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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

February 4, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH:

~~ROBERT G. BELL~~ *RGB*

FROM:

STEVEN R. JONES *J*

SUBJECT:

Defense Draft Bill on C-17 Aircraft Program
(DoD 103-037) (LRM D-554)

OMB requests views on the attached DoD draft bill which will accompany the DoD report on the C-17 program as required by Congress. The bill would implement the settlement which Under Secretary of Defense John Deutch and McDonnell Douglas reached on financial and performance issues related to the C-17 aircraft. The draft legislation appears straightforward in implementing these agreements.

Concurrence by:

Jeremy Rosner *JR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: Defense Draft Bill on C-17 Aircraft Program
(DoD 103-037) (LRM D-554)

The NSC staff has reviewed the Defense draft bill implementing C-17 program changes and concurs.

0846

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503**

February 2, 1994

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

SPECIAL

**LRM #D-554
DRAFT #461**

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

**JUSTICE - Sheila F. Anthony - (202)514-2141 - 217
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)395-3723 - 249**

**FROM: RONALD K. PETERSON (for) *Ronald K. Peterson*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference**

**OMB CONTACT: MIKE GOAD (395-7301)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-6194**

**SUBJECT: DEFENSE Draft Bill C-17 Aircraft Program (DOD
103-037)**

DEADLINE: 5:00 P.M., FRIDAY, February 4, 1994

COMMENTS: As required under P.L. 103-160, the attached draft bill will accompany the Defense Department report on the C-17 program. The bill would implement the settlement agreement between the United States and the contractor; we have attached a copy of the settlement agreement for your review only. The Defense Department has asked for expedited clearance of the draft bill; thus, if you do not respond by the deadline, we will assume that your agency has no comment.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:

**J. McClelland
C. Dennis
K. MacIntyre
E. Rea**

DRAFT - February 1, 1994

Sec. xxx. C-17 Aircraft Program

(a) Subject to the limitation set forth in subsection (b) (1), the Secretary of the Air Force shall modify contract F33657-81-C-2108 and such other C-17 contracts as may be appropriate, without regard to requirements of law relating to the making, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts, as directed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.

(b) (1) The modifications referred to in subsection (a) shall not exceed those which are necessary to settle claims and disputes and to revise the range/payload and other specifications to implement the terms of the C-17 settlement agreement set forth in the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology letter dated January 3, 1994.

(2) Nothing in this section shall limit the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology or the Secretary of the Air Force to take any action that is otherwise authorized and is in accordance with the requirements of law relating to the making, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts.

(c) The Secretary of the Air Force shall report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives on any modifications made to C-17 contracts pursuant to this authority within sixty days after such modifications are made.

SECTIONAL ANALYSIS

Section 136(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Public Law 103-160, limits the obligation of funds for the procurement of C-17 aircraft until the Secretary of Defense submits to the congressional defense committees a report on the C-17 acquisition program. The report is required to contain a proposed resolution of contractor claims and any requested legislation relating to those claims.

On January 6, 1994, the C-17 contractor, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, accepted a offer by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology that would resolve the outstanding contractor claims on the C-17 program. Implementation of this settlement agreement will require legislation.

The proposed legislation relates to the resolution of contractor claims on the C-17 acquisition program. It must be submitted to the congressional defense committees as part of the report required under section 136(c) of Public Law 103-160 before fiscal year 1994 funds can be obligated for the procurement of C-17 aircraft.

ACQUISITION AND
TECHNOLOGY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

January 3, 1994

Mr. John F. McDonnell
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
McDonnell Douglas Corporation
P.O. Box 516
St. Louis, MO 63166-0516

Dear Mr. McDonnell:

As a result of our communications over the past several weeks I believe that I must restate my offer for settlement of C-17 issues. This letter supersedes all prior letters.

Over the past five months we have performed an intensive review of the C-17 program. Based on this review, I have concluded that the current C-17 program is not viable without substantial change and that three elements of change are required for a successful strategic airlift program:

1. A provisional 2-year program for C-17 production at a rate of 6 aircraft per year. During this period McDonnell Douglas must (a) introduce major management and manufacturing process changes, (b) demonstrate an ability to deliver aircraft on schedule and at cost, (c) successfully complete the flight test program and (d) satisfy all other contract specifications including Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability (RM&A) requirements.
2. Execution of a comprehensive settlement between the United States Government and McDonnell Douglas on outstanding C-17 business and management issues. This prospective settlement and the management and manufacturing production changes mentioned above are the subject of this letter.
3. Consideration of a mix of commercial wide-body aircraft or new C5-B production to meet the requirements for military airlift in the future.

These three elements will require consideration and action by Congress and my support of this course of action depends upon Congressional commitment to the entire package. The business settlement in this letter cannot stand alone because by itself it does not accomplish the goal of assuring the nation's strategic airlift military requirement will be met.



Resolution of claims and disputes.

McDonnell Douglas has filed twelve claims of approximately \$450 million against the Government under contract F33657-81-C-2108. I understand the company is planning to file additional claims of approximately \$1.25 billion. The parties cannot effectively work for the success of the program and litigate claims of this magnitude at the same time. Therefore, if McDonnell Douglas releases the Government from all C-17 claims it may have as of today, whether filed or not, the Air Force will modify contract F33657-81-C-2108 to increase the target costs and ceiling prices by a total of \$237 million. Additional details on the claims settlement are set forth in Attachment A.

Revisions to the specifications.

The Air Force will revise the range/payload and other specifications as stated in Attachment B and will revise the delivery schedule for aircraft T-1, and P-1 through P-6. The Government will waive all claims it may have as of the date of this agreement for failure of McDonnell Douglas to meet the original contract specifications. The Government also will waive claims for the failure of McDonnell Douglas to meet the delivery schedule for aircraft T-1, and P-1 through P-6. The delivery schedule under contract for aircraft beginning with P-7 shall remain the same.

Charging "sustaining" engineering costs.

McDonnell Douglas shall charge previously incurred nonrecurring engineering costs for aircraft design, special tooling or test equipment, and retrofit of design changes required for the C-17 to meet contract specifications, together with such other nonrecurring engineering costs as the Defense Plant Representative directs, to the full scale engineering development (FSED) portion of contract F33657-81-C-2108. The impact on McDonnell Douglas of these adjustments will be \$41 million for nonrecurring engineering costs incurred through June 30, 1993, that were previously allocated to the Lot IV, V, and VI production contracts.

McDonnell Douglas also shall establish a system to identify and record C-17 future nonrecurring engineering costs, and a methodology to allocate these costs between the FSED portion of contract F33657-81-C-2108 and C-17 production contracts. The Defense Plant Representative shall approve the allocation of C-17 nonrecurring engineering costs between the FSED portion of contract F33657-81-C-2108 and C-17 production contracts prior to McDonnell Douglas receiving any payment for these costs. It is estimated that approximately \$130 million in additional nonrecurring engineering costs will be charged to the FSED portion of contract F33657-81-C-2108.

Flight test extension.

McDonnell Douglas shall submit a proposal to modify contract F33657-81-C-2108 to extend the flight test program to a total of 152 "aircraft months." The parties will share the cost of this extension. The contracting officer and McDonnell Douglas will negotiate an estimated cost for this extension, and the contract will be modified to increase the target cost and ceiling price by 50 percent of the negotiated estimated cost. The cost of the flight test extension is estimated to total \$123 million, or approximately \$61.5 million for each party.

Redesign wing.

McDonnell Douglas shall redesign the wing to eliminate the need for supplemental straps to meet design limit load requirements for the wing. The redesign effort shall begin immediately, and the redesigned wing shall be incorporated as soon as practicable, but not later than aircraft P-29. McDonnell Douglas will bear the total cost of all nonrecurring engineering effort for the redesign, and for all new or modified production special tooling and special test equipment required for the redesigned wing. Costs incurred for this effort shall be separately identified and shall not be allowable, directly or indirectly, on any C-17 or other Government contract. The cost for the wing redesign is estimated to be \$32 million.

CAD/CAM, MIS, AQS.

In order to improve efficiency, McDonnell Douglas must implement a Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided Manufacturing System, Management Information System, and Advanced Quality System.

A. Computer Aided Design/Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) System. McDonnell Douglas shall implement a CAD/CAM system for use on the C-17 program, as described in Attachment C. The Government and McDonnell Douglas will share the cost of the CAD/CAM system equally, as provided in Attachment C, with the Government share estimated at \$20 million.

B. Management Information System (MIS). McDonnell Douglas shall implement a computerized MIS system for the C-17 program as described in Attachment C. Government personnel shall have access to this system and its data. The Government and McDonnell Douglas will share the cost of the MIS equally, as provided in Attachment C, with the Government share estimated at \$15 million.

C. Advanced Quality System (AQS). McDonnell Douglas shall upgrade its existing quality system as described in Attachment C. The Government and McDonnell Douglas will share the cost of the

AQS equally, as provided in Attachment C, with the Government share estimated at \$2.5 million.

Product improvement cost reduction projects.

As a demonstration of its commitment to the C-17 program, McDonnell Douglas shall invest not less than \$100 million for product improvement cost reduction projects to improve the efficiency of the manufacturing process and to lower the aircraft unit cost. McDonnell Douglas will bear the total cost of these projects, and only the Government will benefit from these projects. The details are in Attachment C.

Other settlement issues.

Additional issues that have been the subject of lengthy disputes between the project office and McDonnell Douglas must be settled. Those disputes will be resolved by contract actions as stated in Attachment D. The estimated cost of these issues is approximately \$12 million to the Government, and approximately \$52 million to McDonnell Douglas.

General terms and conditions.

The general terms and conditions set forth in Attachment E are applicable to this agreement.

Attachments A through E are a part of this agreement.

I will establish a group to monitor the implementation of this agreement. The group will report directly to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) and the Chief Executive Officer of McDonnell Douglas Corporation. It is my intention that the group shall be co-chaired by an Air Force general officer and a neutral senior industry official, both of whom shall have extensive acquisition experience. The group will include representatives from appropriate Government offices. McDonnell Douglas agrees to assign appropriate McDonnell Douglas representatives to participate with the group and to issue any necessary direction to McDonnell Douglas components to cooperate with the group.


This agreement will not become binding on the Department of Defense or on McDonnell Douglas until: (1) Congress supports the entire three-part approach; and (2) authorizing legislation and appropriations necessary to implement this agreement are enacted. If approved by Congress, the elements set forth in this letter of agreement must be implemented by modification of the existing C-17 contracts or by new contractual agreements entered into by McDonnell Douglas and the Air Force.

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In order to expedite the process, I am directing the Air Force contract personnel to work with your representatives to prepare the contract documents necessary to implement this agreement promptly when it is appropriate. I request that you give a similar direction to your staff.

Please indicate your acceptance by signing below and returning one copy to me by close of business on January 6, 1994.

Sincerely,



Accepted:


John F. McDonnell
Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer
McDonnell Douglas Corporation

Dated: 6 Jan 94

Attachment A

**Agreement Between
Under Secretary of Defense John M. Deutch
and
Mr. John F. McDonnell
To Settle C-17 Issues
January 3, 1994**

CONTRACT CLAIMS AND DISPUTES

1. Claim settlement procedures. When authorizing legislation and appropriations necessary to implement this agreement have been received, contract F33657-81-C-2108 will be modified to increase the target costs and the ceiling prices by a total of \$237 million.

2. McDonnell Douglas actions.

a. Upon execution of this agreement, McDonnell Douglas shall join with the Government in a request to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals to defer further action on all pending C-17 related ASBCA appeals. McDonnell Douglas and the Government shall defer all action on these appeals. McDonnell Douglas shall not file any additional appeals with the ASBCA or any court, and shall not file any additional claims with the contracting officer, relating to C-17 contracts while DoD is seeking necessary settlement authority and appropriations. If DoD has not notified McDonnell Douglas by December 31, 1994, that necessary settlement authority and appropriations have been made available, McDonnell Douglas may thereafter file any additional claims or appeals it deems appropriate and proceed with further action on previously filed ASBCA appeals.

b. Upon execution of the contract modification described in paragraph 1 above, McDonnell Douglas agrees to dismiss with prejudice all currently pending C-17 claims and appeals, and to provide the Government with the release as stated below.

3. Release of Claims. Concurrent with, or contained in, the claim settlement modification, McDonnell Douglas shall provide the following release of claims:

McDonnell Douglas Corporation, on behalf of both itself and its operating divisions, including McDonnell Douglas Aerospace - Transport Aircraft and its corporate predecessors in interest, hereby releases and forever discharges the Government from all contractual claims, demands, requests for equitable adjustment, or any other causes of action, known or unknown, that McDonnell

Douglas may have on or before [the date of execution of this agreement] arising out of C-17 program contracts. This release expressly includes all C-17 program claims, including claims under contracts for C-17 Aircrew Training Systems, certified or otherwise, that McDonnell Douglas Corporation or any of its operating divisions, may have on or before [the date of execution of this agreement] and all other C-17 related contractual claims, demands or causes of action, on its own behalf or on behalf of any subcontractor, arising out of any Government action or inaction occurring on or before [the date of execution of this agreement]. With respect to any contractual claim, demand, or cause of action of any kind initiated by a McDonnell Douglas Corporation subcontractor, vendor, supplier, or other party, McDonnell Douglas Corporation agrees to resolve such disputes without involving the Government, and releases and forever discharges the Government from any liability whatsoever arising out of any such claims, demands or causes of action. This release shall not preclude McDonnell Douglas Corporation from asserting defenses or offsetting amounts against Government claims, but the claims and other matters encompassed by this release shall not be used to assert or support any counterclaim against the Government.

Attachment B

Agreement Between
Under Secretary of Defense John M. Deutch
and
Mr. John F. McDonnell
To Settle C-17 Issues
January 3, 1994

C-17 SPECIFICATIONS REVISIONS

1. The System Specification (MDC S0001C) for the C-17 Airlift System shall be revised as follows:

Paragraph 3.2.1.1 Maximum payload mission, line 2: Replace "172,200 pounds" by "169,000 pounds"; line 3: Replace "160,000 pounds" by "157,000 pounds".

Paragraph 3.2.1.2 Heavy Logistics Mission, lines 2-3: Replace "150,000 pounds" by "145,000 pounds"; lines 4-5: Replace "130,000 pounds" by "120,000 pounds".

Paragraph 3.2.1.3 Intertheater logistics mission, lines 2-3: Replace "120,000 pounds" by "114,000 pounds".

Paragraph 3.2.1.5 Ferry Range, line 2: Replace "4,600 NM" by "4,300 NM".

Paragraph 3.2.1.6.1 Maximum Gross Weight Takeoff, line 3: Replace "7,600-foot paved runway" by "8,200-foot paved runway".

Paragraph 3.2.1.6.2 Small austere airfield takeoff, lines 3-4: Replace "2,900-foot long" by "3,000-foot long"; line 4: Delete "Load Classification Number (LCN) 48"; lines 5-6: Delete "with the equivalent strength and shear capabilities".

Paragraph 3.2.1.6.3 Critical engine inoperative takeoff, line 2: Replace "2,941-foot" by "3,000-foot"; line 3: Delete "LCN 48"; lines 4-5: Delete "with equivalent strength and shear capabilities".

Paragraph 3.2.1.7.1 Normal landing, line 2: Replace "3,300-foot" by "3,950-foot"; lines 2-3: Delete "LCG IV (Load Classification Group)"; line 4: Replace "with a payload of 167,064 pounds and fuel" by "at the zero fuel weight of the mission defined in paragraph 3.2.1.1 plus fuel".

Paragraph 3.2.1.7.2 Maximum effort landing, line 2: Replace "2,650" by "3,200-foot"; line 2: Delete "LCN 48"; lines 3-4: Delete "with equivalent strength and shear capabilities"; line 5:

Replace "with a payload of 124,076 pounds and fuel" by "at the zero fuel weight of the mission defined in paragraph 3.2.1.3 plus fuel"; line 7: Replace "3,000-foot" by "3,400-foot"; line 7: Delete "LCG IV"; line 8: Replace "with a payload of 134,599 pounds and fuel" by "at the zero fuel weight of the mission defined in the second sentence of paragraph 3.2.1.2 plus fuel".

Paragraph 3.2.1.7.3 Maximum payload landing, line 2: Replace "2,700-foot" by "3,000-foot"; line 2: Delete "LCG IV"; lines 3-4: Replace "with a payload of 167,064 pounds and fuel" by "at the zero fuel weight of the mission defined in paragraph 3.2.1.1 plus fuel".

Paragraph 3.2.1.8 Ground flotation, line 1: Replace "with a payload of 124,076 pounds" by "at the zero-fuel weight of the mission defined in the second sentence of paragraph 3.2.1.2"; line 3: Replace "48" by "50"; line 5: Replace "runways" by "runways with equivalent strength and shear capabilities as an LCN 50 paved runway".

Paragraph 3.2.1.9.1 Turning, line 2: Delete "LCN 48".

Paragraph 3.2.1.9.2 Backing up, line 2: Delete "LCG IV"; line 3: Replace "with a payload of 167,064 pounds and fuel" by "at the zero fuel weight of the mission defined in paragraph 3.2.1.1 and fuel".

Paragraph 3.2.1.10.1 Cruise speed and altitude, line 3: Replace "0.77 Mach" by "0.74 Mach"; line 4: Replace "28,000 feet" by "27,000 feet".

Paragraph 3.2.1.10.2a. Airdrop speed, line 1-2: Replace "1.2 V, (not to exceed 130 KIAS)" by "130 KIAS (1.2 V, or greater margin)".

Paragraph 4.1.1.2, Initial Squadron Operations (ISO), line 7: Delete "approximately one month".

Table 10.2.1 C-17A PEACETIME DESIGN MISSION PROFILES, missions 7, 8: Replace "163.6 (1000's of LBS)" by "157.0 (1000's of LBS)"; mission 11: Replace "6500 NM" by "6000 NM".

Paragraph 50.1, Mission Performance, line 3: Replace "6.5 pounds per U.S. gallon" by "6.7 pounds per U.S. gallon"; line 5: Replace "fuel" by "fuel at brake release for takeoff. Ramp weight shall be defined as takeoff gross weight plus fuel weight equal to fifteen minutes of engine operation at idle power for sea level static standard day conditions consistent with paragraph 50.1.1a Ground operations."

Paragraph 50.1.1 b.(2) Cruise, line 1: Add "Cruise using optimum step climb to start of descent"; lines 1-2: Replace "Cruise to

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overhead destination at long range cruise speed" by "Cruise at optimum cruise speed"; line 2, Replace "0.77 Mach" by 0.74 Mach"; lines 3-4: Delete "at altitude for best cruise performance"; line 3: Replace "28,000 feet" by "27,000 feet"; lines 3-4: Delete "nor greater than cruise ceiling".

Paragraph 50.1.1 c. Descent and landing: Replace "No time, fuel or distance credit" by "Time, fuel and distance credit shall apply".

Paragraph 60.6.4, Conduct of the ORE., line 3: Delete "approximately one month".

2. The Prime Item Development Specification (MDC S0002C(1)) for the C-17 Air Vehicle shall be revised as follows:

Paragraph 3.2.1 Performance, line 6: Replace "mid-range center of gravity" by "payload/range optimum center of gravity".

Paragraph 3.2.1.11.1b. Mil-A-8860 - Exceptions: Add "12. The maximum takeoff weight is the weight of the airplane with the maximum internal and external loads necessary to provide the mission capabilities specified in the C-17 System Specification; after allowance is made for fuel burned during engine warmup and pre-flight taxi. This weight applies to:

- a) Take-off loads
- b) In-flight refueling conditions
- c) Flight loads
- d) Flutter and divergence prevention
- e) Serial delivery loads

(Ref 6.2.1.2)

13. The landplane weight is defined as 491,900 pounds.
(Ref 6.2.1.5.2)".

Paragraph 3.2.1.11.1b. Mil-A-8860 - additions: Add "4. The maximum ramp weight is the weight of the airplane with the maximum internal and external loads necessary to provide the mission capabilities specified in the C-17 System Specification; with no reduction for fuel burned during engine warmup and pre-flight taxi. This weight applies to:

- a) Pre-flight taxi and ground handling loads
- b) Wheel jacking, if such jacking is required for changing wheels and tires
- c) Vibration

(Ref 6.2.1.2)".

Paragraph 3.2.1.11.1d.6. Mil-A-8862 - Exceptions: Replace "design weight" by "ramp weight".

Paragraph 3.2.1.11.1: Add "g. Mil-W-25140B - Exceptions 1. An entry for ramp weight limitations shall be entered in Chart E.

(Ref. 3.7.9.15.5).

2. The ramp weight shall be defined as Takeoff Gross Weight plus warmup and preflight taxi fuel. It will vary with each mission in the same manner as Takeoff Gross Weight. (Ref. 6.2.3)".

Paragraph 3.3.1.2.12 Design for contamination, Demonstration subparagraph: Delete.

Paragraph 3.7.1.2.1.3b. Flotation, line 2: Replace "LCN 48" by "LCN 50".

Paragraph 3.7.1.2.1.3c. Flotation, line 4: Replace "50 passes" by "40 passes".

Paragraph 3.7.1.6.3.2 Sump space, lines 1-2: Replace by "The sump space for each fuel tank shall be identified".

Paragraph 3.7.1.7.1.6 Leakage rate, lines 2-3: Replace "0.07 v^{0.67} plus 0.5 pounds per minute" by "110 pounds per minute".

Paragraph 3.7.1.7.2.1.9 Surface temperatures, lines 6-16: Replace by "

...Exposed flight crew and loadmaster station surfaces (panels, knobs, switches, and other hand-actuated devices) which can normally be handled/contacted/actuated by air crew members while not wearing protective clothing shall not exceed the limits specified below for flight crew controls. Exposed flight crew and loadmaster station equipment surfaces which could be contacted accidentally by the bare skin of the air crew shall not exceed the limits specified below for inadvertent contact surfaces, or shall be shielded/guarded to prevent inadvertent contact by air crew members. The air vehicle, except the exposed flight crew and loadmaster stations, shall conform to the biothermal requirements of MIL-STD-1472 paragraph 5.13.4.6. ... shall be used as design guides.

	Metal	Glass	Plastic
Flight crew controls	49°C(120°F)	59°C(138°F)	69°C(156°F)
Inadvertent contact	60°C(140°F)	68°C(154°F)	85°C(185°F)".

Paragraph 3.7.2.1.1.10 Engine Fuel, line 2: Replace "JP4" by "JP8".

Paragraph 6.1.1c., d., f., g., h. Weight terminology (various): Replace "No reductions" by "reductions"; Replace "taxi, warmup, or climb-out" by "taxi and warmup".

Paragraph 6.1.1g. Change title from "Maximum design weight" to "Maximum take-off weight".

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Paragraph 6.1.1e. Landplane landing weight, Replace by "The landplane landing weight is specified in 3.2.11.1.b, item 13."

Paragraph 6.1.1o. Add "o. Maximum ramp weight. The aircraft maximum gross weight for the performance defined under 3.2.1. No reductions are permitted for fuel used during taxi, warmup, or climb-out."

Section 20.2 Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, Add: "AF Designated F-117-PW-100)".

Attachment C

Agreement Between
Under Secretary of Defense John M. Deutch
and
Mr. John F. McDonnell
To Settle C-17 Issues
January 3, 1994

COMPUTER AIDED DESIGN/COMPUTER AIDED MANUFACTURING (CAD/CAM),
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (MIS), ADVANCED QUALITY SYSTEM
(AQS) PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS AND PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT COST REDUCTION
PROJECTS.

1. CAD/CAM, MIS and AQS. Within sixty days of the execution of this agreement, McDonnell Douglas shall provide the C-17 Program Director with proposals for the program improvement systems described below. The objectives of these programs are to, over time, modernize business practices so as to improve the efficiency of the program, in particular through a transition from paper to electronic means of communication, design and manufacturing, and to improve the management of cost, safety, and reliability through an improved quality system. The Contracting Officer and McDonnell Douglas will agree to a specific description of each system, and the nature and the timing of its implementation. The parties will also agree on the estimated cost of the acquisition and implementation of each of these program improvements. In order to provide the maximum benefits to the C-17 program from these program improvements, McDonnell Douglas will make these improvements as expeditiously as possible, but in no event later than one year from the date of this agreement. However, McDonnell Douglas shall not be required to implement these program improvements until the Government notifies McDonnell Douglas that authorizing legislation and appropriations for these program improvements have been received. The parties estimate that the total costs for these systems will be \$40 million for CAD/CAM, \$30 million for MIS, and \$5 million for AQS. The parties will share the cost of these program improvements equally, within these estimates, with the cost to the Government estimated at \$20 million for CAD/CAM, \$15 million for MIS, and \$2.5 million for AQS. Costs in excess of these estimated amounts will be allowable under the terms of the relevant C-17 contracts if the costs are allowable under the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

a. C-17 CAD/CAM System. McDonnell Douglas shall implement a CAD (three dimensional) network. This CAD network shall be the single engineering and manufacturing CAM data base to which any new or updated drawings would be added. Beginning on the date to be specified by the C-17 Program Director, drawings requiring update/changes shall be accomplished in a CAD

format and added to this data base. Beginning not later than production lot 9 assembly start, McDonnell Douglas Corporation shall begin incorporating all C-17 drawings into this CAD system. The system shall be compliant with the Computer-aided Acquisition and Logistics System at this time. In addition, the CAD/CAM system shall be networked to McDonnell Douglas elements responsible for production planning, tooling, technical orders, and manufacturing engineering to ensure all functions are using the same engineering data base.

b. MIS. McDonnell Douglas shall implement a MIS system associated with the development, production, and sustainment of the C-17 weapon system which allows McDonnell Douglas and the Government to exercise oversight of the program, track and assess program technical, schedule, and funds status, and identify problems requiring action. Access to these information products shall be provided by electronic means as well as on magnetic, paper, or other media, as required to permit the timely and complete access to the information. However, the MIS shall use electronic media for information generation, access, transmission, storage, and integration. As a minimum, the level of detail in the MIS information products shall include electronic mail capability, and access to contractor technical, funds and schedule performance, Contract Data Requirements List status, Engineering Change Proposal status, and LSA data. The MIS shall be installed at the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, with access available to the Defense Plant Representative Office, System Program Office, Program Executive Office, Air Force Material Command and Air Logistic Center facilities.

c. AQS. McDonnell Douglas shall implement an AQS in accordance with the Manufacturing Process Improvement Plan. This system shall be compliant with ANSI/ASQC Q-90 series standards. The system should be upgraded using ANSI/ASQC Q91-1987 and Q94-1987 as guides. The system will be directed at designing and building quality in by use of such tools as process control and continuous process variability reduction during the manufacturing process, rather than inspecting it in at the end of the production line. An effective root cause corrective action and disposition system will be implemented. The system shall reflect a prevention-based, multifunctional approach to quality. All major/critical subcontractors must comply with these requirements.

2. Product Improvement Cost Reduction Projects. The goal of each product improvement cost reduction project shall be to improve the quality and lower the production cost of C-17 aircraft.

a. Schedule. No later than thirty days after execution of this agreement, McDonnell Douglas shall propose projects with an aggregate capital investment of not less than

\$35 million. No later than one year after execution of this agreement, McDonnell Douglas shall propose additional projects with an aggregate capital investment of not less than \$65 million. The parties shall agree upon the specific projects to be undertaken and a precise description for each. At least \$35 million of projects shall be completed by December 31, 1995, and the remaining projects shall be completed by December 31, 1996. However, McDonnell Douglas shall not be required to implement product improvement cost reduction projects until the Government notifies McDonnell Douglas that authorizing legislation and appropriations for this agreement have been received. If legislation is not enacted by September 30, 1994, the parties will negotiate alternate dates for implementation of these projects.

b. Project Costs and Benefits. McDonnell Douglas shall bear the total cost of these projects. The costs incurred for these projects shall be separately identified and shall not be allowable, directly or indirectly, on any C-17 or other Government contract. In addition, McDonnell Douglas shall not benefit on C-17 production contracts from cost savings attributable to these projects. Unless the parties agree on a different procedure, the parties shall, prior to McDonnell Douglas implementation of these projects: (1) negotiate the estimated net cost savings for each project; (2) reduce the target cost of each existing C-17 production contract by the amount of estimated cost savings attributable to these projects that is applicable to the aircraft being produced under the contract; and, (3) reduce the target profit, target price, and ceiling price on each existing C-17 production contract by the same percentage as the applicable reduction to target cost. The price of future C-17 production contracts shall be negotiated based on the estimated cost savings for these projects, and McDonnell Douglas shall not receive any profit consideration in future C-17 contracts for having implemented these projects.

Attachment D

**Agreement Between
Under Secretary of Defense John M. Deutch
and
Mr. John F. McDonnell
To Settle C-17 Issues
January 3, 1994**

OTHER SETTLEMENT ISSUES

1. McDonnell Douglas agrees to take the following actions at no change in contract target cost or ceiling price.

a. Ditching Locks. McDonnell Douglas shall make any design and production modifications necessary so that the aft cargo door latch and lock system (ditching locks) are controllable in flight from the load master's control panels and from the flight deck.

b. Test Requirements Document. McDonnell Douglas shall provide Test Requirements Documents, except for depot support equipment built-in-test, in accordance with Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) item 3059.

c. Fault Isolation Manuals. McDonnell Douglas shall provide Fault Isolation Manuals (Technical Orders) prepared at the level of detail specified by the Government (pursuant to contract 2108 CDRL item A0005 and paragraph 3-6 of the Specification Interpretation Document).

d. Composite/Structures Repair. McDonnell Douglas shall provide composite/structure repair engineering data and identification of resultant depot level support equipment.

e. Retrofit of Flaps and Slats. McDonnell Douglas shall complete the required effort to redesign the flaps and slats, incorporate the redesigned flaps and slats into future production aircraft, and retrofit existing aircraft.

f. Mission Computer Reserve Capacity. McDonnell Douglas shall implement corrective action to insure compliance with contract specification requirements for mission computer throughput.

g. Built-In-Test. McDonnell Douglas shall implement corrective action to ensure compliance with contract specification requirements relating to Built-In-Test false alarm rates.

h. Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability (RM&A). McDonnell Douglas shall implement a high visibility, aggressively managed reliability growth program and a RM&A Performance Review Board.

i. Manufacturing Process Improvement. McDonnell Douglas shall develop and implement a Manufacturing Process Improvement Plan.

j. Integrated Program Master Plan. McDonnell Douglas shall develop and implement an Integrated Program Master Plan.

k. Management Plan for Software Development and Release. McDonnell Douglas shall develop and implement a Management Plan for Software Development and Release.

l. Government Property System. McDonnell Douglas shall take the necessary corrective actions and submit required documentation to qualify for recertification of its government property system within 12 months of the date of this agreement.

m. Improvements to Range/Payload Performance. McDonnell Douglas shall implement the following initiatives:

- (1) Use the Pratt & Whitney 94 Commercial Engine;
- (2) Implement low risk weight reduction initiatives to reduce empty weight by 1,500 lbs;
- (3) Reduce total aircraft drag by one percent;
- (4) Increase maximum takeoff gross weight 5,000 lbs to 585,000 lbs.

