

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: Chron File - June 1993 #2 [5]				
Staff Office-Individual: Defense Policy-Bell, Robert				
Original OA/ID Number: 45				
Row: 31	Section: 3	Shelf: 2	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For Samuel Berger from Robert Bell. Subject: Candidates for CTB Negotiator. [partial] (2 pages)	05/07/1993	b(6)
002a. memo	Duplicate of vz4420_003a. (1 page)	06/22/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. cable	Duplicate of vz4420_003b. (2 pages)	05/21/1993	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	Duplicate of vz4420_002a. (1 page)	06/21/1993	P1/b(1)
003b. cable	Duplicate of vz4420_002b. (2 pages)	06/11/1993	P1/b(1)
003c. cable	Duplicate of vz4420_002b. [page 1 only] (1 page)	06/11/1993	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	Duplicate of vz4420_004. (1 page)	06/22/1993	P1/b(1)
004b. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief [Nectar Bend]. (1 page)	06/11/1993	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	For Executive Secretary, National Security Council. Subject: Significant Military Exercise - EAGLE SALUTE 93-1. (1 page)	06/23/1993	P1/b(1)
005b. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief. (2 pages)	06/04/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 45

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - June 1993 #2 [5]

2016-0152-F

vz4421

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 24, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR JEREMY ROSNER

FROM: ROBERT BELL *RB*

SUBJECT: Hill Contacts

Per your request, provided below is a list of congressional members (Senate) with whom I have a "close personal and professional relationship":

Senator Bingaman
Senator Bryan
Senator Cohen
Senator Conrad
Senator Exon
Senator Glenn
Senator Levin
Senator Lugar
Senator Nunn
Senator Reid
Senator Rockefeller
Senator Sarbanes
Senator Shelby
Senator Stevens
Senator Wallop
Senator Warner

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

24-Jun-1993 11:10 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Christina L. Funches
(FUNCHES)

SUBJECT: NOTE FROM JEREMY ROSNER

All senior staff should have received a memo from Howard Paster asking for a list of Hill associates (personal and professional). Please submit this list to Jeremy Rosner by COB today and we will forward to Paster in one memo.

Thank you.

Distribution:

FOR: Robert G. Bell	(BELL)
FOR: Richard E. Feinberg	(FEINBERG)
FOR: Martin S. Indyk	(INDYK)
FOR: George J. Tenet	(TENET)
FOR: Jenonne R. Walker	(WALKER)
FOR: Eileen B. Claussen	(CLAUSSEN)
FOR: Richard A. Clarke	(CLARKER)
FOR: Kent M. Wiedemann	(WIEDEMANN)
FOR: Dennis C. Jett	(JETT)
FOR: Alan J. Kreczko	(KRECZKO)
FOR: Jeremy D. Rosner	(ROSNER)
FOR: Donald K. Steinberg	(STEINBERG)
FOR: Daniel B. Poneman	(PONEMAN)
FOR: R. Nicholas Burns	(BURNS)
CC: Sandra L. Kelly	(KELLYS)
CC: Roseanne M. Hill	(HILLR)
CC: Kathy Leahy	(LEAHY)
CC: Patricia A. Rawson	(RAWSON)
CC: Martha S. Ramsay	(RAMSAY)
CC: Wanda D. Lindsey	(LINDSEY)
CC: Norma D. Schillaci	(SCHILLACI)
CC: Joan S. Hunerwadel	(HUNERWADEL)
CC: Natalie S. Wozniak	(WOZNIAC)
CC: Marion H. Blieberger	(BLIEBERGER)
CC: Betty A. Marshall	(MARSHALL)
CC: Wendy E. Gray	(GRAY)
CC: Brenda I. Hilliard	(HILLIARD)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: Allison M. Wright	(WRIGHT)
CC: M. Brooke Darby	(DARBY)
CC: M. Kay LaPlante	(LAPLANTE)
CC: Nancy H. Maxfield	(MAXFIELD)

TO: Senior Staff
FROM: Howard Paster *HP*
DATE: June 21, 1993

RE: Hill Contacts

As we move into the last stages of the reconciliation process we want to make sure that as many Members of Congress as possible are contacted by the White House and urged to support the President.

I know many of you have close personal and professional relationships with many House and Senate members. It would be helpful for me to have a list of these members from all of you so we can put together an outreach plan for the White House staff to touch base with their friends and associates on the Hill over the next few weeks.

Your help in this effort will allow us to reach many more members than we would be able to were we to rely only on the Legislative Affairs staff. Please get back to me with a list of Hill associates as soon as possible. Thank you.

TO: STRASSER, J

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 24 JUN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MILITARY EXERCISES

ADNSA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO ADM STRASSER RE ANNUAL GLOBAL GAME

ACTION: BERGER SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 17 JUN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
HAHN
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWF

CLOSED BY: NSASK

DOC 3 OF 3

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


June 24, 1993

Dear Admiral Strasser:

Thank you very much for your invitation to participate in your upcoming Global Game. As you know, we on the National Security Council staff are very supportive of your efforts to investigate new approaches to national security in our changing world environment.

I regret that I will not be able to be away from my duties long enough to participate as the game's National Command Authority. However, I plan to attend your final session on July 30 to hear the results of this year's Global Game.

Sincerely,



Samuel R. Berger
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser
President
Naval War College
Newport, RI 02841-1207

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 15, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RBB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Invitation to Attend the Annual Global Game at Newport, R.I.

At Tab II, you have been invited to participate as the National Command Authority in Global Game 93 during the week of July 12-19. The game is held annually at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. and brings together mid-to-upper level representatives of government agencies, Congressmen and Congressional staffers, and leaders of industry to investigate potential changes to the U.S. national security and military strategies. At Tab III, Tony Lake encouraged the participation of senior staff from interested agencies.

Early in the Administration, we were asked how the Global Game could contribute to the NSC effort to draft a new National Security Strategy. At our request, the Global Game this year will look at the relationships and trade-offs between key national security issues in light of new interagency mechanisms established by the Clinton Administration (see Tab IV).

Although your participation during the first week would greatly contribute to efforts to properly identify and formulate national security issues, we feel there would be more to be gained in having you or Tony represent the NSC in the one-day debrief of the results of the game on July 30.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I declining the invitation to participate in the Global Game from July 12-19. We recommend that you attend the final report of the results of the Game on July 30.

Attachments

Tab I Letter for Signature
Tab II Invitation from RADM Joseph C. Strasser, U.S. Navy
Tab III Lake Memo of April 9, 1993
Tab IV Background Information on Global Game 93

I think this is a good idea -- it's worth one day of your time. I'd encourage either you or Tony to go. SW

Do you want to attend? Should I? Why don't you? R



4350

PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island
02841-1207

SER 3272
JUN 08 1993

Dear Mr. Berger,

The Naval War College will conduct the annual Global Game from 12 to 30 July 1993. As you know, Global is the only continuous forum in the country where the national security environment is examined in a nonattribution manner across the full range of contemporary strategic and operational issues. There is nothing comparable to this effort anywhere in this country or across the globe. Many senior participants have declared that it is truly a "national treasure."

Global Game 93 will focus on the adequacy of existing policy and strategy in light of global and domestic challenges confronting the new administration. Game play will include important policy issues involving both traditional and non-traditional use of military forces, as well as the economic and trade dimensions of national security.

You are cordially invited to participate in a key leadership role in the game's National Command Authority for the game period 12 to 19 July. Your presence will add to the fidelity of play and enhance the quality of the results. In light of current world events, this forum promises to be timely and provocative.

Dr. Robert S. Wood, Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, will coordinate your visit. He can be reached at autovon 948-2270 or commercial (401) 841-2270.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH C. STRASSER
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Mr. Samuel R. Berger
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Office of National Security Affairs
The White House, Room 1/WW
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20500




GLOBALIZATION




GLOBAL 93 MAJOR CONCERNS

NSC



NEC





PARALLEL ISSUES BETWEEN NSC AND THE NEC

NSC

1. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
2. NATIONAL SECURITY
 - DETERRENCE STRATEGY
 - REGIONALIZATION
 - DIB/DUAL USE
 - MILITARY SPECS
3. ARMS PROLIFERATION
 - FOREIGN MIL SALES
 - MIL TECH TRANSFER
 - CLASSIFIED PROGRAMS
 - DUAL USE/MIL SPECS

NEC

1. ECONOMIC FORECAST
2. ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS
AND GROWTH
 - TRADE POLICY
 - GLOBALIZATION
 - NIB/GLOBAL INDUS BASE
 - FINANCE
3. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
 - ECON DEVELOP ASSIST
 - JOINT VENTURES
 - INTELLECTUAL PROP RIGHTS
 - DUAL USE/COM'L STDS



PARALLEL ISSUES (CONTINUED)

