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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Robert Bell. Subject: Release of DOD Report on Military Readiness. Record ID: 9401248. (2 pages)	02/17/1994	P1/b(1)
001b. report	Defense Science Board, Readiness Task Force, Draft Interim Report [on Military Readiness] (35 pages)	01/19/1994	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For the Honorable Ash Carter from Robert Bell. Subject: Nuclear Posture Review. (4 pages)	02/17/1994	P1/b(1)
003. memo	Duplicate of 001a. (2 pages)	02/17/1994	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Steven Andreasen. Subject: Proposed PDD on FY 94-99 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. Record ID: 9420218. (1 page)	02/18/1994	P1/b(1)
004b. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Proposed PDD on FY 94-99 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. Record ID: 9420218. (2 pages)	02/18/1994	P1/b(1)
004c. draft	Presidential Decision Directive [Draft of PDD-21] [42 U.S.C. 2162] (4 pages)	02/18/1994	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)
004d. memo	For the President from Hazel O'Leary and Les Aspin. Subject: Fiscal Year 1994-1999 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. [42 U.S.C. 2162] (4 pages)	12/28/1993	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

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**DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON READINESS
INTERIM REPORT**

Chairman

**General Edward C. Meyer
(U.S. Army, Retired)**

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DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON READINESS

INTERIM REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

The Secretary of Defense established the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Readiness, known as the "Readiness Task Force" (RTF), to provide him with advice, recommendations, and supporting rationale which address the areas below.¹

- Key indicators for measuring readiness and candidate methodologies for providing early warning of potential readiness problems, including assessments of:
 - How the Department deals with readiness concerns; and
 - The adequacy of existing readiness reporting systems.
- Other matters affecting individual and collective readiness, such as: structure, lift, sustainability, active-reserve mix, retention, training, and the use of civilians and coalition personnel support.

Members of the Readiness Task Force are:

General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Retired), Chairman
General Maxwell R. Thurman, USA (Retired)
General Larry D. Welch, USAF (Retired)
Admiral Huntington Hardisty, USN (Retired)
Admiral Robert L. Long, USN (Retired)
General Joseph J. Went, USMC (Retired)
Lieutenant General Julius W. Becton, Jr., USA (Retired)
Lieutenant General Herbert R. Temple, Jr., USA (Retired)

II. OVERVIEW

The Readiness Task Force has reviewed a broad range of readiness topics and has looked in depth at numerous specific aspects of readiness. This Interim Report of the Readiness Task Force highlights areas that we believe the Department of Defense should focus on to provide the ready forces needed, today and tomorrow, to respond to likely challenges in the changing world environment. The report also provides recommendations for the next phase of the Task Force's activities, and proposes a May deadline for our final report.

¹The Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness was established on May 19, 1994 in Terms of Reference signed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, who is organizationally responsible for all panels of the Defense Science Board.

In conducting its activities, the Readiness Task Force has met as a group frequently, and its members have visited numerous sites, individually as well as in groups, to gather information for this report. Significantly, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense have met with us at most of our group meetings so that they could take timely action, rather than wait for formal reports. In addition, we have met with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Chiefs as we developed our findings and recommendations. As a result of these collaborative efforts, steps to implement many of the recommendations made in this report already are underway.

To help understand the findings and recommendations in this Interim Report, the points below establish the context in which they should be read.

- Current Status of Military Readiness. Although there are some downward indicators, we found the general readiness posture of our military forces to be acceptable. Many of our current readiness concerns are a direct result of turbulence associated with the drawdown in our force structure, complications associated with changes in strategy, and changes in resource allocations stemming from budget reductions. We would expect such turbulence to subside as we adjust to the new defense environment. Civilian and military leaders are concerned, however, that, unless we take preventive or corrective actions, continuing force reductions, strategy changes, and budget reductions could cause serious readiness degradations. We think these are legitimate concerns.
- Current Readiness Reporting Systems. Current readiness assessment systems, while having shortcomings which this report addresses, were designed to focus on specific readiness resources (e.g., personnel, equipment, training, supplies) that are critical to achieving unit readiness. Other systems provide general information which permits identifying major shortfalls in resources that would inhibit responses to contingencies. This information, coupled with our commanders' experienced judgments, has provided a useful assessment of current unit readiness.
- Readiness Task Force Focus. Taken in the aggregate, our initial recommendations should serve as a basis for adjustments in the way the Department of Defense oversees and manages the readiness of its military forces. While the military Services should continue to exercise the readiness responsibilities they have today, they should take steps that will help the Department to:
 1. Bring a greater joint forces perspective to readiness, in addition to the largely single-service unit perspective we have today;
 2. Develop ways to project the future readiness implications of our policy and budgetary decisions, rather than waiting until such decisions have been implemented in order to determine whether the readiness of our forces has been degraded;
 3. Develop better ways to link readiness concerns to our policy development and resource allocation processes; and

4. Integrate the readiness oversight and management roles of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs and the Services.

This Interim Report addresses our concerns in each of these areas and suggests approaches for dealing with them.

