

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title: Chron File - May 1993 #3 [2]				
Staff Office-Individual: Defense Policy-Bell, Robert				
Original OA/ID Number: 45				
Row: 31	Section: 3	Shelf: 2	Position: 1	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For the Executive Secretary, National Security Council - Eastern Castle 93. (1 page)	05/21/1993	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief. (2 pages)	04/15/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 45

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - May 1993 #3 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4405

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 24, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *KTB*
FROM: RICHARD HOOKER *RH*
SUBJECT: Letters of Congratulations

We were asked to prepare letters of congratulations for certain general and flag officers nominated for promotion or retirement in grade.

Concurrence by: Keith Hahn *KH*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo for the President at Tab I

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Letters of Congratulations
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letters of Congratulations

Purpose

To personally recognize certain general or flag officers recently nominated for promotion or retirement in grade.

Background

We routinely prepare Presidential letters of congratulations for flag and general officers when nominated for promotion, or reassignment or retirement in grade.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters of congratulations at Tab A

Attachment

Tab A Letters of Congratulations

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Admiral Emery:

It is a pleasure to send my personal congratulations to you on the occasion of your nomination for promotion to Vice Admiral and assignment as Commander, Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet. Through long years of arduous service to our great nation, you have served faithfully in positions of ever-increasing responsibility and importance. The American people are indeed fortunate to be served by senior military leaders of your stature and accomplishments.

Hillary and I wish you every success as you take up your new duties. Good luck, and best wishes for your continued service to the nation.

Sincerely,

Rear Admiral George W. Emery, USN
Commander, Submarine Group Five
San Diego, California 92106-3521

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear General Wolfe:

It is a pleasure to send my personal congratulations to you on the occasion of your nomination for promotion to Lieutenant General and assignment as Vice Commander, Air Combat Command. Through long years of arduous service to our great nation, you have served faithfully in positions of ever-increasing responsibility and importance. The American people are indeed fortunate to be served by senior military leaders of your stature and accomplishments.

Hillary and I wish you every success as you take up your new duties. Good luck, and best wishes for your continued service to the nation.

Sincerely,

Major General Thad A. Wolfe, USAF
Assistant Deputy Director
for Operations
National Security Agency
Fort Meade, Maryland 20755-6000

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear General Jaquish:

As your long and distinguished career comes to a close, I want to extend my personal thanks and warm congratulations to you for many years of faithful and distinguished service. For more than three decades, you have set a standard for achievement and accomplishment in peace and war. The American people are indeed fortunate to have been served by an officer of your unique talents and abilities.

Hillary and I wish you every success and happiness as you complete your remarkable military career.

Sincerely,

Lieutenant General John E. Jaquish, USAF
Principal Deputy to the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330-1060

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear General Christmas:

It is a pleasure to send my personal congratulations to you on the occasion of your nomination for promotion to Lieutenant General and assignment as Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force. Through long years of arduous service to our great nation, you have served faithfully in positions of ever-increasing responsibility and importance. The American people are indeed fortunate to be served by senior military leaders of your stature and accomplishments.

Hillary and I wish you every success as you take up your new duties. Good luck, and best wishes for your continued service to the nation.

Sincerely,

Major General George R. Christmas, USMC
Director for Operations/J-3
United States Pacific Command
Camp Smith, Hawaii 96861-5025

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Admiral Chiles:

It is a pleasure to send my personal congratulations to you on the occasion of your nomination for reappointment as Vice Admiral and assignment as Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command. Through long years of arduous service to our great nation, you have served faithfully in positions of ever-increasing responsibility and importance. The American people are indeed fortunate to be served by senior military leaders of your stature and accomplishments.

Hillary and I wish you every success as you take up your new duties. Good luck, and best wishes for your continued service to the nation.

Sincerely,

Vice Admiral Henry G. Chiles, Jr., USN
Commander, Submarine Force
United States Atlantic Fleet
Norfolk, Virginia 23511-6296

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear General Kross:

It is a pleasure to send my personal congratulations to you on the occasion of your nomination for reappointment as Lieutenant General and assignment as Commander, Fifteenth Air Force. Through long years of arduous service to our great nation, you have served faithfully in positions of ever-increasing responsibility and importance. The American people are indeed fortunate to be served by senior military leaders of your stature and accomplishments.

Hillary and I wish you every success as you take up your new duties. Good luck, and best wishes for your continued service to the nation.

Sincerely,

Lieutenant General Walter Kross, USAF
Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command
Scott Air Force Base, Illinois 62225-5363

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear General Johnson:

It is a pleasure to send my personal congratulations to you on the occasion of your nomination for reappointment as Lieutenant General and assignment as Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. Through long years of arduous service to our great nation, you have served faithfully in positions of ever-increasing responsibility and importance. The American people are indeed fortunate to be served by senior military leaders of your stature and accomplishments.

Hillary and I wish you every success as you take up your new duties. Good luck, and best wishes for your continued service to the nation.

Sincerely,

Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnson, USMC
Commanding General
I Marine Expeditionary Force
Camp Pendleton, California 92055-5401

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear General Hearney:

It is a pleasure to send my personal congratulations to you on the occasion of your nomination for promotion to Lieutenant General and assignment as Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. Through long years of arduous service to our great nation, you have served faithfully in positions of ever-increasing responsibility and importance. The American people are indeed fortunate to be served by senior military leaders of your stature and accomplishments.

Hillary and I wish you every success as you take up your new duties. Good luck, and best wishes for your continued service to the nation.

Sincerely,

Major General Richard D. Hearney, USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements
and Programs
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps
Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

TIME STAMP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER:

3380ACTION OFFICER: REDACTED

DUE:

May 17☐ Prepare Memo For Lake/Berger☐ Appropriate Action☐ Prepare Memo For Podesta☐ Prepare Memo For Itoh☒ Prepare MemoLake

to

Podesta

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. _____

Concur	FYI	Concur	FYI	Concur	FYI
☐	☐ Andreasen	☐	☐ Harris	☐	☐ Riedel
☐	☐ Andricos	☐	☐ Holl	☐	☐ Roemer
☐	☐ Aoki	☐	☐ Hooker	☐	☐ Saeed
☐	☐ Barth	☐	☐ Hull	☐	☐ Sanner
☐	☐ Beers	☐	☐ Indyk	☐	☐ Schwartz
☐	☐ Bell	☐	☐ Jett	☐	☐ Shahan
☐	☐ Burns	☐	☐ Jones	☐	☐ Spalter
☐	☐ Canas	☐	☐ Kelly	☐	☐ Tenet
☐	☐ Clarke	☐	☐ Kristoff	☐	☐ Tilley
☐	☐ Clarke, P.	☐	☐ Kupchan	☐	☐ Van Eron
☐	☐ Claussen	☐	☐ Kyle	☐	☐ Waguespack
☐	☐ Farrell	☐	☐ Lowenkron	☐	☐ Walker
☐	☐ Fauver	☐	☐ Menan	☐	☐ Walsh
☐	☐ Feinberg	☐	☐ Merchant	☐	☐ Wayne
☐	☐ Forsythe	☐	☐ Morley	☐	☐ Wiedemann
☐	☐ Fry	☐	☐ O'Leary	☐	☐ Wilson
☐	☐ Gail	☐	☐ Owens-Kirkpatrick	☐	☐ Witkowski
☐	☐ Gottmoeller	☐	☐ Poneman	☐	☐
☐	☐ Gross	☐	☐ Primoch	☐	☐
☐	☐ Hahn	☐	☐ Rice	☐	☐

INFORMATION

☒ Kenney☒ Soderberg☒ Exec Sec Desk☐ Berger☒ Records Mgmt.

COMMENTS

Logged By JFReturn to Records Mgmt.
379 OEGB

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 05/12/93ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 5/17/93SUBJECT: MILITARY NOMINATIONS:

1. REAR ADM GEORGE W. EMERY, USN
2. MAJ GEN THAD A. WOLFE, USAF
3. LTGEN JOHN E. JAQUISH, USAF
4. MAJGEN GEORGE R. CHRISTMAS, USMC

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	PASTER	☐	☐
McLARTY	☐	☐	RASCO	☐	☐
GEARAN	☐	☐	RUBIN	☐	☐
PANETTA	☐	☐	SEGAL	☐	☐
EMANUEL	☐	☐	STEPHANOPOULOS	☐	☐
GIBBONS	☐	☐	VARNEY	☐	☐
HALE	☐	☐	WATKINS	☐	☐
HERMAN	☐	☐	WILLIAMS	☐	☐
LAKE	☐	☐	BELL, Bob	☒	☐
LINDSEY	☐	☐	CLERK	☐	☒
MONTOYA	☐	☐		☐	☐
NUSSBAUM	☐	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

Do you have any objection to the attached?

RESPONSE:

The National Security Council staff concurs in the attached military nominations.

JOHN D. PODESTA
 Assistant to the President
 and Staff Secretary
 Ext. 2702

Anthony Lake

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 05/12/93

ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 5/17/93

SUBJECT: MILITARY NOMINATIONS:

1. VICE ADMIRAL HENRY G. CHILES, JR., USN
2. LTGEN WALTER KROSS, USAF
3. LTGEN ROBERT B. JOHNSTON, USMC
4. MAJGEN RICHARD D. HEARNEY, USMC

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	PASTER	☐	☐
McLARTY	☐	☐	RASCO	☐	☐
GEARAN	☐	☐	RUBIN	☐	☐
PANETTA	☐	☐	SEGAL	☐	☐
EMANUEL	☐	☐	STEPHANOPOULOS	☐	☐
GIBBONS	☐	☐	VARNEY	☐	☐
HALE	☐	☐	WATKINS	☐	☐
HERMAN	☐	☐	WILLIAMS	☐	☐
LAKE	☐	☐	BELL, BOB	☐	☐
LINDSEY	☐	☐	CLERK	☐	☒
MONTOYA	☐	☐		☐	☐
NUSSBAUM	☐	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

Do you have any objection to the attached?