NSC

4. STRATEGIC LIFT
5. COMMAND, CONTROL,
COMMUNICATIONS &
INTELLIGENCE
6. ENERGY: ASSURED SUPPLY
7. MANPOWER:
AVAILABILITY/QUALITY
8. POLICY FORMULATION

NEC

4. INTERNAT'L TRANSPORT
5. TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND
COMPUTERS
6. ENERGY: SUPPLY EFFICIENCY
7. LABOR FORCE:
EDUCATION NEEDS/
JOB CREATION
8. POLICY FORMULATION



GLOBAL 93 CRITICAL SECTORS

DEFENSE INDUSTRY CLUSTER

- **AEROSPACE**
- **TELECOMMS**
- **SHIPBUILDING**

ENVIRONMENTAL CLUSTER

- **AGRI-BUSINESS**
- **ENERGY**

COMPUTER/INFO CLUSTER

- **SEMI-CONDUCTORS**
MICROELECTRONICS
- **PHOTONICS**
- **SOFTWARE**

MAT'LS/MFG CLUSTER

- **COMPOSITE MAT'LS**
- **MACHINE INTEL/ROBOTICS/**
FLEX MFG



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GLOBAL 93

WEEK 2 - REGIONAL CRISIS SCENARIOS

CRISIS ISSUES	AMERICAS	EUROPE	CIS
	NATION BUILDING: •NON-TRADITIONAL MILITARY ROLES & MISSIONS •DRUG WAR •HAITI	COALITION ACTIONS: •WIDENING BALKANS •EURASIA •	MRC/U.S. AND ALLIES NOT PARTIES: •RUSSIA vs UKRAINE •RUSSIAN "IMPLOSION" •
	-MASS MIGRATION -UNGOVERNABILITY -INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION -DEFORESTATION -PROLIFERATION -DEMOCRACY -	-COALITION WARFARE NATO AS ARM OF U.N. -TECH TRANSFER -MASS MIGRATION -	-PROLIFERATION -INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION -MASS MIGRATION -DEMOCRACY -

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GLOBAL 93

WEEK 2 - REGIONAL CRISIS SCENARIOS

ISSUES CRISIS	AFRICA LRC/HUMANITARIAN OPS: •ALGERIA vs TUNISIA •NIGERIA •MOZAMBIQUE/SUDAN (SON OF SOMALIA)	MID-EAST MRC: •MILITANT IRAN • •	PACIFIC ECONOMIC CONFLICT: •TRADE WAR •DEALING WITH CHINA (NON-DEMOCRATIC) •KOREA
	-MASS MIGRATION -HEALTH -DESERTIFICATION -DRUG WAR -DEMOCRACY -	-EXPEDITIONARY WAR FIGHTING -COALITION BUILDING/ WARFARE -PROLIFERATION -SUCCESSION OF POWER	-TECH TRANSFER - - -

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

June 24, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ROBERT BELL *RB*
SUBJECT: Choosing a CTB Negotiator

In response to a request from Sandy last month, I sent in a memo outlining some choices for a CTB negotiator (Tab I). With the President's decision on nuclear testing issues now imminent, we need to turn our attention to this with more urgency. One new candidate who has recently thrown his hat in the CTB ring is Mike Krepon of the Stimson Center.

Concurrence: Rost Gottemoeller *RG*

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss these candidates, and any others you have in mind, at an early opportunity with Secretary Christopher, Secretary Aspin and Acting ACDA Director Graham.

Attachment
Tab I May 7 Memorandum

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For Samuel Berger from Robert Bell. Subject: Candidates for CTB Negotiator. [partial] (2 pages)	05/07/1993	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 45

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - June 1993 #2 [5]

2016-0152-F

vz4421

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D C 20506

May 7, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM:

ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*

SUBJECT:

Candidates for CTB Negotiator

You forwarded the letter from Professor (b)(6) (Tab I) and asked about the status of our deliberations concerning selection of a CTB negotiator.

I met with (b)(6) last month and found him to be both likable and well-informed on the history and politics of the CTB issue. He has been recommended by a number of pro-CTB Senators and Representatives and is working hard to line up more support. The questions I have about his qualifications fall mainly into two areas: (1) does he have the requisite management skills to serve as Head of Delegation, and (2) would he enjoy the confidence of DOD, JCS and DOE.

His resume is

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

[001]

None of this is to suggest that he could not win the respect of the participating agencies or run a tight ship within his negotiating team. It is just to say that on paper, he does not come across as the perfect choice for this position. I think he should be interviewed by you and Tony, but at least two others should be interviewed as well (plus any others Tom Graham may recommend):

-- Steven Ledogar. Steve is currently serving as U.S. Ambassador to the CD in Geneva and has a proven track record as the head of a delegation. One option considered in our Review is to "dual hat" our CD ambassador as our CTB negotiator with the other four declared nuclear states. Both sets of talks (Perm-5 and CD) will be conducted in Geneva and will have to be linked.

Another advantage of using Steve as our CTB negotiator is that he has already been confirmed in his CD position. Going this route would avoid the possibility that the CTB nominee would be taken hostage by those on the right or the left who might want to try to influence our CTB negotiating objectives. The disadvantage of using Steve is that he is not technically proficient in nuclear testing issues (neither is Phil Schrag) and would thus require a deputy with strong credentials in this field. One possibility as deputy would be Paul Robinson, of DOE, who was the Chief U.S. Negotiator for the Protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty under President Reagan. Tom Graham thinks this "duo" would be the best way to proceed.

(b)(6)

[001]

11 (b)(6) is not chosen as Chief CTB Negotiator, I would think he could play a useful role in some capacity on the U.S. delegation (e.g., as deputy to (b)(6)).

Attachment

Tab A Letter from (b)(6)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6/24

TO:

Kent Wiedemann:

FROM: Bob Bell (3330)

Jim Reed thought we
had had the action
on this but it was
actually yours. Since
the Base Closing
Commission voted yester-
day to keep HQ & the
Army at Presidio I'd
suggest you coordinate
the revised reply with Steve J.

CAN WE SOFTEN
2nd ¶ AS A

TIME WHEN POSSIBLE

SOLICITING HER VOTE
ON OTHER ISSUES - MORE
NICE WORDS EXPLAINING

WHY WE CAN'T HELP

PASSED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1993

MEMO FOR BOB BELL
STEVE JONES

SUBJ: Response to
Senator Feinstein

Note Howard Paster's comment
next under.

Tony Lake would like to try to
soften the last paragraph up a
bit, in tone if not in
substance.


Reed

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Dianne:

I appreciated receiving your letter in support of the establishment of a Presidio Pacific Center. The vision of an international center designed to anchor the United States in the Pacific is exciting and could offer a unique opportunity to bolster economic and cultural cooperation with our Asian allies.

As you know, the Presidio Pacific Center is only one of the applicants for use of the Presidio. Since the National Park Service cannot endorse any applicant at this time, I do not think it would be appropriate for me to mention the project to Prime Minister Miyazawa. I will, however, keep this very interesting proposal in mind and I wish you the best of luck.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

TO: ITOH

FROM: BELL

DOC DATE: 23 JUN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ADMINISTRATIVE

PERSONS: ANDREASEN

SUBJECT: NSC STAFF FORN TRAVEL - ANDREASEN TO LONDON & PARIS 28 JUN - 3 JUL

ACTION: SODERBERG APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 26 JUN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BELL

LOGREF:

FILES: ADMIN

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ANDREASEN
BELL
MANZANARES
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY WA DATE 6/25 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 1 OF 1

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

June 25, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: NSC Staff Foreign Travel

NSC Staff Member: Steven Andreasen
Director for Defense Policy and
Arms Control

Purpose of Travel: To represent NSC on consultations on nuclear testing issues in London (June 29-30) and Paris (July 1-3).

Itinerary:

<u>Date</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Major Event/Meeting</u>
June 29-30	London	UK	Consultations with allies on nuclear testing issues
July 1-3	Paris	France	

for Kristie A. Keuning
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 23, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY SODERBERG

THROUGH: J. ROBERT MANZANARES *JRM*
FROM: ROBERT BELL *RB*
SUBJECT: NSC Staff Travel - Steven Andreasen

Request travel orders be provided for Steven Andreasen as the NSC representative on the delegation for consultations with our allies on nuclear testing issues scheduled for June 28-July 4, 1993 in London and Paris.

NSC is requested to cover the expenses of the trip. Per diem is estimated at \$215 for London, June 29-30; per diem is \$230 for Paris, July 1-4. Air fare is estimated to be approximately \$1,000 round trip.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the attached travel request and the memorandum to the Department of State.

