

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Chron File - November 1993 #1 [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

Defense Policy-Bell, Robert

Original OA/ID Number:

48

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
31	3	3	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Anne Witkowsky. Subject: Use of Open Skies.... Record ID: 9321228. (2 pages)	11/02/1993	P1/b(1)
001b. draft	[Presidential Review Directive on Expanding the Open Skies Treaty]. Record ID: 9321228. (7 pages)	11/02/1993	P1/b(1)
002. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee Meeting, November 1, 1993. Record ID: 9321241. (3 pages)	11/03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 48

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4497

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: NEEL, R

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 02 NOV 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SOMALIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SP FOR PRES ATTENDANCE AT MEMORIAL SERVICE FOR MEMBER OF US ARMED
FORCES KILLED IN SOMALIA LAST MONTH

ACTION: NEEL DISAPPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 04 NOV 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BELL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 2 OF 2

Schedule Proposal

THE WHITE HOUSE

date 11 / 2 / 93

WASHINGTON

☒ ACCEPT☒ REGRET☐ PENDING

TO: Roy Neel
Deputy Chief of Staff

FROM: Anthony Lake

REQUEST: The President's attendance at a memorial service for member of the U.S. Armed Forces killed last month in Somalia.

BACKGROUND: The President expressed interest in attending one of the memorial services planned for members of the U.S. Armed Forces killed last month in Somalia. There are three such events that would be appropriate; **November 8 at Fort Benning, November 9 at Fort Campbell and November 10 at Fort Bragg.**

PURPOSE: To express to the families of the deceased and members of the military your deep concern for those killed during last month's fighting in the Somalia.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None

DATES AND TIMES: **Monday, November 8, 10:00 a.m.**
Tuesday, November 9, 3:30 p.m.
Wednesday, November 10, 5:00 p.m.

DURATION: **Two hours plus travel time**

LOCATIONS: Fort Benning, Georgia - November 8
Fort Campbell, Kentucky - November 9
Fort Bragg, North Carolina - November 10

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Senior DOD Rep,
Anthony Lake

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Varies depending with event chosen

REMARKS REQUIRED: Yes

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open press for Fort Benning and Fort Campbell. Closed press for Fort Bragg.

FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE: If she wishes

VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE: If he wishes

cc: Stephanie Streett

SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE: If she wishes

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

CONTACT: Robert Bell ext. 3330

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2 Nov 93

/ Nancy —

- per your request
- updated to reflect today's meeting.

Bb

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: President's Schedule for Veterans' Day

Purpose

To make recommendations regarding your involvement in Veterans' Day activities on November 11.

Background

It is customary for the President or his designee to participate in the wreath-laying ceremony at Arlington Cemetery on Veterans' Day. Former President Bush attended once in 1991; former President Reagan attended twice, in 1985 and 1988; and former President Carter attended twice, in 1977 and 1978. In addition to this activity, which occurs at 1100, November 11, agencies have suggested a number of other events that you might consider with regard to our commemoration of Veterans' Day this year:

1. November 10: Oval Office presentation of replica statue of Women's Vietnam Veterans' Memorial by Memorial Board leadership (15 minutes between 1000-1400). This will enable a veterans-related photo for morning paper on November 11 (suggested by VA).
2. Host breakfast 0800-0930, November 11, for leaders of major veterans organizations and spouses (suggested by VA).
3. Invite 1-2 Commanding officers and NCO's from units that were engaged in last month's fighting in Somalia to informal meeting in the Oval Office, 0930-1000, November 11 (suggested by Army). We would also invite these troops to the VA breakfast.
4. Visit VA hospital in Martinsburg, West Virginia (suggested by VA). NOTE: This event could have a health care focus and stress the VA's role in your initiative.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

5. Dedication of Womens' Vietnam Veterans Memorial on the Mall, 1400, November 11. NOTE: Vice President Gore would attend this event after participating in the christening of the USS Stennis aircraft carrier in Newport News, Virginia, at 1200.

RECOMMENDATION

That you participate in the following Veterans' Day activities:

1. Women's Vietnam Veterans' Memorial Statue Presentation, November 10
 Approve _____ Disapprove _____
2. VA Breakfast, November 11
 Approve _____ Disapprove _____
3. Oval Office Meeting with Troops, November 11
 Approve _____ Disapprove _____
4. Also Invite Troops to Breakfast?
 Approve _____ Disapprove _____
5. Wreath Laying at Arlington Cemetery, November 11
 Approve _____ Disapprove _____
6. Visit VA Hospital in Martinsburg, West Virginia
 Approve _____ Disapprove _____

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9307375
RECEIVED: 28 SEP 93 08

TO: GINGRICH, NEWT
ET AL

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 02 NOV 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR TESTING
CO

NON PROLIFERATION

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR FM REP GINGRICH ET AL & REP SPRATT ON NUCLEAR TESTING

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 01 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN

LOGREF: 9307570

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

WH STRIPPING DESK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ANDREASEN

~~BELL~~

GROSS

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY

DATE

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSJEB

DOC

3 OF

3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9307375

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 ANDREASEN
002 LAKE
002 ANDREASEN
002 LAKE
003
003 WH STRIPPING DESK

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 93092809 PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
Z 93102119 FOR DECISION
Z 93102120 FOR FURTHER ACTION
Z 93102217 FWD TO PRES FOR SIG
X 93110312 PRES SGD LTRS
X 93110312 FOR DISPATCH

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

003 931102 GINGRICH, NEWT
003 931102 SPRATT JR, JOHN M
003 931102 HYDE, HENRY J
003 931102 KYL, JON
003 931102 SPENCE, FLOYD D
003 931102 GILMAN, BENJAMIN A

DISPATCH FOR INFO

WH STRIPPING DESK

UNCLASSIFIED

REFERRAL

DATE: 03 NOV 93

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH STRIPPING DESK

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: GINGRICH, NEWT

SOURCE: PRESIDENT


DATE: 02 NOV 93

SUBJ: LTR FM REP GINGRICH ET AL & REP SPRATT ON NUCLEAR TESTING

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 03 NOV 93

COMMENT:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "W. Leary", is written over a circular stamp. The stamp contains the word "FOR" in capital letters.

WILLIAM H. LEARY

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 2, 1993

Dear Representative Gingrich:

Thank you for your letter of September 22 on nuclear testing. As you know, the People's Republic of China conducted an underground nuclear test on October 4, despite the urging of more than 20 nations, including the United States, not to do so.

I was deeply disappointed by this action. We have urged China to refrain from further nuclear tests and to join the other nuclear powers in a global moratorium. Such a moratorium will contribute to the achievement of the Administration's goal of completing a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty by 1996, consistent with the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment passed by Congress last fall and signed by President Bush.

In response to the Chinese test, I have directed the Department of Energy to take such action as is needed to put the United States in a position to be able to conduct nuclear tests next year, provided the notification and review conditions of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment are met in the Spring of 1994. My ultimate decision on whether to test will be based on fundamental U.S. national security interests, taking into account (1) the contribution further tests would make to improving the safety and reliability of the U.S. arsenal in preparation for a CTB; (2) the extent to which China and others have responded to the U.S. appeal for a global moratorium on testing; (3) progress in the CTB negotiations; and (4) the implications of further U.S. nuclear tests on our broader non-proliferation objectives. I have also asked Administration officials to begin consultations with Congress and our allies on these issues.

I am pleased to report that our bilateral consultations with the other nuclear states on the organization and conduct of CTB negotiations have been very successful. We have also made progress in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to confer a negotiating mandate on the CD's Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Testing. While we still have some important procedural matters to resolve, I believe that we will be able to begin the CTB negotiations at an early date.

Finally, I would hope that you will support the Administration's recent budget amendment for Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons activities. This amendment will preserve an infrastructure to resume testing if required and will speed work on alternative means of maintaining confidence in the safety, reliability and performance of our nuclear inventory.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "B" and a long, sweeping underline.

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 2, 1993

Dear Representative Hyde:

Thank you for your letter of September 22 on nuclear testing. As you know, the People's Republic of China conducted an underground nuclear test on October 4, despite the urging of more than 20 nations, including the United States, not to do so.