RESPONSE:

The National Security Council staff concurs in the attached military nominations.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

Anthony Lake

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

1

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 3379

ACTION OFF [REDACTED]

DUE: May 17

☐ Prepare Memo For Lake/Berger

☐ Appropriate Action

☐ Prepare Memo For Podesta

☐ Prepare Memo For Itoh

☒ Prepare Memo Lake

to Podesta

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. _____

Concur

FYI

☐ ☐ Andreasen
☐ ☐ Andricos
☐ ☐ Aold
☐ ☐ Barth
☐ ☐ Beers
☐ ☐ Bell
☐ ☐ Burns
☐ ☐ Canas
☐ ☐ Clarke
☐ ☐ Clarke, P.
☐ ☐ Claussen
☐ ☐ Farrell
☐ ☐ Fauver
☐ ☐ Feinberg
☐ ☐ Forsythe
☐ ☐ Fry
☐ ☐ Gail
☐ ☐ Gottamoeller
☐ ☐ Gross
☐ ☐ Hahn

Concur

FYI

☐ ☐ Harris
☐ ☐ Holl
☐ ☐ Hooker
☐ ☐ Hull
☐ ☐ Indyk
☐ ☐ Jett
☐ ☐ Jones
☐ ☐ Kelly
☐ ☐ Kristoff
☐ ☐ Kupchan
☐ ☐ Kyle
☐ ☐ Lowenkron
☐ ☐ Menan
☐ ☐ Merchant
☐ ☐ Morley
☐ ☐ O'Leary
☐ ☐ Owens-Kirkpatrick
☐ ☐ Poneman
☐ ☐ Primorach
☐ ☐ Rice

Concur

FYI

☐ ☐ Riedel
☐ ☐ Rosner
☐ ☐ Saeed
☐ ☐ Sanner
☐ ☐ Schwartz
☐ ☐ Sheehan
☐ ☐ Spatar
☐ ☐ Tenet
☐ ☐ Tilley
☐ ☐ Van Eron
☐ ☐ Waguespack
☐ ☐ Walker
☐ ☐ Walsh
☐ ☐ Wayne
☐ ☐ Wiedemann
☐ ☐ Wilton
☐ ☐ Witkowski

INFORMATION

☒ Kenney

☐ Berger

☒ Info Sig Desk

COMMENTS

Logged By JB

Records Mgmt.
379 OEOB



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000



4 MAY 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Navy Flag Officer Nomination

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I recommend the assignment of Rear Admiral (Selectee) George W. Emery, United States Navy, as Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet/Commander Submarine Allied Command, Atlantic, and his nomination for appointment to the grade of vice admiral. Admiral Emery is 52 years old and is currently assigned as Commander Submarine Group FIVE. He will succeed Vice Admiral Henry G. Chiles, Jr., who is being nominated for another position.

In carrying out the duties and responsibilities of this assignment, a flag officer must have demonstrated highly effective performance in a number of senior leadership positions. He must be able to control all U. S. submarines and attached personnel throughout the Atlantic Ocean area. He must be able to maintain combat readiness, conduct Anti-Submarine Warfare operations, and provide support to high-value task organizations. He must also be able to advise the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic on submarine matters and coordinate submarine planning within the Atlantic Command. Admiral Emery meets these requirements.

Approval of this nomination will not cause the Navy to exceed the number of officers authorized to be serving in the grade of vice admiral. As required by title 10, United States Code, section 601(d) (1), I have attached an evaluation of Admiral Emery's performance in joint assignments from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

William J. Perry

Attachments



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000



3 MAY 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


SUBJECT: Air Force General Officer Nomination

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I recommend the duties of Vice Commander, Air Combat Command and Vice Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces Atlantic, a position of importance and responsibility previously designated to carry the grade of lieutenant general, be assigned to Major General Thad A. Wolfe, and that you nominate him for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general. General Wolfe, who is 50 years of age, is currently assigned as Assistant Deputy Director of Operations, National Security Agency. He will succeed Lieutenant General Stephen B. Croker, United States Air Force, who is being nominated for another position.

In order to carry out the duties and responsibilities of the proposed assignment, an officer must have demonstrated highly effective performance in a number of senior leadership positions involving the planning and employment of strategic forces and command, control, communication and intelligence platforms worldwide. General Wolfe meets these requirements.

The above action will not result in the Air Force exceeding the number of officers authorized to be serving in the grade of lieutenant general.

As required by title 10, United States Code, section 601(d)(1), I have attached an evaluation of General Wolfe's performance in joint duty assignments from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


William J. Perry

Attachments



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000



7 MAY 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Air Force General Officer Nomination

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I recommend you nominate Lieutenant General John E. Jaquish, United States Air Force, for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general on the retired list. General Jaquish, who is 56 years of age, is currently assigned as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Department of the Air Force.

William J. Perry

Attachments



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

3 MAY 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Marine Corps General Officer Nomination

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I recommend the assignment of Major General George R. Christmas, United States Marine Corps, as Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force, and his nomination for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general. General Christmas is 53 years old and is currently assigned as Director, Operations J-3, United States Pacific Command. He will succeed Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston, United States Marine Corps, who is being nominated for another position.

In carrying out the duties and responsibilities of this assignment, a general officer must have demonstrated highly effective performance in a number of senior leadership positions. He must be able to achieve and maintain combat readiness of assigned forces. He must be able to plan for and conduct contingency operations, amphibious and other ground exercises, and mission essential air-ground training. He must be able to act as the direct representative of the Commander, Marine Corps Forces Pacific, in all operational matters in the eastern Pacific/Southern California area. General Christmas meets these requirements.

Approval of this nomination will not cause the Marine Corps to exceed the number of officers authorized to be serving in the grade of lieutenant general. As required by title 10, United States Code, section 601(d)(1), I have attached an evaluation of General Christmas' performance in joint assignments from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "William J. Perry", is positioned above the printed name.

William J. Perry

Attachments



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000



3 MAY 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Navy Flag Officer Nomination

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I recommend the assignment of Vice Admiral Henry G. Chiles, Jr., United States Navy, as Deputy Commander in Chief, United States Strategic Command, and his nomination for reappointment to the grade of vice admiral. Admiral Chiles is 55 years old and is currently assigned as Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet/Commander Submarine Allied Command, Atlantic. He will succeed Vice Admiral Michael C. Colley, who is retiring.

In carrying out the duties and responsibilities of this assignment, a flag officer must have demonstrated highly effective performance in a number of senior leadership positions. He must be able to fulfill the responsibilities of the Commander in Chief during that officer's absence and act as the principal assistant and advisor in the formulation of policies, plans, and directives. Admiral Chiles meets these requirements.

Approval of this nomination will not cause the Navy to exceed the number of officers authorized to be serving in the grade of vice admiral.

William J. Perry

Attachments



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

3 MAY 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Air Force General Officer Nomination

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I recommend the duties of Commander, Fifteenth Air Force, and Director, Fifteenth Air Force Air Combat Operations Staff, Air Mobility Command, a position of importance and responsibility previously designated to carry the grade of lieutenant general, be assigned to Lieutenant General Walter Kross, and that you nominate him for reappointment to the grade of lieutenant general. General Kross, who is 50 years of age, is currently assigned as Vice Commander, Air Mobility Command. He will succeed Lieutenant General John E. Jackson, Jr., United States Air Force, who has been nominated for another position.

In order to carry out the duties and responsibilities of the proposed assignment, an officer must have demonstrated highly effective performance in a number of senior leadership positions involving the deployment and employment of military airlift forces. He must also possess a thorough understanding of operations, including the war planning process. General Kross meets these requirements.

The above action will not result in the Air Force exceeding the number of officers authorized to be serving in the grade of lieutenant general.


William J. Perry

Attachments



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000



3 MAY 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Marine Corps General Officer Nomination

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I recommend the assignment of Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston, United States Marine Corps, as Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, and his nomination for reappointment to the grade of lieutenant general. General Johnston is 55 years old and is currently assigned as Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force. He will succeed Lieutenant General Matthew T. Cooper, United States Marine Corps, who is retiring.

In carrying out the duties and responsibilities of this assignment, a general officer must have demonstrated highly effective performance in a number of senior leadership positions. He must be able to plan, direct, coordinate, and supervise Headquarters staff agencies on all matters relating to manpower planning, budgeting, policies and programs, personnel research and information systems, manpower management, and administration. He must be able to act as the principal point of contact in matters involving manpower for agencies external to the Marine Corps. General Johnston meets these requirements.

Approval of this nomination will not cause the Marine Corps to exceed the number of officers authorized to be serving in the grade of lieutenant general.

William J. Perry

Attachments



THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

3 MAY 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Marine Corps General Officer Nomination

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I recommend the assignment of Major General Richard D. Hearney, United States Marine Corps, as Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, and his nomination for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general. General Hearney is 53 years old and is currently assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Programs, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. He will succeed Lieutenant General Duane A. Wills, United States Marine Corps, who is retiring.

In carrying out the duties and responsibilities of this assignment, a general officer must have demonstrated highly effective performance in a number of senior leadership positions. He must be able to assist the Commandant of the Marine Corps in planning and coordinating staff activities on all matters relating to equipping, manning, training, and organizing Marine Corps aviation units and installations. He must be able to advise the Commandant on joint matters pertaining to aviation. General Hearney meets these requirements.

Approval of this nomination will not cause the Marine Corps to exceed the number of officers authorized to be serving in the grade of lieutenant general. As required by title 10, United States Code, section 601(d)(1), I have attached an evaluation of General Hearney's performance in a joint assignment from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


William J. Perry

Attachments

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3087

May 24, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RBB*
FROM: STEVEN ANDREASEN *SPA*
SUBJECT: Letter from McGeorge Bundy

McGeorge Bundy wrote to pass on to you an advance proof of a Foreign Affairs piece entitled "Reducing Nuclear Danger" and a paper entitled "The Nuclear Watershed of Spring 1993."

The response from you to Mr. Bundy thanks him for the material, notes that the issues raised in these two papers mirror the policy reviews currently underway in the administration, and encourages him to bring to your attention similar items in the future.

Concurrences: Rose Gottemoeller *RG* and Dan Boneman *DB*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Letter to McGeorge Bundy
Tab II Letter from McGeorge Bundy

Dear Mac:

I want to thank you for your letter, along with the advance proof of the Foreign Affairs piece and paper on the Nuclear Watershed.

The subject headings in these two documents mirror the policy reviews that are currently underway within the administration on proliferation, nuclear testing and arms control. Of course, the government is a bit behind you in coming up with concrete recommendations for the President. But we will benefit from your perspective on these difficult problems as we work through them in the days ahead.