In addition, McDonnell Douglas shall continue an active weight control program and perform trade studies on the following alternatives to determine, by cost-benefit analysis, the desirability of incorporation into the C-17 design:

- (5) Increased fuel carrying capacity;
- (6) Removal of core thrust reverser;
- (7) Use of composite nacelle.

2. The Government and McDonnell Douglas will jointly take the following actions at no change in contract target cost or ceiling price.

a. Integrated Product Development. The parties will jointly implement Integrated Product Development, consistent with the Defense Science Board C-17 Task Force final report.

b. Incremental Configuration Audits. The parties will continue the incremental Functional Configuration Audit (FCA)/Physical Configuration Audit (PCA) process.

c. Management Plan for Affordability. The parties will jointly develop and implement a Management Plan for Affordability.

d. Reliability, Maintainability, and Availability (RM&A) Testing. The parties will conduct a multibase RM&A evaluation rather than using just Charleston AFB. The C-17 Program Director shall specify the date on which the Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) shall begin. The ORE may begin later than 30 days after Initial Operational Capability (IOC). Government warranty rights under the C-17 contracts that are limited to defects identified no later than 180 days after IOC shall be extended to 90 days after completion of the ORE, regardless of the date of the IOC. The C-17 Program Director shall determine what revisions to RM&A testing in the ORE are necessary to make the testing more operationally representative.

e. Subcontractor Engineering Data. McDonnell Douglas shall provide and mark Subcontractor Engineering Data as required by the C-17 contracts. The Government may challenge "limited rights" markings on the data as provided in the contracts. The parties shall establish a working group to resolve disagreements on this issue, and shall refer any unresolved differences to the appropriate higher level for decision.

3. Clarification of Existing Contract Requirements. McDonnell Douglas is not currently required to perform the work identified in this paragraph. If the Government has a requirement in this area, it will be the subject of a future contract or contract modification. It is noted that Technical Order Maintenance has already been the subject of a separate contract modification.

a. Refurbish aircraft T-1.

b. Provide Initial Squadron Operations (ISO) in excess of 12 months.

c. Provide airdrop testing instrumentation on aircraft P-3, P-4, or P-5.

d. Implement 400 pound troop seat.

e. Provide "Crash/Fire Rescue" as described in the McDonnell Douglas proposal submitted on July 2, 1993.

4. The parties shall take the preliminary steps to implement these other settlement issues, including submission of proposals

4

and negotiation of any implementation details, however, nothing in this agreement shall be deemed to require the parties to implement these other settlement issues until the Government has notified McDonnell Douglas that authorizing legislation and appropriations for these other settlement issues have been received.

Attachment E

**Agreement Between
Under Secretary of Defense John M. Deutch
and
Mr. John F. McDonnell
To Settle C-17 Issues
January 3, 1994**

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. References to "costs" shall be deemed to mean "allowable costs" in accordance with Part 31 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Where a subsequent contract or contract modification is required by this agreement the applicable revision of the Federal Acquisition Regulation shall be the revision in effect on the date that the implementing contract document is executed.

2. It is the intention of the parties to this agreement that, although this agreement refers to contracts between the Government and the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, and other contractual documents between those parties are contemplated by this agreement, this agreement is not a contract for the procurement of property or services and is not subject to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, as amended.

3. The Government expressly reserves any and all causes of action for fraud, misrepresentation, false statements, and false claims arising from the C-17 program.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 4, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH:

ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*

FROM:

ANNE WITKOWSKY *AW*

Attached are NSC staff comments on the ACDA Annual Report, as requested by ACDA.

Concurrences by: *in draft* Steve Andreasen, *in draft* Elisa Harris, *in draft* Steve Aoki

RECOMMENDATION

That you provide these NSC comments to ACDA.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to ACDA

Tab A NSC Comments on ACDA Annual Report

Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: 1993 ACDA Annual Report

Per your request, attached are NSC staff comments on the 1993 ACDA Annual Report.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A NSC Comments on ACDA Annual Report

ACDA

ANNUAL REPORT

1993

**Draft for National Security Council clearance
January 31, 1994, 5:34pm**

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I am pleased to transmit the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Annual Report for 1993.

ACDA is one among several national security agencies. Its work is done in collaboration with the Departments of State and with other agencies of the United States government, to bring maximum resources to bear on problems of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament. American national security is a large and complex picture; this report deals with ACDA's part of the picture.

On July 3, 1993, after a comprehensive interagency review, I decided to strengthen and revitalize ACDA to reflect post Cold War priorities in arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament.

This report is organized to reflect ACDA's ongoing revitalization to meet the increasingly complex arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament challenges of the 1990s. The report is written within the context of existing law, but reflects the new priorities in ~~However, my Administration continues to work with Congress on~~ pending ACDA revitalization legislation which was initially developed under the leadership of the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Claiborne Pell, and which has received wide bipartisan support in both houses of Congress.

This revitalization re-affirms and strengthens ACDA's **key function as the U.S. Government's primary agency for policy formulation and advice on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament matters.** It is consistent with the judgment of the Department of State Inspector General that *"it remains important to the nation to have a specialized, technically competent, and independent arms control institution."*

ACDA's specific responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

— Providing advice:

- acting as principal adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament;
- providing the legal adviser to ~~all~~ arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament negotiations;

— Negotiating:

- leading the U.S. Comprehensive Test Ban negotiating team at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva;
- leading the U.S. negotiating team at the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Extension Conference;
- chairing the Washington backstopping (policy support) for the Conference on Disarmament;
- participating in the Safety, Security, and Dismantlement Talks;

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- participating in the Safety, Security, and Dismantlement Talks;

in developing and implementing

Items not cleared by State Dept in ~~bold redline~~

- Implementing and verifying:
 - leading the U.S. delegation to the Chemical Weapons Preparatory Commission, and to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons which will succeed it;
 - leading the U.S. delegations to all meetings and conferences on the Biological Weapons Convention;
 - leading the U.S. delegation to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty;
 - leading the U.S. delegation to the Special Verification Commission of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty
 - leading the U.S. Component of the Standing Consultative Commission of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
 - leading the U.S. delegation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission of the Threshold Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;
 - drafting, with interagency coordination, the President's annual Report to Congress on *Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements*;
 - providing the Principal Deputy Director of the On-Site Inspection Agency
 - participating in the U.S. delegation to the Joint Consultative Group on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty;
 - participating in the Open Skies Consultative Commission;
- Controlling exports:
 - participating in the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group on nuclear weapons related exports
 - participating in the Australia Group on chemical weapons related exports;
 - participating in the meetings of the Missile Technology Control Regime;
- Coordinating and reporting on research on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament;
- Informing and educating the public:
 - leading the Interagency Working Group on Public Diplomacy for Arms Control and Nonproliferation;
 - publishing extensively on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament.

My decision to strengthen and revitalize ACDA, combined with continued Congressional support, will help the U.S. Government move vigorously to eliminate the overarmament of the Cold War; prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, apply arms control solutions to regional problems, and establish global norms for the control of conventional arms.

The Report is a concise summary of the wide-ranging and complex issues that ACDA deals with each day; I commend it to your attention.

William J. Clinton

Items not cleared by State Dept in ~~old redline~~

Convention

- Implementing and verifying:
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William J. Clinton

DIRECTOR'S OVERVIEW

1993 has been a significant year for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, one that presented unusual challenges as well as unusual opportunities. This report tells how ACDA met them.

I have been Director of ACDA since November 22, 1993. Consequently, the bulk of the activities and achievements set out here occurred before my tenure began. The Agency was fortunate during this time to have benefited from the capable leadership of Acting Director Thomas Graham, Jr., and this report in major part reflects his success in that capacity. History will have particular reason to be grateful for ACDA's seminal role in the formulation of United States nuclear testing policy during 1993.

I will let the report speak to the year just past. I wish now to say something about ACDA and the times to come.

The end of the Cold War now means more for ACDA to do, rather than less; harder challenges rather than easier ones; a multipolar world on which to focus, rather than a primarily bipolar world. Every indicator suggests that this trend will continue indefinitely.

The inexorable pace of technology is enabling outlaw nations to find more and easier opportunities to obtain dangerous weapons and the means of delivering them. Technological advances create possibilities for weapons development and proliferation that would have been science fiction just a few years ago. As one example, computer capacity that only recently could be effectively contained by export controls can now be manufactured by any mid-tech nation and is available in consumer retail outlets everywhere in the world. Anticipating such possibilities—and responding accordingly—has become both more challenging and more essential.

In addition, political ramifications of the end of the Cold War have had the side effect of creating new sources of proliferation, of loosening some of the constraints against proliferation that existed under the Cold War power structure. Moreover, realizing the rewards of some of the signal achievements in United States-Soviet arms control negotiations, including the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaties, has been made more difficult because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its replacement by not one but several nations, each with its own security interests, its own economic limitations, and its own political turmoil.

Although the end of the Cold War has amplified some of our national security problems, it has at the same time augmented the possibility of arms control solutions to those problems. Where once the major nuclear question for the two largest powers was how to ratchet strategic nuclear counterforce capability rapidly upward, now the question is how to ratchet all nuclear weapons capability affordably downward. Where preoccupation with Cold War concerns once forced us to focus primarily on nuclear arms control between ourselves and the Soviet Union, we now focus with equal intensity on very dangerous Third World proliferation.

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steadily move back away from the nuclear precipice and reduce nuclear weapon inventories consistent with our national security.

United States was how to maintain strategic deterrence while keeping pace with Soviet modernization,

*empirically fulfill
that mandate.*

These changes magnify and intensify ACDA's potential contribution to national security. Our Agency has a vital mandate to advance arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament on behalf of the U.S. Government around the world, and also within that government at home. ACDA's unique function is to ensure that arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament are always part of the national security policy debate, that there is always an unconflicted voice on their behalf in the highest levels of government. While I am Director, ACDA will stand for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament whenever they serve national security. We will do so ~~alongside~~ *in* other agencies if possible, but alone if necessary. It is when ACDA stands alone that the need for what it has to say is often most acute.

*in
alliance
with*

John D. Holum
Director

These changes magnify and intensify ACDA's potential contribution to national security. Our Agency has a vital mandate to advance arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament on behalf of the U.S. Government around the world, and also within that government at home. ACDA's unique function is to ensure that arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament are always part of the national security policy debate, that there is always an unconflicted voice on their behalf in the highest levels of government. While I am Director, ACDA will stand for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament whenever they serve national security. We will do so alongside other agencies if possible, but alone if necessary. It is when ACDA stands alone that the need for what it has to say is often most acute.

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I. CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Nuclear weapons are, by a wide margin, the most destructive devices ever devised. None has been used in anger for the past 48 years. ACDA's highest priority is to ensure that nuclear weapons will never be used again. Our efforts are concentrated on two tracks:

- Eliminating the massive nuclear over-armament that remains from the Cold War;
- Curbing and reducing of the number of entities with nuclear weapons available for use.

ELIMINATING COLD WAR NUCLEAR OVER-ARMAMENT

Arms reduction and economic conversion were relatively simple and straightforward after the end of the Second World War. They are far more complex and difficult today, after the end of the Cold War. Even though the United States and Russia agree that nuclear arsenals should be dramatically reduced,

- the hazardous combination of high explosives and radioactive materials renders safe dismantlement of nuclear weapons a difficult and expensive process,
- the long-lasting potential of fissile material to be remanufactured into new nuclear weapons requires secure and expensive storage,
- the breakup of the Soviet Union has left large stocks of nuclear weapons on the territories of four governments rather than one, and
- all four of these governments are undergoing economic and political stress.

U.S. and Russian intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) have been eliminated under the INF Treaty. It is, therefore, possible to make a relatively clear distinction between tactical (short-range) and strategic (long-range) nuclear weapons in the American and Russian arsenals.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

The large numbers, smaller size, and, in some cases, less safe design of tactical nuclear weapons renders them inherently more difficult to control than strategic weapons.

The aborted coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991 raised major questions about how control would be maintained over the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons located throughout the republics of the Soviet Union. A breakdown in the military command and control of these weapons could lead to nuclear weapons being seized for use in civil conflict or for sale on the black market, or being involved in accidents resulting from careless handling.

To encourage Soviet reciprocity President Bush announced, on September 27, 1991, that the U.S. would unilaterally withdraw approximately 2,400 tactical nuclear weapons from overseas. Within a week, former Soviet President Gorbachev responded by announcing similar measures, including elimination of most Soviet short-range missile warheads and nuclear artillery shells, withdrawal and elimination of all Soviet nuclear land mines and nuclear warheads for air-defense missiles, and removal of all Soviet tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and multi-purpose submarines. These weapons, along with those from ground-based naval aviation, were to be stored centrally in Russia, and in some cases eliminated.

This Soviet response, combined with the mounting political instability in the Soviet Union, spurred U.S.

interest in enhancing the safety and security of the large number of tactical nuclear weapons to be transported, centrally stored in Russia and dismantled. The Safety, Security and Dismantlement (SSD) effort, discussed on page 8, began in response to this interest.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of four newly independent former Soviet states with nuclear weapons located on their territories, Russian President Yeltsin accelerated the dismantlement schedule.

The presence of large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in a politically and economically strait Russia, and the possibility of black-market sale of these weapons, continues to be a source of major concern. Nevertheless, the world is far more secure as a result of the rapid and complete withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine of the former Soviet Union.

Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Strategic nuclear weapons include the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, and heavy bombers, with their warheads, that can strike from one continent to another. They possess not only the longest range of any weapon class, but also the greatest destructive power. While they are unlikely to be the first nuclear weapons to be used in a conflict, if they were used they would cause by far the greatest damage.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and the Lisbon Protocol

On July 31, 1991, President Bush and President Gorbachev signed the START I Treaty, mandating reductions in the superpower strategic nuclear arsenals by approximately one third. After the demise of the Soviet Union, such large scale reductions of strategic weapons remain of critical importance, both intrinsically and because they reduce the motivation for new nuclear-weapon states to emerge from the breakup of the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty on May 23, 1992, accepting their obligations as successor states to the former Soviet Union for the START Treaty. The Lisbon protocol commits Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to accede to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon states in the shortest possible time; associated letters from the Presidents of these three states further commit them to eliminate all nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms located in their territories within the seven year START reduction period.

Belarus and Kazakhstan are fulfilling their Lisbon obligations. Both have ratified START without conditions. Belarus has acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapons state; Kazakhstan's parliament has approved NPT accession, and Kazakhstan expects to formally accede to the NPT in mid-February 1994.

In contrast, Ukraine's hesitance to fulfil its Lisbon obligations has been a source of serious concern. The Ukrainian Parliament has ratified START I, but with conditions that are unacceptable to the other Parties and have thus delayed START's entry into force. Most troubling was the Ukrainian Parliament's rejection of the Lisbon Protocol obligation, to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapons states. The Ukrainian Parliament also conditioned START ratification on the receipt of:

- technical and financial assistance for dismantling the strategic nuclear forces on its territory;
- compensation for the highly enriched uranium extracted from the nuclear weapons removed to Russia from Ukraine;
- security guarantees from Russia and the United States.

The U.S. has worked hard with Ukraine and Russia to satisfy Ukraine's concerns in these areas, and to facilitate the early deactivation and elimination of nuclear weapons now in Ukraine. At the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in January 1994, Presidents Clinton, Kravchuk, and Yeltsin signed a trilateral agreement that commits Ukraine to eliminate the nuclear weapons on its territory and return the warheads to Russia for dismantlement within seven years. In return, Ukraine will receive:

- compensation for the highly enriched uranium in those warheads;
- security assurances;
- assistance with dismantling the strategic nuclear forces on its territory;
- economic assistance.

President Kravchuk has recently resubmitted the START Treaty and the NPT to the Ukrainian Parliament.

In the meantime, we are continuing our efforts to make START work in a multilateral context. Although the Treaty has not yet entered into force, the U.S. and its four Treaty partners have been meeting regularly in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), established by the Treaty, to work out details of Treaty implementation. Much of the work of the JCIC has been devoted to the complicated and uncharted process of clarifying the Treaty rights and obligations of each of the four successor states to the former Soviet Union. Similar work is being done in the Special Verification Commission, charged with implementing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which has been in force since 1987, and which also has required adaptation to the post-Soviet world.

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II

Recognizing their mutual interest in stabilizing nuclear strategic nuclear forces at levels below those dictated by START I, on January 3, 1993 the U.S. and Russia signed the START II Treaty.

START II will further reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads down to approximately one third of the pre-START I levels. But START II's qualitative stabilizing features are at least as important as its numerical reductions.

By prohibiting heavy ICBMs and multiple warhead ICBMs, START II will significantly reduce first-strike potential and thereby increase stability. These weapons have long been considered destabilizing because they have been at once the most vulnerable strategic systems and those most capable of destroying large numbers of hard targets on the other side.

Like START I, START II will serve U.S. nonproliferation interests by helping to allay the security

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concerns of the other successor states to the former Soviet Union, and by demonstrating U.S.-Russian commitment to deep reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals.

START I and START II are separate agreements that will be in force simultaneously. START II relies heavily and explicitly on START I definitions and extensive verification procedures; by its own terms START II cannot be implemented until START I enters into force. It will remain in effect as long as START I does.

The ratification, entry into force, and full implementation of the START I and START II Treaties and the Lisbon Protocol by all Parties is at once the unfinished business of the Cold War and the first task of the post-Soviet era.

Future Strategic Arms Control

In the coming year, ACDA will explore the possibility of arms control measures designed to structure the world's major nuclear forces so as to further promote stability and reduce first-strike potential. ACDA also increasing its efforts to assess the impacts of new technology on strategic arms control and its verification.

Safety, Security, and Dismantlement (SSD) of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Safety, security, and dismantlement (SSD) of weapons of mass destruction from the arsenal of the former Soviet Union is a principal U.S. security concern and policy goal. This includes the complete denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as well as the accelerated reduction of Russia's nuclear weapons, the elimination of its chemical weapons, and the advancement of U.S. nonproliferation objectives.

The post-Soviet era has opened the possibility of advancing these security objectives not only through the traditional means of negotiated arms control agreements, but also through innovative cooperative efforts. The Nunn-Lugar Act authorized the President to spend up to \$400 million in Department of Defense funds in Fiscal Year 1992 to finance weapons dismantlement and nonproliferation in the four states of the former Soviet Union with strategic nuclear weapons located on their territory. A further \$800 million in Department of Defense funds has been appropriated for Fiscal Years 1993-1994.

SSD assistance is already being provided to Belarus and Russia. Umbrella and implementing agreements with Kazakhstan and Ukraine entered into force in December 1993 and January 1994, and technical assistance is now under way.

SSD assistance takes many forms, depending on U.S. interests and the needs of the recipient country. These include programs to:

- facilitate and expedite the elimination of strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and chemical weapons (both the United States and Russia have already begun to eliminate strategic nuclear weapon delivery vehicles that will be subject to the START I Treaty limits);
- facilitate the deactivation and safe and secure return of nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement;
- assist Russian efforts to provide safe and secure storage for special nuclear materials recovered from dismantled weapons;
- provide support for establishing continuous communication links in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine for transmission of arms control treaty-related notifications.

We are concerned that Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine ensure that expertise and special materials for weapons of mass destruction, and of course the weapons themselves, do not spread within their borders to unauthorized individuals, or beyond their borders to other countries or sub-national groups. Thus, the U.S. is providing SSD assistance to:

- help design, establish, or improve export control systems to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies;
- establish or enhance the existing national systems of nuclear material control and accounting and physical protection, to help these states better protect civilian nuclear materials against possible internal or external proliferation threats;
- establish science and technology centers in Moscow and Kiev that will fund scientific projects to engage the scientific talent formerly employed by the military-industrial complex in more productive and peaceful non-military endeavors.

Finally, U.S. assistance is helping the recipient nations overcome the economic and environmental consequences of the Cold War by:

- promoting the conversion of defense industrial, technological and scientific facilities and personnel to more productive and peaceful endeavors;
- assisting, to the extent resources permit, with environmental assessment at former Soviet military facilities.

HALTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has long been a fundamental national security and foreign policy objective of the United States. Nuclear proliferation threatens regional security and challenges our ability to assist allies and friends during a conflict. It can lead to increasingly dangerous arms races throughout the world. Of even greater concern, it can increase the risk that nuclear weapons will be used.

Strong U.S. leadership and support for this framework has been a consistent feature of U.S. foreign and national security policy. The present Administration has declared the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to be one of the primary foreign policy concerns of the United States. As President Clinton emphasized in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, 1993, *"One of our urgent priorities must be attacking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction...and the ballistic missiles that can rain them down on populations hundreds of miles away."*

The next day the President announced the establishment of a framework for U.S. policy on nonproliferation and export control. Key elements of the U.S. policy are directed at nuclear nonproliferation, including:

- achieving the indefinite extension of the NPT;
- affirming support for the IAEA and the need to ensure it has adequate resources;
- reaffirming support for the Nuclear Suppliers Group;
- implementing domestic export controls that recognize both U.S. nonproliferation objectives and the commercial needs of U.S. exporters.

President Clinton also announced a series of new initiatives concerning fissile materials. The United States will undertake a comprehensive approach to the growing accumulation of fissile material, both from

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President Clinton also announced a series of new initiatives concerning fissile materials. The United States will undertake a comprehensive approach to the growing accumulation of fissile material, both from

dismantled nuclear weapons and from civil nuclear programs. Under this approach, the United States will:

- seek to ban any addition to stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium outside of IAEA safeguards, and to ensure that existing stockpiles are subject to the highest standards of safety, security, and accountability;
 - propose a multilateral convention prohibiting the production of HEU or plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes or outside international safeguards;
 - encourage more restrictive regional arrangements to constrain fissile material production in regions of instability and high proliferation risk;
 - submit U.S. fissile material no longer needed for our deterrent to inspection by the IAEA;
 - explore means to limit the stockpiling of plutonium from civil nuclear programs, and seek to minimize the civil use of HEU;
 - initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for plutonium disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary, and economic considerations.
- more here?*
Deserve more for

Nuclear nonproliferation has never been a uniquely American interest; it depends on broad international cooperation. The international community has a deep stake in a successful nuclear nonproliferation regime. The United States will continue to maintain close ties with its allies in this area, well as with Russia and other countries.

Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. With more than 160 Parties, it is the most widely-accepted multilateral arms control treaty in history and represents the primary legal and political barrier to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT establishes a framework essential to global and regional stability, for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and for facilitating and regulating cooperation among states in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Under Article I of the NPT, each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty (U.S., U.K., Russia, France, and China) pledges *"...not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; and not in any way to encourage, or induce a non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices."*

Under Article II of the NPT, each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty pledges *"...not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."*

Under Article III, each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities as a means to verify the pledge under Article II.

Under Article IV, the NPT Parties have a right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and all Parties undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Under Article VI of the NPT, Parties to the Treaty undertake "to pursue negotiations in good faith effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

It is noteworthy that, while Article VI does not mandate any specific action regarding any specific weapon, it has nevertheless been implemented to a significant degree. The INF Treaty constituted the major step toward disarmament by eliminating and outlawing an entire class of nuclear weapons. The 1991 reciprocal initiative on tactical nuclear weapons, reviewed on page 5, constituted a rapid and cooperative withdrawal for elimination of nearly all of the world's tactical nuclear weapons. START II will take another major step by eliminating MIRV ICBMs and heavy ICBMs.

EXTENSION OF THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY BEYOND 1995. In 1995, by the terms of the Treaty, a critically important conference of NPT Parties will be convened to "decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or fixed periods."

The U.S. Government strongly supports the NPT and is engaged in efforts to achieve its indefinite, unconditional extension in 1995. 1993 NPT-related activities of the U.S. Government in focused largely on preparing for the 1995 NPT Conference and on broadening support for its indefinite extension. In addition, the U.S. Government continued to address Parties' noncompliance with NPT obligations, and to promote adherence to the Treaty.

ACDA is leading U.S. Government participation in negotiations on the NPT and its extension in 1995. Preparations for the 1995 NPT Conference are well underway. In May 1993, the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPT Conference was held in New York at U.N. Headquarters. The meeting was attended by a record number of NPT Parties and served as a productive beginning to the year preparatory phase for the 1995 NPT Conference. ACDA led the U.S. delegation to the May PrepCom meeting. Throughout 1993, ACDA conducted numerous bilateral consultations with key NPT Parties in Washington, New York, Geneva, and Vienna in an effort to promote broad international support for the indefinite extension of the NPT. This outcome has now been endorsed by a number of states, including the members of NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the South Pacific Forum, and the G-7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, U.K., and U.S.). In addition, support among developing nations for indefinite extension is beginning to emerge.

Preparations for the 1995 NPT Conference are being made in the context of severe challenges to the international nonproliferation regime, including the still-unresolved situation in Iraq and North Korea's announcement that it would withdraw from the NPT rather than submit its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections. These events caused some NPT Parties concern about overall compliance with the Treaty and the effectiveness of the IAEA in assuring that safeguards are effectively applied. ACDA has participated in U.S. efforts to address the situations in Iraq and North Korea, and has supported IAEA initiatives to improve strengthen the IAEA safeguards system.

While challenges to a successful NPT extension outcome remain, significant opportunities have emerged over the past year for strengthening and broadening the international nonproliferation regime that in turn will reinforce U.S. efforts to extend the NPT indefinitely. Such opportunities include:

- the decision to begin negotiation of a comprehensive test ban (CTB) treaty at the Conference on Disarmament;
- the agreement to begin negotiation of a multilateral convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes;

- the continuing efforts by U.S. and Russia to implement START I and II.

These initiatives have had a positive effect on the NPT, particularly on the record of NPT Parties in meeting their obligations under Article VI.

BRINGING ADDITIONAL MEMBERS INTO THE NPT. ACDA continued a substantial program throughout 1993 to encourage wider adherence to the NPT. Following the accession of ten new states in 1992, seven more states - Armenia, Belarus, Czech Republic, Guyana, Mauritania, Slovakia, and St. Kitts & Nevis - joined the Treaty in 1993.

The accession of Belarus was particularly significant and welcome, given continuing concerns about the disposition of nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union stationed on its territory. ACDA has continued to work to bring the remaining New Independent States of the former Soviet Union into the Treaty. We welcomed Kazakhstan's parliamentary action to ratify the NPT; this action brings it closer to meeting its pledge to join the NPT, which will require deposit of a formal instrument with one of the three NPT depositing governments. We anticipate that Kyrgyzstan may take up the issue of accession in the near future. The Ukrainian Parliament's unacceptable conditioned ratification of START I and its failure to ratify the NPT, however, are sources of continuing concern. There is reason for hope that the January 14, 1994 statement by the Presidents of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine will lead to early progress on these issues.

In addition to efforts with the New Independent States, ACDA continues to urge non-Parties in other regions, including South Asia and the Middle East, to join the Treaty. We are also encouraging all NPT Parties that have not done so to complete the IAEA safeguards agreements that are required by the Treaty.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

For over 30 years, the International Atomic Energy Agency has served vital U.S. security and nonproliferation interests through its program of international safeguards, which provide assurances that nuclear materials are not diverted from civilian to military purposes. It plays a central role in international efforts to make the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy available to countries worldwide. The IAEA has also helped make nuclear facilities safer worldwide through its nuclear safety program.

The United States is one of the IAEA's strongest supporters and provides approximately 25 percent of its annual budget. The United States is also a significant contributor to its technical assistance and cooperation programs, which are supported by voluntary contributions of the membership.

Although the IAEA has operated with a zero-real-growth budget since 1984, it has, so far, successfully met the challenge of increased responsibilities. However, since 1992 the Agency has been forced to cut some programs and defer others across the board each year. New activities, including Agency safeguards on U.S. material from dismantled nuclear weapons, verification activities for a potential fissile material production cut-off convention, and the acceptance by additional states of full-scope safeguards, nevertheless will place additional resource demands on the Agency. The U.S. is committed to ensuring adequate resources for safeguards and recognizes that significant resources will be required. ACDA is working with the State Department to help define long-term funding approaches for increased IAEA responsibilities.

IAEA SAFEGUARDS. The IAEA's international nuclear safeguards system was developed to help provide assurance to all states that nuclear activities placed under safeguards are directed toward peaceful purposes, to dissuade potential proliferators from using safeguarded nuclear materials for other than peaceful purposes.

and to detect diversion of these materials from peaceful uses. IAEA safeguards form a comprehensive system of accounting and reporting procedures, on-site inspection, and nuclear material measurements and surveillance. The system is based on a network of 188 separate international agreements between the IAEA and participating states, based on NPT membership and/or conditions of supply of peaceful nuclear technology and materials.

The IAEA's experience in carrying out inspections under U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, including its discovery of Iraq's violations of its safeguards agreement, has led the IAEA and its member states to consider and implement measures to strengthen the safeguards system, particularly with respect to undeclared activities.

In 1992 the IAEA's Board of Governors reaffirmed the IAEA's statutory right to undertake special inspections of undeclared nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon states with comprehensive safeguards agreements. The Board also approved measures for early provision of design information for planned nuclear facilities and expanded reporting of transfers of nuclear material, material and equipment. It is considering environmental monitoring to improve detection of undeclared activities. These and other proposals will be considered further in 1994. ACDA is playing a key role in analyzing and reviewing measures to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system.

The IAEA continues to administer an extensive safeguards program, which is integral to the NPT's purpose of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. In 1992 the IAEA safeguarded approximately 35 tons of separated plutonium, 366 tons of plutonium contained in irradiated nuclear reactor fuels, 11 tons of high-enriched uranium, 36,000 tons of low-enriched uranium, and 78,000 tons of natural and depleted uranium. Safeguarding these materials, 493 nuclear facilities and some 320 smaller installations were involved, most of which were located in states that do not have nuclear weapons and which accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities. The IAEA conducted 2,047 inspections in 1992, verified the integrity of 21,000 seals, reviewed approximately 5,320 surveillance records, and analyzed 1,439 samples.

In 1993, ACDA devoted special attention, through the IAEA's Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation, to recommending ways to correct the shortcomings in IAEA safeguards revealed by the Iraq experience. These recommendations are now being aggressively pursued by the IAEA. They focus on very sensitive techniques, including environmental monitoring, for detecting clandestine nuclear facilities. ACDA also continued to promote the adoption of advanced safeguards for civilian nuclear facilities that will process or use separated plutonium as nuclear fuel.

During 1993, ACDA and other U.S. experts held bilateral consultations on IAEA safeguards issues with Australia, the European Atomic Energy Community, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. TI talks dealt with strengthening existing safeguards and implementing safeguards in new plutonium facilities. We reached agreement with each of the Parties on support for IAEA field testing and assessment of new safeguards techniques.

IAEA TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. The IAEA provides peaceful nuclear assistance in such areas as medicine, agriculture, and industry. The United States provides support to its technical assistance programs, both through voluntary contributions to the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund and through voluntary "in-kind" contributions. These contributions include equipment for research, donations of expert services, training courses, and fellowships for study in the United States. The United States has considerable discretion over the distribution of these contributions, giving preference to states that have joined the NPT or are Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco (see page 16). In this way the United States has demonstrated tangibly that adherence to these nonproliferation treaties facilitates access to peaceful nuclear technology, an

important benefit of these agreements.

