

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Chron File - October 1993 #2 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Defense Policy-Bell, Robert

Original OA/ID Number:

47

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
31	3	2	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For William Itoh from Keith Hahn. Subject: Significant Military Exercise SEAL BILAT 2-93. Record ID: 9308001. (1 page)	10/18/1993	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	For Executive Secretary, National Security Council. Subject: Significant Military Exercise - SEAL BILAT 2-93. (1 page)	10/14/1993	P1/b(1)
001c. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB) [Seal Bilat 2-93] (1 page)	10/07/1993	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	Duplicate of 001a. (2 pages)	10/18/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	Duplicate of 001b. (1 page)	10/14/1993	P1/b(1)
002c. cable	Duplicate of 001c. (1 page)	10/07/1993	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Steven Andreasen. Subject: Letter to Senate and House Appropriations Committee Regarding Funding....Record ID: 9308163. (1 page)	10/19/1993	P1/b(1)
003b. draft	Letter to Senator Robert Byrd. (1 page)	10/19/1993	P1/b(1)
003c. draft	Letter to Senator Mark Hatfield. (1 page)	10/19/1993	P1/b(1)
003d. draft	Letter to Representative John Murtha. (1 page)	10/19/1993	P1/b(1)
003e. draft	Letter to Representative Joseph McDade. (1 page)	10/19/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 47

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - October 1993 #2 [1]

2016-0152-F

vz4487

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	For Thomas McNamara et al. Subject: Debrief on Lab to Lab Discussions. (2 pages)	10/20/1993	P1/b(1)
005a. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB) [Fuentes Caminos 94] (2 pages)	09/29/1993	P1/b(1)
005b. cable	Duplicate of 005a. (2 pages)	09/29/1993	P1/b(1)
006a. letter	[Personally Identifiable Information] [partial] (2 pages)	10/06/1993	b(6)
006b. letter	To Sam Nunn. [partial] (1 page)	10/06/1993	b(6)

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COLLECTION:

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2016-0152-F

vz4487

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise SEAL BILAT 2-93

Military exercise SEAL BILAT 2-93 is approved.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	For Executive Secretary, National Security Council. Subject: Significant Military Exercise - SEAL BILAT 2-93. (1 page)	10/14/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 47

FOLDER TITLE:

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2016-0152-F

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COLLECTION:

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8083

October 19, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*

FROM: STEVEN R. JONES *C*

SUBJECT: OMB Revised Draft Bill on Polar Satellite
Convergence

OMB requests views on draft legislative language (Tab C) regarding polar environmental satellite convergence, which implements recommendations of the National Performance Review.

The NSC concurred with the original OMB draft language at Tab B. Based upon comments received from NOAA and NASA, OMB has circulated revised language which is more specific. The revised language and analysis directs Commerce, Defense and NASA to establish a "single civilian polar environmental and weather satellite system" rather than a "single polar environmental satellite system" as contained in the original draft. The revised draft also calls for an OSTP working group implementation plan by April 30, 1994 and directs the plan to result in savings of \$300 million in budget authority and \$254 million in outlays between FY 1994 and 1995.

We should object strongly to language that requires a single civilian system before the question is properly reviewed within the OSTP-led Convergence Working Group, in which I am representing the NSC. At stake is requiring environmental and weather data needed by warfighting CINCs to be furnished by a civilian agency prior to an interagency review to determine if our defense needs can be adequately met by this approach.

The inclusion of specific dates and dollar savings also prejudice the outcome of the OSTP-led working group. DoD and OSTP also object to the addition of these restrictive legislative requirements.

Concurrence by: Jeremy Rosner *JR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to OMB
Tab II Previous OMB Language and NSC Concurrence
Tab III Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES J. JUKES

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: OMB Revised Draft Bill on Polar Satellite
Convergence (D-451, Draft 408)

The NSC does not concur with the subject revisions made to the draft legislative language on polar satellite convergence. The revised language is overly-restrictive and completely prejudices the results of the current OSTP-led Convergence Working Group, in which the NSC is participating. The NSC requests that OMB use the original draft language that we previously cleared (LRM D-439) in our October 15, 1994 memo to you.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 15, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES J. JUKES

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITO 

SUBJECT: OMB Draft Bill on Polar Satellite Convergence

The NSC concurs in the draft legislative language regarding polar satellite convergence.

Draft bill language:

"The Departments of Commerce and Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration are authorized to establish a single polar environmental satellite system, which meets national needs."

Draft description:

The Departments of Commerce and Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration have formed a Steering Committee to address and recommend options for consolidation of polar environmental satellite systems. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) will conduct an interagency review of the plans for consolidation.

The goal is to achieve a long-range vision for an integrated program that meets national needs. The OSTP review will identify implementation options and documentation for the transition from existing programs to the recommended options. This legislation will enable those plans to be implemented as soon as they are completed.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

October 18, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #D-451
DRAFT #408

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

COMMERCE - Michael A. Levitt - (202)482-3086 - 324
DEFENSE - Samuel T. Brick, Jr. - (703)697-1305 - 325
NASA - Jeff Lawrence - (202)358-1948 - 219
NEC - Sonia Mathews - (202)456-6722 - 429
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)395-3723 - 249
OSTP - Chris Clary - (202)456-7116 - 288

FROM: JAMES J. JUKES (for) *JJ*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: Jeffrey WEINBERG (395-3457)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-3454

SUBJECT: OMB Draft Bill Polar satellites convergence

DEADLINE: 3PM October 19, 1993

COMMENTS: This is a revised version of the draft bill that was circulated on Oct. 13th.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the the "pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:

Howard Paster
Rich DalBello
Greg Simon
Elaine Kamarck
Margaret Yao
Bill Halter
Jennifer Palmieri
Ken Schwartz
Cora Beebe

Jeff Payne
Don Gessaman
Arnie Donahue
Tony Wu
Kathy Peroff
Jack Fellows
Sarah Horrigan

You may also respond by (1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail if the analyst does not answer); (2) sending us a memo or letter; or (3) if you are an OASIS user in the Executive Office of the President, sending an E-mail message. Please include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.

FROM: _____ (Date)
 _____ (Name)
 _____ (Agency)
 _____ (Telephone)

The following is the response of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:

_____ Concur

_____ No objection

_____ No comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _____

_____ Other: _____

_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this
_____ response sheet

DRAFT

10/18/93

[NOTE: The following language will be Title II of an omnibus bill implementing various recommendations of the National Performance Review.]

TITLE II -- POLAR SATELLITE CONVERGENCE

SEC. 201. POLAR SATELLITE CONVERGENCE.

The Departments of Commerce and Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall establish a single civilian polar environmental and weather satellite system, which meets national needs. A detailed implementation plan shall be submitted to Congress by the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, in consultation with the Departments of Commerce and Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, by April 30, 1994. The plan shall be designed to result in savings of \$300 million in budget authority and \$254 million in outlays between fiscal years 1994 and 1999.

[INSERT FOR SECTIONAL ANALYSIS]

SEC. 201. POLAR SATELLITE CONVERGENCE.

This section would require the Departments of Commerce and Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to establish a single civilian polar environmental and weather satellite program, which meets national needs. The three agencies have formed a steering committee to recommend options for the consolidation of the Commerce and Defense polar orbiting weather satellite systems and appropriate aspects of NASA's EOS-PM spacecraft series. The Office of Science and Technology Policy will conduct an interagency review of the plans for consolidation and submit a detailed operating plan to Congress by April 30, 1994. The plan will be designed to result in savings of \$300 million in budget authority and \$254 million in outlays from currently projected levels between fiscal years 1994 and 1999.

