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FROM: LAKE
NUSSBAUM, B

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 5, 1993

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 
BERNARD NUSSBAUM 

SUBJECT: Washington Post Editorial "The Army Owes Some
Answers"

At Tab A you asked for additional information on the March 23 Washington Post editorial concerning U.S. Army surveillance of Martin Luther King and civil rights organizations. The Atlanta Journal article from which this editorial was drawn is provided at Tab B and an Atlanta Constitution article which provides some additional insight is at Tab C.

The allegations contained in the Journal article were raised before in Congressional hearings in the early 1970s. During and before the Vietnam War the U.S. Army did conduct domestic surveillance on U.S. citizens and organizations. All Army historical files on this surveillance are now in the custody of the National Archives and Records Administration and are available to the public.

As a result of Congressional hearings in the early 1970s, stringent controls and oversight measures were implemented on and within the U.S. intelligence community and military services. These controls include Congressional oversight by both the House and the Senate Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence and by DoD and military services oversight officials. The military services are not conducting any such surveillance now. Since 1976, the military services have been generally prohibited from collecting and maintaining information on non-DoD affiliated U.S. citizens by Presidential Executive Order. Exceptions are specified by the current Executive Order 12333, "U.S. Intelligence Activities," which is also available to the public.

Members of Congressman Dellums staff have advised the Army that the Congressional Black Caucus will be writing to you concerning this story. The Army has directed its researchers to recheck the Investigation Records Repository at Ft. Meade, the Center for Military History, the Special Forces archives and the Alabama National Guard records for additional references on this topic.

Attachments

Tab A Washington Post Editorial "The Army Owes Some Answers"
Tab B Atlanta Journal Article "Spying on King"
Tab C Atlanta Constitution Article "Spying Report Shocks King
Associates"

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

The Army Owes Some Answers

THERE IS plenty of evidence on the record that in the 1960s and 1970s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local police agencies tailed, bugged and kept a meticulous collection of secret gossip on the personal and political behavior of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. and other prominent black leaders. Those accounts, it turns out, may have revealed only small glimpses into the government's intrusive behavior during that era. According to Sunday's edition of *The Commercial Appeal* in Memphis, government spying on blacks started more than 75 years ago and continued for years—at the hands of the United States Army. That piece of ugly history, if true, can't be allowed to remain in the shadows.

The reasons for the military's alleged domestic sleuthing were as flimsy at the turn of the century as they were when J. Edgar Hoover's FBI was running amok. As preposterous as it seems, the Army attributed justifiable anger among blacks at their mistreatment in the early 1900s to possible influence by foreign-backed subversives from, of all places, Germany. That

kind of paranoia and prejudice reportedly governed the Army's behavior through World War I, the civil rights movement and anti-Vietnam protests, when it mounted intelligence operations. They reportedly even deployed the Green Berets at one point. It is a sickening story about government spying that shadowed southern churches and ministers, monitored three generations of the Martin Luther King Jr. family and recruited black Americans to inform on each other. The story that unfolded in the *Commercial Appeal* describes an Army that feared black Americans were or could become a national security threat. The real threat to the country's interest, however, were those in the Army who masterminded the plot. *mc 3/22*

Yesterday, an Army spokesman said the Army was researching records to "determine the facts surrounding the allegations." The Army says it expects to complete the research soon, but until then, it has "no verifiable information for release." The spying may have stopped, but the need for full public disclosure of all the facts is strong.

Tom L. Blumstein

what's the deal on this

Artists on the Hill

THE NATION'S artists and arts organizations rarely speak in anything that could be called unison, but 450 of them converged on Washington and Congress last week for their annual "arts advocacy day" bearing a surprisingly unified—and mild—message. Perhaps even more surprising, the average reception they report getting from lobbied lawmakers this time was not the suspicion and fear of the last few years—what one arts association president paraphrases as "Get off our backs, your crazy stuff will get us in trouble"—but a non-panicked willingness to listen. The lobbied representatives and senators, about 340 of them by the arts groups' count, mostly heard pitches on the federal role in the arts and education, and their questions, when they asked any, had to do with how the arts groups' specific concerns—which this year include education, tax and insurance matters—fit in with the bigger legislative landscape.

If such a return to business after the recent cultural wars should materialize, it will be all to the good. The annual advocacy day, the 15th annual such event, focused on matters in which the interests of arts groups overlap with those of

other nonprofits (for instance, the Clinton budget's projected cuts in nonprofit direct-mail subsidies, or the difficulty in securing adequate health insurance for artists) and those in which they merge with the continuing work on education reform.

Education Secretary Richard Riley gave them a boost on this front in a Wednesday speech, announcing that the arts now comprise one of the six "primary subjects" enumerated as national education goals. Barbara Jordan delivered a lecture in the Kennedy Center that declared the arts' ability to "reattach *pluribus* to *unum*" and to dissolve endless ethnic separatism, adding, "The arts have no pigmentation, thank God." Lobbyists sought to persuade representatives that community arts programs, funded either by the NEA or by local money it draws, constitute not only uplift but also programs for the disabled, the elderly, children—all those good things that draw funds rather than controversies. If this kind of pitch has an old, familiar feel, common to every interest group seeking a few extra strips of pork in tough times, it is nonetheless infinitely preferable to the last few rounds of debate on this topic.

Unfair to Federal Retirees

The Post's March 15 editorial "The Republicans Find a Budget" found merit in the proposal to reduce the cost-of-living adjustments given to federal and

budget, federal employees may suffer more than 10 times the cost of deficit reduction compared with private-sector employees at equivalent wages. It

To further cut COLAs to retirees would permanently diminish the base of retiree benefits. It is unfair to single out federal retirees by impact.

SPYING ON KING

The Army viewed Martin Luther King Jr. as subversive, and tried to stop him. They feared his campaign of non-violence would spark revolution in the streets.

But he was just one target in a 75-year campaign of spying on black leaders using informants, bugging and even aerial surveillance by U2 spy planes.

By Stephen G. Tompkins
THE (MEMPHIS) COMMERCIAL APPEAL
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The intelligence branch of the U.S. Army spied on the family of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. for three generations.

Top-secret, often illegal, intrusions into the lives of black Americans began more than 75 years ago and often focused on black churches in the South and their ministers.

The spying was born of a conviction by top Army intelligence officers that black Americans were ripe for subversion — first by agents of the German Kaiser, then by Communists, later by the Japanese and eventually by those opposed to the Vietnam War.

At first, the Army used a reporting network of private citizens that included church members, black businessmen and black educators. It later employed cadres of infiltrators, wiretaps and aerial photography by U2 spy planes.

As the civil rights movement merged with anti-war protests in the late 1960s, some Army units began supplying sniper rifles and other weapons of war to civilian police departments. Army intelligence began planning for what some officers believed would soon be armed rebellion.

By March 1968, Dr. King was preparing to lead a march in Memphis in support of striking sanitation workers and another march a few weeks later that would swamp Washington with people demanding that less attention be paid to Vietnam and more resources devoted to America's poor.

By then the Army's intelligence system was keenly focused on Dr. King and desperately searching for a way to stop him.