ACDA continues to supply vital expertise toward the review and monitoring of the IAEA's various technical programs. ACDA is represented on the interagency International Technical Liaison Organization which oversees technical cooperation with the IAEA. Technologies that increase the risks of nuclear proliferation are discouraged, while others that reduce potential proliferation risks are supported.

Under Article IV of the NPT United States has pledged to foster *"the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of developing areas of the world."* The U.S. has steadfastly pursued this pledge through the technical assistance and cooperation programs of the IAEA and on a bilateral basis to enable the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Since its founding in 1957, the IAEA's technical assistance and cooperation programs have been instrumental in bringing the benefits of nuclear energy in the fields of electrical power generation, medicine, agriculture and science to both the developed and developing countries around the world, with considerable technical and financial support from the U.S.

The IAEA's technical cooperation programs largely focus on projects and activities requested and carried out by individual member states. Regional programs that support training and joint projects have also been instituted in Latin America, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia and the Pacific. By making a positive contribution to human health, agriculture and other fields utilizing nuclear techniques in developing countries, which comprise the majority of IAEA members, the technical assistance and cooperation programs generate widespread international support for the Agency. However, many developing countries view the technical assistance programs as the major benefit they receive for their continuing support of the NPT and IAEA safeguards. The U.S. pursues technical assistance and cooperation programs, therefore, not simply for the important developmental assistance they provide, but also as an integral part of our broader nonproliferation policy. In addition, the technical assistance programs help bring a system of oversight and stability to the international transfer of nuclear-related technology.

The United States supports the Agency's technical assistance programs in two ways:

- through voluntary contributions ("pledges") to the Agency's Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund to support the "hardcore" programs of the Agency's technical cooperation efforts;
- through "in-kind" extrabudgetary contributions made directly to specific programs or projects. The United States provides equipment, experts, training courses and fellowships for study in the U.S.

Defense Industry Conversion in Russia

Major legacies of the Cold War include not only the weapons of mass destruction, but also the industries and people capable of producing them. The competitors in that confrontation now face enormous defense industrial overcapacity. Conversion of that capacity to peaceful commercial uses that contribute to economic growth is essential.

The problem is especially acute in the former Soviet Union, since these nations are attempting to transform themselves from command economies to a market system at the same time they are trying to

convert a major portion of their military production to commercial purposes.

One of the most potent weapons in the world today is the mind of a knowledgeable Russian nuclear weapons scientist. This mind is attached to a body which must be fed, and which in turn is usually attached to a family which must also be fed. Scientists around the world are usually well paid, but present economic conditions in Russia frequently do not support paying scientists on the scale they deserve and to which they are accustomed. If relatively well-financed would-be proliferant states are willing to pay well for the use of the scientist's mind, Russian economic conversion becomes a matter of obvious American national interest.

It is in the national security interest of the United States that Russia and other New Independent States convert their defense industries rapidly and effectively. The U.S. and Russian governments have established a Joint Commission on the Diversification of Defense Industry, in which ACDA participates.

Through the re-orientation of nuclear weapons R&D to industrial R&D, there is a potential for former military scientists to create long-term high-technology civilian enterprises that can be commercially viable. To evaluate this concept ACDA, together with the U.S. Department of Energy and Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), has co-sponsored entrepreneurial workshops in Moscow and the United States. The objectives of these workshops are:

- to facilitate conversion of a major portion of Russian nuclear weapons R&D complexes into market-driven, commercially viable industrial R&D enterprises;
- to encourage weapons scientists to contributing to a market-based economy;
- to exploit the enterprise- and job-creation potential of the high technology capabilities of the Russian nuclear weapons complex.

Building on the 1992 Boston experimental workshop, a prototype workshop was held in Moscow in June 1993 for 22 scientists from MINATOM weapons laboratories Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70. The Moscow workshop trained the participants in the basic entrepreneurial skills of R&D capability and production capacity assessment, market research, capability-to-market matching, market-driven product development, business plans, business organization, intellectual property rights evaluation and protection, capital investment, and funding plans. The focus of the training was on being able to develop effective business plans that could attract American venture capitalists and joint venture partners.

The MINATOM minister has requested more workshops be held in the U.S. and Russia. The third workshop is being planned for March at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in California, and the fourth one for the summer of 1994 at Arzamas-16. The Livermore workshop, planned for about 25 Russian nuclear weapons scientists from Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70, will develop further the concepts learned in the Moscow workshop and focus on developing industrial partnerships. The workshop will include industrial participation and will perform business planning case studies based on competitively selected technical proposals from the MINATOM labs.

Nuclear Weapons Free Zones

With the end of the Cold War and the consequent great reduction in the nuclear arms competition between the United States and the states of the former Soviet Union, new attention has been given to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free-zones in many areas of the world. The United States supports the creation of such zones in regions where they would contribute to the achievement of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals and would be consistent with other U.S. national security interests.

THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO. One of the models for these efforts is the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco after the section of Mexico City in which it was signed on February 14, 1967. The Treaty of Tlatelolco predates the NPT and represents the first effort by a group of states to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a heavily populated region.

The Treaty now has 24 Latin American and Caribbean Contracting Parties that have pledged not to develop, manufacture, or acquire nuclear weapons. As Contracting Parties, these states have accepted the application of IAEA safeguards for all their nuclear activities in order to assist in verifying compliance with the Treaty. The Treaty also establishes a regional organization, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (known by its Spanish acronym OPANAL), to help ensure compliance with its provisions.

The Treaty will come fully into force when all eligible states have signed and ratified (as necessary according to their laws) the Treaty and its two Protocols, and concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA. States can, however, individually waive this requirement for universal adherence and declare the Treaty in force for their respective territories, thereby creating the nuclear free zone in a piecemeal fashion.

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Cuba are Latin American states with nuclear programs that have not yet brought the Treaty into force. However, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are close to bringing the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force for their respective national territories.

Argentina and Chile completed their domestic ratification procedures in late fall of 1993. The Brazilian Congress is also close to completing its ratification of the 1992 amendments; the Chamber of Deputies approved the amendments in October, 1993 and the Senate may vote its approval soon. Argentina and Brazil have already committed in a 1991 bilateral treaty not to produce, test, manufacture, acquire, receive, or store any nuclear weapon and to use nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. It is possible that all three countries will bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco fully into force for their national territories in early 1994. When this occurs, Cuba will be the sole Latin American country with a nuclear program to remain outside the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The Cuban Government has announced on several occasions its intention to join the Treaty "when all the other states of the region have done so."

The Treaty of Tlatelolco, like the NPT, requires its Contracting Members to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. In their 1991 bilateral treaty for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Argentina and Brazil created the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), a bilateral agency dedicated to applying IAEA-like safeguards in both countries. In December 1991, Argentina, Brazil, and ABACC concluded and signed a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. When in force, this agreement will fulfill Tlatelolco's safeguards obligations by providing for IAEA safeguards on all peaceful nuclear activities in the two countries, including a number of previously unsafeguarded, sensitive facilities. Safeguards will be carried out by both the IAEA and ABACC, jointly and independently. After entry

into force and complete implementation of the agreement, the longstanding proliferation concerns associated with the nuclear programs of Argentina and Brazil will have been significantly reduced. Argentina and Brazil are close to bringing their quadripartite comprehensive safeguards accord with the IAEA into force. The Argentine Congress approved the ratification of the agreement in August 1992, but the Brazilian Congress not yet completed its legislative procedures. Meanwhile, ABACC has continued and expanded its inspection of both countries' nuclear-related facilities.

The United States remains firmly committed to the goals of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and will continue to seek its full implementation. The Treaty makes a substantial contribution to regional peace and stability, well to strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime as a whole.

THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE. In August 1985, eight members of the South Pacific Forum signed the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga. The Treaty now in force for 11 of the 15 Forum members, including Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, and the Solomon Islands. The Treaty bans the manufacture, possession, stationing, and testing of any nuclear explosive device in territories in the zone for which the Parties are internationally responsible, as well as the dumping of radioactive waste at sea. Three Protocols extend the Treaty's provisions to states outside the zone:

- Protocol I requires states with territories in the region to apply the prohibitions on manufacture, stationing, and testing of nuclear explosive devices to their territories;
- Protocol II commits the five declared nuclear-weapon states not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against Parties to the Treaty or Protocol Parties' territories within the zone;
- Protocol III commits the five nuclear weapon states not to test any nuclear explosive device within the zone.

The United States Government is currently reviewing its policy toward the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone in the context of its broad examination of U.S. nonproliferation policies.

AFRICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONE. The U.S. has supported the concept of the denuclearization of Africa since the first United Nations General Assembly resolution in 1964. However, no real progress made until South Africa, the continent's most advanced state in both peaceful and military nuclear technology, joined the NPT in mid-1991. In April of this year, an Organization for African Unity "Experts Group" convened in Harare, Zimbabwe to begin the process of drafting a treaty. The initial text produced by that meeting is based largely on the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and includes new provisions on the physical protection of nuclear material and the prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations; its three protocols are similar to those of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. The U.S. is identified as eligible to sign the non-use and non-testing Protocols only, as it has no territories for which it is internationally responsible in the African region.

The Experts Group will meet two more times in 1994, and intends to have a final text ready for signature at the next Organization of African Unity Summit meeting in June 1994. The U.S. was asked by officials of the Group to review informally the draft text produced by the Harare meeting. The United States Government, with ACDA as the lead agency, will continue to comment on subsequent drafts of the proposed treaty in light of U.S. national security interests.

International Export Controls

The United States has long urged cooperation among countries that export nuclear and nuclear-related materials and equipment to ensure that commerce in this area does not contribute to nuclear proliferation. This cooperation ranges from bilateral discussion of individual cases to development and implementation of multilateral guidelines. Multilateral cooperation largely takes place in the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group; these bodies have done valuable work in this area which we review on page 49.

Emerging Nuclear Suppliers. The question of promoting responsible nuclear export policies with new suppliers was a major topic of bilateral and multilateral discussion during 1993. The United States believes that such efforts should continue and strives to ensure that export activities by new suppliers are held under arrangements that minimize the danger of nuclear proliferation. Our basic underlying objective is to encourage new suppliers to accept the fundamental nuclear export norms embodied in the Zangger guidelines which pertain to NPT Parties, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines which pertain to all nuclear suppliers. As new suppliers enter the international market, it is important to encourage them to adopt the same rules that govern the behavior of the traditional supplier nations.

If a new supplier is an NPT party, the task is somewhat easier, because Parties to that Treaty have undertaken obligations to require IAEA safeguards on certain nuclear exports. For example, South Africa's accession to the NPT led it to join the Zangger committee in 1992. Even new non-NPT suppliers such as Argentina understand the importance of verifying the peaceful use commitments of their nuclear trading partners and have announced in recent years that their nuclear exports will be subject to IAEA safeguards. Argentina's comprehensive new nuclear export control policy (including acceptance of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply) and adherence to the NSG Guidelines led to an invitation for it to participate in the 1993 NSG plenary as an observer. These are historic changes in Argentina's export policies which the United States has recognized and applauded.

On the other hand, China's nuclear exports continue to be a major source of concern. While the IAEA approved a safeguards agreement covering the sale of a research reactor to Algeria, the earlier secret nature of this cooperation gives rise to suspicion about the transaction. Moreover, its nuclear cooperation with Iran and Pakistan raises serious questions about China's nuclear export policies. The United States continues to oppose China's decision to supply a nuclear power plant to Pakistan without requiring full-scope IAEA safeguards, and has protested the decision announced in 1992 to provide a similar power plant to Iran. China's decision to suspend its participation in the Middle East arms control supplier initiative also raises questions concerning its support for responsible nonproliferation export policies.

BANNING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE TESTING

Recent events have enhanced prospects for a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) treaty.

On July 3, 1993, President Clinton reversed 12 years of U.S. Government opposition to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, declaring: "A test ban can strengthen our efforts worldwide to halt the spread of nuclear weapons." He also extended the 1992 Congressionally-mandated moratorium on U.S. nuclear explosive testing through September 1994, and called upon other nuclear-weapons powers to observe similar restraint. He explained that by doing so, he put the United States "in the strongest position to negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban and to discourage other nations from developing their own nuclear arsenals."

In August the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) decided to begin CTB negotiations at the outset of its January 1994 session. In November the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution that supports CTB negotiations "as a priority task." The CD decision and the U.N. resolution were approved by consensus; all five nuclear-weapon states, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, supported them both. Therefore, there is virtually universal support, in principle, for a CTB. A negotiating mandate was agreed to at the CD on January 25, and preparations are now complete for rapid CTB negotiations

CTB treaty has traditionally been a goal for the United States and for many other states, but a longstanding question has been whether we can ensure effective verification. ^{the ability} ~~Good international monitoring~~ to detect and identify explosive events is essential for detecting and deterring violators, while minimizing false alarms. Devising an effective international monitoring regime will be a major challenge to the members of the CD.

ACDA will manage the CTBT negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, will chair the CTBT backstopping group in Washington, and will provide expert members to the U.S. delegation to the Conference.

II. ELIMINATING CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

While the mass destruction potential of a chemical or biological weapon is many times greater than that of a conventional weapon, the technology needed for its design and manufacture is only marginally greater than that needed for a conventional weapon. More than two dozen countries have programs to research or develop chemical weapons and a number of them, including Libya, Iran, and Iraq, have stockpiled such weapons.

In the past year the world has taken major steps toward total elimination of chemical and biological weapons. An exceptionally significant step was the opening for signature and ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

ELIMINATING CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

Chemical weapons elimination efforts have been conducted on two tracks: a worldwide negotiating track, and a U.S.-Russian negotiating track.

Chemical Weapons Convention

This very far-reaching treaty bans all research, development, stockpiling, transfer and possession of chemical weapons.

More than 20 years of negotiations were completed on September 3, 1992, when the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva forwarded the finished Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to the United Nations General Assembly. The General Assembly endorsed it by consensus on November 30, 1992. The supporting resolution was cosponsored by 145 countries.

The CWC was opened for signature by President George Bush on January 13, 1993 at Paris. 130 countries, including the United States, became original signatories within three days. As of December 1993, 164 countries have signed the CWC, and four have deposited instruments of ratification. Signatories include China, India, Pakistan, virtually all European countries except former Yugoslavia, all former Soviet republics except Uzbekistan, and all Western Hemisphere states except Suriname and some of the English-speaking Caribbean nations. The most significant non-signatories include Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, North Korea, Syria.

The CWC will enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, but no earlier than January 1995; thus 65 ratifications are needed by July 1994 for entry into force by January 1995. During his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, 1993 the President said, "I call on all nations, including my own, to ratify this accord quickly so that it may enter into force by January 13, 1995."

President Clinton submitted the CWC to the U.S. Senate for Advice and Consent November 23, 1993 emphasizing that "This Treaty is one of the most ambitious in the history of arms control, banning an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. It is a central element of my Administration's nonproliferation policy. The Treaty will significantly enhance our national security and contribute to greater global security." The Administration hopes to complete ratification of the CWC by the summer of 1994 to help ensure entry into force at the earliest date provided in the Convention, which is January 1995.

Secure prompt Senate advice and consent to ratification as a means of promoting

"this correct? or have they
"ratified the Convention."

ACDA is the U.S. Government agency on the CWC. This includes:

- chairing backstopping and task force meetings;
- developing and coordinating guidance for U.S. Government negotiators;
- chairing task force meetings and developing and coordinating Executive Branch policy on CWC ratification, including:
 - preparing the Article-by-Article analysis of the Convention and draft implementing legislation;
 - preparing the report to Congress on verifiability of the CWC which is required under Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act;
- supervising and administering U.S. budgeting process for the CWC;
- acting as the Office of National Authority that will interface with the OPCW and coordinate U.S. CWC-related administrative and logistical actions in the U.S. after entry into force of the Convention;
- informing and educating U.S. chemical industry about the CWC.

CWC PREPARATORY COMMISSION (PrepCom). Because of the similarity between CW facilities and various commercial chemical facilities, and because of the large number of member nations possessing such facilities, CWC implementation will be a far more ambitious undertaking than implementation of any previous arms control agreement. Verification and other aspects of implementation of this Convention require the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to have a full-time staff of approximately 500 trained and equipped to conduct large numbers of expert inspections anywhere in the world. *Comm*

If the Chemical Weapons Convention is to be credible, its verification apparatus must be able to swing into full operation the moment the Convention enters into force. It has, therefore, been necessary to establish a ~~substantive~~ Preparatory Commission to establish procedures, purchase inspection equipment, and train inspectors to be fully in place at the time of entry into force. *develop*

Both the OPCW and the PrepCom are located in The Hague, which was chosen because it offered the most functionally and financially attractive package.

Americans hold three key positions in the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS): Head of Administration, Chief of Industry Verification, and Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary for Policy. The PTS is the implementing and support body of the Preparatory Commission and will evolve into the OPCW Technical Secretariat.

The PrepCom convened in its first plenary session February 8-12, 1993. Subsequent plenary meetings were held April 19-23, June 28-July 2, September 27-October 1, and December 13-16. PrepCom Expert Groups met during the year, between plenary sessions, on:

- Rules of Procedure;
- Privileges and Immunities;
- Budget;
- Program of Work;
- Financial Regulations;
- Staff Rules;
- Data Systems;
- OPCW Building;
- Chemical Engineering;
- Safety and Health;
- Inspection Team Composition;
- Technical Cooperation and Assistance;
- Analytical Chemistry;
- Industry Declarations;
- Equipment;
- Training;
- Chemical Weapons Facilities;
- Chemical Industry Facilities;
- Single Small Scale Facility;
- Challenge Inspections;
- Technical Cooperation and Assistance;
- Old and Abandoned Chemical Weapons;
- CWC Implementation.

Each Expert Group reports to a Working Group. Working Groups meet only during PrepCom plenary sessions to approve Expert Group intersessional work before sending it to the plenary. There are two Working Groups: Working Group A deals with Budget and Administrative matters, while Working Group B deals with Verification and Technical Assistance.

Two PrepCom issues have been particularly contentious: Israeli regional group participation has been complicated by Arab nations' opposition to including Israel in the Asian group, which would be its natural geographic place. Instead, the European Community may, at least temporarily, accept Israel into the European group. Language usage for the Expert Groups has also been an ongoing issue. While PrepCom plenary and Working Group sessions were interpreted into all six U.N. official languages (English, French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, and Arabic) and all plenary documents translated into all six, English was the sole working language for Expert Groups. France, sometimes supported by Canada, has pressed for French to be added. Other delegations objected for budgetary reasons, and some delegations insisted that if French added the other four U.N. languages would have to be added as well; this would have dramatically increased the cost of the Expert Groups. The working solution has been to continue English as the sole working language unless a delegation specifically requested translation/interpretation into one of the other U.N. languages for a particular Expert Group session.

*The Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG)
is exploring the possibility of temporary
Israeli participation in its group.*

As of the end of 1993, the PrepCom

- developed organization, staffing, and structure, hiring 66 staff members;
- established guidelines for inspection team composition, inspection and laboratory equipment lists.;
- outlined the training program for future inspectors.;
- developed staff and financial regulations;
- finalized a Host Country agreement;
- begun planning for a permanent building;
- completed substantial work on required declarations and on an information management system
- conducted seminars on implementing legislation and conduct of inspections for representatives of member States

The PrepCom is planning to complete its work in 1994. Remaining work primarily consists of:

- developing the detailed instructions necessary for complete declarations and inspection preparation;
 - inspector training beginning in August 1994; inspection teams will be equipped and ready by the end of 1994;
- assisting member States in ratification efforts, sponsoring seminars for member States, and assisting National Authorities' preparation for complying with the Convention.;
- conducting multinational trial inspections.

United States-Russia Bilateral Negotiations and Agreements

Because Russia has ~~by far~~ the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons, we have a particular interest in helping them to dispose of it.

WYOMING MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU). At the September 23, 1989 Wyoming ministerial meeting, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a two-phase Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the purpose of building confidence in the superpowers' mutual willingness to de information necessary to comply with the future Chemical Weapons Convention.

Phase I provided for an exchange of general data on chemical stocks and production facilities, and for a series of exchange of visits to CW facilities. This phase was successfully completed in February 1991.

Phase II provided for an exchange of detailed data, and for intrusive challenge inspections at both declared and undeclared facilities. Implementation of this phase has required further negotiations. In 1993, ACDA led a negotiating team to Geneva and Moscow which reached agreement with Russian negotiators December 1, 1993. The two sides are now in the process of performing the text in preparation for signature. It provides for completion of data exchange by 120 days after signature, a trial challenge inspection by each side between 180 and 225 days after signature, and two routine inspections plus two challenge inspections by each side to be completed by 300 days after signature.

BILATERAL NON-PRODUCTION AND DESTRUCTION AGREEMENT (BDA). In this agreement, signed June 1, 1990, the United States and Russia commit to destroy all their existing chemical weapons and to produce no more chemical weapons, regardless of what other nations may or may not do with their chemical weapons. This agreement reflected a judgment by both Parties that deterrence of third-party chemical use does not require chemical weapons of our own. This judgment was subsequently supported by Desert Storm experience.

Since signing the BDA, ~~the states of the former U.S.S.R.~~ ^{has signed, Russia has} have experienced difficulty in preparing for chemical weapons destruction, which was scheduled to have begun by the end of 1992. Its pilot destruction facility was closed due to public environmental concerns. The changing political situation in the Former Soviet Union and the Russian Federation in 1991-2 slowed development of implementing procedures for the verification of non-production and destruction. The BDA schedule has now been aligned with the CWC

during the January
1994 Moscow
Summit.

schedule for total CW destruction within ten years of Entry Into Force.

The same ACDA-led United States delegation that negotiated implementation of Phase II of the Wyoming MOU simultaneously drafted protocols to the BDA, completing these protocols in March 1993. Within one month, the United States Government approved the draft and so notified the Russian Government. On September 17, Russia proposed changes, principally attempting to make conversion of former CW production facilities easier. In November-December 1993 the ACDA-led U.S. delegation went to Moscow where agreement on implementation of Phase II of the Wyoming MOU was reached, but consideration of the BDA was postponed. *The U.S. hopes to secure Russia's agreement to the BDA protocols as soon as possible in 1994.*

UNITED STATES-RUSSIA CW DESTRUCTION PROGRAM. On July 30, 1992, the United States and Russia signed an agreement to cooperate in the destruction of CW. Pursuant to the agreement, the U.S. has offered to provide \$25 million in Nunn-Lugar funds to help Russia:

- formulate a concept plan for its destruction program;
- purchase alarm systems for safety and warning purposes at CW destruction sites and during transport of CW to the destruction sites;
- train Russian technicians in U.S. CW destruction techniques;
- fund visits by Russian technical, ministerial, and local officials to U.S. CW destruction sites.

ACDA serves as the interagency policy coordinator for the CW destruction agreement, which is executed by the Department of Defense. The United States has set up a field office in Moscow to obtain the technical data needed to formulate a program of work which supports the Russian requirements, and six Russian interns are receiving training in the U.S.

Nevertheless, progress has been extremely slow. Despite years of effort, the actual Russian CW destruction program is stalled. While a rough concept plan has been created, no sites have been approved for destruction facilities, no decisions have been made about the technology to be used, and no Russian funds have been appropriated for facility construction. On January 7, 1994, the United States and Russia signed a Program of Work that includes receipt of Russian detailed technical data and competitive selection of a U.S. contractor to develop a comprehensive plan for Russian chemical weapons demilitarization.

showed this to be true? Thought report only through 12/93?

ELIMINATING BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (BW)

Development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons is prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972, to which 134 nations are Parties. We continue to seek means of strengthening this essential agreement through enhanced transparency.

In 1992 and 1993 ACDA led the U.S. delegation to the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts, mandated by the 1991 Review Conference of States Parties to the BWC. The Group identified and examined 21 potential verification measures for further consideration. Off-site measures include information monitoring, data exchange, remote sensing, and inspections. On-site measures include exchange visits, inspections, and continuous monitoring. *from a scientific and technical standpoint.*

The Group concluded that reliance could not be placed on any single measure, but that combination of measures could help to examine compliance while protecting sensitive commercial proprietary information and national security needs. *enhance*

The Group's Final Report has been distributed to all 134 Parties to the Convention. If requested by majority of the Parties, a Special Conference will be convened to discuss the Report. *The U.S. supports holding such a conference.*

The U.S. will promote new measures to provide increased transparency of 24 activities and facilities that could be used for biological weapons purposes.

ACDA 1993 Annual Report
Draft for NSC clearance
January 31, 1994, 522pm

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ELIMINATING PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (CBW)

While the Chemical Weapons Convention and the efforts of the Biological Weapons Convention Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts are major advances, all the news is not good. Over two dozen countries are researching or developing CW. In many instances, foreign biological weapons programs have closely on the heels of chemical weapons programs. A number of nations, including Iraq, Iran, and Libya, have chemical weapons in place.

to depile

Even after the CWC is in effect, nonproliferation measures will be needed to reduce the probability of noncompliance and choke off CBW programs in non-signatory nations. To this end, during 1993 ACDA reviewed approximately 1,500 U.S. export license applications to ensure that our nation is not inadvertently contributing to foreign CBW programs. ACDA also participated in the Interagency SHIELD CBW proliferation working group, which coordinates U.S. efforts to halt the foreign transfer of CBW-related materials to CBW programs of concern.

As the historical memory and informal Executive Secretary of the U.S. delegation to the 25-nation Australia Group, ACDA contributed to that group's adoption of comprehensive export controls on 54 CW precursors, CBW equipment and BW-related organisms and toxins. ACDA led U.S. efforts to obtain agreement on increased cooperation among Australia Group (see page 51) members on improving enforcement of existing export controls. ACDA also drafted the Australia Group's new program to coordinate technical assistance to non-member nations to help them control their CW-relevant exports. We also sought to secure adoption of the Group's new "no-undercut" policy, which ensures a level playing field for U.S. industry by committing all Australia Group members to honor the export license denials for nonproliferation reasons of other members.

We believe CBW proliferation can be fruitfully attacked from the demand side as well as the supply side. To this end, ACDA has urged and fully participated in U.S. consultation with countries known to have CBW, encouraging them to declare and destroy their stocks. We have also participated in U.S. consultations with non-Australia Group countries such as India, to help them implement effective CW export controls.

III. CONTROLLING MISSILES AND SPACE WEAPONS

Diplomacy and domestic factors,

MISSILE PROLIFERATION

The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union have multiplied both the threats from missile proliferation and the opportunities for dealing with it.

In 1993 U.S. arms control and nonproliferation efforts succeeded in a number of areas relating to missile nonproliferation:

- At the 1993 Plenary meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the member governments agreed to give new emphasis to dealing directly with the critical missile proliferation threat emanating from governments outside the Regime.
- Partly in response to years of U.S. diplomatic effort, Argentina has embarked on a new course with respect to missile proliferation. Its government has completely eliminated the Condor II ballistic missile program, which was a source of major concern because of its export potential. Argentina's responsible actions opened the way for its membership in the MTCR in November, 1993.
- Hungary also joined the Regime, having agreed to destroy its SCUD missile inventory.
- South Africa, also responding to a combination of U.S. political and technology transfer incentives, has terminated its missile-related space launch vehicle program, and is working toward eventual membership in the MTCR. *has adhered to the MTCR Guidelines.*
- Brazil's progress towards observing and eventually joining the MTCR has been slowed by domestic economic and political problems, but the U.S. continues to encourage progress in this direction.
- Russia has officially adhered to the MTCR via a bilateral agreement with the U.S.

Russian
At the same time, Russia's missile-related exports, *inconsistent with* the MTCR obliged the U.S. in 1992 to impose sanctions on Russian entities involved in the proposed transfer to India of cryogenic engines and related technology controlled under the MTCR. *required* With U.S. and Russian negotiations deadlocked and the transfers to the Indian Space Research Organization continuing, ACDA proposed a negotiating strategy that the U.S. put forward. The U.S. negotiating team, including ACDA experts, reached agreement with Russia July 1993. With this issue resolved, the way is open for Russia to qualify for membership in the MTCR, and to cooperate extensively with the U.S. in commercial space projects.

MTCR Annex items.
Chinese missile-related activities also presented difficult problems during 1993. Previously imposed U.S. sanctions had been lifted on the basis of Chinese assurances that they would not engage in future missile-related transfers in contravention of MTCR standards. However, accumulated evidence led the U.S. to conclude that China had transferred M-11 ballistic missile technology to Pakistan. After intense consultations in which ACDA participated, the U.S. again imposed sanctions on the entities involved, requiring for two years (1) denial of new export licenses for MTCR Annex items, and (2) denial of U.S. Government contracts relating to the specific list of missile-related items controlled by MTCR members. Simultaneously, the U.S. offered China the opportunity to solve the problem along lines which have proven productive with Russia. *Equipment*
Negotiations to this end are under way.

South Asia is presently the scene of a ballistic missile arms race. Both India and Pakistan are building nuclear-capable missile systems - Pakistan in reaction to India, and India as a counterweight to Chinese and Pakistani missile capabilities. In an attempt to slow and ultimately reverse this competition, the U.S. proposed a sequence of arms control steps, *acquired* now are under consideration by India and Pakistan to cap and eventually roll back their missile programs.

North Korea remains a producer and supplier of missiles and technology, while refusing to accept IAE inspections which could determine the existence of an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. The MTCR

We also believe it is

partners, acting collectively as well as individually, continue to press North Korea to cease its missile proliferation.

but
little progress has been made in
~~The entire Middle East region remains largely unresponsive to arms control and non-proliferation measures, with the principal exception of the inspection and sanction activities following the military defeat of Iraq. We are hopeful that the agreement in process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization may begin to change this.~~ *positive developments in the peace process*

In the meantime, the U.S. is continuing to support freely the UN Special Commission activities in Iraq.

The Interagency Missile Trade Analysis Group, for which an ACDA officer serves as Executive Secretary, is the focal point for efforts to curb missile proliferation. This group initiated numerous diplomatic demarches and pursued other channels when necessary to interdict international commercial transactions that could contribute to missile projects of concern. From a supply-side perspective, ACDA participates in the Interagency Missile Technology Export Control group which reviews all munitions and dual-use licenses for consistency with MTCR criteria and U.S. policy considerations.

With the change in Administrations, ACDA played a key role in drafting portions of various Presidential Reviews and Decision Directives outlining U.S. policy regarding missile and space issues.

SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES

The technology used in space launch vehicles (SLVs) to place civilian payloads in orbit is almost identical to the technology used in a ballistic missile. In recognition of this, the MTCR controls space launch technology in the same way it controls missile technology, except where the technology cannot contribute to a vehicle capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. In practice, making such distinctions is sometimes difficult.

As a consequence of the new U.S. policy of cooperation with Russia in commercial space matters, the U.S. export control community has received an increasing flow of license applications involving the importation of Russian space technology, and cooperative projects involving combinations of U.S. and Russian expertise. The U.S. offer to Russia of a share in the U.S. space station project illustrates this trend. ACDA is the arms control voice in the resulting policy and licensing decisions when missile proliferation issues are raised — for example, by the need to supply Russia with technical information in connection the provision of Russian services, or by the provision by Russia of launch hardware and/or technology to non-MTCR members including India or China.