Aug: E

21163

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 18, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY SODERBERG

THROUGH: J. ROBERT MANZANARES

FROM: ROBERT BELL *RB*

SUBJECT: Travel Request for Keith Hahn to London, England,
November 1-5, 1993

Request travel to London, England, November 1-5 for Keith Hahn to participate as a member of the U.S. delegation to the U.S./Russian Bilateral Maritime Negotiations, Law of the Sea discussions and Major Maritime Powers conference. The following major items will be addressed by this delegation:

- Bilateral negotiations will be conducted with the Russian delegation on November 1-2. We are hoping to codify the agreements worked out (but never signed) with the Soviet Union at Jackson Hole in 1989 regarding the definition of territorial waters (specifically in the North Sea where submarines collided earlier this year). Russians appear ready to sign.
- We will meet with the other Major Maritime Powers (U.K., France, Germany, Japan and Russia) on November 3 to discuss strategy for ratification of the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention. Three states (St. Vincent, Honduras and Barbados) recently ratified the LOS Convention, bringing the total to 59. We expect a rush to be #60. By its terms, the LOS Convention will come into force one year after the 60th ratification. We will attempt to find ways to accelerate activity to "fix" the seabed mining provisions that are keeping us from ratifying the Convention.
- The formal Major Maritime Powers meeting will take place November 4-5 and will address the following issue areas: Territorial Seas (such as North Korean declaration of a 50 n.m. military zone); International Straits; Archipelagic States declarations; Exclusive Economic Zones; Continental Shelf; High Seas (including Freedom of Navigation and alien smuggling issues); and Marine Environment (including radiological waste disposal).

Keith Hahn participated in the last Major Maritime Powers meeting held in Washington, D.C. last November.

The trip will incur no cost to the NSC.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the travel authorization form at Tab I and memo to Marc Grossman at Tab II.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Travel Authorization Form
Tab II Memo to State Department

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: KEITH HAHN
2. PURPOSE/EVENT (Include Dates): Travel to London, England,
1-5 November, to participate as a member of the U.S.
delegation to the U.S./Russian Bilateral Maritime
Negotiations
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): _____

4. DEPARTURE DATE 11/1 RETURN DATE 11/5
DEPARTURE TIME _____ RETURN TIME _____
5. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOVT. AIR _____ COMMERCIAL AIR x POV _____ RAIL _____
OTHER _____
6. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION _____ PER DIEM _____ OTHER _____
TOTAL _____
7. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC _____ OTHER x
IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: _____
DoD Blanket Travel Orders
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO x
IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid By
Traveler, Describe Source & Arrangements): _____

9. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ 0
10. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You
Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): _____

11. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: K. Hahn
12. APPROVALS: Senior Director Robert A. Bell
Director of Administration _____
Executive Secretary _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: NSC Staff Foreign Travel

NSC Staff Member: Keith D. Hahn
Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control

Purpose of Travel: To participate as a member of the U.S.
delegation to the U.S./Russian Bilateral
Maritime Negotiations.

ITINERARY

<u>Date</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Major Event/Meeting</u>
1-5 November	London	England	Attend meetings

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 18, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY SODERBERG

THROUGH: J. ROBERT MANZANARES

FROM: ROBERT BELL *RB*

SUBJECT: Travel Request for Keith Hahn to London, England,
November 1-5, 1993

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Approve _____

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Negotiations
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): _____
4. DEPARTURE DATE 11/1 RETURN DATE 11/5
DEPARTURE TIME _____ RETURN TIME _____
5. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOVT. AIR _____ COMMERCIAL AIR x POV _____ RAIL _____
OTHER _____
6. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION _____ PER DIEM _____ OTHER _____
TOTAL _____
7. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC _____ OTHER x
IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: _____
DoD Blanket Travel Orders
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO x
IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid By
Traveler, Describe Source & Arrangements): _____
9. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ 0
10. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You
Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): _____
11. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: K. S. Hahn
12. APPROVALS: Senior Director Robert A. Bell
Director of Administration _____
Executive Secretary _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: NSC Staff Foreign Travel

NSC Staff Member: Keith D. Hahn
Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control

Purpose of Travel: To participate as a member of the U.S.
delegation to the U.S./Russian Bilateral
Maritime Negotiations.

ITINERARY

<u>Date</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Major Event/Meeting</u>
1-5 November	London	England	Attend meetings

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

07 223951185

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ACTIVITY REPORT

TRANSMISSION OK

FILE	8834
CON TEL	92283780
SECTION ID	10
START TIME	10 10 10
END TIME	01
PAGES	2 00

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10/19/93 16:10 223951185

001

ACTIVITY REPORT

TRANSMISSION OK

TX/RX NO.	8835
CONNECTION TEL	92283760
CONNECTION ID	G3
START TIME	10/19 16:09
USAGE TIME	01'22
PAGES	2/002

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION

DeBokes
224 - 7530

FAX -

Urgent
Rick DeBokes
SASC
FAX# 228-3780

UNCLASSIFIED URGENT
FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

FROM: Rob Bell
PHONE: (202) 395-3330
FAX: 395-1185

TO	FAX	PHONE
<u>Rich DeBobis</u>	<u>228-3780</u>	<u>224-7530</u>

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET 2

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: _____

UNCLASSIFIED

URGENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 19, 1993

TO: Senator Nunn
c/o Rick DeBobes

FROM: Bob Bell *RBB*
NSC/Defense Policy & Arms Control

SUBJ: Tactical Control at the Battle of Yorktown

During the battle of Yorktown, a combined American/French force under the overall operational command of General George Washington fought the British under General Cornwallis. Washington's French counterpart was General Rochambeau. During the seige, an increasingly desperate Cornwallis ordered the British cavalry to attempt a break-out. Washington placed American infantry under the tactical control of a French cavalry commander to repulse the breakout. The French-led tactical counterattack defeated the British cavalry, Cornwallis was stuck under seige and later surrendered, and the United States won its independence.

Had something along the lines of the Nickles amendment been enacted by the Continental Congress, General Washington would have had to have said to Rochambeau: "General, your troops can die under the command of my generals but my Congress says my troops cannot fight under the tactical control of your generals. You'll just have to try to repulse that British break-out on your own."

Two footnotes:

More than a century and a half after Yorktown, a grateful USA named the 14th Street bridge across the Potomac the Rochambeau bridge.

A little more than two centuries after Yorktown, the United States placed a brigade of the 82d Airborne under the tactical control of the French 11th Light Infantry in Operation Desert Storm. The combined US/French force was assigned a military objective to seize during the ground campaign against Iraqi forces. The name given this military objective: "Rochambeau". This was in commemoration of the success of the combined American/French operations at Yorktown.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9308083
RECEIVED: 18 OCT 93 20

TO: JUKES, J

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 19 OCT 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ENVIRONMENT
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

SCIENTIFIC

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: OMB REVISED DAFT BILL ON POLAR SATILLITE CONVERGENCE

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 19 OCT 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: JONES

LOGREF: 9307928

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
EXECSEC
JONES

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSASK

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 19, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES J. JUKES

FROM:

WILLIAM H. ITCHER 

SUBJECT:

OMB Revised Draft Bill on Polar Satellite
Convergence (D-451, Draft 408)

The NSC does not concur with the subject revisions made to the draft legislative language on polar satellite convergence. The revised language is overly-restrictive and completely prejudices the results of the current OSTP-led Convergence Working Group, in which the NSC is participating. The NSC requests that OMB use the original draft language that we previously cleared (LRM D-439) in our October 15, 1993 memo to you.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8083

October 19, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*
FROM: STEVEN R. JONES *SJR*
SUBJECT: OMB Revised Draft Bill on Polar Satellite
Convergence

OMB requests views on draft legislative language (Tab III) regarding polar environmental satellite convergence, which implements recommendations of the National Performance Review.

The NSC concurred with the original OMB draft language at Tab II. Based upon comments received from NOAA and NASA, OMB has circulated revised language which is more specific. The revised language and analysis directs Commerce, Defense and NASA to establish a "single civilian polar environmental and weather satellite system" rather than a "single polar environmental satellite system" as contained in the original draft. The revised draft also calls for an OSTP working group implementation plan by April 30, 1994 and directs the plan to result in savings of \$300 million in budget authority and \$254 million in outlays between FY 1994 and 1995.

