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Folder Title:

Chron File - April 1993 #2 [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

Defense Policy-Bell, Robert

Original OA/ID Number:

44

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Marc Grossman. Subject: Purchase of HEU. (1 page)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Duplicate of 001a. (1 page)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	For William Itoh from Barbara Starr. Subject: Legal Memorandum on Implications. (1 page)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	For the Deputies Group from Mary Elizabeth Hoinkes. Subject: [Implications] (9 pages)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 44

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - April 1993 #2 [3]

2016-0152-F

vz4383

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

1993

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 14, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RB*
FROM: RICHARD HOOKER *RH*
SUBJECT: Response to Congressman Saxton

We drafted a response to Congressman Saxton expressing the President's sensitivity to the political situation in Russia and the Administration's intent to maintain a military capable of responding to threats from a revanchist Russia.

Concurrences by: *in draft* Keith Hahn and Rose Gottemoeller *RG*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo forwarding a draft response to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Action Memo to the President
Tab A Draft Letter
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
HOWARD PASTER

SUBJECT: Response to Congressman Saxton

Purpose

To respond to Congressman Saxton's concerns about instability in Russia and the defense drawdown expressed in his letter to you dated March 23.

Background

Congressman Saxton wrote to you pointing out that continuing instability and turmoil in Russia constitutes a potential threat to US interests. He advocates the Base Force as the right kind of military force structure to cope with these potential threats.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the response to Congressman Saxton at Tab A

Attachments

Tab A Draft Letter
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Congressman Saxton:

I read your letter of March 23 with great interest. I want you to know I share your concerns about Russia's fragile situation. I am sure you know that we are making every effort to shore up President Yeltsin's position and support the democratic process in Russia.

We are now conducting a comprehensive strategic review to look at many of the same concerns you have. Our military forces will be smaller than the Base Force outlined by the previous Administration. However, I am confident that our military will remain fully capable of meeting these threats, a view shared by General Powell in his congressional testimony of March 31.

I appreciate your views and look forward with pleasure to working with you on these and other issues in the near future.

Sincerely,

The Honorable H. James Saxton
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

H JAMES SAXTON
JL DISTRICT NEW JERSEY

COMMITTEES
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEES
MILITARY ACQUISITION
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
AND FACILITIES

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

1993

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3003

COMMITTEES
MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES

SUBCOMMITTEES
RANKING REPUBLICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND
NATURAL RESOURCES
OCEANOGRAPHY, GREAT LAKES AND
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF

SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING
SUBCOMMITTEES

HEALTH AND LONG
TERM CARE

HUMAN SERVICES
TASK FORCE ON SOCIAL
SECURITY AND WOMEN

March 23, 1993

President Bill Clinton
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500-0

Dear President Clinton:

Like you, I am very disturbed by the recent events in Russia. If President Yeltsin falls, the situation in Russia that has been so promising could suddenly reverse.

I know you are well aware of the frightening atrocities that past communist regimes have committed. While we are not sure how the hard line communists are proposing to run Russia if they seize control, we do know what they have done in the past.

The most frightening information was revealed just last week when it was discovered that the Russians and East Germans had laid out detailed plans for an invasion of Western Europe.

In light of this information, I am writing to first compliment you and your diplomatic team for its quick and stern public support of President Yeltsin. This is very important at this critical juncture.

Second, I am asking you to re-think your defense cuts so that if a worst case scenario occurs in Russia, the United States will have many options available to it so it can defeat any threat to national security.

I recognize the need for reduced defense spending, but I believe the base force level as proposed by General Colin Powell is more appropriate. This level of spending will reduce our defense costs yet enable the U.S. to carry out several contingencies that may occur at the same time.

REPLY TO

☐ 438 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-3003
202 225-4765

☐ 100 HIGH ST. SUITE 301
MT. HOLLY, NJ 08060
609 261-5800

☐ 7 MADLEY AVE
TOMS RIVER, NJ 08053
908 544-1170

☐ 1 MAINE AVENUE
CHERRY HILL, NJ 08001
609 428-0500


President Bill Clinton
Page 2
March 23, 1993

A strong defense capability is like an insurance policy. Like all insurance policies, nobody wants to use it, but it is there if needed.

Despite great strides towards democracy, Russia is still the only country in the world that can destroy the United States in 30 minutes. I never forget that.

With hard line communists hopeful of being swept back into power, a reduced defense capability at this critical crossroad would not be wise and limit our options.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jim Saxton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Jim" and last name "Saxton" clearly distinguishable.

Jim Saxton
Member of Congress

HJS/srm

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 29, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM ITOH

FROM: HOWARD G. PASTER
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL MAIL

Enclosed please find two letters which were sent to the President and require a Presidential response. They are as follows:

- 1) Jim Saxton (R-NJ), concerning Russia.
- 2) Jim Exon (D-NE), concerning Russia.

If you have any questions concerning these letters, please contact LeeAnn Inadomi of my staff at ext. 7500.

Enclosures

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 14, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise TIKSI SAREX

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, approving military exercise TIKSI SAREX. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

TIKSI SAREX is a CINCPAC-sponsored, and U.S. Air Force-funded combined exercise between U.S. and Russian military forces. It is designed to exercise U.S. and Russian interoperability for Arctic search and rescue. It is scheduled to take place April 19-24 near Tiksi, Russia and will involve approximately 32 U.S. personnel and one Canadian observer. Also at Tab II are approval memoranda from other interested government agencies.

The critical cancellation date is April 17, 1993, however we have been informed that Defense would like to release a Press Statement on this exercise on April 16.

Concurrence by: Rose Gottemoeller *RG*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I approving the exercise.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab II OSD Executive Secretary Memorandum, April 9, 1993

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise TIKSI SAREX

Military exercise TIKSI SAREX is approved.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000


2332
9 APR 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise - TIKSI SAREX

The Department of Defense recommends NSC approval of the attached Significant Military Exercise Brief, Exercise TIKSI SAREX. The Department of State concurs with this recommendation.

Please note the critical cancellation date is 17 April 1993.


Michael B. Sherfield
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated

UNCLASSIFIED

JOINT STAFF
INFO SERVICE CENTER

ROUTINE
R 201900Z MAR 93 ZYB
FM USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J3//
TO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JETD//
INFO JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//U3/J4/J5//
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP:SP/EP//
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//DUSD:SR/ASD:PA//
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//ASD/ISA:EAPR//
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC//PM-RSA/PM-ISO//
SAF WASHINGTON DC//IAC// HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XOOOE//
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//DO/XP//
COMALCOM ELMENDORF AFB AK//J3/J5//
AMC SCOTT AFB IL 11AF ELMENDORF AFB AK