Whenever U.S. launch vehicles and/or technology are being considered for export, ACDA ensures that nonproliferation considerations are addressed, consistent with U.S. policy and our MTCR responsibilities. Political and physical safeguards developed by ACDA have been used in formulating U.S. agreements with Russia, Brazil and South Africa.

The existence of a rapidly growing commercial space market in which the U.S. can play an important role has helped to advance our missile nonproliferation objectives. The U.S. agreement on terms for regulating Russian access to the U.S. commercial launch market, and U.S.-Russian agreement on participation in the U.S. space station, were decisive factors in gaining Russian agreement to terminate the Indian Space Research Organization project and accept MTCR standards regarding future exports.

MISSILES USED AS SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES

Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan are all considering converting ICBMs and SLBMs to be deactivated under START into space launch vehicles, and marketing civilian space launch services with them. To the extent this occurs, the U.S. must be assured that the START restrictions on ICBMs and SLBMs are being adhered to, that ballistic missiles are not being flight tested under the guise of space launches, and that critical missile technologies and systems do not fall into the hands of others. START prohibits transfers of strategic

offensive arms to third countries. ICBMs or SLBMs, when converted to SLVs, are still ICBMs or SLBMs for purposes of that prohibition. In addition, the U.S. has, for both START-limited systems and other missiles, broader missile nonproliferation concerns reflected in the MTCR and in U.S. law requiring imposition of trade and contract sanctions on entities in non-MTCR countries that export missile technology contrary to the MTCR..

To be profitable, space launch services must be sold to the international market, and the countries that do so must have agreements with the countries and or international organizations to which they will provide these services. The U.S. has signed such an agreement with Russia which will also entail Russia's observance of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The agreement will permit Russia to contract for up to eight launches into geosynchronous (very high) orbit between 1998 and 2000.

3?

Correct
dates?

IV. CONTROLLING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Unlike chemical and biological weapons which we hope to eliminate, and unlike nuclear weapons which we hope will never again be used, conventional weapons are the everyday tools of armed conflict. While they cannot be eliminated or their use prohibited in the foreseeable future, their availability and use should be significantly controlled and restrained. U.S. and international efforts to control conventional arms range from unilateral measures, to multilateral negotiations and agreements, to global conventions.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

Total world military spending has dropped substantially since peaking in 1987; this trend has accelerated since 1990 with the collapse of the Soviet empire. The aggregate decline of about 7.5% from 1987 to 1990 steepened to nearly 9% in 1991 alone. Total armed forces in the world have dropped less, by 10% since peaking in 1986.

In most arms exporting countries, military and industrial pressures to export have increased as a result of sharply reduced defense budgets following the end of the Cold War. Maintenance of an adequate defense industrial base in major arms producing/exporting nations has therefore become more salient to national defense and to the economic future of military producers. Moreover, the widespread development and acquisition of advanced conventional military capabilities is being facilitated by erosion of the distinction between military and dual-use technology.

Controlling the spread of conventional weapons, therefore, will be an increasingly important part of the global arms control agenda in the 1990s. Recognizing that the U.S. has special responsibilities for leadership as the world's largest arms supplier and the world's only military superpower, ACDA has advocated controlling conventional weapons exports through national, bilateral and multilateral arms export control initiatives.

ACDA's role is to examine exports from the arms control perspective. Under the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, ACDA reviews proposed commercial arms exports licensed by the Department of State and government-to-government Foreign Military Sales and military assistance programs. We also evaluate licenses for the export of dual-use items subject to missile and chemical/biological nonproliferation controls administered by the Department of Commerce.

ACDA evaluates proposed transfers or exports to determine whether they might:

- contribute to an arms race;
- support international terrorism;
- increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict;
- prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control arrangements; or
- adversely affect the arms control policy of the United States.

In assessing export cases, ACDA also takes into account factors including:

- regional stability and military balance;
- legitimate defense needs relative to threats;
- the military force structure, strategy and doctrine of the proposed recipient and its neighbors;
- whether the transfer would constitute a "new," offensive, power-projection, or destabilizing capability;
- proliferation implications;
- risks of misuse or unauthorized retransfer.

We give particular attention to cases involving significant military or power projection capabilities including aerial refuelling, submarines, unmanned air vehicles, stand-off and "smart" weapons, dispensing weapons, supercomputers, and advanced weapons development and manufacturing know-how. In 1993,

ACDA evaluated more than 1,500 government-to-government and commercial defense trade, along with 1,200 dual-use items subject to missile and CBW export controls.

ACDA participated in the development of the ^{U.S. Policy} ~~Presidential Decision Directive~~ on Nonproliferation and Export Controls, which states that the U.S. will seek greater transparency in conventional arms transfers, and will promote regional confidence-building measures to encourage restraint on such transfers to regions of instability. Pursuant to this Directive, the U.S. Government is undertaking a comprehensive review of its conventional arms transfer policy. This review will deal with national security, arms control, trade, budget, and economic competitiveness factors.

ACDA participates in various interagency committees and working groups concerned with technology and arms transfer and security assistance issues. These include:

- Nonproliferation and Export Control Interagency Working Group:** Develops and oversees implementation of U.S. policy on the full range of nonproliferation and export control issues.
- Security Assistance Program Review Working Group:** Here ACDA ensured that arms control and proliferation implications were considered in developing the Administration's annual security assistance budget request.
- National Disclosure Policy Committee:** Makes decisions on the foreign release of classified U.S. defense systems and technology.
- Missile Technology Export Control Group:** Reviews export license applications for items of proliferation concern to non-MTCR countries.
- Missile Trade Analysis Group:** Assesses worldwide diversion/transfer of missile-related technology and attempts to interdict those that could contribute to proliferation. ACDA's representative serves as Executive Secretary.
- Chemical and Biological Weapons Control Group:** Referred to as SHIELD, this group reviews export license applications for dual-use CW or BW-related goods, technology, or services and generates demarches to interdict foreign shipments that could contribute to CBW proliferation.
- Supercomputer Working Group:** Reviews proposed supercomputer exports and decides what conditions should be attached to the export.
- Technology Transfer Working Group:** Reviews intelligence reports, open marketing literature, and other documentation for possible diversion of U.S.-origin defense articles to unauthorized applications or end-users.
- Advisory Committee on Export Policy:** Adjudicates and decides dual use export cases that have not been resolved because of lower-level interagency differences.

Through close monitoring of U.S. license applications and intelligence reports on global arms transfers, in 1993 ACDA discovered several actual or apparent diversions of U.S. technology and/or parts and components. These unauthorized re-exports were brought to the attention of the Technology Transfer Working Group, where the appropriate demarches were drafted and corrective actions were initiated to halt such transfers.

In close cooperation with the Department of State, ACDA played a catalytic role in the creation and funding of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to permit the use of foreign assistance funds for activities including technical assistance in support of defense industry conversion, weapon dismantlement, and other arms control and nonproliferation objectives.

The most notable development in the area of multilateral export controls this year was the President's initiative to bring them into line with post Cold War realities, in partnership with Russia and other formerly proscribed countries that meet relevant standards. In this context, ACDA participated in the development of the framework for a new multilateral export control regime to replace the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) no later than March 31, 1994. When established, the new regime will promote transparency and responsibility with regard to the transfer of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies to regions of tension. The new regime will complement, not duplicate, existing nonproliferation regimes; membership will be open to supplier nations meeting international nonproliferation

and export control norms.

In another significant development, the U.N. has established a Register of Conventional Arms for the purpose of curbing excessive accumulations of conventional arms, and to increase openness in conventional arms transfers. The initiative establishing the register, General Assembly Resolution 48/36L, was put forth by the European Community and Japan, and was co-sponsored by the U.S. Resolution 48/36L set in motion a number of activities which have resulted in the establishment of the register, the inclusion of a new item called "Transparency in Armaments" on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, increased awareness of the importance of national legislation and policies on import and export controls, and regional initiatives in the area of conventional arms confidence-building.

While the register itself was designed to serve as a global confidence-building measure rather than a measure of military capability, an annex to resolution 46/36L contained a list of seven categories of military equipment and their definitions and requested states to provide data on the number of items imported and exported in each category. Beginning in April 1993, eighty-two nations, including the U.S., submitted data to the U.N. register on their imports and exports of conventional weapons covered by the seven categories. Some, including the U.S., also volunteered additional information on their national import-export control policies and legislation.

ACDA is the agency responsible for managing the U.S. submission to the U.N. register and for chairing backstopping meetings dealing with the discussions in the U.N. and in the Conference on Disarmament on all issues dealing with transparency in armaments.

While export controls are essential, unfortunately they can never entirely prevent the acquisition of our conventional weapons by hostile nations or sub-national entities. Even the most effective export controls cannot prevent an Iran-like situation in which a former ally becomes hostile, nor can they prevent U.S. weapons from being lost on the battlefield and recovered by our adversaries. Nevertheless, recent technological developments suggest it may be possible for the United States and other advanced nations to retain control over the use of our advanced conventional weapons even when we have lost physical possession of them. U.S. nuclear weapons have long had elaborate and expensive Permissive Action Links for this purpose; now it may be possible to apply functionally similar safeguards to conventional weapons with near-zero cost and weight penalties. ACDA is exploring whether such a device can, under combat conditions, be made sufficiently transparent to authorized users and at the same time be sufficiently impenetrable to unauthorized users.

CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS (CCW)

The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, sometimes called CUSHIE or CCW, was signed by the United States in 1982. 44 nations are Party to the Convention.

The form of the treaty, as a Convention and Protocols, was chosen intentionally in order to enable States to add extra Protocols relating to different categories of weapons to take into account new weapons developments. The treaty now has three Protocols: the first on Non-Detectable Fragments; the second on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices; and the third on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons.

ACDA is particularly concerned about mines. In the length of time required for the reader to review this report, it is probable that someone will be maimed or killed by a mine *which was directed against someone else*. Mines have the uniquely pernicious property of remaining lethal for years or decades after the military reason for their deployment has vanished. While bombs and artillery shells occasionally fail to explode as planned only to detonate at a later time, such delayed detonation is an explicit design requirement for a fully functioning mine. ACDA is exploring the possibility of requiring the use of modern mine-design technology to eliminate post-combat mine casualties.

Several governments and international organizations have expressed interest in convening a review conference of the CCW. As chair of the interagency backstopping group providing instructions to the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, ACDA ensured that the U.S. view was represented in the drafting and adoption of a General Assembly resolution calling for the conference. It appears from tentative U.N. schedules that the formal review conference could be held in September 1995, to be preceded in 1994 by several meetings of government experts.

As chair of the backstopping of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, ACDA guided the introduction of a U.N. resolution sponsored by the United States calling on nations to agree to a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land mines that pose grave dangers to civilian populations. The U.S. resolution was co-sponsored by seventy-five other nations, indicating wide-spread support for an international export moratorium.

After the passage of the U.N. resolution, the U.S. has approached all landmine producing nations, asking them to institute a three-year export moratorium on all anti-personnel landmines. Such moratoria would implement the U.N. resolution and also serve to precede an eventual permanent landmine export control regime.

All moratoria, by definition, are temporary measures. It is important to use the momentum begun by this moratorium to work together with other countries in developing a workable long-term mine control regime which creates a permanent and effective set of restrictions and allowable exceptions.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL REGIMES IN EUROPE

European security concerns have changed dramatically since the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact agreed to bring the conventional forces balance in the Atlantic to the Urals region into approximate numerical parity. Three useful conventional forces regimes have recently been implemented which have set lowered ceilings on force levels, substantially improved predictability, transparency, and stability, and paved the way for further arms control progress.

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was designed to promote security and stability through verifiable lower levels of conventional armed forces in Europe, to eliminate disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and to reduce the capability to initiate large-scale offensive action in Europe. It sets limits on tanks, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, artillery, and fixed-wing combat aircraft for two groups of states – NATO allies and members of the former Warsaw Pact – west of the Ural mountains. CFE was signed in Paris on November 19, 1990 by heads of state or government of the 22 members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, then present for the Paris Summit of the CSCE.

On June 14, 1991, at the CFE Extraordinary Conference held in Vienna, Austria, the Soviet Union entered into two accompanying commitments: one legally binding and one politically binding. The former details the Soviet reduction obligation for naval infantry and coastal defense forces. The latter agreement commits the Soviet Union to specified reductions of military equipment, of the same types as those limited by the treaty, located east of the Ural Mountains even though that area is outside the CFE Treaty area of application.

The CFE Treaty entered into force on November 9, 1992. In the two years between signature and entry into force, Europe witnessed the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union which raised the issue of successor states to the Soviet Union whose territory was covered by the Treaty. Thus, on May 15, 1992 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, the eight successor states of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Georgia, agreed that each would fully exercise the rights and obligations provided in the CFE Treaty and its associated documents. These specifically include:

- the maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments and equipment, which were not to exceed the total ceilings established for the U.S.S.R.;
- the maximum levels of conventional armaments in the naval infantry and coastal defense forces.

On June 5, 1992 a CFE Extraordinary Conference was held in Oslo, Norway. The then-29 States Parties to the Treaty agreed in the Oslo Final Document to recognize both that the Soviet Union was disestablished and that the eight successor states were now fulfilling its rights and obligations. The 29 CFE States Parties also confirmed the eight signatories of the Tashkent Agreement, and that their collective reduction liabilities at the time of the Treaty's entry into force for treaty-limited equipment would at least equal the reduction liability of the former Soviet Union.

Treaty Implementation. The CFE Treaty required States Parties to complete 25% of all reductions for which they are liable by November 17, 1993, the end of the first reduction phase. Collectively, the CFE State Parties have far exceeded this requirement.

For the United States, the CFE Treaty has never been an end in itself, but has been a part of a continuing effort to achieve stability in Europe. Careful implementation of its provisions has served and continues to serve as the basis for a new security relationship in Europe. The Treaty has proven itself a vital part of the structure for peace in post-Cold War Europe. It has significantly enhanced security, accountability, cooperation, and openness throughout the area of application.

This has been accomplished by setting equipment ceilings which must be met on or before November

(we had to
abstain)

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1995, by requiring reduction of excess equipment, by allowing for intrusive on-site inspections, and by establishing regular, comprehensive information exchanges. Considering the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the ongoing internal conflicts in some new states, implementation of this complex Treaty has generally been smooth. It has improved throughout the course of the year, as nations gained familiarity with CFE procedures.

During the first reduction phase over 17,450 battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft and attack helicopters were destroyed or converted under the Treaty's stringent procedures. More than 1,000 on-site inspections were held, including inspections of declared sites, specified areas, and reduction sites.

The CFE Treaty limits holdings of conventional military equipment of every major standing army in Europe. The resulting equipment ceilings are the core of the Treaty. They must be attained by late 1995. CFE's four subzone ceilings ~~help~~ restrict the amount of equipment CFE states or groups can deploy on their territory in order to prevent destabilizing concentrations of forces in any one region of Europe. The flank zones are subzones of particular military and political sensitivity. The Southern flank zone ~~(it present the center of some controversy)~~ comprises territory in the Black Sea region belonging to Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria. Russia and Ukraine are the only CFE states whose national territory falls into more than one subzone. ~~Without the flank ceiling, the full armies of Russia and Ukraine, the two largest in Europe, theoretically could both be deployed in the Black Sea region.~~

True, but
highly unlikely

Russia and Ukraine have recently called for relief from CFE Treaty equipment limits for the flank zones around the Black and Baltic Seas. We and our allies ~~have indicated~~ believe that fulfillment of CFE's commitments is critical to future European security ~~(and that we will not agree to reopen the Treaty)~~. We ~~have offered to~~ discuss Treaty implementation concerns in its implementing body, the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) on the basis that any solution must be acceptable to all 30 CFE signatories.

are

Agreement on Personnel Strengths of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE IA). Article XVIII of the CFE Treaty provided that the States Parties of the Treaty would continue negotiations under the CFE Mandate. The outcome of these follow-on negotiations was a politically binding agreement to limit the personnel strength of the conventional armed forces of the States Parties in the CFE area of application. The agreement is formally known as the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, or CFE-IA. It limits full-time military manpower and provides for greater transparency of military forces through stabilizing measures and information exchanges. This is the first multilateral limitation of the military personnel forces of most of the nations of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Open Skies Treaty

The Treaty on Open Skies is based upon a U.S. initiative of May 1989; it was signed by 25 states in Helsinki, Finland, on March 24, 1992, and ratified by the U.S. on November 2, 1993. Additional nations can apply for membership after entry into force. During 1993, the official U.S. Open Skies aircraft, the OC-135B, was on static display both in the U.S. and in Europe, and will be available for trial flights in 1994, the year in which entry into force is expected.

Open Skies establishes a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the entire territory of its signatories. It is designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence by giving all participants, regardless of size, a direct role in observing military or other activities of concern to them. Currently covering territory from Vancouver east to Vladivostok, Open Skies is the most wide-ranging international effort to date to promote openness and transparency of military forces and activities.

The Treaty on Open Skies is based upon four basic principles:

- com territorial open and access;
- use of unarmed aircraft for observation flights;
- a sensor suite using universally available equipment;
- annual quotas for reciprocal overflights.

The Treaty allows for consensus decisions to upgrade sensors, adjust quotas, and admit new participants in order to enhance its effectiveness. The Open Skies Consultative Commission is the forum established to facilitate the Treaty's implementation.

We believe Open Skies has potential for expansion in the future.

In its present form, it can help in increasing transparency and building confidence in Europe. It might later be expanded geographically, either by adding new countries to the present regime, or by developing similar regional regimes in other areas of the world. The rules and procedures for Open Skies could provide a basis for such new regimes.

Open Skies might also be expanded substantively. Crisis stabilization/crisis monitoring is an area that might be considered as a future Open Skies application. The concepts of unrestricted overflight of another nation's territory, personnel from both the observed and the observing party on board the aircraft, and collected data being provided to all interested parties could be a useful model for crisis stabilization/crisis monitoring, *(regime)* *isn't this going a bit far?* *USC has not even discussed such a regime.*

ACDA prepared the article-by-article analysis of the Treaty on Open Skies which was provided to the U.S. Senate in preparation for ratification hearings.

Current discussions in the Open Skies Consultative Commission are focussed on implementation issues bearing on entry into force, including sensor methodologies, flight procedures, *and* ~~the possible expansion of Open Skies into environmental monitoring~~. ACDA participates in these discussions.

environmental monitoring does not bear on entry into force & has hardly been touched upon, in relative terms, in the OSCE.

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)

The overall implementation of CSBMs continues to improve, with the states of the former Soviet Union taking steps to meet their obligations under the 1992 Vienna Document.

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The CSCE states conducted their fourth exchange of military information on December 15, 1993. Additional activities conducted under the 1992 Vienna Document that serve to enhance confidence and transparency include:

- Belgium, the United States, Denmark, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, Russia, Ukraine and Switzerland hosted air base visits in 1993. These eight states bring to 17 the number of states to have hosted air base visits since the measure went into effect in 1991. Belgium the United States and France also conducted demonstrations of new types of major weapons and equipment systems during 1993.

1995, by requiring reduction of excess equipment, by allowing for intrusive on-site inspections, and by establishing regular, comprehensive information exchanges. Considering the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the ongoing internal conflicts in some new states, implementation of this complex Treaty has generally been smooth. It has improved throughout the course of the year, as nations gained familiarity with CFE procedures.

During the first reduction phase over 17,450 battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft and attack helicopters were destroyed or converted under the Treaty's stringent procedures. More than 1,000 on-site inspections were held, including inspections of declared sites, specified areas, and reduction sites.

The CFE Treaty limits holdings of conventional military equipment of every major standing army in Europe. The resulting equipment ceilings are the core of the Treaty. They must be attained by late 1995. CFE's four subzone ceilings help restrict the amount of equipment CFE states or groups can deploy on their territory in order to prevent destabilizing concentrations of forces in any one region of Europe. The flank zone are subzones of particular military and political sensitivity. The Southern flank zone, at present the center of some controversy, comprises territory in the Black Sea region belonging to Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria. Russia and Ukraine are the only CFE states whose national territory falls into more than one subzone. Without the flank ceiling, the full armies of Russia and Ukraine, the two largest in Europe, theoretically could both be deployed in the Black Sea region.

Russia and Ukraine have recently called for relief from CFE Treaty equipment limits for the flank zone around the Black and Baltic Seas. We and our allies have indicated that fulfillment of CFE's commitments is critical to future European security and that we will not agree to reopen the Treaty. We have offered to discuss Treaty implementation concerns in its implementing body, the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) on the basis that any solution must be acceptable to all 30 CFE signatories.

Agreement on Personnel Strengths of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE IA). Article XVIII of the CFE Treaty provided that the States Parties of the Treaty would continue negotiations under the CFE Mandate. The outcome of these follow-on negotiations was a politically binding agreement to limit the personnel strength of the conventional armed forces of the States Parties in the CFE area of application. The agreement is formally known as the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, or CFE-IA. It limits full-time military manpower and provides for greater transparency of military forces through stabilizing measures and information exchanges. This is the first multilateral limitation of the military personnel forces of most of the nations of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Open Skies Treaty

The Treaty on Open Skies is based upon a U.S. initiative of May 1989; it was signed by 25 states in Helsinki, Finland, on March 24, 1992, and ratified by the U.S. on November 2, 1993. Additional nations can apply for membership after entry into force. During 1993, the official U.S. Open Skies aircraft, the OC-135B, was on static display both in the U.S. and in Europe, and will be available for trial flights in 1994, the year in which entry into force is expected.

Open Skies establishes a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the entire territory of its signatories. It is designed to enhance mutual understanding and confidence by giving all participants, regardless of size, a direct role in observing military or other activities of concern to them. Currently covering territory from Vancouver east to Vladivostok, Open Skies is the most wide-ranging international effort to date to promote openness and transparency of military forces and activities.

The Treaty on Open Skies is based upon four basic principles:

- complete territorial openness and access;
- use of unarmed aircraft for observation flights;
- a sensor suite using universally available equipment;
- annual quotas for reciprocal overflights.

The Treaty allows for consensus decisions to upgrade sensors, adjust quotas, and admit new participants in order to enhance its effectiveness. The Open Skies Consultative Commission is the forum established to facilitate the Treaty's implementation.

We believe Open Skies has potential for expansion in the future.

In its present form, it can help in increasing transparency and building confidence in Europe. It might later be expanded geographically, either by adding new countries to the present regime, or by developing similar regional regimes in other areas of the world. The rules and procedures for Open Skies could provide a basis for such new regimes.

Open Skies might also be expanded substantively. Crisis stabilization/crisis monitoring is an area that might be considered as a future Open Skies application. The concepts of unrestricted overflight of another nation's territory, personnel from both the observed and the observing party on board the aircraft, and collected data being provided to all interested parties could be a useful model for a crisis stabilization/crisis monitoring regime.

ACDA prepared the article-by-article analysis of the Treaty on Open Skies which was provided to the U.S. Senate in preparation for ratification hearings.

Current discussions in the Open Skies Consultative Commission are focussed on implementation issues bearing on entry into force, including sensor methodologies, flight procedures, and the possible expansion of Open Skies into environmental monitoring. ACDA participates in these discussions.

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- Two observable activities, one conducted by NATO states and one by Sweden, were notified under the "prior notification and observation of certain military activities" measures. According to Vienna Document 1992, military activities requiring prior notification include those which engage formations of land forces that, either under a single operational command or in combination with air or naval components, have at least 9,000 troops or at least 250 battle tanks. In addition to being notifiable, military activities are also subject to observation if the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 13,000, or if the number of battle tanks engaged meets or exceeds 300.
- A total of 55 evaluation visits were conducted in 1993, including first-time visits to the Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Evaluation visits are a CSBM contained in Vienna Document 1992. These visits provide each participating state with the opportunity to visit active formations and units, in their normal peacetime locations as reported in the *Annual Information Exchange of Military Forces and Information on Plans for the Deployment of Major Weapons and Equipment Systems*, in order to evaluate the accuracy of the information exchanged. Vienna Document 1992 provides a quota system for evaluation visits.

Force Reductions and confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) codified by the European arms control process have helped diminish the instability created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new independent states. Required regular data exchanges and contacts have enabled member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to monitor the military force-building efforts of the newly created states, and potentially to influence those efforts.

V. REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL

As the superpower rivalry has receded with the end of the cold war, the most likely threats the world faces stem from regional instability, often arising from tensions generated by political, military, ethnic, or religious differences. The dangers posed by these conflicts are dramatically heightened by the development or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and advanced military capabilities.

In this new international security environment, regional arms control has become increasingly important. Many states have begun to negotiate and implement measures designed to increase transparency of military activities, contain destabilizing arms races, and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on a regional level. During 1993 ACDA sought to promote regional arms control in several areas. ACDA provided essential continuity of institutional support in these processes. This role is critical in fostering regional arms control, particularly when the process extends over long periods of time.

To better address this changing world in which more states are demonstrating interest in arms control, ACDA in 1993 reorganized itself and transferred all regional arms control responsibilities to the Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control bureau, except for matters related to countries in the area of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which includes the United States, Canada, and all European states except Albania. The Nonproliferation Bureau's mission has been expanded to include the fostering of regional arms control by sharing U.S. expertise and experiences concerning conventional arms reductions confidence-and security-building measures. This effort is designed to reduce tension, promote or maintain peace, and remove incentives for arms races or development of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC REGION

Korean Peninsula

The Korean Peninsula remains an area of tension where the threat of North Korean nuclear proliferation is high and political intentions are difficult to determine. North Korea's nuclear program presents a major threat to global nuclear non-proliferation norms, and to regional stability and security in Northeast Asia.

ACDA has played a major role in formulating U.S. policies designed to convince North Korea to resolve the nuclear issue. ACDA has participated in all U.S.-North Korea high-level talks during 1993 and has primary responsibility for coordinating U.S. assistance to South Korea on implementation of the bilateral inspection regime to be negotiated under the South-North denuclearization agreement.

North Korea acceded to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1985 but originally refused to place all of its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. Toward the end of 1991, North Korea began to take steps designed to convince the world that its nuclear program was peaceful. These included negotiating its NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA and signing an agreement with South Korea that banned nuclear weapons and reprocessing and enrichment facilities on the Korean peninsula; it also included a commitment to negotiate a bilateral inspection regime. At about the same time, the two Koreas also signed an agreement of reconciliation and non-aggression.

North Korea's NPT safeguards agreement came into force in April 1992, and for a while North Korea appeared to be cooperating fully with the IAEA in implementation of the agreement. North Korea revealed several previously secret nuclear facilities, including a reactor capable of producing significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium that began operating in 1986, a reprocessing plant, and a larger reactor under construction.

However, detailed analysis of nuclear samples taken by the IAEA raised questions about North Korea's initial declaration of plutonium production, and the U.S. learned through subsequently-released intelligence that North Korea was attempting to conceal two nuclear waste sites. Ultimately, North Korea refused to allow the

IAEA to adequately inspect these two sites. The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on February 25, 1993, urging North Korea to extend full cooperation to the IAEA and to permit access to these sites. North Korea continued to refuse, and on March 12 it sent a letter to the U.N. Secretary-General stating its intention to withdraw from the NPT. On May 11, the Security Council passed a resolution urging North Korea to reconsider its stated intention to withdraw from the NPT and to comply with its NPT safeguards agreement. The Security Council invited all U.N. members to support that effort. This set the stage for direct U.S.-North Korean talks.

On June 11, following a week of talks in New York, the U.S. and North Korea issued a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT. In a separate statement, the U.S. also noted that North Korea had been told that certain steps must be avoided if the dialogue is to continue, e.g., additional reprocessing, any break in the continuity of IAEA safeguards, or a withdrawal from the NPT.

A further step was taken at the next round of talks which were held in Geneva from July 14-19. In the joint statement issued at the close of these discussions, North Korea agreed that it was "prepared to begin" consultations with the IAEA on outstanding issues and with South Korea on bilateral issues including the nuclear issue. The U.S. has met informally with North Korea several times to resolve this issue. *As a result of informal talks held December 29, 1993, we believe North Korea has moved closer to meeting our objectives. Statements by that government indicate willingness to accept inspections needed by the IAEA to maintain continuity of safeguards at declared sites.* *made clear that continuation of our dialogue requires continued IAEA safeguards*

The U.S. agreed that it was prepared to support the introduction of light water reactors to North Korea *as part of a broad and thorough solution to the nuclear weapons issue.* Light water reactors are not optimal producers of plutonium for nuclear weapons programs and can be more effectively safeguarded than North Korea's current graphite moderated reactors. *The two sides agreed to meet again within two months to discuss outstanding issues, but the U.S. also made clear it would not expect to begin a third round of talks until North Korea has begun serious discussions with the IAEA and South Korea.* *requires continued IAEA safeguards*

Although North Korea met with the IAEA, it has not renewed nuclear discussions with South Korea on implementation of the bilateral nuclear agreement. Moreover, North Korea has refused to accept full IAEA North ad-hoc and routine inspections. In December 1993, IAEA Director General Hans Blix stated that the safeguards system in North Korea "cannot be said to provide any meaningful assurance of peaceful use..." *He added, however, that the system could be partially or fully restored if North Korea cooperated. At the end of December, 1993, North Korea publicly indicated it would accept a yet-to-be-determined scope of IAEA inspection necessary to maintain continuity of safeguards.* *substitution* *for North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors* *a recognition of North-South dialogue*

China continues to cause concern as source of weapons proliferation in the post Cold War world. In 1993 ACDA began development of a comprehensive and integrated U.S. package of political, security, and technology transfer measures designed to modify China's proliferation behavior in concrete ways, in the context of the bilateral relationship. ACDA has also taken steps to revive arms control bilaterals that were held with China annually during the 1980s until high level talks were curtailed following the Chinese Government's crushing of pro-democracy activities in 1989. Such talks have provided an opportunity to exchange views on the broad range of arms control issues. They also provide a forum to address those issues, particularly relating to nonproliferation, that damage Sino-U.S. relations.

but had not reached agreement with IAEA on the scope of safeguards activities to be carried out
Northeast Asia

The U.S. participated in several unofficial dialogues on regional security issues, including a mixed government/academic conference hosted by the University of California at San Diego's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. The purpose of this Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue was to encourage consultation and cooperation among the six powers having a direct interest in Northeast Asia: Russia, China,

Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and the United States. ACDA provided analysis of confidence-building measures in Northeast Asia to assist in preparation for U.S. participation in the dialogue.

Southeast Asia

At the July 1993 Post-Ministerial Conference of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an ASEAN Regional Forum was created to facilitate discussion of regional security issues. This forum will meet for the first time in 1994. Its membership includes the six ASEAN states (Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Brunei), ASEAN's seven dialogue partners (the U.S., Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and the European Union), Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos, and Papua New Guinea. ACDA supports U.S. efforts in the region by developing arms control initiatives and confidence-building measures that can contribute to East Asia/Pacific security. In addition, ACDA assesses the viability of other proposals together with their impact on U.S. interests, and analyzes regional participation in multilateral arms control agreements.

SOUTH ASIA

South Asia remains in the forefront of U.S. nonproliferation concerns due to the presence of advanced, unsafeguarded nuclear programs and active ballistic missile development programs, both of which increase the possibility that a future conflict in that region could escalate into a nuclear war. Both India and Pakistan could assemble nuclear weapons within a short time, and both have tested ballistic missiles and acquired aircraft capable of delivering such weapons. In addition, Indo-Pakistani tensions and seemingly endless territorial, ethnic, religious, and political disputes threaten to spark a fourth war between them. While Kashmir is the potential flash point of greatest current concern, the tension is not caused by or confined to any single issue.