We should object strongly to language that requires a single civilian system before the question is properly reviewed within the OSTP-led Convergence Working Group, in which I am representing the NSC. At stake is requiring environmental and weather data needed by warfighting CINCs to be furnished by a civilian agency prior to an interagency review to determine if our defense needs can be adequately met by this approach.

The inclusion of specific dates and dollar savings also prejudice the outcome of the OSTP-led working group. DoD and OSTP also object to the addition of these restrictive legislative requirements.

Concurrence by: Jeremy Rosner *JR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to OMB
Tab II Previous OMB Language and NSC Concurrence
Tab III Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 15, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES J. JUKES

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITO 

SUBJECT: OMB Draft Bill on Polar Satellite Convergence

The NSC concurs in the draft legislative language regarding polar satellite convergence.

Draft bill language:

"The Departments of Commerce and Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration are authorized to establish a single polar environmental satellite system, which meets national needs."

Draft description:

The Departments of Commerce and Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration have formed a Steering Committee to address and recommend options for consolidation of polar environmental satellite systems. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) will conduct an interagency review of the plans for consolidation.

The goal is to achieve a long-range vision for an integrated program that meets national needs. The OSTP review will identify implementation options and documentation for the transition from existing programs to the recommended options. This legislation will enable those plans to be implemented as soon as they are completed.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

October 18, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #D-451
DRAFT #408

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

COMMERCE - Michael A. Levitt - (202)482-3086 - 324
DEFENSE - Samuel T. Brick, Jr. - (703)697-1305 - 325
NASA - Jeff Lawrence - (202)358-1948 - 219
NEC - Sonia Mathews - (202)456-6722 - 429
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)395-3723 - 249
OSTP - Chris Clary - (202)456-7116 - 288

FROM: JAMES J. JUKES (for) *JJ*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: Jeffrey WEINBERG (395-3457)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-3454

SUBJECT: OMB Draft Bill Polar satellites convergence

DEADLINE: 3PM October 19, 1993

COMMENTS: This is a revised version of the draft bill that was circulated on Oct. 13th.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:

Howard Paster
Rich DalBello
Greg Simon
Elaine Kamarck
Margaret Yao
Bill Halter
Jennifer Palmieri
Ken Schwartz
Cora Beebe

Jeff Payne
Don Gessaman
Arnie Donahue
Tony Wu
Kathy Peroff
Jack Fellows
Sarah Horrigan

DRAFT

10/18/93

[NOTE: The following language will be Title II of an omnibus bill implementing various recommendations of the National Performance Review.]

TITLE II -- POLAR SATELLITE CONVERGENCE

SEC. 201. POLAR SATELLITE CONVERGENCE.

The Departments of Commerce and Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall establish a single civilian polar environmental and weather satellite system, which meets national needs. A detailed implementation plan shall be submitted to Congress by the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, in consultation with the Departments of Commerce and Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, by April 30, 1994. The plan shall be designed to result in savings of \$300 million in budget authority and \$254 million in outlays between fiscal years 1994 and 1999.

[INSERT FOR SECTIONAL ANALYSIS]

SEC. 201. POLAR SATELLITE CONVERGENCE.

This section would require the Departments of Commerce and Defense and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to establish a single civilian polar environmental and weather satellite program, which meets national needs. The three agencies have formed a steering committee to recommend options for the consolidation of the Commerce and Defense polar orbiting weather satellite systems and appropriate aspects of NASA's EOS-PM spacecraft series. The Office of Science and Technology Policy will conduct an interagency review of the plans for consolidation and submit a detailed operating plan to Congress by April 30, 1994. The plan will be designed to result in savings of \$300 million in budget authority and \$254 million in outlays from currently projected levels between fiscal years 1994 and 1999.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Duplicate of 001a. (2 pages)	10/18/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 47

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - October 1993 #2 [1]

2016-0152-F

vz4487

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 19, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise SEAL BILAT 2-93

Military exercise SEAL BILAT 2-93 is approved.


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	Duplicate of 001b. (1 page)	10/14/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 47

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - October 1993 #2 [1]

2016-0152-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. cable	Duplicate of 001c. (1 page)	10/07/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 47

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - October 1993 #2 [1]

2016-0152-F
vz4487

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Steven Andreasen. Subject: Letter to Senate and House Appropriations Committee Regarding Funding....Record ID: 9308163. (1 page)	10/19/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 47

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - October 1993 #2 [1]

2016-0152-F
vz4487

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. draft	Letter to Senator Robert Byrd. (1 page)	10/19/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 47

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - October 1993 #2 [1]

2016-0152-F

vz4487

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. draft	Letter to Senator Mark Hatfield. (1 page)	10/19/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 47

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - October 1993 #2 [1]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. draft	Letter to Representative John Murtha. (1 page)	10/19/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 47

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - October 1993 #2 [1]

2016-0152-F

vz4487

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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003e. draft	Letter to Representative Joseph McDade. (1 page)	10/19/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 47

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - October 1993 #2 [1]

2016-0152-F
vz4487

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	For Thomas McNamara et al. Subject: Debrief on Lab to Lab Discussions. (2 pages)	10/20/1993	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
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8142

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 20, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RGB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise FUERTES CAMINOS 94
SOUTH PHASES I & II

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, approving military exercise FUERTES CAMINOS 94 SOUTH PHASES I & II. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

FUERTES CAMINOS 94 SOUTH is a two phase engineering field training exercise consisting of the deployment, employment and redeployment of an engineering joint task force working together with host nation forces to build schools, clinics, conduct well drilling (in Paraguay only) and upgrading existing access roads in designed areas to support the exercise. Phase I will take place in the Department of Valle Del Cauca, Colombia January 15 - February 28. Phase II will take place in the Department of San Pedro, Paraguay May 16 - September 16. Approximately 200 personnel will be involved in Colombia and 450 involved in Paraguay.

in draft

Concurrence by: Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I approving the exercises.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab II OSD Executive Secretary Memorandum, October 19, 1993

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassification: OADP

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VR* NARA, Date *10/2/06*
2016-0152-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise FUERTES CAMINOS 94
SOUTH PHASES I & II

Military exercise FUERTES CAMINOS 94 SOUTH PHASES I & II are
approved.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8142



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301


19 OCT 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise -
FUERTES CAMINOS 94 SOUTH PHASES I & II

The Department of Defense recommends NSC approval of the attached Significant Military Exercise Brief, Exercise FUERTES CAMINOS 94 SOUTH, PHASES I (COLOMBIA) & II (PARAGUAY). The Department of State concurs with this recommendation.

Please note the critical cancellation date for PHASE I is 29 October 1993 and for PHASE II, 13 January 1994. Should you have any questions or comments the OSD action officers are Lt Col Stan Hoppe, (703)614-2616, or LTC(P) Clif Ripperger, (703)697-5454.


Robert P. McAleer
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

This memo is UNCLASSIFIED when separated from its attachment.

X62660

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB) [Fuertes Caminos 94] (2 pages)	09/29/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - October 1993 #2 [1]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. cable	Duplicate of 005a. (2 pages)	09/29/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 47

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - October 1993 #2 [1]

2016-0152-F

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DRAFT FOR EDITING ONLY

Please do not quote or cite

*Fixed To:
Jon Madushin
(707-7639)
10/20/93; cc to
Steve H. Also*

**The Moratorium on Nuclear Testing:
The Administration's Plan**

Edited transcript

Summary of a CRS seminar held July 19, 1993 (morning session)

In September 1992, Congress adopted an amendment by Senators Hatfield, Mitchell, and Exon to the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill (H.R. 5373) to impose limits on U.S. nuclear testing. The amendment mandated a moratorium on nuclear testing, permitted some tests after the moratorium ended but before September 30, 1996, and banned U.S. tests after that date unless another nation conducted a test. President Bush signed the measure into law (P.L. 102-377) in October 1992.

In the first half of 1993, there was extensive debate inside the Administration, in Congress, and outside of government, first on what tests to conduct and then on whether to resume testing. On July 3, 1993, President Clinton announced his decision to continue the moratorium at least through September 30, 1994, to seek tests before then if another nation tested, and to explore means of maintaining the U.S. nuclear stockpile without testing.