III. SCOPE -- READY TO DO WHAT?

The Readiness Task Force focused on the readiness management and oversight process. We did not look in detail into: acquisition, technology, or industrial base issues related to readiness (which are being examined by separate panels of the Defense Science Board); the adequacy of forces to carry out the Bottom-Up Review; or the readiness of the nuclear forces to carry out the nuclear forces strategy pending the outcome of the Nuclear Posture Review.

A major challenge has been to answer the question -- "Ready to do what?" This question was partially answered in September with the release of the Bottom-Up Review (BUR), which addressed the needs for conventional and unconventional forces. Our Task Force has determined that the conventional and unconventional forces should be ready to respond to the three areas defined in the Bottom-Up Review:

- Rapid response to two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts anywhere in the world with major land, sea, air, and space forces.
- Rapid response to small contingencies, sometimes requiring highly precise operations, with a very high probability of success from the outset of the operation.
- Special capabilities demanded by special situations in peacekeeping, peacemaking, humanitarian missions, etc.

The Services and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in a continuing process of evaluating the adequacy of the forces necessary to carry out the requirements identified through the Bottom-Up Review. Moreover, in light of the importance of joint and combined operations in the protection of U.S. and allied security interests, the FY 1995-99 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) directed the CINCs to assess joint readiness in the context of the Bottom-Up Review and to advise on readiness matters in the Program and Budget process.

IV. CURRENT FACTORS AFFECTING READINESS

The Readiness Task Force's review took into account the impacts on readiness of the following changes:

- The world situation and threat perception;
- National military strategy;
- Funding levels;
- Roles and missions;
- End strengths - military, active, reserve, civilian;
- Organization of force structure;
- Production, availability and access to strategic resources;
- Personnel quality of life and morale;
- Basing (overseas and CONUS); and
- Supporting infrastructure.

Many of these changes have a negative impact on near-term readiness, and affect each of the Services differently. Examples are:

- Army -- Increasing the practice of borrowing military manpower to conduct tasks unrelated to their military missions, and increasing numbers of mismatches between job requirements and service-member skills ("MOS mismatches") due to personnel turbulence;
- Navy -- Providing operating funds for bases that did not close as scheduled, even though O&M funds for those bases were removed from the budget;
- Air Force -- Shortfall in availability of critical spare parts due to Congressional restrictions on maintenance funding authority; and
- Marine Corps: Lengthy or frequent contingency deployments ("high OPTEMPO") that prevent units from participating in required training activities.

Until this change-related turbulence declines, units in the field will inevitably be subject to some degraded readiness. Turbulence is the number-one enemy of cohesiveness in units and concomitant readiness. During this period of change, there will be various instances of degraded readiness occurring, and anecdotal evidence of readiness problems from the field will be common.

There are several changes which should have a positive impact on readiness. In addition to the creation of our Task Force, the Department has undertaken additional initiatives to ensure the continuing readiness of U.S. military forces, consistent with our national security requirements:

- Made readiness the Department of Defense's top priority and included readiness reporting requirements in the Defense Planning Guidance;
- Created the Senior Readiness Oversight Council. This council, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, is the senior-level DoD forum for readiness policy and oversight.
- Created the Readiness Working Group. Chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, this group provides the primary support for the Senior Readiness Oversight Council.
- Established the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel was reorganized and renamed, and then elevated to Under-Secretary status.
- Established the position of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness. This new position in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is the focal point on the OSD staff for readiness issues.
- Increased Service focus on unit readiness monitoring capabilities; and
- Conducted readiness off-site meetings (three-days of meetings chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense), which resulted in plans to develop analytical tools that relate resources to readiness.

Additionally, Congress has demonstrated continuing support for readiness in the budget process.

V. LEVELS OF READINESS

Based on U.S. security requirements posed by the Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs), small contingencies, and special capabilities noted in Section III above, the Readiness Task Force, drawing on JCS definitions, discussions with senior civilian and military defense leaders, and our members' own experiences, found it useful to consider the three readiness levels defined below:

1. Unit readiness -- the level of preparedness of units to execute assigned missions with available weapon systems or support systems. The Task Force specifically addressed both current unit readiness and indicators of future unit readiness.
2. Joint (and combined) force readiness -- the level of preparedness of Combatant Commands and Joint Task Forces to integrate ready combat and support units into an effective joint and combined operating force.

3. National readiness -- the level of preparedness to support the national military strategy is the broadest level of readiness, which includes the traditional four pillars of military capability: readiness of military units (and joint and combined forces readiness), sustainability in combat, modernization of forces, and force structure.

A. Elements of a Readiness System

The Task Force determined that managing and assessing the first ("unit") and second ("joint force") levels of readiness requires a system that contains at least the following five elements:

- Defined areas of readiness (e.g., equipment, personnel, training, C4I, etc.);
- Clearly assigned responsibility and criteria for those areas of readiness;
- Measures of readiness in each of the defined areas;
- A reporting and verification system; and
- A system of review by the various levels of authority responsible for allocating resources to achieve readiness and/or decisions to employ ready forces.