In recognition of this danger, India and Pakistan have undertaken several confidence-building steps designed to reduce regional tensions. The two countries have signed and ratified bilateral agreements on avoidance of airspace violations, notification of military exercises, and establishment of a communications link, or "hotline" at the senior military level. In 1991, India and Pakistan ratified an agreement not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. Lists of facilities covered by the agreement were exchanged in 1992. There is reason for concern, however, that neither side has fully implemented these agreements and that noncompliance, in the absence of adequate dialogue, may actually be contributing to an increase in regional tension.

India and Pakistan have declared a bilateral ban on chemical weapons, and are working on a similar statement concerning biological weapons. Both have signed the Chemical Weapons Conventions (CWC) and agreed in principle to a multilateral, verifiable cut-off of fissile material production and to a global comprehensive nuclear test ban.

ACDA is working with the State Department to develop South Asian arms control initiatives. These include a multilateral, regional dialogue on nonproliferation and regional security in South Asia agreed to in principle by India and Pakistan, and regional approaches that could lead over time to a roll-back of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery capabilities.

As part of these efforts, ACDA is helping India and Pakistan develop arms control and verification techniques which could help reduce tensions in the region. Proposals are communicated to the region at both the government and nongovernmental level through bilateral consultations and other public fora. In addition, ACDA provides information to India and Pakistan on aspects of the U.S.-Soviet arms control experience which could be applicable to South Asia.

Finally, ACDA is involved in U.S. efforts to prevent the export of nuclear related material, technology, and equipment to India and Pakistan. This effort has been greatly aided by the decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to restrict the export of 65 dual-use commodities to countries of proliferation concern and to

require full-scope safeguards a condition of significant supply. In addition, the missile rocket programs of both countries have been slowed by export license denials by the governments that joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. The U.S. has also imposed trade sanctions on both Indian and Pakistani entities that imported missile technology from Russia and China, respectively. The U.S. continues to urge both India and Pakistan to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and to adopt responsible national export control policies and regulations for both nuclear and missile related exports, to forgo deployment of any ballistic missiles, and to begin an arms control process.

MIDDLE EAST

This region has been generally considered to hold the world's most intractable political, religious, and cultural tensions and violent expression of those tensions. Nevertheless, peace has been established between the Israelis and Egyptians, and is now being seriously negotiated between the Israelis and the Palestinians, Jordanians, Syrians, and Lebanese. Arms control can improve the security of all Parties in the region.

Peace Process Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS)

The ACRS working group is one of five multilateral groups formed shortly after the opening round of the Middle East peace process in Madrid in October 1991. The economic, refugee, environment, water and arms control working groups meet in plenary session every three or four months in various hosts' capitals. Twelve Arab states, Israel, and now a Palestinian delegation have been joined by a number of extra-regional participants for plenary and intersessional meetings focusing on both conceptual and operational arms control measures that can be applied in the Middle East.

Since May 1992, the U.S. and Russia, co-sponsors of the ACRS working group, have hosted four plenary sessions. With breakthroughs in the bilateral peace process -- most notably the September 13, 1993 signing of the "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements" between Israel and the PLO and the "Common Agenda" of the Israelis and Jordanians -- region-specific measures and venues have become the focal point of the group's efforts. The fifth ACRS plenary meeting is planned for April 1994 in Qatar.

Until mid-1993, the working group had focused primarily on an educational phase, since many delegations had limited arms control expertise. Due to requests from regional states to meet more frequently, informally and at the expert level, intersessional events were inserted between plenaries. Six intersessional events were held during the fall, sponsored by both regional states and extra-regional states with a particular background in the subject area. Egypt hosted a verification seminar with a visit to the Multilateral Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai. Turkey held a workshop on information exchange on military forces and mechanisms to report unusual military activities. The Netherlands introduced the CSCE Communications Network to the working group participants. The Canadians' maritime measures workshop focused on incidents at sea and search and rescue agreements. Austria hosted a seminar on declaratory measures and long-term objectives for the region. The co-sponsors also undertook studies and analyses of past arms control proposals in the Middle East and a compilation of various confidence-building measures. These intersessional events helped to develop a cadre of political and military expert-level delegates who are versed in the details of various CBMs and other arms control measures which promise progress both before and after a full peace is reached in the region.

At the Moscow Plenary in November 1993, the working group welcomed the offer of the CSCE to link up to its communications network based in The Hague. Establishment of a communications link/data base between thirteen or more Middle Eastern participants would be a seminal accomplishment of the peace process. Work is now underway to implement a temporary network through the CSCE for passing arms control information prior to the eventual establishment of a network based and operated in the Middle East, possibly in a newly created regional security institution. Detailed intersessional work is also scheduled on measures related to maritime and information exchange measures, as well as for declaratory measures and

other CBMs of particular interest to regional Parties.

ACDA has been a key participant in the ACRS process since its inception. It is the lead agency establishing the communications network, based on its experience with setting up the original CSCE network and as the architect of the new CSCE communications network to seven former Soviet Union states. ACDA has presented numerous papers and briefings on arms control both to the ACRS working group and governmental and non-governmental entities in the region. ACDA serves as the main provider of source material both to participants new to arms control and to those wishing to understand the intricate details of specific agreements.

ACDA's unique contributions to the peace process – historical interaction with regional and extra-regional participants on arms control; negotiating experience on agreements of relevance to the region; and the ability to integrate ACRS work with other ongoing negotiations (e.g. the recently completed Chemical Weapons Convention or preparations for the 1995 NPT review) – will enable it to provide substantial and sustained efforts in support of regional security in the Middle East.

United Nations Special Commission on Iraq

Following Iraq's defeat in early 1991 in the Gulf War, the U.N. Security Council adopted three resolutions (Security Council Resolutions 687, 707, and 715) to eliminate future threats from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and missiles. Among other things, these resolutions

- condemned Iraq's violation of its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations;
- requested and empowered the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the IAEA to destroy or remove from Iraq virtually all materials, equipment, and facilities related to nuclear weapon activities, chemical and biological weapons, and specified missiles, and to carry out an ongoing, long-term inspection program to ensure that these weapons and missile programs not resumed.

In 1993, continuing inspection work in all areas brought the Commission closer to a transition from the original destruction phase into long-term monitoring of the Iraqi weapons programs. To date, UNSCOM and the IAEA have conducted 64 inspections which have focused on documenting and destroying or rendering harmless key buildings, equipment and material relating to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons as well as missile-related material. After prolonged delay, on November 26, 1993, Iraq accepted Resolution 715 which provides for the implementation of long-term monitoring arrangements. ~~Iraq's acceptance of Resolution 715 was a necessary condition for lifting the U.N. ban on Iraqi foreign oil sales.~~ However, the Chairman of the Special Commission, with U.S. support, has recommended that the ban not be lifted until Iraq provides a full and detailed disclosure of its weapons capabilities and suppliers, and there has been ~~six months' experience~~ with an effective long-term monitoring program. Additionally, the IAEA continues to report that Iraq has failed to give key procurement information about its nuclear program.

For a year and a half, the UNSCOM Deputy Chairman in New York was provided by ACDA. The Deputy Coordinator of the U.S. Government support effort to the UNSCOM in Washington also came from ACDA. ACDA continues to work closely with the IAEA in carrying out its Iraq-related work as well as its continuing efforts to contain the spread of nuclear-weapons-related activities in the region.

*a sustained
period of Iraqi
compliance*

Other Nuclear Weapons Related Activities in the Middle East

ACDA has been seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the Middle East. U.S. policy continues to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the region, including the application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities. In addition to pressing for a global agreement banning the production of weapons-useable fissile material, we are encouraging more restrictive regional arrangements to constrain enrichment and reprocessing of fissile material that can be used for nuclear explosive purposes. ACDA also plays an important role in monitoring nuclear-weapons-related procurement by states in the region, while urging other states to refrain from nuclear cooperation with suspected proliferators.

We are very concerned about the ultimate direction of the Iranian nuclear program and continue to monitor the nuclear activities of that country very closely. According to 1993 public testimony by the Director of Central Intelligence, Iran is pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons despite being a party to the NPT. He stated that Iran will probably take 8 to 10 years to produce its own nuclear weapons, perhaps sooner if it receives critical foreign assistance. In an effort to dispel suspicions about its nuclear activities, Iran permitted visits by IAEA inspectors in February 1992 and November 1993. In both cases, the IAEA concluded that the activities at the inspected sites were consistent with the peaceful application of nuclear energy. However, the IAEA cannot vouch for the facilities and sites not visited, nor can it preclude the possibility that the facilities and sites visited will not be used for other activities in the future. Through multilateral fora and bilateral contacts, the United States has urged all supplier countries not to engage in any nuclear cooperation with Iran until that country provides persuasive evidence that it will abide by its NPT obligations.

As a non-NPT country with unsafeguarded nuclear activities, Israel's nuclear activities are of major concern to other states in the region and the United States. License applications for nuclear-related dual-use exports to Israel are not approved unless U.S. agencies are confident that they will not contribute to Israel's unsafeguarded nuclear activities. We continue to urge Israel to accept IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities and to adhere to the NPT.

Libya is a source of serious concern. The United States discourages supplier states from engaging in nuclear cooperation of any kind with that country. Although Libya is a party to the NPT, its leaders have made statements that raise questions about Libya's long-term commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Specifically, Libya's operation of a 10-megawatt Soviet-supplied research reactor continues to be a cause of concern.

Algeria, which is not party to the NPT, has purchased a 15-megawatt nuclear reactor from China. While the transaction was initially conducted in secrecy, Algeria has recently submitted this facility to IAEA safeguards and, at the reactor's inauguration on December 21, 1993, announced its intention to join the NPT. However, because of lack of specificity on when it will join the NPT or accept a full-scope safeguard agreement which would allow the IAEA to inspect undeclared facilities, the U.S. will continue to monitor Algeria's nuclear program closely.

Is this still right?

LATIN AMERICA

Organization of American States

ACDA has supported the Organization of American States Special Committee on Hemispheric Security since its inception in 1991. In 1993 ACDA has advised and coordinated all arms control and nonproliferation matters for the U.S. delegation to the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly in Managua, Nicaragua.

On June 11, 1993, the OAS General Assembly adopted four arms control resolutions. This action reflected continued OAS interest and focus on arms control and nonproliferation. The U.S. delegation worked with other delegations to secure cosponsors and support for their respective resolutions. The four resolutions adopted were:

- The Special Committee on Hemispheric Security resolution which proposes to continue and intensify consideration of issues relating to hemispheric security, including the establishment of informal working groups of governmental experts.
- An Argentine resolution to hold a governmental experts' meeting before the next General Assembly on confidence- and security-building measures in the region.
- An Argentine resolution calling on OAS member states to provide on a regular basis to the United Nations its reports on transfer in arms (U.N. resolution 46/36 L) and military expenditures (U.N. resolution 46/25) and for the Secretary General of the OAS to make appropriate arrangements to receive this data from the U.N. Secretary General.
- A Mexican resolution on the Treaty of Tlatelolco urging all states of Latin America and the Carib to take steps promptly to make the treaty fully effective.

In response to one of the approved resolutions, on November 17-19, 1993, the OAS convened its first experts' meeting on arms control in Washington. ACDA made arrangements for a U.S. delegation composed of ACDA, State, DOD, and JCS which attended the two day preparatory meeting. The U.S. made two presentations: on the definition of confidence- and security-building measures, and on our experience with them.

Mexico

Mexico has long had a strong interest in arms control. In an effort to broaden U.S. international arms control dialogues, ACDA's Acting Director and a group of arms control experts met on October 15 in Mexico City to exchange views on arms control issues with the Mexican Government. The Acting Director met with the Acting Foreign Minister of the Secretariat of External Relations and his staff. ACDA consultations included reviewing the status of various arms control agreements and regimes that are currently at the forefront of the administration's bilateral and multilateral efforts to increase global and regional security and stability. Both sides agreed to continue this dialog.

South America

In April 1993, an ACDA team of experts traveled to Buenos Aires to meet with foreign ministry, defense ministry and the military service officials to provide the U.S. perspective on its arms control experiences in areas of interest to them. During the joint U.S.-Argentine security consultations held in Washington, on June 22-23, 1993, the Acting Director briefed an Argentine delegation, headed by the Foreign Minister, on international and regional arms control.

As part of a U.S. effort to support regional arms control in Latin America, ACDA sponsored an arms control workshop for civilian and military representatives from the Government of Argentina on October 18-19, 1993. The Argentine delegation received presentations from arms control experts on strategic arms control, conventional arms control, confidence- and security-building measures, nonproliferation and verification. As part of the workshop, the Argentine delegation also received extensive briefings and tours at the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center and the On-Site Inspection Agency.

Central America

At its first meeting in July 1990, the Central American Security Commission agreed on a process to accomplish the following goals:

- ensure armed forces are defensive and not offensive in nature;
- maintain a reasonable balance or a proportional and comprehensive equilibrium of weapons, equipment and troops such that they do not constitute a threat to neighboring countries;
- define a new model of security relations based on cooperation, communication and prevention.

We have been exploring means, including consultations and workshops, to continue to support Cer

Other Nuclear Weapons Related Activities in the Middle East

ACDA has been seeking to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the Middle East. U.S. policy continues to promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the region, including the application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities. In addition to pressing for a global agreement banning the production of weapons-useable fissile material, we are encouraging more restrictive regional arrangements to constrain enrichment and reprocessing of fissile material that can be used for nuclear explosive purposes. ACDA also plays an important role in monitoring nuclear-weapons-related procurement by states in the region, while urging other states to refrain from nuclear cooperation with suspected proliferators.

We are very concerned about the ultimate direction of the Iranian nuclear program and continue to monitor the nuclear activities of that country very closely. According to 1993 public testimony by the Director of Central Intelligence, Iran is pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons despite being a party to the NPT. He stated that Iran will probably take 8 to 10 years to produce its own nuclear weapons, perhaps sooner if it receives critical foreign assistance. In an effort to dispel suspicions about its nuclear activities, Iran permitted visits by IAEA inspectors in February 1992 and November 1993. In both cases, the IAEA concluded that the activities at the inspected sites were consistent with the peaceful application of nuclear energy. However, the IAEA cannot vouch for the facilities and sites not visited, nor can it preclude the possibility that the facilities and sites visited will not be used for other activities in the future. Through multilateral fora and bilateral contacts, the United States has urged all supplier countries not to engage in any nuclear cooperation with Iran until that country provides persuasive evidence that it will abide by its NPT obligations.

As a non-NPT country with unsafeguarded nuclear activities, Israel's nuclear activities are of major concern to other states in the region and the United States. License applications for nuclear-related dual-use exports to Israel are not approved unless U.S. agencies are confident that they will not contribute to Israel's unsafeguarded nuclear activities. We continue to urge Israel to accept IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities and to adhere to the NPT.

Libya is a source of serious concern. The United States discourages supplier states from engaging in nuclear cooperation of any kind with that country. Although Libya is a party to the NPT, its leaders have made statements that raise questions about Libya's long-term commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Specifically, Libya's operation of a 10-megawatt Soviet-supplied research reactor continues to be a cause of concern.

Algeria, which is not party to the NPT, has purchased a 15-megawatt nuclear reactor from China. While the transaction was initially conducted in secrecy, Algeria has recently submitted this facility to IAEA safeguards and, at the reactor's inauguration on December 21, 1993, announced its intention to join the NPT. However, because of lack of specificity on when it will join the NPT or accept a full-scope safeguard agreement which would allow the IAEA to inspect undeclared facilities, the U.S. will continue to monitor Algeria's nuclear program closely.

LATIN AMERICA

Organization of American States

ACDA has supported the Organization of American States Special Committee on Hemispheric Security since its inception in 1991. In 1993 ACDA has advised and coordinated all arms control and nonproliferation matters for the U.S. delegation to the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly in Managua, Nicaragua.

On June 11, 1993, the OAS General Assembly adopted four arms control resolutions. This action reflected continued OAS interest and focus on arms control and nonproliferation. The U.S. delegation worked with other delegations to secure cosponsors and support for their respective resolutions. The four resolutions adopted were:

- The Special Committee on Hemispheric Security resolution which proposes to continue and intensify its consideration of issues relating to hemispheric security, including the establishment of informal working groups of governmental experts.
- An Argentine resolution to hold a governmental experts' meeting before the next General Assembly on confidence- and security-building measures in the region.
- An Argentine resolution calling on OAS member states to provide on a regular basis to the United Nations its reports on transfer in arms (U.N. resolution 46/36 L) and military expenditures (U.N. resolution 46/25) and for the Secretary General of the OAS to make appropriate arrangements to receive this data from the U.N. Secretary General.
- A Mexican resolution on the Treaty of Tlatelolco urging all states of Latin America and the Carib to take steps promptly to make the treaty fully effective.

In response to one of the approved resolutions, on November 17-19, 1993, the OAS convened its first experts' meeting on arms control in Washington. ACDA made arrangements for a U.S. delegation composed of ACDA, State, DOD, and JCS which attended the two day preparatory meeting. The U.S. made two presentations: on the definition of confidence- and security-building measures, and on our experience with them.

Mexico

Mexico has long had a strong interest in arms control. In an effort to broaden U.S. international arms control dialogues, ACDA's Acting Director and a group of arms control experts met on October 15 in Mexico City to exchange views on arms control issues with the Mexican Government. The Acting Director met with the Acting Foreign Minister of the Secretariat of External Relations and his staff. ACDA consultations included reviewing the status of various arms control agreements and regimes that are currently at the forefront of the administration's bilateral and multilateral efforts to increase global and regional security and stability. Both sides agreed to continue this dialog.

South America

In April 1993, an ACDA team of experts traveled to Buenos Aires to meet with foreign ministry, defense ministry and the military service officials to provide the U.S. perspective on its arms control experiences in areas of interest to them. During the joint U.S.-Argentine security consultations held in Washington, on June 22-23, 1993, the Acting Director briefed an Argentine delegation, headed by the Foreign Minister, on international and regional arms control.

As part of a U.S. effort to support regional arms control in Latin America, ACDA sponsored an arms control workshop for civilian and military representatives from the Government of Argentina on October 18-19, 1993. The Argentine delegation received presentations from arms control experts on strategic arms control, conventional arms control, confidence- and security-building measures, nonproliferation and verification. As part of the workshop, the Argentine delegation also received extensive briefings and tours at the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center and the On-Site Inspection Agency.

Central America

At its first meeting in July 1990, the Central American Security Commission agreed on a process to accomplish the following goals:

- ensure armed forces are defensive and not offensive in nature;
- maintain a reasonable balance or a proportional and comprehensive equilibrium of weapons, equipment and troops such that they do not constitute a threat to neighboring countries;
- define a new model of security relations based on cooperation, communication and prevention.

We have been exploring means, including consultations and workshops, to continue to support Central

American efforts to negotiate arms control.

VI. NEGOTIATING AND IMPLEMENTING ARMS CONTROL

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is responsible for negotiation and implementation of a large variety of currently ongoing arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements. At the majority of these fora, ACDA provides the backstopping component, the leadership, and one or more members of the United States Delegation, including advisers and experts from one or more of ACDA's specialized offices, and as necessary a legal adviser from its Office of General Counsel.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT (CD)

The CD is the single global multilateral negotiating forum for arms control matters. It operates by consensus. Its most notable recent accomplishment was the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was signed in January 1993 and submitted to the Senate for ratification on November 23, 1993. Negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban began in the Conference on Disarmament when it opened its 1994 session on January 25.

The Conference on Disarmament is the successor to the previous multilateral disarmament negotiating bodies, reconfigured in 1979 to include all of the nuclear-weapon states. Its original active membership of 40 states was reduced to 37 following the unification of Germany and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The Conference permits non-member nations to participate as observers. In 1993, participation by non-members rose to the record number of 50 because of the general increase in interest in multilateral arms control discussion since the end of the Cold War, and because of particular interest in the chemical weapons negotiations.

The Nuclear Test Ban Ad Hoc Committee discussed non-seismic verification technologies during the second part of the 1993 session of the Conference on Disarmament. The Committee's chairman was asked to begin work on a negotiating mandate for the 1994 talks on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Successful informal consultations on that issue were held in Geneva in November-December 1993. The mandate developed during those consultations was adopted by the CD on January 25, 1994.

In addition to its work on the nuclear test ban, during 1993 the Conference also focused on transparency in armaments, outer space, and negative security assurances.

During 1993, an Ad Hoc Committee for Transparency in Armaments was established at the Conference, with a mandate drawn largely from a U.N. resolution suggesting specific responsibilities of the Conference in this area. Among issues considered were the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms, military holdings, procurement through national production, technology transfers, and weapons of mass destruction. The United States delegation tabled various proposals for action as well as papers on export controls as it relate to conventional military equipment and technology, on the arms export system of the United States and its policies and practices, and on an international data exchange of military holdings and procurement through national production.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space continued to focus mainly on outer space confidence building measures. The United States continues to oppose a negotiating mandate for the Committee, on grounds that the Conference on Disarmament is not the appropriate forum for negotiating outer space issues. It is expected that efforts from other nations toward developing such a mandate will continue in 1994.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances, which deals with assurances by nations that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, met several times during 1993 but did not make significant progress. This Committee is expected to return to this topic in 1994.

In 1993, membership became an issue in itself as many of the observer states continued to seek full membership status. The President of the Conference on Disarmament directed the Australian representative to the Conference to develop a "package" of proposed new members. Because of the inclusion of Iraq in the

package, the United States did not support it, on the principle that long Iraq was the subject of United Nations sanctions, it would be inappropriate to elevate the status in the CD of a state whose behavior is flagrantly opposed to the goals of that organization. The Conference agreed to continue consultations on this issue, and it is likely that the question of enlargement of the membership will again arise during 1994.

The Conference on Disarmament met in January-March, May-June, and August-September of 1993,

ACDA provides the primary leadership, staff and support for the United States Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament. ACDA also chairs the Washington backstopping efforts for the work of the Conference on Disarmament, and prepares and coordinates all guidance to the Delegation.

TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (NPT) PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons provides for the convening of a conference, twenty-five years after the Treaty's entry into force, to decide whether the Treaty will continue in force indefinitely or will be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. That conference will be held in New York from April 17 to May 12, 1995.

In preparation for that conference, the NPT Preparatory Committee has been established by Par to the Treaty; its first meeting was held at the United Nations in New York in May 1993. Subsequent meetings are scheduled for January and September 1994, and January 1995.

ACDA, as the lead Executive Branch agency for NPT matters, is responsible for developing and implementing U.S. Government strategy regarding that Conference, including the Preparatory Committee meetings.

(ABM Treaty) STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC)

The SCC was established by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and is charged with implementing that Treaty.

The ABM Treaty provides that, in addition to SCC sessions, a formal review of the Treaty be held every five years. To fulfill that requirement, the fourth ABM Treaty Review was held in Geneva from September 27 to October 1, 1993. The United States delegation was led by Acting ACDA Director Thomas Graham, Jr. The delegations present—representing Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States—exchanged views on the operation of the Treaty, on rights and obligations under the Treaty, and on the question of state succession to the Treaty in light of the breakup of the Soviet Union. The strict traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty was reaffirmed, and those present agreed on the importance of maintaining the viability of the Treaty in view of political and technological changes. All delegations at the review advocated continuing efforts to strengthen the ABM Treaty.

Following the review, the SCC met twice during the autumn of 1993 in Geneva to discuss ABM Treaty issues. During the two sessions, the United States concentrated on two problems:

First, the need to establish a multilateral succession arrangement for the ABM Treaty, in light of the demise of the Soviet Union. The United States seeks acceptance, as ABM Treaty Parties, of all the New Independent States that wish to become Parties.

Second, the need to draw a clear distinction between theater ballistic missile defenses and strategic ballistic missile defenses. The United States seeks an agreed understanding that will clarify the demarcation between ABM systems and theater ballistic missile defense systems.

At the same time, the United States Government has withdrawn the previous Administration's

proposals to revise the ABM Treaty. The United States will *not* propose revisions to the Treaty that would provide for:

- additional ABM system deployment areas and ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites;
- elimination of restrictions on sensors;
- elimination of restrictions on the development and testing of ABM systems and components;
- elimination of restrictions on the transfer of ABM systems and components.

ACDA leads the United States Component of the SCC, providing the United States Component with the United States Commissioner, the secretariat, the legal adviser, policy and technical experts, and administrative support. ACDA also chairs the U.S. Government interagency Standing Consultative Commission Backstopping Committee, which has overall responsibility for developing U.S. policy guidance related to the activities of the Commission and implementation of the ABM Treaty.

SAFETY, SECURITY AND DISMANTLEMENT (SSD) TALKS

The purpose of the SSD is to facilitate the dismantlement of nuclear weapons by Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and to ensure the safety and security of this dismantlement. Various projects are under discussion, all focussing on denuclearization and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and sensitive nuclear weapons technology from the former Soviet Union. These projects include --

- assistance in dismantling strategic offensive arms, specifically ICBM silos, ICBM frames, ICBM liquid rocket fuel, SLBM tubes, SSBN submarines, and heavy bombers;
- defense conversion--assistance in the conversion of military technologies and capabilities into civilian activities;
- assistance in developing and improving systems for fissile material control, accounting, and physical protection;
- assistance with safe, secure storage and transportation of nuclear weapons and fissile material recovered from Former Soviet Union nuclear weapons. This will include:
 - assistance for services and training relating to the construction of a safe, secure, and ecologically sound storage facility for fissile material;
 - technical assistance in the design of a storage facility;
 - fissile material containers;
 - flexible armored blankets for protecting nuclear weapons containers;
 - safe and secure rail cars for transporting nuclear weapons and fissile materials;
- nuclear accident response equipment and training;
- environmental restoration, to help restore the environment at former strategic rocket facilities.
- export control to limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction;
- government-to-government communications for the efficient transmission of arms control notification.

In 1993, the United States Delegation to the Safety, Security and Dismantlement Talks, at meetings in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and the United States, continued SSD discussions that began in 1991 with those four states. ACDA provided a member of the delegation.

(INF Treaty) SPECIAL VERIFICATION COMMISSION (SVC)

The SVC is the implementing body for the Treaty Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF), which entered into force on June 1, 1988. Although elimination of declared missiles under the INF Treaty has now been completed, we must be able to satisfy ourselves that more are not being produced.

The INF Treaty remains in force indefinitely, and provides for continuing inspections of specified

production facilities until the year 2001 to ensure that the ban on missiles subject to the Treaty's provisions is observed. Specifically, the INF Treaty gives the Parties the right to conduct a certain number of inspections annually of former missile facilities, and to conduct continuous monitoring at certain other facilities.

- Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the twelve former Soviet republics have become successor states to the INF Treaty. Six of those states - Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan - have inspectable facilities covered by the INF Treaty on their territories. Of these six, four are active participants in the work of the Commission: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Each of the remaining two has only one inspectable facility on its territory; with the consent of the active Parties, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan do not attend meetings of the Commission or participate in inspections.

The SVC normally meets in Geneva. In June 1993, the United States met with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan at the first formal session of the SVC attended by the latter two Parties. Issues considered during 1993 dealt principally with multilateralization of the Treaty's inspection regime, including:

- multilateral operating procedures;
- new points of entry and exit for inspections;
- communications links;
- allocation of costs for inspection activities.

ACDA leads the United States Delegation to the Special Verification Commission, and provides the United States Representative, the secretariat, the legal adviser, policy and technical experts, and administrative support. ACDA also chairs the U.S. Government's interagency Special Verification Commission Support Group, which develops U.S. policy guidance related to the activities of the Commission and the implementation of the INF Treaty.

(START I) JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION (JCIC)

The JCIC is the implementation body for the START I (Strategic Arms Reduction) Treaty, which was signed by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in 1991.

The START I Treaty provides that certain of its provisions will be provisionally applied between the time of Treaty signature and its entry into force. Among them are the provisions establishing the JCIC.

Two JCIC sessions were held in 1993, at which agreements were concluded on:

- provision of tapes and data associated with the analysis of telemetric information;
- procedures for the additional confirmation of the dimensions of first stages of submarine launched ballistic missiles;
- technical specifications for United States equipment used for continuous monitoring in Russia;
- additional points of entry for the non-Russian Parties for START inspection aircraft and inspectors;
- use of an additional type of aircraft as inspection aircraft;
- procedures for defining zones within which the movement of ballistic missile submarines is restricted during certain inspections of submarine bases
- exhibition of the technical characteristics of the silo-based variant of the Russian SS-24 ICBM at the Pavlograd, Ukraine facility where this missile has been produced
- exhibition of a missile designated by Russia as a new variant of the SS-25 mobile ICBM at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Russia.

The U.S.-Russia START II Treaty has its own implementation forum, the Bilateral Implementation Commission, but this body will not be established until after START II enters into force. Because START II depends, with few exceptions, entirely on START I for definitions, counting rules, and verification and implementation provisions, the work being done in the JCIC on the implementation of START I will be directly relevant to the ultimate implementation of START II.

The JCIC has been functioning since late 1991 and has held a total of six sessions. The Commission normally meets in Geneva. The Parties to the JCIC are the Parties to the START Treaty: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and the United States.

ACDA leads the United States Delegation to the JCIC, providing the United States Representative, the secretariat, the legal adviser, policy and technical experts, and administrative support. ACDA also chairs the U.S. Government Interagency JCIC Backstopping Committee, which develops U.S. policy guidance for the activities of the Commission and implementation of the START Treaty.

ZANGGER (NPT EXPORTERS) COMMITTEE

Article III.2 of the NPT requires each party to ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied to their exports to non-nuclear weapon States. In order to reach agreement on which exports should trigger this requirement, a group of NPT exporting states first met in 1971 under the leadership of a Swiss diplomat, Claude Zangger. Zangger retired in 1989, but the Committee continues to call itself the Zangger Committee in honor of his many years of valuable service. An Austrian diplomat, Fritz Schmidt, is now chairman.

The "trigger list" of items that require the application of IAEA safeguards when exported to non-nuclear weapon states has expanded significantly since it was first published in 1974. Article III.2 provides the guidelines for what items may be included on the list, i.e., source or fissionable special material and certain "especially designed or prepared" equipment and material. This generally limits the list to specialized items for the nuclear fuel cycle including nuclear reactors and fuel and components for reactors. Equipment for other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, fuel enrichment, and spent fuel reprocessing, are also covered.

The Zangger Committee Understandings and trigger list help to ensure that supplier countries control key nuclear items either to deny them to states if the risk of diversion is too great, or to ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied when exports are made. The result is to force a potential proliferator to build its own nuclear facilities, which is expensive and time-consuming, or to accept IAEA safeguards on the export, which will then be violated if the recipient diverts the item for military purposes.

The Committee's membership increased to 29 in 1993 with the addition of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, South Africa, and Spain. It meets in Vienna, and in 1993 followed its long-established practice of holding two annual meetings. During 1993 the Committee reached preliminary agreement to clarify certain entries on the trigger list related to uranium enrichment and primary coolant pumps for reactors. In addition, the Committee agreed to review the non-sensitive portions of the fuel cycle in the trigger list to determine whether any clarification is needed and to consider what role it might play in the 1995 NPT extension conference. ACDA participates in all Zangger Committee activities, attending meetings and developing and drafting policies.

THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP (NSG)

The Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines were first agreed in 1976, published in 1978, and are now accepted by 29 countries, with both the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic having joined in 1993. While the Zangger Committee Understandings primarily ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied to certain exports to non-nuclear weapon States, the NSG Guidelines go further by addressing other essential questions. One example is the treatment of sensitive fuel cycle technologies including enrichment and reprocessing. These fuel cycle operations have justifiable civilian uses in certain countries with large nuclear power programs. However, by producing highly-enriched uranium and by separating plutonium from spent fuel, they can also present a major proliferation risk.

The Guidelines emphasize the importance of exercising restraint in the export of sensitive technologies, and permit consultations in cases where such exports might increase the risk of conflict or

instability. Moreover, if such exports ultimately take place, strict conditions must apply. These Guidelines helped to establish a policy that has been in force on a de facto basis for the past 13 years: the embargo on exporting enrichment and reprocessing plants to volatile regions or to other countries where there may be a risk of proliferation.

The NSG plenary met in Lucerne, Switzerland from March 30 to April 1, 1992, and continued to make major advances in nuclear export controls. At this meeting, the NSG amended its Guidelines to require full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition for any new, significant nuclear supply commitment to non-nuclear weapon States. A common policy to this effect had been adopted in 1992, but this amendment became the first change to the NSG guidelines in 14 years. The U.S. adopted this principle as a national requirement in 1978 and had long encouraged others to do so. This step constitutes a major strengthening of the Guidelines, which now in effect embargo trigger list items to countries without full-scope IAEA safeguards.

At the 1993 Plenary meeting, NSG members also:

- made a special appeal to the new states from the former Soviet Union to accede to the NPT non-nuclear weapon States, welcomed Argentina's adherence to the guidelines;
- invited all other supplier countries to adhere to the NSG Guidelines;
- adopted new procedural arrangements to formalize its membership and to improve the effectiveness of its operations.

The NSG also began to implement the multilateral arrangement to control some 65 nuclear related dual-use items. This arrangement is designed to impede assistance to non-nuclear weapons states for unsafeguarded and nuclear explosive activities. At meetings in March and October 1993 with U.S. chairmanship, the NSG began to consult and exchange information under the arrangement. Other NSG activities in 1993 involved further efforts to strengthen controls being carried out in working groups on conditions of supply, the nuclear control list, and information sharing.

ACDA was privileged to play a major role in these achievements. For many years, ACDA officers have authored U.S. diplomatic initiatives seeking to advance the U.S. full-scope safeguards policy and to create multilateral dual-use export controls. ACDA played an extensive part in U.S. efforts in the NSG. The senior representative providing U.S. views in the NSG working group on conditions of supply is an ACDA official. ACDA is also involved in all U.S. nuclear export cases, including those on dual-use commodities.

REGULAR GENERAL CONFERENCE (OF THE TREATY OF TLAHELCO)

The Treaty of Tlatelolco was opened for signature in 1967 and now has 24 Latin American and Caribbean Parties that have pledged not to develop, manufacture, or acquire nuclear weapons. The Parties to the Treaty have accepted the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards for all of nuclear activities, in order to assist in verifying compliance with the Treaty. The United States, although not a party to the Treaty, has signed two of the Additional Protocols to the Treaty. The Treaty establishes a regional organization, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (known also by its Spanish acronym OPANAL) to help ensure compliance with its provisions.

ACDA leads U.S. Government efforts supporting full entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which has not yet occurred. In this capacity, ACDA led the United States Delegation to the Thirteenth Regular General Conference in May 1993, in Mexico City.

PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

This is a temporary commission, established by the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention), negotiations on which were completed in the Conference on Disarmament in 1992. The of the Preparatory Commission is to prepare detailed procedures for implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and to lay the foundation for the new international organization mandated by the Chemical Weapons Convention. That new permanent organization will be the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; when it comes into being upon entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Preparatory Commission will go out of existence.

The Preparatory Commission met in the Hague five times in 1993. Expert meetings were held between meetings of the Commission.

ACDA heads the United States Delegation to the Preparatory Commission, and provides policy advisors, technical experts, administrative support staff, and Delegation's legal advisors. ACDA also cl s the Washington backstopping effort for the PrepCom, and prepares and coordinates all guidance to the delegation. ACDA coordinates and manages the U.S. share of the OPCW budget.

AUSTRALIA GROUP

Chaired by Australia, the Australia Group is an informal forum of states whose goal is to discourage and impede chemical weapons and biological weapons proliferation by harmonizing national export controls chemical weapons precursor chemicals, biological weapons pathogens, and chemical and biological weapons dual-use production equipment, by sharing information on countries of concern, and by other ways and means.

The Australia Group was formed in 1984 as a result of the use of chemical weapons during the Iraq War. There are presently 25 members of the Group, including Australia, Argentina, Austria, the Eurc Union, Hungary, Iceland, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Requests by other states to join the group are considered on a case-by-case basis.

The Group has established common export controls on 54 chemical precursors, a list of production equipment related to chemical weapons, and certain microorganisms, toxins, and production equipment related to biological weapons.

In June 1993, the Australia Group completed and adopted comprehensive export controls on chemical weapons precursors, biological weapons agents, and dual-use chemical and biological weapons production equipment. The Group also adopted a U.S.-proposed "no-undercut" policy, which will ensure that the export license denials of one member are respected by all other members. Argentina and Hungary joined the Group in June. At the December 1993 meeting, the Group adopted U.S. proposals for improving member cooperation in enforcing export controls and agreed to U.S.-proposed measures to coordinate member export control assistance and other non-member outreach activities.

ACDA participates in the U.S. delegation to the Australia Group. It played a leading role in developing and securing adoption of the U.S. proposals to improve member enforcement cooperation and coordination of export control assistance activities.

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MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR)

The Missile Technology Control Regime is a multilateral export control regime, created in April 1987 by the United States, Canada, West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. It is neither a treaty nor an international agreement; rather, the MTCR is a voluntary arrangement among countries that share a common interest in preventing missile proliferation and controlling exports of missile-related items in accordance with a common Guidelines and Technology Annex. The MTCR originally controlled missiles and unmanned air vehicles capable of carrying a 500 kilogram payload to a range of 300 kilometers; it has since been extended to cover missiles capable of delivering any weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical or biological) of any weight to any range.

Having successfully put in place an effective multilateral regime to control the export of missile-related hardware and technology from member states, the MTCR participants focused in 1993 on the problem of non-member suppliers. At the November plenary session of the MTCR, the members agreed to place increased emphasis on dealing directly with the missile proliferation threat emanating from outside of the MTCR.

ACDA participates in the missile nonproliferation efforts of the United States, taking part in MTCR plenary sessions and technical experts meetings, as well as in bilateral meetings with Russia, China, and other key non-members of MTCR.

(CFE Treaty) JOINT CONSULTATIVE GROUP (JCG)

The JCG is the implementing body for the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The CFE Treaty enhances European security and stability by establishing quantitative limits on tanks, personnel carriers, artillery pieces, helicopters, and fixed-wing combat aircraft.

The CFE Treaty provides that each party to the Treaty is entitled to representation on the JCG. Its overall function is to promote the objectives of the Treaty, to implement the Treaty's provisions and, to the extent specified in the Treaty, attempt to resolve disagreements among the Parties to the Treaty.

Specific functions of the JCG include:

- addressing questions of compliance with or possible circumvention of the CFE Treaty;
- considering measures to enhance CFE Treaty viability and effectiveness;
- seeking to resolve any ambiguities and differences of interpretation that may arise in CFE Treaty implementation;
- seeking to resolve various technical questions that may arise;
- considering matters of dispute arising out of implementation of the CFE Treaty.

Decisions of the JCG are made by consensus, which the CFE Treaty defines to mean the absence of any objection by any representative of a party to the CFE Treaty. The JCG may act on matters within its competency as set forth in the CFE Treaty; other matters require action by the Parties to the Treaty themselves, rather than the JCG. An example of this was the two-step process by which the Czech and Slovak Republics formally succeeded to the rights and obligations of the former Czechoslovakia in early 1993. Much of the day-to-day discussion of the ways in which this would take place was conducted through the JCG. The final action was taken at an extraordinary conference of the Parties themselves, a device expressly authorized in the CFE Treaty.

Among the issues that the JCG addressed in 1993 were the question of limits on conventional armaments and equipment in the flank zones of Europe (discussed in Chapter III), the distribution of costs to be paid by the CFE Treaty Parties for the work of the JCG, and development of reduction and conversion procedures (some of the means by which conventional armaments and equipment subject to the CFE Treaty are to be eliminated) that go beyond those in the CFE Treaty. Further questions on how certain Parties are to pay for the reduction and conversion activities required of them under the Treaty will likely be on the agenda.

the JCG in 1994.

The JCG has been in nearly continuous session since November, 1990. ACDA continues to participate in the work of the Group. The senior ACDA representative on the United States Delegation to the JCG is often the senior U.S. official present at sessions of the Group.

COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROLS (COCOM)

COCOM is a multilateral export control regime established in 1949 to maintain common controls on items that could enhance the military capabilities of the then Communist Bloc nations. The 17 member group includes Japan, Australia, and the NATO countries other than Iceland. COCOM has three control lists: the International Munitions List, the Industrial List which covers dual use items, and the International Atomic Energy List.

In 1993, in response to a U.S. initiative, COCOM members began developing the framework for a new arrangement that will :

- promote transparency and responsible trade in armaments and dual-use goods and technologies;
- not duplicate the work of existing multilateral control regimes, but complement existing weapons of nuclear destruction nonproliferation regimes;
- permit bona fide trade;
- continue to protect very sensitive military equipment and technology;
- permit membership by all nations that meet international nonproliferation and export control norms.

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed at the Vancouver summit to eliminate export control relics of the Cold War, and to establish in their place a partnership between the East and West in this area. COCOM will therefore be replaced, on or before March 31, 1994, by a new system of multilateral restraint now being negotiated.

ACDA has participated in the interagency delegations negotiating the new initiative from the onset and has been deeply involved in the working groups established to draft the new regime's guidelines and to identify "Very Sensitive Items" for appropriate listing.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL SECURITY WORKING GROUP (ACRS WG)

The multilateral Arms Control and Regional Security working group is one of five entities formed shortly after the opening round of the Peace Process in Madrid in October 1991. It meets in Plenary session every three or four months at the Ambassadorial/Assistant Secretary level.

The United States and Russia (as co-sponsors), twelve Arab states, Israel, the Palestinians, the UN, the European Union (formerly European Community), Turkey, the European Free Trade Association, Canada, Ukraine, India, Australia, Japan and China have participated in the working group to date. Between plenary sessions of the working group, informal meetings of experts have taken place at the request of regional participants. Topics have ranged from maritime, communications and information exchange measures to declaratory measures and long term objectives for the region.

The ACRS WG is the only formally organized regional forum in the Middle East that includes both Israel and the Arabs on arms control and regional security matters. ACDA has participated in ACRS work since its inception. The Director, the Assistant Directors, and other ACDA officials have presented briefings and papers to the working group and have conducted bilateral consultations in the region.

CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE), FORUM FOR SECURITY COOPERATION (FSC)

At the Helsinki summit in 1992, the participating nations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe created a new body, the Forum for Security Cooperation. The tasks of the FSC, which were broadened by CSCE ministers in Europe late in 1993, include:

- negotiation of arms control, disarmament and confidence and security building measures;
- enhancement of regular consultation and intensified cooperation among participating nations on matters related to security;
- reducing the risk of conflict;
- implementation of Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs);
- annual implementation assessment meetings on CSBMs;
- provision of a forum for discussion and clarification of information exchanged under agreed CSBMs;
- preparation of seminars on military doctrine and other subjects.

In the arms control area in 1993, the FSC focused on preliminary efforts to create a global military information exchange; development of and improvements to the Vienna Document '92; new confidence-building and stabilizing measures; and attempted "harmonization" of existing arms control obligations. Other areas receiving attention were force planning, arms transfers, military nonproliferation cooperation and contacts, regional security issues, and security enhancement and cooperation, including development of a code of conduct on the politico-military aspects of security. The FSC's work program and progress will be reviewed in 1994 at the next CSCE Review Conference in Budapest.

ACDA is a member of the United States Delegation to the FSC. FSC meetings are held in Vienna.

FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly deals with arms control and security issues.

In the 1993 session the First Committee adopted by consensus resolutions supporting a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and an agreement to prohibit production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. The Committee also considered 48 arms control and security resolutions on issues ranging from nuclear testing and nonproliferation to conventional arms transfers and regional disarmament. Two U.S.-sponsored resolutions were adopted by consensus, including a resolution calling for a moratorium on the export of land mines that attracted 66 co-sponsors, a record for a U.S. resolution in the First Committee.

In addition, the First Committee passed resolutions on nuclear weapons free zones for the Middle East and Africa and on consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco (see page 16).

Acting ACDA Director Thomas Graham, Jr. addressed the Committee on October 19, 1993. His talk stressed the importance of arms control in the post Cold War world and noted that four priority tasks must be completed:

- ensuring the nonproliferation of weapons of mass and the means of delivering them;
- establishing global norms for the control of arms; destruction
- applying arms control lessons and confidence-building measures to the settlement of regional disputes;
- eliminating the excesses of armaments and overcapacities of the defense industries from the Cold War.

The First Committee met between October 18 and November 19, 1993 in New York.

ACDA provides the primary leadership and staff for the United States Delegation to the First Committee, and chairs the Washington backstopping efforts for preparation and guidance to the delegation.

UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

The United Nations Disarmament Commission is a subsidiary body of the United Nations General Assembly. It deliberates on arms control and security issues, and comprises all U.N. members.

The 1993 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission took place in April and May 1993. Three items were on the agenda; one of them achieved approval by consensus – a report on "guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security." The other agenda items dealt with the role of science and technology in disarmament and related fields, and with nuclear disarmament: no consensus was reached on either of these items.

This Commission meets annually in New York in the spring. ACDA provides the primary leadership and staffing for the United States Delegation to the United Nations Disarmament Commission, as well as chairing the Washington backstopping efforts for preparation and guidance to the delegation..

UNITED STATES-RUSSIA COMMISSION ON DEFENSE INDUSTRY CONVERSION

The United States-Russia Commission on Defense Industry Conversion met in Russia in November 1993 and agreed to pursue several initial defense conversion projects, including:

- joint ventures in housing for Russian military officers;
- joint ventures between Russian defense industry enterprises and United States firms;
- the possible establishment of technology parks in selected cities.

ACDA is a member of this Commission.

OPEN SKIES CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (OSCC)

The OSCC, which meets in Vienna, is the implementing body for the Treaty on Open Skies, which provides for unarmed aerial observation flights over each party's territory in order to gather information about military forces and activities as a means of promoting openness and transparency.

The Commission's chief function is to monitor the operation of the Treaty on Open Skies and to discuss and, if possible, resolve any implementation issues that might arise. It makes decisions by consensus. The Treaty sets forth the powers of the Commission and specifies those matters that the Commission may decide; all other matters require the formal action of the Parties themselves outside of the Commission.

As with other fora, much of the day-to-day work of the Commission is done in various informal working groups, including those on flight procedures, sensors (the measuring and recording instruments that an observation aircraft may carry), rules and procedures for observation flights, and formats and notifications for various flight and other activities. When working groups are able to reach decision on an issue, the matter is then passed to the full Commission for final decision. In July 1993, the United States took over as chair of the Sensor Working Group.

Sensor decisions required by the Treaty before entry into force of the Treaty probably will be an early item of discussion in 1994, as will various flight procedures.

Each party to the Treaty on Open Skies is represented on the Commission, which meets monthly in Vienna when it is in session. In 1993, the Commission met twice.

ACDA is a member of the United States Delegation to the Commission, participating in plenary sessions and all working group meetings.

VII. ORGANIZING ARMS CONTROL RESEARCH

The 1961 Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, requires ACDA's Director to

- (1) ensure the conduct of research, development, and other studies in the field of arms control and disarmament;
- (2) make arrangements for the conduct of research, development, and other studies in the fields of arms control and disarmament by private or public institutions or persons;
- (3) coordinate the research, development, and other studies conducted in the field of arms control and disarmament by or for other Government agencies in accordance with procedures established under the Act.

Historically, ACDA has met this requirement through such efforts as sponsorship of the Arms Control Research Coordinating Committee (an interagency group established to coordinate arms control research), maintenance of the Arms Control Research Network (ACORN) data base of completed, ongoing and planned research, participation in interagency committees focussing on research and development, and compilation and submittal of the Annual Report to Congress on Arms Control Research.

A significant component of ACDA's research effort is its external research program, which is managed by an internal Research Review Board. The Board reviews research projects proposed by Bureaus and Offices and recommends a program budget structure for external research activities.

The Research Review Board looks to the external research program to provide support for the Agency through projects that are critical to performance of the ACDA mission, that are time sensitive, and that directly support ongoing arms control negotiating efforts concerning nuclear and strategic forces, including strategic defenses; conventional forces; chemical and biological weapons; and nonproliferation issues.

In 1993 ACDA managed an external research program of about \$1.5 million, examining strategic, chemical and conventional weapons, nonproliferation, verification, crisis stability, dismantlement and environmental technologies, and scientists in the former Soviet Union. Specifically:

- ACDA used the multi-agency HYDICE experiment to examine multi-spectral imaging applications in geology, drug enforcement, and military reconnaissance. ACDA's interest is in defining a data collection program to exploit arms control verification capabilities for potential monitoring of START compliance, conventional forces, and chemical warfare or nuclear installations.
- An external research project analyzed the potential key issues of the 1995 NPT Extension Conference and to recommend U.S. strategies and actions for ensuring that the NPT is extended indefinitely and unconditionally in 1995.
- Support was provided to the Program for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies to develop and implement data handling and analytical enhancements to their Emerging Nuclear Suppliers and International Missile Proliferation databases.
- Two external research projects provided assistance and support to the U.S. Representative to the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) for the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and to provide such information, studies, and support to the PrepCom—as designated by ACDA—to assist the U.S. Representative. The project was extended beyond the PrepCom to include support to the U.S. Representative to the CWC over the initial implementation years.
- Contractor support developed a "Dismantlement and Environment Technologies Catalog" identifying technologies being used, or that could be used, in the Former Soviet Union for weapons dismantlement.
- An external research project addressed arms control and disarmament questions in conventional

force verification methodology and assessments, conventional force analysis, and analysis of other countries' perspectives on conventional arms control.

- ACDA participated with the Department of Energy in preparing and implementing a two week entrepreneurial training workshop in Moscow for mid-level scientists and managers from the FSU nuclear weapons complex, addressing market economy fundamentals, preparation of proposals for commercial ventures, and making contacts with interested U.S. businesses.
- ACDA continued support of the IAEA technical assistance database system which proved invaluable to the 1990 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and will be needed to support the NPT 1995 Conference.
- An external research project addressed strategic force verification methodology and assessment, and strategic and theater nuclear force analyses.

The scope of the ACDA external research program was quite broad given its relatively small budget. A comparison between the research conducted and the ACDA research functions defined in the Act reveals that the ACDA projects were thinly spread across a large number of these functions in order to provide a balanced body of research. Research functions that dovetailed with the roles of other governmental institutions were relatively well funded, whereas those roles unique to ACDA received little or no support beyond the small efforts that ACDA external research could provide. ACDA has carefully spent its available funds across a wide range of activities, often participating in interagency programs to encourage needed arms control research. However, the increased emphasis on arms control attending the demise of the Soviet threat and the associated world wide realignments suggests that more needs to be done.

ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL RESEARCH. As part of the coordination of interagency arms control research, ACDA will make a significant revision in the format of the Annual Report to Congress on Arms Control Research. Past reports listed research project summaries without commentary regarding the relationship of these research efforts to arms control priorities. Future Annual Reports will include assessments of the relationship of these research projects to national arms control priorities. ACDA will work within the interagency process to establish research priorities and conduct this assessment.

VIII. ORGANIZING AND STORING ARMS CONTROL INFORMATION

ACDA continues to improve upon its long history of arms control information management. Having used computers in support of arms control analyses virtually since the creation of the Agency, ACDA computer support now also provides administrative and operations support to all parts of the Agency, maintains arms control data bases used by other interested federal agencies as well as ACDA staff, and – with the recent introduction of a public information bulletin board – is providing pertinent arms control information to the entire academic and institutional research world. Well established data bases maintained by the Agency include:

- the Automated Recourse to Electronic Negotiation Archives (ARENA) system which permits search of the complete text of all arms control negotiations;
- the Processor for Arms Control Treaties (PACTS) database which permits similar search of the complete texts of all arms control treaties to which the U.S. is a party;
- the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) databases of international arms sales and military expenditures;
- various economic data used to prepare the Annual Report to the Congress on WMEAT;
- the ACDA Integrated Retrieval System (AIRS) database of citations to thousands of arms control studies and reports;
- the Arms Control Research Network (ACORN) database listing all federal arms control research projects and their recent products;
- an extensive data base on worldwide annual military expenditures, arms transfers, armed forces;

ACDA is the repository for the U.S. Government of data exchanged among nations pursuant to arms control treaties. The ACCORD repository was established by ACDA during 1993 to automate this role. This computer-based federal repository allows exchange data, notifications, and inspection reports to be archived in a single location. To the extent possible, the information is made available in electronic form so that federal agencies can have immediate access. The repository consists of both classified and unclassified computer databases, as well as storage for paper copies of data when needed. The initial version holds data from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, Open Skies, and the Confidence and Security Building Measures Agreement. Work is underway to add START and Chemical Weapons Convention data and to backfill exchange data from other treaties.

During 1993 ACDA made considerable progress toward an integrated open systems Agency-wide computer network. Inter-connection between the previously disparate VAX-based technical and database computer system and the Wang-based office automation system is under test. A pilot imaging subsystem in support of the Director's office is nearly operational. Development of a Wang/IBM-based message handling subsystem is underway. This will replace the manual acquisition, sorting, and distribution of heavy daily ACDA telegram traffic with an automated system fed electronically by the Department of State system. New computer networks for office automation are being introduced in Geneva, the Hague and Vienna in support of our negotiation delegations, with E-mail connection to the main ACDA network. Portable office automation and telecommunication capabilities were added for the delegations negotiating in the former Soviet Union. This equipment includes satellite telephones, portable computers and printers to allow worldwide data and fax communications capability. It helps to compensate for the lack of support facilities and infrastructure in the new states.

To provide improved management of its computer resources, ACDA reorganized its Operations and Information office under the Chief Information Officer to provide separate but coordinated focal points for analysis, databases, development, and computer administration. Major contracts were competed for operations and development support. We conducted comprehensive review of computer operations, conducted, and refined plans for migration to the open systems network.

We anticipate that, by the end of 1994, every member of the ACDA staff will have a personal computers his or her desktop that will enable access, under appropriate security controls, to all ACDA databases and automated support capabilities. Interconnection to other Agency systems will also be available

on a selective basis. Studies and development to further improve the efficiency and capability for organization and storage of arms control information will continue to be a significant ACDA focus .

IX. COMMUNICATING WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

One of ACDA's four mandates legislated in the 1963 ACDA Act is "the dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control and disarmament." ACDA seeks to provide the public with clear and technically competent insight into the often arcane debate over national security policy. In order to better meet this requirement, the Office of Public Information was established in 1993, replacing the previous Office of Public Affairs. This Office is divided into two new components, a Public Diplomacy Division and a Publications and Media Division.

We welcome suggestions from our customers as we move into development of arms control and nonproliferation curricula and associated materials for use by academic institutions in the United States and overseas, establishment of regular press briefings, and the use of new technologies including computerized multi-media presentations.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTIVITIES

In the information age, a coherent strategy for informing the public is essential to the success of U.S. arms control and nonproliferation initiatives and policies. To develop and implement such a strategy, the ACDA Director of Public Information chairs a new interagency Working Group on Public Diplomacy for Arms Control and Nonproliferation. Representatives from the State, Defense, Commerce and Energy Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the On-Site Inspection Agency, and the United States Information Agency regularly meet in this group under the auspices of the National Security Council to formulate plans for communicating with the American people and the rest of the world.

The ACDA Historian's Office is an integral part of ACDA's Public Diplomacy activities, improving the public's understanding of where arms control and nonproliferation efforts have taken us and what problems they may help us solve in the future. The Historian's Office produces *Documents on Disarmament*, yearly compilations of historical documents on arms control and nonproliferation issues.

PUBLISHING AND OTHER CUSTOMER SERVICES

The Publications and Media Division of the Office of Public Information produces the wide variety of publications that explain present and past arms control and nonproliferation developments to the United States and the world. In addition to the publications cited in the preceding section, these documents include:

- official texts of treaties, agreements, statements, and speeches;
- fact sheets on virtually all facets of arms control and nonproliferation activities;
- press releases of key developments in these areas.

The *ACDA News* - containing relevant stories that appear in newspapers across the country - is published daily and the *ACDA News Special Edition*, highlighting important articles from professional journals, is published every week.

This division publishes a bi-weekly calendar of events on arms control and nonproliferation, and *News Roundups* of recent media stories on arms control and nonproliferation issues. PI also produces *ACDA Readers*, comprised of all ACDA publications on a particular topic; recent examples include chemical and biological weapons, nonproliferation, New Independent States, and confidence and security building measures. To improve service to customers, PI has set up an Electronic Bulletin Board to provide electronically the growing number of ACDA publications on our already extensive, newly-created *Publications List*.

The number of the ACDA Electronic Bulletin Board is
202-736-4436 **Layout In box**

We also have produced a *Who's Who* of key ACDA professionals to assist organizations : ing speakers on arms control and nonproliferation matters.

Other recently produced publications include a monthly *Current Articles* on arms control and related matters and periodic newsletters for industry on Chemical Weapons Convention implementation. In preparation are *Handbooks* on non-governmental organizations and on academic programs that focus on arms control and nonproliferation. In addition, we will be publishing a semi-annual *Index of Articles* starting in January 1994 and an update of the 1990 edition of the *ACDA Agreements Book*. These new efforts are crucial to making sure that United States Government arms control and nonproliferation policy is responsive to public concerns.

THE ACDA LIBRARY

ACDA's Library/Technical Reference Center is an integral part of PI, serving as a repository for thousands of difficult-to-find volumes on arms control and nonproliferation and helping ACDA officers keep up-to-date with the latest research. The Technical Reference Center also is responsible for compiling Current Articles of Interest. Revitalization plans for ACDA anticipate expanding the resources of the Library to better serve researchers and the general public.

X. ACDA ORGANIZATION

ACDA is reorganizing to best meet the arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament challenges of the post Cold War world. This chapter describes ACDA's organization as of January 1994.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, the Director is the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of State, and other senior government officials on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament matters, ~~and on their relationship to other aspects of overall national security policy.~~ The Director is responsible for all ACDA operations, activities, and positions.

General Advisory Committee (GAC)

Abolished under new legislation?

The General Advisory Committee is a Presidential policy advisory body on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament, consisting of up to 15 members. The Committee, by law, reports to the President, the Secretary of State, and the ACDA Director on its findings and recommendations.

Executive Secretary and Advisor for Internal Affairs (D/EX)

The Executive Secretary directs the ACDA Secretariat, assuring that the Agency is responsible to internal and external requirements and demands ranging from general public inquiries to urgent, highly sensitive policy formulations being constructed within the Government. The Executive Secretary advises the Director and other Agency principals on the status of internal operations and activities, and implements new or improved approaches to increase their effectiveness.

Executive Document Support Section. The Executive Document Support Section maintains permanent records of all decisions made by the ACDA Director and Deputy Director, and all relevant Presidential, interagency and ACDA Principals papers. This section tracks, researches, and retrieves in full text, summary and chronological order the evolution of policy decisions, and archives ACDA's history.

Policy Planning Group (D/PPG)

The Policy Planning Group is responsible for the Agency's arms control and nonproliferation policy planning efforts and advises the Director on related issues. In this regard, the Policy Planning Group assists the Bureaus and Offices in recommending options to address problems and identify new opportunities in the post Cold War Area, and formulates policy options for consideration by the Director.

Advanced Projects Office (D/AP)

The Advanced Projects Office creates, identifies, collects, assembles, integrates, analyzes, evaluates, and develops innovative concepts and positions offering new avenues to arms control and disarmament. Advanced Projects produces inventive arms control concepts for consideration by the Director and other national security principals. Its subject area includes the full range of control, reduction, elimination, nonproliferation, and counterproliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons and their delivery systems, as well as ACDA-specific projects including the preparation of this Annual Report. Its projects build both on internally generated concepts and on ideas collected from government, academic and nongovernmental sources.

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Principal Deputy Director, On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)

An ACDA official serves as the Principal Deputy Director of the On-Site Inspection Agency, which the agency charged with operational responsibility for the conduct of arms control on-site inspections.

Senior Military Advisor (D/M)

The Senior Military Advisor serves as the principal advisor to the ACDA Director on military matters and is the representative of the Director to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Advisor evaluates arms control and nonproliferation proposals from a military perspective and assesses their potential contributions to the national security of the United States. The Advisor commands ACDA's military detailees, which currently number 30.

U.S. Commissioner of the U.S./U.S.S.R. Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)

The U.S. Commissioner of the Standing Consultative Commission, with the rank of Ambassador, represents the United States in the SCC on matters related to the ABM Treaty and heads the U.S. component of the Commission.

U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament (CD)

The U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, with the rank of Ambassador, leads the U.S. delegation to the CD in Geneva, the U.N. Disarmament Commission, the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, and, as requested, also represents the ACDA Director in other negotiations.

U.S. Representative to the Special Verification Commission (SVC)

The U.S. Representative to the Special Verification Commission, with the rank of Ambassador, heads the U.S. delegation to the Commission, which is the implementing body for the INF Treaty.

U.S. Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC)

The U.S. Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, with the rank of Ambassador, heads the U.S. delegation to the Commission, which is the implementing body for the START Treaty. Currently, the same person serves as U.S. Representative to both the SVC and the JCIC.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (DD)

The Deputy Director functions as Acting Director during periods of the Director's absence. The Deputy Director, by law, is specifically responsible for the administrative management of ACDA, for intelligence-related activities, and for ACDA's Special Compartmented Intelligence Facility.

Office of Security

The Office of Security is responsible for ACDA's security programs in Washington, DC and overseas. These programs cover the full range of security services and include physical, procedural, personnel, technical, and computer security, investigative and intelligence functions, as well as liaison with other Federal investigative agencies and offices of security. In addition, the office manages the security and accountability of all special compartmented information materials designated for use by ACDA.

Office of Equal Employment Opportunity

The Office of Equal Employment Opportunity serves as the primary resource in ACDA for compliance with various laws, management directives, and guidelines applicable to Equal Opportunity. It provides leadership to the Agency's top management, bureau and office heads to carry out the continuing policy and program of nondiscrimination and affirmative action.