In response to congressional interest in this topic, the Congressional Research Service sponsored a seminar on July 19, 1993, to discuss the President's decision and its implications. This paper summarizes the morning session, which focused on the Administration's plan; a companion paper will summarize the afternoon session, which considered comprehensive test ban (CTB) issues.

and NSC Senior Director

Three panelists participated in the morning session: **Robert Bell**, Special Assistant to the President for Arms Control and Defense Policy, who is at the center of policymaking on this issue; **David Culp**, Legislative Coordinator for Plutonium Challenge, who has coordinated legislative efforts on behalf of the Hatfield amendment and a continuation of the moratorium; and **Frank Gaffney**, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Reagan Administration and now Director for the Center for Security Policy, who has taken the lead in arguing for a resumption of testing. The moderator was **Jonathan Medalia** of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of CRS.

Robert Bell: The Administration based its review in early 1993 on the *assumption* ~~view~~ that there was a consensus within Congress that the Hatfield amendment should stand as written, and not be challenged from the right or left. So, the Hatfield amendment was used to guide the Administration's review of policy. *Within this le-*
parameter, Views and alternatives would be considered within the Administration, and the President would balance them and make a final decision.

On the pro-testing side of the ledger, the Administration viewed the balance between views as follows. The amendment allowed 15 tests, of which three could be British tests that would be used to improve gravity bombs and to preserve the option for a safety improvement for their Trident warhead. Despite ~~some~~ criticism of those tests, they were important to the British and had to be given weight. The law permitted ^{also} U.S. reliability tests. While some questioned the need for them after perhaps 1,000 U.S. nuclear tests, few of those tests dealt with the reliability of warheads that would continue into the next century. This was a marginal issue, because we have high confidence in our warheads, which will persist at least 10 years into the future. At issue was how to maintain confidence beyond that. Very few tests have been done of the reliability of production-line warheads, especially when contrasted to the many reliability tests of deployed ballistic missiles. There is an argument to take one last postdeployment test of ^{the three warheads} ~~warheads~~ that will be the backbone of the future U.S. deterrent.

of improvements of reliability on the margins

For both the Administration and Congress, though, the most important argument for more testing was for safety improvements. While U.S. warheads are fundamentally safe, the issue is that if this is the last series of tests, are there any areas where we could make safety improvements? Two were considered: SLBM warheads and cruise missile warheads. The Navy has been reluctant to ^{make safety improvements to its} ~~conduct safety tests of~~ SLBM warheads for several reasons: it would cost several billion dollars to make the needed changes; system performance would decline somewhat; and there could be reliability costs of replacing a proven warhead with one that, while perhaps safer, could never be tested in a postdeployment configuration. The Navy also felt that it could compensate for any safety problems with improved handling procedures.

Regarding the cruise missile warhead, the safety concern was not hypothetical: if the warhead were engulfed in flames in an aircraft fire, the warhead's high explosive could detonate, scattering plutonium. However, the bombers are not on alert, so the scenario could not now happen. The scenario required an assumption that it was worth hedging against a situation in which the situation in Russia had deteriorated so much that it was worthwhile to put bombers back on alert. Even under that assumption, there was not convincing evidence that switching the old warheads for new was ^{cost-effective} ~~worth doing~~ -- except at the time when these warheads would have to be replaced anyway because they were at the end of their service lives. As a hedge against a resumption of the cold war and with a requirement to change warheads at the end of their service lives, a cost-benefit analysis [as required by the Hatfield amendment] does support making that change. ^{then} This change would happen perhaps a decade from now, but if there is going to be a CTB, the tests would have to be done now. Accordingly, the test option looked at nine tests: three for the British, three for reliability, and three for a cruise missile warhead.

The pro-test side of the ledger also contained broader considerations. One had to do with test ban readiness. While the Department of Energy never took seriously congressional efforts to promote test ban readiness, the Hatfield amendment provided opportunities to do experiments adjunct to the main purposes of permitted tests that would have helped maintain stockpile confidence

under a CTB. Another concern had to do with the politics of ratification of a CTB. Given the need for a two-thirds majority, the Administration must be able to make the case when a treaty is up for Senate advice and consent that it did everything it could to prepare prudently for a CTB. There is also an issue of what sort of transition there should be for changing the focus of the labs and the test site from testing to using other means to maintain warheads.

On the anti-testing side of the ledger was the concern over the impact of resumed testing on U.S. nonproliferation goals. The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is scheduled for a major review in 1995, and a resumption of testing would affect that review. Within the Administration, the debate was whether resumed testing would cripple the chances of meeting U.S. objectives in the review conference, or whether it would severely erode those chances. One could argue that there should be no link between NPT and CTB; that the U.S. has made great progress in arms control, including great steps to reduce our nuclear arsenal; and that those steps should meet the world's requirements for an indefinite extension of the NPT. The reality, though, is that extending the moratorium on testing appears to be a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for securing NPT extension. Resumed testing would also complicate negotiations on a CTB. Finally, many bilateral considerations, such as with India, Pakistan, Ukraine, and North Korea, would be strengthened by not testing.

Weighing these considerations, the President decided that testing would help prepare for a CTB and would promote improvements in safety and reliability. But he decided that the costs of testing outweighed its benefits. A worldwide moratorium would put us in the best position to secure NPT extension and negotiate a CTB. If another nation tests, though, the President has stated he will direct DOE to prepare to resume testing, which will require congressional approval under the Hatfield amendment. In the Hatfield report due March 1, 1994, the Administration will indicate whether it plans any tests for FY1995. That decision will reflect several factors, notably progress toward a CTB.

David Culp: I work for Plutonium Challenge, a coalition of national arms control and environmental groups, but my remarks today are my own. Plutonium Challenge supports the President's decision as good for nonproliferation. Since then, the Russians and French have extended their moratoria, and the British have said they could live with the U.S. moratorium. The Chinese position is unclear. In his July 3 speech, the President said the current arsenal is safe and reliable, a judgment made after months of debate. If another nation breaks the moratorium, Clinton said he would ask DOE to prepare to conduct tests and would submit a request to test to Congress, which is not a categorical statement that we would resume testing. The U.S. would clearly respond if Russia resumed, there would be little justification for responding if France resumed, and China would be somewhere in the middle. Clinton made three points regarding DOE: it is to maintain a capability to resume testing; it is to develop methods to maintain safety and reliability other than through underground testing; and the Administration will shift funds at the DOE national laboratories from weapons testing to nonproliferation and arms control.

the prospects of achieving agreement on an indefinite extension of the NPT.

What will the Chinese do over the next 15 months? On the one hand, French SPOT satellite photos show the Chinese are making preparations at their nuclear test site for another test, perhaps as soon as September. Chinese weapons scientists also told a group of American arms control experts six weeks ago that they want to continue testing. On the other hand, China is trying to get the Olympics in 2000 scheduled in Beijing, a decision to be made this fall. That's a strong disincentive for them to resume testing. The U.S. has a \$25 billion trade deficit with China; exports to the U.S. are an important factor for the Chinese leadership. There would also be a strong international outrage if China resumed testing. As a result, I think China will not resume testing. They are probably having the same political debate that is happening here, in Russia, and in France: the weapons scientists in those countries want to resume testing, but the political leadership has resisted it and endorsed a moratorium. I think that Members of Congress, private organizations, and others should push the Chinese not to resume testing. It's important to start negotiations quickly. It will be difficult for them to test in the middle of negotiations.

When will the negotiations start? It's important for the Administration to appoint a negotiator. John Holum has been announced as the new director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, but he may not be confirmed until February. The Administration should not wait for that to happen, but should proceed with a CTB negotiator so negotiations can proceed.

