Case Number: 2016-0152-F

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: Chron File - August 1993 #1 [1]				
Staff Office-Individual: Defense Policy-Bell, Robert				
Original OA/ID Number: 46				
Row: 31	Section: 3	Shelf: 2	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Legislative Referral Memorandum #M-580. [CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)	07/30/1993	P3/b(3)
002a. memo	For Executive Secretary, National Security Council. Subject: Significant Military Eercise - EAGER TIGER 93. (1 page)	07/29/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. cable	re: Part I Signficant Military Exercise Brief [Eager Tiger 93] (2 pages)	07/09/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 46

FOLDER TITLE:
Chron File - August 1993 #1 [1]

2016-0152-F
vz4448

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9306161
RECEIVED: 14 AUG 93 13

TO: ZUMWALT, E R

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 03 AUG 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY MP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES REPLY TO ADM ZUMWALT RE SUGGESTION FOR MONTHLY PRES VIDEO MSG TO MILITARY PERSONNEL

ACTION: PRES SGD LTR DUE DATE: 18 AUG 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BELL
		GOTTEMOELLER
		HAHN
		JONES
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

6161

August 3, 1993

Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, Ret.
Suite 641
1500 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22209

Dear Bud:

Thank you for your insightful suggestions. I am sorry I have not responded sooner, but the volume of mail I've received has been overwhelming.

I am working hard to maintain a close dialogue with the members of the Armed Forces. I'll keep your views in mind as I formulate ways to communicate with our nation's military personnel.

Sincerely,

BILL CLINTON

BC/KB/CV/tex (Corres. #797975)

cc: Tony Lake, NSC with inc.

E. R. ZUMWALT, JR.
ADMIRAL, U. S. NAVY (RET.)

May 26, 1993

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Despite the obviously very full plate you have at the moment, I wanted to recommend that you consider the following as a means of communication with the military.

I believe that a video message recorded by you monthly for distribution to all military activities would make an important contribution to strengthening the personal awareness of individual military persons of their Commander-in-Chief with regard to his policies, his concerns for them, and his interest in establishing good communications with them.

The technique is one that I used as Chief of Naval Operations to communicate with personnel of all ships and stations. I believed it to have been very effective at the time; and over the ensuing 19 years, I have received countless appreciative comments on the use of this medium by the recipients.

If you could possibly take 15 minutes each month to record your thoughts on a single major issue or on a medley of issues affecting the military, I believe that there would be great payoff in morale during these years when so many changes are coming about.

An introduction of each video by the Secretary of Defense or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would make it clear that you are doing this through rather than by-passing the chain of command.

Very respectfully,

Bud Zumwalt

E. R. Zumwalt, Jr.

1500 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 641
Arlington, Virginia 22209
(703) 527-5380

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 2, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY

SUBJECT: Request for Meeting with the President on Arms Control Issues

Attached is request from several well-known arms control experts for a meeting with the President on a range of arms control issues, including a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and on nonproliferation. This request was sent to the President in May, before he had announced his decisions on Testing and on ACDA's future. In both of these areas, we believe these individuals would find favor with the President's decisions. Furthermore, a number of these individuals have had an opportunity to make their views known to the NSC staff over the course of past weeks and months.

Concurrence: Steve Andreasen and Dan Poneman.

Recommendation

That the President decline this meeting request.

Attachments
Tab A Meeting Request

May 11, 1993

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

We are ready to work with you to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction, negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and strengthen the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. We believe these objectives are linked.

Our country needs a revitalized, independent agency focusing like a laser beam on arms control and non-proliferation issues, precisely because you and the Secretary of State have so many other urgent matters to attend to. A strong ACDA Director, working with your full confidence and that of the Secretary of State, can promote the post-Cold War arms control agenda, including your non-proliferation and nuclear test ban agenda items. If, on the other hand, ACDA is further weakened and loses its independent voice, progress in combatting proliferation and negotiating a CTB will be more difficult to achieve.

We request a meeting with you to discuss these important objectives, and how we can help you achieve them.

With best wishes for your success, we are,

Respectfully,

Jerome B. Wiesner
President Emeritus, M.I.T.

Gerard C. Smith
Chairman, Washington Council for Nonproliferation

Frank von Hippel
Chairman, Federation of American Scientists Fund

John Adams
Executive Director, Natural Resources Defense Council

Henry W. Kendall
Chairman of the Board, Union of Concerned Scientists

Julia Moore
Executive Director, Physicians for Social Responsibility

Jerome Grossman
Chairman, Council for a Livable World

Michael Krepon
President, Henry L. Stimson Center

cc: The Honorable Warren M. Christopher
The Honorable Les Aspin
The Honorable Tony Lake

5576

MEMORANDUM

TO: NSC | William Itoh

FR: Marcia

DT: 6/22/93

SUBJECT: Meeting on Arms Control Issues

I. **PRESIDENTIAL SCHEDULING ACTION**

✓ Pending decision

___ President will not be attending

II. **SCHEDULING CORRESPONDENCE**

✓ Pending decision

___ "REGRET" Letter to be sent

II. **ACTION TO BE TAKEN**

✓ Please advise if the President should attend.

___ The President will <u>not</u> be attending. Please determine if a representative of the President should be sent and coordinate.

___ Please coordinate a representative of the President to attend.

III. **SURROGATE SUGGESTION(S)**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 2, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY

SUBJECT: Request for Meeting with the President on Arms Control Issues

Attached is request from several well-known arms control experts for a meeting with the President on a range of arms control issues, including a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and on nonproliferation. This request was sent to the President in May, before he had announced his decisions on Testing and on ACDA's future. In both of these areas, we believe these individuals would find favor with the President's decisions. Furthermore, a number of these individuals have had an opportunity to make their views known to the NSC staff over the course of past weeks and months.

Concurrence: Steve Andreasen and Dan Poneman.

Recommendation

That the President decline this meeting request.

Attachments
Tab A Meeting Request

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The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

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Respectfully,

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President, Henry L. Stimson Center

cc: The Honorable Warren M. Christopher
The Honorable Les Aspin
The Honorable Tony Lake

5576

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TO: NSC | William Itoh

FR: Marcia

DT: 6/22/93

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I. **PRESIDENTIAL SCHEDULING ACTION**

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___ "REGRET" Letter to be sent

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✓ Please advise if the President should attend.

___ The President will <u>not</u> be attending. Please determine if a representative of the President should be sent and coordinate.

___ Please coordinate a representative of the President to attend.

III. **SURROGATE SUGGESTION(S)**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 2, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL

FROM: KEITH HAHN

SUBJECT: Invitation for the President to Attend General Powell's Retirement Ceremony

At Tab B Marcia Hale asks whether there are other events being planned for General Powell's retirement and whether this is the event that the President should attend. I was assured by the OSD Executive Secretary that the retirement ceremony on September 30 is to be the most important and most visible event associated with the General's retirement and the one which the President should attend. DoD does not yet have a clear agenda for the ceremony, but we can assume there will be a speaking role for the President.

Concurrence by: Jeremy Rosner

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Marcia Hale at Tab I recommending that the President attend General Powell's retirement ceremony.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab A Schedule Proposal

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR MARCIA HALE

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Invitation for the President to Attend General Powell's Retirement Ceremony

You asked my advice on the schedule proposal at Tab A. While there will be several military events recognizing General Powell upon his retirement, DoD plans to make the official retirement ceremony on September 30 the focus of their recognition. It would be most appropriate for the President to attend and participate in this event.

Attachment
Tab A Schedule Proposal

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

93 JL 21 A9:38

Schedule Proposal

July 13, 1993

_____ACCEPT _____REGRET _____PENDING

TO:	Marcia L. Hale Assistant to the President and Director of Scheduling and Advance
FROM:	David Watkins D. Watkins Assistant to the President for Management and Administration
REQUEST:	The President to participate in the retirement ceremony of General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
PURPOSE:	To bid farewell and to thank him for his support of the Office of the President.
BACKGROUND:	General Powell has served as Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff since October 1989.
PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION:	None
DATE AND TIME:	Thursday, September 30, 1993, 4:00 p.m.
DURATION:	To be determined
LOCATION:	Fort Myer, Virginia
PARTICIPANTS:	To be determined
OUTLINE OF EVENT:	To be determined
REMARKS REQUIRED:	To be provided by speechwriters.
MEDIA COVERAGE:	Open
RECOMMENDED BY:	Mr. David Watkins Secretary of Defense

ROUTING SLIP

DATE: 1/2/09

FROM: Marcia Hale
Director of Scheduling & Advance

SUBJECT:

TO:

Rahm Emanuel	___	Howard Paster	___
Mark Gearan	___	John Podesta	___
David Gergen	___	Jack Quinn	___
Alexis Herman	___	Carol Rasco	___
Nancy Hernreich	___	Bob Rubin	___
Anthony Lake	✓	Eli Segal	___
Bruce Lindsey	___	George Stephanopolous	___
Mack McLarty	___	Ann Stock	___
Regina Montoya	___	Christine Varney	___
Roy Neel	___	David Watkins	___
Bernie Nussbaum	___	Maggie Williams	___

FOR YOUR:

Information___ Advice ✓ Action___

COMMENTS: Doug,

Are there other events being planned for Carol's retirement? Do this by Grant Park? Should go to Executive

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

June 28, 1993

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Department of Defense, I cordially invite you to participate in the retirement ceremony of General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The ceremony will be held on Thursday, September 30, 1993, at 4 p.m. at Fort Myer, Virginia.

As our Commander-in-Chief, your participation would certainly make this occasion special for General Powell, his family, and for all of us in the Department. Your favorable response to this invitation would be most appreciated. Thank you for your consideration of this invitation.

Respectfully,

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 2, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL

FROM: KEITH HAHN

SUBJECT: Commerce Proposed Testimony on Dual Use of Navy Technology for Ocean Research

At Tab II is the proposed testimony that Undersecretary for Oceans and Atmosphere at NOAA, Dr. James Baker, plans to present to the House committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on August 4. The testimony strongly supports the use of DoD assets for dual-use purposes -- specifically for environmental studies. Most of the discussion centers around the use of the Navy's Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS) which is used primarily to track submarines and surface ships. Many of the IUSS acoustic sensors and the Over the Horizon Radar capabilities that NOAA would like to use are classified, leading-edge technologies and their use would need to be carefully coordinated with DoD to preclude compromising important national security capabilities.

I have talked to DoD legislative affairs and to the cognizant Navy and Air Force offices to ensure that they are comfortable with this testimony. They indicate that the testimony does not propose any initiatives that have not already been in work for some time.

Concurrence by: Jeremy Rosner

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I concurring in the proposed testimony.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES J. JUKES

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: Commerce Proposed Testimony on Dual Use of Navy Technology for Ocean Research

The National Security Council staff concurs in the proposed testimony.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Legislative Referral Memorandum #M-580. [CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)	07/30/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 46

FOLDER TITLE:
Chron File - August 1993 #1 [1]

2016-0152-F
vz4448

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

5642

TESTIMONY

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

TESTIMONY

July 30, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #H-580

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

DEFENSE - Samuel T. Brick, Jr. - (703)697-1305 - 325
ENERGY - Bob Rabben - (202)586-6718 - 209
INTERIOR - Ralph Hill - (202)208-6706 - 329
STATE - Julie C. Norton - (202)647-2137 - 225
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)395-3733 - 249
EPA - Thomas C. Roberts - (202)260-5414 - 326
NEC - Sonia Mathews - (202)456-6722 - 429
NSF - Lawrence Rudolph - (202)357-9435 - 248
OSTP - [illegible] - (202)456-7116 - 288
CIA - (b)(3) [001]

FROM: JAMES J. JUKES (for)
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: Bonaparte LIU (395-3090)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-3454

SUBJECT: COMMERCE Proposed Testimony on Dual use of Navy technology for ocean research

DEADLINE: 2PM August 2, 1993

COMMENTS: Commerce has requested clearance on Monday, August 2nd.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:
Howard Pastor
Katie McGinty
Ken Schwartz
Cora Beebe
Jeff Payne
Tom Stanners
Steve Dotson
Greg Henry
Arnie Donahue

LRM #M-580

RESPONSE TO LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

If your response to this request for views is simple (e.g., concur/no comment) we prefer that you respond by faxing us this response sheet. If the response is simple and you prefer to call, please call the branch-wide line shown below (NOT the analyst's line) to leave a message with a secretary.

You may also respond by (1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail if the analyst does not answer); (2) sending us a memo or letter; or (3) if you are an OASIS user in the Executive Office of the President, sending an E-mail message. Please include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.