Our Task Force assessed existing readiness systems as defined by the above five elements. Further, we made some preliminary judgments about how well the current readiness system works. In this Interim Report we have made some specific comments on the state of readiness as defined, reported, and reviewed by the existing system. We will make additional comments and recommendations in our final report.

B. Current Unit Readiness

There currently exists a well-defined reporting system to evaluate the current readiness of combat and support units. It embraces the five elements of a readiness system as defined above. For example, the elements of unit readiness include equipment readiness, personnel readiness, and training readiness. Responsibility for each of these areas is clearly defined within the military Services' statutory responsibility to organize, train, and equip forces. The Services have mature measurement and reporting systems for units, and results are evaluated and validated through readiness inspections, exercises, and contingency after-action reviews. Unit readiness reporting is reviewed at multiple levels, including the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. While shortfalls exist in current readiness, generally stemming from having to make choices among limited resources, the current unit readiness system is mature and well understood at multiple levels of command, management, assessment and review.

C. Future Unit Readiness

The Department's systems for predicting future unit readiness are significantly less mature and less comprehensive than those for reporting current unit readiness. For example, current reporting systems include the unit commander's forecasts of near-term changes in each of the readiness measurement areas. Commanders often base these forecasts on short-term and anecdotal considerations with little benefit of analyses of quantified data. While there are some mature, validated systems in use within the Services for assessing the impact of current budget allocations on future readiness, there is no comprehensive, aggregated system of assessment, reporting, and reviews useful to senior OSD, JCS and CINC decision makers.

Early in our effort, we attempted to identify key indicators that could serve as useful "red flags" for senior defense managers to signal potential problems affecting future readiness. While such warnings could be identified in each readiness measurement area, some problems may not be evident until it is too late to take preventive actions. Therefore, we believe it is more useful to the decision maker to have valid longer-range predictions of impacts expressed in terms similar to those used to assess current readiness. Initial successes in this area give us high confidence this can be done.

For example, the Air Force uses a mature, calibrated system that forecasts future equipment readiness in terms similar to those used to describe current equipment readiness -- weapons system mission-capable rates and sortie-generation capability. This Air Force system to forecast equipment readiness uses input variables such as: dollars available to buy spare parts, depot and unit logistics, manpower, systems reliability, and maintenance practices. The outputs are mission-capable rates and sortie-generation capability by system. While this system does not predict readiness by unit, predicting readiness by weapons system is useful for both budget allocation and future force readiness purposes.

Other systems, which exist or are being developed, such as the Army's system to forecast personnel levels, offer likely candidates for upgrade to achieve the level of comprehensiveness needed to give useful predictions of future readiness in the other measurement areas. However, there is, at present, no requirement for reporting and review of this projected data at OSD, JCS, or CINC levels.

D. Joint (and Combined) Forces Readiness

Our Task Force assessed the current state of the Department's ability to measure joint readiness as poorly defined. Specifically, there is no clear definition of areas of joint readiness (analogous to the elements of unit readiness) that incorporates the following (as well as other) essential elements:

- Unit readiness;
- The C4I system;

VI. INTERIM OBSERVATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK

This section summarizes the main thrust of our work to date and our plans to carry it to completion.

A. Observations

Based on the many briefings, extensive consultations with senior military and civilians, and internal deliberations, the Readiness Task Force offers the following observations concerning readiness:

- **Recognizing the Challenge.** The Defense Department has recognized the potential threats to readiness. It has taken early steps to address these threats, including:
 - Setting readiness as the first priority for the Department.
 - Issuing guidance to the Services to construct their programs and budgets so that readiness will be funded at a level sufficient to carry out the tasks prescribed in the Bottom-Up Review.
 - Inviting the combatant commanders in the field -- the CINCs -- to express their readiness concerns to the Secretary at a specially convened Defense Resources Board meeting during the program and budget review process.
 - Creating the position of Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, supported by a Deputy Under Secretary for Readiness, to serve as the focal point for DoD readiness activities.
 - Conducting a defense issues conference that included a major addressal of the relationship of resources to readiness.
- **Defining Readiness to Do What.** A prerequisite for ensuring that forces are ready, is to have a definition of what missions the forces need to be ready to perform. The Bottom-Up Review provided the framework for this definition. It defined the overall classes of military operations in which U.S. forces should be prepared to engage, and in the case of major regional conflicts, rough timing for the engagement of major combat units. Still to be fully defined, however, are the readiness requirements for many other essential parts of the force, including support units, elements such as C4I and strategic lift needed to integrate units to make them effective in joint operations, and a variety of supporting infrastructure. Further, such definition has yet to take place for operations below the scale of major regional conflicts (e.g., peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, disaster relief) or for operations involving weapons of mass destruction.
- **Current Readiness Status.** The general readiness posture of our military units today appears to be acceptable. For several years to come, however, turbulence associated with the drawdown in force structure, changes in strategy, and budget reductions will likely result in many anecdotal reports of readiness problems. An individual unit, for example, may experience a temporary shortage in personnel during transition. In this case, what is

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important for readiness overall is that such a temporary shortfall is of short duration and/or compensated for elsewhere in the force. The Department should take careful notice of anecdotal readiness problems which collectively may foretell broad trends toward hollowness within units that will require corrective actions.