I was deeply disappointed by this action. We have urged China to refrain from further nuclear tests and to join the other nuclear powers in a global moratorium. Such a moratorium will contribute to the achievement of the Administration's goal of completing a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty by 1996, consistent with the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment passed by Congress last fall and signed by President Bush.

In response to the Chinese test, I have directed the Department of Energy to take such action as is needed to put the United States in a position to be able to conduct nuclear tests next year, provided the notification and review conditions of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment are met in the Spring of 1994. My ultimate decision on whether to test will be based on fundamental U.S. national security interests, taking into account (1) the contribution further tests would make to improving the safety and reliability of the U.S. arsenal in preparation for a CTB; (2) the extent to which China and others have responded to the U.S. appeal for a global moratorium on testing; (3) progress in the CTB negotiations; and (4) the implications of further U.S. nuclear tests on our broader non-proliferation objectives. I have also asked Administration officials to begin consultations with Congress and our allies on these issues.

I am pleased to report that our bilateral consultations with the other nuclear states on the organization and conduct of CTB negotiations have been very successful. We have also made progress in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to confer a negotiating mandate on the CD's Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Testing. While we still have some important procedural matters to resolve, I believe that we will be able to begin the CTB negotiations at an early date.

Finally, I would hope that you will support the Administration's recent budget amendment for Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons activities. This amendment will preserve an infrastructure to resume testing if required and will speed work on alternative means of maintaining confidence in the safety, reliability and performance of our nuclear inventory.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 2, 1993

Dear Representative Kyl:

Thank you for your letter of September 22 on nuclear testing. As you know, the People's Republic of China conducted an underground nuclear test on October 4, despite the urging of more than 20 nations, including the United States, not to do so.

I was deeply disappointed by this action. We have urged China to refrain from further nuclear tests and to join the other nuclear powers in a global moratorium. Such a moratorium will contribute to the achievement of the Administration's goal of completing a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty by 1996, consistent with the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment passed by Congress last fall and signed by President Bush.

In response to the Chinese test, I have directed the Department of Energy to take such action as is needed to put the United States in a position to be able to conduct nuclear tests next year, provided the notification and review conditions of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment are met in the Spring of 1994. My ultimate decision on whether to test will be based on fundamental U.S. national security interests, taking into account (1) the contribution further tests would make to improving the safety and reliability of the U.S. arsenal in preparation for a CTB; (2) the extent to which China and others have responded to the U.S. appeal for a global moratorium on testing; (3) progress in the CTB negotiations; and (4) the implications of further U.S. nuclear tests on our broader non-proliferation objectives. I have also asked Administration officials to begin consultations with Congress and our allies on these issues.

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Finally, I would hope that you will support the Administration's recent budget amendment for Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons activities. This amendment will preserve an infrastructure to resume testing if required and will speed work on alternative means of maintaining confidence in the safety, reliability and performance of our nuclear inventory.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Jon Kyl
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 2, 1993

Dear Representative Spence:

Thank you for your letter of September 22 on nuclear testing. As you know, the People's Republic of China conducted an underground nuclear test on October 4, despite the urging of more than 20 nations, including the United States, not to do so.

I was deeply disappointed by this action. We have urged China to refrain from further nuclear tests and to join the other nuclear powers in a global moratorium. Such a moratorium will contribute to the achievement of the Administration's goal of completing a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty by 1996, consistent with the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment passed by Congress last fall and signed by President Bush.

In response to the Chinese test, I have directed the Department of Energy to take such action as is needed to put the United States in a position to be able to conduct nuclear tests next year, provided the notification and review conditions of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment are met in the Spring of 1994. My ultimate decision on whether to test will be based on fundamental U.S. national security interests, taking into account (1) the contribution further tests would make to improving the safety and reliability of the U.S. arsenal in preparation for a CTB; (2) the extent to which China and others have responded to the U.S. appeal for a global moratorium on testing; (3) progress in the CTB negotiations; and (4) the implications of further U.S. nuclear tests on our broader non-proliferation objectives. I have also asked Administration officials to begin consultations with Congress and our allies on these issues.

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Finally, I would hope that you will support the Administration's recent budget amendment for Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons activities. This amendment will preserve an infrastructure to resume testing if required and will speed work on alternative means of maintaining confidence in the safety, reliability and performance of our nuclear inventory.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Floyd Spence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 2, 1993

Dear Representative Gilman:

Thank you for your letter of September 22 on nuclear testing. As you know, the People's Republic of China conducted an underground nuclear test on October 4, despite the urging of more than 20 nations, including the United States, not to do so.

I was deeply disappointed by this action. We have urged China to refrain from further nuclear tests and to join the other nuclear powers in a global moratorium. Such a moratorium will contribute to the achievement of the Administration's goal of completing a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty by 1996, consistent with the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment passed by Congress last fall and signed by President Bush.

In response to the Chinese test, I have directed the Department of Energy to take such action as is needed to put the United States in a position to be able to conduct nuclear tests next year, provided the notification and review conditions of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment are met in the Spring of 1994. My ultimate decision on whether to test will be based on fundamental U.S. national security interests, taking into account (1) the contribution further tests would make to improving the safety and reliability of the U.S. arsenal in preparation for a CTB; (2) the extent to which China and others have responded to the U.S. appeal for a global moratorium on testing; (3) progress in the CTB negotiations; and (4) the implications of further U.S. nuclear tests on our broader non-proliferation objectives. I have also asked Administration officials to begin consultations with Congress and our allies on these issues.

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Finally, I would hope that you will support the Administration's recent budget amendment for Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons activities. This amendment will preserve an infrastructure to resume testing if required and will speed work on alternative means of maintaining confidence in the safety, reliability and performance of our nuclear inventory.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton", with a stylized, cursive script.

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 2, 1993

Dear John:

Thank you for your letter of September 22 on nuclear testing. As you know, the People's Republic of China conducted an underground nuclear test on October 4, despite the urging of more than 20 nations, including the United States, not to do so.

I was deeply disappointed by this action. We have urged China to refrain from further nuclear tests and to join the other nuclear powers in a global moratorium. Such a moratorium will contribute to the achievement of the Administration's goal of completing a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty by 1996, consistent with the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment passed by Congress last fall and signed by President Bush.

In response to the Chinese test, I have directed the Department of Energy to take such action as is needed to put the United States in a position to be able to conduct nuclear tests next year, provided the notification and review conditions of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment are met in the Spring of 1994. My ultimate decision on whether to test will be based on fundamental U.S. national security interests, taking into account (1) the contribution further tests would make to improving the safety and reliability of the U.S. arsenal in preparation for a CTB; (2) the extent to which China and others have responded to the U.S. appeal for a global moratorium on testing; (3) progress in the CTB negotiations; and (4) the implications of further U.S. nuclear tests on our broader non-proliferation objectives. I have also asked Administration officials to begin consultations with Congress and our allies on these issues.

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Finally, I would hope that you will support the Administration's recent budget amendment for Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons activities. This amendment will preserve an infrastructure to resume testing if required and will speed work on alternative means of maintaining confidence in the safety, reliability and performance of our nuclear inventory.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bill", written in black ink.

The Honorable John M. Spratt, Jr.
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

11 2 93

WASHINGTON

ACTION

November 2, 1993

NOV 2 09:49

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
HOWARD PASTER

SUBJECT: Letter from Representative Gingrich et al and
Representative Spratt on Nuclear Testing

Purpose

To respond to letters from Representatives Gingrich, Spence, Hyde, Gilman and Kyl and Representative Spratt regarding nuclear testing.

Background

Representatives Gingrich, Spence, Hyde, Gilman and Kyl have written you expressing their willingness to work with you to gain bipartisan support for the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing should the PRC, or any other nation, conduct a nuclear test. Representative Spratt has written you urging you not to respond "in kind" to a Chinese nuclear test.