Let me close by noting that nothing you send me is "unsolicited." I value your advice and counsel, and encourage you to bring to my attention similar items in the future.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Carnegie Corporation
of New York
437 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10022

3087

Carnegie Corporation of New York

437 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022 • (212) 371-3200 • Telex: US166776 • Fax: (212) 754-4073

March 26, 1993

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Tony:

I enclose a couple of documents that I have persuaded myself I would want to see if I were in your place. That's a severe test because what I remember most clearly about my own first months on that job is how nearly I collapsed under the weight of unsolicited documents from friends old and new.

One of the documents is not urgent—it is simply an advance proof of a piece that Bill Crowe, Sid Drell, and I have done for *Foreign Affairs*; it will be out April 5. It shows where the three of us come out on some broad nuclear issues that I suspect will look easy and almost academic from your present perspective.

The second and shorter paper is different. It is my own effort to dramatize the opportunity for decisive action the President has right now in this field. The wretched nuclear problem is going to look a lot better or a lot worse before the summer, and I really do think the result depends on one man—though I also think he has the best team ever to help him. So this is a memo designed for a single reader, but you can tell him, as I cannot, what the present state of play is in the relevant places. What I remember best, on this subject, is that even the most assertive officials, in and out of uniform, know that this is the President's own business in the end, so he can act.

Sincerely,



McGeorge Bundy

Enclosures

TO: FZ, PLD, FILE, AUTHORFIRST PROOF (a)

REDUCING NUCLEAR DANGER

McGeorge Bundy

William J. Crowe, Jr.

Sidney Drell

A Dramatically New Situation

TWO ENORMOUS EVENTS of recent years have opened the way for effective worldwide action against the danger of nuclear weapons. The first is the end of the Cold War and Soviet communism. The second is the sharp double lesson of the case of Saddam Hussein: that a rich and aggressive tyrant could get close to building a bomb of his own, but also that his effort could be blocked by effective international action. There is now a real prospect that almost all countries—those with many warheads, those with few and those with none—can come together in a worldwide program to reduce the existing nuclear arsenals and to prevent their further proliferation.

There are three immediate tasks: to execute the large bilateral reductions in U.S. and Russian forces that have been announced in recent years, to assure that Russia remains the

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only nuclear weapon state among the successor states of the old Soviet Union, and to reform and reinforce the worldwide effort to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons by applying the lessons learned in the case of Saddam Hussein.

In a dramatically new situation we must ask ourselves afresh the question that belongs to us all by the basic rules of our society: What should we ask of Washington in its policy and its behavior with respect to nuclear danger? What do present worldwide conditions tell us about what our government's policy should be, and what it should try to achieve, in the rest of this century? We have been led to the following propositions.

The United States should respect the reality that as long as there are bombs, there will be a nuclear danger that is unique in all history. The bomb is uniquely dangerous because it is uniquely destructive—so destructive that in all the conflict and tumult of the Cold War no one chose to use it or to provoke its use by others. That reality must permeate American policy choices even more thoroughly in the future than in the past. It requires intense and continuous effort to reduce the danger that comes from the very fact that the bomb is technically possible. It requires respect and support for those who have responsible control over such weapons. It also requires, at the other end of policymaking, a higher priority than ever for choices that can help prevent the possession of this weapon by international adventurers like Saddam Hussein.

From Opponents to Friends

WHAT UNDERLIES the great new Russian-American arms control measures of the last two years, and gives promise of further progress, is a set of interlocking political decisions and actions that have turned the Russians and the Americans from opponents to friends. Their nuclear competition now has no cause but itself, and both sides, in their actions of the last few years, have shown their understanding that all they need from these weapons, with respect to each other, is clear assurance that neither side will ever be able to achieve, without ample notice, any nuclear advantage that might be considered usable against the other. There is no short road to complete nuclear disarmament, but the road away from superpower confrontation has indeed been opened; the United States and Russia can walk that road together, to their common advantage, as they learn the art of cooperative

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nuclear moderation under the first and second Strategic Arms Reduction treaties (START) and their exchanged announcements of major tactical reductions.

What is also important for the long run, and less often remembered, is that Americans have a parallel absence of underlying political hostility with all other announced nuclear weapons states. The United States does not think of any of them as potential enemies in war—not the British or the French, self-evidently; not the Chinese because both countries have learned better over the forty years since Korea. The absence of direct hostility between China and the United States does not make that relationship the same as the American relation to England or France, or even Russia, but it is enough to mean that the nuclear danger between them that both have felt in the past no longer exists. Other differences with China persist, but it makes no sense for either side to let such differences prevent cooperation against nuclear danger.

Americans can expect differences with all four of the other permanent members of the Security Council, but not warfare with any. The political changes required to produce a change in this expectation are very large. Before they could have a direct impact on nuclear balance or nuclear danger, there would be plenty of time for any necessary American response in either conventional or nuclear rearmament. The prudent judgment for the present is that it should be both the American purpose and the American expectation that in the 1990s the five permanent Security Council members should continue on their new course of cooperation against nuclear danger. In these matters they are not in hot competition, and there is no underlying political animosity that need prevent them from working together. Pride is another matter; so is greed; so is misunderstanding. Any one of the three can hamper or even prevent cooperation. But the common real interest is to work together against nuclear danger.

The same general rule applies to our nuclear-danger relations with all other countries. Except for a few—perhaps Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Libya—all the world's governments now favor an end to nuclear proliferation. What is true of the five announced nuclear weapon states is true of the three other states that must be judged to have nuclear warheads of their own: Israel, India and Pakistan. Their formal status is a question of some difficulty, but neither their neighbors nor the

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world can doubt that, in terms of what they could do in desperation, they are nuclear weapon states. Still they are not eager for nuclear competition or open threat, let alone for aggressive use of what they have. They can join in reducing their own contribution to nuclear danger.

Still more clearly on the side of reducing nuclear danger are the scores of states, large and small, that have definitely rejected the course of obtaining their own nuclear weapons. The basic division in the world on the subject of nuclear proliferation is not between those with and without nuclear weapons. It is between almost all nations and the very few who currently seek weapons to reinforce their expansive ambition.

A Doctrine of Defensive Last Resort

ANY AMERICAN first use of nuclear weapons should be governed by a stringent doctrine of defensive last resort, which can also be adopted by all other nuclear weapon states.

As matters stand at the beginning of 1993, there is no vital interest of the United States, except the deterrence of nuclear attack, that cannot be met by prudent conventional readiness—there is no visible case where the United States could be forced to choose between defeat and the first use of nuclear weapons. This is one crucially important meaning of the 1989–91 transformation of Europe.

In the foreseeable future, the American president will be able to accompany support for a doctrine of defensive last resort with the assurance that the president and commander in chief sees no present likelihood of any confrontation that would require this dreadful choice. Indeed the U.S. government has already gone a long way in this direction. A doctrine of last resort was adopted by NATO in 1991, and in the NATO context the word “defensive” can fairly be taken for granted—by its own language the North Atlantic Treaty is a defensive alliance. This new NATO doctrine gives reassurance to all members, both of support and of prudence. It can do the same thing more broadly as a basic doctrine of the United States.

Both nuclear history and present nuclear politics would support a doctrine one step more rigid—a doctrine that nuclear weapons should be used only in response to their use by oth-

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ers—commonly called no first use. This posture was urged by some for NATO when the dominant opinion was that only a readiness for first use would deter communist aggression.¹ President Carter moved toward this posture when he declared in 1978 that the United States would never use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state unless that state were acting as the ally of a nuclear power. The last clause was

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aimed at the possible case of an aggressive ally of the Soviet Union; the case lively in memory was that of North Korea in 1950–53. In 1993 the clear priority for American military planners is that they should aim to keep their present capability to deter or defeat a conventional aggressor by conventional means. There is no early danger that this capability will be lost, and accordingly the present leaders can reaffirm the 1978 assurance. Indeed, taking account of the

end of the Cold War, they can strengthen it. There is no present obstacle to an American declaration against any use at all of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state.

In recognizing the possibility of a future case in which there might be justification for a use of nuclear weapons in defensive last resort, we are simply resisting the notion that our country can be certain, a priori, that there will never be a case when such use might be the least bad choice. The steady policy of the United States should be to do its part, by arms control, conventional capability and the general worldwide reduction of nuclear danger, to ensure that no such terrible choice ever becomes necessary. All of these lines of action can and should be pursued under a doctrine of defensive last resort.

The doctrine of defensive last resort has one further advantage. It corresponds to the nuclear policy of other nuclear weapon states much more closely than a flat policy of no first use. At present Russian possession of nuclear weapons helps to

¹See, for example, McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,” *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1982.

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give the Russians confidence that they do not endanger their homeland when they accept the independence of Eastern Europe and the breakup of the old Soviet Union. As long as the Russians have the bomb, there is little danger of large-scale attack by others on Russia for the decisive reason that no one could expect them to accept any large defeat without resort to the bomb. There is a parallel protection for France in its nuclear capability; without it Paris might be deeply uncomfortable with its larger but bomb-free German neighbor. The position of Britain is less clear-cut, because the surrounding seas protect it from those nearby and because the possible threat from Russia is not only distant but more nuclear than conventional—requiring defense by deterrence, not by a last resort to first use.

But it is not surprising that among the five permanent members of the Security Council only China has declared an unqualified policy of no first use. The Chinese have become confident, after conflicts with Soviets, Americans, Indians and Vietnamese, that they can hold their own against all possible opponents without resort to nuclear weapons except as a deterrent to the nuclear weapons of others. If Americans had only themselves to defend they could make a parallel declaration; no one is going to threaten the United States conventionally on its own territory. But as it is, with contingent obligations overseas and friends who still rely in some measure on its nuclear protection, and with other nuclear powers sharing its caution for their own reasons, it makes sense for the United States to have a doctrine one step broader—a doctrine of defensive last resort.