TO: Bonaparte LIU (395-3090)
Office of Management and Budget
Fax Number: (202) 395-3109
Analyst/Attorney's Direct Number: (202) 395-3090
Branch-Wide Line (to reach secretary): (202) 395-3454

FROM: _____ (Date)

_____ (Name)

_____ (Agency)

_____ (Telephone)

SUBJECT: COMMERCE Proposed Testimony on Dual use of Navy technology for ocean research

The following is the response of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:

_____ Concur

_____ No objection

_____ No comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _____

_____ Other: _____

_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this response sheet

TESTIMONY OF
DR. JAMES BAKER
UNDER SECRETARY FOR OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANOGRAPHY, GULF OF MEXICO
AND THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AUGUST 4, 1993

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee:

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) sincerely appreciates the opportunity to testify on this most important and timely matter. We believe the dual-use concept offers potential for fundamental advances in many aspects of ocean research generally, and to NOAA missions specifically. The "eyes and ears" developed and operated at considerable expense to help defend our Nation can give us an unprecedented view of our own ocean environment - - three-quarters of the Earth - - potentially improving our management of living marine resources, prediction of natural disasters, knowledge of climate change, and information on a host of other critical issues.

Much still must be done to prove this potential. Some significant steps have already been taken, and many scientists feel the promise is good. We must now: (1) identify the systems and technologies most likely to have environmental applications; (2) test and prove the most promising concepts; (3) resolve security and classification concerns about civilian use; and (4) establish mechanisms and resources for dual-use operation. Each application will have unique circumstances, but we believe that close cooperation with the Department of Defense, other federal agencies, and the civilian academic community can make this work.

Various interagency panels and working groups are now engaged in the first step. NOAA has participated in preliminary projects and anticipates more in the future. A process is already working. With encouragement, it will succeed.

Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS)

Several exciting applications involve the Navy's Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS). This system is designed to locate and track ships and submarines acoustically. For several years now, NOAA scientists at our Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory (PMEL) have been working with the Navy to use the system as a research tool in their Vents program. Their emphasis

has been to detect, locate, and describe hydrothermal activity throughout the North Pacific Basin. Additional NOAA scientists at the National Marine Mammal Laboratory (NMML) have identified and located endangered whales in the North Pacific using IUSS information. The work has proven very successful, both as good science and as a demonstration of NOAA/Navy cooperation. In fact, this collaboration has been a stimulant for NOAA to seek other uses of the IUSS.

The PMEL project has evolved over several years to where it now uses a realtime data link from the Navy to NOAA's facility in Newport, Oregon. There, the raw acoustic data are processed to detect signals from volcanic and seismic activity. In a dramatic success, this link detected and located a submarine volcanic eruption just as it started a few weeks ago. A research ship in the area was alerted and sent to the location. It was able to collect rare water samples at the event. This type of quick response to a rare event, and the monitoring of more frequent hydrothermal venting events would only be practical with dual-use of the IUSS.

Other significant IUSS applications have been proposed as well. These includes

- assessing global warming by measuring bulk ocean temperature using acoustic tomography techniques;
- monitoring marine mammal (e.g., endangered whales) behavior, migrations, and assessing population sizes and distributions;
- monitoring and detecting driftnet and other fishing activity in the North Pacific and elsewhere;
- assessing fisheries stocks in EEZ waters;
- transmitting data from and geolocating drifting mid-water instrument packages; and
- measuring open ocean rainfall rates.

Demonstration projects for the first three - - global warming, marine mammal studies, and driftnet fishing - - have been or soon will be carried out. Several were funded through the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP). Although NOAA is not directly involved in some of these, their results may point the way for other long-term applications. The latter three proposals have not been tested, but appear technically feasible and worth further study. The IUSS system clearly offers the potential for a range of civil applications, and NOAA strongly supports its dual use.

Ships

NOAA and the Navy are cooperating in identifying ships that can be utilized for civilian missions. NOAA has received three former T-AGOS surveillance vessels for conversion to meet specialized NOAA oceanographic and nautical charting mission requirements. NOAA is investigating the potential for using up to eight of these vessels in the modernization of the NOAA fleet of survey and research vessels.

Over the Horizon Radar (OTH)

Another system for possible dual-use is the Over The Horizon (OTH) Radar, built for the Air Force. This system uses an ionospheric bounce of low-frequency radar to provide early warning of aircraft attack. Its potential application to ocean environmental studies arises because the returning radar signal is modulated by ocean wave conditions. Although this "sea clutter" is rejected when tracking aircraft, the information can be recovered by special processing.

Scientists from NOAA's Wave Propagation Laboratory (WPL) have demonstrated the ability to extract surface wave and wind direction data over large ocean areas. They believe it will be possible to extract wind speed and wave height as well. Applications of such data include observations to improve significantly synoptic scale modelling and weather forecasts in data sparse ocean areas. And a dramatic test during Hurricane Andrew last year demonstrated the ability to track these storms continuously in conjunction with satellite data as they approach the coast.

NOAA remains involved in an interagency task group exploring uses of the OTH radar. Because the Air Force already has decided to mothball the system, significant funding would be needed for continuing operations. Multiple agency participation for a variety of missions appears the only feasible option. We do not know what the outcome will be of the interagency task group, but remain hopeful that a cost-effective mix of missions may be found.

Other Classified Surveillance Assets

The defense and intelligence agencies also operate other highly classified assets. This category includes assets producing what is called "satellite imagery" in the civilian community. Although we cannot provide further information about classified assets in this forum, NOAA is participating with others in the Environmental Task Force process to identify potential applications for beneficial civilian purposes.

As an example of processes to implement dual use, there was legislation in 1992 directing use of intelligence assets to support enforcement of driftnet fishing regulations (the High Seas Driftnet Fisheries Enforcement Act, Public Law 102-582). In this case, NOAA and the intelligence agency involved are in the process of establishing a separate Memorandum of Understanding. The application has proven very successful, and provides a capability we simply could not afford to match with more traditional ship and aircraft patrols.

The Department of Defense also cooperates with NOAA in providing access to, and use of, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) data. For example, the Special Sensor Microwave/Imager data is used by NOAA researchers to study the soil wetness, precipitation, and similar subject's index. NOAA recently provided this data to the Vice President for his Midwest "Flood" briefing. NOAA participates in the shared processing data network for the exchange of meteorological satellite data and products. Also NOAA provides the archive service for selected DMSP data sets.

Conclusions

NOAA strongly supports the concept of dual use for environmental purposes. A period of testing is needed to prove the value of each application, but the process should go forward.

Dual use implies civil access to environmental data. We feel NOAA is the civil agency uniquely charged by heritage and mission to provide conversion of defense and intelligence assets, and their historic data, to civil use for environmental purposes.

Except for ships, NOAA believes that these assets should be operated in their parent agencies, preserving the integrity of the assets for defense applications. Dual use however would also allow the assets to be used to preserve our Nation's environmental and economic security. This is an important goal and one in which our defense-related assets can offer valuable contributions.

Thank you Mr. Chairman. This concludes my testimony. I would be pleased to respond to any questions from you or other members of the Subcommittee.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 2, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL

FROM: KEITH HAHN

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise EAGER TIGER 93

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, approving military exercise EAGER TIGER 93. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

EAGER TIGER 93 is a combined U.S. and Royal Jordanian Air Force field training exercise designed to improve combined air operations and improve airspace management and air defense capabilities. It is scheduled to take place August 27-31 in the vicinity of King Faisal Air Base and Shaheed Mwaffaq Air Base, Jordan.

The critical cancellation date is August 10, 1993.

Concurrence by: Martin Indyk

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I approving the exercise.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II OSD Executive Secretary Memorandum, July 29, 1993

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 10/3/91
2-2510-0152-7

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR BG MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise EAGER TIGER 93

Military exercise EAGER TIGER 93 is approved.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	For Executive Secretary, National Security Council. Subject: Significant Military Eercise - EAGER TIGER 93. (1 page)	07/29/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 46

FOLDER TITLE:
Chron File - August 1993 #1 [1]

2016-0152-F
vz4448

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. cable	re: Part I Signficant Military Exercise Brief [Eager Tiger 93] (2 pages)	07/09/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 46

FOLDER TITLE:
Chron File - August 1993 #1 [1]

2016-0152-F
vz4448

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5666

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1993

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During floor debate on the FY 1994 defense authorization bill, an amendment may be offered to delete further funding for procurement of Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). I wanted to advise you that I would be strongly opposed to such an amendment.

As you know, the United States currently plans to deploy a fleet of 18 Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) as the sea-based leg of the Triad of strategic nuclear forces the United States will maintain under the START II Treaty. My FY94 budget request contains $1.14 billion to procure the next annual increment of D-5 SLBMs to go aboard the Trident SSBNs and to purchase long-lead items for the FY 1995 buy. Although the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) is considering a number of options for reducing the number of Trident SSBNs below the eighteen currently planned, no decisions have been made to do so. Moreover, even at the lowest Trident levels that remain under review pursuant to the BUR, additional D-5 missile procurements are required in FY 1994 and 1995.

Some have suggested that the United States could save money by simply deploying half as many D-5 missiles on each Trident submarine while doubling the number of warheads carried by each missile. In other words, instead of having each submarine carry 24 missiles, each of which would be armed with 4 warheads, we would deploy only 12 D-5s on each Trident while having each missile carry 8 warheads.

There are a number of major problems with this "detubing" proposal. First, we have negotiated the START II Treaty on the assumption that each D-5 would be attributed as carrying 4 warheads, not eight. Second, under START rules the 12 "empty" missile tubes on each submarine would count as though they were each occupied by a D-5 missile with four warheads. As a result, this approach would place the United States in violation of the START II warhead ceilings unless we obtained permission from our treaty partners to change the Treaty.

Unfortunately, a U.S. proposal along these lines would open a pandora's box in terms of inviting counterproposals by our START partners for relief from other treaty dismantlement requirements they find onerous. If the United States were to ask Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan for permission to revise or

eliminate the strict START SLBM launcher elimination procedures, each of these states would likely demand a quid pro quo in areas under both START and CFE where they are already pressing us to simplify or waive weapons elimination requirements. The result would be an unravelling of the meticulously negotiated dismantlement procedures contained in both accords, with an attendant degradation in the irreversibility of these agreements.

For this and other reasons which Secretary Aspin has enunciated in a recent letter to you, I am opposed to any amendment that would, if adopted and enacted into law, terminate D-5 production after the FY 1993 procurement is completed.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

The Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1993

Dear Senator Thurmond:

During floor debate on the FY 1994 defense authorization bill, an amendment may be offered to delete further funding for procurement of Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). I wanted to advise you that I would be strongly opposed to such an amendment.

As you know, the United States currently plans to deploy a fleet of 18 Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) as the sea-based leg of the Triad of strategic nuclear forces the United States will maintain under the START II Treaty. My FY94 budget request contains $1.14 billion to procure the next annual increment of D-5 SLBMs to go aboard the Trident SSBNs and to purchase long-lead items for the FY 1995 buy. Although the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) is considering a number of options for reducing the number of Trident SSBNs below the eighteen currently planned, no decisions have been made to do so. Moreover, even at the lowest Trident levels that remain under review pursuant to the BUR, additional D-5 missile procurements are required in FY 1994 and 1995.

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There are a number of major problems with this "detubing" proposal. First, we have negotiated the START II Treaty on the assumption that each D-5 would be attributed as carrying 4 warheads, not eight. Second, under START rules the 12 "empty" missile tubes on each submarine would count as though they were each occupied by a D-5 missile with four warheads. As a result, this approach would place the United States in violation of the START II warhead ceilings unless we obtained permission from our treaty partners to change the Treaty.

Unfortunately, a U.S. proposal along these lines would open a pandora's box in terms of inviting counterproposals by our START partners for relief from other treaty dismantlement requirements they find onerous. If the United States were to ask Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan for permission to revise or

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For this and other reasons which Secretary Aspin has enunciated in a recent letter to you, I am opposed to any amendment that would, if adopted and enacted into law, terminate D-5 production after the FY 1993 procurement is completed.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

The Honorable Strom Thurmond
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1993

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During floor debate on the FY 1994 defense authorization bill, an amendment may be offered to delete further funding for procurement of Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). I wanted to advise you that I would be strongly opposed to such an amendment.

As you know, the United States currently plans to deploy a fleet of 18 Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) as the sea-based leg of the Triad of strategic nuclear forces the United States will maintain under the START II Treaty. My FY94 budget request contains $1.14 billion to procure the next annual increment of D-5 SLBMs to go aboard the Trident SSBNs and to purchase long-lead items for the FY 1995 buy. Although the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) is considering a number of options for reducing the number of Trident SSBNs below the eighteen currently planned, no decisions have been made to do so. Moreover, even at the lowest Trident levels that remain under review pursuant to the BUR, additional D-5 missile procurements are required in FY 1994 and 1995.

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For this and other reasons which Secretary Aspin has enunciated in a recent letter to you, I am opposed to any amendment that would, if adopted and enacted into law, terminate D-5 production after the FY 1993 procurement is completed.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

The Honorable Daniel Inouye
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1993

Dear Senator Stevens:

During floor debate on the FY 1994 defense authorization bill, an amendment may be offered to delete further funding for procurement of Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). I wanted to advise you that I would be strongly opposed to such an amendment.