The response from you notes that we deeply regret the recent test by China and are encouraging the Chinese to refrain from further testing. The response also notes that you have directed the Department of Energy to take such actions as are needed to put the U.S. in a position to be able to conduct nuclear tests next year, provided the notification and review conditions of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment are met in the Spring of 1994 and notes the relevant factors upon which your ultimate decision on whether to test will be made. The response tracks closely with the statement released by the White House on October 5 in response to the Chinese test.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response to Representatives Gingrich, Spence, Hyde, Gilman and Kyl and Representative Spratt at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Representatives Gingrich, Spence, Hyde, Gilman and Kyl; and Representative Spratt

Tab B Letter from Representatives Gingrich, Spence, Hyde, Gilman and Kyl; and Representative Spratt

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

September 22, 1993

Honorable Bill Clinton
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We were surprised this past July when you decided to extend the moratorium on U.S. nuclear testing. In our judgment, a modest U.S. nuclear testing program was still required to ensure and enhance the safety, reliability and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear systems. Likewise, we did not believe that continued testing by the United States would in any way undermine U.S. and international nonproliferation efforts which we all support.

We were heartened, however, by that portion of your July 3 announcement in which you linked the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing with the conduct of other nuclear powers. We concurred with your promise that "If, however, this moratorium is broken by another nation, I will direct the Department of Energy to prepare to conduct additional tests while seeking approval to do so from Congress."

As you know, a September 17, 1993, Washington Post article disclosed that the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) may be planning to conduct an underground nuclear test in the near future. The article stated publicly what Clinton Administration Officials had been predicting for several months. The article also reported that a debate has emerged within your Administration over whether your July 3 promise should be fulfilled if the PRC conducts a nuclear test.


In light of these developments, and consistent with your July 3 announcement, we strongly urge you to reaffirm your commitment to resume testing should another nation test. Such a statement might be an effective deterrent to any country contemplating conducting a nuclear test while simultaneously laying the necessary groundwork in Congress for any future request to resume the U.S. testing program.

We stand ready to work with you to gain bipartisan support for the resumption of the U.S. nuclear testing program should the PRC, or any other nation, conduct a nuclear test.


We look forward to your reply.


Sincerely,


NEWT GINGRICH
House Republican Whip


FLOYD D. SPENCE
Ranking Republican
House Armed Services Committee


HENRY J. HYDE
Chairman
House Republican
Policy Committee


BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
Ranking Republican
House Foreign Affairs
Committee


JON KYL
Ranking Republican
Military Application of
Nuclear Energy Panel
House Armed Services Committee

JOHN M. SPRATT, JR.
5th DISTRICT, SOUTH CAROLINA

1536 LONGWORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-5501

COMMITTEES:
ARMED SERVICES
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515/4

September 29, 1993

7570
DISTRICT OFFICES:

FEDERAL BUILDING
BOX 350
ROCK HILL, SOUTH CAROLINA 29731
(803) 327-1114

39 E. CALHOUN STREET
SUMTER, SOUTH CAROLINA 29150
(803) 773-3362

88 PUBLIC SQUARE
BOX 25
DARLINGTON, SOUTH CAROLINA 29532
(803) 393-3998

The Honorable William J. Clinton
President
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I commend you for seeking to dissuade China from conducting a nuclear test; but if China conducts a test, I urge you not to respond in kind. The Chinese will accomplish nothing by testing that requires us to test. They are not developing a warhead that will give their arsenal an edge over ours or pushing their stockpile to levels that even approach ours. Should China test, it will be test number 39; should the United States test, it will be test number 943. This is a short way of saying that there is no comparison between us. If we test because China tests, and for no better reason, we will slip back into the logic of the nuclear arms race.

I know some will say that China cannot be allowed to flout your moratorium with impunity. But we will not punish China by testing. China's leaders could probably care less whether we test. If we need to penalize China, we should deny something they want dearly, such as high-tech export licenses or textile/apparel quotas.

If you do consider testing, presumably you will consider one of the nine tests on the agenda prepared by the Nuclear Weapons Council. For five years, I have chaired a panel of the Armed Services Committee that oversees the nuclear weapons complex. I conceived the idea of the Drell Commission and traveled with the commission throughout the complex. I can assure you that there is no compelling need for any of the nine proposed tests.

When you were weighing your decision on nuclear testing, I wrote a memorandum that I intended to send you but did not complete before you reached your decision. I revised it to be made as a floor statement to the House when the Defense Authorization bill came up, and I am enclosing a copy. This paper is longer than you have time to read, but I submit it to back up this letter, because it sorts through the arguments for and against testing. It also shows that I am not ardently opposed to nuclear testing under any circumstances. However, the need for the nine proposed tests is not critical, and it is negligible in comparison to other security


September 29, 1993

Page Two

objectives which testing could undermine, such as dismantling missiles in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Byelorussia and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.

I was in Ukraine and Russia with the Gephardt Codel in April, and we found the path to ratification of START I and II littered with obstacles. We do not need to add any more. The Chinese are not at present a threat to us, but for years the Russians maintained a million troops on their border with China. There are surely some in Russia who still perceive the Chinese as a threat. If China tests, and we test in response, Yeltsin will be expected to prove Russia's prowess; and if Russia tests, it is bound to send trembles through Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belorussia. We do not know how new nuclear tests may affect Ukraine and the removal of their missiles or all the nuclear states of the former Soviet Union and their ratification of START II. But we do know that these objectives, and non-proliferation generally, are so vital to our security that we should not put them at risk by nuclear tests that are not necessary.

Respectfully,


John M. Spratt, Jr.

JMSj:hb
Enclosure

STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN JOHN SPRATT

NUCLEAR TESTING MORATORIUM

Last year the House passed a one-year moratorium on nuclear testing. The Senate took the test moratorium and added testing restrictions, and an amendment offered by Senator Hatfield was adopted as part of the Energy and Water Appropriation Act.

The Hatfield Amendment bars nuclear tests between September 30, 1992, and July 1, 1993, and allows for tests afterward only if the President has submitted a schedule to Congress for resuming "Nuclear Testing Talks with Russia" and a plan for "achieving a multi-lateral comprehensive ban on testing" by September 30, 1996.

The Hatfield Amendment limits the number of tests each year to no more than 5 and the number of tests over four years (fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 1996) to no more than 15, as follows: each year one test may be conducted to prove the reliability of a warhead, provided the President certifies that the test is "vital to national security;" each year a test may be conducted on behalf of the British; the remaining tests are confined to certifying a warhead after safety devices have been retrofitted onto it. Since we have conducted no tests in fiscal year 1993, the Hatfield Amendment in effect limits the tests to three for the British, three for reliability, and nine for certifying safety devices.

The emphasis on "safety devices" stems from the Drell Commission Report, submitted in December of 1990. In 1990, the Armed Services Committees asked three eminent physicists (Sidney Drell of Stanford, Charles Townes of Berkeley, and John Foster of TRW) to take a hard, critical look at safety in our nuclear arsenal. We were prompted by classified testimony from the directors of the national labs (Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia), who told us that warheads were deployed and still being built that did not incorporate all state-of-the-art nuclear safety devices. They implied, in effect, that we were incurring unnecessary nuclear risks. Basically, they had reference to three "modern safety devices":

(1) Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety (ENDS): A nuclear weapon equipped with ENDS has two separate strong links that must be closed electrically for the weapon to be armed---one by operator-coded input, another by environmental input corresponding to the flight trajectory; in addition to the strong links, one weak link must be closed. By requiring three separate circuits to be closed, ENDS ensures that an aberrant electrical charge, such as lightning, will not accidentally detonate a warhead. Introduced in 1977, ENDS is now used in approximately half (52%) of our nuclear weapons.

(2) Insensitive High Explosive (IHE): The explosion of a thermonuclear weapon is initiated by a conventional explosive layered around a plutonium hull. (Because the plutonium hull is shaped like the pit of a fruit, it is commonly called the "pit.") Since 1980, "insensitive high explosive" or "IHE" has been the chemical explosive preferred for this purpose, because IHE is more difficult to detonate accidentally than its predecessor, which is known simply as "High Explosive" or "HE". Introduced in 1979, IHE is used in approximately 25% of our nuclear weapons.

(3) Fire-Resistant Pits (FRP): A fire-resistant pit is designed to contain molten plutonium should it melt in an accidental fire. The FRP reduces the risk of plutonium dispersal into the atmosphere or the risk of molten plutonium going critical. Introduced in the late 1980s, fire-resistant pits are now used in about 10% of our nuclear weapons.

The Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM-A) came under especially critical attack by the lab directors because it lacks any modern safety features, and until recently, was loaded on bombers on ready alert. In 1974, an engine on a B-52 caught fire on the landing strip and the fire might have ignited SRAMs aboard the bomber but for a change in direction of the wind. Had the rocket fuel or explosives in the SRAMs ignited, the plutonium pit in its warhead could have been blasted into the atmosphere and aerosolized, leaving radioactive damage miles around the base. Some of us who learned how real this risk was sought to have the SRAM taken off alert bombers and stored in bunkers. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney asked the Air Force to review the problem. The Air Force did so and decided to take the SRAMs off alert.

The SRAM-A raises the risk of accidental nuclear detonation, but at a very low probability and at a very low yield. It carries a higher risk of plutonium dispersal, with potentially grave consequences. However, as the Drell Commission noted, safety analysis has focused largely on nuclear yield accidents and too little on plutonium dispersal accidents.

It was this latter risk--plutonium dispersal--that brought the W-88 warhead, the warhead for the D-5 missile, under scrutiny. Although insensitive high explosive (IHE) was developed when the W-88 warhead was designed, its extra weight and volume could have meant slightly less yield for the W-88, or less range for the D-5 missile, or they might have meant deploying 7 rather than 8 warheads on the D-5. Los Alamos and the Navy traded-off safety for performance and chose not to use IHE in the W-88 warhead. The additional risk is small, but it is compounded by the design of the D-5 missile.

The D-5 carries 8 warheads contained in re-entry bodies. Rather than being mounted on a deck above the rocket motor, the re-entry bodies are mounted on a ring, and the upper-end of third-stage rocket motor protrudes through the center of the ring. Within the rocket motor itself, another trade-off was made. The Navy chose a rocket propellant that pushes the missile to greater velocity and longer range, but also detonates more easily than the alternative propellant.

The Navy bristles at the suggestion that it traded safety for performance in designing this missile and its warhead. The Navy stresses its safety record and insists that the tubes on the Trident submarine keep the D-5 missile in a highly protective environment. But on occasion, the D-5 missiles are lifted out of their tubes by an overhead crane. The crane's cable connects to the missile by a bull-ring in the missile's nose cone, and it is not hard to imagine how an accident could occur. If a missile were dropped, it could conceivably detonate the propellant, which in turn could cause the HE in the warhead to detonate. This could lead to a low-yield nuclear reaction, but more probably it would result in an explosion that pulverized the plutonium pit and dispersed the aerosolized plutonium into the atmosphere.

In summary, four compromises in safety were made in the design of the D-5 missile and the W-88 warhead:

- (1) The use of HE instead of IHE.
- (2) The use of a detonable propellant in the third-stage motor in lieu of a less detonable propellant.
- (3) The placement of the third-stage motor and the re-entry bodies in close proximity.
- (4) The use of a conventional pit in lieu of a fire-resistant pit, although a fire-resistant pit probably would not withstand the intense heat of a missile propellant explosion or HE detonation either.

Most of the criticism against the W-88 came from Lawrence Livermore Lab. The design for the warhead went to Los Alamos, but scientists at Livermore kept pressing questions about the W-88. Eventually, their concerns leaked out of the labs, and the Drell Commission was established to assess these concerns. W-88's were being built without IHE and deployed on D-5 missiles close to a detonable propellant. Since safer features were available, and the extra range and yield were marginal, and of far less importance with the end of the Cold War, the main question presented to the Drell Commission was: Why build the D-5/W-88 in this configuration? Although the D-5/W-88 was the Drell Commission's focal point, their charter was broadened, and before they finished, they looked into the safety of the entire nuclear stockpile.

The Drell Commission recommended that all nuclear weapons in the stockpile be equipped with ENDS and that all nuclear bombs and cruise missiles loaded on aircraft be equipped with IHE and fire-resistant pits. With respect to the D-5/W-88, the Commission recommended that the Navy do a "more credible analysis on how well or whether the D-5/W-88 meets modern safety standards."

The Drell Commission found also that the national labs nurtured a more ambitious agenda for enhancing the safety of nuclear weapons. The labs, particularly Livermore, would like to explore a new design generation of nuclear weapons---weapons in which a hardened plutonium capsule is completely segregated from the high explosive until the weapon is armed. This would call for an undetermined amount of research, testing, time, and money. The Drell Commission reported the concept without recommendation. Whatever the merits may be, it is unrealistic to think that Congress would approve the cost.

In response to the Drell Commission, the Navy ran a new series of probabilistic risk assessments showing that detonation as a result of dropping the D-5 is exceedingly improbable. The Navy agreed to separate the post-boost vehicle that carries the re-entry bodies from the body of the D-5 whenever the missile is lifted from its tube, but the Navy estimated an overall cost of \$4-5 billion to redesign the W-88 warhead to incorporate IHE and the third-stage of the D-5 missile to segregate the rocket motor from the re-entry bodies. The \$4-5 billion

estimate seemed inordinate, but it was credible enough to chill anyone's ardor for redesigning the W-88 and the D-5's third stage motor.

When the Chairman of the Drell Commission presented his report to Congress, he said that he supported continued testing for safety purposes, but also agreed with Secretary of State James Baker, who said "we cannot approach proliferation in a business-as-usual manner." Drell said: "If, or when, it is judged that agreeing to a comprehensive test ban would be an important aid to non-proliferation, I recommend that the United States agree to such a ban. Meanwhile, I support a testing program designed to advance the possibilities and understanding of enhanced safety, thereby helping us prepare for a comprehensive test ban...I recommend that the United States abandon its official position that we must continue to test as long as we have nuclear weapons. It should be replaced by a policy that limits underground tests to those that are required to insure that all the weapons...meet appropriately conservative criteria for nuclear weapons safety."

This advice set the stage for the Hatfield Amendment, which limits the number of tests to 15 as discussed previously. As the moratorium imposed by the Hatfield Amendment drew closer to its end date of July 1, 1993, an interagency group presented President Clinton with an alternative testing plan composed of 9 specific tests --- three for reliability, three for the British, and three for certifying safety devices. But neither reliability nor safety nor national security generally required that any of these tests be conducted within the next twelve months:

1. W-80 Safety Tests. Rather than dealing with the W-88 and its shortcomings, three tests were proposed to re-certify the W-80 warhead with a fire-resistant pit. The W-80 is the warhead used in air-launched cruise missiles ("ALCMs"). To certify the warhead, tests would be needed, but the need to test now is not compelling for two reasons:

- (1) Cruise missiles are no longer loaded on bombers but are stored in bunkers. The only safety risk mitigated by fire-resistant pits is the risk of fire when bombers are on ready alert and loaded with ALCMs.

- (2) Fire-resistant pits will not remove this risk for ten years, because the Air Force does not plan to replace existing pits in deployed W-80s with fire-resistant pits until the year 2003.

Clearly, there is no rush to test the new FRP for the W-80.

2. Reliability Tests. It was also proposed that the following warheads be tested for reliability:

- W-88, the warhead for the D-5, Trident II missile.
- W-76, the warhead for the C-4, Trident I missile.
- W-87, the warhead for the MX or Peacekeeper missile.

Each of these warheads was tested in development, and each has been tested at least once since production. To my knowledge, there are no unresolved questions about the capability of any of these warheads. Because they will be deployed for years to come, reliability tests would be useful, but in truth, the tests would be useful at some time well into the future when the effects of aging have taken their toll. In all likelihood, testing now will tell us what development tests have already told us: that in their current condition, these warheads are reliable.

The Hatfield Amendment allows one test per year for reliability, but requires the President to certify to Congress that "it is vital to the national security interest of the United States to test the reliability" of the warhead at issue. Had the President opted to resume testing, I doubt that such a certification could have been made in good faith; and under the Hatfield Amendment, the President's certification could have been challenged and disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress.

3. British Tests. It was also proposed that three tests be allowed for the British to prove the design of a new gravity bomb and a new warhead for the D-5 missile. We have a commitment to the British, but there are good reasons for overriding it:

(1) Nuclear gravity bombs have been built for almost fifty years. Experience with previous designs should be enough to give the British adequate confidence without testing.