Approve

[Signature]

Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Travel Authorization Form
Tab II Itoh Memorandum to State

DATE June 23,

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: Steven P. Andreasen
2. PURPOSE/EVENT (Include Dates): Consultations with allies
on nuclear testing issues, June 29-July 3.
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):
Washington, DC to London, UK to Paris, France
and return
4. DEPARTURE DATE June 28, 1993 RETURN DATE July 4, 1993
DEPARTURE TIME 4:00 PM RETURN TIME 4:00 PM
5. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOVT. AIR _____ COMMERCIAL AIR X POV _____ RAIL _____
OTHER _____
6. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION \$1000.00 London \$215 \$1,450-
TOTAL \$3535- (Coach) PER DIEM Paris \$230 OTHER \$75
7. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC X OTHER _____
IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: _____
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO X
IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid By
Traveler, Describe Source & Arrangements): _____
9. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ YES \$500
10. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You
Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): _____
11. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Steven P. Andreasen
12. APPROVALS: Senior Director Robert S. Boer
Director of Administration J. Robert Mangano
Executive Secretary Kristie A. Kenney

TO: SHERFIELD, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 23 JUN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MILITARY EXERCISES

ISRAEL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MILITARY EXERCISE NOBEL SHERLEY 13 NOBEL CHRIS

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 26 JUN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
EXECSEC
HAHN

COMMENTS: _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 10/3/2016
216-0152-F

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND _____ W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 3 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4594


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 24, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise NOBLE SHIRLEY 13 -
NOBLE CHRIS

Military exercise NOBLE SHIRLEY 13 - NOBLE CHRIS is approved.


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4594

June 23, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise NOBLE SHIRLEY 13 -
NOBLE CHRIS

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, approving military exercise NOBLE SHIRLEY 13 - NOBLE CHRIS. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

NOBLE SHIRLEY 13 - NOBLE CHRIS is a two part exercise that will be conducted at the Haifa Air Base, Israel and Nizzanim Beach (10 miles south of Ashdod). The goal is to offload equipment that is destined for the Israeli Defense Force by conducting a combined air insertion at Haifa Air Base and an amphibious landing at Nizzanim Beach. This exercise will allow U.S. forces to exercise their landing plans and save a considerable amount of money in port handling and inland transportation costs. Because Nizzanim Beach is used by the civilian population for sunbathing, only the southern portion of the beach will be available for the landing. This offload is much like those conducted previously during daylight in Haifa port, except that the offload is across the beach. It will take place July 7-21.

The critical cancellation date is June 30, 1993.

Concurrences by: *[Signature]* Martin Indyk and *[Signature]* David Satterfield

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I approving the exercise.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab II OSD Executive Secretary Memorandum, June 22, 1993

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VZ* NARA, Date *10/3/26*
2016-0152-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	Duplicate of vz4420_003a. (1 page)	06/22/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 45

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - June 1993 #2 [5]

2016-0152-F
vz4421

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. cable	Duplicate of vz4420_003b. (2 pages)	05/21/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 45

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - June 1993 #2 [5]

2016-0152-F

vz4421

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9304592
RECEIVED: 23 JUN 93 08

TO: SHERFIELD, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 24 JUN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MILITARY EXERCISES

JORDAN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MILITARY EXERCISE INFINITE SHADOW 93-3

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 26 JUN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
EXECSEC
HAHN

COMMENTS:

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DOC 3 OF 3

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 10/3/06
2016-052 F

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 24, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise INFINITE SHADOW 93-3

Military exercise INFINITE SHADOW 93-3 is approved.


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4592

June 23, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *KB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise INFINITE SHADOW 93-3

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, approving military exercise INFINITE SHADOW 93-3. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

INFINITE SHADOW 93-3 is designed to provide an opportunity for U.S. naval forces to train with Jordanian naval units, to gain operational appreciation of the capabilities of the Jordanian Navy, and to provide an American presence in the Red Sea. It is scheduled to take place in international waters near the Gulf of Aqaba on July 5-8 and will involve the USS Peterson (DD969).

The critical cancellation date is June 29, 1993

Concurrences by: Martin Indyk *MI* and David Satterfield *DS*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I approving the exercise.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *W* NARA, Date *10/3/2011*
7016-0152-7

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Duplicate of vz4420_002a. (1 page)	06/21/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 45

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - June 1993 #2 [5]

2016-0152-F
vz4421

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. cable	Duplicate of vz4420_002b. (2 pages)	06/11/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 45

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - June 1993 #2 [5]

2016-0152-F
vz4421

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. cable	Duplicate of vz4420_002b. [page 1 only] (1 page)	06/11/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 45

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - June 1993 #2 [5]

2016-0152-F
vz4421

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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TO: SHERFIELD, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 24 JUN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MILITARY EXERCISES

ETHIOPIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MILITARY EXERCISE NECTAR BEND 93

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 26 JUN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
EXECSEC
HAHN

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 10/3/2010

2010-0152-F

COMMENTS: _____

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DOC 3 OF 3

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
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 24, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise NECTAR BEND 93

Military exercise NECTAR BEND 93 is approved.


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4595

June 23, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL ^{RGB}
FROM: KEITH HAHN ^{KH}
SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise NECTAR BEND 93

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, approving military exercise NECTAR BEND 93. At Tab I Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

NECTAR BEND 93 is a combined U.S.-Ethiopian explosive ordnance disposal field training exercise. It is designed to enhance Ethiopian ability to safely handle, store and dispose of munitions. It will also enhance Ethiopian ability to detect, clear and dispose of landmines. It will take place around several Ethiopian munitions storage facilities and Addis Ababa beginning July 25 and ending September 28. A total of 45 U.S. and 150 Ethiopian personnel will be involved.

The critical cancellation date is June 30, 1993.

Concurrence by: Dennis Jett ^{DJ}

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I approving the exercise.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II OSD Executive Secretary Memorandum, June 22, 1993

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 10/3/2016
2016-0752-F

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004a. memo	Duplicate of vz4420_004. (1 page)	06/22/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 45

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - June 1993 #2 [5]

2016-0152-F
vz4421

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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004b. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief [Nectar Bend]. (1 page)	06/11/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 25, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*
FROM: RICHARD HOOKER *RDA*
SUBJECT: Restoration of Rank to Admiral Kimmel

We have reviewed the issues surrounding Admiral Husband Kimmel's relief and retirement following the attack on Pearl Harbor. We see no compelling reason for the President's acting to reverse President Roosevelt's decision.

For several decades, Admiral Kimmel's family has been lobbying successive administrations to restore Kimmel to the temporary four star rank he held at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. They have renewed their efforts with this Administration. As you know, Admiral Crowe has taken a personal interest in their case.

The facts relevant to the case are not in dispute (Tab I). Admiral Kimmel received an official "war warning" message from the Navy Department on November 27, 1942 informing him that hostilities with Japan were imminent and directing him to put Pearl Harbor in a state of defense. None of the naval or air deployments called for in the applicable war plans were implemented to defend the islands by Kimmel or his Army counterpart, LTG Walter Short.

At President Roosevelt's direction, Kimmel and Short were relieved of their commands and retired in their permanent two star ranks after a series of lengthy and exhaustive service and congressional investigations. It should be noted that they were not courtmartialed or even demoted. They were simply not granted the courtesy of retiring in their highest temporary rank.

While some intelligence available in Washington was not forwarded to Kimmel, there is no evidence that Washington had any specific intelligence confirming an imminent attack on Pearl Harbor. The "missing" intelligence merely amplified what Kimmel and Short had already been told, that war seemed imminent. Toward the end of these investigations, Admiral Kimmel increasingly adopted the "FDR conspiracy" defense and openly aligned himself with congressional Republicans hoping to use the Pearl Harbor disaster as a campaign issue in 1944.

According to the Navy, every Administration since FDR has reviewed the case and confirmed the findings of the original investigations. The current CNO, Admiral Kelso, takes the

position that Kimmel should not be rehabilitated, arguing a) that the principles of command accountability and responsibility fully justify the findings and actions taken at the time, and b) that no new information has surfaced which might challenge the original findings. We have found nothing to suggest that earlier investigations of the matter are in error.


In the absence of new findings we believe that the evidence supports respecting the Navy's position and letting the matter stand.

It should also be noted that restoring Kimmel to his past rank would logically raise questions as to why the President had or had not exonerated General Short. However, the historical record suggests that Short was even more culpable than Kimmel.

Attachment

Tab I Harvard Case Study

PEARL HARBOR



At 7:55 on the morning of December 7, 1941, a Japanese attack force of 353 planes swept down on the United States Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor, delivering the first and most devastating blow of a coordinated Japanese offensive throughout the Pacific. Launched from six carriers waiting two hundred miles off the northern shore of Oahu, Japanese aircraft reached Pearl Harbor virtually undetected. Within two hours they sank or seriously damaged eighteen American ships, disabling all but one of the American battleships assigned to the Pacific. Only the U.S. carriers and their aircraft were spared, by chance being at sea on weekend maneuvers. Almost 350 of the 394 American planes on the island were destroyed on the ground. 2,403 Americans were dead. Japanese losses totaled fifty five men and twenty nine aircraft. By sundown, Pearl Harbor was among a group of successful raids carried out simultaneously on Guam, Wake, and the Philippine Islands, on Hong Kong and Malaya.