The Office directs and provides equal employment opportunity in the special program areas of upward mobility, affirmative employment for people with disabilities, multi-year affirmative action plan, special emphasis programs, and outreach recruitment. The Office is responsible for individual complaint counseling, investigations and adjudication of complaints in accordance with applicable federal statutes. An on-going analysis of the Agency's workforce is conducted periodically to assess affirmative measures in order to achieve a diversified workforce.

MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS BUREAU (MA)

The Multilateral Affairs Bureau develops arms control policy, strategy, and tactics, and provides organizational support, delegation staffing, and Washington backstopping for multilateral arms control negotiations and related activities.

Nuclear Testing Policy Division (MA/NTP)

The Nuclear Testing Policy Division is responsible for interagency backstopping for the multilateral negotiations leading to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. It also covers any related bilateral activities, international conferences or consultations which relate to nuclear testing and existing constraints on tests, including:

- the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty;
- the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty;
- the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

The Division provides delegation members and support for any related efforts.

European Security Negotiations Division (MA/ESN)

The European Security Negotiations Division prepares ACDA guidance for European security negotiations in Vienna and elsewhere. It participates in the backstopping and facilitation of treaty implementation through the Joint Consultative Group of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and the Open Skies Consultative Commission. This division supports Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe efforts to increase/maintain stability in Europe, including:

- implementation of Confidence and Security Building Measures;
- in the Forum for Security Cooperation;
- by organizing and conducting the Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings.

The European Security Negotiations Division provides delegation staffing for these negotiations, and consults and coordinates with allied and other foreign governments on multilateral arms control issues.

Scientific and Technological Policy Division (MA/STP)

The Scientific and Technological Policy Division is the ACDA center for the control of chemical and biological weapons. This division directs interagency backstopping for CBW issues, develops and coordinates guidance, and provides delegation staffing for negotiations and meetings related to these issues, including:

- the Chemical Weapons Convention;
- the Biological Weapons Convention;
- the U.S.-Russian Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding;
- the Bilateral Destruction Agreement negotiations;
- the Trilateral Biological Weapons and other CBW negotiations.

International Security Affairs Division (MA/ISA)

The International Security Affairs division is responsible for policy guidance for U.S. delegations to various multinational arms control conferences and meetings. Principal among these are the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the U.N. First Committee which deals with arms control and security issues, and the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

This division provides policy guidance (by chairing the Washington interagency backstopping group) and staff for U.S. delegations to periodic conferences to review the operation of numerous multilateral arms control treaties, including:

- international experts' meetings on multilateral outer space arms control;
- international experts' meetings on transparency in armaments;
- the Environmental Modification Convention Review Conference;
- the Seabed Arms Control Treaty Review Conference;
- the Limited Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference

STRATEGIC AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU (SEA)

The Bureau of Strategic and Eurasian Affairs is ACDA's center for nuclear arms control and disarmament with nations of the former Soviet Union. This includes:

- implementation of existing strategic and theater nuclear arms control agreements (START I, START II, and the INF Treaty);
- negotiation and implementation of future nuclear arms control agreements;
- implementation of the ABM Treaty;

- negotiations concerning theater and strategic ballistic missile defense;
- negotiation and implementation of agreements on the safety, security, and dismantlement (SSD) of the nuclear weapons of the FSU;
- assistance with conversion of the former FSU defense industry to civilian purposes.
- helping to ensure that the U.S. Government coordinates its approach to issues that overlap the SSD and START regimes.

Strategic Negotiations and Implementation Division (SEA/SN)

The Strategic Negotiations and Implementation Division is the ACDA center for control of long-range and intermediate-range delivery systems. It supports and chairs:

- the Backstopping Committee for the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on START I implementation;
- the Backstopping Committee for the Special Verification Commission Subgroup on INF Treaty implementation;
- expects to support and chair the Backstopping Committee for the Bilateral Implementation Commission on START II implementation upon entry into force of the START II Treaty.

This Division also leads ACDA participation in interagency ratification efforts for the START II Treaty through representation on the Treaty Working Group.

Strategic Transition Division (SEA/ST)

The Strategic Transition Division deals with elimination of nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union, with NATO nuclear weapons policy including the no first use issue and tactical nuclear weapons issues.

This division provides policy input and analytical and negotiating support to:

- the Safety, Security, and Dismantlement (SSD) Coordinating Group;
- SSD Delegation meetings with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine;
- meetings of NATO's High Level Group on nuclear policy issues.

ST's involvement in SSD has expanded considerably since its initiation in 1991, as the focus of a control in general has shifted from bilateral, U.S.-Soviet issues to, in this case, direct negotiations with successor states of the FSU on weapons safety, dismantlement, and nonproliferation concerns involving each of them.

Theater and Strategic Defenses Division (SEA/D)

The Theater and Strategic Defenses Division is ACDA's center for:

- implementation of the ABM Treaty;
- future limits on defensive forces;
- examination of the relationships between strategic offensive and defensive forces;
- Anti-Satellite Weapon arms control issues.

This Division supports and chairs the Backstopping Committee for the Standing Consultative Commission. During the past year, in that capacity the Division led the Administration's preparations for the fourth five-year Review of the ABM Treaty as well as two sessions of the Standing Consultative Commission. SEAD provides representatives and support staff for these negotiations.

Defense Conversion Division (SEA/DC)

The Defense Conversion Division is responsible for development, negotiation, and implementation of defense industry conversion policies and programs, principally with states of the former Soviet Union. Particular attention has been given to the development of entrepreneurial training workshops for FSU nuclear weapons scientists and managers, described on page 14. This Division is ACDA's center for participation in the U.S.-Russian Commission on Defense Industry Conversion.

The Division also is expanding its contacts with the Chinese defense conversion program.

where?

INTELLIGENCE, VERIFICATION, AND INFORMATION SUPPORT BUREAU (IVI)

This bureau provides expert analysis and support to the Agency with respect to the full panoply of arms control intelligence, verification, and compliance issues. It is responsible for preparing all computer-based arms control analysis and data bases as well as managing the Agency's computer and telecommunications assets. It oversees ACDA's external research budget, and coordinates all arms control research funded by other U.S. Government agencies.

Verification and Compliance Division (IV/VC)

The Verification and Compliance Division provides analytical and technical expertise in four principal areas:

- developing measures and techniques for verification of arms control agreements under negotiation;
- implementation of verification measures incorporated in arms control agreements now in force;
- assessment of the compliance of other countries with arms control agreements;
- presentation of verification-related issues to other U.S. Government agencies, Congress and the public.

Verification and Compliance Division participation in the development and assessment of verification methods includes preparing papers for the interagency community that address issues related to U.S. verification capabilities and requirements. The Division provides experts to participate in mock and actual inspection exercises, offers "lessons learned" from U.S. experience in implementing previous agreements, and coordinates with the On-Site Inspection Agency on logistics. The Division drafts, with interagency coordination, the President's annual Report to Congress on *Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements*, as well as the formal reports, required by Section 37 of the ACDA Act, evaluating U.S. ability to verify the provisions of specific agreements.

Intelligence Resources Division (IV/IR)

The Intelligence Resources Division:

- provides current intelligence to the Director and his senior staff on a daily basis;
- represents ACDA to and within the United States Intelligence Community;
- participates in Intelligence Community production committees and other bodies, providing an interface between the intelligence producer and the policy-making consumer;
- states ACDA's formal requirements for intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting;
 - acts as repository and distribution agent for Intelligence Community information on arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament;
- ensures that ACDA is aware of all intelligence data relevant to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament.

The Intelligence Research and Analysis Division:

- provides in-depth intelligence support and analysis for the Director and Bureaus.
- IRA conducts focused research into arms control and proliferation issues;
- prepares intelligence briefs and reports;
- requests specialized reporting and analysis from the Intelligence Community.

The Division is staffed by four analysts and a supervisor detailed from the Intelligence Community.

Operations Analysis and Information Management Office (OI)

The Office of Operations Analysis and Information Management provides research support for arms control and proliferation issues, and is responsible for computer support to the Agency. OI is divided into four sections:

- The Operations Analysis Section produces quantitative analytical studies in support of ACDA bureaus and offices, develops computer software for the Agency, supports ACDA's role as the government coordinator of arms control research, and prepares the Annual Report to Congress on Arms Control Research.
- The Economic Analysis Section supports defense conversion, transparency in armaments, and economic aid analysis, and is responsible for preparing the Annual Report to Congress on World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT).
- The Information Management Section develops information management systems for the Agency and the Government arms control community.
- The Computer Operations Section provides computer operations support for all ACDA sites.

NONPROLIFERATION POLICY AND REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL BUREAU (NP)

The mission of ACDA's Bureau of Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Control (NP) is to develop and implement policies in support of:

- the nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their missile delivery systems;
- controls on international transfers of conventional arms and dual-use technology;
- a sound and efficient export controls for U.S. products;
- commercial space policy issues;
- regional arms control initiatives designed to reduce tension, promote or maintain peace, and remove incentives for arms races or development of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.

In 1993, the Bureau was reorganized to better address future challenges to nonproliferation. A new division was created to deal with the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The existing International Nuclear Affairs Division and Weapons and Technology Control Division assumed responsibility for ACDA's expanded efforts in regional arms control.

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This Division provides advice, assessments, and policy recommendations on the international relations aspects of nuclear nonproliferation, including:

- the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
- the Treaty of Tlatelolco and other nuclear weapons free zones;
- the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
- cooperation among nuclear supplier countries, especially multilateral export controls, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee;
- U.S. agreements for civil nuclear cooperation;
- regional arms control approaches to reducing incentives for proliferation;
- preparing the unclassified Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement that is required by law for each proposed agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation;
- providing the President with ACDA views on U.S. nuclear export control issues.

Dual mission appears inconsistent. Which division has primary responsibility?

Nuclear Safeguards and Technology Division (NP/NST)

This Division:

- provides technical advice and policy recommendations on nuclear proliferation issues including the IAEA safeguards system, nuclear fuel cycle, and the technological aspects of nuclear nonproliferation;
- develops safeguards concepts;
- monitors and seeks to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system;
- holds bilateral consultations on these matters with experts abroad;
- develops safeguards and other technical concepts related to the Administration's nonproliferation initiatives;
- participates in guiding the U.S. Program of Technical Assistance for IAEA Safeguards and recruiting/training of U.S. nationals for service at the IAEA;
- makes recommendations on new safeguards agreements, and on U.S. assistance to IAEA technical cooperation efforts;
- monitors and helps guide the IAEA's program of technical assistance;
- assesses the safeguards and nonproliferation implications of emerging technologies;
- assists in the implementation of nonproliferation initiatives including spent fuel storage.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Division (NP/NPT)

ACDA is the U.S. Government's lead agency for the NPT. Because of the NPT's vital contribution to U.S. and international security, ACDA created a new division within the Nonproliferation Bureau to support NPT indefinite extension in 1995. This Division:

- develops, coordinates, and implements U.S. Government policy on all NPT matters;
- provides advice, assessments and policy recommendations on all aspects of the NPT;
- initiates or participates extensively in NPT diplomacy with other Treaty Parties;
- monitors international and multilateral developments relating to the NPT;
- provides leadership for NPT-related meetings and conferences, and in the promulgation of U.S. Government views with regard to the NPT.

Unlike the other three Divisions, WTC does not focus on nuclear weapons. The Weapons and Technology Control Division deals with proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, missile delivery systems, conventional armaments, and dual-use technology transfer, and regional arms control efforts involving these capabilities. This Division:

- contributes to missile, chemical, and biological weapons nonproliferation efforts including the multilateral Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia Group;
- assesses the arms control implications of proposed arms and technology transfers;
- represents ACDA in the preparation of the Administration's annual security assistance programs;
- develops policy initiatives in related areas including advanced weapons and space launch vehicle technology controls;
- develops and supports regional security and arms control initiatives;
- represents ACDA in arms and dual-use technology transfer, and export control policy development;
- provides the ACDA member of the National Disclosure Policy Committee.

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (GC)

The Office of the General Counsel is responsible for all matters of domestic and international law relevant to the work of the Agency. The Office is particularly involved in the drafting and negotiating of arms control treaties and agreements, and their ratification, implementation, interpretation, review and revision. An attorney from the Office serves as the Legal Adviser to each U.S. arms control delegation led by ACDA or led by any other U.S. Government agency. Particular negotiations in which ACDA attorneys have most recently played a significant role included those on:

- Safety, Security and Dismantlement;
- Chemical Weapons;
- Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation with EURATOM.

Office attorneys also serve as Legal Adviser to U.S. delegations to conferences reviewing existing arms control agreements, including the 1992 Review Conference of the Environmental Modification Convention and the ABM Treaty Review, and to U.S. delegations at sessions of several implementing commissions, including the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (START implementation), the Joint Consultative Group (CFE implementation), the Standing Consultative Commission (ABM implementation), the Special Verification Commission (INF implementation), the Bilateral Consultative Commission (TTBT implementation), and the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (preparation for CWC implementation). The Office is also responsible for all legal aspects of the nonproliferation responsibilities of the Agency. During the past year, attorneys from the Office played a central role in the ratification of the Open Skies Treaty and the submission of the Chemical Weapons Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

In addition, the Office of the General Counsel handles all legal matters relating to arms control policy formulation and ACDA legislative programs, including the drafting, application and interpretation of such legislation. The Office carries out liaison as required with the Legislative Reference Division of the Office of Management and Budget. As counsel to the Director, the Office handles all legal aspects of Agency policies and operations in the areas of personnel, ethics, security, patents, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), contracts, procurement, and fiscal and other administrative matters.

PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (PI)

The Office of Public Information informs the public about past and current arms control and nonproliferation issues and associated U.S. policies.

International Nuclear Affairs Division (NP/INA)

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PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE (PI)

The Office of Public Information informs the public about past and current arms control and nonproliferation issues and associated U.S. policies.

Publications and Media Division

Public Information's Publications and Media Division produces a range of materials, including press releases, fact sheets, brochures, ACDA News, News Roundup, Special Edition, reports, compendiums of treaties and agreements, historical documents, ACDA Newsletter, Current Articles, and a journal, Studies in Arms Control and Nonproliferation. It also handles press contacts and the ACDA Speakers Bureau.

This division PI fills thousands of information requests each year. Responding to this ever increasing demand, We recently established a toll-free number for publications requests and, inaugurated an Electronic Bulletin Board.

Public Diplomacy Division

The Public Diplomacy Division:

- provides substantive and administrative support, under the aegis of National Security Council, for the Public Diplomacy Interagency Working Group which the Director of PI chairs;
- coordinates ACDA public diplomacy activities, drafts and produces public diplomacy materials;
- promotes and coordinates outreach activities to nongovernmental organizations and academe;
- sets up conferences and seminars.

OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA)

The ACDA Office of Congressional Affairs is the Executive Branch's central agency to support the ratification of arms control treaties and agreements. It responds to Congressional interest in arms control by arranging briefings, seminars, and consultations between ACDA officials and legislators or their staffs. It coordinates Congressional travel to negotiating fora, and accompanies legislators and staffs on travel. It advises the Director of the legislative and policy implications of all arms control issues and proposals. The office coordinates appearances of ACDA officials before Congressional committees. In addition, OCA routinely distributes informational material on arms control issues to legislators and their staffs.

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (A)

The Office of Administration provides full administrative support to ACDA and all of its components, including the negotiating staffs in Geneva, Switzerland; Vienna, Austria; and The Hague, The Netherlands.

Financial Management (A/FM)

The Financial Management Division (A/FM) is responsible for ACDA's financial operations and travel management. This includes the preparation, submission, and justification of the Agency's budget proposals to the Office of Management and Budget and the Congress, coordination and control of budget execution, and maintenance of accounting and travel systems. It also includes liaison on financial matters with congressional committees, with the Office of Management and Budget, and with other agencies.

Personnel (A/PER)

The Personnel Division manages the human resources of the Agency including recruiting, staffing, position classification, employee relations, employee benefits, employee development and training, position management and resource allocation. A/PER serves as liaison with the Office of Personnel Management, General Services Administration, Department of Labor, and other Federal agencies concerned with personnel matters.

Contracts (A/CON)

The Contracts Division manages procurement of ACDA's contracted goods and services. It

- -- provides technical advice and guidance in planning for contracted acquisitions and development of procurement requests;
- solicits bids and offers, awards contracts, grants, purchase and delivery orders, and inter-agency agreements;
- performs all contract administration, settlement and termination actions.

Communications and Services (A/CS)

The Communications and Services Division is responsible for space management and general housekeeping and maintenance of offices. This division requisitions services, equipment, and furniture. It serves as ACDA's agent in the development and implementation of the ongoing State Department/ACDA/AID/GSA renovation project.

Geneva Administration (A/GEN)

The Geneva Administration Division supports the various arms control delegations conducting meetings in overseas locations. This administrative support includes providing office space, equipment, transportation, and conference services. This division works closely with the Department of State International Organizations Mission in Geneva.

XI. FELLOWSHIPS

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY DOCTORAL FELLOWSHIPS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Hubert H. Humphrey Doctoral Fellowships in Arms Control and Disarmament, designed to encourage specialized training and research in arms control, are sponsored by ACDA as a part of its legislatively-mandated responsibilities for the conduct, support and coordination of arms control research. Named in honor of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, a strong arms control advocate, these grants provide tuition assistance and stipends to advanced graduate students completing dissertations on arms control related topics. Candidates for the J.D. degree are also eligible for Humphrey Fellowships during their third year of study. Candidate applications, including abstracts of Ph.D. dissertation or J.D. thesis topics, are reviewed by a panel of academic consultants and by a selection committee. Sixteen rounds of competition have been held since the inception of the program in 1979, and a total of 73 awards have been made to date.

The following students received Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship awards for the 1993-94 academic year.

Ann M. Florini, University of California at Los Angeles
Dissertation Title: "Transparency and International Cooperation"

David J. Karl, University of Southern California
Dissertation Title: "Do Nuclear Weapons Really Matter and How Would We Know?: A Comparative Examination of Three Non-Superpower Strategic Relationships"

WILLIAM C. FOSTER FELLOWS VISITING SCHOLARS PROGRAM

This ACDA program for visiting scholars in the field of arms control and disarmament was established by Congress in 1983. The purpose of the program was designed *"to give specialists in the physical sciences and other disciplines relevant to ACDA's activities an opportunity for active participation in the arms control and disarmament activities of the Agency and to gain, for the Agency, the perspective and expertise such persons can offer."* Candidates for the Fellowship, who must be tenured or tenure-track faculty at a U.S. college or university, are chosen by a board chaired by the current Director and composed of all former directors of ACDA. ACDA began this program by competitively seeking up to six visiting scholars for the 1984-85 academic year, and this process has continued each subsequent year. In honor of the first director of ACDA, William C. Foster, these visiting scholars are known as William C. Foster Fellows. Fellows serving in ACDA in 1993-94 are:

Charles Anderton, PhD, College of the Holy Cross, assigned to ACDA's Bureau of Strategic and Eurasian Affairs;

Mary Grizzard, PhD, Latin American Institute/University of New Mexico, assigned to ACDA's Bureau of Multilateral Affairs;

Peter Pella, PhD, Gettysburg College, assigned to ACDA's Bureau of Nonproliferation Policy and Regional Arms Control;

Paul Richards, PhD, Lamont-Doherty Geological Observatory/Columbia University, assigned to ACDA's Bureau of Intelligence, Verification and Information Support

Raymond Zilinskas, PhD, Maryland Biotechnical Institute/University of Maryland, assigned to ACDA's Bureau of Intelligence, Verification and Information Support

Appendix A: Arms Control and Related Treaties and Agreements

I. NUCLEAR WEAPONS MEASURES

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty)

Parties to the Treaty agree not to conduct nuclear weapon tests, or any other nuclear explosion, in the atmosphere, beyond atmospheric limits including outer space, or under water. Signed August 5, 1963; entered into force October 10, 1963.

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

Obligates Latin American Parties not to acquire or possess nuclear weapons, nor to permit the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons on their territories by other countries. Signed February 14, 1967; entered into force April 22, 1968.

Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

Calls on nations outside the Treaty zone to apply its denuclearization provisions to the territories in the zone "for which de jure or de facto they are internationally responsible." Signed May 26, 1977; ratified by the United States November 19, 1981.

Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

Obligates nuclear-weapon states to respect the denuclearized status of the zone; not to contribute to acts involving violation of obligations of the Parties; and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Latin American Parties. Signed April 1, 1968; ratified by the United States May 8, 1971.

Agreement of 17 February 1989 Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America

U.S. accepts full-scope safeguards for its territories in the Treaty area. Signed February 17, 1989; entered into force April 6, 1989.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty)

Designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, while promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Signed July 1, 1968; entered into force March 5, 1970.

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

Designed to reduce the risk of theft of nuclear material. Signed March 3, 1980; entered into force February 8, 1987.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United States (and Protocol Thereto)

Provides for the application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in designated nuclear facilities in the United States. Signed November 18, 1977; entered into force December 9, 1980.

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Arms Control Treaty)

Prohibits nations from emplanting or emplacing on the seabed or ocean floor nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction or facilities for such weapons. Signed February 11, 1971; entered into force May 18, 1972.

Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("Accident Measures" Agreement)

Requires cooperation to reduce the risk that an accidental or unauthorized action might trigger nuclear disaster. Signed and entered into force on September 30, 1971.

Common Understanding Related to Articles 2 and 5 of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of September 30, 1971 (June 14, 1985)

Clarifies the meaning of "unexplained nuclear incidents" found in Article 5 of the Agreement on Measures and other terms found in Article 2.

Interim Agreement Between the USA and USSR on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I Interim Agreement)

Freezes existing aggregate levels of American and Soviet strategic nuclear missile launchers and submarines until an agreement on more comprehensive measures can be reached. Signed May 26, 1972; entered into force October 3, 1972.

Treaty Between the USA and USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty)

Provides that the two Parties may each have only two ABM system deployment areas, so restricted and so located that they could not provide a nationwide ABM defense or become the basis for one. Signed May 26, 1972; entered into force October 3, 1972.

Protocol Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

Limits each Party to a single ABM system deployment area. Signed July 3, 1974; entered into force May 24, 1976.

Protocol on Procedures Governing the Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components (July 3, 1974)

An implementation of the ABM Treaty that establishes procedures for the replacement and dismantling or destruction of ABM systems.

Supplementary Protocol to the Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM systems and Their Components of July 3, 1974 (October 28, 1976), (Including the Integral Agreed Statement Regarding Section III, Paragraph 5)

An implementation of the ABM Treaty that establishes procedures for the replacement, dismantling, or destruction of operational ABM systems and for the exchange of ABM system deployment areas.

Agreed Statement Regarding Certain Provisions of Articles II, IV, and VI of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of that Treaty (November 1, 1978), (Including the Integral Commissioners' Identical Conformed Statements Read at the Signing of the Agreed Statement)

Defines test ranges within the meaning of Article IV of the ABM Treaty on the basis of the presence of ABM components for testing, identifies the current test ranges for each side, and sets forth procedures of notifying the other Party when a new test range is established. The Agreed Statement also specifies criteria for applying the term "tested in an ABM mode" as used in the ABM Treaty to ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars. Finally, the Agreed Statement specifies that the ABM Treaty permits air defense radars located at ABM test ranges to carry out air defense functions, but to avoid ambiguous situations or misunderstandings, provides that the sides will refrain from concurrent testing of air defense components and ABM system components co-located at the same test range, and that air defense radars utilized as instrumentation equipment will not be used to make measurements on strategic ballistic missiles.

Common Understanding Related to Paragraph 2 of Section III of the Agreed Statement of November 1, 1978, Regarding Certain Provisions of Articles II, IV, and VI of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, and the Utilization of Air Defense Radars at the Test Ranges Referred to in Article IV of that Treaty (June 6, 1985)

Specifies the criteria for concurrent operation of ABM components and air defense system components.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War

Commits the two nations to make the removal of the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons an "objective of their policies." Signed and entered into force on June 22, 1973.

Treaty Between the USA and USSR on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty)

Prohibits underground nuclear weapon tests of more than 150 kilotons. Signed July 3, 1974; entered into force December 11, 1990.

Treaty Between the USA and USSR on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PTT Treaty)

Governs all underground nuclear explosions carried out at locations outside U.S. and Soviet weapon test sites specified under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and limits any individual nuclear explosion to 150 kilotons. Signed May 28, 1976; entered into force December 11, 1990.

Treaty Between the USA and USSR on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II Treaty)

A Treaty to replace the SALT I Interim Agreement (which expired in October 1977) with one, lasting through 1985, which would provide broader scope and more detailed constraints on U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms. Signed June 18, 1979; the Treaty was not ratified.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

Establishes a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in each nation's capital as well as a special facsimile communications link between the Centers to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Signed and entered into force September 15, 1987.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)

U.S. and the Soviet Union agree to eliminate and ban all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range capability of between 300 and 3400 miles (500 and 5,500 km). Signed December 8, 1987; entered into force June 1, 1988.

Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Term, "Weapons Delivery Vehicle." The Exchange of Notes was done in Geneva May 11-12, 1988.

Defines "weapon delivery vehicle" used in Article II of the Treaty. Made part of the Treaty by the U.S. Senate and the exchange of notes upon entry into force of the INF Treaty. Entered into force June 1, 1988.

Agreed Minute of May 12, 1988

Adds a number of understandings, chiefly concerning the conduct of inspections. Made part of the Treaty by the Senate and the exchange of notes upon entry into force of the INF Treaty. Entered into force June 1, 1988.

Agreed Statement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Establishes rules concerning the application of Treaty inspection procedures at the U.S. continuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, Russia. Signed and entered into force December 8, 1988.

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding Procedures for the Operation of the Special Verification Commission

Establishes procedures for the operation of the Commission established by Article XIII of the INF Treaty. Signed and entered into force December 20, 1988.

Agreed Statement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Establishes rules concerning application of Treaty inspection procedures in connection with the INF Treaty at the U.S.S.R.'s continuous monitoring inspection site at Magna, Utah. Signed and entered into force June 9, 1989.

Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles

Contains implementation arrangements, lists of inspection equipment and procedures for its use. Signed and entered into force December 21, 1989.

Amendment I to the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 21, 1989

Contains a technical description of the system for measuring the length and diameter of the second stage of the SS-25 missile and procedures for its use to implement paragraph 14 (c) of Section IX of the INF Treaty's Inspection Protocol. Signed and entered into force April 4, 1991.

Amendment II to the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 21, 1989

Permits U.S. and U.S.S.R. inspectors conducting INF inspections to use personal dosimeters for the purpose of personal health monitoring. Signed and entered into force April 4, 1991.

Amendment III to the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 21, 1989

Establishes principles and procedures for settlement of INF Treaty expenses related to the conduct of inspections pursuant to the Treaty. Signed and entered into force December 11, 1991.

Amendment IV to the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 21, 1989

Establishes procedures for updating diplomatic clearance numbers and flight routes for INF inspection airplanes. Signed and entered into force December 11, 1991.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles

Obligates each Party to notify the other no less than 24 hours in advance, of the planned date, launch area, and area of impact for any planned launch of an ICBM or SLBM. Signed and entered into force May 31, 1988.

Protocol to the threshold test ban treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Provides for additional verification provisions. Signed on June 1, 1990 and entered into force on December 11, 1990.

Protocol to the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Provides for additional verification provisions. Signed on June 1, 1990 and entered into force on

December 1, 1990.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I)

-Establishes significantly reduced limits for intercontinental ballistic missiles and their associated launchers and warheads; submarine launched ballistic missile launchers and warheads; and heavy bombers and their armaments including long-range nuclear air launched cruise missiles. Signed July 31, 1991; Senate consented to ratification on October 1, 1992; has not yet entered into force.

Protocol to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Lisbon START Protocol)

Enables implementation of the START Treaty in the new international situation following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The protocol constitutes an amendment to and is an integral part of the START Treaty and provides for Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine to succeed to the Soviet Union's obligations under the Treaty. Also, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine commit themselves to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapons states in the shortest possible time. In accompanying letters they commit themselves to eliminate all nuclear weapons from their territory within seven years. Signed May 23, 1992. The U.S. Senate consented to ratification on October 1, 1992; Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia have ratified, with Belarus and Kazakhstan acceding to the Nonproliferation Treaty; final Ukrainian action pending.

Joint Statement on Korean Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Russia and the United States call for the full implementation of the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; dated June 17, 1992.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and Prevention of Weapons Proliferation

The United States agrees to assist the Russian Federation in destroying its nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; provide safe and secure transportation and storage of such weapons in connection with their destruction; and establish additional verifiable measures against the proliferation of such weapons. Signed and took effect June 17, 1992.

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Resulting from the Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons in Russia

Parties agree to convert as soon as practicable highly enriched uranium (HEU) resulting from dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons into low enriched uranium (LEU) for fuel in commercial nuclear reactors, and to establish appropriate measures to fulfill the non-proliferation, physical security, material accounting and control, and environmental requirements with respect to HEU and LEU subject to the agreement. Signed and entered into force on February 18, 1993.

Agreement Between The United States of America and the Republic of Belarus Concerning Emergency Response and the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The United States agrees to assist the Republic of Belarus in responding to emergencies related to removing nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems from Belarus for destruction and in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Signed and took effect October 22, 1992.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II)

Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation which further reduces strategic offensive arms by eliminating all MIRVed ICBMs (including all "heavy" ICBMs) and reducing the overall total of warheads for each side to between 3000 and 3500. Signed January 3, 1993; will enter into force following ratification by the U.S. and Russia and entry into force of the START I Treaty.

Agreement between the United States of America and Ukraine concerning assistance to Ukraine in the elimination of strategic nuclear arms, and the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction

The United States agrees to assist Ukraine in the elimination of strategic nuclear arms located in Ukraine; assist and cooperate in the establishment of measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, to include the technology and expertise related to such weapons; and the expansion of emergency response capabilities in connection of the removal of nuclear warheads from Ukraine for destruction and the elimination of strategic nuclear arms. Signed on October 25, 1993; will take effect when both Parties exchange diplomatic notes confirming the completion by each Party of all applicable procedures required for the entry into force of this agreement. (The United States provided such a note to Ukraine on December 4, 1993; as of December 14, the U.S. was awaiting Ukraine's response.)

Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Kazakhstan concerning the destruction of silo launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles, emergency response, and the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons

The United States agrees to assist the Republic of Kazakhstan in the destruction of ICBM silo launchers, and other activities related to the destruction of strategic offensive arms located in Kazakhstan; assist in the establishment of verifiable measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan, to include the technology, expertise and materials related to such weapons; and the expansion of emergency response capabilities in connection with the removal of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan for destruction; and other assistance related to the destruction of strategic offensive arms located in Kazakhstan. Signed and took effect on December 13, 1993.

II. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MEASURES

Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (The Geneva Protocol)

Restates the prohibition of the 1919 Versailles and 1922 Washington Treaties against the use of poisonous gases, and adds a ban on bacteriological warfare. Signed June 17, 1925; entered into force February 8, 1928.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weapons Convention)

Parties to the Convention undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes," as well as related weapons and means of delivery. Signed April 10, 1972; entered into force March 26, 1975.