- Focusing on Joint Readiness. The Department's focus for readiness assessments and resource allocation traditionally has been on military units within each of the services. Virtually every military operation envisioned in the Bottom-Up Review, however, will involve joint operations where units of several services need to operate in concert to accomplish overall objectives. Thus a force whose units are ready may not necessarily be a force ready for such joint operations. This suggests broadening the focus beyond near exclusive attention to units within the Services to include the readiness of multi-service forces to engage successfully in military operations.
- Reporting and Projecting Unit and Joint Readiness. As indicated above, the Department has in place a very extensive system to report on the current readiness of military units within each of the Services. There does not exist, however, an effective system to project the future readiness of these units -- to estimate whether they will be ready to carry out tasks in the future, given funds allocated for readiness in DoD programs and budgets. As for readiness to conduct multi-service joint operations, there do not exist effective systems either to assess the current state of joint readiness, or to estimate future joint readiness resulting from a given funding allocation.
- Carrying Out the National Military Strategy. The Readiness Task Force did not assess directly whether our forces have sufficient readiness or capability to carry out our National Military Strategy. It does not appear that the analysis conducted during the Bottom-Up Review considered all the essential elements of strategic readiness. For example, it did not analyze in sufficient depth the needs for C4I to integrate forces, nor did it sufficiently account for readiness to deal with threats from weapons of mass destruction. Additional analysis in these and other areas is being conducted by OSD, the Chairman, and the CINCs. Therefore, judgments on the adequacy and readiness of forces to carry out the guidance in the Bottom-Up Review must be deferred until such efforts have matured.

B. Interim Recommendations

Given our observations, we recommend that the Department give consideration to pursuing the activities listed below.²

1. Joint Force Readiness. The Department should provide greater emphasis on the joint forces perspective of readiness. This could be realized through carrying out a number of activities, including those to:
 - Define in specific terms what criteria a force must meet in order to be judged ready to carry out joint operations.
 - Develop and implement a system to measure, assess and report on whether forces meet the criteria for being ready for joint operations.
 - Adjust the Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS) used to develop and review readiness funding streams, to ensure that the perspective of the CINCs -- the combatant commanders who are the customers for use of ready joint forces -- are effectively represented both in the construction and review of budget and program proposals developed by the services.³
 - Develop fully the Department's C4I architecture -- the integration of command control, communications, computer and intelligence assets needed to support joint military operations. This should include the readiness of satellite components (communication and intelligence) of the C4I system to ensure it can support joint contingency operations.
 - Improve coordination among the various military institutions involved in joint readiness, to include, for example, convening a future conference involving the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the CINCs to consider creation of definitions, and reporting systems for joint force readiness.

² We recommend that the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness propose to the Secretary of Defense the responsibilities for the appropriate offices within OSD who in conjunction with the Services and the OJCS will ensure that the recommendations described here are implemented.

³ One example here is modification of the Preparedness Evaluation System, the vehicle for the CINCs to report on their readiness needs to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and civilian leaders. Currently the system: 1) raises a very long list of issues of varied priority and linkage to readiness; 2) does not necessarily provide CINC perspectives at a time when they would be most effective in influencing Service programs and budgets; and 3) does not provide the CINCs the wherewithal to make recommendations and suggest tradeoffs in the context of constrained availability of funding. Modifications to this system could include encouraging CINCs to set priorities on their concerns with a focus on those most important to readiness, incorporating flexible reporting so CINC inputs will be timely, and improving information flow to the CINCs to allow them to make readiness recommendations in the context of budget constraints.

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- Initiate planning for a major joint wargame to test the joint readiness of U.S. forces (with or without allied support) and all essential supporting elements to execute two nearly simultaneous MRCs with a particular view toward identifying major shortfalls in readiness that need correction. Such a wargame should take advantage of new technological developments that allow such games to be conducted using a combination of live field exercises linked with computer simulations that represent non-exercised portions of military operations.
 - Conduct nuclear exercises involving the joint military and civilian command structure to ensure the ability of military and civilian leadership to carry out their roles, and provide confidence in the continued effectiveness of nuclear control and security means. These steps need to be taken regardless of the outcome of the Nuclear Posture Review.
2. Projecting Future Readiness. The Department should improve analytical tools to help project the future readiness implications of our policy and budgetary decisions. Activities in support of this recommendation would include:
- A Department work plan to develop and improve the set of analytical models and other means that can be used to help better understand the relationship between funding allocation decisions and future force readiness.
 - A pilot program at USACOM and USCENTCOM which will provide each CINC with the capability to contribute timely and useful input to the Service requirements process.
3. Organizing For Readiness. The Department should reexamine the readiness oversight and management roles of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and the CINCs. In many areas of readiness, responsibilities are clear. The Title X responsibilities of the Services to organize, train and equip units is a notable example. In the case of resource allocations to support readiness, and planning for readiness to conduct joint operations, responsibilities are less clear. Such responsibilities should be delineated to ensure an effective overall program for readiness is carried out. In addition, where there are ongoing efforts within the Department concerning functional areas (e.g. Defense Science Board Task Force on Chemical Warfare, Nuclear Posture Review, Facilities (BRAC '95), etc.), readiness matters should be included in their terms of reference, and their outputs should include an assessment of the impact of the proposals on readiness.
4. Funding Contingency Operations. The Department should work with Congress in developing a contingency funding system which does not divert, delay or disrupt the flow of funds needed to maintain readiness of forces not engaged in these operations.

