONDURAS.

7. PURPOSE:

A. OVERALL EXERCISE OBJECTIVES:

(1) DEMONSTRATE CONTINUING U.S. SUPPORT FOR HONDURAS

(2) PROMOTE ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE

HN.

(3) FOSTER MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE

U.S. AND HN.

(4) ENHANCE THE READINESS OF PARTICIPATING U.S. AND HN

UNITS.

(5) PROVIDE U.S. FORCES WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO DEPLOY TO

REMOTE OCONUS LOCATION.

(6) EXPOSE U.S. ENGINEER UNITS TO A BARE-BASE ENVIRONMENT.

(7) DEVELOP A POSITIVE IMAGE IN THE HN TOWARD THE U.S.

GOVERNMENT AND ITS ARMED FORCES THROUGH HCA ACTIVITIES.

(8) FAMILIARIZE U.S. CONUS BASED FORCES WITH THE USSOUTHCOM

AOR.

(9) EXERCISE JOINT TASK FORCE BRAVO COMMAND AND CONTROL/

LOGISTICS SUPPORT SYSTEMS.

(10) CONDUCT COMBINED/JOINT ENGINEER TRAINING.

(11) CONDUCT JOINT OPERATIONS TO ENHANCE INTEROPERABILITY

BETWEEN US FORCES.

(12) DEVELOP A TIME PHASED FORWARD DEPLOYMENT DATA (TFDD)

THROUGH THE USE OF JOINT OPERATIONS, PLANNING, AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

(JOPE) TO ENSURE SUCCESSFUL DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS.

(13) DEVELOP A PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND MIST PLAN DESIGNED TO

CREATE THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY TO CONDUCT A SUCCESSFUL EXERCISE.

(14) EVALUATE LOGISTICAL SUSTAINMENT OPERATIONS.

B. JOINT MISSION ESSENTIAL TASKS (JMET) OF THE EXERCISE:

(1) PLAN AND COORDINATE THE SUSTAINMENT OF ASSIGNED AND

AUGMENTING FORCES COMMITTED INTO THEATER.

(2) CONDUCT FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE (FID) AND NATION

ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS.

(3) IMPROVE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY RELATIONS AND

INTEROPERABILITY BETWEEN U.S. AND HOST NATION FORCES.

(4) IMPROVE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND SUPPORT FOR

CIVILIAN, DEMOCRATIC RULE.

8. OPLAN EXERCISED: N/A

9. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS:

(A) FORMAL DIPLOMATIC AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS CONCERNING THIS

EXERCISE ARE BEING NEGOTIATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF HONDURAS.

B. DATE COMMITMENTS MADE: ONGOING.

C. OTHER POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS:

(1) THIS INCREASED COOPERATION WILL STRENGTHEN AND

UNDERScore U.S. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN HONDURAS,

AND WILL IMPROVE U.S. AND HOST NATION FORCE READINESS.

(2) THE EXERCISE WILL SERVE TO DEMONSTRATE U.S. RESOLVE

WITHIN THE REGION AND ASSIST HONDURAS IN IMPROVING THEIR

ENGINEERING/HUMANITARIAN CIVIC ACTION CAPABILITIES.

10. POLITICAL-MILITARY SCENARIO SUMMARY: JTF BULLDOG WILL DEPLOY BY

SEA AND AIR TO HONDURAS DURING THE PERIOD 01 JUL - 15 SEP 94 TO

CONDUCT A COMBINED JOINT ENGINEER FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE (FTX).

THE FTX EXERCISES WILL INVOLVE CONVENTIONAL ENGINEER FORCES WORKING

SIDE-BY-SIDE WITH HN ENGINEERING FORCES TO BUILD FOUR (4) NEW

SCHOOLS, REPAIR ONE (1) SCHOOL AND DRILL TWELVE TO FOURTEEN (12-14)

WATER WELLS.

11. SUMMARY OF KEY EXERCISE EVENTS:

A. PHASE I. PREDEPLOYMENT (01 APR - 31 MAY 94).

B. PHASE II. EQUIPMENT/RESOURCE DEPLOYMENT (01 - 15 JUN 94).

C. PHASE III. ADVANCE DETACHMENT OPERATIONS (15 - 30 JUN 94)

D. PHASE IV. EXECUTION (01 JUL - 31 AUG 94)

E. PHASE V. REDEPLOYMENT (01 SEP - 15 SEP 94)

F. PHASE VI. POST EXERCISE ACTIONS (15 - 30 SEP 94).

12. DIRECTING HEADQUARTERS: USSOUTHCOM, JOINT TASK FORCE BRAVO

(JTF-B) SERVING AS EXECUTIVE AGENT.