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Early data exchange and visits designed to facilitate the negotiation, signature and ratification of a global ban on chemical weapons. Signed and entered into force September 23, 1989.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement

Calls for the destruction of the vast bulk of the U.S. and Soviet declared chemical weapons stockpiles, with on-site inspection to determine that destruction has taken place. Signed on June 1, 1990; agreement has not yet entered into force.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC)

An agreement drafted by the 39 nations of the Conference on Disarmament to ban chemical weapons worldwide. Forwarded to the United Nations on September 7, 1992 and endorsed by consensus, with 145 co-sponsors, on November 30, 1992. The CWC was opened for signature in Paris on January 13, 1993. It will enter into force 180 days after deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, but no earlier than two years after its opening for signature.

III. MISSILE AND SPACE WEAPON MEASURES

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty)

Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth, install on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise station in outer space, nuclear or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. Signed January 27, 1967; entered into force October 10, 1967.

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

Agreement between the United States and its G-7 (Economic Summit) allies (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and Japan), announced on April 16, 1987, designed as a multilateral mechanism to control the export of missile-related technologies.

IV. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS MEASURES

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty)

Reduces and sets ceilings from the Atlantic to the Urals on key armaments essential for conducting surprise attack and initiating large scale offensive operations. Signed by the 34 NATO and Warsaw Pact states November 19, 1990; applied provisionally July 17, 1992. Entered into force November 9, 1992.

Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Oslo Final Document)

Enables implementation of the CFE Treaty in the new international situation following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Notes the May 15, 1992 Agreement in Tashkent among the states successors of the U.S.S.R. on the principles and procedures for implementing the CFE Treaty. Signed and entered into force June 5, 1992.

Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE 1A)

CFE states-Parties declare national limits on the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces in the Atlantic to the Urals area. Signed July 10, 1992; entered into force July 17, 1992.

V. REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL

The Antarctic Treaty

Internationalizes and demilitarizes the Antarctic Continent and provides for its cooperative exploration and future use. Signed December 1, 1959; entered into force June 23, 1961. See also, Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), signed February 14, 1967 (and related protocols and agreements).

Concluding Document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (Helsinki Final Act)

U.S., Soviet Union and 33 other nations sign a document which provides for notification of major military maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops and other confidence-building measures. Signed and entered into force August 1, 1975.

Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (Stockholm Document)

Contains a set of six concrete and mutually complementary CSBMs, including mandatory ground or aerial inspection of military activities, that improved upon those contained in the Helsinki Final Act. Adopted September 19, 1986; entered into force January 1, 1987.

Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (2 Plus 4 Treaty)

Reunifies East and West Germany and places limits on location of military forces. Signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the

German Democratic Republic on September 12, 1990; entered into force October 3, 1990.

**Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on Confidence - and Security - Building Measures
Convened In Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna
Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe**

Incorporates Stockholm Document of 1986. Adds measures related to transparency about military forces and activities, improved communications and contacts, and verification. Adopted November 17, 1990; entered into force January 1, 1991.

see also page 29, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), signed November 19, 1990, under section on Controlling Conventional Weapons.

**Vienna Document 1992 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Convened
In Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe**

Incorporates the Vienna Document 1990. Added further measures related to transparency regarding military forces and activities, and constraints on military activities. Expands the zone of application for CSBMs to include the territory of U.S.S.R. successor states which were beyond the traditional zone in Europe (i.e., all of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). Adopted March 4, 1992; entered into force May 1, 1992.

Treaty on Open Skies

Commits States Parties in Eurasia and North America to open their airspace, on a reciprocal basis, permitting the overflight of their territory by unarmed observation aircraft in order to strengthen confidence and transparency with respect to their military activities. Signed and applied provisionally March 24, 1992; ratified by the United States November 2, 1993; has not yet entered into force.

VI. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (CBMs)

**Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics Regarding the Establishment of A Direct Communications Link ("Hot Line" Agreement)**

Assures quick and reliable communications between the heads of governments of the nuclear superpowers. Signed and entered into force June 20, 1963.

**Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications Link ("Hot Line" Modernization
Agreement)**

Establishes two satellite communications circuits, with multiple terminals in each country. Signed and entered into force on September 30, 1971.

**Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to
Expand the Direct Communications Link**

Adds a facsimile transmission capability to the "Hot Line." Signed and entered into force July 17, 1984.

**Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Modifying the Memorandum of Understanding of June 20, 1963 Regarding the Establishment of a Direct
Communications Link**

Further improves the Direct Communications Link by integrating advanced facsimile capabilities. Note exchanged and entered into force June 24, 1988.

**Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas**

Cooperation to reduce the risk of naval conflict due to accident, miscalculation, or the failure of communication. Signed and entered into force on May 25, 1972.

see also, Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War (signed and entered into force on June 23, 1973), in section I, Controlling Nuclear

Weapons.

see also page 77, Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, signed September 15, 1987.

Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities

Cooperative procedures to prevent and resolve peacetime incidents between the armed forces of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.. Signed June 12, 1989; entered into force January 1, 1990.

Agreement Between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises

A confidence-building measure requiring notification of any major strategic exercise which includes heavy bomber aircraft. Signed September 23, 1989; entered into force January 1, 1990.

see also, Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on Confidence - and Security - Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), adopted November 17, 1990, in section on Regional Arms Control.

see also, Vienna Document 1992, adopted March 4, 1992.

see also, Treaty on Open Skies, Signed March 24, 1992.

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

Prohibits military or any other environmental modification techniques having widespread, longlasting and severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to any other State Party. Signed May 18, 1977; entered into force October 5, 1978.

Joint Russian-American Declaration on Defense Conversion

The United States and the Russian Federation declare their intention to devote priority to cooperation in advancing defense conversion; dated June 17, 1992.

Appendix B: ACDA Publications

The following publications may be obtained free of charge from:
Office of Public Information
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)
320 21st Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20451.
fax (202) 647-6928.

For further information, call Wanda Cooper at 1-800-581-ACDA

ARTICLES/NEWS ITEMS

- ACDA News (Daily compilation of news items)
- ACDA News Roundup (Chronology of media reports on a single issue)
- ACDA News Special Edition (Bi-weekly compilation of journal articles)
- Current Articles of Interest (Bibliography of articles published monthly)

■ACDA/ARMS CONTROL

- ACDA legislation pending in Congress
- ACDA's Mission
- Acronyms: Glossary of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Acronyms
- Arms Control and ACDA in the Post Cold War World (FACT SHEET, June 1993)
- Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations (1990 edition)
- Chronology of Arms Control and Related Treaties and Agreements Including Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, and Measures Related to Transparency, Non-Proliferation and Defense Conversion, When Signed and When Entered Into Force (FACT SHEET, February 1, 1993)
- Confirmation Hearing for Director Designate of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (PRESS RELEASE, October 28, 1993)
- Opening Statement by Senator Pell on the Nomination of John D. Holum to be Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (OFFICIAL TEXT, October 28, 1993)
- President Names Holum to Head ACDA (OFFICIAL TEXT, October 6, 1993)
- Report to Congress on Arms Control and Disarmament Studies Completed in 1992 (June 22, 1993)
- Senate Confirms John Holum as Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (PRESS RELEASE, November 22, 1993)
- United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Annual Report to the Congress 1992
- U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 30th Anniversary (PRESS RELEASE, September 20, 1991)

ADDRESSES, SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS

- Address by Dr. Edward J. Lacey, Acting Assistant Director, Bureau of Verification and Implementation, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the Fall Meeting of the Biological and Biotechnology Section of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, Baltimore, Maryland (September 29, 1992)
- Address by Michael D. Rosenthal, Division Chief for International Nuclear Affairs Nonproliferation Policy Bureau, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the American Nuclear Society, San Diego, California (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 21, 1993)
- Conference on Disarmament: U.S. Plenary Speech by Ambassador Stephen Ledogar (OFFICIAL TEXT, July 23, 1992)
- Entry into Force of the CFE Treaty (Statement by Richard Boucher, U.S. Department of State, November 9, 1992)
- Joint Statement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America (New York, June 11, 1993) (FACT SHEET, June 22, 1993)
- Joint Statement on CFE (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 1, 1990)
- Joint Statement on Nonproliferation (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 4, 1990)
- Joint Statement on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 1, 1990)
- Remarks by Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger Upon Signing the Chemical Weapons Convention Paris, France (January 13, 1993)
- Remarks by the President to CSCE Conference, Helsinki (July 9, 1992)

- "Some Personal Observations on Proliferation in the 1990s," Keynote Address by Thomas Graham, Jr. Acting Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the AFCEA Seminar on Mobilizing the U.S. Counterproliferation Effort—May 24-25, 1993 (PRESS RELEASE, June 7, 1993)
- Statement by John D. Holum Director Designate U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate (OFFICIAL TEXT, October 28, 1993)
- Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (FACT SHEET, July 10, 1992)
- Statement by Secretary of State James A. Baker, III at the Signing of the START Protocol—Lisbon, Portugal (May 23, 1992)
- Statement by the President Concerning Talks Between the U.S. and North Korea in New York on the Nonproliferation Treaty (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 11, 1993)
- Statement by the President on the Chemical Weapons Convention (OFFICIAL TEXT, January 13, 1993)
- Statement by the President on the New Chemical Weapons Initiative (OFFICIAL TEXT, May 13, 1991)
- Statement by the Press Secretary, Lehman Paper - Concluding the Chemical Weapon Convention (FACT SHEET, August 13, 1992)
- Statement by the Press Secretary on Senate's Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the CFE Treaty (November 25, 1991)
- Statement by the Press Secretary on the Open Skies Treaty (ISSUES BRIEF, August 7, 1993)
- Statement by the Press Secretary on the U.S. Instrument of Ratification of the Treaty on Open Skies (OFFICIAL TEXT, November 3, 1993)
- Statement by the Press Secretary on U.S. Support for the Chemical Weapons Convention Completed at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (FACT SHEET, August 13, 1992)
- Statement by Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (OFFICIAL TEXT, April 5, 1993)
- Statement by Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies on the Review of the Future Role of ACDA (OFFICIAL TEXT, March 17, 1993)
- Statement by Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (OFFICIAL TEXT, March 11, 1993)
- Statement by Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Statement for the Record (OFFICIAL TEXT, May 18, 1993)
- Statement by Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting Director U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to the First Committee of the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in General Debate (OFFICIAL TEXT, October 19, 1993)
- Statement of Sherman M. Funk Inspector General of the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Committee on Appropriations House of Representatives (March 30, 1993)

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

- Defense and Space Talks (ISSUES BRIEF, November 10, 1988)
- Five Agreements Between the U.S. and the Former Soviet Union within the Standing Consultative Commission Now Declassified and Released to the Public (OFFICIAL TEXT, January 1993)
- Fourth Review of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty Conducted in Geneva, Switzerland (PRESS RELEASE, October 1, 1993)
- Joint Communique: Fourth Review of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (OFFICIAL TEXT, October 1, 1993)
- Soviet Violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty: The Kraysnoyarsk Radar (ISSUES BRIEF, August 24, 1988)
- Thule and Fylingdales Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radars and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (ISSUES BRIEF, August 24, 1988)
- Traditional Interpretation of Antiballistic Missile Treaty Endorsed by Clinton Administration (PRESS RELEASE, July 14, 1993)
- Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile System (OFFICIAL TEXT)

- The U.S. and Russia Declassify Five Agreements from the Standing Consultative Commission (FACT SHEET, January 1993)

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

- The Biological Weapons Convention (FACT SHEET, August 18, 1993)
- The Biological Weapons Convention Report of the AD Hoc Group of Governmental Experts (FACT SHEET, November 23, 1993)
- Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference 1991 (March 27, 1991)
- Executive Order 12735: Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation (OFFICIAL TEXT, November 16, 1990)
- Final Document: Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Geneva, 9-27 September 1991)
- Joint U.S./UK/Russian Statement on Biological Weapons, (Statement by Richard Boucher, U.S. Department of State, September 14, 1992)
- Statement by the President: Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 (The White House, May 22, 1990)

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

- Agreement Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons (OFFICIAL TEXT, June 1, 1990)
- The Australia Group (FACT SHEET, April 20, 1993)
- The Australia Group (OCCASIONAL PAPER, May 18, 1993)
- Australia Group Export Controls on Materials Used in the Manufacture of Chemical and Biological Weapons Control List of Dual-Use Chemicals: Commercial and Military Application (FACT SHEET, October 25, 1993)
- Australia Group List of Dual-Use Chemicals for Export Control: Commercial and Military Application (FACT SHEET, May 20, 1993)
- Australia Group Meeting, Australian Embassy, Paris 2-10 June 1993 (FACT SHEET, July 28, 1993)
- Australia Group Meeting, Australian Embassy, Paris 7-10 (PRESS RELEASE, December 1992)
- Chemical Weapons Arms Control Chronology of Key Events: 1925-1989 (ISSUES BRIEF, April 1, 1992)
- The Chemical Weapons Convention (FACT SHEET, January 5, 1993)
- Chemical Weapons Convention: A Balance Between Obligations and the Needs of States Parties (OCCASIONAL PAPER, January 5, 1993)
- Chemical Weapons Convention Signatories/Parties (FACT SHEET, October 22, 1993)
- Chemical Weapons Convention Update for Industry (September 1993)
- Chemical Weapons Convention Update for Industry, Vol. 2 November 1993)
- Chemical Weapons Negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (FACT SHEET, August 13, 1992)
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Appendix C: Arms Control Abbreviations and Acronyms.

(Columns will be correctly set up by desktop publishing program)

ABACC	Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear America)
Materials (Latin	
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACEP	Advisory Committee on Export Policy
ACIS	Arms Control Impact Statements
ACIS	Arms Control Intelligence Staff
ACME	Arms Control in the Middle East
ACRCC	Arms Control Research Coordinating Committee
ACRS	Arms Control and Regional Security
ACV	Armored Combat Vehicle
AEM	Arsenal Exchange Model
AEW	Airborne Early Warning
AFAP	Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectiles
AFSATCOM	Air Force Satellite Communications System
AFTAC	Air Force Technical Applications Center
AG	Australia Group
AHC	Ad Hoc Committee
AIFV	Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle
ALASAT	Air-Launched Anti-Satellite [weapon]
ALBM	Air-Launched Ballistic Missile
ALCM	Air-Launched Cruise Missile
AMRAAM	Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
AND	Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
APAG	Atlantic Policy Advisory Group
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARM	Anti-Radiation Missile
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ASAT	Anti-Satellite [weapon]
ASBM	Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASM	Air-to-Surface Missile
ASROC	Anti-Submarine Rocket
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
ATBM	Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile
ATF	Advanced Tactical Fighter
ATH	Above-the-Horizon
ATM	Anti-Tactical Missile
ATTU	Atlantic To The Urals
AWACS	Airborne [early] Warning and Control System
BCC	Bilateral Consultative Commission
BIC	Bilateral Implementation Commission
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
BMDO	Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
BMEWS	Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
BMLNA	Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
BWG	Backstopping Working Group
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers and
Intelligence	
CANDU	Canadian Deutrium [reactor]
CASC	Central American Security Commission

CAT	Conventional Arms Transfers
CBM	Confidence-Building Measures
CBW	Chemical and Biological Weapons
CC	Consultative Committee
CCD	Charged Couple Device
CCE	Consultative Committee of Experts
CCF	COCOM Cooperation Forum [see COCOM]
CCL	Continuous Communications Link
CCW	Convention on Conventional Weapons
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CDE	[Stockholm Conference on] Confidence- [and Security-Building Measures and] Disarmament in Europe
CEE	Central and East Europe
CEMA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CEP	Circular Error Probable
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [Treaty]
CFE 1A	Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of CFE
CGS	CONUS Ground Station [see CONUS]
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CISCMACWG	Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Arms Control Working Group
CLS	Capsule Launch System
CNAD	Council of National Armaments Directors
CNPC	Community Nonproliferation Committee
COCOM	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
COMSAT	Communications Satellite
CONUS	Continental United States
COPUOS	Committee On the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
CORRTEX	Continuous Reflectometry for Radius Versus Time Experiment
CPC	Conflict Prevention Center
CPD	Comprehensive Program of Disarmament
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSBM	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSD	Commission on Sustainable Development
CTB	Comprehensive Test Ban
CUSHIE	[see CCW]
CW	Chemical Weapons/Warfare
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
D&S	[see DST]
DEW	Distant Early Warning
DC	Defense Conversion
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DCL	Direct Communications Link [see MOLINK]
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DPC	Defense Planning Committee
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
DSAT	Defense Satellite
DSCS	Defense Satellite Communications System
DSP	Defense Support Program

DSS	Designated Seismic Station
DST	Defense and Space Talks [see D&S]
DTSA	Defense Technology Security Administration
DTWG	Defense Trade Working Group
EAA	Export Administration Act
EAR	Export Administration Regulations
EARB	Export Administration Review Board
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC	European Community
ECASS	Export Control Automated Support System
EDAC	Economic Defense Advisory Committee
EIF	Entry Into Force
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
EMP	Electro-Magnetic Pulse
EMT	Equivalent Megatonnage
ENMOD	Environmental Modification Convention
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EPCI	Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative
ESF	Economic Support Fund
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FCCSET	Federal Coordinating Committee on Science, Engineering and Technology
FEWS	Follow-on Early Warning System
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FROD	Functionally Related Observable Difference
FSA	Freedom Support Act
FSC	Forum for Security Cooperation
FSE	Forum on Security in Europe
FSS	Full-Scope Safeguards
FSU	Former Soviet Union
FYDP	Five-Year Defense Program
GAC	General Advisory Committee
GC	General Conference [of the IAEA, q.v.]
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GGCL	Government-to-Government Communications Link
GLBM	Ground-Launched Ballistic Missile
GLCM	Ground-Launched Cruise Missile
GODOS	Group Of Democratically Oriented States
GPALS	Global Protection Against Limited Strikes
GPS	Global Positioning System [MAUSTAR, q.v.]
GPS	Global Protection System
GSE	[Ad Hoc] Group of Scientific Experts
HAC	House Appropriations Committee
HACOG	House Arms Control Observer Group
HACV	Heavy Armament Combat Vehicle
HASC	House Armed Services Committee
HEU	Highly-Enriched Uranium
HFAC	House Foreign Affairs Committee
HFUM	Helsinki Follow-up Meeting
HLG	High Level Group
HLTF	High Level Task Force
HLWG	High Level Working Group
HOG	House Observer Group
HSIC	High Speed Integrated Circuits

HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IC	Intelligence Community
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICF	Inertial Confinement Fusion
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IEA	International Energy Agency
IEPG	Independent European Program Group
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFR	Initial Fast Reactor
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [Treaty]
INTLO	International Nuclear Technical Liaison Office
IOC	Initial Operational Capability
IR	Infrared
IRBM	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
ISCA	Office of Independent States and Commonwealth
Affairs	
ISTC	International Science and Technology Center
JACADS	Johnson Atoll Chemical Agents Disposal System
JAEIC	Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
JCC	Joint Consultative Commission
JCG	Joint Consultative Group
JCIC	Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JPMG	Joint Politico-Military Group
JSCNOET	Joint Standing Committee on Nuclear and Other
Energy	Technologies
JVE	Joint Verification Experiment
JWC	Joint Warning Center
LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory
LASCAR	Large Scale Reprocessing Plants
LEU	Low-Enriched Uranium
LLNL	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LOW	Launch on Warning
LPAR	Large Phased-Array Radar
LRINF	Longer-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
LRNA	Long Range Nuclear ALCMs [see ALCM]
LTBT	Limited Test Ban Treaty [also known as PTBT, q.v.]
LUA	Launch Under Attack
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MAPI	Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry [of the
Russian Federation; now MINATOM, q.v.]	
MARC	MTCR Annex Review Committee [see MTCR]
MARV	Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle
MC&A	Materials Control and Accountability
MCWG	Munitions Control Working Group
MILSTAR	Military Strategic and Tactical Relay System
MINATOM	Ministry of Atomic Energy [of the Russian
Federation]	
MIRV	Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicle
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement

MOLINK	U.S.-Soviet hotline [see DCL]
MOU	Memorandum Of Understanding
MOX	Mixed Oxides [of plutonium and uranium]
MRV	Multiple Reentry Vehicle
MTAG	Missile Trade Analysis Group
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
MTEC	Missile Technology Export Committee
MWC	Missile Warning Center
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NAG	National Advisory Groups
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear/Biological/Chemical [weaponry]
NCA	National Command Authority
NCND	Neither Confirm Nor Deny
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDPC	National Disclosure Policy Committee
NEA	Nuclear Energy Agency
NEVWG	Nuclear Export Violations Working Group
NFROD	Non-Functionally Related Observable Difference
NFU	No First Use
NFZ	Nuclear-Free Zone
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIC	New(ly) Industrial(ized -izing) Countries
NIM	National Intelligence Means
NIS	New(ly) Independent States [of the former Soviet
Union]	
NNA	Neutral and Non-Aligned [States]
NNPA	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
NNWS	Non-Nuclear Weapons State
NORAD	North American Air Defense [Command]
NPAS	Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement
NPC	Nonproliferation Center
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
NPT	Non-Proliferation [of Nuclear Weapons] Treaty
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NMICC	National Military Intelligence Collection Center
NMIPC	National Military Intelligence Production Center
NMISC	National Military Intelligence Support Center
NRRC	Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
NRS	Nuclear Reactor Safety
NSA	National Security Agency
NSA	Negative Security Assurances
NSC	National Security Council
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
NSG	Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSPC	National Space Council
NSPD	National Space Policy Directive
NSSM	National Security Study Memorandum
NST	Nuclear and Space Talks
NTB	Nuclear Test Ban
NTI	National Trial Inspections
NTM	National Technical Means
NTT	Nuclear Testing Talks

NUDET	Nuclear Detonation
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
NWS	Nuclear Weapons State
NWSS	Nuclear Weapons Storage Site
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development	
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
OIMM	Objective Information on Military Matters
OOV	Object of Verification
OPANAL	Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean	
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OS	Open Skies
OSCC	Open Skies Consultative Commission
OSI	On-Site Inspection
OSIA	On-Site Inspection Agency
OTH	Over-The-Horizon
PAL	Permissive Action Link
PAR	Perimeter Acquisition Radar
PARCS	Perimeter Acquisition Radar Characterization
System	
PATTIC	Proliferation and Technology Transfer Intelligence
Committee	
PCC	Policy Coordinating Committee
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PDM	Presidential Decision Memorandum
PNET	Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
PNW	Prevention of Nuclear War
POE	Point Of Entry
POTAS	Program for Technical Assistance to [IAEA, q.v.]
Safeguards	
PPCM	Perimeter and Portal Continuous Monitoring
PRD	Presidential Review Directive
PREPCOM	Preparatory Committee
PRM	Presidential Review Memorandum
PSA	Positive Security Assurances
PTBT	Partial Test Ban Treaty [also known as LTBT, q.v.]
PTS	Provisional Technical Secretariat
PUNE	Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy
RDE	Radar Detection Equipment
RECOVER	Remote Continual Verification
REM	Roentgen Equivalent Man
RERTR	Reduced Enrichment in Research and Test Reactor
REVCON	Review Conference
RPV	Remotely Piloted Vehicle
RV	Reentry Vehicle
RW	Radiological Weapons
SACOG	Senate Arms Control Observer Group
SAGSI	Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards
Implementation	
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SAPRWG	Security Assistance Program Review Working Group

SAR	Synthetic Aperture Radar
SAROS	SAR for Open Skies [see SAR]
SAWG	Safeguards Agreement Working Group
SBT	Seabed [Arms Control] Treaty
SCC	Standing Consultative Commission
SCVC	Special Committee on Verification and Compliance
SDIO	Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
SFRC	Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SIDAC	Socialist International Advisory Committee on Arms
Control and Disarmament	
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operations Plan
SLBM	Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM	Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
SLV	Space Launch Vehicle
SMS	Stage Measuring System
SNDV	Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle
SNEC	Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination
SNF	Short-Range Nuclear Forces
SNL	Sandia National Laboratory
SNM	Special Nuclear Materials
SOG	Senate Observer Group
SPECOM	[UN] Special Commission
SPNFZ	South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
SRAM	Short-Range Attack Missile
SRINF	Shorter-Range Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces	
SRM	Shorter-Range Missile
SSAC	State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear
Material	
SSBN	Sub-Surface Ballistic Nuclear [submarine]
SSC	Superconducting Super Collider
SSCI	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
SSD	Safety, Security, and Dismantlement [of nuclear
weapons]	
SSI	Suspect Site Inspection
SSM	Surface-to-Surface Missile
SSN	Sub-Surface Nuclear [submarine]
SSOD	Special Session on Disarmament
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
STCU	Science and Technology Center in Ukraine
STIC	Science and Technology Intelligence Committee
STOF	Short Time of Flight
SVC	Special Verification Commission
SWG	Supercomputer Working Group
TACF	Technical Assistance & Cooperation Fund
TEM	Technical Experts Meeting
TERCOM	Terrain Contour Matching System
THAAD	Theater High-Altitude Area Defense
TIA	Transparency In Armaments
TIP	Treaty Implementation Panel
TLE	Treaty-Limited Equipment
TNF	Theater Nuclear Forces
TOR	Terms of Reference
TRANSEAUVER	Transport by Sea Verification

TSCC	Technical Support Coordinating Committee
TTBT	Threshold Test-Ban Treaty
TTIC	Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDC	United Nations Disarmament Commission
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFC	United Nations [General Assembly] First Committee
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNSCOM	UN Special Commission
VCC	Verification Coordinating Committee
VLS	Vertical Launch System
VSM	Verification and Stability Measures
VTWG	Verification and Technology Working Group
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WMEAT	World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
19xx	
WP	Warsaw Pact
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization
WTTAG	Weapons Technology Trade Analysis Group
ZC	Zangger Committee

Appendix D: Membership In Multilateral Arms Control Agreements

UPDATED TABLE WILL BE INSERTED BEFORE PUBLICATION

ACDA

ANNUAL REPORT

1993

**Draft incorporating interagency comment
January 31, 1994, 5:22pm**

TO: The Director

FROM: D\AP - Robert Sherman

SUBJECT: Response to interagency comments on 1993 Annual Report

Recommendation:

APPROVE_____ **DISAPPROVE**_____ **OTHER**_____

Attachments:
as stated.

Drafted: D\AP - Robert Sherman 647-4622

Clearances:

0814

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

JAN 31 1994

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: 1993 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Attached is the Annual Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for National Security Council comment or clearance by COB February 3, 1994. It has been cleared by the Department of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget. It has also been cleared by the Department of State with the exception of two matters, both on page 1, which are marked in **shaded bold** and on which we ask for National Security Council adjudication.

ACDA's point of contact is Bob Sherman, 202-647-4622; fax 202-647-2094.

for Gilbert C. Antia
Barbara Starr
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

February 4, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH:

ROBERT BELL *RGB*

FROM:

KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from Representative Dornan et al RE Combat Positions for Women in the Military

At Tab B ten members of Congress have written the President to express their concern about the recent announcement to open up additional combat positions for women. Citing the findings of the Commission on Women in the Armed Forces completed at the end of the Bush Administration, they ask the President to postpone any change in current policy regarding women in combat.

The response at Tab A describes the evolution of this policy and states the President's support of Secretary Aspin's decision.

Concurrence by: Jeremy Rosner *(JR)*

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letters to Members of Congress
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
SUSAN BROPHY

SUBJECT: Letter from Representative Dornan et al Concerning
Combat Positions for Women in the Military

Purpose

To respond to ten members of Congress who are urging you to postpone any changes in the policy regarding the assignment of women to combat positions.

Background

The signatories of the letter at Tab B are opposed to Secretary Aspin's decision to open up additional combat positions for women in the military. They believe that this decision should be made by the new Secretary of Defense and that such steps should only be taken after full consultation with Congress. Citing the findings of the President's Commission on Women in the Armed Forces, they imply that opening additional positions to women will have an adverse impact on combat readiness.

The response at Tab A reviews the considerations that led to the decision to open additional combat positions to women and indicates your support for the steps taken by Secretary Aspin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Members of Congress
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Stump:

I appreciate the concern expressed by you and several of your colleagues about former Secretary of Defense Aspin's recent decision to open additional combat positions to women in the U.S. military -- a decision Secretary Perry indicated in his confirmation proceedings he fully supported. As you know, this issue has been the focus of debate and study for many years.

In 1988, then Secretary of Defense Carlucci promulgated the "risk rule" that closed noncombatant positions or units to women if their risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire or capture are equal to or greater than the risks for land, air or sea combat units with which they are associated. Following the Persian Gulf War, Congress established the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces to which you refer to review, among many other issues, then current combat exclusionary provisions. In its final report, this commission recommended that "military readiness should be the driving concern regarding assignment policies; there are circumstances under which women might be assigned to combat positions."

The same Authorization Act that mandated this commission also repealed the law that prohibited women from being assigned to combat aircraft. Last April, Secretary Aspin implemented that provision and initiated a review of the remaining restrictions on the assignment of women in the military, including the appropriateness of the "risk rule." The resulting review concluded that the "risk rule" is no longer appropriate and that women are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except for assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground.

I personally believe that the strongest argument in favor of women in combat is the need to select the best qualified person for a position, regardless of gender. As Commander-in-Chief, I remain committed to ensuring we have the most ready and best equipped armed forces in the world. Removing artificial barriers to professional excellence is one way to achieve this goal.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Bob Stump
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Representative Dornan:

I appreciate the concern expressed by you and several of your colleagues about former Secretary of Defense Aspin's recent decision to open additional combat positions to women in the U.S. military -- a decision Secretary Perry indicated in his confirmation proceedings he fully supported. As you know, this issue has been the focus of debate and study for many years.

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I personally believe that the strongest argument in favor of women in combat is the need to select the best qualified person for a position, regardless of gender. As Commander-in-Chief, I remain committed to ensuring we have the most ready and best equipped armed forces in the world. Removing artificial barriers to professional excellence is one way to achieve this goal.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert K. Dornan
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

0865

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

February 1, 1994

The President
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are greatly alarmed at the recent announcement by outgoing Secretary of Defense Les Aspin opening up additional combat positions for women in the United States military.


First, we do not believe such action should be taken by an outgoing cabinet member without any consultation with the United States Congress. Any decision on this issue should be made only by the new Secretary of Defense after thorough consultation and hearings with members of the House and Senate.


Next, this appears to be yet another move by your Administration to change the military with no regard whatsoever for combat readiness. The mission of our military remains simple and clear: to deter war and if necessary conduct combat operations to achieve swift and decisive victory. We have neither heard nor seen any discussion, let alone proof, from the Department of Defense that opening up additional combat positions to women would in any way improve combat readiness. In fact, there are many indications that just the opposite would occur.


Finally, we find it unacceptable that the comprehensive findings of the President's Commission on Women in the Armed Forces have not been used or discussed by the Department of Defense in formulating any new policy. This commission held numerous in-depth hearings on this issue and came to some very specific conclusions regarding women in combat. To ignore their work is to ignore the facts regarding this issue.

We therefore urge you to immediately postpone any change in the current policy regarding the assignment of women to combat positions in the United States military. We look forward to your immediate reply on this issue affecting combat readiness.

Best regards,


Robert K. Dornan, M.C.



Bob Stump, M.C.



Gerald B. A. Solomon, M.C.


Tom DeLay, M.C.


Bob Livingston, M.C.


Philip M. Crane, M.C.


James M. Inhofe, M.C.


Roscoe G. Bartlett, M.C.


John T. Doolittle, M.C.


Bob Inglis, M.C.