(2) Britain's nuclear deterrent is not based on gravity bombs but on SLBMs. Britain is building under license as many as 4 Trident submarines, all to be equipped with D-5's that are vastly more important to the UK's security than gravity bombs. Britain has designed its own warhead for the D-5, which has been certified. The British are planning to put improved safety devices on their D-5 warhead, and would like to test warheads equipped with these devices. This is important, but there is a countervailing consideration. The U.S. has far more at risk in provoking Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan by resuming tests, than in disappointing the British by continuing the moratorium. The British ought to understand why we do not want to risk the chance of removing ICBMs from Ukraine, or the chance of gaining accession to the NPT by the nuclear states of the Former Soviet Union and ratification of START I and II. All of these objectives are more important to world security than testing Britain's gravity bomb or new D-5 safety devices.

During April, I was in Ukraine and Russia with the Gephardt Congressional Delegation, and we found the path to START I and II and the NPT littered with obstacles. There is no reason to add another one. No one can tell with certainty what effect testing will have on Russia, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, or Ukraine; but certainly no one can say that testing will help us work out the removal of missiles from Ukraine, or help us gain approval of NPT and START I and II from the nuclear states of the former Soviet Union. Our security interest in getting rid of the missiles in Ukraine and in gaining accession to the NPT and ratification of START I and II is enormous. By comparison, our need for nuclear testing over the next 12-24 months is negligible. In fact, in the post-Cold War world, our interests are probably be served by an extended moratorium, because it gives us moral high ground as we try to control

the spread of nuclear weapons, which is a major security risk.

The President was right, therefore, to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing; but he should not let it become a moratorium on the hard decisions that have to be made before the question of testing is settled for the long-run. Energy, Defense, and the NSC have to decide whether limited testing is required in the long-run as our arsenal ages, and since their views are not exactly disinterested, outside experts ought to be asked in for advice. The Department of Energy and the labs should take this moratorium as a sign of what the future holds, and start studying in earnest how to remanufacture warhead components when testing is limited or no longer allowed. And before testing is forsworn forever, the experts ought to resolve the merits of low-yield testing, plus testing things other than warheads---like devices to disable mini-nukes planted by terrorists. Even more fundamentally, the Department of Energy has to figure out how it will keep the corporate memory on nuclear weapons if testing is not allowed---and how it will attract and retain the talent a nuclear arsenal requires when nuclear warheads are no longer being designed, developed, or tested.

These decisions need to be made now, not left until 1996 when the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty comes up for renewal---and overbearing pressure for a comprehensive test ban comes with it.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 30, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH

FROM: HOWARD G. PASTER
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL MAIL

Attached are copies of letters sent to the President from several members of Congress.

Since these letters address national security issues, I would appreciate your assistance in drafting a response. The letters are as follows:

- 1) Romano Mazzoli (D-KY), concerning refugees;
- ✓ 2) John Spratt (D-SC), concerning nuclear testing; and
- 3) Peter King (R-NY), concerning Northern Ireland.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please feel free to call LeeAnn Inadomi at x7500.

Enclosure

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 19, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*
FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN *SPA*
SUBJECT: Letter from Representative Gingrich et al and
Representative Spratt on Nuclear Testing

Representatives Gingrich, Spence, Hyde, Gilman and Kyl have written the President expressing their willingness to work with the President to gain bipartisan support for the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing should the PRC, or any other nation, conduct a nuclear test. Representative Spratt has written the President urging the President not to respond "in kind" to a Chinese nuclear test.

The response from the President notes that we deeply regret the recent test by China and are encouraging the Chinese to refrain from further testing. The response also notes that the President has directed DOE to take such actions as are needed to put the U.S. in a position to be able to conduct nuclear tests next year, provided the notification and review conditions of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Amendment are met in the Spring of 1994 and notes the relevant factors upon which the President's ultimate decision on whether to test will be made. The response tracks closely with the statement released by the White House on October 5 in response to the Chinese test.

Concurrence: Jeremy Rosner *JR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to Representatives Gingrich, Spence, Hyde, Gilman and Kyl; and Representative Spratt
Tab B Letter from Representatives Gingrich, Spence, Hyde, Gilman and Kyl; and Representative Spratt

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 2, 1993

Tony:

Howard and Bob Rubin both concur in the recommendation. I redrafted the second half of the memo from you to the President to reflect the new info I received re the C-17's payload carrying capabilities under Secretary Aspin's revised plan.

Bob Beel

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

October 28, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ROBERT BELL *RbB*

SUBJECT: SecDef Recommendations on C-17 Program

Late last night, Secretary Aspin sent the President a memorandum (Tab A) advising him of a number of changes the Secretary is considering in the Air Force's C-17 acquisition program. Although the Defense Acquisition Board is not scheduled to decide the future of this program until mid-November, Under Secretary Deutch previewed these changes in closed briefings to congressional defense committees this week. News of the briefings and the proposed changes leaked today (see Tab II).

Defense apparently hoped the briefings would restore confidence in the Congress in the future of this trouble-plagued program and help the Senate conferees in both the authorization and the appropriations conferences persuade House conferees to restore the deep C-17 funding cuts the House made in both bills. My information, though, is that the briefings met with a decidedly mixed reaction.

While I understand what Defense hoped to accomplish, I have expressed my displeasure to Rudy DeLeon about our being put in a situation where congressional committees are being briefed on a major change in the single largest procurement program in the President's defense budget before the White House is consulted on the possible changes. It is also disturbing that we first learned about the briefings in the Wall Street Journal.

The changes Secretary Aspin proposes in the C-17 program include:

- Continue the current procurement program for another two years at the rate of six aircraft per year but make no commitment for additional purchases after this. Together with the 20 C-17s already under contract and the 6 C-17s proposed in our FY 1994 request, that would mean committing the U.S. Government to a fleet of only 38 aircraft, rather than the 120 now planned or the 210 originally envisioned.
- In November 1995, the Administration would decide, based on contractor performance and flight test results, whether to terminate or continue the program. If the Administration decides to continue the program, it would plan on buying a total of about 120 C-17s as well as some number of commercially-available wide-body transports to meet our overall airlift enhancement requirements.

- The prospect of the profits that would accrue from a potential 120 aircraft buy would give the prime contractor, the McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corporation (MDC), incentives to get the program back on track.
- As part of an overall package of financial trade-offs, MDC would drop \$1.2 billion in potential claims against the U.S. Government and make new corporate investments of about \$456 million to complete flight testing and improve technical performance. In return, the Air Force would make a \$348 million payment to MDC to settle outstanding claims and cover its portion of flight test costs.
- In what will undoubtedly provoke sharp criticism in some quarters on the Hill, the Air Force would "significantly relax" some performance specifications that the C-17 has proven unable to meet (e.g., wing stress loadings) but which Defense now believes would not "compromise its operational requirements."

Secretary Aspin notes that he believes "this settlement is attainable with MDC." The larger question is whether the compromise plan will be attainable with Congress.

Congress will most likely divide into five camps on this proposal:

- "Good government" champions such as Senator Levin will charge that by relaxing the C-17 contract specifications we have "moved the goal posts" forward to make it easier for MDC to score.
- Defense-minded Members who appreciate that a successful C-17 program provides a critical underpinning to our new "win-win, nearly simultaneously" strategy will support the changes.
- Liberals who think our two-war strategy is misguided and excessively robust will decry the necessity for spending billions more for this plane.
- Members with constituencies that have a substantial economic interest in the future of the program (18,000 jobs in Long Beach alone and another 25,500 elsewhere) will rally behind the plan.
- Senator Nunn will question whether we gave adequate consideration to other, lower-cost alternatives to the C-17, such as relying more on sealift or buying commercially available wide-body transports.

My sense is that this will be very close. We could see an outcome wherein the Senate and House appropriators agree to fund the C-17 in FY 1994 at or close to our requested amount (\$2.3 billion) but the Senate authorizers refuse to drop their provision requiring that the plane meet (or substantially meet) the original contract specifications if the appropriated funds

are to be released. This would leave the program in limbo and be tantamount to killing it.