On April 4, 1968, Dr. King was killed by a sniper's bullet at the Lorraine Motel in Memphis.

Army viewed King as national security threat

Some of the Army's spying against anti-war and civil rights groups became public knowledge in 1971 congressional hearings. But key intelligence officers avoided testifying, leaving the full story untold.

The 16-month investigation uncovered no hard evidence that Army intelligence played any role in Dr. King's assassination, although Army agents were in Memphis the day he was killed.

But the review of thousands of government documents and interviews with people involved in the spying revealed that by early 1968 Army intelligence regarded Dr. King as a major threat to national security.

Army intelligence opened its file on Dr. King in 1947 with a photograph showing him and other Morehouse College students leaving a meeting of Mrs. Dorothy Lilley's Intercollegiate Council. She was a suspected Communist, according to the file on Dr. King kept by the 111th Military Intelligence Group at Fort McPherson in Atlanta.

Reports on Dr. King's activities were added periodically through the 1950s, but comments in his intelligence file indicate Army officers at first considered him more of a phenomenon than a threat.

Army spies pegged Dr. King as a Communist tool in the fall of 1957, when he spoke at the 25th anniversary of the integrated Highlander Folk School in Monteagle, Tenn. Army intelligence had watched the school for years.

A Sept. 6, 1940, report from Maj. G.R. Carpenter, assistant chief of staff for intelligence for the Sixth Corps Area in Chicago, said the school's executive director, Miles Norton, and the Rev. Claude Williams of Memphis, a New York native known for his "Communist activities," were working together to teach "a course of instruction to develop Negro organizers in the

Southern cotton states."

Dr. King's visit was given extra weight because of an FBI report received the previous July of his Baltimore meeting with Stanley Levison, a New York millionaire who had been under bureau surveillance as a Communist fund-raiser since June 9, 1952. The two formed a long friendship and business relationship.

King seen as igniting violence

The suspicion with which top Army officers viewed blacks had its genesis in simple ignorance but gained credence because of real and perceived links between black civil rights activists and Communists and other subversives.

As Dr. King gained prominence as a civil rights leader, intelligence officers also came to believe he was a man who sparked violence wherever he went, his non-violent philosophy notwithstanding.

For example, an agent of the 113th Intelligence Detachment overheard Dr. King at a January 1963 dinner at the Edgewater Beach Hotel in Chicago telling "two black men and a pretty white woman that Project C was ready to go," according to the surveillance report the agent filed.

A follow-up report dated Jan. 24 describes Project C as "plans for massive disruption of public and private enterprise in Birmingham."

Three months later, Dr. King entered Birmingham. Television screens filled with pictures of marching black elementary-school children being herded into police wagons while their parents were bombarded with high-



Martin Luther King's speeches roused blacks to secure their rights, but Army intelligence feared a "full-scale revolt."

powered water guns as they left the 16th Street Baptist Church. Riots broke out, and Ku Klux Klansmen patrolled the night streets with shotguns.

On May 12, the White House ordered Gen. Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to send 3,000 men from Fort Benning, Ga., to Birmingham. Maj. Gen. Charles Billingslea, commander of the Army's 2nd Division, had asked for help in Birmingham because "I may have a full-scale revolt on my hands down here."

Portions of the monthlong Birmingham disturbances were recorded by U2 spy planes taking off from the supersecret "Site 98" outside Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. Over the next seven years, at least 26 other such domestic spy flights by U2s and at least two involving the more advanced SR-71 were requested by Army commanders and flown by the Air Force, according to classified documents.

Maj. Gen. William Yarborough, the Army's top spy, became convinced that either the Chinese or Soviets, through Cuba, bankrolled Dr. King and other black activists.

General Yarborough's evidence came from Lt. Gen. Marcelino Garcia Barragan, the Mexican minister of national defense.

Through a trusted aide, General Garcia gave Army intelligence a report on June 29, 1967, that said Mexican army intelligence had discovered militant black Americans receiving combat training and secret funding from the Havana-based Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS), financed by Communist China's military intelligence agency.

The report said, "American Negroes [were] sighted [with] automatic weapons / unarmed combat training / drilling evident" at an urban guerrilla training camp near Chiapas in southern Mexico.

OLAS's aim was to "commence guerrilla wars throughout the hemisphere to destabilize United States-backed governments . . . and (OLAS) has pledged its support to the Negro liberation movement."

Stokely Carmichael, co-chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and a leader of the black power movement, was among a number of black Americans associated with OLAS.

And Mr. Carmichael increasingly was seen in Dr. King's company.

Anti-Vietnam speech shook world

In speech after speech the year before he died, Dr. King tied the growing disillusionment of inner-city and rural Southern blacks to the country's preoccupation with Vietnam.

On April 4, 1967, he told 3,000 people at New York's Riverside Church:

"A few years ago, it seemed as if there was a

real promise of hope for the poor, both black and white, through the poverty program.

"And then came the buildup in Vietnam, and I watched this program broken and eviscerated as if it were some idle political plaything of a society gone mad on war. . . . Somehow this madness must cease. We must stop now."

The speech shook the world. Life magazine called it "a demagogic slander that sounded like a script for Radio Hanoi."

Dispatches from the 525th Military Intelligence Group (MIG) in Vietnam reported that "Negro troops are unsettled" by articles on Dr. King's speech in Pacific Stars and Stripes and their hometown newspapers.

To many, Dr. King's shift in direction served as a lens to focus the nation's compassion and sense of justice on resolving its inner conflicts.

But General Yarborough and other intelligence officers heard only the voice of an enemy who was gaining ground.

By summer, the ground was shaking.

"Tank crews blast away at entrenched snipers with .50-caliber machine guns" was not a headline from Vietnam but from Detroit, where 43 people died and \$45 million in property was destroyed. Rioters burned and plundered 100 other American cities during that long, hot summer.

Detroit was particularly significant to Army leaders, not just because of the bloodshed and damage but due to the results of a secret survey.

After the riot, 496 black males arrested for firing rifles and shotguns at soldiers were herded into a warehouse north of Detroit. They were interviewed by agents of the Army's Psychological Operations Group, dressed as civilians, in conjunction with the Behavior Research Institute of Detroit.

The arrested men were asked dozens of questions, but the responses 363 of them gave to the question "Who is your favorite Negro leader?" stunned Army intelligence.

Dr. King was the clear favorite — 178 of the men named him. Men considered more radical, such as Mr. Carmichael and Malcolm X, came in a distant second and fourth.

Army intelligence leaders repeatedly used this survey to signify the danger Dr. King represented to national security.

Dr. King really scared top Army commanders on Dec. 4, 1967, when he announced his intent to lead a Poor People's March on Washington the next spring to focus public attention on the "total, direct and immediate abolition of poverty."

Years of protest had Army brass scared

Dr. King's call for a "Poor People's Campaign" came on the heels of the nation's worst

summer of violence in three years and an October anti-war protest in which 200,000 demonstrators had besieged the Pentagon as alarmed Army brass watched from the roof.