Washington responded immediately to the blow. On December 8, President Roosevelt went before Congress to secure a declaration of war against Japan, characterizing the enemy action as "a surprise offensive, dastardly and unprovoked". The following day he told the American people that his administration had consistently pursued a peaceful solution to troubles in the Far East, negotiating in good faith with Japanese Ambassador Nomura until the moment of attack. With a sudden, unexpected, and deceptive strike, Roosevelt said, "the Japanese have treacherously violated the long-standing peace between us."

In private, however, Roosevelt and his advisers were at a greater loss to explain the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Top American officials in Washington and Hawaii were prepared for Japanese military action in the Pacific or Far East on the weekend of December 7. Detailed intelligence information indicated that a large offensive was imminent. Theater commanders in the Pacific had been alerted to the dangerous rift in relations with Japan. Warnings of war had been issued to military representatives in Hawaii, and precautions against hostile action had been taken. Still, a direct attack on the United States, especially one on Pearl Harbor, came as a complete surprise. Expecting conflict in the Pacific into which the United States might be drawn, and confident of their knowledge of Japanese capacity and intentions, high ranking members of the Roosevelt administration and their military counterparts concentrated on preventing World War II from entering through the back door. Japan blew up the front of the house.

Pearl Harbor and the Coming of War

The chief military officials at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack were General Walter Short, Commander of the Army's Hawaiian Department, and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Each had a small intelligence staff operating under his command, responsible for collecting and reporting local information and receiving periodic dispatches from military sources in Washington. Generally, the duties assigned Hawaiian intelligence were limited and technical. Although the two Naval units, Combat Intelligence and Fleet Intelligence, were comprised of experienced and well-trained officers, they were restricted to the inexact science of monitoring Japanese ship movements and transmitting to Washington coded Japanese naval messages intercepted by radio receivers. Army Intelligence (or G-2) was staffed by less experienced men whose primary function was to guard the island against espionage. Neither Army nor Navy intelligence officers were expected, or given the opportunity, to prepare independent estimates of enemy action or intentions based on the information that passed through their hands.² For that, Short and Kimmel were dependent on their superiors in Washington, General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff and Admiral Harold ("Betty") Stark, Chief of Naval Operations.

During the critical weeks prior to the raid on Pearl Harbor, the commanders in Hawaii were provided information by their sources in Washington and by their own intelligence officers that led them to expect Japanese military action in the near future. Reports ranged from fragments of "raw", or entirely factual, material concerning Japanese troop movements to explicit predictions and directives from Stark and Marshall. Throughout the month of November, Naval Intelligence in Hawaii was informed by contacts in the Far East of sightings of Japanese naval convoys heading toward Southeast Asia, observations that were consistent with claims of troop build-ups in Indochina since the summer. On November 1, the Chief of Combat Intelligence at Pearl reported a change in the call signals of Japanese ships, not an unusual occurrence by itself, but one that was a customary prelude to military action. When the call signals were altered again on December 1, an unprecedented event in such a short space of time, it suggested to naval intelligence in Hawaii that the Japanese were in the final stages of preparation for battle. The change in call signals was also disconcerting because it made the identification of Japanese vessels nearly impossible. In mid-November, Combat Intelligence lost track of a fleet of enemy carriers. Naval intelligence assumed that it was in home waters, a conclusion based on previous experience.³ The carriers were not located until December 7.

Reports of the southern movement of Japanese ships and the concurrent estimation of an imminent Japanese attack somewhere in

the vicinity of Southeast Asia were confirmed by dispatches sent from Washington in late November to both the Army and the Navy. On November 24, Naval Intelligence at Pearl received the following message from the Chief of Naval Operations:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action aedes (addressees) to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.4

Three days later, on November 27, Admiral Stark sent a stronger statement to the Pacific Fleet, designed to bring Kimmel up to date on the perspective in Washington. It was a short, clear summary of the Navy's expectations:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46. Inform district and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department.5

The concurrent message sent to General Short was relayed to Kimmel by the Chief of Naval Operations on the following day. It was a more ambiguous warning than the Navy dispatch, less certain of the state of negotiations between Secretary of State Hull and Ambassador Nomura, and without an estimation of the probable target of Japanese hostilities. It read:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil

population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. A separate message is being sent to G-2, Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in the United States. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. Unquote...Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46, so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

On November 28, General Short also received a message via the local G-2 unit sent by General Sherman Miles, Chief of G-2 in Washington, warning of possible sabotage in the event of war:

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop hostilities may ensue stop subversive activities may be expected stop inform commanding general and chief of staff only.⁷

Neither Kimmel nor Short regarded these messages with great concern. To Kimmel and his Fleet Intelligence officer, Commander Edwin Layton, the information from Stark and Marshall merely reinforced their own estimation that the Japanese were on the verge of launching an attack somewhere in Southeast Asia. Layton had also considered the possibility that Japan might move on the Philippines or Guam, as a precautionary measure to protect their flank. WPL 46, mentioned in both the Army and Navy warning, was a plan to deploy part of the Pacific Fleet to the Marshall Islands in the event of a Japanese offensive in the Far East. The term "a surprise aggressive move in any direction" was interpreted to apply only to the southern Pacific, perhaps including American forces in the Philippines, but certainly not Pearl Harbor. Kimmel did not increase the alert status of the Fleet as a result of the warning. General Short considered the message from the War Department as a warning against sabotage on the Islands, and heeding the caution "not to alarm civil population", he placed the troops under his command on the lowest alert possible. He replied to the War Department, General Marshall, and the directors of the Army and Navy War Plans: "Report department alerted to prevent sabotage period".⁸

Subsequent information from Washington did little to alter these expectations. On December 3 and 4, Kimmel received the message that Japanese consular and diplomatic posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London had been urgently instructed to destroy their codes and ciphers. This news was based on top secret MAGIC information available only in Washington.⁹ On December 6, Kimmel had been told by local G-2 that the Japanese consulate had been burning papers for the preceding two days. Following the attack, the reports of code destruction were considered by those in Washington as clear

indications to the theater commanders that they should have initiated a full alert.¹⁰ Kimmel, however, did not regard the information as a spectacular tip-off. He observed that the Japanese consulate in Honolulu had been seen burning papers four or five times earlier that year. He had also received a message from Naval Operations ordering him, on December 6, to instruct American posts in the outlying Pacific areas to destroy their own secret papers and documents in light of the tense international situation.¹¹

The danger signals of November were seen by the Hawaiian commanders in the context of an entire year of building tension between Japan and the United States. On three previous occasions during 1940 and 1941, war warnings were sent from Washington to the Pacific Theater: with the fall of France in May 1940, with the Roosevelt administration decision to impose an embargo on oil exports to Japan in July 1941, and with the collapse of the moderate Konoye cabinet in Tokyo just a month before, in mid-October 1941. These alerts, combined with numerous reports of sabotage threats or alleged Japanese plans to attack the Soviet Union, its long-time enemy, created a background of "noise" which could obscure or alter the perception of accurate and important intelligence information. The Hawaiian commanders were also mindful of fulfilling one of their primary missions in the Pacific, the training of American pilots and crews for duty in the Philippines. Time spent on reconnaissance and defense of Oahu was time wasted in the preparation of trained squadrons for the American base in the Far East, which was believed to be considerably more vulnerable to enemy attack than Pearl Harbor.¹²

Compounding the problem of sorting out significant signals from "noise", Kimmel and Short were kept in the dark concerning important international developments and current American foreign policy. Washington did not have a regular procedure for keeping the theaters abreast of decisions in the White House, details on the progress of negotiations between Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Japanese Ambassador Nomura, planned American reaction to possible moves by the Axis powers, or reports of developments in Japan. This type of information was considered either irrelevant, since Hawaii was not expected to make its own predictions of enemy behavior, or too highly classified to risk having the Japanese intercept it. This was the case with Washington's most closely guarded, and most valuable, secret, the decoded and translated Japanese diplomatic messages, collectively known as "MAGIC". After July 1941, Pearl Harbor stopped receiving regular messages based on MAGIC. During November, only three dispatches, the information of Japanese code destruction among them, were derived from that source. Kimmel and Layton both repeated requests for more complete information. But for the most part, they and Short were given meager servings from their superiors, and what "raw" information they had was made difficult to interpret outside the context of events seen in

Washington or Tokyo. Except for information and opinions contained in personal letters to Admiral Kimmel from Admiral Stark (infrequently relayed to General Short), the Hawaiian commanders were often only as well informed on policy matters as reading local newspapers would permit.¹³

Kimmel, Layton, and Short naturally filled these gaps with assumptions about the nature of the enemy and their own position in Hawaii. The Fleet at Pearl Harbor was stationed there primarily as a deterrent to Japanese aggression, as a prominent sign of American Naval power in the Pacific, thousands of miles from Japan. If swung into action, it could destroy a Japanese task force so far from home in a few minutes. Besides, as General Marshall explained to President Roosevelt in May of 1941, "The Island of Oahu, due to its fortifications, its garrison and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world."¹⁴ Admiral Kimmel concluded that the Japanese would be inviting "national suicide" by attacking it.¹⁵ Looking out his living room window on the morning of December 7, Kimmel could not identify the planes flying dangerously close to the ground until the bombs began to explode.