As you know, the United States currently plans to deploy a fleet of 18 Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) as the sea-based leg of the Triad of strategic nuclear forces the United States will maintain under the START II Treaty. My FY94 budget request contains $1.14 billion to procure the next annual increment of D-5 SLBMs to go aboard the Trident SSBNs and to purchase long-lead items for the FY 1995 buy. Although the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) is considering a number of options for reducing the number of Trident SSBNs below the eighteen currently planned, no decisions have been made to do so. Moreover, even at the lowest Trident levels that remain under review pursuant to the BUR, additional D-5 missile procurements are required in FY 1994 and 1995.

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For this and other reasons which Secretary Aspin has enunciated in a recent letter to you, I am opposed to any amendment that would, if adopted and enacted into law, terminate D-5 production after the FY 1993 procurement is completed.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1993

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During floor debate on the FY 1994 defense authorization bill, an amendment may be offered to delete further funding for procurement of Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). I wanted to advise you that I would be strongly opposed to such an amendment.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1993

Dear Representative Spence:

During floor debate on the FY 1994 defense authorization bill, an amendment may be offered to delete further funding for procurement of Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). I wanted to advise you that I would be strongly opposed to such an amendment.

As you know, the United States currently plans to deploy a fleet of 18 Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) as the sea-based leg of the Triad of strategic nuclear forces the United States will maintain under the START II Treaty. My FY94 budget request contains $1.14 billion to procure the next annual increment of D-5 SLBMs to go aboard the Trident SSBNs and to purchase long-lead items for the FY 1995 buy. Although the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) is considering a number of options for reducing the number of Trident SSBNs below the eighteen currently planned, no decisions have been made to do so. Moreover, even at the lowest Trident levels that remain under review pursuant to the BUR, additional D-5 missile procurements are required in FY 1994 and 1995.

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For this and other reasons which Secretary Aspin has enunciated in a recent letter to you, I am opposed to any amendment that would, if adopted and enacted into law, terminate D-5 production after the FY 1993 procurement is completed.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Floyd Spence
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1993

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

The Honorable John P. Murtha
Chairman
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1993

Dear Representative McDade:

During floor debate on the FY 1994 defense authorization bill, an amendment may be offered to delete further funding for procurement of Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). I wanted to advise you that I would be strongly opposed to such an amendment.

As you know, the United States currently plans to deploy a fleet of 18 Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) as the sea-based leg of the Triad of strategic nuclear forces the United States will maintain under the START II Treaty. My FY94 budget request contains $1.14 billion to procure the next annual increment of D-5 SLBMs to go aboard the Trident SSBNs and to purchase long-lead items for the FY 1995 buy. Although the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) is considering a number of options for reducing the number of Trident SSBNs below the eighteen currently planned, no decisions have been made to do so. Moreover, even at the lowest Trident levels that remain under review pursuant to the BUR, additional D-5 missile procurements are required in FY 1994 and 1995.

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For this and other reasons which Secretary Aspin has enunciated in a recent letter to you, I am opposed to any amendment that would, if adopted and enacted into law, terminate D-5 production after the FY 1993 procurement is completed.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Joseph M. McDade
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9304874
RECEIVED: 30 JUN 93 11

TO: BROWN, GEORGE E
ET AL

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 02 AUG 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MILITARY BASES
CO
DEFENSE CONVERSION

PERSONS: BROWN, GEORGE E
MOYNIHAN, DANIEL P
LEVY, DAVID A
D'AMATO, ALFONSE M

SUBJECT: PRES REPLY TO REP BROWDER ET AL RE BASE CLOSURES

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH
DUE DATE: 03 JUL 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: JONES
LOGREF: 9303635 9304739

FILES: WH
NSCP:
CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
WH STRIPPING DESK		BELL
		JONES
		NSC CHRON
		ROSNER

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE 8/2 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM CLOSED BY: NSKDB
DOC 5 OF 5

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ID 9304874

REFERRAL DATE: 02 AUG 93

MEMORANDUM FOR: WH STRIPPING DESK

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: BROWN, GEORGE E

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 02 AUG 93

SUBJ: PRES REPLY TO REP BROWDER ET AL RE BASE CLOSURES

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUEDATE: 03 AUG 93

COMMENT:

FOR WILLIAM H. LEARY

NSC RECORDS MANAGEMENT OFFICE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1993

Dear Glen:

Thank you for your letters regarding the Base Closure Commission's recommendations on Fort McClellan and Letterkenny Army Depot.

After careful review, which included the analysis and recommendations of Secretary Aspin and General Powell, I found the recommendations contained in the Commission's report on balance to be acceptable. Accordingly, I approved the Commission's recommendations on July 2 and forwarded them to Congress in accordance with the law. The Congress now has 45 days to act upon the base closure list.

I am aware of the difficult choices inherent in this process and the affects of these choices on local communities having a long and proud military tradition. This is, however, a necessary process to eliminate excess infrastructure and ensure the quality of our future military forces. It is now time to focus on how we can aggressively assist those communities and people in their base reuse and economic redevelopment activities.

As you know, I announced on July 2 a five-point plan to revitalize communities adversely affected by base closure and realignments. The plan will speed economic development planning, environmental cleanup, property disposal and worker transition. Transition coordinators are being assigned to hard-hit communities to be full-time advocates, trained to cut through red tape and speed redevelopment.

I appreciate your concern regarding base closures. We must take the actions necessary to ensure the strength and readiness of our future military forces. I look forward to working with Congress to make our base revitalization efforts a success.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Glen Browder
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1993

Dear Representative Levy:

Thank you for your letter recommending that I reject the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's recommendations and send them back to the Commission with instructions to spare the Staten Island naval base.

After careful review, which included the analysis and recommendations of Secretary Aspin and General Powell, I found the recommendations contained in the Commission's report on balance to be acceptable. Accordingly, I approved the Commission's recommendations on July 2 and forwarded them to Congress in accordance with the law. The Congress now has 45 days to act upon the base closure list.

I am aware of the difficult choices inherent in this process and the affects of these choices on local communities having a long and proud military tradition. This is, however, a necessary process to eliminate excess infrastructure and ensure the quality of our future military forces. I believe it is now time to focus on how we can aggressively assist those communities and people in their base reuse and economic redevelopment.

As you know, I announced on July 2 a five-point plan to revitalize communities adversely affected by base closure and realignments. The plan will speed economic development planning, environmental clean-up, property disposal and worker transition. As of July 9 the Department of Defense has assigned a transition coordinator for every base recommended for closure or realignment. These coordinators will be full-time community advocates, trained to cut through red tape and speed your community's economic development.

I appreciate your concern and agree that we must take the actions necessary to ensure the strength and readiness of our future military forces. I look forward to working with Congress to make our base revitalization efforts a success.

Sincerely,



The Honorable David A. Levy
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1993

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter recommending that I reject the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's recommendations and send them back to the Commission asking for reconsideration of the decision to establish an east coast air mobility base at McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey.

After careful review, which included the analysis and recommendations of Secretary Aspin and General Powell, I found the recommendations contained in the Commission's report on balance to be acceptable. Accordingly, I approved the Commission's recommendations on July 2 and forwarded them to Congress in accordance with the law. The Congress now has 45 days to act upon the base closure list.

I am aware of the difficult choices inherent in this process and the affects of these choices on local communities having a long and proud military tradition. This is, however, a necessary process to eliminate excess infrastructure and ensure the quality of our future military forces. I believe it is now time to focus on how we can aggressively assist those communities and people in their base reuse and economic redevelopment.

As you know, I announced on July 2 a five-point plan to revitalize communities adversely affected by base closures and realignments. The plan will speed economic development planning, environmental cleanup, property disposal and worker transition. As of July 9 the Department of Defense has assigned a transition coordinator for every base recommended for closure or for major realignment. These coordinators will be full-time community advocates, trained to cut through red tape and speed your communities' economic development.

I appreciate your concern and agree that we must take the actions necessary to ensure the strength and readiness of our future military forces. I hope that we can work together to make our base revitalization efforts a success.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1993

Dear Senator D'Amato:

Thank you for your letter recommending that I reject the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's recommendations and send them back to the Commission asking for reconsideration of the decision to establish an east coast air mobility base at McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey.

After careful review, which included the analysis and recommendations of Secretary Aspin and General Powell, I found the recommendations contained in the Commission's report on balance to be acceptable. Accordingly, I approved the Commission's recommendations on July 2 and forwarded them to Congress in accordance with the law. The Congress now has 45 days to act upon the base closure list.

I am aware of the difficult choices inherent in this process and the affects of these choices on local communities having a long and proud military tradition. This is, however, a necessary process to eliminate excess infrastructure and ensure the quality of our future military forces. I believe it is now time to focus on how we can aggressively assist those communities and people in their base reuse and economic redevelopment.

As you know, I announced on July 2 a five-point plan to revitalize communities adversely affected by base closures and realignments. The plan will speed economic development planning, environmental cleanup, property disposal and worker transition. As of July 9 the Department of Defense has assigned a transition coordinator for every base recommended for closure or for major realignment. These coordinators will be full-time community advocates, trained to cut through red tape and speed your communities' economic development.

I appreciate your concern and agree that we must take the actions necessary to ensure the strength and readiness of our future military forces. I hope that we can work together to make our base revitalization efforts a success.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

The Honorable Alfonse D'Amato
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1993

Dear Governor Cuomo:

Thank you for your letter recommending that I reject the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's recommendations and send them back to the Commission asking for reconsideration of the decision to establish an east coast air mobility base at McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey.

After careful review, which included the analysis and recommendations of Secretary Aspin and General Powell, I found the recommendations contained in the Commission's report on balance to be acceptable. Accordingly, I approved the Commission's recommendations on July 2 and forwarded them to Congress in accordance with the law. The Congress now has 45 days to act upon the base closure list.

I am aware of the difficult choices inherent in this process and the affects of these choices on local communities having a long and proud military tradition. This is, however, a necessary process to eliminate excess infrastructure and ensure the quality of our future military forces. I believe it is now time to focus on how we can aggressively assist those communities and people in their base reuse and economic redevelopment.

As you know, I announced on July 2 a five-point plan to revitalize communities adversely affected by base closures and realignments. The plan will speed economic development planning, environmental cleanup, property disposal and worker transition. As of July 9 the Department of Defense has assigned a transition coordinator for every base recommended for closure or for major realignment. These coordinators will be full-time community advocates, trained to cut through red tape and speed your communities' economic development.

I appreciate your concern and agree that we must take the actions necessary to ensure the strength and readiness of our future military forces. I hope that we can work together to make our base revitalization efforts a success.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Mario M. Cuomo
Governor
State Capitol
Albany, NY 12224

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1993

Dear Barbara:

Thank you for your letter regarding the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommendations and the economic impacts on California.

After careful review, which included the analysis and recommendations of Secretary Aspin and General Powell, I found the recommendations contained in the Commission's report on balance to be acceptable. Accordingly, I approved the Commission's recommendations on July 2 and transmitted them to Congress in accordance with the law. The Congress now has 45 days to act upon the base closure list.

I am aware of the difficult choices inherent in this process and the affects of these choices on local communities having a long and proud military tradition. This is, however, a necessary process to eliminate excess infrastructure and ensure the quality of our future military forces. It is now time to focus on how we can aggressively assist those communities and people in their base reuse and economic redevelopment activities.

As you know, I announced on July 2 a five-point plan to revitalize communities adversely affected by base closure and realignments. Bob Rubin and I discussed the impact on California and the details of this plan with local officials from the bay area on July 5. The plan will speed economic development planning, environmental cleanup, property disposal and worker transition. Transition coordinators are being assigned to hard-hit communities to be full-time advocates, trained to cut through red tape and speed redevelopment.

I appreciate your concern regarding base closures. We must take the actions necessary to ensure the strength and readiness of our future military forces. I look forward to working with you and other Members of Congress to make our base revitalization efforts a success.

Sincerely,

Bill

The Honorable Barbara Boxer
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1993

Dear Dianne:

Thank you for your letters regarding the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's recommendations regarding Alameda Naval Air Station and the 6th Army Headquarters at the Presidio of San Francisco.

After careful review, which included the analysis and recommendations of Secretary Aspin and General Powell, I found the recommendations contained in the Commission's report on balance to be acceptable. Accordingly, I approved the Commission's recommendations on July 2 and transmitted them to Congress in accordance with the law. The Congress now has 45 days to act upon the base closure list.

I am aware of the difficult choices inherent in this process and the affects of these choices on local communities having a long and proud military tradition. This is, however, a necessary process to eliminate excess infrastructure and ensure the quality of our future military forces. It is now time to focus on how we can aggressively assist those communities and people in their base reuse and economic redevelopment activities.

As you know, I announced on July 2 a five-point plan to revitalize communities adversely affected by base closure and realignments. Bob Rubin and I discussed this plan in some detail with local officials from the Bay area on July 5. The plan will speed economic development planning, environmental cleanup, property disposal and worker transition. Transition coordinators are being assigned to hard hit communities to be full-time advocates, trained to cut through red tape and speed redevelopment.