Civilian authority's responses to these upheavals had shaken the faith of Army leaders in the government's stability. Top officers believed the years of violence and protest had weakened the nation's social and political foundations.

Memos reveal Army leaders were increasingly frustrated with top civilian Pentagon officials who ignored warnings that black unrest was Communist-inspired, damaging morale in Vietnam and leading to armed revolt at home.

By December 1967, some officers felt desperate. Among them were General Yarborough, who had been named assistant chief of staff for intelligence in 1966, and Maj. Gen. William Blakefield, chief of U.S. Army Intelligence Command, who reported to General Yarborough.

"The Army was over a barrel," General Yarborough said in an interview at his home in Southern Pines, N.C.

The suspicion with which top Army officers viewed blacks had its genesis in simple ignorance but gained credence because of real and perceived links between black civil rights activists and Communists and other subversives.

"Blacks were using the uncertainty of the Vietnam period and taking advantage of it," General Yarborough said. "They were attacking the weak point in the line, which is tactically a good idea, but you couldn't do it without arousing animosity of all kinds."

"You couldn't expect people to be rational and look at this in a cool way," he said. "We were trying to fight a war at the same time where the home base was being eroded."

Army officers "take an oath to protect the country against all enemies, foreign and domestic," General Yarborough said. "You see people breaking windows and throwing Molotov cock-

tails, snipers shooting policemen, people who are outwardly trying to shut the government down and announce that is what they are going to do, you have a feeling that this is perhaps a domestic enemy."

General Blakefield told Army historians in 1975: "There was a fear among high-ranking Army officers that the long-term judgment of historians might be that the Army, in the late 1960s, failed to protect the people of this country, as they had in other times of crisis."

To stop that "enemy," General Yarborough and General Blakefield used the resources of the largest domestic spy network ever assembled in a free country.

Though many black leaders spoke out against the Vietnam War, Army intelligence focused on Dr. King, whom General Yarborough described as "the messiah for his people, his own personal qualities notwithstanding."

3 generations of preachers spied on

Dr. King wasn't the first black leader, nor the first in his family, to be targeted for surveillance by the Army's spy agencies.

In September 1917, the War Department's Military Intelligence Division (MID) opened a file on King's maternal grandfather, the Rev. A.D. Williams.

As pastor of Ebenezer Baptist Church, the Rev. Williams played a key role in Atlanta's black community. He was the Atlanta NAACP's first president in 1910 and an officer in the National Baptist Convention, the largest black religious organization of the time.

During World War I, military intelligence targeted black ministers and others as troublemakers or friends, depending on whether they worked as MID informants. Memphis businessman Robert Church Jr. supplied MID Maj. Walter Loving with names of prominent blacks in each major Southern city, intelligence files show.

One of the first items in the Rev. Williams's intelligence file was a top-secret telegram sent to the Army's Southern Department headquarters in Atlanta. The telegram said in part:

"It behooves us to find out all we possibly can about this colored preacher."

Later, a memo in the Rev. Williams's file labeled him a "radical Negro agitator" for leading a campaign to create a black high school.

His NAACP involvement also earned him the attention of Army intelligence officers, who believed the civil rights group was "an agitative pro-Soviet organization for propagandizing the Negroes," according to a 1926 report by Lt. Col.

Walter Boswell, Army intelligence executive officer at the War Department.

Dr. King's father, the Rev. M.L. King Sr., eventually succeeded the Rev. Williams as pastor at Ebenezer — and inherited his own Army watchers, Army intelligence records show.

The Rev. King Sr.'s participation in the National Negro Congress tarred him with the Communist brush as well.

Col. Walter Buck, assistant chief of staff for intelligence, Third Army, at Fort McPherson in Atlanta said in a March 1947 report to the War Department that the NNC "serves as the staff unit of the Communist Party among Negroes."

The NNC's "program includes the ultimate founding of a Negro state in the South after the revolutionary overthrow of white landlords and capitalists," Colonel Buck said.

Of the three large black organizations active at the start of World War II — the NAACP, the National Urban League and the NNC — the National Negro Congress was considered the most activist and radical. Communist Party supporters gradually took it over, according to most histories, and a split with anti-war Stalinists at the start of WWII led to the group's decline.

Despite the years of watching the King family, top Army officers were rattled by the prospect of Dr. King leading a horde into the nation's capital again.

An intelligence analysis distributed during a Dec. 12, 1967, conference at the Pentagon described Dr. King's plans for the March on Washington as "a devastating civil disturbance whose sole purpose is to shut down the United States government."

The analysis described Dr. King as "a Negro who repeatedly has preached the message of Hanoi and Peking."

'They didn't have a clue'

Some of the Army's best officers attended that meeting to discuss "target-city priorities" in light of "King's plans to ignite violence and mayhem" throughout the United States in April, according to a report on the conference.

But the meeting broke up in frustration, one participant said.

"Looking back, I remember nobody had any answers," he said. "We had all these West Point geniuses who could lead divisions. But when it came to stopping Dr. King, they didn't have a clue."

Nevertheless, Army intelligence intensified its surveillance of Dr. King and covertly dispatched Green Beret teams to make street maps, identify landing zones for riot troops, and scout

sniper sites in 39 potential racially explosive cities, including Memphis.

The 20th Special Forces Group, headquartered in Alabama, seemed perfect for these scouting missions in the South. The 20th SFG was a National Guard unit, part-time warriors who lived and worked in many of the communities where black unrest was centered.

Green Berets from the 20th often spied on Dr. King and other black Americans during the 1960s, military records and interviews show.

Some Vietnam Special Forces veterans —



Civil rights leaders such as Stokely Carmichael (left), Martin Luther King Jr. and Floyd McKissick were feared as dangerous subversives by some in the Army.

particularly those who had worked in murky clandestine operations with the CIA, the Special Operations Group (SOG) or the top-secret Detachment B-57 — were “dumped” into the 20th “for safekeeping,” according to a former major with Army counterintelligence.

“They couldn’t let a lot of these crazy guys back into the States because they couldn’t forget their training,” he said. “Birmingham [20th SFG

headquarters] became Saigon. The rural South was ‘in-country,’ and at times things got out of hand.”

Many members of the 20th SFG during the ‘60s still live in the South, some under new identities. Some of them spoke to The Commercial Appeal only if their names were not used or locations revealed.

A former 20th Special Forces sergeant from Detachment B-6, Company B, who was stationed in Columbus, Miss., said the unit’s undercover missions “didn’t peek into windows, if that’s what you mean.”

Klan passed on information

In return for paramilitary training at a farm in Cullman, Ala., Ku Klux Klansmen soon became the 20th’s intelligence network, whose information was passed to the Pentagon.

Bill Wilkinson, chief of the Klan’s Invisible Empire branch in 1983, told United Press International that the group no longer had a training camp at Cullman.

“And they’re not paramilitary. We called them ‘Klan Special Forces,’” he said.

On Feb. 19, Dr. King went to Miami to drum up support for the Poor People’s Campaign. Armed with a new \$230,000 Ford Foundation grant, he told a group of black ministers that American capitalism must be reorganized.