Washington Intelligence and Magic

In 1941, decision makers in Washington had access to a variety of intelligence sources dealing with the Japanese. Among them were the Tokyo Embassy and its contacts in the Far East, American reporters stationed abroad, and decoded intercepts of official Japanese correspondence. The last was by far the most spectacular. Although Army and Navy specialists had little luck reading Japanese military codes, they had broken a majority of the codes protecting diplomatic traffic. In August 1940, after almost two years of work, Colonel William F. Friedman succeeded in finding the key to the top secret PURPLE code, used by the Japanese in transmitting highest priority diplomatic messages. Intercepted, decoded, and translated PURPLE messages became known as MAGIC. Throughout the period surrounding the attack on Pearl Harbor, top American officials were reading confidential diplomatic communications not only between Tokyo and the Washington Embassy, but between Japanese leaders and their chief representatives in London, Berlin, and Southeast Asia. On many of the days that Secretary of State Hull met with Ambassador Nomura in their crucial negotiations, he knew beforehand what the Japanese Ambassador was going to say and why. The apparent completeness and same-day receipt of MAGIC information gave many officials a sense of secure knowledge of Japanese intentions.

With 4000 MAGIC messages arriving daily, decoding was a 24-hour job shared by Army and Navy intelligence.

Distribution of information derived from MAGIC was subject

to extremely strict security in Washington. If the Japanese were to discover, or even suspect, that their codes had been broken, the United States would be deprived of one of its most valuable assets. The standard procedure for dissemination of MAGIC began in the Far Eastern sections of G-2 and ONI, where Colonel Rufus Bratton and Commander A.H. McCollum, with the help of his assistant, A.D. Kramer, selected the material to be passed on to the American high command. All three were highly trained and experienced intelligence officers. Their choices were confirmed by their superiors, Brig. General Sherman Miles, Director of MID, and Captain T.S. Wilkinson, head of ONI. Besides Miles and Wilkinson, only seven other officials in Washington received MAGIC intercepts: Secretary of War Henry Stimson; Chief of Staff Marshall; Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox; Chief of Naval Operations Stark; the Navy's Chief of War Plans, Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner; Secretary of State Hull; and President Roosevelt by way of his military aide. Daily deliveries of MAGIC intercepts were made each day by a courier carrying copies in a locked pouch. While the messenger stood by, the copies were read once and then returned to ONI or MID, where they were destroyed.¹⁶

During November 1941, accumulating MAGIC intercepts told a dramatic, if sometimes cryptic, story of Japan's final maneuvers prior to war. Dispatches from Tokyo to the Washington Embassy came at a furious pace. They focused on the vital importance of Nomura's mission, pressing the Ambassador to obtain Hull's acceptance of a Japanese compromise deal before a late November "deadline". On November 5, Tokyo wired Washington: "Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month."¹⁷ When Nomura pleaded for more time, Tokyo responded that the date was immovable, explaining, "the fate of our Empire hangs by a slender thread of a few days."¹⁸ On November 22, Tokyo relented and moved the deadline to November 29, but added, "this time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen."¹⁹ There were eight "deadline" messages in all in November, an unprecedented series. In no previous messages, even in times of severe tension with the United States, had Tokyo specified a single date, after which things were "automatically going to happen."²⁰ In addition to these transmissions, Roberta Wohlstetter has uncovered at least nineteen others sent from Tokyo to Washington in November which stress that "a crisis is fast approaching" and that Japan was tendering its "final proposal", "our last effort". On November 14, Nomura was informed that "Both in name and in spirit this offer of ours is the last indeed...we gambled the fate of our land on this throw of the die."²¹

MAGIC also included instructions sent from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin. Among these were the orders, on November 30, to pass the following information to Hitler and

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop:

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.²²

On the same day Tokyo ordered its embassies and consulates around the world (excepting Rome and Berlin) to destroy their codes and secret documents.

Intelligence and the Decision Makers: Perspectives on Intelligence

With the exception of Colonel Bratton and Commander McCollum and his assistant Lieutenant Commander Kramer at the Far Eastern desks of G-2 and ONI, no official in Washington had an opportunity to study the MAGIC intercepts as a body. Those on the MAGIC distribution list saw only brief glimpses of the daily tally sheet. Faced with pressing problems around the world, they had neither the time nor the background to search for trends or develop alternative evaluations of Japanese moves based on MAGIC. Given the volume of intelligence material available, it would have been difficult for them to form reliable hypotheses about Japanese plans.

Although the official duties of ONI and MID included evaluation (as well as collection and distribution) of intercepted materials, this was in fact not the case. In practice, prediction of enemy intentions or evaluation of intelligence information was strictly off limits for ONI and MID officers. Neither Bratton nor McCollum, Miles nor Wilkinson, were consulted by the chief policy makers concerning the import of specific Japanese messages. Miles and Wilkinson were so excluded from the foreign policy structure that they resorted to reading intercepts of MAGIC information traveling from Washington to Tokyo in order to keep up to date on progress in the Hull-Nomura negotiations.²³ Wilkinson confessed after the attack, "...prior to getting into the war we did not know the U.S. side of the argument that was going on."²⁴ His boss, Admiral Turner of War Plans, was covetous of his own evaluations and information and kept ONI (which he considered "solely a collection agency and a distribution agency") in the dark.²⁵ Wilkinson, for instance, learned of the late November warning messages sent to Pearl Harbor after the fact and through "informal channels".²⁶

The isolation of intelligence officers not only kept them from using their close contact with MAGIC to work up their own estimates. It also exacerbated the already poor communication between the services and between Washington and the theaters. The

tight security protecting MAGIC caused confusion over who exactly was seeing it, or information based on it. General Miles believed that the command at Pearl Harbor was reading MAGIC on a regular basis. He was not alone in this assumption. A high ranking Army intelligence officer testified after the attack that he was under the impression that a staff of 400 on Oahu was intercepting, decoding and evaluating MAGIC.²⁷ Miles, and apparently Marshall, also thought that Hawaiian G-2, and consequently General Short, received automatically copies of all information sent to Commander Layton and Admiral Kimmel. In fact, Kimmel only relayed messages when specifically instructed to do so. As a result, G-2 dispatches to Hawaii contained only instructions relevant to the prevention of sabotage, which Miles considered the primary G-2 function.²⁸

The separation between collection and evaluation of intelligence information resulted in dilution of the message it might have provided. Personal assumptions about the Japanese were regularly substituted for background knowledge of the domestic political scene in Tokyo. Some officials thought the Japanese "tricky". For example, David Kahn quotes Fletcher Pratt, a pre-war writer on naval subjects, on theoretical reasons that the Japanese would make poor aviators. These included racially inherent myopia and inner ear defects resulting in poor balance; a code of values which assessed individual life as worthless, leading pilots to give up when their airplanes got into trouble; poor Japanese performance in individual activities such as flying; and a culture and educational system with little emphasis on development of mechanical skills. Kahn also notes the pre-Pearl Harbor views of a former ONI director, Captain W.D. Puleston, as typical of the day: "Japan has been energetic in her efforts to create naval aviation, but she is usually a phase behind. She cannot match in numbers the planes carried on American carriers, . . . and her personnel cannot send planes aloft or take them aboard as rapidly as American personnel." Kahn concludes "racism and the presumption of rationality prevented current details from being assembled into a pattern that might indicate what was happening in Japan."²⁹ Both Pratt and Puleston expressed the conventional wisdom of the day, that Japan would not dare take on the naval and industrial might of the United States.

Others felt that the Japanese had natural proclivities for collecting reams of unnecessary detail. This explanation was popular when, beginning in early September, ONI and MID intercepted messages from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting complete diagrams of berthing locations of the Pacific Fleet and the schedule of ships arriving and departing from Pearl Harbor. Washington pointed out that similar information had been requested for almost every port from Manila to Panama.³⁰

The subordinate role of ONI and MID was conditioned by a general lack of respect within the armed services for intelligence personnel. In 1941, intelligence was a job without much prestige, reserved for officers considered unqualified for a command position.³¹ Army and Navy "generalists" were suspicious of "egg head" units which they believed were unqualified to perform the delicate task of evaluation.³² This was certainly the case with the relationship between Admiral Turner and ONI. Those in Far Eastern sections were considered too immersed in the "oriental point of view." This was true even in MID, where Miles frequently discounted Bratton's ominous reports of possible developments in the Far East by placing them in the larger context of the European war.³³

Intelligence and the Decision Makers: Undeclared War and the Atlantic Strategy

Compared with Nazi Germany, Japan seemed remote and manageable. Since the spring of 1940, Germany had conquered Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium. On June 21, after less than six weeks of resistance, France surrendered. Britain was beleaguered by German bombers. Shipping lanes in the Atlantic were menaced by German submarines. Some felt an invasion of Great Britain was imminent. Then, almost a year to the day after the fall of France, Hitler turned on his ally, the Soviet Union, and launched a surprise offensive in the east.