C. Future Work

Additional Research. The recommendations above are based on the work of the Readiness Task Force to date. This work is admittedly incomplete. There are several areas that require more in-depth investigation before we can offer further recommendations with confidence. These areas include:

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- Use of Simulations;
- Joint C4I/Space;
- Joint/Combined Training and Doctrine;
- Funding for operations related to training and military engagement (OPTEMPO);
- Mobility;
- Reserves;
- Sustainment;
- Personnel; and
- Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Beyond these, the Readiness Task Force will look into any other areas suggested by the Secretary of Defense/Deputy Secretary of Defense or Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Further, the Task Force will attempt to define readiness criteria and a system to prioritize readiness recommendations.

Final Report. The Readiness Task Force anticipates providing a final report to the Secretary of Defense by May 21, 1994. The Task Force will be divided into sub-groups to monitor the functional areas outlined above and will be prepared to make such additional recommendations concerning those areas as appropriate. The Task will also refine the recommendations made in this interim report should that prove appropriate. The proposed role of the Task Force after May 21, 1994 will be addressed in its final report.

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THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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WASHINGTON DC 20301-4000




January 18, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
VICE-CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, NAVAL OPERATIONS
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, US AIR FORCE
THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL AND
READINESS

SUBJECT: READINESS TASK FORCE DRAFT INTERIM REPORT

A copy of the subject report is attached for your review and comment. General Edward C. Meyer, Chairman of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Readiness, will discuss the Draft Interim Report at Secretary Aspin's breakfast meeting with the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Service Chiefs, ASD(P&R), and DASD(R) on 19 January 1994.

Please ensure no reproduction of this draft report.


Michael A. Parmentier
Executive Secretary
Readiness Task Force

Attachment:
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	For the Honorable Ash Carter from Robert Bell. Subject: Nuclear Posture Review. (4 pages)	02/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 263

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1994 #2 [3]

2016-0152-F
vz4539

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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003. memo	Duplicate of 001a. (2 pages)	02/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 263

FOLDER TITLE:

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UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9400825
RECEIVED: 02 FEB 94 10

TO: COOKE, DAVID O

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 17 FEB 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY

ANSA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: INVITATION TO ADDRESS DOD SERVICE ORIENTATION PROGRAM ON 14 MAR

ACTION: LAKE SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 05 FEB 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL

FEAVER

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 17, 1994

Dear Dr. Cooke:

Thank you for inviting me to address the Senior Executive Service APEX Orientation Program on March 14, 1994. I regret that my schedule will prevent me from attending. I wish you success with your program.

Sincerely,



Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Dr. David O. Cooke
Director, APEX Orientation Course
Administration and Management
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-1950

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 14, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL

FROM: PETER FEAVER *PDF*

SUBJECT: Invitation to Address DoD Service Orientation
Program on 14 March

At Tab II, D.O. Cooke, Director of the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service APEX Orientation Program, has written to invite you to speak at an APEX luncheon on 14 March 1994.

I checked with Wilma Hall and learned that your schedule would prevent you from attending this event. Tab I is a letter extending regrets to this group.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter expressing regrets at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Letter Declining Invitation
Tab II Incoming Correspondence



ADMINISTRATION
AND MANAGEMENT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950

0825

25 JAN 1994



The Honorable Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington DC 20500

Dear Mr. Lake:

My office is in the process of developing the Department of Defense (DoD) Senior Executive Service (SES) APEX Orientation Program. This consolidated DoD orientation program is designed to provide newly appointed Senior Executives an understanding of the DoD structure and the processes critical to its operation. In addition, it will facilitate integration of these executives' new responsibilities into DoD and Component responsibilities. By bringing together these senior executives our goal is to enhance their leadership effectiveness, foster an improved sense of jointness and teamwork, and create a corporate approach to DoD operations. The "APEX" program (required senior orientation for SES) is the civilian counterpart to the military's "CAPSTONE" program for general/flag officers.

The first of several orientation programs to be offered in 1994 is scheduled for March 14-25 with approximately 24 Career Executives and current Administration officials participating. The first week will consist of briefings and discussions with the senior leadership of the Department of Defense and other leaders of the Executive and Legislative Branches of the government. We would be honored to have you address our group at a luncheon in the Pentagon on **March 14, 1994**, 12:30 pm. We believe it is critical for these new senior executives to have a thorough knowledge of the relationship of the White House and DoD in providing our country's national security. As the assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, you are in a unique position to share your knowledge and experience in educating these new members of the SES.