The President's decision also has implications for the budget. The energy and water development appropriations bill, as passed in the House before the President's speech, cut the Administration's request for nuclear weapons research, development, and testing budget for FY1994. The FY1993 budget for nuclear testing is \$419 million; the FY1994 request was \$462 million; and the House figure is \$404 million. Since that was passed before the President's July 3 speech, I think that the \$404 million is the high water mark. The Administration is preparing an amendment for the weapons research, development, and testing budget, and apparently will propose \$404 million, with the remaining money directed away from the testing program and toward some other capabilities, such as hydronuclear experiments, inertial confinement fusion, construction of a larger facility for weapons effects testing, enhanced computer technology. This program would continue over a number of years.

The House and Senate will consider several amendments on nuclear testing. One is to eliminate "mininukes," or very low yield nuclear weapons to destroy airbases or underground command centers of third world countries. Congress has firmly rejected the concept of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states, and I think Congress will eliminate funding for this program. Another amendment will be to delete funds for aboveground nuclear testing, or "Safeguard C," which relates to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. The third amendment relates to \$57 million in the Defense Nuclear Agency for a weapons effects test, which the Hatfield amendment clearly prohibits. More important for the weapons labs is what will happen to the weapons research, development, and testing budget over the next couple of years. I think there's a willingness to see a glide-down for these facilities. I question a couple of these facilities. One is the facility for hydronuclear testing, which will allow DOE to conduct

small-yield nuclear explosions above and below ground. If we do those tests, other countries such as India and Pakistan will also want the right to build such facilities. From a proliferation standpoint, I think the Administration needs to rethink that. I also question the inertial confinement fusion facility, which may cost as much as \$1 billion, or more with cost overruns. I question whether Congress will support this facility at that price.

Another implication is the role of the nuclear weapons labs over the long term. Even before the Hatfield amendment was passed, there was talk about consolidating the two nuclear weapons labs into one. We now conduct research at Livermore in California and Los Alamos in New Mexico; they are redundant. I think DOE will have to look at whether it can maintain two weapons labs over the long term.

The last implication is Senate ratification. Some in the Administration are concerned about not being able to secure CTB ratification. It's instructive to consider the debate over the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963. In early 1963, Senators Dodd and Humphrey introduced a resolution calling for negotiation of a limited test ban treaty, which obtained 24 cosponsors. Earlier this year, Senators Hatfield, Mitchell, and Exon introduced a resolution, which currently has 56 cosponsors, calling for negotiation of a CTB. In the 1963 debate, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed strong reservations, the director of Livermore opposed the treaty, and some members of the Senate Armed Services Committee objected to it, but after two weeks of debate, it was approved by a vote of 80 to 19. The record since then shows it was a sound agreement and has advanced arms control and nonproliferation. With this in mind, I predict that a CTB will easily pass the Senate.

Frank Gaffney: It's my job to bring debate to this debate, as apparently it's only me who believes it is unconscionable and irresponsible for the United States simultaneously to rely on nuclear weapons for its security and to eschew one of the most important and time-tested means by which we establish and maintain confidence in the reliability and effectiveness of those arms. In so doing, we have an appreciable effect on how other people have confidence in our arms and are therefore deterred by those arms.

Let me make a point about the context in which this decision is being made, which I believe is fundamentally in the context of a nuclear freeze. This gimmick of the early 1980s envisioned a cessation by the United States and others of nuclear testing, the production of nuclear weapons, the production of materials that go into nuclear weapons, the atrophying of the infrastructure responsible for maintaining them, and the attrition of the personnel who operated those facilities. Ten years ago, President Reagan and a majority in Congress recognized that a freeze along those lines would recklessly endanger national security, and it was rejected.

Today, as a result of actions by Presidents Clinton and Bush, we are forgoing the opportunity to conduct nuclear tests, and are producing no nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon materials. Also, as a practical matter, we are permitting the atrophying and dismantling of the infrastructure and work force

responsible for our nuclear weapons complex. Some believe it is acceptable to have adopted in effect a nuclear freeze posture in the current environment, that it's okay to take such reckless liberties with our nuclear weapons and the deterrent force they represent. Bob Bell mentioned one example, separating our bombers from the weapons they would carry in hostilities, which illustrates a general attitude that it's okay to take with a less ominous view the threat we once dealt with from the former Soviet Union. I think it worth noting that virtually every Soviet weapon that was pointed at us in the Cold War is still pointed at us. Russia continues to manufacture nuclear arms and the materials that go into them, and to develop new classes of strategic forces. The exception is that due to environmental problems -- not political decisions -- that resulted from Moscow's indifference to its population's safety, Russia is no longer able to test nuclear weapons at the sites that were established. That exception aside, this is the scenario that those of us who opposed the nuclear freeze worried about -- the United States frozen in important respects while others, even our most formidable adversary, would not be. If all the nuclear weapons that were pointed at us are still pointed at us, we must recognize that the political circumstances that make us so sanguine at present could very rapidly change.

The argument is frequently made by President Clinton and others that stopping our nuclear testing will help the United States discourage other nations trying to build or buy nuclear arms from doing so. Unfortunately, I believe, Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Syria, and others are more apt to regard such unilateral restraint as contemptible weakness by the United States rather than as a model for them to follow. I know of absolutely no basis other than perhaps wishful thinking for positing a direct connection between the presence or absence of U.S. testing and global proliferation.

A far more compelling case can be made that American restraint in this area is likely to impel rather than preclude proliferation. For one thing, the pariah states are likely to regard the deterioration of America's nuclear arsenal as an inducement to acquire nuclear capabilities. They don't need to test nuclear weapons in order to proceed with their nuclear weapons programs. This is another untenable proposition that has been put forward about our exercising restraint except if someone else decides to test, a ludicrous basis for making our own decision about whether testing is in our own national interest or not. You don't need to test a nuclear weapon if it is a relatively crude device, and you will be satisfied with its reasonably high probability of operation. Pakistan, South Africa, some say Israel, and a number of other nations we now credit with having nuclear weapons have acquired them without testing.

Another category of nations that is likely to proceed with nuclear weapons in the absence of confidence that we are preserving the effectiveness of ours are our friends, the developed nations for whom nuclear weapons capabilities have always been readily available but eschewed as a matter of policy mainly because they felt confident that their security would be vouchsafed by our nuclear umbrella. To the extent that is increasingly open to question, especially because of the various decisions that affect the viability and robustness of our deterrent, I think it absolutely predictable that Japan, South Korea, perhaps Taiwan, perhaps Germany, perhaps Switzerland, and others will opt for a nuclear capability.

I'd like to encourage you to get a copy of a report submitted by the Reagan Administration to Congress around September 1988 entitled, "The Relationship Between Progress in Other Areas of Arms Control and More Stringent Limitations on Nuclear Testing." I think it's the single most comprehensive publicly available official analysis of the need for U.S. nuclear testing. A couple of the highlights: The report noted, "Nuclear testing is indispensable to maintaining the credible nuclear deterrent which has kept the peace for over 40 years. We do not regard nuclear testing as an evil to be curtailed but as a tool to be employed responsibly in pursuit of national security." It concludes, "As long as we must depend on nuclear weapons for our fundamental security, nuclear testing will be necessary."

The report lists four reasons. One is to ensure the reliability of our nuclear deterrent. Bob noted that we rarely conducted dedicated postdeployment tests of nuclear weapons to ensure that they were reliable. Yet every weapons test that we did contributed to our understanding of and confidence in weapons in our arsenal.

Second, to improve the safety, security, survivability, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal. The report noted a fact ignored by proponents of testing: testing has allowed the introduction of modern safety and security features on our weapons and has permitted a reduction by nearly one-third in the number of weapons in our stockpile since 1960, as well as a reduction in total megatonnage to about one-fourth of its 1960 value.

Third, to ensure we understand the effects of a nuclear environment on our military systems. You've heard David point out a saving we could obtain as a result of the President's decision, eliminating a test that the Defense Nuclear Agency would have conducted that would have established that our equipment, probably conventional military equipment, would have performed as specified in a nuclear environment. What happens if we go about our business without nuclear weapons but others continue to acquire them and use them against our forces? How will our conventional weapons perform? Will they fail catastrophically, as they have done many times in real tests, or will they perform as they are supposed to? Thanks to our savings on DNA's test program and the larger program, we will not have the same level of confidence even about how our conventional equipment performs, to say nothing of our nuclear equipment.