"If we lose in the Atlantic, we lose everywhere." Few in the military or in the Roosevelt Administration disagreed with this conclusion by General Marshall. Through 1941, the President and Congress began to take measures to aid Britain without falling into open war with Germany. With American vessels running supplies for the British, the United States was risking a clash with German submarines. In October, alleged attacks took place on two American Naval vessels, both of which turned on the submarines. Although the circumstances of the confrontations remained a mystery to most Americans, Roosevelt accused Germany of unprovoked attacks on United States ships. In late October and early November, Roosevelt moved to arm merchant ships through an amendment in the Neutrality Act. On November 17, the revised Act was approved.

With events in the Atlantic slipping toward war with Germany, American analysts clarified United States strategy in the event of a World War. The signing of the Tripartite Pact among Germany, Italy and Japan in September 1940, in which they pledged cooperation against common enemies, led planners to consider a war with Germany to mean war with Japan as well.³⁴ With this in mind, a Joint Board of military chiefs developed the first in a series of Rainbow Plans. The Joint Board dismissed the possibility of an all-out American effort in the Pacific

while Hitler continued to survive in Europe. Rainbow 5, the plan operational at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, was organized along the same theme. So was Admiral Stark's Plan D (or "Dog"), in which the Navy would hold the Japanese at bay while concentrating its fire power in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Warned General Marshall in September 1940, "A serious commitment in the Pacific is just what Germany would like to see us undertake."³⁵ Steps taken by the military in 1940 and 1941 were consistent with this orientation. In April 1940, Roosevelt ordered the Pacific Fleet, normally anchored in San Diego, to remain at Pearl Harbor as a deterrent to the Japanese. In January 1941, the Army began a vigorous program reinforcing defenses in the Philippines for the same reason. That summer, the Islands received their most prominent reinforcement in the person of General Douglas MacArthur.

But there was a limit to the amount of preparatory action the Administration could authorize. Roosevelt and his advisers had to contend with an American public that was largely committed to avoiding war in both the Atlantic and Pacific. Roosevelt himself had made similar commitments while running for an unprecedented third term of office in 1940. "We will not participate in foreign wars...except in case of attack" was a central plank of the Democratic platform in 1940, and many hoped to hold Roosevelt to it. Although the Lend-Lease measure and the amendment of the Neutrality Act were billed by the Administration as acts of self-defense (the former was titled "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States"), they encountered stiff opposition and heated debate in Congress.³⁶

Isolationist sentiment hampered military preparedness. All the armed service chiefs lamented the paucity of arms and men equipped to fight a two ocean war. During the 1930's heyday for isolationism and Pacifism, military appropriations were slashed by Congress. When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, the total strength of the U.S. Army was just under 190,000 officers and enlisted men. In the fall of 1941, the Army General Staff estimated that a "Victory Program" against the Axis powers would require over 8,000,000 men. Existing forces were just over 1,600,000.³⁷ Naval strength was similarly deficient; although strenuous efforts were made to put the Navy on a war footing following the beginning of war between Japan and China in 1937, the money for expansion was difficult to obtain. In August 1941, Congress came within one vote of sending home all draftees.

The strength of isolationism also influenced decision-makers' perceptions of probable Japanese strategies for war. Members of the Administration feared that if Japan attacked Russia or Britain first, the United States would be placed in an awkward and potentially dangerous position. Roosevelt had been reminded by Prime Minister Churchill in August 1941 that Japan could inflict a decisive blow against British forces in the Far

East if the United States did not pledge its willingness to oppose them with force.³⁸ But it seemed doubtful that American public opinion would permit a declaration of war against Japan in retaliation for an attack on Borneo, Singapore, the Netherland East Indies, or the Kra Isthmus. This would be the logical move for the Japanese if they hoped to avoid immediate conflict with the United States. Fear that this would be Japan's strategy gripped American decision-makers during the fall of 1941.

Intelligence and the Decision-Makers: Perspectives on Japan

Roosevelt's absorption in the European war left American dealings with Japan almost entirely in the hands of the State Department and Secretary Hull. By November 1941, Hull was exhausted by months of fruitless negotiations with Ambassador Nomura. At the time, he remarked that he and Nomura were "going around and around in the same circle."³⁹ He hoped still to reach an agreement which might defer war in the Pacific. But the odds seemed against it. Hull had concluded by mid-August that a conflict was inevitable sooner or later, saying, "Nothing will stop them but force."⁴⁰ He continued working to ensure that it was later.

Hull was a principled man, and his approach to the Japanese was based on principle. In 1937, he had set down his own "principles of international morality," a doctrine condemning nations involved in wanton aggression; in August 1941, he was still convinced that they were applicable. In 1938, he had advocated a "moral embargo" of war materials to the Japanese; in 1941, he had helped engineer the mandatory embargo on scrap iron and oil sales to Japan. When Nomura arrived in Washington to commence talks with the American government in the spring of 1941, Hull handed him a list of principles which he felt was the basis for any discussion of American Far Eastern policy:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
3. Support of the principle of equality, including the equality of commercial opportunity.
4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.⁴¹

During his negotiations with Nomura, Hull had to contend with equally principled members of his own Department and of the Administration who considered his approach to the Japanese too

conciliatory. Although the State Department's Japan experts asked for understanding of the Japanese perspective, a more outspoken group advocated a hard line toward Tokyo. This faction was dominated by Stanley K. Hornbeck. The Department's chief Far Eastern expert between 1928 and 1941, Hornbeck saw China as the necessary center of American foreign policy in the Far East. His experience had taken him through the Manchurian Incident in 1931, when American failure to actively oppose Japan allowed them to annex that portion of northern China. After Japan launched a full-scale invasion of China in 1937, Hornbeck supported a "get tough" approach to aggression in the Far East.⁴² By 1941, he was hardly alone. This school drew support not only within State but also from Secretary of War Stimson, a former Governor General of the Philippines and the Secretary of State during the Manchurian Incident, and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. Stimson, Ickes, and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau had strenuously supported enforcing strict embargoes against Japan in the belief, expressed by Morgenthau, that it would bring Tokyo quickly to its knees. In the fall of 1941, Ickes felt that a war with Japan would be won swiftly, thereby allowing the United States to fight Hitler without distraction from the Pacific.⁴³ Hornbeck outdid even Ickes. He believed that Japan had neither the military capacity nor the political will to engage the United States in battle. In a memorable evaluation written on the 27th of November, 1941, Hornbeck, Hull's chief adviser on Far Eastern policy, asserted:

In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese Government does not desire or intend to have forthwith armed conflict with the United States. The Japanese government, while launching new offensive operations at some point or points in the Far East, will endeavor to avoid attacking or being attacked by the United States.... Were it a matter of placing bets, the undersigned would give odds of five to one that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before December 15...would wager three to one that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before the 15th of January (i.e., seven weeks from now); would wager even money that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before March 1...⁴⁴

At the highest levels of the Army and Navy, this strain of optimism was tempered by concern over military unpreparedness. Throughout the late months of 1941, General Marshall and Admiral Stark petitioned President Roosevelt, and anyone else who would listen, not to provoke the Japanese into a war which the United States was not yet equipped to fight. As early as 1939 and 1940, Marshall advocated restraint in dealing with Japan because of the depleted condition of the U.S. Army.⁴⁵ In the summer of 1941, he and Stark argued against the imposition of embargoes for fear that the Japanese would retaliate.⁴⁶ During the fall, when Stark was convinced that the "shooting war" in the Atlantic made an

all-out war against Germany inevitable and imminent, he wrote Kimmel at Pearl Harbor, "The longer we can keep the situation in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned..."⁴⁷ A two-ocean war at this juncture could be disastrous. On November 5, Marshall and Stark presented a joint memo to Roosevelt in which they declared, "War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance."⁴⁸ On November 27, they wrote the President again with respect to Japan, concluding, "The most essential thing now, from the United States' viewpoint, is to gain time." In order to do this, they argued against transmitting an ultimatum to Tokyo stating America's last conditions for peaceful negotiations.⁴⁹

Within the armed services as a whole, the caution of Marshall and Stark alternated with a more aggressive and fatalistic attitude. In the Navy, rapid turnover of commanding officers and exclusion from the policy structure made it difficult to develop an independent image of Japan's political and military perspective. So too did tradition. Since the turn of the century, justification of American naval strength was based in part on the assumption of vital American interests in the Far East. The Navy had a natural tendency to view Japan as a monolithic aggressive force, an inevitable opponent of American naval expansion in the Pacific. Throughout the 1930's, Japan (under the code name "Orange") was the perennial enemy in Naval war exercises run out of Pearl Harbor. Historian Waldo Heinrichs writes, "The Navy's image was of an enemy poor in resources, overpopulated, historically expansionist, imbued with a warrior tradition, and, in the 1930's, ruled by a fanatical military clique."⁵⁰