This doctrine also fits the requirements of the three unannounced nuclear weapon states—Israel, India and Pakistan. The Israeli case is the clearest: the underlying motivation for the Israeli bomb is clearly the reality of vastly outnumbering unfriendly neighbors. The fact that the Israeli bomb is not for casual use is evident both in the desperate conventional battles that have been fought without its use and in the intense Israeli commitment to conventional strength. Evidence on Indian and Pakistani policy is thinner, but the general weight of informed judgment is that each country is governed more by fear than by ambition, and that each feels its nuclear need primarily because of perceived danger from the other. In this situation the immediately urgent requirement is the reduction of the level of tension between the two; the first contribution that

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nuclear policy can make is that of mutually recognized moderation in weapons development and deployment. Sharing in the worldwide adoption of a doctrine of defensive last resort could be helpful here.

The American interest in a worldwide effort against any use of nuclear weapons is clear and strong, and it is equally clear that it will take visible American leadership to ensure such an effort.

Reducing Nuclear Reliance

WE SUPPORT the new budgetary priorities that reflect the end of the Cold War and the need to attend to domestic concerns, but we also believe it makes sense to keep room, as a matter of the most elemental national defense priority, for a financially solid program of reducing nuclear danger.

American budgetary priorities in action against nuclear danger should be shifted away from U.S. nuclear deployments to support cooperative reduction with Russia, encourage full acceptance of non-nuclear status by other successor states like Ukraine, and reinforce international action to prevent further proliferation all around the world.

The United States should think about all its national actions and expenditures affecting nuclear danger with a recognition that there is no a priori reason to prefer arms to arms control. What is essential is to understand the particular advantages and disadvantages of particular choices and act accordingly.

During the Cold War Americans thought the best way to reduce the Soviet nuclear threat was by a fully matching set of nuclear developments and deployments. Now the best way is cooperative reduction. The last Congress and the Bush administration both took remarkable steps in this direction. Congress, with bipartisan support, assigned \$400 million a year, in the Defense budgets for 1992 and 1993, to the task of assisting the nuclear weapons cleanup in the old Soviet Union. The executive branch in 1992 agreed in principle to purchase up to 500 tons of formerly Soviet weapons-grade uranium. These actions had general bipartisan support, demonstrating that there is wide understanding of their contributions not only to arms reductions but to the national security of the United States. They should also be seen as the first steps toward further cooperation, by all the nuclear-capable states,

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to limit the supply and control the diffusion of fissionable material.

Need for action of this sort will continue and expand. American readiness to help will strengthen the hands of all those in Russia and other successor states who prefer the turn against nuclear danger to any more adventurous course. Moreover, actions of this kind, when they provide American dollars for activities in the common interest of reducing nuclear danger, can also be a general reinforcement to the economy of Russia and other affected states, and therefore serve the broader American interest in the political success of democratic and moderate governments.

A quite parallel value attaches to the strengthening of international arrangements for limiting nuclear proliferation. If agencies like the International Atomic Energy Agency are to have wider responsibilities and powers in this field, American reinforcement will be essential, and the more so because both habit and interest will produce strong demands from other states that if the IAEA is to be stronger in enforcement it must also be stronger in its work for cooperation in peaceful nuclear uses. If the IAEA is to get a sufficient flow of information about trade in relevant materials and devices, there must also be reinforcement of the most important single source of information, American intelligence—and indeed such reinforcement has begun.

There is a complex question about the possible future role of a separate agency of the Security Council, functioning like the special commission that has been necessary in the case of Iraq. It is not clear that the IAEA, with its inherited ethos of trust in those it monitors, can do all the hard work alone.

What is clear is that if there is to be timely international action against suspect states, there must be readiness to act in the U.N. Security Council, and here American support will be crucial. When there is also need for a U.N. blue-helmet force, it will help greatly if there

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is a new American readiness to participate. Similarly, if there is to be effective regional action that encourages restraint and penalizes its opposite, there must in most cases be American readiness for a share in such action. More generally, as the case of Saddam Hussein illustrates almost too clearly, the power that backs up any insistence on unwelcome inspection is likely to be insufficient unless the Americans are visibly able and ready to help. Fortunately it is probable that very few cases will be as sharp as that of Iraq. What is largely missing so far on the American scene, and greatly needed, is a major effort, always including leaders from both parties, to make it clear to the American people that U.S. assistance of this kind is as much a matter of attending to nuclear danger as any direct payment for American nuclear weapons systems. The funds for such work should somehow be considered a part of a national budget against nuclear danger, because treating them in this way will make clear not only what they are for, but how moderate they are in comparison with the tens of billions the United States will still be spending on all aspects of American nuclear weapons even as such forces are reduced.

Phasing Out Nuclear Testing

THE UNITED STATES can strengthen its own effort against nuclear danger by durable changes from its past policy on such matters as testing and strategic defense.

The problem of nuclear testing presents both an obvious opportunity and a somewhat less obvious difficulty for the United States. The comprehensive test ban has been debated for more than thirty years. In principle the United States has supported it, but in practice the Cold War produced nuclear fear and competitiveness that prevented agreement. Now, with the end of the Cold War and the beginning of nuclear moderation, the United States does not need tests for new warheads with either larger or smaller capabilities than those it now has. America's present large-yield warheads are quite destructive enough, and at the lower end of the scale it would do much better to seek conventional weapons with improved accuracy and penetration.

It is excellent that the Bush administration in 1992 ruled out nuclear weapons tests for new designs, and it is wrong for anyone to encourage the nuclear weapons laboratories to seek support for such designs, except for safety improvements.

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Programs of this kind, indeed, would sharply weaken the American effort to reduce nuclear danger. They would make it plain to the rest of the world that the U.S. policy of reduced reliance on nuclear forces was for export only.

In this situation the most important past arguments against a comprehensive treaty fade, and the historic arguments in its favor come to the fore: it will help limit the spread of weapons; it will help dampen the competition among those who already have warheads.

More generally, the end of testing has been an asserted objective of all members of the Nonproliferation Treaty for almost twenty-five years. In that time the United States, which has always found reasons of one sort or another for resisting a ban, has come to be perceived as deliberately hostile to an objective it formally accepted as part of the bargain struck between states with and without nuclear weapons in that treaty. There is therefore a considerable political cost in any continued American opposition to a comprehensive test ban.

For all these reasons we support the emerging U.S. policy of 1992: a phased approach to an internationally agreed end of testing during this decade, an approach that permits a limited number of tests in the 1990s, with the primary objective of safety. In this period overall safety will also be improved if the deep reductions of START II are carried out as scheduled, because many present concerns about safety center on warheads that will be retired in these reductions; in this sense nuclear arms reduction is itself a contributor to weapon safety. For remaining nuclear weapons the most important safety goals can be achieved by the cut-off date, September 30, 1996, that was enacted by Congress late in 1992.

It may well be true, as partisans of testing often argue, that American testing is not a cause of nuclear ambition in a leader like Saddam Hussein; such leaders will want the bomb, if they can get it, with or without American underground tests. But the comment misses the real point: a great many people, in many countries, who are strong believers in a common effort against nuclear danger, have learned over a long period to put a test ban high on their list of priorities, and to measure the seriousness of the nuclear weapon states by their readiness to support such a ban. The United States does not need new nuclear capabilities, and it would strengthen its position among people whose help it needs by supporting a nuclear test ban.

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Still a limited and temporary exception for safety testing makes sense. The safety of nuclear weapons is a common interest of all states, and since we cannot expect an early end to the current stockpiles—only their steady and sober reduction—limited safety testing is justified to reduce real concerns about warheads remaining in the stockpile. A limited and temporary exception for underground safety testing will not seriously affect the prospects for a comprehensive test ban treaty, especially if the safety testing is conducted as openly as possible so that the international community of nuclear experts can be assured that safety is indeed the object of such testing.

The need for safety tests is not good news for those who have both a deep commitment to early achievement of a complete test ban and a long experience of delays defended on the ground that there was this or that continued justification for testing. But the reality is that some American weapons are not as safe as they could and should be. They can be made properly safe, but not without some time and some tests. While the 1996 cut-off in the new law does not hold if a foreign state tests after that date, it is a reasonable deadline for American safety testing.

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ing. The passage of this conditional test-ban legislation is a landmark showing the new post-Cold War priorities of the American government.

A comprehensive test ban extending over generations would eventually bring a gradual erosion of confidence in the reliability of remaining nuclear warheads. (Reliability in this context means dependable explosion on command; it is not the same as warhead safety.) This would present new issues, and the proper response will depend on the degree of progress that has been made by then in reducing both nuclear danger and the traditional reliance on nuclear deterrence of high technical precision.

The central point remains. The congressional action of 1992 has laid the basis for American leadership in reaching a comprehensive test-ban treaty while also attending to real prob-

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lems of safety. Such a treaty, much more than a fragile moratorium, will weigh against proliferation, and indeed against enlargement of nuclear arsenals.

Strategic Defense

THE CASE OF STRATEGIC defense is one of the best examples of the requirement that we respect the realities of nuclear warheads. There is a recurrent tendency to ask technical experts to do more than nature permits—to make us safe, by science and technology, from what science and technology have made possible. Sometimes technological enthusiasts contribute to the confusion by advertising more than they can deliver. The case that is currently relevant is that of strategic defense. There really is no present prospect at all that all-out defense can outrun all-out offense in nuclear warfare, because of one simple reality: the overwhelming destructiveness of every single nuclear warhead. A kill-rate of even ten percent will defend you against ordinary aircraft with ordinary bombs—the largest bomber force will fade in a month of such continued attrition. But with nuclear warheads a kill-rate of 90 percent—extraordinarily hard to achieve—is wholly inadequate. Even 95 percent is not enough: for the smallest American and Russian forces in sight at the end of the century, it could mean some 150 warheads on homeland targets. And no one is now asserting that a defensive force of this quality is possible by any technology at all.

Once overall strategic defense is put aside as currently impossible—which is in reality what the U.S. government has already done in the last two years—one can address more realistically the question of what should be done.