UNCLAS //N03502//
MSGID/GENADMIN/USCINCPAC J3//
EXER/TIKSI SAREX//
SUBJ/PART I SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISE BRIEF//
J3/01-00-04/CDO/J30-0/J311/
RMKS/1. EXERCISE NAME: TIKSI SAREX.
2. GEOGRAPHIC AREA: TIKSI, RUSSIA, GEOCOORD 7136N, 1284E.
3. DATES: 19-24 APR 93.
4. CRITICAL CANCELLATION DATE: 17 APR 93.
5. TYPE: CJCS PART I. USCINCPAC-SPONSORED, USAF-FUNDED.
6. PURPOSE: TO EXERCISE U.S.-RUSSIAN INTEROPERABILITY FOR ARCTIC SEARCH AND RESCUE. MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACT BETWEEN U.S. AND RUSSIAN FORCES.
7. OPLAN EXERCISED: NONE.
8. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS:
A. THIS EXERCISE IS THE ONLY U.S.-RUSSIA MIL-TO-MIL EXERCISE FOR PACIFIC FORCES THIS YEAR. BOTH COUNTRIES ARE ANXIOUS FOR MIL-TO-MIL CONTACTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES.
B. DATE COMMITMENTS MADE: SEARCH AND RESCUE EXERCISE FIRST PROPOSED TO THE RUSSIANS OCT 91. COMMITMENT TO EXECUTE APR 93 TIKSI SAREX MADE MAR 93 WITH REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE/VISAS FOR PLANNING TEAM TO TRAVEL TO TIKSI IN MAR 93.
C. CRITICAL CANCELLATION DATE BASED ON DATE FUNDS WILL FIRST BE SP TO EXECUTE EXERCISE. HOWEVER, WITH THE EXECUTION OF PLANNING CONFERENCE 17-22 MAR 93, CANCELING THE EXERCISE WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. THE RUSSIAN MILITARY DELEGATION TRAVELED TO TIKSI TO PREPARE FOR THE PLANNING CONFERENCE AND EXERCISE ON 10 MAR 93.
9. POLITICO-MILITARY SCENARIO SUMMARY: NONE.
10. SUMMARY OF KEY EXERCISE EVENTS:
A. 17-22 MAR 93: EXERCISE PLANNING CONFERENCE IN TIKSI.
B. 19 APR 93: U.S. FORCES DEPLOY TO TIKSI. ONE C-5 TO TRANSPORT TWO HH-60 HELICOPTERS AND EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS AND ONE HC-130 TO SELF DEPLOY.
C. 20 APR 93: BRIEFINGS FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS. HH-60 PREPARATION.
D. 21 APR 93: SEARCH AND RESCUE EXERCISE. U.S. AND RUSSIAN HELICOPTERS WILL FLY FROM TIKSI TO SIMULATED CRASH SITE ON ISLAND 225

JOINT STAFF V1 47
ACTION J7-JETD(3) (U,6,7,F)
INFO SJS-N(1) NMCC:CWO(1) J3(3) NIDS(1) J4(5)
J4:MILSEC-J(1) J7(6) J4:SUSD-J(1) J4:MOBLO-J(1)
J5(1) J5:CBB-J(1) QUAL CONTROL(1) J4:MRD-J(1)
J4:LRC-J(1) J6(9) J5:WCEUR-J(1) J5:POLICY-J(1)
J7:JECG-J(1) SHAPE LNO(1) J5:NUC-CHM-J(1)
J5:DDIN-J(1) J6E-J(1) J6U-J(1) J5:NATO-J(1)
J5:PAC-J(1)
+OCSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+NATS PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC
+NEACP

SECDEF V2 18
ACTION (U,8,F)
INFO SECDEF-N(1) USDP:FILE(1) USDA:TS(1)
ASD:PA(1) USDP:PDISP(1) USDP:IA(1) USDP:DASDEUR(1)
USDP:DSAA(1) USDP-CH(1) USDP:ESN(1) USDP:PPEAP(1)
USDP:START(1) USDP:VP(1) USDP:SCC(1) USDP:EP(1)
USDP:W&ACP(1) USDP:REE(1) USDP:ISA(1)
+USDP:CCC
+SAFE

NM NORTHEAST OF TIKSI. U.S. HELICOPTERS WILL IN-FLIGHT REFUEL FROM HC-130. RUSSIAN HELICOPTERS WILL REFUEL ON FORWARD GROUND REFUELING STATION. RUSSIAN AND U.S. RESCUE PERSONNEL WILL CONDUCT MEDICAL PROBLEM WITH RUSSIAN "SURVIVORS." SURVIVORS WILL BE EVACUATED ON U.S. AND RUSSIAN HELICOPTERS. HC-130 WILL BE USED AS A COMMAND AND CONTROL/OBSERVATION PLATFORM. RUSSIAN OBSERVERS ON U.S. AIRCRAFT AND U.S. OBSERVERS ON RUSSIAN AIRCRAFT WILL BE USED WHEREVER POSSIBLE.
E. 22 APR 93: FORMAL EXERCISE DEBRIEF. U.S. AND RUSSIAN PARARESCUE PERSONNEL WILL CONDUCT PARACHUTE JUMPS FROM U.S. HC-130 AND RUSSIAN AN-12 IN TIKSI AREA. HELICOPTERS PREPARED FOR REDEPLOYMENT
F. 23 APR 93: U.S. FORCES REDEPLOY TO ALASKA.
11. DIRECTING HEADQUARTERS: USCINCPAC-SPONSORED. COMPACAF-FUNDED AND EXECUTIVE AGENT.
12. PARTICIPATING COMMANDS, HEADQUARTERS, AND FORCES:
A. UNITED STATES: 11AF - 7 PERSONNEL (1 MSN COMMANDER, 3 TRANSLATORS, 1 RESCUE CONTROLLER, 2 COMBAT CAMERAMEN). ALASKA AIR NATIONAL GUARD - 1 HC-130, 2 HH-60, 24 PERSONNEL (13 AIRCREW, 6 PARARESCUEMEN, 5 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL).
B. ALLIED: ONE CANADIAN OBSERVER. NUMBER OF RUSSIAN PARTICIPANTS UNKNOWN.
C. TOTAL: 32 PERSONNEL.
13. SCOPE OF ANTICIPATED PARTICIPATION:
A. OTHER UNIFIED COMMANDS: U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (USTRANSCOM).
B. UNASSIGNED FORCES: NONE.
C. ALLIED NATIONS: RUSSIAN MILITARY FORCES. ONE CANADIAN OBSERVER.
D. OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES OR DEPARTMENTS: NONE.
14. SIMULATED USE OF NUCLEAR OR OTHER UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS: NONE.
15. COUNTERDRUG-RELATED OPERATIONS OR TRAINING IN EXERCISE: NONE.
16. COORDINATION WITH OTHER UNIFIED, SPECIFIED, OR SERVICE COMMANDS GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES, OR REPRESENTATIVES:
A. PRIOR COORDINATION WITH RUSSIAN MILITARY BY USDAO MOSCOW.
B. HQ USAF PROPOSED EXERCISE AND WILL PROVIDE FUNDING.
C. C-5 TRANSPORTATION REQUIRED FROM USTRANSCOM.
17. RECOMMENDED PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA) POLICY:
A. RECOMMEND ACTIVE PA APPROACH. THIS IS THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT EXERCISE OF U.S. FORCES ON RUSSIAN SOIL IN MANY YEARS. AN ACTIVE APPROACH DURING THIS PERIOD OF CHALLENGE FOR THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP WOULD SERVE TO DEMONSTRATE U.S. COMMITMENT TO THE DEVELOPING U.S. - RUSSIA MIL-TO-MIL RELATIONSHIP.
B. EXECUTIVE AGENT, COMPACAF, WILL PROVIDE COUNTRY TEAM-COORDINATED PROPOSED PA GUIDANCE (PAG) TO USCINCPAC J03 NLT 2 APR 93, WHO WILL FORWARD PAG TO OASD(PA) FOR APPROVAL.
C. PUBLIC AFFAIRS OBJECTIVES:
(1) EMPHASIZE THAT THIS TRAINING ENHANCES U.S. - RUSSIA INTEROPERABILITY AND CAPABILITIES FOR ARCTIC SEARCH AND RESCUE.
(2) FOCUS ON THE HUMANITARIAN NATURE OF THE EXERCISE.
(3) IDENTIFY THAT THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND MIL-TO-MIL CONTACTS PROGRAM, WHICH INCLUDES THIS SAREX, IS A MEANS TO ENHANCE STABILITY ACROSS THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.
18. GENERAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: COUNTRY TEAM COORDINATION WITH RUSSIA ON TIKSI SAREX CONDUCTED MAR 92-MAR 93.
19. PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT: U.S.-RUSSIA MIL-TO-MIL CONTACTS INTENDED TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. PRIMARY CONCERN IS CONDUCTING A SAFE, PROFESSIONAL EXERCISE THAT WILL HAVE POSITIVE IMPACT ON OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA.
20. ADDITIONAL REMARKS:
A. U.S. FORCES DEPART FROM ELMENDORF AFB, AK FOR TIKSI, RUSSIA WITH STOPS IN NOME, AK AND ANADYR, RUSSIA (GEOCOORD 6915E, 17710N). WILL PICK UP RUSSIAN NAVIGATORS IN ANADYR.
B. NO REQUIREMENT FOR REFUEL AT EN ROUTE STOPS. REFUEL REQUIRED AT TIKSI. FUEL WILL BE PROVIDED/PAID FOR BY RUSSIAN MILITARY.
C. PREDEPLOYMENT SURVEY TEAM REQUIREMENTS: USTRANSCOM AIRLIFT SUPPORT ELEMENT EXPERT TO VERIFY C-5 CAPABILITY AT TIKSI. WILL TRAVEL TO TIKSI WITH PLANNING CONFERENCE ATTENDEES 17 MAR 93.
21. POINT OF CONTACT: CDR DILLON, J311, DSN 477-7265.// BT