I believe the key issue here is the extent to which Defense proposes to relax the C-17's performance standards. I think we should be cautious in endorsing this set of changes until we are briefed on the plan and are assured that no significant operational requirements would be forfeited. I have requested such a briefing as soon as possible.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President with Secretary Aspin's memo attached.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
 Tab A 10/27 Memo from Secretary Aspin
Tab II Article from 10/28 WSJ

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
HOWARD PASTER *HP*
ROBERT RUBIN *RR*

SUBJECT: Secretary Aspin's Memo on the C-17 Program

Purpose

To forward to you Secretary Aspin's October 27 memo outlining various changes in the C-17 aircraft program that have been proposed to Congress by the Defense Department.

Background

The changes Secretary Aspin proposes in the C-17 program include:

- Continue the current procurement program for another two years at the rate of six aircraft per year but make no commitment for additional purchases after this. Together with the 20 C-17s already under contract, the six C-17s proposed in our FY 1994 request and the flight test aircraft, two more years at six aircraft per year would mean committing the U.S. Government to a fleet of about 40 C-17s rather than the 120 now planned or the 210 originally envisioned.
- In November 1995, the Administration would decide, based on contractor performance and flight test results, whether to terminate or continue the program. If the Administration decides to continue the program, it would plan on buying a total of about 120 C-17s as well as some number of commercially-available wide-body transports to meet our overall airlift enhancement requirements.
- The prospect of the profits that would accrue from a potential 120-aircraft buy would give the prime contractor, the McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corporation (MDC), incentives to get the program back on track.
- As part of an overall package of financial trade-offs, MDC would drop \$1.2 billion in potential claims against the U.S. Government and make new corporate investments of about \$456

million to complete flight testing and improve technical performance. In return, the Air Force would make a \$348 million payment to MDC to settle outstanding claims and cover its portion of flight test costs.

- The Air Force would "significantly relax" some performance specifications that the C-17 has proven unable to meet (e.g., payload-to-range capabilities), but which Defense now maintains would not "compromise its operational requirements."

Discussion

The key issue raised by Secretary Aspin's proposal is the extent to which we would be relaxing performance requirements for the aircraft. The main change being recommended involves the aircraft's payload-to-range capabilities. The original contract required MDC to produce a C-17 capable of carrying a 130,000 pound load to a distance of 3200 nautical miles (nm) without aerial refueling. This specification was chosen, first, because 3200 nm represents the average "longest leg" in most overseas airlift scenarios; and second, because the heaviest piece of military equipment a C-17 would be expected to transport -- the M1-A2 tank in its "drive on/drive off" configuration -- weighs 129,000 pounds.

In flight tests to date, the C-17 has only demonstrated a capability to carry 93,000 pounds to this distance. Secretary Aspin proposes to relax the original contract standard from 130,000 pounds to 120,000 pounds. This means MDC will have to improve the aircraft's heavy lift capabilities significantly (i.e., from 93,000 to 120,000 pounds) if the company is to receive C-17 purchase orders beyond the 40 that DOD is now proposing to commit to buy. However, C-17 critics will seize on the fact that even if this improvement is achieved, the new standard means that the C-17 could not carry an M1-A2 tank to the originally specified range. As a result, on missions that involved airlifting this tank, the Air Force would have either to plan on more intermediate stops or arrange for air refueling. DOD maintains that this restriction "is not considered critical from a cost-effectiveness point of view, since air transport of M1s is a very small part of mobility planning."

Secretary Aspin notes that he believes "this settlement is attainable with MDC." The larger question is whether the compromise plan will be attainable with Congress. In consultations with the congressional defense committees over the last week, the new plan met with a mixed reaction. It is clear we have our work cut out for us if we are to persuade Congress to fund this program at the requested level.

RECOMMENDATION

A successful C-17 program provides a critical underpinning to our new "win-win, nearly simultaneously" strategy. Cancellation of the C-17 would result in substantial jobs losses in California (18,000) and elsewhere (25,500) and necessitate an urgent program to develop alternative airlift capabilities that could result in delays and higher costs. We recommend that you support Secretary Aspin's proposal.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Memo from Secretary Aspin



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

27 OCT 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The C-17 Aircraft Program

The C-17 is a modern military transport airplane, designed to move rapidly military personnel and equipment required for any contingency. The airplane is built by the McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corporation (MDC) in Long Beach California; currently 18,000 are employed in California and another 25,500 are employed by MDC and its principal subcontractors in other areas of the country.

The program has been plagued by cost over-runs, schedule slips, and technical problems since its launch in 1985. We believe there are three reasons for the program difficulties:

- (1) the disincentives for contract performance that arise when a fixed-price development contract goes over ceiling;
- (2) the lack of adequate management and technical attention by MDC; and
- (3) poor program management by the Air Force.

Present plans call for purchase of about 120 C-17s at a unit cost of over \$300 million per aircraft. Over \$9 billion has been spent so far. There has been significant Congressional opposition to continuation of the C-17 program, and since the C-17 is the largest acquisition program in the DOD five-year program there is a temptation to cancel the program.

However, the "Bottom-up" Review confirmed the critical need for modern airlift capability to prevail in Major Regional Conflicts. If the C-17 were to be cancelled, there would be an urgent need to embark on an alternative military transport program that could ultimately prove more costly, delay the availability of much needed airlift, and result in job loss in California and elsewhere.

In May, I instructed John Deutch, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, to undertake a complete review of the program. This

review included a "Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis" (COEA) that systematically examined alternative mixes of aircraft for providing the needed airlift. It also included the report of an independent Defense Science Board task force of government and industry experts to identify measures needed to make the C-17 program work. John has made recommendations to me that I believe are sensible from all points of view.

The analysis leads us to a comprehensive approach both to meeting the airlift requirement and dealing with the program and business aspects of the C-17 situation that is not "business as usual." Here are the specifics.

Our critical need is the ability to deliver to austere and often congested airfields enough of the very large pieces of cargo we would need in the early days of a major regional conflict. To meet this mission we examined every conceivable mix of airlift aircraft types, including the C-17, C-5B, C-141 service life extension, and various commercial wide body aircraft like 747s and DC-10s. Our analysis shows that the optimum solution would be a fleet of about 120 C-17s, assuming the aircraft work according to specifications and don't cost too much. But the analysis also shows that a mixed fleet of C-17s and commercial wide body aircraft can reasonably meet the military requirement. It is this latter point that gives us the flexibility we need to bring this matter to a successful conclusion.

Our strategy would be to continue the C-17 program for a two-year interim period at the current production rate of six aircraft per year until key performance and program milestones could be demonstrated. For example, we need to complete flight testing and determine the reliability and maintainability of the C-17 to see if the aircraft can live up to the kind of performance that would justify buying up to 120 units. Similarly, we need to be assured that cost and schedule are within control before committing to large numbers of C-17s.

At the interim production rate of six aircraft per year, the government would commit to less than the minimum number of C-17s indicated in the analysis of the mixed fleet airlift solution. Additionally, we will get the information we need between now and November 1995 to make the right decision about buying more C-17s than in this mixed fleet.

To make this happen we need to fix what's broken in this program, beginning with creating incentives for success. A comprehensive settlement of all outstanding contract and management issues with MDC is the critical element here. Under this settlement:

(1) MDC would drop \$1.2 billion in potential claims against the government.

(2) MDC would make new expenditures of about \$456 million, under which they would complete flight testing and make management and technical improvements in the program. There would be no change in the aircraft delivery schedule.

(3) The government would make new expenditures of \$348 million, including \$237 million to settle outstanding claims, and to cover its portion of the flight test program.


(4) The government would significantly relax some performance specifications that the C-17 cannot meet, but that do not compromise its operational requirements.

We believe this settlement is attainable with MDC. It requires certain congressional authorizations, as well as additional appropriated funds.

Substantial changes were also needed in Air Force management of this program. They have been made. We will continue to monitor management closely.

As to incentives for MDC, if they can make this program successful in terms of cost, schedule and aircraft performance, they can anticipate favorable consideration of a profitable, multi-year contract for the larger number of C-17s our analysis shows is preferable.