I should also mention that when I raised with Prime Minister Miyazawa in Tokyo the issue of establishing an Asia Pacific Center at the Presidio, he seemed interested. He noted the Presidio's significance to Japan dates to 1951, when the Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Japan-United States Mutual Security Assistance Pact were signed there.

As you know, I share your belief that a center dedicated to fostering exchange, study and contact between the U.S. and the countries of Asia could be a valuable asset to developing Asia Pacific regional economic, political and security relations. As the process for deciding future use of the Presidio continues, an

Asian Pacific Center would certainly offer an outstanding opportunity to continue the historic traditions of this unique facility. I look forward to staying in touch with you as the proposal progresses.

Again, I appreciate your concern regarding base closures. We must take the actions necessary to ensure the strength and readiness of our future military forces. I look forward to working with Congress to make our base revitalization efforts a success.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 5/2

4874

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 30, 1993 93 JUL 30 A9:27

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
ROBERT RUBIN
HOWARD PASTER

SUBJECT: Letters from Representatives Browder and Levy, Senators D'Amato, Moynihan, Feinstein and Boxer, and Governor Cuomo RE: Base Closures

Purpose

To respond to separate letters received from Representatives Browder and Levy, Senators D'Amato, Moynihan, Feinstein and Boxer, and Governor Cuomo regarding your decision on the Base Closure and Realignment Commission report.

Background

You approved the Commission's recommendations July 2. The proposed individually tailored responses focus on your 5-point plan to revitalize the closing bases. It also mentions that you raised with Prime Minister Miyazawa the concept of an Asian Pacific Center at the Presidio in the letter to Senator Feinstein.

While the submitted letters collectively support the rejection of the Base Closure Commission Report, each Member addresses a separate issue. A brief synopsis of the individual concerns and the Commission's recommendations follow:

Senator Boxer appealed for a revision of recommendations to take into account the cumulative economic impact on California.

-- DoD indicates that the cumulative direct employment impact in California for the next three base closure rounds is estimated to be 78,500. While these impacts are significant, California has approximately 15 percent of total DoD employment and 20% of DoD expenditures. While 8 bases are being recommended for closure in 1993, this is out of 67 major installations in California, far more than most other states.

Representative Levy appealed not to close Naval Station Staten Island, cautioning against downsizing our military too fast.

-- The Commission accepted the DoD recommendation to close the Staten Island naval base. The Commission did make a minor change, retaining family housing, as necessary, to support Naval Weapons Station in Earle, New Jersey.

Senator D'Amato, Senator Moynihan and Governor Cuomo appealed not to make McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey, an east coast air mobility base.

-- The Commission rejected the Air Force and DoD recommendation to make Plattsburgh AFB in New York an east coast "Air Mobility Center" and chose instead McGuire AFB in New Jersey. This is the first time a Commission has added a major base not recommended by DoD for deactivation to the closure list. NSC and NEC staff met with community representatives from Griffiss AFB and Plattsburgh AFB on June 30 to hear local concerns. This decision was discussed in your June 30 meeting with Secretary Aspin and Bob Rubin. The Secretary did not believe this issue weighed heavily enough to warrant your rejection of the entire list.

Representative Browder appealed to reject recommendation to transfer tactical missile maintenance and other work to Letterkenney Army Depot and accept Commission's recommendation to keep Ft. McClellan open.

-- Commission overturned the DOD recommendation to close Ft. McClellan with the exception of the live agent training facility. The Commission also rejected the DoD plan to close Letterkenney Army Depot and decided to consolidate all tactical missile maintenance at Letterkenney from eight other depots.

Senator Feinstein recommended the rejection of the closure of Alameda Naval Air Station and its essential support facilities and maintain the 6th Army Headquarters at the Presidio of San Francisco.

-- The Commission rejected the DoD recommendation regarding the 6th Army Headquarters, recommending that it stay at the Presidio. The Commission approved the Secretary of Defense proposal to close the Alameda Naval Air Station, with a slight modification in where the aircraft would be relocated. The impact on the Bay area was softened somewhat by a commission vote to retain naval supply center in Oakland.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A	Letters to Representatives Browder and Levy, Senators D'Amato, Moynihan, Feinstein and Boxer, and Governor Cuomo
Tab B	Base Closure Commission Recommendations and Base Closure Impacts on California
Tab C	Incoming Correspondence

To West Wing Desk
FYI

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

27-Jul-1993 10:34 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: M. Brooke Darby
(DARBY)

SUBJECT: Packages 4874 and 5103

There are two packages in the system (5103 and 4874) - responses to Senator Feinstein - that overlap. The former is currently with Paster's office and the latter is with Bell's shop for edits. A copy of 5103 has gone to Bell fyi. When these packages arrive back in our office, they should go to Kristie so she can decide whether the responses should be combined or whether they can both go.

Many thanks.

Distribution:

FOR: Wendy E. Gray (GRAY)
FOR: Brenda I. Hilliard (HILLIARD)
FOR: Cathy Millison (MILLISON)
FOR: Allison M. Wright (WRIGHT)
FOR: M. Brooke Darby (DARBY)
FOR: M. Kay LaPlante (LAPLANTE)
FOR: Michelle M. Bloxton (BLOXTON)

4874
Redo

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 14, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: STEVEN R. JONES

SUBJECT: Letters to President RE: Base Closures from Representatives Browder and Levy, Senators D'Amato, Moynihan, Feinstein and Boxer, and Governor Cuomo

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum for the President requesting his response to letters received from Representatives Browder and Levy, Senators D'Amato, Moynihan, Feinstein and Boxer, and Governor Cuomo regarding his decision on the Base Closure and Realignment Commission report.

President Clinton approved the Commission recommendations and transmitted them to Congress on July 2. The proposed responses by the President address the individual concerns and focus on the Administration's plan to speed base reuse planning, environmental cleanup, property disposal and worker transition.

Concurrences by: Jeremy Rosner, David Lane (NEC)

RECOMMENDATION

That you send a joint memo with Howard Paster and Bob Rubin to the President (Tab I) recommending his signature on letters at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letters to Representatives Browder and Levy, Senators D'Amato, Moynihan, Feinstein and Boxer, and Governor Cuomo
Tab B Base Closure Commission Recommendations and Base Closure Impacts on California
Tab C Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 7, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL RGB

FROM: STEVEN R. JONES

SUBJECT: Letter to President from Senator Boxer Urging Rejection of Base Closure Commission Recommendations

Senator Boxer has written the President recommending that he reject the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and ask the Commission to revise their recommendations to take into account the cumulative economic impact on California.

Department of Defense analysis shows that implementing the Commission's 1993 base closure recommendations would create a direct job loss (or employment shift) of approximately 15,000 military and 14,000 civilian jobs (29,000 total -- most in the San Francisco bay area). Cumulative direct employment impact in California for the three base closure rounds is estimated to be approximately 78,500 jobs.

While the impacts of base closure on California are significant, especially given the weak economic recovery, California can expect large reductions given that it has approximately 15 percent of total DoD employment and 20 percent of DoD expenditures (Tab B). While 8 bases are recommended for closure in California in the 1993 round, this is out of a total of 67 major installations, far more than most other states.

Based upon our analysis and the recommendations of Secretary Aspin and General Powell, President Clinton approved the Commission recommendations and transmitted them to Congress on July 2. The proposed response by the President focuses on the Administration's plan to speed base reuse planning, environmental cleanup, property disposal and worker transition. On July 5 the President and Bob Rubin met in San Francisco with local bay area officials to discuss details of the base reutilization plan.

Concurrences by: Jeremy Rosner, David Lane (NEC)

RECOMMENDATION

That you send a joint memo with Howard Paster and Bob Rubin to the President (Tab I) recommending his signature at Tab A.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to Senator Boxer
Tab B Base Closure Impacts on California
Tab C Incoming Correspondence

4739

GLEN BROWDER
3D DISTRICT, ALABAMA

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0103

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1221 LONGWORTH BUILDIN
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-01
(202) 225-3261

DISTRICT OFFICES:
104 FEDERAL BUI
POST OFFICE BOX 2042
ANNISTON, AL 36202
PHONE: 236-5655

107 FEDERAL BUILDING
OPELIKA, AL 36801
PHONE: 745-6221

115 EAST 4SIDE
TUSKEGEE, AL 36083
PHONE: 727-6490

June 23, 1993

The Honorable Bill Clinton
President of the United States
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Soon you will have the report of the 1993 Base Closure and Realignment Commission, and I urge you to accept their recommendation to keep Fort McClellan, Ala., open.

The commission's decision represents a reaffirmation of its 1991 decision plus a careful analysis of significant new information provided by the fort's supporters this year. The commission's decision is fully supported by the record and deserves to be endorsed.

The Army has assigned serious missions and responsibilities to Fort McClellan. I hope you will insist that this year be the last year in the foreseeable future that Fort McClellan is nominated for closure.

Sincerely,

Glen Browder

Glen Browder
Member of Congress

GB/rbm

4739 /add-on

GLEN BROWDER
3D DISTRICT, ALABAMA

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1221 LONGWORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-0103
(202) 225-3261

DISTRICT OFFICES:
104 FEDERAL BUILDING
POST OFFICE BOX 2042
ANNISTON, AL 36202
PHONE: 236-5655

107 FEDERAL BUILDING
OPELIKA, AL 36801
PHONE: 745-6221

115 EAST NORTHSIDE
TUSKEGEE, AL 36083
PHONE: 727-6490

93 JUN 25 P3 Washington, DC 20515-0103

June 24, 1993

The Honorable Bill Clinton
President of the United States
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

When Congress established the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, we gave the commission broad authority to review Department of Defense recommendations on closing or realigning defense-related installations. At the same time, we gave the president the power to reject individual recommendations and return them to the commission for reconsideration.

This is to ask that you exercise your power to reject the commission's decision to transfer tactical missile maintenance and other work to Letterkenny Army Depot. The commission's action reverses the recommendation of the Defense Department.

Congress specified last year (P.L. 102-184) that the depot-level missile maintenance work should not be consolidated in a single location without competitive bidding. A federal court upheld that law and the Department of Defense agrees with our position against consolidation.

In addition, there is serious disagreement among the interested parties over the information used by the commission to reach its decision.

I urge you, Mr. President, to ask the commission to reconsider.

Sincerely,

Glen Browder

Glen Browder
Member of Congress

GB/rbm

DAVID A. LEVY
4TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK
COMMITTEES:
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
PUBLIC WORKS AND
TRANSPORTATION

4914

116 C/ HOUSE OFFICE BUI
W/ TON, DC 20515-3204
(202) 225-5516

203 ROCKAWAY AVENUE
VALLEY STREAM, NY 11580-5837
(516) 872-9550

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3204

June 28, 1993

President Bill Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

It is with deep conviction that I write you in opposition to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's list of recommendations.

I am most concerned with decision to close Naval Station New York, located at Staten Island. The Staten Island Naval Station is the only remaining naval base in the entire Northeast. Its location provides the Navy a quick response capability to the North Atlantic and to potential trouble areas in the Middle East or the Adriatic. In fact, the Staten Island base is up to two days closer to the Mediterranean than other east coast bases, such as Mayport and four to five days closer than naval stations located on the Gulf Coast. Reaction time, so important in today's world, is enhanced by Staten Island's proximity to open sea.

Mr. President, I hear many of my colleagues expressing the sense that the cold war is over and it is time to start downsizing our military. While I share that view, we cannot do so at a rate that will seriously imperil our defense capability or our responsibilities to our allies. I firmly believe that closing the Staten Island base compromises our defense capabilities.

Nearly fifty years have passed since this country was involved in a war unparalleled in the annals of world history. America learned many valuable lessons from that war, perhaps the most important being that we must never be caught with our guard down, as we were at Pearl Harbor. Relatedly, we learned that we must never station an entire fleet in one place. The Staten Island base provides for the ship berthing capabilities needed to fulfill a vital distribution of the Atlantic fleet.

Mr. President, I want to close by reaffirming the strategic need for the Staten Island base. Operation Desert Storm was an example of the type of regional conflict in which this country

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

will be involved during the remainder of this decade and into the next century. No, we do not have to equip our military to fight the Soviets. However, we must insure that our military, especially our Navy, is capable of addressing world emergencies on a moment's notice. The Staten Island base provides this capability and should remain open and operating.

I respectfully request that you reject the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's recommendations and send the proposal back to the commission with instructions to spare the Staten Island base.

Thank you in advance for your attention in this regard.

Sincerely,



David A. Levy
Member of Congress

DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN
NEW YORK

4884

93 JUN 29 P6:08

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3201

June 28, 1993

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The Base Closure and Realignment Commission has voted to overturn Secretary Aspin's recommendation and establish an east coast air mobility base at McGuire Air Force Base. This was the only change made to his recommendations for large aircraft bases.

McGuire was the least qualified of the three candidates for this mission. It falls short in military value, ramp space and condition, airspace congestion, refueling system, and condition of facilities.

The views of one or two commissioners seemed to sway the votes of the others. We cannot accept the fact that they were able to overturn the results of countless hours of research and analysis in the Pentagon, or that the defense planners found the wrong answer on this. We hope you will not either.