MCN=93079/05420 TOR=93079/2233Z TAD=93079/2304Z CDSN=MAZ489

PAGE 1 OF 1
201900Z MAR 93

UNCLASSIFIED



OFFICE OF UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

25 MAR 1993


In reply refer to:
I-16979/93



MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY PLANNING

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise Brief--Tiksi SAREX (U)

~~(C)~~ This office has reviewed the subject proposal and concurs.


James W. Morrison
Director, Office of Russian, Eurasian,
and East European Affairs



OFFICE OF UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000



22 March 1993

I-93726979

24 Mar 93

MEMORANDUM FOR ^{for} DIRECTOR, EUROPEAN POLICY, OASD (ISA)
DIRECTOR, RUSSIAN, EURASIAN & EAST EUROPEAN
AFFAIRS OASD (S&R)

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise

Attached is a brief on significant military exercise U.S. TIKSI SAREX. This exercise is a USCINCPAC-sponsored, COMPACAF-funded U.S.-Russian interoperability event, known as an arctic search and rescue exercise (SAREX). This SAREX will take place in the vicinity of Tiksi, Russia and is scheduled for execution from 19 to 24 April 1993.

Please provide your comments or concurrence to me no later than 7 April 1993. My POCs are Lieutenant Colonel Stan Hoppe and Colonel Bill Larson, (703) 614-2616.

A copy of this brief has been forwarded to the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, an information copy to the ASD (Public Affairs), and an advance copy has been provided to the NSC Staff.

Maxwell Alston
Acting Director
for Emergency Planning

Attachments:
As stated

CC:
Director, Foreign Military Rights Affairs, OASD (ISA)



THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-7000

J-7A 00418-93
24 March 1993

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR FOR EMERGENCY PLANNING, OFFICE OF
THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR SECURITY POLICY**

**Subject: Significant Military Exercise Brief for Exercise
TIKSI SAREX**

1. In accordance with DOD Directive C-5030.43, 26 March 1970, "Significant Military Exercises," the enclosed significant military exercise brief for Exercise TIKSI SAREX (USCINCPAC 201900Z MAR 93) is forwarded for coordination with the Department of State and final approval by the National Security Council. The Joint Staff recommends approval.
2. Critical cancellation date is 17 April 1993.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "M. J. Williams", is positioned above the typed name.

M. J. WILLIAMS
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
Vice Director for Operational Plans
and Interoperability

Enclosure

Copy to:
CSA
CNO
CSAF
CMC
CMDT COGARD
DJS



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 5, 1993

Mr. Maxwell Alston
Acting Director
OSUSD (SP)/EP
The Pentagon, Room 1D460
Washington, D.C. 20301-2200

Dear Mr. Alston:

In response to your letter, I-93/16979, the Department of State concurs in the conduct of the exercise TIKSI SAREX as described in your provided brief. The Department understands that no funds under the Developing Countries Combined Exercise Program (DCCEP) have been allocated for this exercise.

Sincerely,

John B. Piazza, Colonel, USAF
Office Director
International Security Operations
Bureau of Political Military Affairs

cc: Dpty. Asst. Sec. Bruce Weinrod
Anthony Gray OASD/ISA (GA)
Capt. Stephen Woodall J-7 (JETD)

April 14, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RB*
FROM: STEVEN R. JONES *SJ*
SUBJECT: White House Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP)
Regional Briefing - Update

You asked that I update you on the ARPA Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) kick-off meeting that I attended in New York on April 12. The meeting was very successful. About 1000 people from business, government and academia attended. The conference provided a good forum to begin the public-private partnership envisioned in the TRP program.

During the morning I accompanied the government delegation (led by Secretary O'Leary, Dr. Gibbons and Governor Cuomo--also Dorothy Robyn and David Lane from the NEC attended) visiting EDO Corporation on Long Island. EDO's government business has declined from \$95 million to \$55 million over the past five years, and employment has dropped from 894 people to 303. EDO is diversifying its defense business (mine warfare, missile launchers) into commercial aircraft components and natural gas vehicle conversions. The State of New York recently provided EDO \$160,000 in retraining grants and \$550,000 in loans for new equipment as part of their Defense Diversification Program, one of the more aggressive state defense conversion programs. EDO projects \$30 million in annual sales and 200 jobs from its natural gas conversion activities by the year 2000. The company plans to submit proposals for TRP technology development funds.

The agenda for the conference itself is at Tab A. The President made brief remarks to the conference via satellite, and stated that defense conversion is one of his highest priorities. He emphasized the new partnerships required, and viewed the TRP program as "operation restore jobs." Congressmen Gilman (R-NY) and Payne (D-NJ) attended. Both Secretary O'Leary and Dr. Gibbons' remarks promoting a new style of government and aligning public and private interests were well received. Dr. Gary Denman, Director of ARPA, emphasized the importance of dual-use technologies in meeting our future defense and economic needs. The afternoon's technical sessions were devoted to the details of the TRP programs, and how to submit proposals in the areas of dual-use technology development, deployment, and manufacturing education and training.