The Rev. Samuel Billy Kyles of Memphis, who was in the audience, later that afternoon told Dr. King about 1,300 Memphis sanitation workers who were striking against the city for refusing to recognize their union. The Rev. Kyles, joining the Rev. James Lawson, asked Dr. King to come to Memphis to support the strikers.

A Feb. 22 report in Dr. King’s Army intelligence file states: “Indications from reliable source are MLK will be in Memphis to support union striking city.”

In February 1968, the 113th Military Intelligence Group (MIG) at Fort Sheridan, Ill., outside Chicago, began supplying the “Legion of Justice” terrorist group with tear gas, Mace, electronic surveillance equipment and money to harass anti-war groups.

Led by Chicago lawyer S. Thomas Sutton, who recruited Chicago police intelligence officers, the Legion used wiretaps supplied by 113th agents to break into and bug the offices of anti-war groups.

In Baltimore, the Inspectional Services Division of the city police received secret funding from the 109th MIG to spy on area black radicals.

In Washington, the Metro Police received

\$120,000 in 1967 and \$150,000 in 1968 from Army intelligence. Undercover police intelligence officers met regularly with 116th MIG agents. They maintained an index card file of 21,000 suspected black and anti-war radicals.

Teams of police and Army intelligence officers followed and photographed Dr. King during a prayer march in Arlington Cemetery on Feb. 6, 1968, and his sermon the following day at Vermont Avenue Baptist Church. The officers later used the pictures for dart practice.

Meanwhile, the Army had finished its intelligence outlines on 124 cities with the potential for

zones, secret storage sites for riot gear and weapons, and files on all civic leaders and known troublemakers.

Details of those plans were kept secret from civilian law enforcement agencies for fear of leaks. Still, at least the Army felt better prepared for Dr. King.

On April 3, Dr. King returned to Memphis. Army agents from the 111th Military Intelligence Group shadowed his movements and monitored radio traffic from a sedan crammed with electronic equipment.

Eight Green Beret soldiers from an "Operation Detachment Alpha 184 Team" were also in Memphis carrying out an unknown mission. Such "A-teams" usually contained 12 members.

On April 4, at 6:01 p.m., a bullet from a 30.06 rifle equipped with a scope struck Dr. King down on the balcony of the Lorraine Motel.

The man whose fingerprints were found on that gun — James Earl Ray — pleaded guilty to Dr. King's murder and is serving a 99-year prison sentence. Ray bought the rifle from a sporting goods store in Birmingham, FBI investigators said.

On Oct. 3, Attorney General Ramsey Clark sent a report to the White House.

The predicted summer of violence that was to have begun with Dr. King's April 22 demonstrations in Washington never happened, the report said.

Rioting had broken out in several cities as news of Dr. King's assassination spread, but "there was a clear and significant decline in the number and severity of riots and disorders this summer," Mr. Clark said.

Portions of the monthlong Birmingham disturbances were recorded by U2 spy planes taking off from the supersecret "Site 98" outside Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. Over the next seven years at least 26 other such domestic spy flights by U2s and at least two involving the more advanced SR-71 were requested by Army commanders and flown by the Air Force, according to classified documents.

violence that summer. The outlines included maps with all "sensitive areas" marked, landing

SIDEBAR

Carmichael's violent words fed Army fears of urban guerrillas

By Stephen G. Tompkins
THE (MEMPHIS) COMMERCIAL APPEAL

In early May 1967, Army intelligence microphones hidden in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee offices in Atlanta recorded SNCC co-chairman Stokely Carmichael discussing an armed revolt by black Americans.

Mr. Carmichael: We'd learn a

lot from studying [Che] Guevara's tactics. But baby, we gotta have the guns and stuff to do the damage. The man don't understand till you aim at his head. [Argentine-born Guevara was Cuban strongman Fidel Castro's top lieutenant and wrote an influential book on guerrilla warfare.]

SNCC employee George Ware: Yeah, well, where you gonna get it?

Mr. Carmichael: South, south of here.

On May 5, Mr. Carmichael distributed a secret report to SNCC members. Army intelligence obtained a copy of the seven-page document, titled "Report From the Chairman." It said in part:

"Around the world and particularly in the Third World, we are looked to as the organization

inside the United States who is ready to lay the foundation for a revolution. . . . We must then be prepared to wage a fight against this country inside the country."

Army intelligence saw the report and the taped conversation as evidence of Mr. Carmichael's willingness to turn to violence and possible foreign influence.

Later evidence would hurt not only Mr. Carmichael but Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. as well. Army agents photographed and recorded Dr. King and Mr. Carmichael in meetings.

After Dr. King's speech at New York's Riverside Church on April 4, 1967, Mr. Carmichael encouraged a black audience in St. Petersburg, Fla., on April 18 to support Dr. King's stance on Vietnam.

But the most damaging piece of secret information came from Mexican army intelligence.

Mexican agents uncovered in May 1967 a plot led by Javier Fuentes Gutierrez, head of the Mexican Communist Party, to establish a "socialist regime" within Mexico.

Mr. Gutierrez and his cohorts were financed by Hsinhua (now spelled Xinhua), the Chinese Communist press agency, which Mexican intelligence discovered was a front for the Chinese Ministry of State Security, China's CIA.

Mr. Gutierrez's followers already had dynamited a Mexican army truck and were seeking rifles and mortars from arms dealers.

But more important to U.S. Army intelligence, the Mexicans revealed Mr. Gutierrez was a top organizer of the Havana-based Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) — another

group that received Chinese funding.

OLAS not only helped finance Mr. Gutierrez's activities but had set up a terrorist training camp in the jungles of Chiapas in southern Mexico.

Black Americans had been seen training at the camp.

On July 19, Mexican troops raided the Chiapas camp and snatched a large cache of automatic rifles, grenades and machine guns.

According to still classified Army intelligence files, the AK-47 rifles eventually were traced from gunrunner Kenneth G. Burnstine of Miami to gun dealer Mitchell Livingston WerBell III of Atlanta, a former OSS agent who ran his own paramilitary training camp on a 60-acre farm in Powder Springs, Ga.

Mr. WerBell supplied military weapons to anybody with the cash to pay for them. Mr. WerBell also had key contacts throughout the Caribbean.

Mr. Carmichael was photographed talking to one of those contacts — Marti Tellez — in the Havana Libre Hotel on July 27. Mr. Tellez, a former Haitian army captain, flew contraband for Mr. Burnstine's Miami-based Florida Atlantic Airlines.

A Cuban agent working for the CIA took the picture, and a report on the meeting was forwarded to Army intelligence.

"These [OLAS] are radical Communist revolutionaries who advocate militant and coordinated guerrilla warfare throughout the Americas," according to an analysis of the meeting based on CIA reports.

On Aug. 2, five days after meeting with Mr. Tellez, Mr. Carmichael said he would lead

an armed revolt against his homeland.

Mr. Carmichael then threatened President Lyndon B. Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk.

"We are not waiting for them to kill us. We will kill first and we will settle the score," Mr. Carmichael said.