As the number of military bases decreases, the importance of each grows. This decision is too important to let stand unchallenged. We urge you to send the Commission's final recommendations back to them for reconsideration of the matter, as is your prerogative.

Sincerely,

Alfonse M. D'Amato
United States Senate

Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Senate

Mario M. Cuomo
Governor of New York

DIANNE FEINSTEIN
CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0504

June 28, 1993

PRIORITY

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I urge you not to accept the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's recommendation to close the Alameda Naval Air Station (NAS) and its essential support facilities. The Commission's four to three vote to close Alameda NAS does not make military or fiscal sense, and was not justified based on the statutory criteria.

By voting to close Alameda NAS, the Commission decided to keep open an unfinished naval station in Everett, Washington that is only 60 percent complete and will require $190 million in additional military construction. I am baffled by the logic of the Department of Defense's recommendation and the Commission's final decision to close an existing naval facility and keep open a base that does not yet exist.

ALAMEDA HAS THE HIGHEST MILITARY VALUE

By law, military value must be given priority consideration. This criteria includes current and future mission requirements, the impact of operational readiness, and availability of land, the ability to accommodate contingency and mobilization requirements, and cost and manpower implications. However, based on the Navy's own data and the facts that were presented, the Commission clearly deviated from its own criteria in deciding to close Alameda NAS.

The military value of Alameda NAS is 58.2 (the highest of any west coast naval station). By comparison, the military value of the Everett facility is only 42.8 -- more than 15 points less than Alameda NAS.

Alameda NAS has many significant advantages over the Everett facility. Most important is the fact that Alameda NAS is an operational, full service base with all the required support facilities nearby. The Everett facility, on the other hand, is not yet complete and, as I stated, will require $190 million in additional military construction just to bring the base up to initial operating capacity.

In addition, Alameda NAS has an adjacent airfield and aviation maintenance depot; the Everett facility does not. At Alameda NAS, aircraft can be off-loaded directly onto the adjoining airfield and easily transported to the aviation maintenance depot for repair. At Everett, the nearest naval airfield is more than 100 miles away by road and there is no naval aviation maintenance depot anywhere in the region. At Everett, for example, the entire air squadron would need to be transported from the airfield at Whidbey Island to the aircraft carrier homeported at Everett.

The naval base at Alameda is also closer to naval fleet concentrations and training facilities near San Diego, California. In contrast, ships homeported at Everett will require at least three days of steaming time to reach naval facilities in southern California. Additionally, Alameda's proximity to open ocean gives it a clear advantage over the Everett facility. A ship based at Alameda NAS requires less than one hour of steaming time to reach open ocean. A ship based at Everett, however, requires up to twelve hours to reach open ocean.

Finally, the Alameda area has the highest percentage of military housing nationwide -- over 7,300 units of housing for both enlisted and commissioned personnel. Everett currently has no military housing and even after all construction is completed, the base will have only 195 units of housing. With 5,000 personnel assigned to one aircraft carrier, affordable and available housing becomes extremely important in the quality of life of military personnel.

CLOSING ALAMEDA DOES NOT MAKE FISCAL SENSE

Though the Navy's original estimate for the one-time closure cost of Alameda NAS was only $194 million, a new Navy report estimates that the cost is actually three times more. The Regional Coordination Plan, conducted by the Commander of Naval Base San Francisco, estimates that the cost to close Alameda NAS is $591 million. In comparison, the one-time closure cost of the Everett facility is only $95 million. Unfortunately, the Commission staff, though given the updated Navy report weeks before the final hearing, presented only the original, inaccurate closure costs during the Commission's final deliberations.

The total cost savings from closing Alameda NAS is estimated at a net present value of only $168 million by the year 2013. The additional military construction cost that is immediately necessary at the Everett facility just to achieve initial

operating capacity is $190 million. Therefore, even after 20 years, closing Alameda NAS and keeping open the Everett facility will actually cost the Navy $22 million. In addition, it would take 10 years to recoup any savings from closing Alameda NAS, whereas the enormous savings from closing the Everett facility are immediate.

I understand that the annual operating costs of Alameda NAS are higher than those costs for the Everett facility, but Alameda NAS is a substantially larger facility and is a full service naval installation. In addition to being nuclear certified and fully licensed, Alameda NAS and can berth three nuclear aircraft carriers and 19 cruiser equivalent ships. The Everett facility, when it is finally completed, will only be able to berth one nuclear aircraft carrier and eight cruiser equivalent ships.

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CLOSING ALAMEDA IS SUBSTANTIAL

Economic impact, including the cumulative economic impact from previous base closures, must be taken into consideration by the Commission. Over 31,000 direct and indirect jobs will be affected by the closure of Alameda NAS compared with only 1,102 at the Everett facility. The economic impact of the closure of Alameda NAS on the local community is as high as 4.9 percent, compared with only 0.1 percent for the Everett facility.

As you know, California has been hit hard as a result of previous base closures and defense down-sizing. More than 68,000 jobs were adversely affected as a result of the 1988 and 1991 base closure rounds when 17 military installations were slated for closure in California. In addition, in just the last two years, approximately 250,000 jobs have been lost in California due to reductions in defense spending.

California is still in the depths of a recession from which most of the country has already recovered. Currently, California's unemployment rate is 8.7 percent (well above the national average of 6.9 percent) and 1.3 million Californians are still out of work. The additional loss of over 90,000 jobs throughout the State as a result of this round of base closures will only sink California deeper into its recession and cause severe economic hardship for individuals, families and entire communities.

CONCLUSION

I believe the decision to close Alameda NAS and its support facilities is flawed and not in the national interest. Based on

all the criteria -- military value, return on investment, and economic impact -- the Department of Defense's recommendation and the Commission's final decision do not make sense. Closing Alameda NAS is strategically incorrect, is not cost-effective, and will have a severe economic impact on the San Francisco Bay Area and the entire State of California.

I urge you not to accept the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's recommendation with regard to the Alameda Naval Air Station and its essential support facilities.

Sincerely,

Dianne Feinstein

DF:ram

Ms. President,

This is an S.O.S.

Please help!!!

Dianne

4742

DIANNE FEINSTEIN
CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0504

93 JUN 25 P1 : 56

June 21, 1993

The Honorable Bill Clinton
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to inform you of my strong support for maintaining the 6th Army Headquarters at the Presidio of San Francisco where it is currently located. The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission currently recommends that the 6th Army Headquarters be relocated to the NASA Ames facility at Moffett Field, California.

I have shared my views with the Base Closure Commission, in writing as well as in my most recent testimony before the Commission here in Washington. I have enclosed my letter to Chairman Courter on this issue for your review. In this letter I point out that the move to NASA Ames will cost in the range of $10-$17 million, while the operating costs at both locations are estimated to be comparable. Former Secretary of the Army Michael Stone, in his testimony before the Base Closure Commission on April 25 called the plan to move the 6th Army "an economic loser."

The idea for maintaining the 6th Army Headquarters is supported by myself, Secretary Stone, and Representative Nancy Pelosi among others. Perhaps most importantly, the idea has received strong support from the Department of the Interior and the National Park Service who will be the landlords of the Presidio by the end of next year.

As you may know, the Presidio of San Francisco, as mandated by federal law, will be transferred to the National Park Service as a valuable addition to the Golden Gate National Recreation Area. This transfer will not be affected by the Army remaining at the Presidio. It is our hope that this park will soon become an international center for education and research, and many organizations are involved to make this vision a reality. Maintaining the 6th Army Headquarters at the Presidio will provide the Park Service with a valuable tenant, as well as a source of needed revenue, as the Army would likely enter a lease agreement with the Park Service for the buildings it would utilize.

Your support for maintaining the 6th Army Headquarters at the Presidio is important not only for the money it would save, but for the long-term benefits it would provide to the Park

Service. As the base closure process draws to an end, I urge you to give this plan your most serious consideration.

Sincerely,

Dianne Feinstein
United States Senator

DF:msm
Enclosure

4874

BARBARA BOXER
CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT
AND PUBLIC WORKS

COMMITTEE ON BANKING,
HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

United States Senate

HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
SUITE 112
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0505

1700 MONTGOMERY STREET
SUITE 240
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111

2250 EAST IMPERIAL HIGHWAY
SUITE 545
EL SEGUNDO, CA 90245

June 28, 1993

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Based on preliminary estimates, California will once again be asked to take a disproportionate hit in the base closure process, shouldering nearly thirty-five percent of the job losses nationwide. There must be a better way to distribute the pain of base closures and realignments.

I am writing to urge that you not accept the recommendations of the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, and that you return them with instructions to the Commission to revise their plan in such a way as to reduce the burden on the people of California.

In this round of base closures, the Commission voted to close seven major military installations and several smaller facilities and realign one in California. Tens of thousands of Californians will lose their jobs, an estimated 25,000 in the San Francisco Bay area alone.

The state of California has already borne 60 percent of the personnel reductions attributable to base closures. Since 1988 there have been seventeen California bases slated for closure as a result of previous base closure rounds--more than double any other state.

In March of this year you expressed your hope that the defense base closure and realignment process would not place an undue burden on the people of California. Unfortunately it has done just that.

On behalf of the people of California, I ask that you direct the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to revise their recommendations and take into account the cumulative economic impact on California.

Sincerely,

Barbara Boxer

Barbara Boxer
United States Senator

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Naval Submarine Base, New London's capacity is excess to that required to support the number of ships reflected in the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support the projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations. With a reduction in ships, the Navy requires one submarine base per Fleet. In view of the capacity at the Submarine Base, Kings Bay and the Naval Station, Norfolk, the submarines based at New London can be relocated to activities with a higher military value. The education and training missions being performed at the Submarine Base, New London will continue to be performed there and the Navy will retain piers, waterfront facilities and related property. This realignment, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet bases.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community claimed the Navy's proposal to realign New London did not reduce excess capacity. Instead, it only duplicated existing resources elsewhere and therefore wasted the taxpayers' money. The community also questioned the Navy's configuration analysis. The Navy's analysis required that (1) Norfolk be a part of any solution and (2) there be only one SSBN/SSN unique base per fleet. The community claimed these rules led the Navy to exclude New London automatically from any solution. The community argued the Navy's analysis thus appeared to be used to justify its previous judgment to exclude New London. The community questioned the strategic gain and increase in military value resulting from the realignment of New London, since military value did not appear to be a part of the Navy's configuration analysis. The community proposed an alternate plan involving retaining submarines that would ostensibly save $1.2 billion. The community also stated the economic effect of the realignment would be grave because the New London area is heavily dependent on defense industries.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the Secretary of Defense's recommendation to terminate Naval Submarine Base (SUBBASE) New London's mission to homeport submarines calls for substantial military construction (MILCON) at SUBBASE King's Bay and Naval Station Norfolk to replace capabilities and facilities that exist in New London. The Commission further found the Navy's analysis was very sensitive to one-time costs due to the sizeable MILCON, particularly in view of what costs the Navy deemed appropriate to consider. Just prior to final deliberations, the Chairman of the Navy's Base Structure Evaluation Committee reported to the Commission that the Navy was not likely ever to move attack submarines to Kings Bay.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2, 4, and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Naval Submarine Base, New London remains open and does not realign. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Naval Air Station Alameda, California

Category: Naval Base
Mission: Support of Aviation Activities, Afloat Units, and Other Activities
One-time Cost: $ 193.69 million
Savings: 1994-99: $ -72.17 million (Cost)
Annual: $ 41.69 million
Payback: 10 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Air Station (NAS), Alameda, California and relocate its aircraft along with the dedicated personnel, equipment and support to NASA Ames/Moffett Field, California and NAS North Island. In addition, those ships currently berthed

at NAS Alameda will be relocated to the Fleet concentrations at San Diego and Bangor/Puget Sound/Everett. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Navy Regional Data Automation Center, San Francisco realigns to NAS North Island; Ship Intermediate Maintenance Department disestablishes; the Naval Air Reserve Center and the Marine Corps Reserve Center relocate to leased space at NASA/Ames.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The projected carrier air wing reductions in the DoD Force Structure Plan require a significant decrease in air station and naval station capacity. NAS Alameda is recommended for closure as it has the lowest military value of those air stations supporting the Pacific Fleet. Given the number of aircraft "bedded down" at the air station, it has greatest amount of excess capacity. Also, given the need to eliminate excess ship berthing, its capacity is not required to meet force levels, since no more than five carrier berths are required on the West Coast; three at the fleet concentration in San Diego and two at Bangor/Puget Sound/Everett. Both the limited aircraft (primarily reserve) and ship assets at NAS Alameda can be readily absorbed at bases with a higher military value. This closure results in an increased average military value of both the remaining air stations and naval stations in the Pacific Fleet.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community believed the Navy penalized NAS Alameda's military value ranking because the Navy evaluated Alameda as a naval air station when its capabilities more closely resemble those of a naval station. The community criticized the Navy's plan to build at NAVSTA Everett and NAS North Island to replace existing capabilities at NAS Alameda; it said the Navy underestimated the costs of closing at Alameda and rebuilding elsewhere. The community also asserted that both Everett and North Island required dredging and building nuclear carrier piers and that the licensing and environmental procedures are difficult. The community argued that even if this costly construction were completed, Everett would not have a contiguous airfield while NAS Alameda does, asserting the presence of a contiguous airfield creates a synergism among the facilities at Alameda. By contrast, the absence of a contiguous airfield would pose potentially significant operational problems at Everett.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the aircraft beddown capacity and ship berthing at NAS Alameda is excess to that required to support the DoD force structure. The Commission also found NAS Alameda had the lowest military value as a Naval Air Station in the Pacific fleet. While its military value as a Naval Station is relatively high, its primary purpose is the homeporting of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, and there is sufficient carrier berthing capacity in San Diego, Puget Sound, and Everett. Substantial military construction (MILCON) is occurring at Naval Station, Everett, Washington, and Naval Air Station North Island, California, to replace a portion of the nuclear aircraft carrier berthing capacity that exists at Alameda. These MILCON projects are being accomplished separate from the base closure process and will ultimately result in the Navy's ability to homeport aircraft carriers at a reduced cost.