The Aviation Week article at Tab B is an example of the objective and overall favorable review the TRP program has been receiving. The conference attendees I spoke with were enthused about the high-level Administration support for these initiatives, which is providing a breath of fresh air, new cooperation and innovation into these technical areas. This was tempered with skepticism from some contractors as to how much of a difference this \$500 million will actually make in the ongoing defense contractor downsizing and consolidation.

There is a danger not to oversell initiatives such as TRP as a quick fix providing immediate jobs. I believe it is one of the important steps we can take to assist closer military-commercial integration, which will be crucial in meeting future defense needs. The TRP program is highly leveraged, both in terms of the technologies involved and in the financing arrangements. All TRP projects require at least 50 percent cost-sharing from the private sector to ensure commitment of the participants, and eventual success of the projects.

The announcement of TRP initial awards will take place in the last quarter of FY93. Overall funding for TRP-related programs moderately increases in the FY94 budget. The TRP regional briefings are continuing this week in Detroit, Orlando, Dallas and Los Angeles. The NEC is coordinating Administration participation in these briefings.

Attachments

Tab A	TRP Agenda
Tab B	Aviation Week Article
Tab C	Background Material on TRP Program

8:00-12:00 pm Registration

Registration Bay

12:25-1:45 pm Opening remarks

Imperial Ballroom A & B



Richard Munson,
Executive Director, Northeast-Midwest Institute

Dr. John Gibbons,
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

Hazel O'Leary,
Secretary of Energy

William J. Clinton,
President of the United States

Remarks by state officials.

White House

Technology

Reinvestment

Project

Briefings

1:45-2:45 pm Technology Reinvestment Project Program Overview,
Common Concepts, & Planning for Proposals.

Gary Denman,
Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)

Lee Buchanan,
Director, Defense Sciences Office, ARPA

Rick Dunn,
General Council, ARPA

2:45-3:15 pm Questions and Answers

3:15-3:45 pm Break, coffee and soda will be served

3:45-5:45 pm Breakout A: Technology Development *Imperial A*
and SBIR

Speaker: Lee Buchanan (ARPA), John Gudas (NIST), Bob
Norwood (NASA), Mike Long (DOE), Denis Roark (TRP)

Breakout B: Technology Deployment *Royal*

Speaker: Phil Nanzetta (NIST), Rick Dunn (ARPA), Tom
Starke (DOE), John Fenter (USAF), Richard White (TRP)

Breakout C: Manufacturing Education *Imperial B*
and Training

Speaker: Joe Bordogna (NSF), John Jennings (NASA), John
Ablard (ARPA), Steve Wax (TRP)

5:45 pm Adjourn

If you are interested in obtaining a complete transcript of this or any of the briefings, please call the National Technical Information Service after May 10, 1993 at (703) 487-4650; cite reference number: PB93-169829. Alternatively, you may call the Defense Technical Information Center after May 28, 1993 at (703) 274-6811; cite reference number: ADA-263000.

BUDGET TO PUMP \$1 BILLION INTO 'DEFENSE REINVESTMENT'

WILLIAM B. SCOTT/WASHINGTON

The Clinton Administration's 1994 defense budget allocates approximately \$1 billion to science and technology accounts, fueling more-aggressive dual-use and defense conversion initiatives aimed at strengthening the U. S. economy and global competitiveness.

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) will manage dual-use programs, focusing on high-definition and flat-panel display systems, advanced materials, microelectronics, X-ray lithography and additional "defense reinvestment" program efforts. "Reinvestment" is the Defense Dept.'s new term for what typically is called "defense conversion"—shifting the department's contractors to commercially-oriented products and services.

This element of the Fiscal 1994 budget includes \$375 million for continued technology reinvestment; \$230 million for new technology development; \$210 million to extend programs in lithography, flat-panel displays, materials and other technology areas for another two to three years; and \$125 million earmarked for dual-use of Strategic Defense Initiative Organization-developed technologies. There still is some uncertainty about whether ARPA will manage the SDI funds.

DEFENSE OFFICIALS admitted that directing money to dual-use and conversion efforts was "a way to soften the blow to defense contractors." This is not a give-away, though, they were quick to point out. Cooperative projects between government entities and industry are intended to be cost-sharing arrangements.

The proposed 1994 funds will continue government-industry partnerships that Congress supported in last year's final budget, then bolstered in February with an additional \$420 million dedicated to dual-use efforts.

An information package released last month described a framework for dispensing this additional money under eight separate programs. Entitled "Program Information Package for Defense Technology Conversion, Reinvestment and Transition Assistance"—also known as the "Red-Stripe book"—the document

is strictly a planning tool and not a formal solicitation at this point.

The book outlines a Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) aimed at stimulating "the transition to a growing, integrated, national industrial capability." Under TRP, ARPA and four other government agencies—the Energy Dept.'s Defense

with capabilities that will enhance the long-term competitive industrial base. This activity will initiate and nurture new manufacturing engineering education and training outlets. Particular emphasis will be placed on "dual-use engineering skills and the improvement of technical capabilities at the university, college and vocational levels," according to TRP guidelines.

The project will be administered by a Defense Technology Conversion Council comprised of representatives from the five participating agencies. Chaired by ARPA, the council is charged with "coordinating and integrating Federal Executive Branch activities for technology reinvestment," according to the project's information book.

In its present form, the plan is designed for a two-way information flow that integrates military and commercial industrial bases. Where appropriate, defense technologies will be "spun-off" and made available for commercial use.

True "dual-use" technologies will be developed for both defense and non-defense applications, with special attention given to activities that could make military systems more affordable. Technologies that have proven to be commercially viable, yet show promising defense utility, will be "spun-on" for eventual military applications.

THE TRP IS STRUCTURED to solicit proposals this summer and then award matching funds next fall to teams developing technology-leveraging concepts that improve U. S. industrial competitiveness. In a clear effort to "get the word out," ARPA has borrowed techniques from the commercial sector—toll-free numbers (appropriately, 1-800-DUALUSE), a fax number, and an Internet electronic mail address—to augment conventional announcements in the Commerce Business Daily and Federal Register.

Information conferences scheduled for Apr. 12-16 in New York, Detroit, Orlando, Dallas, and Los Angeles will provide prospective bidders with additional details about the program. The TRP will be released on May 14. Final bid submissions are due by July 23.

DEFENSE REINVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH INITIATIVES (\$ in Millions)

PROGRAM:	FY 1993	FY 1994
Dual-Use Technology Programs		
Reinvestment Programs ¹	327	377
Manufacturing/Technology Extension ²	190	25
Electronics and Materials Initiatives (Tot.)	243	210
High Definition Systems	92	603
Advanced Lithography	71	50
Other	80	100
Additional Dual-Use Initiatives	—	191
SBIR Refocused to Dual-Use	85	161
Total Dual-Use Technology Program	845	9644

¹Includes Dual-Use Technology Partnership Program, Regional Technology Alliances Program and other defense reinvestment programs.