To summarize: Our need for airlift is great. Analysis shows there are different mixes of aircraft types that could meet our needs, with the C-17 being key to all of them. Our proposed settlement gives MDC every incentive to get this program on track, but doesn't commit us to buying more C-17s before we are able to make the right choices. This is not a bailout of MDC; to the contrary, it's the best solution to getting the airlift we need at the least cost to the taxpayer.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "W. Aspin". The signature is written over the bottom portion of the text block.

Pentagon Cuts Order for C-17 Planes, Tells McDonnell to Boost Performance

By THOMAS E. RICKS
And JEFF COLE

Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon plans to buy only about 40 C-17 military cargo aircraft for now, and will then cancel the controversial program if McDonnell Douglas Corp. doesn't improve its performance, several congressional and Pentagon aides said.

The 40 planes would be one-third of the 120 aircraft the Pentagon has been planning to buy for \$40 billion.

In addition, the Pentagon is contemplating making a \$400 million payment to McDonnell Douglas if the company in turn agrees not to file most of the \$1.6 billion in claims it had threatened to seek against the government. Negotiations to resolve the claims are expected to be concluded by the middle of next month, when the Pentagon's Defense Acquisition Board will meet to complete plans for the future of the program, according to a defense official familiar with the situation.

To make the \$400 million payment more palatable to congressional opponents of the C-17, the Pentagon plans to attach several strings to it, such as requiring that it be used to make manufacturing improvements at the company's plant in Long Beach, Calif.

Finally, aides said, the government is likely to accept for the most part the company's claim that the wings of the C-17, which have buckled twice in tests, have substantially met their contractual requirements.

A Concrete Indication

The changes in the C-17 program are significant not only because they address the Pentagon's single most nettlesome acquisition problem, but also because they provide some concrete indication of how the Clinton administration hopes to reform defense acquisition. Most notably, said one Defense Department official, the package builds in incentives to reward the company for improved performance, as well as imposing the traditional penalties for failure.

John Deutch, the Pentagon's top acquisition official, told members of Congress in several closed briefings this week that he wants to adopt a "carrot-and-stick" approach to the C-17 program, aides said. The "carrots" would be the \$400 million payment and a promise to extend the program if the company's manufacturing performance improves. The "stick" is the threat to cancel the program as soon as it is cost-effective to do so, Mr. Deutch said.

It wouldn't be economical to cancel the program now, but cost-effectiveness would be reached by producing about 40 aircraft, Mr. Deutch told members of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees this week. Roughly 20 aircraft already are in production, so producing six a year for three more years would place the termination point in early 1997.



Congressional aides were quick to point out that Mr. Deutch's proposed schedule would put the ultimate decision after the 1996 presidential and congressional elections. They noted that sinking the program and the thousands of manufacturing jobs it supports in Southern California would be far easier then. The Southern California economy already has been socked by defense cutbacks, and capturing the state is believed to be crucial if the Democrats are to hold on to the White House in 1996.

The defense official conceded that the Pentagon is aware of the jobs problem, but denied that the production schedule was determined by politics. Rather, he argued, the schedule will be determined by how well McDonnell Douglas meets a variety of performance guideposts the Pentagon plans to establish.

The number of planes produced "could be more than 40," he said. "It depends on how they [McDonnell Douglas] perform. That will determine the mix between C-17 and some alternatives — wide-body commercials or C-5s." As reported, the Air Force has looked into hedging the C-17 program by purchasing Boeing Co. 747 freighters and other big cargo jets.

Congressional staffers differed over whether Congress will go along with Mr. Deutch's plan. McDonnell Douglas has few fans on Capitol Hill. But pro-defense Republicans are swayed by the military's argument that strategic airlift is badly needed. And objections of many Democrats who would like to see the defense budget cut are muted by concerns about jobs.

'The Optimum Plan'

Rep. Joe Skeen (R., N.M.), who tracks the C-17 for the House defense appropriations subcommittee, said he expects Congress to approve the plan. "The number of aircraft keeps them in business, but it puts the burden on McDonnell to perform," he said. "It's the optimum plan."

Some in Congress may attempt to impose a ceiling on the per-plane cost of the C-17. The unit cost is currently estimated at about \$330 million, but that will rise if the production run is curtailed.

Even if Congress does approve the revamped C-17 program, McDonnell Douglas could face problems elsewhere in Washington. The enforcement staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission is still looking into the company's financial disclosures, and expects to take some action by year end, a congressional aide said. Laura Singer, an SEC enforcement attorney involved in the investigation, declined to comment, as did a company executive.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Anne Witkowsky. Subject: Use of Open Skies.... Record ID: 9321228. (2 pages)	11/02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 48

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4497

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. draft	[Presidential Review Directive on Expanding the Open Skies Treaty]. Record ID: 9321228. (7 pages)	11/02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 48

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F

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21241

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 3, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN *SAA*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of November 1, 1993 DC
Meeting on U.S. Policy on CTB Monitoring and
Verification

Attached for your review is the "Summary of Conclusions" from the November 1, 1993 Deputies Committee meeting on U.S. Policy on CTB monitoring and verification.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the attached Summary of Conclusions at Tab I and authorize William Itoh to sign the memorandum to his counterparts at Tab II.

Attachments

Tab I Summary of Conclusions
Tab II Memorandum to Itoh Counterparts

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VZ* NARA, Date *10/3/2016*
2016-0152-F

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee Meeting, November 1, 1993. Record ID: 9321241. (3 pages)	11/03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 48

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - November 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4497

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~SECRET~~

21241

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. ANN LAVIN
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of Energy

MR. JOHN A LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COLONEL T. R. PATRICK
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. BARBARA STARR
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of DC Meeting on U.S.
Policy on CTB Monitoring and Verification (S)

The attached is for deputies eyes only. The summary of
conclusions attached is for the DC meeting which was held on
November 1, 1993 in the Situation Room from 4:00 - 5:00 PM. (S)

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Summary of Conclusions (S)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 10/2/19
2016-0152 F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

November 3, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM:

ROBERT BELL *RGB*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Response to Larry Joyce

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President requesting that he sign the letter at Tab A in response to Mr. Larry Joyce (Tab B), whose son was killed in Somalia.

Concurrence: Richard ^{*RAC*} Clarke

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Proposed Letter to Larry Joyce
Tab B	Incoming Letter from Larry Joyce

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
SUBJECT: Letter to Larry Joyce

Purpose

To respond to Larry Joyce, a Senior Vice President at the AMA, and father of Sgt James Casey Joyce, who was killed in Somalia.

Background

John Podesta has already sent you the letter from Mr. Joyce. Attached at Tab A is a proposed reply.

If you decide to attend the November 8 Memorial Service at Fort Benning, you may meet Mr. Joyce on that occasion. For that reason, the text of your proposed reply to Mr. Joyce leaves open the question of whether you will phone him, as he requests.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Mr. Joyce at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Incoming Correspondence

cc: The Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Joyce:

I was profoundly touched by your letter concerning the death of your son, Sergeant James Casey Joyce, which I received today. Your eulogy to Casey at the service in Plano moved me deeply and spoke volumes of the character and uniqueness of this man, your son, who died too young.

As you may know, a few days after Casey was killed in Somalia I wrote Deanna and told her of my respect for his courage and his commitment to the ideals on which America was founded. I also mentioned the lives of the hundreds of thousands of Somalis that were preserved due to his efforts, and those of his fellow servicemen and servicewomen, in that desperately poor and suffering nation.

In your letter the pride you felt so keenly in his being a Ranger is manifest. In my remarks to the American people last month on our nation's military involvement in Somalia, I described the heroic ethic of Casey and the rest of the 3/75th Ranger Battalion. When the first Black Hawk helicopter was downed, they stayed with their comrades. They didn't retreat. They held their ground for hours under intensely heavy fire. Their bravery under fire will long be remembered in the annals of American military history.

I would expect that hardly a moment goes by when Casey is not on your mind. But as the 3/75th Ranger Battalion prepares for its memorial service at Fort Benning next week, I know you will think of him all the more. On this occasion, I again want to express my profound sympathy to you, to Gail, to Deanna and to all those who knew and loved Casey. I sincerely believe his death will not have been in vain.

I hope there will be an opportunity to talk to you soon.