In a letter dated June 1, 1993, the Chief of Naval Operations advised the Commission that the original Secretary of Defense recommendation to close Naval Air Station Alameda did not fully distinguish between active duty aviation assets and tenant reserved aviation assets. That distinction is made clear in the Commission recommendation.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Air Station (NAS), Alameda, California and relocate its aircraft along with the dedicated personnel, equipment and support to NAS North Island. In addition, those ships currently berthed at NAS Alameda will be relocated to the Fleet concentrations at San Diego and Bangor/Puget Sound/Everett. Disposition of major tenants is as follows: Reserve aviation assets relocate to NASA Ames/Moffett Field, California, NAS Whidbey Island, and NAS Willow Grove; Navy Regional Data Automation Center, San Francisco

realigns to NAS North Island; Ship Intermediate Maintenance Department disestablishes; the Naval Air Reserve Center and the Marine Corps Reserve Center relocate to leased space at NASA/Ames.

Naval Station Treasure Island, California

Category: Naval Base
Mission: Maintain and Operate Facilities and Support Tenant Activities
One-time Cost: $ 30.95 million
Savings: 1994-99: $ 123.0 million
Annual: $ 44.48 million
Payback: 3 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Station, Treasure Island and relocate personnel, as appropriate to the Naval Station, San Diego, California; Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia; Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois and various Naval Reserve sites in California. Major tenants are impacted as follows: Naval Reserve Center San Francisco relocates to the Naval/Marine Corps Reserve Center, Alameda, California and REDCOM 20 relocates to the Naval Reserve Center, San Bruno, California. Naval Technical Training Center relocates to Fleet Training Center San Diego, Naval Amphibious School, Little Creek and Naval Training Center Great Lakes.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The DoD Force Structure Plan supports a decrease in naval station capacity. Naval Station, Treasure Island has a relatively low military value and its capacity is not required to support Navy requirements. The naval bases to which its activities will be relocated have higher military value to the Navy than does this naval station. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support the projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations. This closure, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Pacific Fleet, reduces excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Pacific Fleet bases.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the closure of Naval Station (NAVSTA) Treasure Island, along with the other proposed Bay Area closures, would destroy the strategic infrastructure of the San Francisco area. It pointed out NAVSTA Treasure Island had a new fire fighting school that was environmentally sound and was the only one of its kind on the West Coast. It was also the site of over 1,000 family housing units and other support services the military retirement community depended upon heavily, particularly in light of the closure of the Presidio of San Francisco.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the capacity to homeport ships at Naval Station Treasure Island was excess to that required to support the DoD force structure. Further, the Commission found the primary purposes of NAVSTA Treasure Island are to provide military family housing, some training and other support for shipboard personnel and dependents in the San Francisco Bay area. In view of the recommendations to close NAS Alameda, these facilities are not required.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Station, Treasure Island and relocate personnel, as appropriate to the Naval Station, San Diego, California; Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia; Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois and various Naval Reserve sites in California. Major tenants are impacted as follows: Naval Reserve Center San Francisco relocates to the Naval/Marine Corps Reserve Center, Alameda, California and REDCOM 20 relocates to the Naval Reserve Center, San Bruno,

at the Presidio of Monterey Annex except the housing, commissary, child care facility, and post exchange required to support the Presidio of Monterey and Naval Post Graduate School. Consolidate base operations support with the Naval Post Graduate School by interservice support agreement. The Department of Defense will evaluate whether contracted base-operations support will provide savings for the Presidio of Monterey. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 88/91 Recommendations

Presidio of San Francisco, California

Category: Command and Control
Mission: Coordinates and Provides Base Operations Support for Sixth U.S. Army
One-time Cost: None
Savings: 1994-99: $ -35.9 million (Cost)
Annual: $ -6.0 million (Cost)
Payback: Never

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Change the recommendation of the 1988 DoD Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission regarding the Presidio of San Francisco, as follows: relocate Headquarters, Sixth U.S. Army from Presidio San Francisco to NASA Ames, CA, instead of to Fort Carson, CO, as originally approved by the Defense Secretary's BRAC Commission in 1988.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The 1988 DoD BRAC Commission recommended closing the Presidio of San Francisco. As a result of this closure, the Army identified Fort Carson, CO, as the receiver of the 6th Army Headquarters. Since then, the 1991 Base Closure Commission recommended several closures and realignments in California that did not have the capacity to receive functions or personnel in the 1988 process. During its capacity analysis, the Army identified available space at NASA Ames (formerly Naval Air Station Moffett) which could accept the 6th Army Headquarters. As part of its analysis, the Army determined the military value of retaining the headquarters in California is enhanced as it provides the best available location necessary to exercise the command and control mission over all the reserve units within its area of responsibility. These reasons are as follow:

(a) Seventy-five percent of the reserve units within Sixth Army's area of responsibility are located on the West Coast;

(b) The principal ports of debarkation for the West Coast are Seattle, Oakland, and Long Beach;

(c) The West Coast is prime territory for military assistance to civil authorities. It is the area with the highest probability of natural disaster and is an area where substantial drug-enforcement missions are taking place;

(d) Timeliness/location is the critical element that may separate success from failure.

Additionally, recent experiences with Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, natural disasters, and civil disturbances have pointed out the need to keep the headquarters on the West Coast.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community contended moving to NASA Ames did not achieve any cost savings. Community representatives argued the annual operating costs to locate 6th Army Headquarters at NASA Ames or the Presidio were similar. The community also stated the Sixth Army would have to move twice — first into temporary, then into permanent facilities — due to renovation requirements at NASA Ames. The requirement of two moves provides additional hidden costs. In addition, the community asserts NASA Ames did not have available family housing on base, while family housing at the Presidio of San Francisco is plentiful, well built, and economical to maintain.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the command and control Sixth U.S. Army exercises over its Reserve Component forces is regional, not site specific, encompasses twelve states, and has not changed from the 1988 stated mission. The Commission found 58 percent of the Reserve units

and 59 percent of the Reserve personnel Sixth U.S. Army supervises were located in the three West Coast states. California contains 38 percent of the Reserve units and 38 percent of the Reserve personnel. Because of the dispersion of the Reserve Component units within Sixth U.S. Army's region, the Commission found communication and travel capability were the foremost requirements in determining its location.

The 1988 Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure recommended the Sixth U.S. Army move to Fort Carson, CO, to place the headquarters on a multimission installation out of a high-cost area. The proposed change to the 1988 DoD BRAC Commission recommendation would keep the Sixth U.S. Army in a high cost area; however, the Army felt operational necessity outweighed the increased steady-state cost. The Army felt staying in California would enhance the Sixth Army's ability to exercise command and control of all Reserve units within its area of responsibility.

The Commission found there was very little difference in the operating costs of staying at the Presidio of San Francisco or moving to NASA Ames, and cost and turbulence could be avoided by not moving.

The Commission found the Secretary of the Interior supports the Sixth U.S. Army remaining at the Presidio of San Francisco as a tenant of the National Park Service. The Commission found the Secretary of the Interior has stated the National Park Service is prepared to begin negotiations on the terms of a lease arrangement and common support costs. The Secretary of the Interior also stated the Park Service is prepared to reach an equitable leasing arrangement that would be competitive with other lessors in the area.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 4. Therefore, the Commission rejects the Secretary's recommendation on the Presidio of San Francisco and instead adopts the following recommendation: the 1988 DoD BRAC Commission recommendation will be changed to allow only the Sixth U.S. Army Headquarters to remain at the Presidio of San Francisco, CA. The Department of Interior and the Department of the Army should negotiate a lease favorable to both departments for the current facilities occupied by Sixth U.S. Army Headquarters and family housing at the Presidio of San Francisco necessary to accommodate the headquarters members. If agreement cannot be reached, the Commission expects the Army to make a subsequent recommendation to the 1995 Commission for the relocation of Sixth U.S. Army Headquarters. The Commission further recommends the Defense Commissary Agency and the Army and Air Force Exchange System determine the commissary and exchange requirements to support Sixth U.S. Army Headquarters based on sound business decisions. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois

Category: Commodity Oriented
Mission: Production
One-time Cost: $ -44.1 million (Savings)
Savings: 1994-99: $ 75.4 million
Annual: $ 1.0 million
Payback: Immediate

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Rock Island Arsenal, IL, as follows: instead of sending the materiel management functions of U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) to Redstone Arsenal, AL, as recommended by the 1991 Base Closure Commission, reorganize these functions under Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) with the functions remaining in place at Rock Island Arsenal, IL.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Under the Commission's recommendation in 1991, the materiel management functions for AMCCOM's armament and chemical functions were to be transferred to Redstone Arsenal for merger with U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM). The merger would have created a new commodity command to be called the Missile, Armament, and Chemical Command (MACCOM). This merger allowed one national inventory control point (NICP) to be eliminated.

Naval Station Mobile, Alabama

Category: Naval Base
Mission: Support Homeported Ships
One-time Cost: $ 4.88 million
Savings: 1994-99: $ 66.83 million
Annual: $ 8.43 million
Payback: 2 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Station, Mobile and relocate assigned ships to Naval Stations Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Ingleside, Texas, along with dedicated personnel, equipment and appropriate other support.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The berths at Naval Station, Mobile are excess to the capacity required to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with a goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support the projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations were configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations as part of the solution. The ships based at Naval Station Mobile can be relocated to other naval bases which have a higher military value. This realignment, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet bases.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the Navy's military value ranking was inaccurate. The community stated the Navy did not give adequate consideration to the role Naval Station (NAVSTA) Mobile plays in training reserves. The community also felt the Navy did not correctly compare NAVSTA Mobile to NAVSTA Pascagoula. The community claimed Mobile was superior to Pascagoula in the areas of navigation, safety, quality of life and the Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity. It believed the Navy greatly overestimated the savings associated with the closure of the base. The community also noted its strong state and local support for the facility and argued the closure of NAVSTA Mobile would have a serious and adverse effect on the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the capacity to homeport ships at Mobile is excess to that required to support the DoD force structure. The Commission also found closure would account for a relatively small job loss in this employment area and would result in savings.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Station, Mobile and relocate assigned ships to Naval Stations Pascagoula, Mississippi, and Ingleside, Texas, along with dedicated personnel, equipment and appropriate other support.