Dr. Diane Goltz, the program manager, will contact your staff to determine your availability. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact us at (703)607-2997. We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely

D. O. Cooke
D. O. Cooke
Director

Attachment:
DoD SES APEX Orientation Course Summary

COURSE SUMMARY

DoD SES APEX ORIENTATION COURSE

The "APEX" program (required senior orientation for Senior Executive Service members) is essentially the civilian counterpart to the military's "CAPSTONE" program for general/flag officers and will be targeted to the Department's senior civilians and senior political appointees. APEX course development and implementation were established by Defense Management Review Decision 974 dated Dec. 15, 1992. The objective of the course is to improve the newly appointed executive's effectiveness on the job through an increased understanding of the Department's structure, the processes critical to its operation, the integration of DoD and Component priorities, and by fostering a sense of jointness.

This is the initial orientation course for all new SES members (career and non-career) within the Department. All DoD civilian employees who have been in the SES for less than one year will be required to attend. SES members who transfer into DoD from other government agencies will also be required to attend. Each Military Department SES Office and the WHS SES Office will provide names to the Senior Executive Service Education and Training Office for establishment of class attendance rosters.

The material covered in the APEX Orientation will address issues and topics of common concern, regardless of Component affiliation. As a minimum, topics will include: DoD goals and priorities; the Joint Chiefs and Joint Commands; Component plans and perspectives; Service structures; acquisition; budget and financial administration; personnel and resources; leadership; evolving issues; logistics; diversity; ethics; integrity; conflict of interest; and protocol.

The course will be delivered by senior OSD and Service military and civilian personnel, and outside experts familiar with the Department's operation, its issues, priorities, and goals. Initial plans call for a five day classroom session, with an additional travel segment to at least two Joint Commands. The program will have a mandatory travel segment that all participants will be required to attend to further their understanding of the joint arena, and an optional portion for those who desire a fuller appreciation of the joint environment. The course will be offered three or four times a year. Class size will not exceed 20-25 attendees.

Additionally, a series of seminars will be provided to increase the SES member's understanding of the domestic and international issues which affect the Department, and shape its priorities. These seminars will provide the SES member with the necessary tools to make better informed planning, policy, and operational decisions, thus improving accomplishment of the Department's mission.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 18, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ROBERT BELL *RGB*

SUBJECT: Secretary of Army's Letter on Posthumous
Commissioning of West Point Cadet

Secretary Togo West has written you (Tab II) to inform you of his support for obtaining a posthumous commission for one of the first black West Point cadets, Johnson C. Whittaker, who he believes was unfairly denied graduation in 1882. The Secretary is reviewing this case and anticipates submitting a formal recommendation to the President soon. The article at Tab III provides some background on the circumstances under which Cadet Whittaker was denied graduation and commissioning.

The proposed reply at Tab I thanks the Secretary for his letter and states that you will look forward to receiving his recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Proposed Letter to Secretary of the Army
Tab II Incoming Correspondence from Secretary of the Army
Tab III The Philadelphia Inquirer Article

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Togo:

Thank you for your memorandum of February 10 concerning a posthumous commission for West Point Cadet Johnson C. Whittaker. I am glad to know you are looking into this tragic case, and I will look forward to receiving your formal recommendation.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable Togo D. West, Jr.
Secretary of the Army
101 Army Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-0101



1054

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON



February 10, 1994

MEMORANDUM THRU: MR. ROBERT C. BELL
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND SENIOR DIRECTOR
DEFENSE POLICY AND ARMS CONTROL

FOR: MR. ANTHONY LAKE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Posthumous Commission for Johnson C.
Whittaker

Tog

Senator Hollings has written regarding a posthumous commission for Johnson C. Whittaker. Johnson C. Whittaker was one of the first black cadets at the United States Military Academy. Mr. Whittaker attended West Point from 1876-1880. He was court-martialed in 1881 for conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman. President Arthur set aside the court-martial in 1882 at which time Mr. Whittaker was separated from West Point for academic reasons. A 90 minute movie of this story will air on Showtime on 27 February 1994.

There are unique circumstances in this case that have led to my supporting Senator Hollings' enclosed draft legislation. I have initiated and will expedite a formal review of this case.

I will let you know when everything is ready for the President to issue a posthumous commission.

Tog
Togo D. West, Jr.

Enclosure



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1994




Honorable Ernest F. Hollings
United States Senate
112 Custom House
200 East Bay Street
Charleston, South Carolina 29401

Dear Senator Hollings:

I am writing in response to your letter to Major General Harrison regarding the grant of a posthumous military commission to Johnson C. Whittaker.

As I currently understand the unique circumstances in this case, I support you and your draft legislation urging the award of a posthumous commission to Johnson C. Whittaker. I have initiated and will expedite a formal review of this case.

Thank you for bringing this matter to my attention.


Togo D. West, Jr.