On Oct. 10, Army intelligence sent a report to Army Chief of Staff Harold Johnson that Mr. Carmichael and his SNCC colleagues were calling for "Negroes to arm themselves in preparation for guerrilla warfare."

In January 1968, as Dr. King was drumming up support for his planned march on Washington, Mr. Carmichael was in Hanoi, the capital of North Vietnam. In February, he met with Dr. King in Washington. Dr. King was killed two months later in Memphis.

In March 1975, Mr. Burnstine was convicted by Florida authorities of masterminding a \$50 million-a-year drug smuggling operation in South America and Mexico. A year later, his World War II-era airplane, a P-51 Mustang, blew up while he was competing in an air show.

In 1974, Mr. WerBell was subpoenaed to testify before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. The committee was looking into financier Robert Vesco's efforts to sell and manufacture automatic weapons in the Caribbean. Mr. WerBell invoked the Fifth Amendment to every question asked by subcommittee investigator Philip R. Manuel.

Mr. WerBell died of a heart attack in 1983. Testimony in a Los Angeles courtroom later that year said Mr. WerBell had been poisoned.

Spying report shocks King associates

By John Blake
and Dennis McCafferty
STAFF WRITERS

Allegations that the U.S. Army spied on the late Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and three generations of his family with everything from U-2 spy planes to Green Beret commando teams shocked Dr. King's son and some of his former associates Sunday.

Martin Luther King III, a Fulton County commissioner, said people regularly tell him about elaborate plots against his father, but that this is a new one.

Mr. King said he had heard that the FBI and CIA routinely spied on his father, but he never suspected the latest allegations, which were ferreted out by The (Memphis) Commercial Appeal.

"The FBI was common knowledge, and maybe the alleged involvement of the CIA, but when it comes to an extensive military intelligence operation with Green Berets and U-2 planes, that's frightening," Mr. King said.

Former Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young, one of Dr. King's closest associates in the civil rights movement, also was surprised.

"It was kind of sad," he said. "This is the first time I've heard about the Army. . . . It just shows that the level of racial sickness was pretty deep in some circles."

The Commercial Appeal reported that the Army started spying on Dr. King in 1947, when he was a student at Morehouse Col-

lege in Atlanta, and continued until his assassination in 1968.

In fact, the spying on the King family began in 1917, when the Army opened a file on Dr. King's maternal grandfather, the Rev. A.D. Williams. The military later spied on Dr. King's father, the Rev. Martin Luther King Sr.

The newspaper reported that the Army considered Dr. King a major national security threat who could spark an armed revolt in the streets.

The Army had a Green Beret team in Memphis on an "unknown mission" when the civil rights leader was gunned down, the newspaper reported.

"We've known, of course, the FBI was doing it," said Ralph Luker, an associate editor with the Martin Luther King Papers Project, jointly based in Atlanta and at Stanford University in California. "We've known that for years. But it's disturbing to know that agencies which are funded by taxpayers were intruding on the lives of taxpayers."

Mr. Young said Dr. King and his staff knew they were constantly monitored by the FBI, the CIA and the Ku Klux Klan. But Mr. Young said they had nothing to hide and routinely told the U.S. Justice Department of their plans for non-violent civil rights campaigns.

"Our feeling was nobody could stop us so long as we remained non-violent," Mr. Young said.

The newspaper said the Army also spied on Stokely Carmichael, the militant leader of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in the 1960s. Army intelligence reportedly believed that Mr. Carmichael, now known as Kwame Ture, was trying to start a black guerrilla war in America.

Reached Sunday in New York, Mr. Ture said he knew as far back as 1967 that the Army spied on him and Dr. King. But he said allegations that he planned an armed revolution in the streets, and once threatened President Lyndon B. Johnson's life, were "taken out of context."

"They lied all the time, so they could get money from Congress and chew up the taxpayers' money," Mr. Ture said.

David Garrow, who wrote about the FBI's surveillance of Dr. King in his 1981 book "The FBI and Martin Luther King," laughed out loud when he heard the new allegations.

Mr. Garrow said he has seen many of the Army's intelligence files on Dr. King firsthand and that they are not as sinister as the newspaper article indicated.

"It was one step up from a clipping operation," Mr. Garrow said. "The guys in the intelligence command were 25-year-old, brand-new ROTC commanders whose jobs were to collect information from cops and local newspapers as to what would happen next."

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1846
RDC

March 25, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Washington Post Editorial "The Army Owes Some Answers"

At Tab A the President asked you and Bernard Nussbaum for additional information on a March 23 Washington Post editorial concerning U.S. Army surveillance of Martin Luther King and civil rights organizations. The response to the President at Tab I confirms that the Army did conduct domestic surveillance on U.S. citizens prior to the early 1970's, and that Congressional hearings made that surveillance a matter of public record twenty years ago. Stringent controls and oversight measures precluding the Army from these activities have been in place since 1976 and are codified in Executive Order 12333.

Members of Congressman Dellums staff have called the Army to advise them that the Congressional Black Caucus will be writing a letter to the President concerning this story. The Army has directed its researchers to recheck the Investigation Records Repository at Ft. Meade, the Center for Military History, the Special Forces archives and the Alabama National Guard records for additional references on this topic. Army headquarters no longer holds the historical files on domestic surveillance. A report on the results of this search is due out by the first of next week.

The Atlanta Journal article from which the Post drew its editorial is at Tab B. A contrary view published the next day in the Atlanta Constitution is highlighted at Tab C.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President in response to his query.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Washington Post Editorial "The Army Owes Some Answers"

Tab B Atlanta Journal Article "Spying on King"

Tab C Atlanta Constitution Article "Spying Report Shocks King Associates"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 5, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR LYNN DAVIS
Department of State

FRANK WISNER
Department of Defense

ROBERT DEGRASSE
Department of Energy

CRAIG CHELLIS
Central Intelligence Agency

BARRY MCCAFFREY
Joint Chiefs of Staff

THOMAS GRAHAM
Arms Control and Disarmament

SUBJECT: ACDA Draft PRD

Attached is a draft Presidential Review Directive on the Future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Please provide comments and/or suggested revisions by COB Tuesday, April 6, 1993.