The United States can keep a sharp eye out for some real possibility of a technical revolution between strategic offense and defense; prudence requires no less, and the United States should not allow its bad experience with the Strategic Defense Initiative, as originally advertised, to make it imprudently inattentive. It can also sustain an active and flexible program consistent with the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 on the less difficult but still demanding mission of defense against limited strikes. In regional conflicts such defenses can have both practical and psychological value against short-range missiles with less-than-nuclear warheads, and the development and production of such systems can proceed in accord with the ABM

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treaty. There are still many outstanding questions about the potential effectiveness of nationwide defenses against only one or a few nuclear-armed missiles of intercontinental range launched, perhaps, accidentally. These can be addressed by a treaty-consistent research program. But effective defense against a large force of nuclear-armed missiles would require a wholly different level of effectiveness simply because of the requirement of a kill-rate near 100 percent. A gulf of ignorance and uncertainty still separates the United States from any prospect of a defensive capability that would make it useful to seek a change in the ABM treaty. It is important to remember that a basic principle undergirding the strategic reductions of recent years is that any nation remains inescapably vulnerable to a large-scale attack. It is hard to accept this reality, but not so hard to see that all one can get from imperfect defense is the same situation with multiplied costs and fears.

Lowering Weapons Deployments

THE U.S.-RUSSIAN REDUCTIONS now under consideration should not be seen as the end of the road; in the long run Americans should work for still further reductions and improvements.

There is no higher priority for the reduction of nuclear danger than the orderly execution of all that is promised in START I and II and in the 1991 exchange of unilateral assurances on tactical warheads. Over the next few years the execution of these agreements and assurances should have operational priority, but the resulting level of 3,000-3,500 strategic warheads on each side should not be accepted as permanent. Any such acceptance, over time, could pin both sides into levels of expense that would be undesirable in themselves and destructive in their impact on the political relations between the two powers.

If we should disregard the present size of the two great arsenals and simply ask ourselves what is the lowest level of strategic strength, measured in warheads, that would give both sides ample assurance, both against nuclear attack and against the other side's breakout to any significant strategic superiority, we would not come out with the currently agreed range. That range reflects an understandable respect for existing habits of targeting, indeed for existing targets, that will not survive the

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changes already in prospect.

It may be better to examine the long-run prospects for lower warhead ceilings by a fresh start upward from zero, with ample safety factors. Assume that the United States will want to be able to hit both military and industrial targets, while keeping substantial forces in reserve and having insurance against losses from a surprise attack. Table 1 shows two alternative force levels for these purposes:

If the reductions now being considered are carried out successfully, the United States and Russia may well be ready by the year 2000—and perhaps sooner—to go to such still lower levels. Numbers like these might raise a question, in Moscow or Washington or both, about the comparative strength of British or French or Chinese forces. All three in 1993 appear to be headed upward, toward numbers of strategic warheads in this same general range. But there is nothing immediately troubling here. If a continuing improvement in superpower nuclear relations permits the big two to agree on such reductions five or ten years from now, there may well emerge a parallel preference for reductions elsewhere, but it may also become necessary for Americans and Russians to accept forces in those countries that become relatively larger as time passes. Any resistance to such a relative change would be based more on habits of thought than on true national interest. Happily there is some evidence from the events of recent years that nuclear moderation can be as contagious as nuclear competition was in the Cold War years.

To some arms controllers, even these reductions will seem like slow work. We can only remark that as it took time to get

Number of Strategic Warheads

Military Targets	200	300
Industrial Targets	200	300
Reserve	100	150
Doubled for Insurance Against Surprise Attack	500	750
TOTAL	1,000	1,500

(Table 1)

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ourselves burdened by these enormous forces, so it will take time—though much less—to cut them back. Nor is 1,000–1,500 warheads the lowest level obtainable by the early 21st century. Our concern here is simply to make it clear that there is no good reason to accept the much higher targets of 1992 as the best that can ever be done.

The true interest of both sides is that each step toward lower and less threatening deployments should be seen as a step forward by healthy majorities on both sides, so that nuclear moderation remains, for both, as it was in 1992, a broadly popular policy. In particular America should avoid the temptation to use a season of great Russian economic stress to drive for one-sided advantages, either by negotiation or appropriation. At any levels now in prospect such marginal advantages would have no real value, and their political damage could be serious. Complaints against such “advantages” supposedly gained by the other side have helped hard-liners to gain strength in both countries in the past. A time of general political success is not a time to risk that success by making the mistake of “piling on.”

Finally, reductions in warhead numbers are not the only means of nuclear restraint. The same broad objectives can also be served by reducing vulnerability, improving controls, avoiding destabilizing surprises and making a broad attack on controlling and limiting weapons-grade material.

Immediate Steps and Long-Term Progress

MODERATE AND IMMEDIATELY practicable courses of action like those recommended here for the reduction of nuclear danger must also be held to the test that they should contribute to the prospect of still larger progress over the longer term.

The question could be raised, why not go further? Can we not roll back or even end the nuclear programs of some existing nuclear states? Can we not insist that there must be absolutely no first use of these weapons by anyone, especially ourselves? Can we not get to numbers of warheads, even in the United States and Russia, that are well below the four-figure levels we have considered? Can we not, perhaps, revive the old notion of putting all nuclear weapons in the hands of an international agency? Could a properly arranged monopoly be operated by a selected government or governments on

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behalf of the United Nations? Should we not, in short, be more bold?

We have two answers to this set of questions. First, by the standards of the past and by what we know of the ways of nations, our proposals are more demanding than cautious. We are asking for a sustained and genuine partnership of the nuclear superpowers in a shared program of national reduction, and of proliferation avoided in the other countries of the old Soviet Union. We are also proposing that the United States call on all others to join in giving a new worldwide priority to the avoidance of further nuclear proliferation. We have argued that the nuclear moderation of every existing nuclear weapons state will be critical to any such program.

Second, these short-term efforts must always be consistent with further progress later toward the further reduction of worldwide nuclear danger. We have examined all our proposals by this test, and they all make further steps easier, not harder. In particular it is right to urge greater strength for international agencies, greater use of open formal agreements governing numbers, safeguards and disclosure, and lower reliance on the threat of nuclear warfare.

More generally it is right to begin to displace the inherited distinction between those with weapons and those without by a wider assertion that in reality all the nations should be on the same side, against nuclear danger, whatever their present degree of reliance on nuclear weapons. This last proposition is so clear and strong that a steady respect for it is the best single guide to action for any country, both now and in the long run.

Leadership from Washington

IN THEIR ACTUAL behavior recent presidents and Congresses have done much to reduce the level of nuclear danger in the world, but they have done much less well in explaining and winning support for the new policy of partnership against that nuclear danger that they have joined with foreign leaders to begin to create. Effective future action will require a stronger policy of public explanation from American political leaders than ever before.

THE NUCLEAR WATERSHED OF SPRING 1993

A history looking back from the year 2001

The great turning point in the twentieth century's struggle for firm control over nuclear danger came in 1993. There are some scholars still who think the decisive year was 1992, when indeed the START agreements were signed, and when the process of real U.N. control of proliferation was begun in Iraq. That mistake was made by many contemporary observers. But the paper START agreements of 1992, broad and sweeping indeed, were not at all self-executing, and the new attention to Iraq was such a special case that it told nothing about the existence or non-existence of an effective international consensus to reduce the reliance of *all* states on nuclear weapons.

The challenges which required decisive response came in 1993, and they did not come to an experienced President Bush, riding two friendly waves, one of unexpected and massive Russian concessions in START and the other the free ride against Saddam's bomb that was provided by victory in the Gulf. They came instead to a beginning President Clinton who had to rally his countrymen against the unavoidable dangers presented in early 1993 by

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general crisis in Moscow and by direct challenge to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in North Korea.

We all know what President Clinton did, and in retrospect it looks easy—as the Marshall Plan did afterward, and also Franklin Roosevelt's Lend-Lease. Clinton simply put the basic requirements of the problem of nuclear danger up front in his approach to the old Soviet Union and the question of North Korea. At the same time he underlined the reality of the internal U.S. position against nuclear danger by ending some bits and pieces of earlier nuclear policy that were still confusing the American message when he came to office. An example which was untimely but useful was the accident between blue and red submarines in March. The President recognized the problem presented when he read in the papers an explanation from an unidentified official at the Pentagon who said it was necessary to know where such Russian submarines were. Checking with experts who were numerous and alert, in his own staff and elsewhere in his Administration, the President confirmed his own judgment that this requirement was nonsensical in a world in which neither side desired or expected or intended to be ready to "win" a general nuclear war. He understood that the decisive deterrent value of nuclear submarines, for both sides, was primarily that their location

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on patrol was *not* known. So he publicly stopped this inherited activity and told the world why. This step was easy, because he could take it on his own authority—of course after consulting his own people, his Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs. While the records are silent on the point, the gossips of the day reported believably that he also consulted his friend Admiral William Crowe; Crowe had a veteran's knowledge of these naval exercises, a statesman's view of their present relevance, and a wise man's view of the kind of change that would make sense to all concerned.

The North Korean affair looks easier to the historian, but for the Clinton White House it was probably harder. It required a sustained cooperation among China, Russia, and the United States that was then unfamiliar to all three, and in the end it also required its own resolution in the Security Council; from these two forces it developed a prospect of effective sanctions and inspections, and eventually there came a clear-cut North Korean decision against nuclear weapons. There were also carefully designed carrots, largely Chinese, to go with the sticks. The President correctly insisted that a single person be found to handle this job, with direct access to him, and Secretary Christopher's nomination of _____ was inspired.

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Handling the nuclear crisis in the old Soviet Union was the hardest because American action could be effective only as it was matched to the political realities of the relevant successor states, especially Russia and Ukraine. The eventual program is obvious looking back, but its construction was a matter of intense and sustained staff work and diplomacy in which the deciding American mind (as always on nuclear policy) was the President's. The resulting arrangements are too familiar to be reported here. What we should note is their decisive component: a use of multiyear U.S. dollars as part of the sustained incentive to the Ukrainians to go *away* from warheads in Ukraine and to the Russians to go decisively *down* in Russia. Helping to pay for the nuclear good sense of others was offensive only to those few Americans who neglected the cost of *not* doing so. Here the Nunn-Lugar precedent, for all its operational weakness, proved a reliable guide to the Congressional response once the issue was fully understood, and the President's insistence that this money be seen as "dollars for nuclear defense" was recognized as a modern parallel to Franklin Roosevelt's lending the British a "garden hose" in the form of Lend-Lease. Putting these dollars in the Pentagon budget, directly under the Commander-in-Chief, was a joint triumph for Clinton, Aspin, and Nunn.