Fourth, to advance our understanding of nuclear weapons design, nuclear testing serves to avoid technological surprise and to allow us to respond to evolving threats. The study notes, "none of these requirements can currently be met without nuclear testing."

I know of no technical basis developed in the last four or five years that permits us to reach a different conclusion today. Even the Bush Administration in January 1990 said, "The United States has not identified any further limitations on nuclear testing beyond those now contained in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty that would be in the U.S. national interest." Subsequently, President Bush signed into law the Hatfield-Mitchell-Exon language, for reasons that had everything to do with the electoral votes that a superconducting supercollider

in Texas would secure for the President if approved and nothing to do with national security, a rank political decision for the most tawdry of political purposes. I don't think it materially changed the bottom line, that there are no limitations on nuclear testing above those we have been living with for many years of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty that are in the national interest.

I believe we are in serious jeopardy of having to rely for the foreseeable future for deterrence on increasingly unreliable nuclear weaponry, which Charles Krauthammer calls denuclearization. It is particularly dangerous insofar as the Clinton Administration and Congress also appear determined to deny this nation the capacity to defend itself against nuclear weapons that might be delivered against us by ballistic missiles. I would also point out that denuclearization is not just a few men's bogeyman. This is a practical reality, if not for the reasons I've mentioned, then for the simple reality of the failure to provide for a routine source of tritium, a nuclear material essential for the operation of today's nuclear arsenal. If that's the case, let's say in 10 to 15 years, every single weapon in the U.S. arsenal will become ineffectual. I believe our elected leaders must acquaint themselves with the cumulative effects of these various initiatives and what they will do to undermine our deterrent in the future.

Indeed, it is past time for a fundamental debate on whether we still need a nuclear deterrent in this country. I disagree with, but respect, people who say we do not, and who therefore say we do not need to do nuclear testing, nor to produce nuclear weapons nor the material that goes into them nor the infrastructure that supports them. I have very low regard for those who say on the one hand we must have a reliable, safe, effective nuclear deterrent, and who say at the same time we do not need to do nuclear testing, and who, whether they say it or not, are party to the other steps of denuclearization that are afoot today. If, on the other hand, we don't need nuclear weapons for deterrence for the foreseeable future -- a view which I do not think is the majority view in Congress or among the American people -- then I think we can go forth along the path we are well along already. But I earnestly hope that if we do so, we do so mindful of the fact that the rest of the world is more likely to exploit than to emulate this policy approach.

Question 1: Didn't the Navy resist some of the safety changes proposed for the Trident II missile even before the Hatfield amendment? Isn't the safety argument just a new justification for continued testing?

Bell: The Navy's position has been constant over the years on not replacing Trident warheads. Three issues determine whether to do the tests for that purpose; each has changed over time. The cost of testing and rebuilding the warheads is more salient now than in the early 1980s. The rebuild would impose performance costs in terms of range or yield to gain safety; this concern is lower now than before. But reliability concerns are most important. The Hatfield amendment, by imposing a cutoff of testing, prevents postproduction tests and ^{make} ~~made~~ reliability of rebuilt warheads a new concern for the Navy. In fact, we didn't make the argument to do nuclear tests in order to develop and retrofit Trident warheads.

would

Gaffney: The issue is not if the Navy wants to do the tests, but if the U.S. government decides it wants the safest possible weapons, and is willing to spend the money, it will not be able to do that thanks to the testing policy unless it is prepared to spend the money and is willing to force the Navy to deploy weapons it does not have confidence in because the weapon could not be properly tested. The tail wagging the dog is that there is something insidious about nuclear testing. You can't make sense out of this debate unless you take it the next step and say there is something insidious about nuclear weapons. We may all feel that way, but having an arsenal with these weapons contributes to our security. We can't discuss testing as an isolated issue without discussing the larger issue, if this nuclear freeze is really the U.S. government's policy.

Bell: It's not black or white even on the safety issue. On the Trident II missile, the warheads are clustered around the third stage. If the third stage blows up, what kind of protection do you need to avoid having a nonnuclear explosion of the warhead that disperses plutonium? Sidney Drell says that if you used insensitive high explosive [IHE, a type of chemical explosive used in warheads that is much less sensitive to fire, impact, and shock than conventional high explosive] in the warhead and redesigned and shielded the warhead, you could prevent dispersal if the third stage detonated. Other experts say that you'd get that dispersal if the third stage detonated even if you used IHE. So to resolve these concerns you would need an extensive test program to redesign and test the whole front end of the missile, but under the legislation that option is not available in the time we have. The Navy had questions about redesigning the front end before the Hatfield amendment as well; what was different after the amendment was the absolute deadline for nuclear testing of Sept 30, 1996, which precluded a postproduction test before then.

Question 2: Please discuss the tritium issue. We have no source of tritium. What effect will that have on the reliability of our weapons?

Bell: We're betting on timelines, that before the existing stockpile declines to the point where we can't do the replenishments necessary, we will have identified an alternate source. That will require funding from Congress.

Gaffney: The problem with the timelines approach is that, unless we're counting on tritium from heaven, it will take at least a decade to get a new tritium source online. Some may suggest we buy it from the Russians or the French, but right now we're approaching the point where you must start building the source of tritium or there won't be any source of tritium by the time you need it. This is a grave national security policy choice that is being ignored.

Culp: We have the ability to produce tritium today if necessary. Current calculations by DOE, though, are that we won't need tritium until around 2006.

Gaffney: David, would you explain how we produce tritium today?

Culp: The Savannah River reactor, and also, if necessary, you could use commercial reactors.

Gaffney: How do your groups feel about either of those choices?

Culp: If there were a national emergency, I don't think there's any doubt that there would be the support in Congress to do it.

Gaffney: I offer that your groups would go crazy if anyone tried to start up the Savannah River reactor for the production of tritium, let alone did the absolute violence to the nonproliferation regime that would be involved in contaminating commercial reactors for nuclear weapons production. Also, the technologies in the budget will not be available in the timelines required.

Culp: Another option, which we've been using for five years, is steady reductions in the nuclear arsenal.

Question 3: I agree with you, Mr. Gaffney, that U.S. restraint in nuclear testing will have little effect on North Korea or other potential proliferators, but Bob Bell did not say that's why the Administration made its decision. He said it was because of the NPT review conference and the likelihood of getting the treaty extended. Are we more likely or less likely to have a bludgeon against proliferators if we get the treaty extended? Also, who do you think is responsible for this nuclear freeze?

Gaffney: Regarding the second question, I think the current and previous Administrations are responsible for instituting what is in effect a nuclear freeze. The present Administration inherited it from the previous one, and is compounding it by adding a permanent testing moratorium.

Question 3: Tritium was a policy choice, but plutonium and uranium were cut off when we decided we had enough.

Gaffney: Policy choices on tritium and on maintaining the materials production infrastructure were made in the last four years mainly on technical grounds. Regarding the link between testing and proliferation, there are more important things than permanently extending the NPT. That treaty hasn't prevented even countries that signed it from going into the nuclear weapons business. We may think there would have been more proliferation without the treaty, but South Africa, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran are at various stages of having nuclear weapons. Most if not all have been members in good standing of the NPT. They have been inspected. I submit that American policy will be at all costs to maintain the fiction that North Korea is still in the NPT, even if they proceed to build nuclear weapons despite it. When Japan said at the G-7 meeting that they don't want to be committed to the indefinite extension of the treaty, it's a straw in the wind that we had better be focused on the problem of proliferation and that it is going forward under the NPT and not simply permit our policies to be driven by the hope that we will be able to perpetuate this treaty and that it will therefore become better in the future.

Question 3: Do you think we'd be better off without the few tools we have than with them?