Robert G. Bell

Robert G. Bell
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director for Defense
Policy and Arms Control

Attachment
As stated

Copy to: Leon Fuerth
Rose Gottemoeller
Dan Poneman

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 10/13/2016
2016-0152-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-X

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: The Future of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (U)

In confronting the changed security environment of the post-Cold War era, the United States will continue to assign the highest priority to arms control and non-proliferation. Although the danger of a massive, coordinated nuclear strike against the United States is now virtually non-existent, the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and enhanced conventional weapons and their delivery systems will pose one of the main security threats to the United States in the coming decade. The strategic nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons agreements successfully negotiated during the last several years must be ratified, implemented and their compliance assured. At the Vancouver summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that "negotiations on a multilateral nuclear test ban should commence at an early date." The two countries are also preparing to resume their dialogue on the ABM Treaty and cooperation in the area of strategic defense. Finally, arms control and confidence building measures in regional areas of tension could well take on added importance in the years ahead. (C)

The U.S. Government must be efficiently organized to address the tasks associated with fulfilling these arms control and non-proliferation priorities. Some agencies, including CIA, DOD, and NSC, have already taken steps to that end, particularly in terms of placing greater emphasis on addressing non-proliferation concerns. However, decisions have yet to be made with regard to one overriding issue: the future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
vZ 10/23/2012

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Given our commitments to countering proliferation, implementing existing arms control agreements, and pursuing more vigorously new arms control priorities, the following organizational issues must be expeditiously addressed:

- Does having a separate advocate agency devoted solely to arms control best serve U.S. interests?
- If so, what are the options for revitalizing and/or restructuring ACDA?
- If not, how should the State Department be reorganized to assume ACDA's responsibilities?
- What are the policy and resource implications of each alternative? (C)

Part II: Tasking

This review will be conducted by the Interagency Working Group on Arms Control, under the chairmanship of the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council Staff. The review will focus on two written products: (1) The March 28, 1993 State Department paper entitled "The Future Role of ACDA", which was prepared by the Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs in informal consultation with representatives from DOD, ACDA and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and (2) a separate paper to be prepared by ACDA which will make the case for its continued existence, as concisely as possible. (C)

All agencies should provide comments on the State Department paper and the options it outlines no later than Wednesday, April 14, 1993. The separate ACDA paper should be submitted to the NSC by this date as well. (C)

The review should be completed by April 21, 1993. It should include clear policy options/recommendations which will reflect analysis of the reasonable spectrum of possibilities for the future of ACDA. Differences in view among agencies should be noted. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. form	Fax Cover Sheet. [CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 44

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - April 1993 #1 [4]

2016-0152-F
vz4378

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TIME OF RECEIPT

URGENT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOMPRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PAGES 3FROM ROBERT BELL 3330 386
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION ACDA Draft PRD

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	LYNN DAVIS	ROOM 7208	647-1049
DEFENSE	FRANK WISNER	ROOM 4E838	703, 697-7200
CIA		(b)(3)	
DOE	ROBERT DEGRASSE	ROOM 4B014	586-2102 [001
JCS	BARRY MCCAFFREY	ROOM 2E868	703/695-4605
ACDA	THOMAS GRAHAM	ROOM 5930	647-9610

REMARKS:

URGENT - PLEASE CALL FOR PICK UP.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 8/29/2016~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

URGENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2201

April 6, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*
FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*
SUBJECT: Global 93 Game

Every July the U.S. Navy hosts a three-week game at the Naval War College in Newport, RI which is attended by representatives of all U.S. military services and most executive agencies, as well as congressional staffers and even a few members of Congress. In recent years we have used this game as an opportunity to sound out elements of the draft National Security Strategy, which is usually published in August.

Our goal this year would be to investigate potential evolutions in the National Security and National Military Strategies of the U.S. within the guidelines of the new Administration. Specifically, we would seek to focus on the following elements:

- Economic
 - Define strategic problems/opportunities
 - Identify key policy objectives
 - Define organizational relationships
- Security
 - Define evolving threats
 - Assess adequacy of National Security and National Military Strategies
 - Define interagency organizations and processes
- Operations
 - Define potential future crises
 - Develop theater & campaign options

The first week of this year's game will seek to integrate security and economic policy, develop regional policies, identify potential threats, and set up crisis management mechanisms. The second week will test responses to several regional crises, exercise campaign plans and examine new military service

doctrines. The third week will look at proposed adjustments to national security, economic and military strategies that emerge from this game.

The Global 93 Game is an excellent opportunity for the military services and the executive agencies to work together to:

- Identify and define strategic problems and opportunities.
- Develop policies and strategies that support those interests.
- Develop a better understanding of security issues and priorities.
- Promote interagency coordination and integration in policy development for crisis response.

It also enables us to coordinate elements of the U.S. National Security Strategy PRD with a broad range of people who think and write about this topic.

Concurrence by:  Steve Jones

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I encouraging executive departments and agencies to support the Global 93 Game.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to Agencies and Executive Departments

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
THE SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC
AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ADMINISTRATOR OF GENERAL SERVICES
MANAGER, NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

SUBJECT: Global 93 Game

The Department of the Navy is sponsoring its Global 93 Game from 12-30 July 1993 at the Naval War College in Newport, RI. Each year the Global Game has proven to be a valuable tool for investigating new approaches to national security in our changing world environment. One of the best features of the Global Games has been the involvement of senior policy officials in the play.

The Global series examines a wide range of challenges to our national security. The current five-game series is designed to explore changes in the post-Cold War international order. The main thrust is twofold: to identify the issues that are pivotal to the national interests of the United States over the next decade; and to analyze these issues in the context of existing policy and strategy in order to identify where changes may be required to achieve national objectives. The keynote theme for this game is "Globalization of Change," with specific emphasis on the relationship between economic security and national security issues.

The game has achieved its greatest successes when senior officials participate. Each department or agency should also be represented at the senior staff level at both the game and the

pre-game workshops to ensure that specific areas of interest receive appropriate consideration.

In preparation for this year's game, two series of workshops are being conducted to ensure that economic and resource issues will be adequately addressed. The Department of Commerce is hosting a series of workshops dealing with the implications of globalization on economic policy, both domestic and international. The Federal Emergency Management Agency is hosting workshops that will investigate the resource implications of globalization.

I encourage all of you to participate and ask that you contact the Game coordinators, Mr. Bud Hay and Captain Russ Palsgrove at the Naval War College, (401) 841-3306/2490 for additional information.

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

cc: The Secretary of Defense
Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2202

April 6, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*
FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*
SUBJECT: National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee (NSTAC) Report

Attached at Tab A is a letter from President Clinton responding to the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) Executive Report. The recommendations of the report are summarized in the memorandum from you to Secretary Aspin at Tab II, asking him to implement the major recommendations of this report.

For background, the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee is composed of 26 corporate leaders of our Nation's telecommunications industry. A membership list is provided at Tab B. Their companies build, supply and operate both the government and the private sector information infrastructure. NSTAC is a Federal Advisory Committee whose objective is to provide the President, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of Defense (as the National Communications System Executive Agent) and other Federal Agencies with a source of expertise, knowledge and insight not available within the government on issues and problems related to the implementation of the National Security Telecommunications Policy.

In the past, this group has been instrumental in coordinating joint industry-government efforts in telecommunications. President Clinton's proposals for programs such as an "information highway" will make their contributions that much more important in the future. A primary NSTAC goal is to ensure that U.S. information highways are sufficiently robust to operate before, during and after any local, national or international crisis. With the rapid expansion of new telecommunications technologies and with over 95 percent of federal government telecommunications being carried over private networks, joint industry-government telecommunications planning is essential to address issues such as interoperability, network security, crisis management of intelligence networks and priority call processing for critical government users.

The letter from the President at Tab A acknowledges the work this group has done over the past year and notes that the Secretary of Defense, as Executive Agent for the National Communications System, has been directed to implement their recommendations. You will be receiving an invitation to attend part of the next NSTAC meeting scheduled for May 27. The Vice President will also be invited to be the guest speaker. We encourage you to attend this meeting with this important group of U.S. technology leaders.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the letter to Robert Allen at Tab A to the President for signature. Also that you sign the memorandum to Secretary Aspin at Tab II, implementing the NSTAC recommendations.