The Nuclear Watershed of 1993

March 26, 1993

Page 5

By the end of 1993 the corner had been turned on all three problems, and the world-wide reaction was that in nuclear matters a new age of sense had opened. In all this the decisive figure was certainly Mr. Clinton. As he explained to his staff when he put this set of actions in train, "This is a case where I *must* act because I *cannot* delegate; this one has to come from the President and Commander-in-Chief, and for me *not* to act is to decide for failure." What the President did not say, but clearly understood, was that in all three cases responses produced only by adding up the special interests of particular parts of the government would have fallen very far short.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3212

May 24, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH:

ROBERT BELL *RGB*

FROM:

STEVEN ANDREASEN *SAA*

SUBJECT:

Letter from Congressman Dellums Recommending Phil Schrag as CTB Negotiator

Congressman Dellums wrote to recommend Phil Schrag as CTB negotiator.

The response from you to Congressman Dellums notes that Mr. Schrag has met with senior members of your staff, and that he is being seriously considered for the position.

Concurrence: Jeremy Rosner *(Y)*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Congressman Dellums

Tab II Letter from Congressman Dellums

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter recommending Phil Schrag as the CTB negotiator. Mr. Schrag has met with senior members of my staff to discuss the position. As you point out, he clearly has the requisite experience and ability for the job. He is being seriously considered for the job.

Given your own deep involvement in this issue, your recommendation will figure prominently as we consider candidates for what will be one of the most important and challenging positions in the Clinton administration.

I look forward to working closely with you during the negotiation.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Chairman
Armed Services Committee
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

RONALD V. DELLUMS
8TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

CHAIRPERSON,
COMMITTEE ON THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

CHAIRPERSON,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE



Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

April 30, 1993

The Honorable Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Mr. Lake 

It is with pleasure that I bring to your attention and enthusiastically recommend Professor Philip G. Schrag of the Georgetown University Law Center for the position of U. S. Representative to the Comprehensive Test Ban Negotiations. For your perusal, his resume is enclosed.

Professor Schrag has worked on the CTB issue for more than two decades and is a recognized authority on the subject. He authored two books and several articles on test ban negotiations, and was the co-rapporteur for the Belmont Conference on Nuclear Test Ban Policy. His report recommended a gradual phase-out of nuclear weapons tests, the approach adopted by the Congress in last year's legislation.

During the Carter Administration, Philip Schrag was Deputy General Counsel at ACDA, as well as the lawyer for the U. S. Delegation to the CTB negotiations. He has the experience necessary to represent our nation admirably.

Philip Schrag was an early supporter of, and worker for, President Clinton. Of major importance is the fact that Professor Schrag continues to be a loyal and ardent supporter of the President and the Administration and can be counted on to not only provide invaluable input to the President, but also to support the President's policies and decisions. I wholeheartedly join my colleagues in both the House and the Senate in support of Professor Schrag.

Having known and utilized Professor Schrag's expertise over the years, I can state unequivocally that he would be of immeasurable value to the Administration. I am pleased to ask your consideration of him as U. S. Representative to the CTB Negotiations.

Sincerely,

Ronald V. Dellums
Member of Congress
Enc.

ANY REPLY TO THIS LETTER
SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO
OFFICE CHECKED:

CARLOTTA SCOTT
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

ROBERT BRAUER
SPECIAL COUNSEL

☐ 2136 RAYBURN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-2661

DONALD R. HOPKINS
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR

H. LEE HALTERMAN
DISTRICT COUNSEL

☐ 201 13TH STREET, SUITE 105
OAKLAND, CA 94612
(510) 763-0370

☐ 1720 OREGON STREET
BERKELEY, CA 94703
(510) 548-7767

☐ 3732 MT. DIABLO BLVD., SUITE 160
LAFAYETTE, CA 94549
(510) 283-8125

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 24, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*
FROM: STEVEN ANDREASEN *SAA*
SUBJECT: Letter from Thirty-Eight Representatives on
Nuclear Testing

Thirty-eight Representatives wrote to the President to express their strong opposition to any comprehensive test ban treaty that allowed for continued underground testing of any nuclear weapons after September 30, 1996.

The response from the President does not specifically address the Representative's concern over continued underground testing beyond September 30, 1996, as we have not made a decision on this issue within the USG. It does note that the administration is in the process of reviewing a number of issues pertaining to this negotiation, and assures the Representatives that their views on this matter are being taken into account during the review.

Concurrence: Jeremy Rosner *JR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letters to Congressmen
Tab B Letter from Congressmen

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
HOWARD PASTER

SUBJECT: Letter from Thirty-Eight Representatives on
Nuclear Testing

Purpose

To respond to a letter signed by thirty-eight Representatives on nuclear testing and a comprehensive test ban.

Background

Thirty-eight members of Congress have written you to express their strong opposition to any comprehensive test ban treaty that allowed for continued underground testing of any nuclear weapons after September 30, 1996.

The response from you to the Representatives notes that the administration is in the process of reviewing a number of issues pertaining to this negotiation, and assures the Representatives that their views on this matter are being taken into account during the review.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the Representatives at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letters to Representatives
Tab B Letter from Representatives

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Dear Mike:

I want to thank you for your letter on nuclear testing and a comprehensive test ban and the work you have done on this issue.

As you know, my administration is in the process of reviewing a number of issues pertaining to the negotiation of a multilateral nuclear test ban. I expect to receive recommendations from the appropriate Departments in the next few weeks on our CTB negotiating strategy and the related question of whether to conduct a final series of phase-out tests consistent with Public Law 102-377.

I want to assure you that your views on this matter are being taken into account during the review, and will be foremost in my mind as I consider recommendations on this difficult issue.

Again, thank you for advising me of your views on this critical issue.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Michael J. Kopetski
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

3271

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

May 5, 1993

President Bill Clinton
Attention: Anthony Lake
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Clinton:

We have learned you may soon be presented with recommendations for the resumption of United States nuclear weapons testing that may run contrary to Public Law 102-377. Therefore, we are writing to share with you our grave concern regarding the forthcoming recommendations on nuclear testing.

As you know, this issue has been debated in Congress for many years. Last year on two separate occasions, the House adopted overwhelmingly legislation to impose a moratorium on U.S. nuclear weapons testing. Former President Bush signed H.R. 5373, the Energy and Water Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1993 last October and we are now observing the nuclear weapons testing moratorium as outlined in the legislation. We wish to reiterate our continued strong support for P.L. 102-377.

This legislation calls for an end to United States nuclear weapons testing after September 30, 1996. We remain committed to this date and a final end of U.S. nuclear weapons testing if other nations refrain also from testing. Any recommendations to continue nuclear testing beyond 1996 clearly are not consistent the law. Additionally, we believe this sends the wrong message to the international community and particularly nations who may consider the nuclear option, now or in the future. Specifically, continued U.S. nuclear weapons testing threatens the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which expires in 1995. The United States must lead the world away from the nuclear threat and we are confident you share this goal.


Mr. President, we respectfully request that you reject any nuclear testing recommendations that run contrary to the letter and spirit of Public Law 102-377. We believe this law continues to enjoy significant support in the Congress. Further, we want to work with you to avoid what will surely be a divisive and difficult confrontation between the Executive and Legislative Branches of government.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,


Mike Kopetski


Ron Dellums


Martin O. Sabo

Vic Fgin

Lane Evans

Ed Mackey

Nancy Peloni

Eugene H. Dura

Louise Staughton

Pat Schroeder

Lynn C. Dalseg

~~Marjorie H. Brown~~

Phil Abernethy

~~Donna Brown~~

James Kennelly

Paula H. H. H.

Dickie Hupshorn

William J. Coyne

Jim Millett

Rene Stark

Rene Hughes

Jim Barchus

~~Jim H. H.~~

Paul E. H.

Andie H.

~~Carl H.~~

Ed H.

Carl H.

Burt H.

Harry H.

Ron Wyden

George E. Brang

Glenz W. H.

Pat T. H.

Jack Reed

Paul H.

Lyn H.

The Following Members signed the letter to President Clinton:

**Mike Kopetski
Martin O. Sabo
David Bonior
Patricia Schroeder
Pete Stark
Ed Markey
Marjorie Margolies Mezvinsky
Joe Kennedy
Bruce Vento
Jack Reed
Neil Abercrombie
Bill Hughes
Larry LaRocco
Alan Wheat
Lynn Woolsey
Robert Matsui
Jim Bacchus
Ron Coleman
Patsy Mink**

**Ron Dellums
Richard Gephardt
Barbara Kennelly
Vic Fazio
Lane Evans
Louise Slaughter
Bill Jefferson
Charles Schumer
George Brown
Nancy Pelosi
William Coyne
Ed Towns
Jolene Unsoeld
Elizabeth Furse
Sidney Yates
Jim McDermott
Charlie Rose
Ron Wyden
Lynn Shenk**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 24, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *REB*
FROM: STEVEN ANDREASEN *SAA*
SUBJECT: Letter from Congressman Kopetski

Congressman Kopetski wrote to the President to express his strong opposition to any comprehensive test ban treaty that allowed for continued underground testing of any nuclear weapons after September 30, 1996.

The response from the President does not specifically address the Congressman's concern over "permitted experiments" beyond September 30, 1996, as we have not made a decision on this issue within the USG. It does note that the Administration is in the process of reviewing a number of issues pertaining to this negotiation, and assures the Congressman that his views on this matter are being taken into account during the review.

Concurrence: Jeremy Rosner *JR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to Congressman Kopetski
Tab B Letter from Congressman Kopetski

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
HOWARD PASTER

SUBJECT: Letter from Congressman Kopetski

Purpose

To respond to Congressman Kopetski's letter on nuclear testing and a comprehensive test ban.

Background

Congressman Kopetski has written you to express his strong opposition to any comprehensive test ban treaty that allowed for continued underground testing of any nuclear weapons below a one-kiloton threshold after September 30, 1996.

The response from you to Congressman Kopetski notes that the Administration is in the process of reviewing a number of issues pertaining to this negotiation, and assures the Congressman that his views on this matter are being taken into account during the review.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Congressman Kopetski at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Congressman Kopetski
Tab B Letter from Congressman Kopetski

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Dear Mike:

I want to thank you for your letter on nuclear testing and a comprehensive test ban. The work you have done on this issue has been instrumental in bringing us to the brink of a multilateral negotiation to realize this long-standing goal of U.S. arms control policy.