Gaffney: I think we will be worse off if we permit our nuclear deterrent to go to hell in a handbasket as a price for maintaining the fiction that the NPT is effective. If that's the choice, then I think we will be worse off than having preserved this tool. I'm for the NPT but I do think we have to be careful about the cost we're willing to sustain to do so. This is a real-world case. Right now, Bob's colleagues are in North Korea talking about the conditions under which we would consider North Korea still a member in good standing of this treaty. It's a joke! North Korea is going forward with a nuclear weapons program.

Question 4: Mr. Gaffney, would you discuss how South Korea, Japan, Switzerland, and other allies would feel compelled to build nuclear weapons if we stop testing? What has the reaction been among our allies? For sake of argument, why would it be bad if our allies build nuclear weapons; wouldn't that provide a substitute deterrent if U.S. nuclear weapons went away?

Gaffney: I think it's risky to draw a direct cause-and-effect relationship between what one state does and a specific action by another state. I wouldn't suggest that the reason Japan wouldn't commit itself to an indefinite extension of the NPT was that we had announced our nonproliferation initiative. But I think a reason Clinton emphasized the U.S. commitment to east Asia was that he recognized that the Japanese, South Koreans, and others are uneasy about the U.S. commitment to that part of the world. They see the rapprochement with North Korea, the decisions on withdrawing U.S. forces from overseas and possibly in due course from Korea, the decline in the U.S. defense budget, and the effect of these initiatives on our nuclear posture, and I think the Japanese are hedging their bets. On your second question, I think we may find ourselves dealing with a nuclear-armed Japan. It's mostly a concern to those who are hard-line about the prospect of proliferation anywhere that even our friends might get nuclear weapons, but it could pose future problems for us as well.

Bell: We're dealing here with timelines that are pretty far out. It's important to contrast that with what the President decided. He didn't decide that we'd never test again; he said that for fiscal 1994 we wouldn't conduct a test unless another state did, in which case he would direct DOE to prepare for the test. He didn't say he would direct DOE to conduct a test because he doesn't have the unilateral authority. You have to direct DOE to prepare for the test while seeking approval from Congress, so you must meet all the conditions of the Hatfield amendment.

In terms of broader consequences, there are three different timelines here. One has to do with degradation of the confidence in the reliability, safety, and performance of the inventory. Everyone agrees that dropoff is not precipitous. It's extremely gradual, especially through the first decade. You can get into an interesting debate over what the slope of that curve will look like 15 or 20 years from now. We're not talking about Germany or South Korea tomorrow deciding they can't count on American nuclear deterrence any more, we're talking about a timeline that's out decades. You're also trying to project a timeline out a decade or two in terms of the world security situation. It's enormously unpredictable. If it's as positive as it's been for the last few years, who knows what our attitude will be in 20 years in terms of the role of nuclear weapons

and our overall defense posture? A third timeline is the one under which you can acquire alternate means of accomplishing this task through new technologies and computer simulations. The matrix of those three timelines out 10 or 20 years is perhaps ultimately unknowable. What we're deciding now is a policy for the next fiscal year. I get frustrated when we talk about assumptions on the world situation, technology development, and confidence in weapons reliability 15 or 20 years out when we're trying to make a policy for the next fiscal year.

Gaffney: I believe it's totally disingenuous to say it's just about the next fiscal year. This is a policy based upon what we'll do vis-a-vis a CTB. A CTB is forever. It means the U.S. government -- particularly if we pursue it as precipitously as we're doing -- might find itself permanently into a testing cutoff within a year or two. You're talking about getting out of the testing business for all time and leaving us with nuclear weapons that were not designed to be untested forever. A nation does not necessarily have to build an infrastructure to get nuclear weapons, but can now buy them on the world market. I think countries will look at how long they can rely on us with a shorter-term view than was the case in the past. I've described this as bungee-jumping without knowing the length of the cord. The President said that he hoped to realize new technologies that will allow us not to have to rely on nuclear testing. To stop nuclear testing now before they're available seems to me just irresponsible.

Aaron Tovish:¹ I think the Japanese position was grossly misrepresented. The Japanese are trying to maintain incentives for nuclear weapon states to go beyond the NPT in arms control, specifically, carrying through on commitments in Article VI of the NPT [regarding a halt to the arms race and pursuit of nuclear disarmament] in a thorough way. Speculations that Japanese misgivings regarding the NPT are related to a future intention to acquire nuclear weapons are scaremongering and don't take into account the constructive role Japan could be playing in the next few years.

Gaffney: The people who are scared are the Japanese. The testing of a North Korean missile capable of attacking Japan with nuclear or chemical weapons has terrified them. I believe it has translated into the beginning of a public demand that something be done about it. It could be through missile defense or some other means, or through nuclear deterrence, but we shouldn't rule it out. I believe it is at least as easy to square their stated policy with what they have the capability of doing as to square it with the public line they're putting out which you are describing.

Peter Zimmerman:² If we want to test a plutonium-fueled nuclear weapon using high explosives to compress the pit [the fissile core of a nuclear weapon] and see if it achieves shapes and sizes needed in order to explode, we

¹ Aaron Tovish is the Deputy Secretary General of Parliamentarians for Global Action, and made a presentation in the afternoon session of this seminar on whether near-universal adherence to a CTB can be achieved.

² Peter Zimmerman is a Senior Fellow in Arms Control and Verification at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

must use plutonium or a simulant for plutonium because you must know how the material squeezes under the explosive. Plutonium doesn't squeeze the same way that uranium or other materials do. Depleted uranium, though, squeezes exactly the same way as uranium-235, which was the active material in the Hiroshima bomb and many other weapons in the inventory. As we retire weapons under START I and II, we will have a cost-free source of highly enriched uranium. If we needed to replace a warhead, we could do so using uranium instead of plutonium without a nuclear-yield test at all. A second comment: I have heard no mention of a decline in safety over time without nuclear testing. People have talked about a decline in reliability, but not safety. Reliability, as I understand it, means that a weapon will deliver a yield within very narrow tolerances; it's not an all-or-none thing. That kind of reliability is nice to have, but not essential.

The two comments together lead me to ask Bob Bell a question. Have we worked out for implementation of our policy and our evaluation of other nations' compliance with a moratorium a working definition of a nuclear test? If so, can you tell us what it is?

Bell: No and no. We have some general thoughts and we're talking with the other nuclear states, but that's part of the negotiations. None of the negotiations on nuclear testing have included a definition of nuclear weapons tests. Some complex issues such as inertial confinement fusion will have to be pinned down in terms of verification. Regarding reliability, nuclear weapons now are fundamentally reliable. These devices, though, are not static. Over time, you have to replenish or replace different parts. Sometimes vendors ~~will~~ will go ~~out~~ out of business and you must find a substitute part. So at some point, maybe 15-20 years, you'll have a device that you're still looking to as part of your deterrent, and you've changed it enough in terms of switching out parts that you ask yourself if it still works and the tolerances within which we can predict the yield.

This gets me to my issue about the timelines of how the world situation is changing. ~~Because~~ the requirement for extreme precision was necessary in the Cold War to execute the nuclear war plans. If the major threat 15-20 years from now is third-world proliferators, those tolerances are less critical. But we don't know if we're going to reach that world. The issues you have to struggle with on reliability are: How will reliability drop off 15-20 years from now? What threat will these weapons be arrayed against -- a Cold War nuclear war plan or a more existential deterrent against North Korea? What will be your technological capability in 15 years to remove the fissile material from a warhead and replicate the performance of the system to some acceptable measure of capability? There are a lot of unknowns there.

Gaffney: I'd like to mention three unknowns. One is that reliability doesn't necessarily degrade gracefully. We've had surprises in the past where weapons have failed catastrophically. Is that the entire arsenal? No. Does it matter more as you have fewer weapons and fewer kinds of weapons? Yes. Is it possible that changes other than those resulting from swapping out of components, such as material and chemical changes over time, affect performance in

a significant way? I think that to bet the farm for all time on the idea that it won't ever happen again is irresponsible.