²Program to be managed by Commerce Dept.'s NIST with Defense Dept. participation. Fiscal 1993 funds support program over a two-year period.

³\$30 million included in Dual-Use Technology Partnerships.

⁴Excludes impact of broader allowable IR&D reimbursement.

Programs area, Commerce Dept.'s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Science Foundation and NASA—eventually will solicit and evaluate proposals for projects in three "activity" areas:

■ **Technology development**—creating new technologies and applying existing ones to new products and processes. Areas of focus will include information infrastructure, electronics and mechanical systems design and manufacturing, materials and structures manufacturing, and training, health care, environmental, aeronautical and vehicle technologies.

■ **Technology deployment**—disseminating technology for application to near-term commercial and military products and processes. Typical outlets will be manufacturing extension services that target small businesses, innovative pilot projects, and "technology access services" that assist private companies in acquiring defense and other government technologies. Information sources will be the Defense Dept., NIST and national laboratories, NASA Regional Technology Transfer Centers and universities.

■ **Manufacturing education and training**—providing the the U. S. work force

ARPA APPLIES DUAL-USE TO AFFORDABLE DEFENSE

WILLIAM B. SCOTT/WASHINGTON

The Advanced Research Projects Agency's (ARPA) increased responsibility for implementing a Clinton Administration policy for increased technology transfer between U. S. defense and civil sectors will not divert funds from military applications, according to the agency's director.

Although the new policy is designed to leverage defense investments for the nation's overall economic benefit, there must first be a clearly defined military need. The administration's promotion of dual-use has affected ARPA's strategic thinking and its decisions about where to invest, but is expected to benefit the Defense Dept. as much as industry.

"WE ARE STILL in the business of demonstrating military capability," Gary Denman, ARPA director, said. "That's the heart and soul of what ARPA has been famous for—bringing technologies to solve military problems. This [dual-use] isn't just about economic impact. It also has to do with affordable defense. A lot of technologies are so expensive that we can't afford to rely on purely military markets. We [also] use the commercial base to make military products more affordable.

"If we have a choice—to use some [technology] that clearly only has military applications, but we can solve the same problem with a solution that has both military and commercial [value]—it makes good business sense to choose the latter approach," he said.


Most of the growth in ARPA's proposed 1994 budget is in the dual-use area, but still includes substantial funding for military-related demonstrations. Within ARPA's five technology-focused offices, for example, information systems continue to be a key growth area.

An experimental Advanced Technology Demonstration Network—commonly known as the Washington-Area Bitway—now in the acquisition process will provide gigabit-class data communications among five or six government agencies and a few private companies in the Washington, D. C. and Baltimore, Md., area.

Besides meshing well with the Clinton Administration's goal of developing a national high-speed data network, the Bitway testbed is aimed at reducing the cost of linking fiber optic channels to military avionics and high-performance computers. A key element of the project is finding ways to cut the costs of high-

speed network component manufacturing, a goal supported by the commercial network industry.

Other growth-area technologies now being researched through ARPA programs—many with dual-use potential—include:



■ Micro-electromechanical systems and microelectronics. These range from "nano-size" elements to some that are "three generations beyond what we have on the shelf today," Denman said (AW&ST Mar. 1, p. 36). Particular attention is being given to photolithography, the potential limiting factor in reducing future microelectronics' size. Denman said ARPA is investigating X-ray lithography "and other solutions."

■ Massively parallel or "scalable parallel" computers and their associated software architectures. Denman stressed that ARPA is not abandoning vector computers, because they are well-suited for many types of problem-solving. "There are other problems, though, that can only be solved using massively parallel" approaches, he said. One objective is to develop compact computers that operate in the 100-200 gigaflop (billions of floating point operations) range and can be integrated with future military equipment.

■ Revising naval ship design and construction techniques. Although only an embryonic ARPA/Navy effort now, studies are aimed at leveraging the "full power of computer-aided design and manufacturing" to reduce the time and cost of shipbuilding, Denman said.

■ Improving ground-force commanders' battlefield situational awareness, particularly during contingency missions where rapid-deployment units could be outgunned by an adversary. Innovative application of information technologies and sensors might give battlefield commanders an "AWACS-on-the-ground" quality of information, Denman said.

As the Defense Dept. continues to scale down, ARPA's selection of potential high-payoff projects becomes especially critical. "The main value of an ARPA is the sorting-out, making the right choices that really shape the future. The present is, in many ways, based on ARPA's past investments," Denman said.

"This will open up a whole set of military capabilities that we can't even imagine today," Denman predicted.

■ High-temperature and advanced composite materials. Activities are focused on cutting manufacturing costs of polymer matrix materials, and improving processing techniques for metal and ceramic matrices.

■ Innovative systems-level solutions to particularly knotty military problems. Examples include the War Breaker program to quickly locate, identify and attack time-critical targets, and ARPA's Advanced Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing aircraft (AW&ST Feb. 22, p. 59 and Mar. 22, p. 17).

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2267

April 8, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RB*

FROM: STEVEN R. JONES *SJ*

SUBJECT: White House Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP)
Regional Briefings

*Steve -
please give me
a brief report
when you
return. (S)*

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) will lead a series of White House sponsored regional briefings next week on the \$500 million Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) (Tab A). The TRP program is the technology piece of the President's \$1.7 billion Defense Reinvestment and Conversion Initiative, announced last month.

The TRP program is innovative in promoting dual-use technology and commercial-military integration, and represents significant new collaboration among the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Energy, NASA, and the National Science Foundation (Tab B). These agencies will hold a single TRP competition later this year, and will jointly evaluate and select proposals.

The regional briefings led by ARPA will inform potential applicants about the TRP programs (see schedule at Tab A). There has been much interest in the TRP program since its announcement --over 7000 calls to the ARPA dual-use hotline in the last three weeks.

I intend to attend the kick-off meeting which will be held Monday, April 12, in New York. Secretary O'Leary and John Gibbons will attend portions of that briefing; it is still uncertain if the Vice President will attend. Other Cabinet officials currently scheduled to attend briefings later in the week are: Secretary Pena (Dallas), and Secretaries Brown and Aspin (Los Angeles).

The New York briefing will also include a morning site visit to EDO Corporation, a defense contractor that is diversifying into alternate powered vehicles. The TRP program is a significant piece of this Administration's efforts to develop dual use technology, more efficiently transfer technology, better integrate defense and commercial production facilities, and create long-term job growth.

Attachments

Tab A TRP Regional Briefing Description
Tab B TRP Program Summary Charts

WHITE HOUSE TECHNOLOGY REINVESTMENT PROJECT BRIEFINGS

The Clinton Administration will hold five regional briefings the week of April 12 on its \$500 million Technology Reinvestment Project (see attached schedule). TRP, part of the President's \$1.7 billion Defense Reinvestment and Conversion Initiative, is an innovative effort to develop dual-use technologies and to help small defense firms make the transition to commercial manufacture.

TRP consists of eight statutory programs established under the Defense Conversion, Reinvestment and Transition Assistance Act of 1992. The mission of TRP is to promote the transition to a growing, integrated national industrial base that provides the most advanced, affordable military systems and the most competitive commercial products. TRP programs are structured to expand high quality job opportunities in commercial and dual-use industries and to demonstrably enhance U.S. competitiveness.