Naval Station Staten Island, New York

Category: Naval Base
Mission: Support Homeported Ships
One-time Cost: $ -16.15 million (Savings)
Savings: 1994-99: $ 298.92 million
Annual: $ 42.64 million
Payback: Immediate

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Naval Station Staten Island. Relocate its ships along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Stations, Norfolk, Virginia and Mayport, Florida. Disposition of minor tenants is as follows: Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity, New York relocates to Earle, New Jersey and Norfolk, Virginia; Recruiting District, New York disestablishes; Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP), Brooklyn Detachment disestablishes.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The berthing capacity of Naval Station Staten Island is excess to the capacity required

TAB B

to support the DoD Force Structure Plan. A comprehensive analysis of naval station berthing capacity was performed with the goal of reducing excess capacity to the maximum extent possible while maintaining the overall military value of the remaining naval stations. To provide berthing to support projected force structure, the resulting mix of naval stations was configured to satisfy specific mission requirements, including: 100 percent aircraft carrier berthing in each fleet; ammunition ships at ESQD-approved berthing; one SSN/SSBN unique base complex per fleet; and maintenance of the Norfolk and San Diego fleet concentrations. The ships currently berthed at Naval Station Staten Island can be relocated to bases with higher military value. This closure, combined with other recommended closures and realignments in the Atlantic Fleet, results in the maximum reduction of excess capacity while increasing the average military value of the remaining Atlantic Fleet bases.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the Navy's analytical process was not sound because it contained many procedural errors, analytical inconsistencies and inflated values for certain capabilities. The community also challenged the soundness of the Navy's megaport concept. It believed closing Naval Station (NAVSTA) Staten Island would pose operational problems because New York is four to five days closer to potential conflicts than ports in the Gulf of Mexico. The community claimed the closure of NAVSTA Staten Island would create a loss of significant training opportunity for Naval Reservists, particularly in light of other planned closures in the Northeast. The community felt the Navy did not adequately consider the adverse economic impact the closure of NAVSTA Staten Island would have on the New York Harbor industrial base, especially private shipyards.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found the capacity to homeport ships at Naval Station Staten Island is excess to that required to support the DoD force structure. The Commission also found closure would account for a relatively small job loss in this employment area and would result in substantial savings. The Secretary suggested a correction or revision to his March 1993 recommendation. The Commission found that the revised proposal had a higher military value and should be adopted.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Station Staten Island. Relocate its ships along with their dedicated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Stations, Norfolk, Virginia and Mayport, Florida. Disposition of minor tenants is as follows: Ship Intermediate Maintenance Activity, New York relocates to Earle, New Jersey and Norfolk, Virginia; Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP), Brooklyn Detachment disestablishes. Retain family housing located at Naval Station, Staten Island, as necessary to support Naval Weapons Station, Earle, New Jersey. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Naval Submarine Base New London, Connecticut

Category: Naval Base
Mission: Support Homeported Submarine
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: 1994-99: N/A
Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Naval Submarine Base (NSB), New London by terminating its mission to homeport ships. Relocate berthed ships, their personnel, associated equipment and other support to the Submarine Base, Kings Bay, Georgia and the Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia. This relocation is to include a floating drydock. Piers, waterfront facilities, and related property shall be retained by the Navy at New London, Connecticut. The Nuclear Submarine Support Facility, a major tenant, relocates to Kings Bay, Georgia and Norfolk, Virginia; and another major tenant, the Nuclear Power Training Unit, disestablishes.

CHAPTER 1
COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has completed its review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense recommendations for base closures and realignments, as transmitted to the Commission on March 12, 1993. This chapter contains a summary of the Commission's findings and its recommendations for closures and realignments.

Information on each of the Commission's base closure and realignment decisions is presented below. The paragraphs entitled "Secretary of Defense Recommendations" and "Secretary of Defense Justifications" were taken verbatim from the *Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report* dated March 1993. The paragraphs entitled "Community Concerns" provide a brief summary of arguments presented to the Commission by local communities; they are not all-inclusive. Where applicable, substantial deviations from the application of the force-structure plan and final criteria are identified.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Initial Entry Training/Branch School

Fort George B. McClellan, Alabama

Category: Initial Entry Training/Branch School
Mission: Chemical and Military Police Centers and Schools
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: 1994-99: N/A
Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Close Fort McClellan. Relocate the U.S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Leonard Wood, MO. Transfer accountability for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities, through licensing, to the Army National Guard. Retain an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserves. Retain the capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Fort McClellan has the least amount of facilities and smallest population of any of the Army's individual entry training/branch school installations and was accordingly ranked ninth in a category of 13 installations. Three of the 13 installations tied for the thirteenth position and were later removed from further consideration as a result of a specific capability needed to support mission requirements. The tenth installation in this category was not considered for closure because it controls airspace, airfields, and aviation facilities which represent unique assets to the Army.

Collocation of the chemical, military police, and engineer schools provides substantial advantages for operational linkages among the three branches. These linkages enable the Army to focus on the doctrinal and force development of three key maneuver support elements. Synergistic advantages of training and professional development programs are: coordination, employment and removal of obstacles, conduct of river crossing operations, internal security/nation assistance operations, operations in rear areas or along main supply routes, and counter drug operations. The missions of the three branches will be more effectively integrated.

Each school develops doctrine, training, leadership, organization, and material products which are technical in nature and proponent specific. The only place to achieve integration is at the combined arms level. Using the opportunity to collocate these schools will assure synergistic solutions for current, emerging, and future challenges.

This recommendation is a change to the recommendation made to the 1991 Commission that was disapproved. The 1991 Commission rejected this recommendation because it found the Army substantially deviated from criteria 1 and 2. Their rationale questioned the Army's decision to maintain the Chemical Decontamination Training Facility (CDTF) in caretaker status because it could contribute little, if any, to chemical

defense preparedness and the CDTF could not be reactivated quickly.

The Army's proposal to close Fort McClellan differs in two respects. First, the DODPI will relocate to Fort Leonard Wood, MO, instead of Fort Huachuca, AZ, and second, the Army will retain the capability to continue live-agent training. Subsequent to the 1991 Commission's decision, the Army conducted an in-depth study of the value of live-agent training. The study affirmed its military value. The Army's nuclear, biological, and chemical readiness training is interwoven throughout all training and included at all levels of command. Operations in a potentially hostile chemical environment are an integral part of individual and collective skills training, and routinely practiced during unit field training exercises. By maintaining the capability for chemical live-agent training at Fort McClellan, the Army will continue to provide realistic chemical preparedness training. A robust chemical/biological defense is a vital part of a three-pronged effort, including arms control and conventional/nuclear deterrence. The Army is the only service that conducts live-agent training, and it will continue this training. The Air Force has indicated its desire to collocate its disaster preparedness technical training with the Army's Chemical School at Fort Leonard Wood; the Army supports this initiative.

The Army provides live-agent training not only for Army personnel (approximately 4000 students per year), but also for other Services, the State Department, and even foreign countries (approximately 600 students per year). This training usually involves two days at the CDTF while other training is conducted at other facilities of the Chemical School. The CDTF will remain part of the Chemical School, even though it is being operated at another location. Although it is feasible to replicate this facility at Fort Leonard Wood, maintaining the existing facility affords the same capability without any additional construction.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued separating the live-agent training facility from the Chemical School would seriously degrade the ability to test chemical decontamination doctrine and equipment. Community representatives also questioned the Army's ability to construct a new facility at Fort Leonard Wood, and noted even if it could be done, it would require up to nine years to accomplish. The community also asserted new construction costs would be up to five times greater than Army estimates.

The community cited the lower military value of other Initial Entry Training/Branch School installations and claimed the return on investment for Fort McClellan's closure was actually much lower than the Army analysis showed. In addition, the community cited numerous reasons for training degradation at Fort Leonard Wood, including the inadequacy of smoke ranges, the inability to develop joint-service training efforts begun at Fort McClellan, and the long period of turmoil resulting from the move. Community representatives also questioned the DODPI's ability to conduct research missions at Fort Leonard Wood.

Finally, the community argued this closure would produce the highest long-term economic impact of this round of the base closure process, because residual property at Fort McClellan would not provide offsetting commercial value for the community.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found separating the Chemical School from the CDTF would negatively impact the nation's chemical-defense capability. There was no guarantee the live-agent training facility, the CDTF, could be moved, and the Commission found it imprudent to jeopardize the facility's existence until such assurance could be obtained.

The Commission validated the military value of the installations in this category and found the DoD process considered all installations fairly and equitably. Fort Leonard Wood had sufficient space to conduct smoke training and the other training functions found at Fort McClellan, as well as additional space to conduct joint-training activities. The Army's recent experience in relocating two other branch schools was significant and could enable the Chemical and Military Police Schools to move with minimal disruption.

The Commission found economic impact was indeed high in the Anniston, AL area.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission rejects the following recommendation of the Secretary of Defense: close Fort McClellan except for Pelham Range and other required training support facilities to be licensed to the Army National Guard, and an enclave to support the U.S. Army Reserves; relocate the Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, MO; retain the capability for live-agent training at Fort McClellan. The Commission does recommend that if the Secretary of Defense wants to move the Chemical Defense School and Chemical Decontamination Training Facility in the future, the Army should pursue all of the required permits and certification for the new site prior to the 1995 Base Closure process. The Commission finds that this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and the final criteria.

Commodity Oriented

Fort Monmouth, New Jersey

Category: Commodity Oriented
Mission: Provides Facilities and Services to All Resident Activities
One-time Cost: $ 63.6 million
Savings: 1994-99: $ -27.0 million (Cost)
Annual: $ 13.3 million
Payback: 10 years

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Fort Monmouth. Relocate the headquarters of U.S. Army Communications Electronic Command (CECOM) from leased space outside Fort Monmouth to Rock Island Arsenal, IL, and transfer the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson, SC. Consolidate activities to maximize utilization of main post Fort Monmouth. Dispose of excess facilities and real property at Evans and Charles Woods subposts, as well as main post, Fort Monmouth.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

Fort Monmouth ranks fourth out of twelve installations in military value. It is a small installation with elements located off base in costly leased space. Relocating the CECOM Headquarters, an administrative and logistical headquarters, from leased facilities located outside the main post of Fort Monmouth, NJ, to permanent facilities at Rock Island Arsenal, IL, allows the Army to terminate a lease of $15 million per year with additional savings of over $8 million per year in locality pay differential for the civilian workforce. At the same time, it better utilizes the excess space identified at Rock Island. Separating the headquarters and administrative function from the research and development aspect of CECOM will not have an operational impact.

Rock Island Arsenal has the infrastructure to support and house the headquarters element of CECOM. Currently, Rock Island has administrative space to accommodate approximately 1,000 additional personnel and permanent building space that can be renovated to accommodate even more personnel. The computer-systems center on the arsenal is one of the Army's largest and can accommodate the needs of the headquarters.

The Rock Island community infrastructure can accommodate the new residents without the need to construct new schools, new water and sewer facilities, or other public facilities. There is abundant housing at reasonable costs and excellent access to higher education, both at the graduate and undergraduate level.

Fort Jackson trains about one half of the basic trainees and is the largest recruit training center. It is also the home of the Soldier Support Center, which is relocating from Fort Benjamin Harrison. The report to the 1991 Commission describing the proposed closure of Fort Benjamin Harrison stated the Army planned to collocate the Chaplain School with this Center eventually. The transfer of the Chaplain School to Fort Jackson benefits not only the Chaplain School's students, but also the large population of basic trainees who are beginning a new career in the Army, many of whom are separated from their families for the first time. The Chaplain School and its staff of chaplains will facilitate the trainees' transition to the Army life.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the Secretary's proposed realignment of CECOM headquarters to Rock Island Arsenal split the headquarters from the

Army Depots

Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania

Category: Depots
Mission: Depot Maintenance
*One-time Cost: $ 23.1 million**
*Savings: 1994-99: $ 42.8 million**
Annual: $ 13.1 million
Payback: 7 years
**These numbers reflect SIMA-E redirect savings*

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign Letterkenny Army Depot (LEAD) by reducing it to a depot activity and placing it under the command and control of Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA. Relocate the maintenance functions and associated workload to other depot-maintenance activities, including the private sector. Retain the conventional ammunition storage mission and the regional Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) mission. Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Letterkenny as follows: instead of sending Systems Integration Management Activity East (SIMA-E) to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, as recommended by the 1991 Commission, retain this activity in place. Retain the SIMA-E and the Information Processing Center at Letterkenny until the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) completes its review of activities relocated under Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD) 918. The activities of the depot not associated with the remaining mission will be inactivated, transferred or otherwise eliminated. Missile maintenance workload will not consolidate at Letterkenny, as originally planned. However, Depot Systems Command will relocate to Rock Island Arsenal, where it will consolidate under the Industrial Operations Command there, as approved by the 1991 Commission.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The decision to realign LEAD was driven by the results of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff triennial review of roles and missions in the Department of Defense. As part of this review, the Chairman chartered the Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study. The study identified a significant amount of excess depot capacity and duplication among the Services.

The Army has concluded the projected ground systems and equipment depot maintenance workload for fiscal year 1999 is not sufficient to maintain all of the ground systems and equipment depots.

In drawing the conclusion to downsize LEAD, the Army considered the following factors: relative military value of the depots, the future heavy force mix, reduced budget, workforce skills, excess capacity, ability of the depots to accommodate new workload levels, the proximity of the depots to the heavy forces in the U.S., and the resulting savings.

SIMA-E, which performs computer systems design and data management functions for a variety of activities, is transferring to the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) in 1993. Retention keeps this activity focused regionally upon the customer. SIMA-West is located in St. Louis and supports functions in the western portion of the U.S. DISA advised the Army there were no advantages or savings from a relocation to Rock Island Arsenal, IL. Less than 25% of the work performed by SIMA-E is associated with the Industrial Operations Command at Rock Island Arsenal.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued the consolidation of the Joint Missile Maintenance mission at Letterkenny Army Depot, as originally recommended by Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD) 918, remains the most sensible and economical option available for the interservicing of missile workload. The community maintained realigning the missile-maintenance workload to other depots would not take advantage of the efficiencies gained by interservicing at a single site. Also, the community argued existing artillery workload should not be transferred to another Army depot as originally planned. The community cited various factors including a partnership arrangement with private industry for assembling the Paladin weapon system. Additionally, the community believed Depot Systems Command (DESCOM) should not relocate to Rock Island Arsenal, IL, as recommended by the 1991 Commission, but should remain in place at LEAD and form the Industrial Operations Command (IOC) from existing DESCOM assets thereby saving the cost of

personnel relocations. The community agreed with the Army recommendation SIMA-E should remain in place at LEAD until DISA determined the best alternative for its future.