If you look at the threat scenario for the future, there may not be tens of thousands of superhard underground silos arrayed against us, but today Saddam Hussein and Kim Il Sung have underground complexes that may be unattackable with our present nuclear arsenal. Perhaps because they are nonnuclear states, arguably, we don't want to attack them with nuclear weapons, but we can't if we want to. I think we'll see more countries, with the help of our friends in Belgium, Germany, Russia, and elsewhere, building capabilities like this that may create different threats and target sets, but ones that we'll need to be able to deal with. We may have a harder time dealing with them than we would otherwise because we've foreclosed testing options. Finally, it's not clear to me that, 15 years hence, if this nuclear freeze mentality goes forward, and the treatment that's being accorded people responsible for nuclear weapons, that you're going to have the base of ready technical expertise that is presumed by your scenarios even if you can do hydronuclear or nonnuclear testing that would be an end run, completely inconsistent with the spirit of the Hatfield amendment, if not with the letter of the law.

Question 5: Mr. Bell, can you discuss the plans the Administration is considering for a CTB -- talks, venue, timing?

Bell: We've begun the consultations; the first one with the Russians began this morning, and another mission is heading out of Washington tonight. So within ten days we'll have been to all the capitals of the other four nuclear powers and will be in a position to analyze what they've said and go the next step of the modalities of the negotiation. Our objective is to have CTB negotiations started this calendar year. I imagine that we'll try to start it with the five nuclear powers -- we're doing that in a sense with the consultations that began this morning -- and at a very early date linking it to the Commission on Disarmament because it must be as broad and universal a treaty as possible. The CD can bring a lot to it, particularly with ~~that~~ ^{the} group of ~~experts~~ ^{scientists} in terms of an international verification regime. Our model is roughly comparable to the Conventional Forces in Europe negotiation, where there was a negotiation within a negotiation but a broader link into the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I think the CD can bring more assets to bear on the CTB than was the case with CSCE vis-a-vis CFE.

Conference

Question 6: Is the Administration contemplating announcing a comprehensive strategy to bring some of these strands together -- CTB negotiations, fissile material production cutoff, plutonium policy?

Bell: I'm sure the intention is to announce a broad framework for nonproliferation. We had hoped to announce it coincidentally with the nuclear testing and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency revitalization announcements on July 3, but some of the issues in the nonproliferation policy review are so tricky that they weren't ready on July 3. That's being handled by a different group in NSC headed by Dan Poneman; I'm not sure how close they are to the finish line, but it's not too far away.



Congressional Research Service • The Library of Congress

Sander.
Q15 FAX
to [unclear]
[unclear]

9/28

Bob-

Here's a draft of the edited transcript of the July 19 CRS seminar on nuclear testing that you participated in. I plan to release it as a CRS report. Please edit it with your remarks as appropriate and return your edits to me, preferably by Oct. 15. If you wish, fax me the edited pages (707-7639). Call me at 707-7632 if you have any questions on this.

Thanks again for participating in this seminar. I very much appreciate your willingness to walk into the lion's den to face Congress on this important issue.

Jon Madeline

UNCLASSIFIED URGENT
FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

FROM: Bob Bell
PHONE: (202) 395-3330
FAX: 395-1185

TO Jon Medalia FAX 202- PHONE
707-7639

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET 15

SPECIAL
INSTRUCTIONS: _____

UNCLASSIFIED URGENT

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/18/93 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 10/20/93

SUBJECT: MILITARY NOMINATIONS: 25 OFFICERS FOR PROMOTION IN THE RESERVE
OF USA

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	PASTER	☐	☐
McLARTY	☐	☐	RASCO	☐	☐
NEEL	☐	☐	RUBIN	☐	☐
PANETTA	☐	☐	SEGAL	☐	☐
BAGGETT	☐	☐	SEIDMAN	☐	☐
EMANUEL	☐	☐	STEPHANOPOULOS	☐	☐
GEARAN	☐	☐	TYSON	☐	☐
GERGEN	☐	☐	VARNEY	☐	☐
GIBBONS	☐	☐	WATKINS	☐	☐
HALE	☐	☐	WILLIAMS	☐	☐
HERMAN	☐	☐	BELL	☒	☐
LAKE	☐	☐	CLERK	☐	☒
LINDSEY	☐	☐		☐	☐
McGINTY	☐	☐		☐	☐
MONTOYA	☐	☐		☐	☐
NUSSBAUM	☐	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

Do you have any objections?

RESPONSE:

Having considered the adverse information on one of the attached military nominations, the National Security Council staff concurs in the recommended promotions.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

Anthony Lake

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

October 14, 1993

10 17 18 P1: 13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JOHN A. GAUGHAN

DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE

SUBJECT:

Army General Officer Nomination

Forwarded for your approval and signature is a nomination containing the names of 25 officers for promotion to the grade indicated in the Reserve of the Army of the United States.

This nomination is submitted by the Deputy Secretary of Defense after considering adverse information pertaining to one officer which has been provided by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Military Manpower & Personnel Policy) (Tab A). If you approve this nomination, the adverse information will be provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

This nomination has been staffed by the Acting Secretary of the Army and approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Recommendation

That you approve and sign the attached.

Attachment



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000



9 OCT 1993


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Army General Officer Nomination

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I recommend you nominate the 25 officers on the attached list for appointment to the grade indicated in the Reserve of the Army of the United States. These officers have been recommended for promotion by a board approved by the Acting Secretary of the Army.

This nomination will not result in the Army exceeding the authorized strength of general officers in an active status in the Reserve of the Army of the United States.

I have personally reviewed adverse information concerning one officer on the attached list and will provide the information to the White House Military Office separately. Should you approve this nomination recommendation, the same information will be provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee.


William J. Perry

Attachment

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006a. letter	[Personally Identifiable Information] [partial] (2 pages)	10/06/1993	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 47

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - October 1993 #2 [1]

2016-0152-F
vz4487

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

The White House

Washington

To the Senate of the United States:

I nominate:

The following United States Army National Guard officers for promotion to the grades indicated in the Reserve of the Army of the United States, under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, sections 593(a), 3385 and 3392:

To be Major General

Brigadier General Robert J. Byrne,
Brigadier General Michael W. Ryan,
Brigadier General William F. Stewart
Brigadier General George K. Hastings

(b)(6)

To be Brigadier General

[006a]

Colonel Frank A. Catalano, Jr.,
Colonel Lawrence E. Gillespie, Sr.,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Colonel Joel W. Norman,

(b)(6)

Colonel Salvador R. Recio-Sanchez,

(b)(6)

Colonel Eugene W. Schmidt

Colonel John E. Stevens,

(b)(6)

Colonel Francis L. Briganti,

Colonel Emilio Diaz-Colon,

Colonel John E. Prendergast,

Colonel Juan F. Rosado-Ortiz

Colonel Murrel J. Bowen, Jr.

(b)(6)

Colonel Fletcher C. Coker, Jr.,

(b)(6)

Colonel Rodney C. Johnson,

(b)(6)

Colonel Thomas C. Johnson,

Colonel Guido J. Portante, Jr.,

(b)(6)

Colonel John C. Rowland,

(b)(6)

Colonel Thomas E. Whitecotton III,

(b)(6)

Colonel Edmund C. Zysk,

(b)(6)

Colonel Francis A. Laden,

Colonel Sigurd E. Murphy, Jr.,

(b)(6)

Colonel Murray G. Sagsveen,

(b)(6)

[006a]

X

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. letter	To Sam Nunn. [partial] (1 page)	10/06/1993	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 47

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - October 1993 #2 [1]

2016-0152-F

vz4487

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

4000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-4000




Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary of Defense recommended the President nominate 25 officers for promotion to the grades of major general and brigadier general in the Reserve of the Army of the United States. The Secretary made that recommendation after considering potentially adverse information pertaining to Colonel (b)(6)

Records reviewed by the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command revealed



[006b]

This information has been carefully considered and should not preclude favorable consideration of the recommended nomination. The Department appreciates your assistance in facilitating the confirmation of pending nominations.

Sincerely,

Edwin Dorn