13. PARTICIPATING COMMANDS, HEADQUARTERS, AND FORCES:

A. US FORCES (APPROX 210 PERS)

(1) USSOUTHCOM

(A) THEATER SUPPORT ELEMENT/PAO

(B) PUBLIC AFFAIRS DETACHMENTS

(2) JOINT TASK FORCE BRAVO (JTF-B) AS EXECUTIVE AGENT

(A) AVN ELEMENT

(B) LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ELEMENT

(3) USARSO FC94 SOUTH TRANSITION SUPPORT CELL

MCN=94119/13332

TOR=94119/2254Z

TAD=94119/2337Z

CDSN=MAK286

PAGE 1 OF 2

292000Z APR 94

02 SECT MSG

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JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER

- (4) USSOUTHAF:
 - (A) 416TH/45TH CES - PRIME BEEF (2 ROTATIONS X 40 PERS)
 - (B) C-130 (TBD)
- (5) USACOM/FORSCOM
 - (A) PORT SUPPORT ACTIVITY
 - (B) CDR I CORPS FT LEWIS (136 PERS)
- 1) 864TH EN JTF BULLDOG (B CO)
TF HQ

BT
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FINAL SECTION OF O2

SUBJECT: PART I SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISE BRIEF (SMEB) (U)

EN CO (VERTICAL)

2) PUBLIC AFFAIRS DET

3) CS/CSS ELEMENTS

(C) 865TH EN WELL DRILLING DET, FT BRAGG (15 PERS)

(6) USSOCOM/USASOC: 96TH CA DET (4 PERS)

(7) USTRANSCOM

(A) MSC: DEPLOYMENT/REDEPLOYMENT SEALIFT

(B) MTMC: PORT OPERATIONS SUPPORT

(C) AMC: DEPLOYMENT/REDEPLOYMENT AIRLIFT

(8) CINCLANTFLT DET SO/COMSECOND NCB NMCB-74 WD (15 PERS)

(9) ACC: C-130

(10) HOST NATIONS

(A) MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

(B) MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS

(C) MILITARY ENGINEERS - TWO (2) PLATOONS (24 PERS)

14. SCOPE OF ANTICIPATED PARTICIPATION:

A. CINCSOUTH IS SUPPORTED CINC.

B. US ASSIGNED FORCES TO THE US MILITARY SERVICES N/A

C. OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES/DEPARTMENTS: US EMBASSY/USMILGP IN HONDURAS WILL MONITOR/COORDINATE POLITICAL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE EXERCISE.

15. SIMULATED USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. N/A.

16. COORDINATION EFFECTED WITH OTHER UNIFIED, SPECIFIED, OR SERVICE COMMANDS, GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES, OR REPRESENTATIVES THEREOF: COORDINATION BETWEEN USSOUTHCOM, USSOUTHAF, USACOM/FORSCOM, USTRANSCOM, CINCLANTFLT, AND AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA HAS OCCURRED.

A. USACOM, USSOCOM, CINCLANTFLT, AND USSOUTHAF WILL PROVIDE FORCES; TRANSCOM WILL PROVIDE INTERTHEATER TRANSPORTATION FOR DEPLOYMENT/REDEPLOYMENT AND INTRATHEATER RESUPPLY

B. UNASSIGNED FORCES TO THE US MILITARY SERVICES N/A

17. RECOMMENDED PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY USSOUTHCOM WILL PURSUE AN ACTIVE PUBLIC AFFAIRS POLICY. PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE CENTAM THEATER OF OPERATIONS WILL OCCUR IN CONCERT WITH USSOUTHCOM POLICY AND WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF AMEMBASSY, TEGUCIGALPA, HONDURAS. USSOUTHCOM PAO WILL COORDINATE AND SUBMIT PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE TO OATSD (PA) SEPARATELY.

18. GENERAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS:

A. DIPLOMATIC INFORMATION: AMEMBASSY, TEGUCIGALPA, SHOULD NOTIFY THE HN GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENTS OF THE REGION ON A PRIVATE BASIS IN ADVANCE OF ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT

B. SECURITY RESTRICTIONS: USSOUTHCOM HAS DOWNGRADED EXERCISE INFORMATION TO "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" (FOUO) FOR PLANNING AND COORDINATING PURPOSES. PLANNERS MAY SHARE FC94 S-HO INFORMATION WITH HN GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS.

19. PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT: (ASSESSMENT OF PERCEPTION OF US AND ALLIED STRATEGY AND MILITARY CAPABILITY.) THIS EXERCISE WILL STRENGTHEN UNDERSTANDING THAT THE US IS WILLING TO HELP THE DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA TO DEVELOP A BASE FOR THEIR INTERNAL GROWTH.