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Presidential letter to Mr. Robert Allen
Tab B	NSTAC Membership
Tab II	Memorandum for Secretary of Defense Aspin

THE WHITE HOUSE

2202

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee (NSTAC) Report

Purpose

To respond to the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) Executive Report.

Background

The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee is composed of 26 corporate leaders of our Nation's telecommunications industry. A membership list is provided at Tab B. Their companies build, supply and operate both the government and the private sector information infrastructure. NSTAC is a Federal Advisory Committee whose objective is to provide the President, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of Defense (as the National Communications System Executive Agent) and other Federal Agencies with a source of expertise, knowledge and insight not available within the government on issues and problems related to the implementation of National Security Telecommunications policy.

In the past, this group has been instrumental in coordinating joint industry-government efforts in telecommunications. A primary NSTAC goal is to ensure that U.S. information highways are sufficiently robust to operate before, during and after any local, national or international crisis. Robert E. Allen, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of AT&T, is the current NSTAC Chairman. Norm Augustine, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Martin Marietta Corporation will be inducted as NSTAC Chairman at the next meeting on May 27.

This year's NSTAC Report provides recommendations for the exchange of sensitive information about hacker attacks on telephone networks and develops guidelines to prevent hackers from disabling individual company and government telephone

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

systems. The Report also assesses technologies that will allow critical government users to complete telephone calls rapidly, even when telephone networks are stressed from physical damage or extreme network congestion.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Robert Allen at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to Mr. Robert E. Allen
Tab B	NSTAC Membership

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Bob:

Your report on the recent work of the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) highlights the Committee's outstanding and valuable support of national security and emergency preparedness objectives. Both Vice President Gore and I are personally interested in this as a potential key element of our planning and investment.

Consequently, network security and its corresponding hacker threat will continue to be a significant issue, requiring close industry and government coordination. To facilitate that coordination, I have directed the National Institute for Standards and Technology to be the Government's focal point for network security standards, and I ask your support to continue industry's efforts through your Network Security Standards Oversight Group.

NSTAC's recommendations for enhanced call completion are also timely, and I have directed the Secretary of Defense, as my Executive Agent, to implement those recommendations through the Manager, National Communications System. Future results of these joint ventures will provide excellent examples of what industry and government can do when we work together.

Please extend my personal thanks to the other members for their contributions. In the years ahead, I will continue to look to the NSTAC for advice and leadership in national telecommunications and technology issues as we jointly build a stronger nation.

Sincerely,

Mr. Robert E. Allen
Chairman of the Board
and Chief Executive Officer
American Telephone and Telegraph Company
295 N. Maple Avenue
Basking Ridge, NJ 07920

**THE PRESIDENT'S
NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE
(NSTAC)
CURRENT MEMBERS
(as of March 16, 1993)**

AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY (AT&T)

Mr. Robert E. Allen
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
American Telephone and Telegraph Company
Basking Ridge, NJ
Appointed January 18, 1989

BELL COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH, INC. (BELLCORE)

Dr. George H. Heilmeier
President and Chief Executive Officer
Bell Communications Research, Inc.
Livingston, NJ
Appointed October 8, 1991

THE BOEING COMPANY

Mr. Arthur E. Hitsman
President
Boeing Computer Services
Seattle, WA
Appointed March 13, 1991

COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION (COMSAT)

Mr. Bruce L. Crockett
President and Chief Executive Officer
Communications Satellite Corporation
Washington, DC
Appointed November 20, 1992

COMPUTER SCIENCES CORPORATION (CSC)

Mr. William R. Hoover
President and Chairman of the Board
Computer Sciences Corporation
El Segundo, CA
Appointed August 14, 1987

ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS (EDS)

Mr. Lester M. Alberthal, Jr.
Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer
Electronic Data Systems
Dallas, TX
Appointed January 15, 1993

GTE CORPORATION (GTE)

Mr. Charles R. Lee
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
GTE Corporation
Stamford, CT
Appointed October 8, 1992

HARRIS CORPORATION (HARRIS)

Mr. John T. Hartley
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer
Harris Corporation
Melbourne, FL
Appointed May 2, 1988

HUGHES AIRCRAFT COMPANY (HUGHES)

Mr. C. Michael Armstrong
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Hughes Aircraft Company
Los Angeles, CA
Appointed November 20, 1992

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION (IBM)

Mr. Gerald W. Ebker
Vice President, and President Federal Sector Division
International Business Machines Corporation
Bethesda, MD
Appointed April 16, 1990

INTERDIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION (INTERDIGITAL)

Mr. William J. Hilsman
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
InterDigital Communications Corporation
Philadelphia, PA
Appointed November 9, 1989

ITT CORPORATION (ITT)

Mr. D. Travis Engen
Executive Vice President
ITT Corporation
New York, NY
Appointed May 13, 1992

LOCKHEED CORPORATION (LOCKHEED)

Mr. John N. McMahon
President
Lockheed Missiles & Space Systems Group
Sunnyvale, CA
Appointed May 13, 1992

MARTIN MARIETTA CORPORATION (MARTIN MARIETTA)

Mr. Norman R. Augustine
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Martin Marietta Corporation
Bethesda, MD
Appointed August 9, 1988

McCAW CELLULAR COMMUNICATIONS, INCORPORATED (McCAW)

Mr. Craig O. McCaw
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc
Kirkland, WA
Appointed March 16, 1988

MCI COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION (MCI)

Mr. Bert C. Roberts, Jr.
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
MCI Communications Corporation
Washington, DC
Appointed January 15, 1993

METROPOLITAN FIBER SYSTEMS COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY

Mr. Royce J. Holland
President and Chief Operating Officer
Metropolitan Fiber Systems Communications Company
Oakbrook Terrace, IL
Appointed January 15, 1993

MOTOROLA, INC. (MOTOROLA)

Mr. John F. Mitchell
Vice Chairman of the Board
Motorola, Inc.
Schaumburg, IL
Appointed May 1983

NORTHERN TELECOM INC. (NTI)

Dr. Paul G. Stern
Chairman of the Board
Northern Telecom Ltd.
Potomac, MD
Appointed August 7, 1990

PACIFIC TELECOM, INC. (PTI)

Mr. Charles E. Robinson
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Pacific Telecom, Inc.
Vancouver, WA
Appointed May 1983

ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION (ROCKWELL)

Mr. Kent M. Black
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer
Rockwell International Corporation
Richardson, TX
Appointed April 9, 1990

SPRINT CORPORATION (SPRINT)

Mr. William T. Esrey
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Sprint Corporation
Kansas City, MO
Appointed July 1990

UNISYS CORPORATION (UNISYS)

Mr. Albert F. Zettlemoyer
President, Paramax Corporation
Senior Vice President, Unisys Corporation
McLean, VA
(Appointment pending application - replacing deceased member)

U.S. TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION (USTA)

Mr. Robert C. Brown, III
1st Vice Chairman of the Board
U.S. Telephone Association
Sugar Land, TX
Appointed March 13, 1991

U S WEST, INC.