COMMISSION FINDINGS:

The Commission found the Army treated all its depots equally. The Commission also found the Army's process for isolating and eliminating excess capacity was a consistent and prudent approach toward decreasing the excess capacity that existed in the Army's depot system.

The Commission carefully considered interservicing of tactical-missile maintenance and found the eight defense depots identified by the Department of Defense as interservicing candidates in the *Tactical Missile Maintenance Consolidation Plan for Letterkenny Army Depot*, 31 January 1992 (revised 30 April 1992) were performing similar work on tactical-missile guidance and control sections and in some instances related ground control systems. In addition to Letterkenny Army Depot, these eight included Anniston Army Depot, AL; Red River Army Depot, TX; Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA; Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA; Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA; Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA; and Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill AFB, UT.

The Commission also found the workload originally planned for consolidation at Letterkenny had decreased. Some missile systems—the Shillelagh, Land Combat Support System, Chaparral, and the ANTSQ-73—were no longer considered viable candidates for transfer because they would soon be retired, and a substantial portion of the remaining work for potential transfer to Letterkenny was being performed by private contractors. Despite all of these interservicing efficiency-reducing factors, a recent study by the Army Audit Agency concluded the annual recurring savings to be realized from tactical-missile consolidation at Letterkenny would still be equivalent to savings achieved from the proposed Letterkenny realignment, if all missile maintenance workload, including that which is currently assigned to the private sector, transitions to Letterkenny.

While the Letterkenny facilities might possibly be under-utilized if the tactical-missile workload was consolidated at the depot, retention of the current artillery workload could help alleviate the problem. Although not included with DOD's original consolidation plan, the transfer of Hawk ground control system maintenance from the Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, could further reduce costs and improve Letterkenny facility utilization rates.

The Commission found the consolidation of tactical-missile maintenance at a single depot was a valid plan worthy of implementation in order to create efficiencies and reduce costs.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission rejects the Secretary's recommendation on Letterkenny Army Depot, PA, and instead, adopts the following recommendation: Letterkenny Army Depot will remain open. Consolidate tactical-missile maintenance at the depot as originally planned by the Department of Defense in the *Tactical Missile Maintenance Consolidation Plan for Letterkenny Army Depot*, 31 January 1992 (revised 30 April 1992). Add tactical-missile maintenance workload currently being accomplished by the Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, California, to the consolidation plan. Retain artillery workload at Letterkenny. Retain the Systems Integration Management Activity-East (SIMA-E) at Letterkenny Army Depot (change to the 1991 Commission recommendation) until the Defense Information Systems Agency completes its review of activities relocated under DMRD 918. Relocate Depot Systems Command to Rock Island Arsenal, IL, and consolidate with the Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command into the Industrial Operations Command, as approved by the 1991 Commission. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Tooele Army Depot, Utah

Category: Depots
Mission: Depot Maintenance
One-time Cost: $ 73.7 million
Savings: 1994-99: $ 107.2 million
Annual: $ 51.0 million
Payback: Immediate

U.S. Marine deployments, the realignment of active-duty resources would not restrict future use of the base for airlift of the Marine forces. The majority of military construction (MILCON) funds expended at March AFB recently has been for the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard facilities which will continue to be needed. In addition, other MILCON funds have been expended for organizational realignments from the 1988 base closure actions. (These organizations would also be remaining at March AFB.) The Commission found no significant disparity in the CHAMPUS documentation. While the Commission agrees some grading errors may have been made in the Air Force report, the adjustments to those color grades did not materially change the overall rating of March AFB.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: March AFB, California, is recommended for realignment. The 22nd Air Refueling Wing will inactivate. The KC-10 (Active and Associate Reserve) aircraft will be relocated to Travis AFB, California. The Southwest Air Defense Sector will remain at March in a cantonment area pending the outcome of a NORAD sector consolidation study. If the sector remains it will be transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG). The 445th Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve (AFRES), 452nd Air Refueling Wing (AFRES), 163rd Reconnaissance Group (ANG) (becomes an Air Refueling Group), the Air Force Audit Agency, and the Media Center (from Norton AFB, California) will remain and the base will convert to a reserve base. Additionally, the Army Corps of Engineers Unit, the US Customs Aviation Operation Center West, and the Drug Enforcement Agency aviation unit will remain at March.

McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey

Category: Large Aircraft
Mission: Airlift
One-time Cost: N/A
Savings: 1994-99: N/A
Annual: N/A
Payback: N/A

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Realign McGuire AFB, NJ. The 438th Airlift Wing will inactivate. Most of the C-141s will transfer to Plattsburgh AFB, NY. Fourteen C-141s will remain and transfer to the Air Force Reserve. The 514th Airlift Wing Air Force Reserve (AFRES), the 170th Air Refueling Group Air National Guard (ANG), and the 108th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) will remain and the base will convert to a Reserve base. The 913th Airlift Group (AFRES) will relocate from Willow Grove Naval Air Station, PA, to McGuire AFB. The Air Force Reserve will operate the base.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

The Air Force has four more large aircraft bases than are needed to support the number of bombers, tankers, and airlift assets in the DOD force structure plan. McGuire ranked low when compared to other bases in its category and when it was compared specifically with other airlift bases.

The Air Force plans to establish a large mobility wing base in the Northeast United States to support the new Major Regional Contingency (MRC) strategy. McGuire AFB, Griffiss AFB, New York and Plattsburgh AFB, New York were evaluated specifically as possible locations for this wing since all met the geographical criteria. Plattsburgh AFB ranked best in capability to support the air mobility wing due to its location, attributes, and base loading capacity.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The community argued McGuire AFB's capability to support the mobility wing was better than that of Plattsburgh AFB, and McGuire AFB proved its capability during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The community also argued McGuire was strategically located to reach Europe with fully loaded C-141s without refueling. They also asserted Plattsburgh AFB could not support the fuel requirements generated by Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm or a similar contingency operation because of the limited capability for fuel resupply during the winter months. The community noted McGuire could accommodate the mobility wing assets for less cost than Plattsburgh AFB.

Further, the community argued McGuire AFB was incorrectly downgraded for ground and airspace encroachment, and training was not encumbered as indicated by the Air Force. Other concerns raised by the community included encroachment of the accident potential zone at Plattsburgh AFB.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found McGuire AFB's training limitations were successfully managed. A new air mobility wing would be able to meet its total mission requirements based at McGuire AFB. DoD did not adequately consider the military value of McGuire AFB in its assessment of the extent of the impact of airspace problems and the base's contribution during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm or potential similar contingency operations. Further, the cost to realign McGuire was understated in the Air Force report. While an increase in civil aviation is very likely to occur, the increased mission activity could be accommodated with continued airspace management by the Federal Aviation Administration. Also, although there were sufficient alternatives for providing fuel to Plattsburgh AFB in the wintertime, the fuel delivery costs were approximately 5.6 times more expensive annually at Plattsburgh AFB than at McGuire AFB. This increased cost of fuel delivery at Plattsburgh AFB, not originally considered in cost computations, makes the base a more attractive closure option than realigning McGuire. In addition, McGuire AFB is closer to customers of the military airlift system, prospective contingency onload points, and is in the heart of the northeast surface transportation systems.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2, 3, and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: retain McGuire AFB as an active installation. The 438th and 514th Airlift Wings, the 170th Air Refueling Group (ANG) and the 108th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) will remain at McGuire AFB. Move the 19 KC-10 aircraft from Barksdale AFB to McGuire AFB. Move the requisite number of KC-135 aircraft to establish the east coast mobility base at McGuire AFB. The C-130 913th Airlift Group (AFRES) remains at Willow Grove NAS, PA. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York

Category: Large Aircraft
Mission: Tanker
One-time Cost: $131.2 million
Savings: 1994-99: $137.1 million
Annual: $56.6 million
Payback: 3 years

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of installations recommended for closure or realignment.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS

The opposing community argued that McGuire AFB had the capability to support the mobility wing better than Plattsburgh and McGuire AFB had proven its capability during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. McGuire is strategically located to reach Europe with fully loaded C-141s without refueling. Opposing communities also argued Plattsburgh AFB could not support the fuel requirements generated by Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm or a similar contingency operation because of the limited capability for fuel resupply during the winter months. The McGuire community also noted McGuire AFB could accommodate the mobility wing assets for less cost than it would take at Plattsburgh AFB. The opposing communities also pointed out the Air Force had failed to properly recognize significant ground encroachment at Plattsburgh AFB. The Plattsburgh community disputed the relative importance of the fuel resupply issue, arguing the base could be refueled anytime, although there had been no previous requirement to do so. Additionally, the Plattsburgh community disputed the relative importance of ground encroachment and argued Plattsburgh was being judged on a double standard regarding the encroachment. The Plattsburgh community stressed the importance of their superior ramp space and superb quality of life.

COMMISSION FINDINGS

The Commission found Plattsburgh AFB had a relatively small active duty force structure supported by a large installation and support organization. Also, the base can be closed with relatively low costs with high returns for a short payback period. Plattsburgh AFB is located some distance from normal airlift customers and onload points, increasing the cost of annual operations. Further, annual fuel resupply to Plattsburgh AFB to support the proposed east coast mobility wing were estimated at $11.8M, approximately 460% higher than at McGuire AFB. The Air Force's Air Installation Compatible Use Zone (AICUZ) program, a voluntary program for communities, provides guidelines for land development near Air Force installations for public safety. There was concern with the continued commercial development in the North Accident Potential Zone II (APZ II). Though the Air Force has a very good accident record, a large airlift/tanker aircraft accident in this area could be catastrophic.

COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Plattsburgh AFB and redistribute assets as appropriate. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

Small Aircraft

Homestead Air Force Base, Florida

Category: Small Aircraft
Mission: Power Projection, F-16
One-time Cost: $42.1 million
Savings: 1994-99: $357.5 million
Annual: $71.0 million
Payback: Immediate

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RECOMMENDATION

Homestead AFB, Florida, is recommended for closure. The 31st Fighter Wing will inactivate. All F-16s from the 31st Fighter Wing will remain temporarily assigned to Moody AFB, Georgia, and Shaw AFB, South Carolina. The Inter-American Air Forces Academy will move to Lackland AFB, Texas. The Air Force Water Survival School will be temporarily located at Tyndall AFB, Florida. Future disposition of the Water Survival School is dependent upon efforts to consolidate its functions with the US Navy. The 301st Rescue Squadron, Air Force Reserve (AFRES) will move to Patrick AFB, Florida. The 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES) will move to MacDill AFB, Florida and convert to KC-135Rs. The NORAD alert activity will move to an alternate location. The 726th Air Control Squadron will relocate to Shaw AFB. The Naval Security Group will consolidate with other US Navy units. All DoD activities and facilities including family housing, the hospital, commissary, and base exchange facilities will close. All essential cleanup and restoration activities associated with Hurricane Andrew will continue until completed. If Homestead AFB resumes operations as a civilian airport, the NORAD alert facility may be rebuilt in a cantonment area.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION

There were several factors which resulted in the closure recommendation. First, the Air Force has one more small aircraft base than is required to support the fighter aircraft in the DoD Force Structure Plan. When the data were evaluated against all eight of the DoD selection criteria, Homestead AFB ranked low relative to the other bases in the small aircraft subcategory. While Homestead AFB's ranking rests on the combined results of applying the eight DoD selection criteria, one stood out: the excessive cost to rebuild Homestead, while other small aircraft bases required little or no new investment. The cost to close Homestead AFB is low, especially when measured against the high cost of reconstruction, and the long-term savings are substantial.

All small aircraft bases were considered equally in a process that conformed to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510), as amended, and the Department of Defense (DOD) guidance. Bases were evaluated against the eight DoD selection criteria and a large number of subelements specific to Air Force bases and missions. Data were collected and the criteria and subelements of the criteria applied by the Base Closure Executive Group (Executive Group), a group of seven general

Impact of Base Closure on California

- The impact on California is regional: Northern California will feel a major impact (loss of 29,000 jobs), but Southern California will lose less than 500 and San Diego will actually gain employment.

- California has an enormous economy, with a huge share of the nation's DoD jobs -- 390,000 in all. As a share of its DoD jobs, California is losing less than several other states (7.6%), vs. Tennessee (19.8%), New York (16.2%), Michigan (13.9%, South Carolina (11.4%), and Florida (9.4%).

- The same is true for bases: 8 major facilities in California will be closed or realigned, out of a total of 67 major bases (or 12%). By comparison, Florida is losing 4 of 24 (16%), Virginia 4 of 29 (14%), and New York 3 of 16 (19%).

- A key reason for so many closures in California during this round has to do with the Navy's need to close a major naval complex on each coast. On the west coast the complex slated to close is in Alameda, where several bases coexist. If you don't close them together you lose the benefit of substantial savings.

- It is also true that the Navy is behind the other services in base closure, so many Naval closures are closing in this round. This has special impact on California, since it is coastal and home to many Naval facilities.