*Finly Hollings*103D CONGRESS
2D SESSION

S. _____

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. HOLLINGS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

For the relief of Johnson Chesnut Whittaker.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
3 **SECTION 1. REQUEST FOR POSTHUMOUS APPOINTMENT AS**
4 **A COMMISSIONED OFFICER IN THE ARMY.**

5 The President is urged and requested to appoint
6 posthumously Johnson Chesnut Whittaker of South
7 Carolina as a commissioned officer in the regular Army
8 in the grade of second lieutenant as recompense for the
9 unjust separation of the said Johnson Chesnut Whittaker
10 from the Corps of Cadets of the United States Military
11 Academy and from the Army in the early 1880s.

1 SEC. 2. BENEFITS.

- 2 No monetary benefits shall accrue by reason of action
3 taken in accordance with the request in section 1.

Posthumous salute to West Point cadet

The ex-slave was ostracized at the academy, then ousted. A bill would award him his commission.

By Brigid Schulte
INQUIRER WASHINGTON BUREAU

WASHINGTON — As West Point cadet Johnson C. Whittaker lay sleeping, three masked men burst into his dorm. With a razor, they gouged his hair and slashed his face, hands and ears. "Like we do hogs down South," they told him.

They tied his hands and feet to his bed, smashed a mirror over his head and left him, barely clothed and bleeding.

Whittaker, one of the first African Americans to attend West Point, was court-martialed and discharged. West Point brass maintained that he had attacked himself to dishonor the military academy.

Through his long ordeal, more than a century ago, Whittaker, born a slave in Camden, S.C., refused to lose hope.

"I have borne much, and although it is enough to drive me to despair, I shall still bear, I shall still hope, for I have done no wrong. . . I shall wait patiently. And maybe, things will grow brighter, and I shall be 'righted' at last," he wrote a friend in his careful hand during his court-martial.

Now, Whittaker's hopes for vindication may finally be answered.

Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D., S.C.) has introduced legislation to "right a wrong" and award Whittaker a posthumous commission as a second lieutenant — a rank given to West Point cadets upon graduation.

"I'm so glad I lived long enough to see this story come about," said Whittaker's granddaughter, Cecil McFadden, 76, who lives in Detroit. "It vindicates his memory. Maybe he can rest in peace now."

For most of his life, the soft-spoken Johnson Chesnut Whittaker was determined to win a place in society.

He was born in 1858 at Chesnut Plantation in Camden. His mother was a slave to Mary Chesnut, author of famous Civil War diaries. His father, James Whittaker, who left shortly after he was born, worked as a seamster by candlelight to earn his freedom before the Civil War.

Convinced that education was the only avenue to acceptance, Johnson Whittaker

studied with fellow South Carolinian Richard Greener, the first African American to graduate from Harvard. He later attended the University of South Carolina.

Rep. Solomon Lafayette Hoge agreed to appoint Whittaker to West Point in 1876, at the height of Reconstruction, when many abolitionists were pushing for full and speedy integration.

Although deep in the North, West Point at the time had a racist atmosphere that differed little from the South.

"The attitude of the nation, North and South, was almost universally, that whites were superior and blacks were inferior, and inferior people have no business aspiring to be officers," said John Marszalek, a history professor at Mississippi State University who wrote a book about Whittaker's life in 1972. "It was a very sad situation."

One year after Whittaker arrived at West Point, Henry Ossian Flipper, who was born a slave in Georgia, became the first African American cadet to graduate. After that, Whittaker was alone with white cadets determined not to allow another African American to graduate.

Whittaker was ostracized. No one spoke to him, except to give him an order. He lived alone and ate alone. Other cadets drew straws to determine the loser who would have to march beside Whittaker.

Whittaker's Bible was his only comfort. "You open it, and some of the flowers he'd put in are still there," Marszalek said. "He made notations and underlinings all having to deal with this terrible ostracism he had to suffer. Things like, 'Keep at it, God will help you through this.' That's something that comes through most of his life."

Whittaker was in his fourth year at West Point when he found a note on his chair April 4, 1880. It read: "Mr. Whittaker, You will be fixed. Better keep awake. A friend."

That night, he was attacked.

Although Whittaker immediately called for a court of inquiry, no cadet confessed. West Point officials determined that no white cadet would break the honor code and lie; therefore, Whittaker must be lying.

At Whittaker's court-martial, the attorney for West Point argued that "Negroes are

noted for the ability to sham and feign."

The doctor who examined Whittaker after the attack testified that Whittaker was lying, because his heartbeat was so regular. Handwriting experts testified that Whittaker himself had written the warning note.

"My heart droops . . . and life almost seems a burden," Whittaker wrote at the time. "Oh, how hard, and how cruel is the blow, who could wonder that as I pen this, I come to the once twinkling eyes. Friendless. Alone. Sad. Suspected, conscious of innocence. What could seem more cruel to a sensitive nature?"

President Chester A. Arthur overturned the court-martial two years later. But Secretary of War Robert Lincoln, son of Abraham Lincoln, discharged Whittaker from West Point, saying he had failed a philosophy course — a thing Whittaker supporters disputed.