The Technology Reinvestment Project represents an unprecedented collaboration between federal agencies. Led by the Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), TRP has strong participation by the Department of Commerce (National Institute of Standards and Technology), the Department of Energy (Defense Programs), the National Science Foundation, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. These agencies will hold a single TRP competition and will jointly evaluate and select proposals. Individual projects will be managed by the agency whose mission and expertise are most germane.

The regional briefings are designed to inform potential applicants about the TRP programs. Each briefing will begin with an introduction by a high-level representative of the Clinton Administration, followed by remarks from federal and state elected officials. An ARPA official will provide a one-hour overview of the TRP; following that overview, there will be three consecutive breakout sessions, lasting about three hours, on TRP programs in (1) technology development, (2) technology deployment, and (3) manufacturing education and training programs. Each briefing will run from approximately 12:30 pm to 5:45 pm (the briefings will not include lunch).

The briefings will be free of charge to attendees. To pre-register or to get a copy of the program information package, please call 1-800-DUAL-USE (8 AM to 7 PM, Monday through Friday). Attendees must make their own hotel reservations (see attached schedule for location).

SCHEDULE

WHITE HOUSE TECHNOLOGY REINVESTMENT PROJECT BRIEFINGS

Monday, April 12

New York City

Sheraton New York Hotel & Towers
811 Seventh Ave. at 52nd Street
New York, NY 10019
212-581-1000

Tuesday, April 13

Detroit

The Westin Hotel
Renaissance Center
Jefferson Avenue
Detroit, MI 48243
313-568-8000

Wednesday, April 14

Orlando

Hyatt Orlando
I-4 and U.S. 192 (Exit 25A)
6375 W. Irlo Bronson Memorial Hwy.
Kissimmee, FL 34746
407-396-1234

Thursday, April 15

Dallas

Radisson Hotel, Central Dallas
6060 N. Central Expressway
Dallas, TX 75206
214-750-6060

Friday, April 16

Los Angeles

The Biltmore Hotel
506 S. Grand Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90071
213-624-1011

These hotels have reserved a block of rooms for attendees for the nights before and after the briefing; they are available at a discount rate on a first-come, first-served basis.

Cities were selected in consultation with the regional governors' associations on the basis of accessibility to large numbers of defense firms.

DRAFT AGENDA

WHITE HOUSE TECHNOLOGY REINVESTMENT PROJECT BRIEFINGS

8:00 AM - 12:30 PM	Registration
8:00 AM	Breakfast for Governors' Staffs/State Officials
10:00 AM	Press Availability/Editorial Board
11:00 AM	Optional Luncheon(s)
12:30 PM	Technology Reinvestment Project Briefing Welcome - Key Clinton Representative
12:45 PM	Remarks by Elected Officials
1:30 PM	Program Overview Lee Buchanan, ARPA
2:30 PM	Coffee Break
2:45 PM	Breakout A Technology Development: Lee Buchanan, ARPA Breakout B Technology Deployment: Phil Nanzetta, NIST Breakout C Manufacturing Education and Training: TBD
5:45 PM	Adjourn

The agenda will be modified for each site.

FACT SHEET

WHITE HOUSE TECHNOLOGY REINVESTMENT PROJECT BRIEFINGS

Audience: We expect 700-1000 people to attend each briefing. Interest in the Technology Reinvestment Project is running strong; TRP's 1-800-DUAL-USE number has received 7000 calls in less than three weeks. Most calls are from small businesses, chambers of commerce, trade associations, universities, and state technology and economic development programs.

Press: We will hold a press availability at each briefing during the morning (the briefings begin at 12:30 PM). The availability will feature the TRP staff who will conduct the briefings, as well as Members of Congress and Governors who wish to participate.

Participation by Elected Officials: We have allotted 45 minutes (from 12:45 to 1:30) for brief remarks by elected officials. Because of the tight schedule, we can only guarantee an opportunity to speak to Governors, Senators, and the regional host; all Members of Congress in attendance will be recognized from the podium.

Regional Hosts:


New York	Northeast-Midwest Institute Richard Munson 202/544-5200 Merrill Wegner 202/226-3920
Detroit	Council of Great Lakes Governors Tim McNulty 312/407-0177
Orlando	Southern Legislative Conference Coleen Cousineau 404/266-1271
Dallas	Southern Governors' Association Candy Penn 202/624-5897
Los Angeles	Western Governors' Association Jim Souby 303/623-9378



Program Information Package
for
Defense Technology Conversion,
Reinvestment, and Transition Assistance



March 26, 1993



Defense Conversion—What It Is

Technology Reinvestment to:

- (1) Focus on turning technologies into products/processes**
- (2) Create jobs in the long term**
 - **Diversification from defense to commercial products**
 - **Integration of defense and commercial production facilities**
 - **Deployment of technology to and from commercial industries**
 - **Development of Dual-Use technologies**


Defense Conversion—What It Is Not

- *NOT* near term compensation for base closings
- *NOT* extension of unemployment benefits
- *NOT* more support for basic research
- *NOT* Government venture capital
- *NOT* for transition of national laboratories to for-profit
- *NOT* a way to continue defense business as usual


Defense Conversion, Reinvestment and Transition

Defense Conversion, Reinvestment and Transition Act of 1992


[Division D of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993]
\$1,767M



Technology Stages and Activity Areas



Technology Reinvestment Project Emphases



Common Requirements

Statutory requirements common to all programs

- (1) All require competitive award
- (2) All contain participation and organizational requirements
- (3) All require industry cost sharing of at least fifty percent (50%)
- (4) Defense emphasis – 10 U.S.C. § 2501

Technology Reinvestment Project

Mission

To stimulate the transition to a growing, integrated, national industrial capability which provides the most advanced, affordable, military systems and the most competitive commercial products.

Strategy

Invest Defense Conversion, Title IV funds in activities which stimulate the:

- 1) Development of technologies which enable new products and processes
- 2) Deployment of existing technology into commercial and military products and processes
- 3) Integration of military and commercial research and production activities

Technology Reinvestment Activities

- Defense Technology Conversion Council (DTCC) established December 16, 1992
 - Department of Defense (Advanced Research Projects Agency and Military Departments)
 - Department of Energy (Defense Programs)
 - National Science Foundation
 - Department of Commerce (National Institute of Standards & Technology)
 - National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- A single competition is planned for the issuance of a formal solicitation
- Evaluation, ranking, and selection of proposals will be conducted jointly
- Distributed execution

Technology Development

Technology Development activities deal with the creation of new product and process technologies and exploration of their potential for commercial and/or defense applications. Proposals that involve either basic research OR final product development beyond the stage of product prototype/feasibility demonstration will be regarded as out of scope.

- Proposals will fall into one of three activities:
 - (1) Spin-Off Transitioning activities are those that demonstrate non-defense commercial viability of technologies already developed for defense purposes.
 - (2) Dual-Use Development activities are those that develop commercially viable technologies that have both defense and non-defense uses.
 - (3) Spin-On Promotion activities are those that demonstrate the defense utility of existing non-defense commercially viable technologies.