Although the Army was troubled by its lack of power in the Far East, a strong streak of optimism was evident in War Plans during the second half of 1941. MacArthur's appointment to the Philippines lifted hopes that adequate reinforcements would soon be in position to deter and, if necessary, oppose Japan's southward advance. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, some Army officers, including General Miles, believed (as did Admiral Stark) that the Japanese were more likely to launch a Siberia campaign than to risk war with the United States. Finally, although the military considered the Japanese a dangerous enemy after reports of brutal fighting against the Chinese, the Army "affected a condescension toward the Japanese as it did toward all Orientals"⁵¹ and continued to harbor its negative presumptions regarding Japanese military capabilities. This translated into the belief that, faced with the threat of American force, Japan would relent. In a G-2 recommendation in August 1941, Miles joined the "get tough" team. He argued that "power diplomacy" would not only keep Japan out of the fight and out of Southeast Asia; but it also had a

good chance of breaking up the Tripartite pact. In late November, he asserted: "Our influence in the Far Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our Naval Power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner."⁵²

On December 5, MID reported: "Japanese government leaders are aware of the perils of further military adventures; they want to avoid a general war in the Pacific."⁵³ Ambassador Grew cabled Hull regarding reports of Japanese troop concentrations in Taiwan and Manchuria; Grew's ambiguous conclusion was that Japanese army operations were possible on short notice in Siberia, the southwest Pacific, or both.⁵⁴

Attempts at a Modus Vivendi

In November, the Japanese government made one last effort to avoid war through negotiation. On November 2, Prime Minister Tojo and his closest advisers agreed to defer the final decision for war until Washington responded to two proposals transmitted from Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull. Proposal A was a reiteration of the Japanese position on the major issues separating the United States and Japan: equality of economic opportunity throughout the world, Japan's right to maintain troops in China, Japan's right to protect its interests in China with troops in Indochina, and the viability of the Tripartite Pact.⁵⁵ Proposal B was to be offered only if Proposal A was rejected. It was a last ditch attempt to avoid war, a modus vivendi. Ambassador Nomura was instructed to obtain a reply to these two measures by the end of November. If the reaction from the American government was not favorable, Nomura was told, "things are automatically going to happen."

Proposal A had a short life. Nomura delivered it to Hull on the evening of November 7. The Secretary of State (who had already seen the document via MAGIC) was noncommittal, and agreed to Nomura's request to discuss the issues with Roosevelt. The Ambassador met with the President on November 10. He was told that Japan should remove its troops from Indochina immediately as a sign of good faith, a condition the Japanese were not disposed to meet.

Proposal B was presented to Hull on November 20. Again, the Secretary was apprised of its contents by virtue of MAGIC intercepts. He also knew of the preceding messages to Nomura indicating that it was the final Japanese offer. The proposal had five points. First, neither Japan nor the United States would engage in additional military expansion into Southeast Asia, save where Japanese troops were presently occupying Indochina. Second, Japan would withdraw its troops in Indochina when an "equitable peace" in China or the Pacific was restored.

Third, Japan and the United States would cooperate in the acquisition of needed raw materials from the Dutch East Indies. Fourth, Japan and the United States would restore commercial relations; the embargo on oil to Japan would be lifted. Finally, the United States would cease aid to China, or, "refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China."⁵⁶

To Hull, the proposal was "clearly unacceptable." He later wrote in his memoirs that "the commitments we should have to make were virtually a surrender." He objected especially to the provisions calling for the resumption of oil sales to Japan and the withdrawal of moral and material support to China. Hull insisted, "The President and I could only conclude that agreeing to these proposals would mean condonement by the United States of Japan's past aggressions, assent to future courses of conquest by Japan, abandonment of the most essential principles of our foreign policy, betrayal of China and Russia, and acceptance of the role of silent partner aiding and abetting Japan in her effort to create a Japanese hegemony over the western Pacific and eastern Asia."⁵⁷

Still, Hull worked to keep negotiations open and to comply with pleas from the Army and Navy to postpone war. In drafting a formal reply to Japan's Proposal B, he and Roosevelt designed a modus vivendi of their own. The United States would immediately ship some oil and rice to Japan. America would work to get Japan and China to the bargaining table. In return, Japan would suspend troop movements and promise not to respect the Tripartite Pact in the event of war between the United States and the Axis powers in Europe.⁵⁸ As a safety measure to guard against Japan misunderstanding the context of the modus vivendi, Hull compiled a statement of firm American principles, for a peaceful resolution in the Pacific, a ten-point note, to accompany the counterproposal. Drafts of both documents were completed on November 22.

On November 25, while the President's advisers waited for British and Chinese comments on the counterproposal Hull joined Roosevelt, Stimson, Knox, Marshall, and Stark at the White House to discuss the possibility of hostilities with Japan. If the American counterproposal failed to satisfy the Japanese leaders, the United States could be at war within the week. Roosevelt wanted to guarantee that, if war came, the roles of aggressor and victim were clearly delineated. Secretary Stimson noted in his diary that the President, "brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked (as soon as) next Monday [December 1] for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into a position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves."⁵⁹

That afternoon, the group that had met at the White House learned from MID that a convoy of up to fifty Japanese ships had been sighted heading south past Formosa. The news convinced Hull and Roosevelt that their modus vivendi would be obsolete. Hull was also disheartened by the tepid response of Great Britain to the counterproposal, as well as by strong criticism from China that it was too conciliatory. On the morning of the 26th, Hull decided to abandon the modus vivendi. In its place, he chose to send the ten-point statement of principle alone as America's answer to Japan's Proposal B. The ten-point memorandum, which Hull called his "comprehensive basic proposal" for continued negotiations, was the strongest statement to date of the American position in the Pacific. It required Japan to withdraw completely from its occupation of the Asian mainland, and to recognize the government of Chiang Kai-shek as the sole legitimate authority in China. Japan was also to renounce the Tripartite Pact and support the formation of a "multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States."60

Hull did not expect Japan to consent to these conditions. The principles had been registered for the record. On November 27, the Secretary of State told Stimson, "I have washed my hands of it, and it [the situation] is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy."61

The ten-point memorandum arrived in Tokyo on the same day. To the Japanese leaders, the document seemed an ultimatum, a flat challenge to the precepts guiding Japanese foreign policy since 1931. After the war, Foreign Minister Togo testified that "Japan was now asked not only to abandon all the gains of her years of sacrifice, but to surrender her international position as a power in the Far East. That surrender, as he saw it, would have amounted to national suicide. The only way to face this challenge and defend ourselves was war."62 The unfavorable American response to Proposal B activated a decision that had been made weeks earlier. On November 28, Nomura was informed (and with him, the recipients of MAGIC) that he would soon receive the official reply to the ten-point note. "With the report of the views of the Imperial Government that will be sent to you in two or three days, talks will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off.... From now on do the best you can."63 On December 1, the Japanese Emperor's formal approval for war was sealed. Japanese embassies and consulates were ordered subsequently to destroy their codes and secret papers. And the Pearl Harbor task force, en route from Japan since November 7, was permitted to proceed with its mission.

"This means war"

On the 27th, reports of Japanese ship movements to the south prompted Stark and Marshall to issue their war warnings to the Pacific theater commanders. Neither was aware that Hull had confronted Japan with a "basic comprehensive proposal." In a joint memorandum presented to Roosevelt on the same day, they reiterated their concern that the military have more time and cautioned against provoking Japan with an ultimatum. They did predict, however, that "If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack: the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; and the Russian Maritime Provinces." They qualified the estimate by pointing out that Japan was unlikely to risk a major assault on the Philippines.⁶⁴

Between November 29 and December 6, the administration continued to examine the probable targets of Japanese aggression and courses of action available for the United States in the event of war. At the President's request, Knox, Stimson, and Hull worked on a warning message to the Japanese Emperor for delivery as a last resort. They also prepared a speech to inform Congress of the gravity of the situation in the Pacific. Retiring to his retreat at Warm Springs, Roosevelt was preoccupied with how to sell the administration's case to Congress and the American people should Japan attack Thailand, French Indochina, the Malay Straits or Russia. Great Britain would fight to defend some of these. Roosevelt and his top advisers agreed that if the British fought, so too should the United States. Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's close personal adviser, remembered later the President's fear that Japan might follow the "one by one" strategy of Hitler's European campaign, gradually isolating the United States until an opportune time for an attack on American forces. Roosevelt concluded that he would have to wait for Japan to commit itself then rally Congress and the public to support the defense of Allied interests.⁶⁵