It was then that Whittaker steeled himself.

"I only wish a chance in the race of life, and I think I can make my mark and win a place," Whittaker wrote. "I have made this resolve: to outstrip many of those who could despise me for four long years."

Whittaker made good on his vow. He returned to South Carolina, received a law degree and later became a teacher at the Colored Normal, Industrial, Agricultural Mechanical College of South Carolina — now South Carolina State University.

He married and had two sons. Miller Whittaker became president of what was then South Carolina State College. John Whittaker



Johnson Chesnut Whittaker was in his fourth year at West Point when he was attacked and court-martialed.

VMI case focused on gender aptitudes

ROANOKE, Va. (AP) — The issue of whether men and women learn differently is on trial as the Virginia Military Institute struggles to remain all-male. Testimony resumes today.

The Justice Department has sued VMI, saying exclusion of women at the state-supported school is discriminatory. An appeals court agreed but gave the state the option of setting up a similar program for women.

The Justice Department returned to court Wednesday to argue that The Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership, proposed for the all-female Mary Baldwin College, is based on gender stereotypes. It wants U.S. District Judge Jackson Kiser to force VMI to admit women.

VMI wants a separate, different military college for women set up at a former finishing school.

The V-WIL program would exclude the 24-hour military atmosphere at the 155-year-old men's school. There would be no Spartan barracks without privacy and no boot camp indoctrination.

Women would be required to participate in the Reserve Officer Training Corps, but after their freshman year, they would play tennis, golf, racketball, while VMI cadets participate in boxing, football and karate.

The V-WIL program would not require women to wear uniforms all the time, as required of the 1,300 cadets at VMI.

VMI's witnesses have said women would develop as better leaders in civilian and military life without the military atmosphere and "adversative model" of education. A program for women identical to VMI would fail for lack of interest, they said.

But Capt. Tamara Frezell, a U.S. Military Academy graduate who commanded forces during the Gulf War, testified that she would have had no interest in attending V-WIL, even though it is in her native Virginia. The elements of VMI that she excluded "are what the military is all about," she said.

"If VMI were integrated, I would have gone to VMI," she said after testifying. "I wanted a rigorous, demanding, structured military environment because I believe that was the best preparation for a military career."

Col. James Sciket, a cadet training officer at the U.S. Military Academy, testified Saturday about the life of West Point cadets. Cadets wake before dawn to reveille, march in formation to meals and classes, and every aspect of their behavior is regulated. "It's demanding, it's stressful and it's challenging," Col. Sciket said. He said there was difference in the treatment and performance of male and female cadets.

moved to Detroit to work for Henry Ford. Both were commissioned Army officers in World War I. His grandchildren have gone on to become doctors, Harvard-trained lawyers and Air Force fighter pilots.

Not long after his return to the state, Johnson Whittaker burned a scrapbook his mother had made of his court-martial, and never spoke of West Point again.

"I admire him for picking up his life and going on — becoming a lawyer, a teacher, a principal and raising a family," said granddaughter McFadden. "He didn't let it ruin his life. ... It must have taken an awful lot of courage."

Whittaker's students — author Ralph Ellison was one — remember his erect, military bearing, his exacting teaching style and how he hummed religious songs while walking the halls between classes. And how he was always alone.

The story of his West Point days was told in whispers. It angered students, but, they said, taught them a valuable lesson: Never give up.

"He persevered in spite of his treatment at West Point," said T.J. Crawford, 82, who received an advanced degree in chemistry at Cornell after being Whittaker's student. "It's just one of those things that you just don't give up on. You keep plugging and plugging until you receive justice."

It's a lesson Crawford said he and others took with them when they fought for their voting rights and desegregated schools. A lesson that has made 1994 different from 1884.

Of the 23 African Americans at West Point in the 1870s and 1880s, only three graduated. But since then, 1,000 African Americans have graduated and gone on to serve as officers.

Awarding a posthumous commission is a rare event. But Army Secretary Togo D. West Jr., himself an African American, said last week that he was committed to righting what a spokesman called "an obvious injustice." Soon, Whittaker may join West Point's famed Long Gray Line.

"It carries a message of hope to me," said McFadden. "Because it makes me know America isn't perfect, but I feel that it's improving. And it's better now than it was then."

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Steven Andreasen. Subject: Proposed PDD on FY 94-99 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. Record ID: 9420218. (1 page)	02/18/1994	P1/b(1)

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004b. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Proposed PDD on FY 94-99 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. Record ID: 9420218. (2 pages)	02/18/1994	P1/b(1)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. draft	Presidential Decision Directive [Draft of PDD-21] [42 U.S.C. 2162] (4 pages)	02/18/1994	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 263

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1994 #2 [3]

2016-0152-F

vz4539

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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004d. memo	For the President from Hazel O'Leary and Les Aspin. Subject: Fiscal Year 1994-1999 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. [42 U.S.C. 2162] (4 pages)	12/28/1993	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 263

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1994 #2 [3]

2016-0152-F
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