Technology Development Focus Areas

- Information Infrastructure
- Electronics Design and Manufacturing
- Mechanical Design and Manufacturing
- Materials/Structures Manufacturing
- Health Care Technology
- Training/Instruction Technology
- Environment Technology
- Aeronautical Technologies
- Vehicle Technology
- Shipbuilding Industrial Infrastructure
- Advanced Battery Technology

These topics are not to be considered exclusive; the Government will entertain ideas in other areas.


Technology Deployment

Proposals will fall into one of four activities:

- (1) Manufacturing Extension Service Providers target small businesses (fewer than 500 employees) to increase competitiveness through technical and management advancement (restructure business practices, assist with accessing consulting services and technologies).
- (2) Extension Enabling Services are activities that link together providers of Manufacturing Extension Service Providers with each other and developers of technology.
- (3) Alternative Deployment Pilot Projects are innovative modes of technology deployment that are alternatives to Manufacturing Extension Service Providers.
- (4) Technology Access Services are activities to assist the private sector with acquiring existing and emerging Dual-Use technologies.

TECHNOLOGY REINVESTMENT PROJECT

Technology Deployment Activities



Manufacturing Education and Training

Proposals will fall into one of seven activities:

- (1) Engineering Education in Manufacturing Across the Curriculum
- (2) Practice-Oriented Master's Degree Programs
- (3) Retraining the Manufacturing Work Force
- (4) Educational Traineeships for Defense Industry Engineers
- (5) Manufacturing Engineering Education Coalitions
- (6) Supplementary Education Awards to Ongoing Centers and Coalitions Devoted to Manufacturing
- (7) Individual/Group Innovations in Engineering Education in Manufacturing

TECHNOLOGY REINVESTMENT PROJECT

Activities by Statutory Program

Tech Deploy. Activity Area

Mfg. Ext. Svc. Providers

Extension Enabling Svcs.

Alt. Deploy. Pilot Projects

Technology Access Svcs.

Tech Devel. Activity Area

Spin-Off Transitioning

Dual-Use Development

Spin-On Promotion

Mfg. Ed. & Trng. Activity Area

**Mfg. Education & Training
(7 Activities)**

							
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Program Emphasis

**Mfg
Eng
Ed:
Grant
Prgm
\$44M**

**Mfg
Expert
Class
\$5M**

**Def
Dual-
Use
Crit
Tech
Ptn
\$82M**

**Def
Adv
Mfg
Tech
Ptn
\$24M**

**Com-
MII
Integ
Ptn
\$42M**

**Reg
Tech
All
Asst
Prgm
\$91M**

**Def
Dual-
Use
Asst
Ext
Prgm
\$91M**

**Mfg
Ext
Prgm
\$87M**


Statutory Programs

Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR)

- Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) plans to solicit proposals from small businesses
 - Proposals will address technology development focus areas
 - Procurement will be based on Federal SBIR guidelines
- Cost sharing will be permitted for TRP SBIR proposals, but is not required and will not be an evaluation factor
- Out-year TRP activities are a natural SBIR Phase III follow-on

TECHNOLOGY REINVESTMENT PROJECT

Joint Agency Program



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 14, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: National Communications System Anniversary

At Tab A is a letter for the President's signature commemorating the National Communications System (NCS) on 30 years of service. The President's letter recognizing this important interagency group will be placed at the front of a document which provides an in-depth narrative of NCS operations and organization.

The charter of the NCS is to ensure national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications for the entire spectrum of national emergencies. This responsibility includes interagency planning and coordination to meet NS/EP requirements, standards (technical and operating) for an interoperable national telecommunications infrastructure, and assistance to the President in the management and coordination of national telecommunication resources during periods of national crises and emergencies.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I and the letter at Tab A to the President for his signature.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to Lieutenant General Alonzo E. Short, Jr.,
U.S. Army

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: National Communications System Anniversary

Purpose

To congratulate the National Communications System on 30 years of service to our Nation.

Background

The National Communications System was established to ensure national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications during national emergencies. It provides interagency planning and coordination to meet NS/EP requirements, technical and operating standards for our national telecommunications infrastructure, and assistance to the President in the management and coordination of national communication resources during periods of crisis or emergency.

The letter at Tab A will be placed at the front of the NCS Annual report on operations and organization.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to the Manager of the National Communications System at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Lieutenant General Alonzo E. Short, Jr., U.S. Army

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear General Short:

I congratulate the members of the National Communications System (NCS) on 30 years of outstanding service to our Nation.

The accomplishments of the National Communications System over the years are a tribute to the spirit of government cooperation. Your goal of ensuring essential communications for the Federal Government under all conditions is even more important today, as was vividly demonstrated during Operation Desert Storm and in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew. Your performance in these and other contingencies underscores the value of telecommunications readiness and availability.

I also commend the successful partnership forged between the government and the telecommunications and information industry, as exemplified by your close cooperation with the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee. This unique relationship between government and the private sector serves as an outstanding example of the importance of working together to accomplish our economic, national security and technology goals.

As we move into the 21st century, I look to the NCS to continue its leadership role in promoting close cooperation among its 27 member agencies and in fostering a productive partnership with the private sector. I commend you on your past achievements and wish you continued success in the future.

Sincerely,

Lieutenant General Alonzo E. Short, Jr. USA
Manager, National Communications System
701 South Court House Road
Arlington, VA 22204-2198

TO: LAKE

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 14 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HEU

RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PURCHASE OF HEU FM RUSSIA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 19 APR 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: AOKI

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

AOKI

FOR CONCURRENCE

BARTH

BURNS

GATI

GOTTEMOELLER

FOR INFO

BELL

ITOH

KENNEY

SODERBERG

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/23/2016
2A6-052-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Marc Grossman. Subject: Purchase of HEU. (1 page)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 44

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - April 1993 #2 [3]

2016-0152-F

vz4383

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	Duplicate of 001a. (1 page)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 44

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - April 1993 #2 [3]

2016-0152-F

vz4383

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320362
RECEIVED: 15 APR 93 09

TO: ITOH

FROM: STARR, B

DOC DATE: 14 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: PROLIFERATION
ARMS CONTROL

KOREA NORTH

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LEGAL MEMO ON IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR ISSUES & AVAILABLE REMEDIES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 19 APR 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: PONEMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: IFM

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
PONEMAN

FOR CONCURRENCE
GOTTEMOELLER
KRISTOFF
TENET
WIEDEMANN
WITKOWSKY

FOR INFO
BELL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By W NARA, Date 8/23/2016
2016-062-f

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	For William Itoh from Barbara Starr. Subject: Legal Memorandum on Implications. (1 page)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 44

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - April 1993 #2 [3]

2016-0152-F
vz4383

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	For the Deputies Group from Mary Elizabeth Hoinkes. Subject: [Implications] (9 pages)	04/14/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 44

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - April 1993 #2 [3]

2016-0152-F
vz4383

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY



MAR 29 P2:05

DIRECTOR

March 29, 1993

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Acting Director

FROM: GC - Mary Elizabeth Hoinkes, Acting *MEH*

SUBJECT: Whether a Party's Right to Withdraw from the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is Within its Sole and Absolute Discretion

ISSUE: Can a case be made that a party's right to withdraw from the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the "NPT") is not within its sole and absolute discretion?