As you know, my Administration is in the process of reviewing a number of issues pertaining to the negotiation of a multilateral nuclear test ban. I expect to receive recommendations from the appropriate Departments in the next few weeks on our CTB negotiating strategy and the related question of whether to conduct a final series of phase-out tests consistent with Public Law 102-377. Your letter has been very useful in helping us understand Congressional intent as it relates to the law.

I want to assure you that your views on this matter are being taken into account during the review, and will be foremost in my mind as I consider recommendations on this difficult issue.

I hope I can call on you in the months ahead for advice on this and other matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Michael J. Kopetski
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

MICHAEL J. KOPETSKI
5TH DISTRICT, OREGON

218 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-3705
202-225-5711
FAX: 202-225-9477

COMMITTEE:
WAYS & MEANS

3144

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3705

April 30, 1993

HOME OFFICE:
THE EQUITABLE CENTER BUILDING
530 CENTER STREET, NE
SUITE 340
SALEM, OREGON 97301
503-588-9100
FAX: 503-588-0963

CLACKAMAS COUNTY OFFICE:
615 HIGH STREET
OREGON CITY, OREGON 97045
503-650-1273

OREGON TOLL FREE: 1-800-548-7179

93 MAY 3 PM 4:43

President Bill Clinton
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As the original sponsor of the nuclear testing amendment to last year's Energy and Water Appropriations Bill, I appreciate your administration's ongoing effort to complete the report to Congress on nuclear testing policy. I look forward to receiving it.


It has come to my attention that the inter-agency group preparing the report will recommend to you that the United States pursue a one-kiloton threshold testing limit instead of a comprehensive ban on all tests. In my view, such a recommendation does not conform to the spirit or letter of the legislation.

The legislation clearly states that the administration must prepare "[a] plan for achieving a multilateral comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons on or before September 30, 1996," and that "[n]o underground test of nuclear weapons may be conducted by the United States after September 30, 1996, unless a foreign state conducts a nuclear after this date, at which time the prohibition on United States nuclear testing is lifted."

As you can see, the legislation's intent is to help implement a multilateral comprehensive test ban treaty. It makes no provisions for substituting a one-kiloton limit for a comprehensive ban. If the report to Congress recommends a one-kiloton threshold, a contentious debate on the report is very likely, as is opposition to the report from many quarters. I strongly suggest that you not endorse the idea of a one-kiloton testing limit and support the original intent of the legislation: a multilateral comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapons tests.

I look forward to working with you on this issue.

Sincerely,



Mike Kopetski
Member of Congress

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 25, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH:

ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*

FROM:

STEVEN R. JONES *Q*

SUBJECT:

FEMA Proposed Testimony on Flood Insurance and New
Federal Insurance Programs

OMB forwarded the subject FEMA testimony (Tab II) for NSC comment. This is the proposed statement of Mr. Reilly, Deputy Federal Insurance Administrator at FEMA before the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Consumer Credit and Insurance.

The testimony offers comments on the National Flood Insurance Program and its potential use for other federal insurance programs. It points out differences between flood insurance and insurance for other natural hazards, and lists evaluation criteria previously used for Federal insurance programs. I find nothing controversial here warranting NSC comment.

Concurrence by: *[Signature]* Jeremy RosnerRECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES J. JUKES

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: FEMA Proposed Testimony on Flood Insurance and New
Federal Insurance Programs

The National Security Council has no objections to the proposed
FEMA testimony on flood insurance.

3766

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

May 24, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #M-323

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

AGRIC-CR - Robin Rorapaugh (all testimony) - (202)720-7095 - 230
COMMERCE - Michael A. Levitt - (202)482-3086 - 324
DEFENSE - Samuel T. Brick, Jr. - (703)697-1305 - 325
HUD - Edward J. Murphy, Jr. - (202)708-1793 - 215
INTERIOR - Ralph Hill - (202)208-6706 - 329
JUSTICE - Faith Burton - (202)514-2141 - 217
TREASURY - Richard S. Carro - (202)622-1146 - 228
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)395-3723 - 249
CEA - Francine Obermiller - (202)395-5036 - 242
CORPS ENGINEERS - Susan Bond - (202)272-0030 - 239
EPA - Thomas C. Roberts - (202)260-5414 - 326
NEC - Sonia Mathews - (202)456-6722 - 429
OSTP - Damar Hawkins - (202)456-6272 - 288
SBA - Christine Swedin - (202)205-6702 - 315

FROM:

JAMES J. JUKES (for) *JJ*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: Jeffrey WEINBERG (395-3457)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-3454

SUBJECT: FEMA Proposed Testimony on Flood insurance
and new Federal insurance programs

DEADLINE: 4PM May 28, 1993

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before
advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in
accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or
receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of
Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:

Ken Ryder
Steve Redburn
Chris Heiser
Jim Jordan
Justine Rodriguez (*pages 506*)

STATEMENT OF
FRANCIS V. KELLY
DEPUTY FEDERAL INSURANCE ADMINISTRATOR
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER CREDIT AND INSURANCE
HOUSE BANKING, FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS
MAY 27, 1993

05/24/93 14:11

202 646 4536

/OGC

0003

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Consumer Credit and Insurance, I am Francis V. Nally, Deputy Administrator of the Federal Insurance Administration, the directorate within the Federal Emergency Management Agency which administers the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and the Federal Crime Insurance Program. With me today is Mr. Mike Mahoney, Physical Scientist with FEMA's Office of Earthquakes and Natural Hazards Programs Division, and Mr. James Taylor, the FIA's Assistant Administrator for Insurance Support Services.

I am pleased to be here today to offer comments on the National Flood Insurance Program. FEMA, under the authorities of both the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended, and the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977, has for many years been involved in discussions concerning a potential Federal insurance role with respect to other natural hazards, in addition to flood. In fact, studies were made in 1971, and again in 1981, with respect to the earthquake peril to examine just this issue. We believe the evaluation criteria developed as a result of these studies might be useful to the Subcommittee in its consideration of whether there is a role for the Federal government.

But before I discuss these with you, I know that your subcommittee wants to know whether the NFIP is a good model for an approach toward other natural hazards. The NFIP operates as a joint venture involving the Federal government, local governments and the insurance industry. Each has an important role in the success of the NFIP. The Federal government has the program management responsibility, identifies the land areas subject to serious flood risk, sets the minimum floodplain management performance standards to be adopted and enforced by the local government in these areas

-2-

as a condition for eligibility for participation in the NFIP, defines the insurance coverage, sets the insurance rates and promulgates the legal requirements of the program by Federal regulations. As a condition of NFIP participation, the local governments establish building permit systems and are responsible for adopting and enforcing least the NFIP minimum floodplain management performance standards established by FEMA.

Insurance companies participating in the program under a financial/subsidy arrangement, insurance agents and brokers and loss adjusters are the primary source of insurance services to policyholders. That which distinguishes the NFIP from other insurance programs is the unique linkage of coordinated joint responsibilities of the federal government, local governments and the insurance industry participants in the program.

From the point of view of its flood plain management objectives, it certainly is a good model of the potential impact the availability of federal insurance combined with other Federal programs can have on the willingness of local communities to adopt far better land use and building code standards. The NFIP's effectiveness results from the close integration of the federal performance standards with the hazard identification and insurance aspects of the program. The role of the State and local governments as the principal actor in future flood loss reduction is also appropriate for other natural hazards, with the Federal Government providing minimum loss-reduction standards and strong technical assistance. A successful natural hazards mitigation program would be able to give greater emphasis to the use of good building performance standards and land use measures than the NFIP alone. Our technical and legal experience with both the land use and building measures in the NFIP have

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FEMA/OGC

008

-3-

substantiated their effectiveness and legality under our current statutory authorities.

The Subcommittee should also be aware, however, of the problems which face the National Flood Insurance Program. While all new construction is risk rated, the program is required by statute to make reasonably priced insurance available to existing construction without regard to the building's full risk premium. Existing construction is construction started prior to the publication of the Flood Insurance Rate Map or December 31, 1974, whichever is later. Additionally, new building performance standards only apply to buildings whose start of construction occurred after the publication of final NFIP regulatory changes. These chargeable rates are set by the public rule making process subject to Congressional oversight. Currently 43 percent of the NFIP policyholders are charged on the average about 33 percent of the full risk premium.

In addition, let me point out two limitations on the NFIP statutory authority which have led to program issues that have been the subject of many Congressional hearings over the last three years. First, the NFIP does not have the authority to offer insurance coverage to indemnify the insured for the increased cost of repairing a substantially damaged building to meet the floodplain management rebuilding standards. That cost can be extremely high (\$20,000 to \$50,000 for a single family home). This gap in available insurance protection for homeowners from the NFIP or the private insurance industry has virtually halted the recovery process in some south Dade county areas for almost eight months with no resolution in sight.

05/24/93 14:12

202 040 4830

/00C

-4-

The second problem issue is the NFIP's lack of authority to identify land areas subject to the thirty and sixty year erosion threat. The absence of this authority prevents us from identifying which buildings should be charged an additional amount to cover the extreme risk when erosion of the land upon which the building is located causes the building to be in a state of imminent collapse due to erosion.

In addition, let us point out a key distinction between flood insurance and other natural hazards insurance. There never has been, nor is there now, private sector flood insurance available for homeowners. The NFIP was created in response to that problem. On the other hand, normally there is private sector wind and earthquake insurance available to homeowners. We believe that it is important to clarify what national public policy purpose would be or should be served before new federal programs are initiated. With respect to flood insurance the public purpose was threefold, to identify the risk, encourage mitigation measures at the local government level, and provide insurance protection as a better alternative to disaster relief. Whereas the virtual complete absence of flood insurance was a vital consideration in assessing the need for federal flood insurance it does not appear to be as critical a factor when it comes to other types of natural hazards insurance. However, another critical factor which prompted passage of the NFIP was the benefit of local flood plain management directed toward mitigating future flood losses.

-5-

Mr. James Lee Witt, the new Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, expressed his view that "I believe that mitigation must become a recognized national priority. While mitigation makes good sense, it often isn't a priority for communities. We will work to change that mindset and provide solid cost-effective tools and incentives to encourage mitigation actions.