20. ADDITIONAL REMARKS

A. DESIRED OR ALTERNATE ROUTING OF FLIGHTS FOR BOTH DEPLOYMENTS AND RETURN ROUTE: NONE PREFERRED

B. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT HOURS, SEA AND AIRLIFT FUNDS INVOLVED FOR FC94 S-HO:

(1) AIRLIFT HOURS..... (TBD)

(2) AIRLIFT FUNDS..... \$2.2M

(3) SEALIFT FUNDS..... \$2.2M

C. ENROUTE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS: NONE

D. PREDEPLOYMENT SITE SURVEY REQUIREMENTS: USSOUTHCOM/JTF-B/TF ENGINEERS HAVE MADE INITIAL SITE SURVEYS JTF BULLDOG WILL CONDUCT FOLLOW-ON SURVEYS AS NEEDED.

E. NUMBER OF US FORCES AND EQUIPMENT REMAINING IN COUNTRY AS A RESULT OF ANY PREVIOUS EXERCISE: NONE.

F. NUMBER OF US FORCES AND EQUIPMENT REMAINING IN COUNTRY AS A RESULT OF THIS EXERCISE: NONE.

G. U.S. FORCES WILL OPERATE IN SUPPORT OF U.S./HO MILITARY TRAINING OBJECTIVES. USSOUTHCOM AUTHORIZES U.S. PERSONNEL TO ACCOMPANY HOST COUNTRY UNITS/PERSONNEL ON ALL ENGINEER OPERATIONS WITHIN DESIGNATED DEPLOYMENT AREAS. HOWEVER, U.S. PERSONNEL WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY HN OPERATIONS WHOSE MISSION IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF FC94 S-HO.

21. POCS FOR THE USSOUTHCOM: SCJ3-DDX, LTC PLEASANT, USA, 286-3259/3252; SCEN IS LTC KETRON, USA, 285-6309.
ODAR BT

MCN=94119/13332

TOR=94119/2254Z

TAD=94119/2337Z

CDSN=MAK286

PAGE 2 OF 2
292000Z APR 94
02 SECT MSG

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the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are illiterate has increased from 1.2 billion to 1.5 billion. The number of illiterate people in the world is projected to reach 1.7 billion by the year 2015. The number of illiterate people in the world is projected to reach 1.7 billion by the year 2015.

ZYLW 101, 1000000, 1000000

FM USCINCSO SCJ3 QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//DDX//

TO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-J8TD/J3-CNOB//

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EXER/KINGS GUARD 94 AND FUERTES CAMINOS 94 SOUTH PH 11//

MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCSO SCJ3-DDX//

REF/A/MSG/USCINCSO 291812Z APR 94//

REF/B/MSG/USCJNCSO 292000Z APR 94//

SUBJ/CHANGES TO SMEBS//

RMKS/1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO CLARIFY PORTIONS OF THE
SMEBS (REFS A AND B) FOR EXERCISE KINGS GUARD 94 (KG94) AND FUERTES
CAMINOS 94 SOUTH (PHASE II)-HONDURAS (FC94 S-HO)

2. KG94: CHANGE PARA 8.A. OF REF A TO READ:

8. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS:

A. U.S. COMMITMENTS TO ALLIES: NO FORMAL AGREEMENTS OR COMMITMENTS WITH REGIONAL FORCES CONCERNING THIS EXERCISE WILL BE MADE. JTF-B, USMILGPS, (HO) AND (ES) WERE BRIEFED ON CONCEPT AND EXERCISE SCOPE DURING INITIAL PLANNING CONFERENCE (IPC) IN JAN 94. HO/ES MILITARY STAFFS WERE ALSO BRIEFED ON THE CONCEPT DURING THE IPC. GOVERNMENTS OF HO/ES AND AMBASSADORS/COUNTRY TEAMS HAVE APPROVED THE EXERCISE.

3. FC94 S-HO: CHANGE PARA 9.A. TO READ:

9. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS:

A. FORMAL DIPLOMATIC AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS CONCERNING THIS EXERCISE ARE BEING NEGOTIATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF HONDURAS AND WE ANTICIPATE AN AGREEMENT WILL BE SIGNED BY 18 MAY 94. THE AMBASSADOR/COUNTRY TEAM HAVE APPROVED THE EXERCISE.// BT

DIV	BILL	AIRTEL
L7EA		
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JETD		
EAD		
TDP		
MED		
CWFO		
SIO		
SUD		
PAA		
STPA		
SPS-02		

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ACTION J7-JETD (3)

INFO SJS-N(1) CMAS(1) NMCC:CWO(1) J3(3) NIDS(1) J4(5)

J4:MILSEC-J(1) J4:SMEDENG-J(1) J7(6) J5(1)

J5:CBB-J(1) QUAL CONTROL(1) J7:JECG-J(1)

USCINCSO LO (1) J33:CNOD-J (1) J6F-J (1)

+NEACP

MCN=94122/08550

TOR=94122/23122

TAD=94122/23122

CDSN=MAZG 19

PAGE 1 OF 1
022214Z MAY 24

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