INTRODUCTION: Some legal opinion holds that a party's right to withdraw from the NPT is absolute or virtually so--that only the withdrawing party may make the necessary decision required by Article X, 1. of the NPT and that once such a decision is made, all that remains is the procedural question of whether the notice of withdrawal was proper in form and correctly delivered. Nonetheless, a case can be made that there is at least an implicit right held by the UN Security Council and/or the parties to review the stated purposes for the withdrawal, and that any withdrawal--as with almost every action taken under a treaty--must meet a basic test of good faith in order to be effective.

APPLICABLE TREATY PROVISION:

ARTICLE X, PARAGRAPH 1.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ANALYSIS: That the right to withdraw is not within the sole and absolute discretion of the withdrawing party is suggested by the very complexity of Article X, 1. Having placed conditions on the right to withdraw, the Treaty requires their fulfillment before withdrawal can occur. If ease of withdrawal (and minimal scrutiny by the other parties) was being sought, Article X, 1. would read roughly as follows: "if a party decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests, it shall, as an exercise of its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw by giving three months prior notice to all other parties." This is in fact a paraphrase of the withdrawal provision of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (the "LTBT"), which was concluded some five years before the NPT.

The drafters of the NPT could have used the LTBT language, but did not. A fair conclusion would be that their intent was to require something more than that required by the LTBT. What was added, of course, is the requirement that the withdrawal notice specify the extraordinary events the withdrawing party "regards" as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Unless this was done for purely informational or cosmetic purposes, it seems fair to conclude that something more is implied for NPT withdrawal. Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires that a treaty "be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose" (emphasis added). Thus it seems safe to conclude that the enhanced notice provision of the NPT was put there for a reason, and that it ought not be glossed over as mere decoration.

The precise wording of Article X, 1. is critical, particularly the relationship of the word "decides" to the rest of the paragraph. The decision that is clearly a subjective one, within the sole prerogative of the withdrawing party, is not whether "extraordinary events" have occurred (i.e. whether a particular fact pattern constitutes "extraordinary events"). Instead, the decision to be made by the withdrawing party is whether extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests. In other words, the withdrawing party may indeed have sole and absolute discretion as to whether its supreme interests are being jeopardized, but the withdrawing party does not, alone, make the decision that any given fact pattern constitutes "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of [the] Treaty." That this is so under the NPT seems much more likely because of the additional requirement in NPT that the withdrawing party identify the extraordinary events before the eyes of the world. Requiring such publicizing of the purported extraordinary events almost seems to beg review of some kind by the other parties--if no review was intended, there would seemingly be little if any need for the withdrawing party to give any explanation, except, perhaps, to satisfy the curiosity of future

academics.

Also of considerable significance is that the notice identifying the purported extraordinary events goes not only to the other parties but to the UN Security Council as well. If there were no intended purpose in informing this body, presumably the requirement would not have been added. In this case, a logical explanation of such purpose results from the relationship between the parties and the International Atomic Energy Agency (the "IAEA"), the IAEA, of course, being absolutely integral to the operation of the NPT. The IAEA has a close relationship with the United Nations. Assuming an allegation of misconduct by the IAEA proffered by a treaty party as "extraordinary events" justifying withdrawal, who better than the UN Security Council to bring the IAEA to task, if such is appropriate, and eliminate the "extraordinary events?"

Thus, there would seem to be a dual purpose behind the enhanced withdrawal provisions for the NPT: first, to enable review of whether particular facts do indeed constitute "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of [the] treaty," and second, to enable the UN Security Council, if indeed there are such events, to attempt to eliminate them and thereby remove any need for an aggrieved party to withdraw from the treaty. Viewed in this context, the additional NPT withdrawal language seems highly meaningful.

Another aspect of "extraordinary events" is based on the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, set forth in Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." This would seem to suggest that even if the withdrawing party were the sole determiner of whether a particular fact pattern constitutes "extraordinary events," such a determination, to have validity, must be made in good faith.

For example, what if a party attempted to withdraw from the NPT by citing the occurrence of a lunar eclipse, or a loss by its national soccer team, or even something entirely non-factual, as being "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Treaty [that] have jeopardized [its] supreme interests"? To be sure, there is much subjectivity involved in all of the Article X, 1. process, but surely there must be some things--some distortions, trivialities, or outright frauds--that would not constitute "extraordinary events" determined on the basis of good faith. Acknowledgment of this leads compellingly to the conclusion that the other NPT parties have at least an implied right to review whether a cited fact pattern meets a minimal good faith test for designation as "extraordinary events." Such a review would presumably be absolutely minimal; the good faith test ought to be easy to meet; but there can and indeed must be at least some right on the part of the other parties to review if

not the question of whether "extraordinary events" jeopardize a state's supreme interests, then surely the question of whether a particular fact pattern is in fact "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of [the] Treaty."

North Korea's withdrawal notice to the UN Security Council, in pertinent part, reads as follows:

The United States together with south Korea has resumed the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, a nuclear war rehearsal, threatening the DPRK, and instigated some officials of the IAEA Secretariat and certain member States to adopt an unjust "resolution" at the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors on February 26, 1993 demanding us to open our military sites that have no relevance at all to the nuclear activities, in violation of the IAEA Statute, the Safeguards Agreement and the agreement the IAEA had reached with the DPRK.
(verbatim rendering of North Korean original)

Passing over the question of whether any of the foregoing jeopardizes the supreme interests of North Korea, are any of the foregoing "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of [the] Treaty?" Assuming, arguendo, that good faith is the only test by which the other parties could attempt to review the North Korea decision, even then there would seem to be serious deficiencies. As for the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, is there any evidence whatsoever that they are "a nuclear war rehearsal threatening [North Korea]" or that they are related to the subject matter--nuclear non-proliferation--of the NPT? If not, good faith would seem to be lacking.

Similarly, an IAEA inspection request to North Korea is part of the very substance of the NPT, part of the bargain and covenant made by that state when it joined the regime. North Korea can hardly cite performance under the treaty as being in any way "extraordinary;" good faith is lacking. Absent good faith, there would seem to be serious doubt that the ("factual") events cited by North Korea are "extraordinary events" for purposes of Article XI, 1. If they are not such events, then North Korea's attempt to withdraw is invalid.

CONCLUSION: A case can be made that a party's right to withdraw from the NPT is not within its sole and absolute discretion. If such right were meant to be absolute, or virtually so, the NPT could have used the language of the LTBT. Instead, by requiring there to be a recital by the withdrawing party of "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of [the] Treaty," the NPT impliedly grants the other parties some right of review. Even if the decision as to whether "extraordinary events" jeopardize a party's supreme interests is within the sole discretion of that state, the language of Art. X, 1. is far less clear that the

withdrawing party has the sole and absolute say as to whether any given factual pattern is in fact "extraordinary events." The close relationship between the UN Security Council, a designated recipient of the withdrawal notice, and the IAEA further suggests intent by the drafters that there be at least some review by the other parties of part or all of the withdrawal decision. The good faith standard, generally regarded as a basic part of customary international law and practice, would not be an unreasonable basis for such review.