The scene in the Far Eastern divisions of Army and Navy intelligence during early December was less complacent. In November, Miles in MID had projected that Thailand would be the next Japanese target.⁶⁶ Colonel Bratton of G-2 and Commander McCollum of ONI interpreted recent signals as indications of more drastic Japanese plans in the Far East. Before war with Japan had become a real and immediate threat, an attack on Pearl Harbor had been considered a feasible and even likely alternative for Japanese planners. William Manchester writes:

Short and Kimmel later testified that neither had considered an attack on Pearl Harbor a possibility. Yet it is difficult to think of many moves in military history which had been predicted more often. Confronting one another across the Pacific, each nation had long pondered the

strategy of a surprise raid on the base. . . . [B]eginning in 1931, every member of each graduating class in Japan's naval academy had been required to answer one question: 'How would you execute a surprise assault on Pearl Harbor?' In January 1941 Ambassador Grew alerted Washington to the possibilities of a sneak raid on Pearl. [He referred in his diary to talk in Tokyo about such plans.] The Peruvian ambassador in Tokyo heard the same talk, and obligingly sent it to Washington via Grew. . . . In July 1941, Richmond Kelly Turner, then chief of the Navy War Plans Division, had named Hawaii as the 'probable' target of any Japanese offensive, and he also predicted that the attack would be made by aircraft. Navy Secretary Knox had written Stimson, 'Hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.' . . . An intercepted Tokyo message on December 3 had inquired whether there were 'any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor.' Rear Admiral Kimmel himself--his memory to the contrary--had warned his staff that 'declaration of war might be preceded by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.' But by early December Pearl seemed a less obvious choice. . . . Roosevelt had thought that the first blow would fall on the Phillipines. No American officer, including General Marshall, had expected a carrier strike on Hawaii now, because Hirohito's crack divisions were in Indochina, ready to jump off for Malaya, Singapore, and the oil fields of the Netherlands East Indies. Pearl Harbor wasn't anywhere near this corridor of advance . . . [I]n the context of the December 1941 strategic picture it seemed almost irrelevant."⁶⁷

On December 1, McCollum drafted an independent warning to the Pacific theaters based on his conclusion that "everything pointed to an imminent outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Japan."⁶⁸ He approached Admiral Turner of War Plans with revised estimates of Japanese troop movements that showed them to be greater than previously thought. Japanese citizens were being evacuated from key British and American locations. Espionage activity against the United States was on the increase. Turner accepted the data but not the interpretation. When he edited McCollum's warning message so that all but "informational" aspects were omitted, McCollum protested. Turner refused to compromise and the dispatch was never sent. On December 5, Bratton and McCollum again tried to convey their urgent forecasts to Army and Navy War Plans. They never got through.⁶⁹

On Saturday, December 6, Japan's awaited reply to the ten-point memorandum began arriving at the Japanese Embassy in Washington. It was in the form of a long, verbose message of fourteen parts. The first thirteen parts were intercepted and decoded by the United States during the early afternoon. They were a review of Japan's consistent and painstaking efforts to secure peace in the Far East despite opposition from the United

States and Great Britain. The theme did not surprise American officials who had expected Japan to reject the terms of the Hull statement. When the first thirteen sections were distributed to MAGIC recipients on the evening of December 6, they did not provoke a notable response from anyone except Roosevelt. Reading the document in his White House study, the President turned to Harry Hopkins and said, in effect, "This means war."⁷⁰ Probably war between Britain and Japan, which would soon involve the United States. There was nothing in the message suggesting a direct move against American positions.

Two final MAGIC intercepts early in the morning of December 7 provided the last clues of Japan's plans to those in Washington. At 3:00 am, the remaining section of the fourteen part message was intercepted by the Navy. It contained the news for which the first thirteen parts had served as an introduction: "The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through future negotiations."⁷¹ Almost an hour and a half later, the Army translated a second message to the Japanese Embassy, instructing Nomura to deliver the fourteen part statement in its entirety to Secretary Hull at 1:00 pm on December 7.⁷²

The completion of the fourteen part message caused little alarm at the intelligence desks of the Army and Navy. A rupture in negotiations had been expected since the MAGIC intercept of November 28. Never before had Nomura been given a precise time for the delivery of a message. When Colonel Bratton received this transmission near 9:00 am, he concluded immediately that the hour signified the time of an attack on American forces somewhere in the Pacific. His reaction was "frenzied."⁷³ He tried to reach General Marshall and the head of Army War Plans, General Gerow, the two men capable of authorizing warnings to the theaters. But Bratton and Miles were unable to locate Marshall, who was on a morning horseback ride in Virginia, until the General arrived at his office at 11:25. There they waited for Marshall to read the entire fourteen part message before coming to the one o'clock instructions. Immediately he drafted and sent an additional alert to the Pacific theaters. It arrived too late.⁷⁴

At 2:00 pm, an hour late, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu (sent to assist Nomura in mid-November) arrived at the State Department for their appointment with Hull. They offered the Secretary of State the document he had seen hours earlier. It said in part:

It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia or the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialist exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the

prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a condition since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.⁷⁵

Hull glanced at the paper, pretending to read. Enraged, he replied:

In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions--infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them.⁷⁶

The time for negotiation and evasion had ended. In the Pacific, Japanese planes had been over Pearl Harbor for an hour.

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4. Quoted in Ibid., p. 44.
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6. Quoted in Ibid., p. 46
7. Quoted in Ibid., p. 62
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9. Ibid., p. 49.
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12. Ibid., p. 23 and pp. 75-136 passim; see also Husband E. Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel's Story, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1955) pp. 32-35
13. Wohlstetter, op cit., pp. 39, 54-57.
14. Quoted in Ibid., p. 69.
15. Quoted in Ibid., p. 55.
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17. Quoted in Ibid., p. 187.
18. Quoted in Ibid., p. 189.
19. Quoted in Ibid., p. 190.
20. Ibid., p. 190.
21. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 193.
22. Quoted in Ibid., p. 208.
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29. David Kahn, "The United States Views Germany and Japan in 1941," in Ernest May (ed.), Knowing One's Enemies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp.477 and 497.
30. Wohlstetter, op cit., p. 213.
31. Ibid., p. 70.
32. Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., "The Role of the United States Navy," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (eds.), Pearl Harbor as History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 203.
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42. Thomson, op cit., p. 101.
43. Wohlstetter, op cit., p. 232.
44. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 264-5.
45. Weigley, op cit., p. 179.

46. Wohlstetter, op cit., p. 117; Feis, op cit., p. 232.
47. Quoted in Beard, op cit., p. 431.
48. Quoted in Ibid., p. 447.
49. Quoted in Ibid., p. 448; Wohlstetter, op cit., p. 249.
50. Heinrichs, op cit., p. 203.
51. Weigley, op cit., p. 167.
52. Wohlstetter, op cit., p. 297.
53. Quoted in ibid., p. 297.
54. Kahn, op cit., p. 499.
55. Feis, op cit., p. 295.
56. Ibid., p. 309.
57. Quoted in Ibid., p. 310.
58. Ibid., p. 320.
59. Quoted in Ibid., p. 314.
60. Quoted in Wohlstetter, op cit., pp. 236-7.
61. Quoted in Feis, op cit., p. 321.
62. Quoted in Ibid., p. 327.
63. Quoted in Wohlstetter, op cit., p. 200.
64. Quoted in Ibid., p. 248-250.
65. Ibid., p. 275-6.
66. Kahn, op cit., p. 500.
67. William Manchester, The Glory and the Dream (Boston: Little Brown, 1973), pp. 253-254, 257-258.
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69. Ibid., p. 312.
70. Feis, op cit., p. 339.
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74. Ibid., p. 310.
75. Quoted in Crowley, op cit., p. 262.
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4650

June 25, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise EAGLE SALUTE 93-1

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, approving military exercise EAGLE SALUTE 93-1. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

EAGLE SALUTE 93-1 is a combined unite level training exercise between U.S. naval and Egyptian naval surface forces. It will consist of general seamanship exercises, maneuvering and station keeping drills, naval gunnery training and search and rescue helo operations. It will take place in the northern Red Sea July 17-21 and involve the USS Spruance and USNS Big Horn.

The critical cancellation date is July 12, 1993.

Concurrences by: Bruce Riedel *BR* and David Satterfield *DS*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I approving the exercise.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab II OSD Executive Secretary Memorandum, June 23, 1993

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *10/3/2006*

216-052-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise EAGLE SALUTE 93-1

Military exercise EAGLE SALUTE 93-1 is approved.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	For Executive Secretary, National Security Council. Subject: Significant Military Exercise - EAGLE SALUTE 93-1. (1 page)	06/23/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 45

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - June 1993 #2 [5]

2016-0152-F

vz4421

RESTRICTION CODES

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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
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005b. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief. (2 pages)	06/04/1993	P1/b(1)
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