Sincerely,

Mr. Larry E. Joyce
2219 North Orchard Street
Chicago, Illinois 60614

8623

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 3, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN PODESTA *JP*
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM LARRY JOYCE

Attached is a letter from Larry Joyce whose son was killed in Somalia. Mr. Joyce is a senior Vice President at the AMA. This letter was delivered (sealed) in a round-about way through the AMA's Washington office.

Mr. Joyce appeared on "Larry King" prior to writing this letter where he attacked Secretary Aspin, but was respectful of you.

 He has included his number and would clearly like a phone call from you. I will have a letter for your signature prepared today, but since its taken awhile for this letter to get here, I wanted you to see it as soon as possible.

LARRY & GAIL JOYCE

2219 North Orchard Street
Chicago, Illinois 60614
312-871-2565

October 22, 1993

Dear President Clinton:

My son, Sergeant James Casey Joyce, was one of the "Unfortunate losses" you referred to in your recent interview with Chicago reporters while speaking about the October 3 Ambush of Army Rangers in Mogadishu. I'm enclosing a picture of Casey and a copy of the eulogy I gave him at one of his services. I gave the eulogy because he had requested it. I'm enclosing it now so you can put a human face on at least one of the "Unfortunate losses."

It's important to us that you know, as you read this, that my wife and I voted for you but have no party affiliation. We pray for your success because the nation's success is dependent upon yours. I also want you to know I have never written any of your predecessors.

As a 20-year Army Veteran with two combat tours in Vietnam, I struggled with my feelings about your early views concerning our involvement in Vietnam. However, I was able to rationalize your protest because I, too, had come to understand the futility of our vague and misguided policy regarding Vietnam. Now, I'm struck by the irony of your public statement about American interests in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia which sound very much like the ill-fate

Obviously, the death of my U.S. Army Ranger son has heightened my interest in how our military is used to enforce American foreign policy.

As you may know, I have been openly critical of your choice for Secretary of Defense, but he is not the focus of this letter. Rather I'm writing to implore you to order an investigation about what went wrong in Somalia, and why, so we don't create another disaster.

My concern is not for retribution -- although I do believe those who were responsible for the October 3 tragedy should be held accountable. But it's essential that we use the knowledge this investigation will generate so future debacles can be avoided.

In the 33 years I've been associated with the United States Army, I can say, unequivocally, that we now have the best-educated, best-trained, best-led, most highly dedicated and motivated Soldiers I've ever seen. They are a national treasure. The men and women who serve in the defense of our nation -- at great personal sacrifice -- deserve dedicated and competent civilian leaders. Mr. President, please use Somalia as the catalyst to put that side of your administration in order.

I have talked to the families who,

talked to the wounded and their families. I talked to active duty and retired Soldiers of all ranks. I don't profess to be their representative but I believe I can help you understand their feelings -- including their apprehensions and their aspirations. I hope you will agree to meet with me soon, face-to-face. I promise that it will be a step in the right direction.

Respectfully yours,
Gary E. Joyner

Enclosures

P.S. My office number is 312-464-4311

**CASEY'S EULOGY
CHRIST UNITED METHODIST CHURCH
PLANO, TEXAS
OCTOBER 9, 1993**

LATE IN THE SUMMER OF 1969, NEIL ARMSTRONG STEPPED ON THE MOON, HURRICANE CAMILLE BATTERED THE GULF COAST, AND GOD GAVE US JAMES CASEY JOYCE.

JAMES IS A FAMILY NAME -- MY GRANDFATHER'S. CASEY IS A NAME I PICKED OFF A LITTLE LEAGUE BASEBALL PLAYER'S UNIFORM. I JUST THOUGHT IT WAS A UNIQUE NAME AND HOPED AND PRAYED THAT WE WOULD HAVE A BOY SO WE COULD CALL HIM CASEY. IT WAS A GOOD CHOICE. CASEY WAS SUCH A UNIQUE AND SPECIAL BOY. HE WAS A CLEVER, DETERMINED AND HAPPY CHILD WHO LITERALLY BEAMED WITH PERSONALITY.

HE WAS THE MOST EXPERIENCED LITTLE LEAGUE FOOTBALL MASCOT EVER -- FIVE TEAMS IN SEVEN YEARS. AND WHEN HE RETRIEVED THE KICKING TEE, HE COULD ALWAYS FIND A MUD PUDDLE TO FALL IN ON HIS WAY BACK TO THE SIDELINE.

DAVEY'S EULOGY
DALLAS, TEXAS
PAGE 2

AS HE GREW INTO HIS TEENS, HIS SENSITIVITY AND HIS ENDURING LOVE OF HISTORY, LITERATURE, AND FOOTBALL -- ESPECIALLY FOR THE COWBOYS -- WERE INGRAINED. AS HE MATURED INTO MANHOOD, HIS DISTINCTIVE LEADERSHIP TRAITS BEGAN TO EMERGE, AND HE HAD A MARVELOUS, AND SOMETIMES DEVILISH, SENSE OF HUMOR. HE LOVED TO LAUGH AND MAKE OTHERS LAUGH. WE LOVED TO LAUGH TOGETHER.

HE HAD UNIMPEACHABLE STANDARDS AND ETHICS HIS ENTIRE LIFE. HE CHOSE HIS FRIENDS CAREFULLY, HE PUT A LOT OF STOCK INTO COMMITMENT. HE MADE THOSE COMMITMENTS HIMSELF AND EXPECTED OTHERS TO DO LIKEWISE. HE WAS A WONDERFUL, TRUE AND LOYAL FRIEND. I KNOW -- BECAUSE WE WERE NOT ONLY FATHER AND SON -- WE WERE CLOSE, CLOSE FRIENDS. WE DIDN'T EVEN HAVE TO TALK -- JUST OCCUPYING THE SAME SPACE WAS ENOUGH. AND THERE WERE THREE WORDS WE USED THOUSANDS OF TIMES -- THOSE THREE WORDS WERE I - LOVE - YOU.

MY ONLY CONSOLATION IS THAT HE KNEW HE WAS LOVED AND HE LOVED DEEPLY. HE AND DEANNA ARE STILL IN LOVE SO DEEPLY IT TRANSCENDS LIFE ITSELF.

HE HAD INCREDIBLY STRONG CHARACTER AND HE WAS UNABASHEDLY PATRIOTIC. HE LOVED GOD, HE LOVED HIS FAMILY, HIS FRIENDS AND HE LOVED HIS COUNTRY. AND HE LOVED BEING A U.S. ARMY RANGER BECAUSE HE WANTED TO BE AMONG THE VERY BEST. HE CHOSE THE MOST DIFFICULT ASSIGNMENT AND TRAINED INTENTLY AND WITH GREAT DETERMINATION UNTIL HE REACHED HIS GOAL. I DON'T THINK I COULD HAVE DONE WHAT HE DID.

IN BATTLE HE FOUGHT BRAVELY. HE DIED BRAVELY. I ONLY WISH I COULD HAVE FOUGHT IN HIS PLACE -- OR AT LEAST AT HIS SIDE. HE IS TRULY AN AMERICAN HERO. HE IS MY HERO. HE WAS STRONG IN EVERY SENSE OF THE WORD. AND HE RECEIVED HIS STRENGTH FROM ALL OF US AND WE'RE ALL STRONGER BECAUSE OF HIM.

HIS SPIRIT IS HERE NOW. HE IS WITH US. AND HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH US IS EPITOMIZED IN THE LAST VERSE OF RUDYARD KIPLING'S POEM "THE LAW OF THE JUNGLE:"

"AS THE CREEPER ENCIRCLES THE TREE TRUNK,
EVER WEAVING, FORWARD AND BACK,
SO THE STRENGTH OF THE PACK IS THE WOLF,

CASEY'S EULOGY
PLANO, TEXAS
PAGE 4

BUT THE STRENGTH OF THE WOLF IS THE PACK."

AND HE'S SAYING TO US NOW "WHETHER YOU'RE IN THIS FAMILY BY BIRTH, BY MARRIAGE, OR BY FRIENDSHIP, STAY TOGETHER. LOVE AND SUPPORT EACH OTHER." IN OTHER WORDS, "DON'T LEAVE THE PACK."