The entire nation needs to make the commitment now to invest in the long term payoff of mitigation and I plan for FEMA to provide leadership to accomplish this effort.

To that end, in my letter to State and territorial directors, and to various constituency groups, I announced that mitigation would be the foundation for developing a stronger emergency management system. I have also discussed this issue with members of my staff to begin the process of integrating mitigation into all our programs. There are several programs at FEMA (such as the NFIP) which currently emphasize mitigation - we need to build on these programs, especially at State and local levels. We know that mitigation at all levels can help reduce disaster assistance costs - it makes good economic sense".

At this point, Mr. Chairman, I will list the evaluation criteria previously mentioned which may be of assistance to you in reviewing bills creating new Federal insurance programs.

1. Correction of a market failure: The rationale for the proposal should be to correct a market failure, arising from the inherently unpredictable nature of a catastrophic natural hazard, not to provide new Federal insurance subsidies.

-6-

2. Actuarial fairness: The proposal must utilize a rate structure that reflects the level of risk facing the insured policyholder to the maximum extent practical.
3. Hazard mitigation: The proposal must include provisions requiring participating States and communities to adopt and enforce appropriate land use and building code policies that will reduce the risk of loss of life and damage to property.
4. Federal oversight and control: The proposal must allow for Federal oversight and control of funds collected and of the operation and management of the program(s).
5. Deficit neutrality: Over time, the proposal must be designed to be deficit neutral.
6. Risk sharing: There must be legitimate risk sharing on the part of the private insurance industry.

Since the Administration has not performed a detailed analysis of the bills currently before Congress, I am not in a position to comment at this time on any of them.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I will be happy to address any questions which you or the other members of the Subcommittee may have.

(Note to reviewers - The bills
are HR 935, HR 764, HR 1302,
and HR 62)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9303678
RECEIVED: 21 MAY 93 18

TO: SHERFIELD, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 25 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MILITARY EXERCISES

EGYPT

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISE EASTERN CASTLE 93

ACTION: KENNEY SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 25 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
EXEC SEC
HAHN
BELL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 10/3/2016
2016-0152-5

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 3 OF 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 25, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise EASTERN CASTLE 93

Military exercise EASTERN CASTLE 93 is approved.


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3678

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 22, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *[Signature]*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise EASTERN CASTLE 93 -
EGYPT

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, approving military exercise EASTERN CASTLE 93. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

EASTERN CASTLE is an engineer exercise conducted in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. Specific elements of EASTERN CASTLE are specified by the exercise name followed by the participant country. In this case, the exercise will take place in Egypt, June 16-September 30. It will involve approximately 100 U.S. and 25 Egyptian forces in constructing a live fire range and a water well project.

The critical cancellation date is June 1, 1993.

Concurrences by: Martin Indyk *[Signature]* and David Satterfield *[Signature]*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I approving the exercise.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab II OSD-Executive Secretary Memorandum, May 21, 1993

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *[Signature]* NARA, Date *12/3/2016*

2016-052-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For the Executive Secretary, National Security Council - Eastern Castle 93. (1 page)	05/21/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 45

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - May 1993 #3 [2]

2016-0152-F
vz4405

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief. (2 pages)	04/15/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 45

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - May 1993 #3 [2]

2016-0152-F
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3778

May 25, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*
FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*
SUBJECT: President's National Security Telecommunications
Advisory Committee Events, May 26-27, 1993

On Wednesday, May 26, at 6:30 p.m. you will be attending a reception with the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) at the Willard Hotel. The reception will be followed by dinner at 7:15 p.m. A list of the NSTAC members who will be attending these events is provided at Tab III.

On Thursday, May 27, at 12:00 p.m. you will be attending the NSTAC Executive Luncheon and Executive Session in the Indian Treaty Room. You have also been asked to provide welcoming remarks upon the arrival of the members at about 12:15 p.m. and brief remarks (about 10 minutes) at about 1:05 p.m. following lunch. Draft comments are provided at Tab I.

As indicated on the schedule at Tab II, Deputy Secretary Perry will follow you. Vice President Gore is tentatively scheduled to preside over the turnover of the gavel from outgoing chairman Bob Allen to incoming chairman Norm Augustine. It is possible that the Vice President will be engaged in legislative negotiations or on the Hill for the vote on the reconciliation package during this period of time. In this case, we will arrange for either you or Deputy Secretary Perry to make the appropriate ceremonial remarks.

Attachments

Tab I Draft Comments for May 27 Luncheon
Tab II Schedule of Events for May 27, 1993 Luncheon
Tab III NSTAC Membership

NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY

COMMITTEE WELCOMING REMARKS

(At approximately 12:15 p.m. Once all are seated)

- On behalf of President Clinton, let me welcome you and congratulate you on what I understand was another successful NSTAC business session. The President is _____ and is unable to attend. Vice President Gore will be joining us later during the Executive Session to give his own views on the role of the telecommunications industry in our national security. As you know, the recommendations of NSTAC XIV were very well received and have been forwarded to the Executive Agent for implementation. I'm looking forward to seeing your recommendations from this NSTAC meeting as well.
- Let me welcome you once again to the Old Executive Office Building. I hope you enjoy your lunch here today. Bob?

REMARKS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ADVISORY COMMITTEE LUNCHEON

- Thank you, Bob. It is a pleasure to meet with the members of the NSTAC. I want to take this opportunity to commend this committee for the contributions it has made over the last eleven years in strengthening our national security and emergency preparedness capabilities.
- The years ahead, the United States must carry out its global responsibilities in a dynamic environment. In this period of both evolutionary and revolutionary change, advanced communications will play an integral role in our Nation's ability to react to events at home and abroad. During the past year, Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki proved the value of the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications established by the NSTAC for responding to national disasters. Without the assistance of the NSTAC companies, the Government could not have reacted so quickly to provide assistance to the communities devastated by the storms.
- So during this past year, we witnessed sweeping changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. We have seen political unrest and human suffering in the former Yugoslavia, and in many other parts of the world. These events have increased our concern regarding the world's political and economic stability. Certainly, in this highly uncertain global environment, the United States cannot afford to relax its national security posture.
- The role of the NSTAC in supporting the Nation's security and emergency preparedness will become increasingly important as world events vie with each other for attention.

In this fluid environment, the President needs advice and information on telecommunications technologies that will help our government anticipate and react to rapidly changing domestic and international situations.

- For the NSTAC to continue to provide this outstanding service to the President and the Nation, it is incumbent on those of us tasked to address national security concerns to keep you informed on the President's goals. The broad outlines of our national security policy are shaped by the changes in the international order that we are all so familiar with by now. Since 1989 the U.S. has:
 - o Significantly reduced the defense budget.
 - o Drawn down our conventional forces.
 - o Stood down many of our strategic nuclear forces.
 - o Brought forces home from overseas.
 - o Concluded a number of major arms control agreements.
- We have seen our strategic focus shift from the USSR to smaller, but still dangerous, regional contingencies. At the same time, pressing domestic concerns such as health care reform, a sluggish economy and major urban unrest now act as constraints on the amount of resources we can devote to foreign policy issues.
- The size of U.S. forces will continue to decline to a sustainable level. We will continue to seek arms control measures that reduce nuclear weapons inventories and control the spread of nuclear technology to potentially hostile states. Unquestionably, counterproliferation is a high priority in this Administration. We will use our leadership in the UN, in NATO and elsewhere to broker settlements

between parties in conflict. And we will use opportunities to promote democratization and respect for human rights in the developing world.

- But the growing thrust of our national security efforts will be on strengthening our economic and readiness base at home and abroad. Foremost among our efforts will be our goal to maintain and increase our advantage in high-technology industries to ensure that our citizens and property remain safe and viable. This is where you come in. Many of this Administration's initiatives in the area of national security will be based on our telecommunications capabilities. We are counting on you to continue to see that this foundation is secure.
- I look forward to reviewing your NSTAC XV Report and to your continuing advice and assistance.

National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee

**EXECUTIVE SESSION--AGENDA
MAY 27, 1993**

1:00 p.m.	Welcoming Remarks	Mr. Allen, Chairman
▶ 1:05 p.m.	Remarks by National Security Advisor	Mr. Lake
1:15 p.m.	Remarks by Executive Agent	Deputy Secretary Perry
1:25 p.m.	Arrival/Remarks by Vice President	Vice President Gore
1:45 p.m.	Recognition of Departing and Arriving Chairmen	Vice President Gore
2:00 p.m.	Adjourn	Mr. Augustine, New Chairman

**The President's
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC)
Members**

Mr. Lester M. Alberthal, Jr.	Electronic Data Systems
Mr. Robert E. Allen	American Telephone and Telegraph Company
Mr. C. Michael Armstrong	Hughes Aircraft Company
Mr. Norman R. Augustine	Martin Marietta Corporation
Mr. Stanley C. Beckelman	The Boeing Company
Mr. Kent M. Black	Rockwell International Corporation
Mr. Robert C. Brown, III	United States Telephone Association
Mr. Bruce L. Crockett	Communications Satellite Corporation
Mr. Gerald W. Ebker	International Business Machines Corporation
Mr. D. Travis Engen	ITT Corporation
Mr. William T. Esrey	Sprint Corporation
Mr. John T. Hartley	Harris Corporation
Dr. George H. Heilmeyer	Bell Communications Research, Incorporated
Mr. William J. Hilsman	InterDigital Communications Corporation
Mr. Royce J. Holland	Metropolitan Fiber Systems Communications Company
Mr. William R. Hoover	Computer Sciences Corporation
Mr. Charles R. Lee	GTE Corporation
Mr. Craig O. McCaw	McCaw Cellular Communications, Incorporated
Mr. Richard D. McCormick	U S West, Incorporated
Mr. John N. McMahon	Lockheed Corporation
Mr. John F. Mitchell	Motorola, Incorporated
Mr. Bert C. Roberts, Jr.	MCI Telecommunications Corporation
Mr. Charles E. Robinson	Pacific Telecom, Incorporated
Dr. Paul G. Stern	Northern Telecom, Incorporated
Mr. Roy A. Wilkens	Williams Telecommunications Group, Incorporated
Mr. Albert F. Zettlemoyer	Unisys Corporation