Mr. Richard D. McCormick
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
U S WEST, Inc.
Englewood, CO
Appointed March 13, 1991

WILLIAMS TELECOMMUNICATIONS GROUP INC (WILTEL)

Mr. Roy A. Wilkens
President
Williams Telecommunications Inc
Tulsa, OK
Appointed November 20, 1992

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE LES ASPIN
Executive Agent, National Communications System

SUBJECT: National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee Recommendations

The President has reviewed the most recent executive report of the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) and the National Communications System (NCS) comments thereon. The following guidance is provided to implement the President's decisions:

a. Network Security. The NSTAC's recommendations are approved. The National Institute for Standards and Technology is directed to serve as the Federal Government's focal point for network security standards issues. The President has asked the telecommunications industry to continue their network security standards efforts through the NSTAC's Network Security Standards Oversight Group. The efforts of the industry and the Government should support the goal of identifying and implementing network security standards initiatives that will benefit the National Security Strategy and protect the Nation's telecommunications resources.

b. Enhanced Call Completion. The NSTAC's recommendations are approved. The Manager, NCS is directed to take steps to provide the means for improving call completion rates for National Security and Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) users during times requiring NS/EP response actions, when the telecommunications networks are stressed and congested. The Manager, NCS, will investigate the advantages to the Government of enhanced call completion services and features, including Calling Name Delivery Service. The Manager, NCS, will also work with the NSTAC's Funding and Regulatory Working Group to investigate potential regulatory issues arising from the implementation of enhanced call completion attributes for NS/EP activities.

The Office of the Manager, NCS (OMNCS) and NCS members will continue their planning efforts with the NSTAC to identify telecommunications issues for NS/EP activities, rank order those issues, and develop a plan for action for their resolution.

The NSTAC's significant and continuing support for our NS/EP telecommunications policies and programs is highly valued by the President. The NCS will continue to seek the NSTAC's advice and assistance and ensure that NCS views on NS/EP telecommunications are considered by the NSTAC in its deliberations. The Manager, NCS, will continue to support and utilize this valuable resource to achieve our national security goals.

As the President and Vice President map a strategy for developing a National Information Infrastructure, various issues will arise requiring expert advice and cooperation from both industry and Government. The President will continue to rely on the unique planning partnership and leadership that both the NSTAC and NCS have demonstrated in the past to achieve similar goals.

The OMNCS and the NCS member organizations are commended for their continued outstanding support to the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee.

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Keith For action Bob

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 4/6/93 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 4/10/93

MILITARY NOMINATIONS: LT.GEN. WAYNE A. DOWNING, USA

SUBJECT: _____

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	PASTER	☐	☐
McLARTY	☐	☐	RASCO	☐	☐
GEARAN	☐	☐	RUBIN	☐	☐
PANETTA	☐	☐	SEGAL	☐	☐
EMANUEL	☐	☐	STEPHANOPOULOS	☐	☐
GIBBONS	☐	☐	VARNEY	☐	☐
HALE	☐	☐	WATKINS	☐	☐
HERMAN	☐	☐	WILLIAMS	☐	☐
LAKE	☐	☐	BOB BELL	☒	☐
LINDSEY	☐	☐	CLERK	☐	☒
MONTOYA	☐	☐		☐	☐
NUSSBAUM	☐	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

COMMENT DUE NO LATER THAN 4/10/93

RESPONSE:

National Security Council staff concurs in the attached military nomination.

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

Anthony Lake

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 2, 1993

93 APR 5 AM : 25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN A. GAUGHAN *for*
DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE

SUBJECT: Army General Officer Nomination

Forwarded for your approval and signature is the nomination of Lieutenant General Wayne A. Downing, United States Army, for appointment to the grade of general and a recommendation for his assignment as Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command.

The Secretary of Defense has attached an evaluation of General Downing's performance in joint duty assignments from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This nomination was staffed by the Acting Secretary of the Army and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

Recommendation

That you approve and sign the attached.

Attachment



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

31 MAR 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Army General Officer Nomination

I recommend the assignment of Lieutenant General Wayne A. Downing, United States Army, as Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command, and his nomination for appointment to the grade of general. General Downing, who is 52 years of age, is currently serving as Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command. He will succeed General Carl W. Stiner, United States Army, who is retiring.

In order to carry out the duties and responsibilities of the proposed assignment, an officer must have demonstrated highly effective performance in senior leadership positions. He must be knowledgeable of the overall management of a unified command and extensively trained and experienced in the application of joint doctrine and special operations. He must be capable of supervising the development of new and progressive methods for deployment of joint forces. He must have successfully worked with other Services in the integrated employment of military force. General Downing meets these requirements.

This action will not result in the Army exceeding the number of officers authorized to be serving in the grade of general. As required by title 10, United States Code, section 601(d)(1), I have attached an evaluation of General Downing's performance in joint duty assignments from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Attachments

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. H. Brown", is located in the bottom right corner of the page.



CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0001

CN-11-93
15 January 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Through: Deputy Secretary of Defense

Subject: General Officer Nomination

1. In accordance with the provisions of title 10, United States Code, and DOD Instruction 1320.4, the Secretary of the Army has recommended Lieutenant General Wayne A. Downing for assignment as Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command, and appointment to the grade of general.
2. I have reviewed Lieutenant General Downing's performance in four joint assignments. He was selected personally by USCINCSOC to establish and be the Director of the Washington Office, United States Special Operations Command. He responded to this challenge with characteristic enthusiasm and competence. Bright, organized, and articulate, General Downing served as a special operations role model in representing USSOCOM interests with Congress, the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, and other government agencies. Today, he serves as Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command. A brilliant thinker, superb tactician, and the finest trainer in the military today, he is the ultimate leader and warrior. He personally led the Joint Special Operations Command in the most challenging mission in its history: JUST CAUSE in Panama. I am confident he is well qualified for this assignment and advancement.
3. After consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I concur in the Secretary of the Army's nomination of Lieutenant General Downing for this assignment and appointment to the grade of general. Accordingly, I recommend you forward the enclosed nomination to the President approving these actions.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "C. L. Powell".

COLIN L. POWELL
Chairman
of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

The White House

Washington

To the Senate of the United States:

I nominate:

The following named officer for appointment to the grade of
general while assigned to a position of importance and
responsibility under Title 10, United States Code, Section 601(a):

To be General

Lieutenant General Wayne A. Downing, 323-32-7002, United States Army

RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER

of

WAYNE ALLAN DOWNING, Lieutenant General

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 10 May 1940, Peoria, Illinois

YEARS OF ACTIVE COMMISSIONED SERVICE Over 28

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307, since August 1991

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

The Infantry School, Basic and Advanced Courses
Armed Forces Staff College
Air War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

United States Military Academy - BS Degree - No Major
Tulane University - MBA Degree - Operations Research/Business

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) None recorded

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Sep 62	Feb 63	Student, Infantry Officer Basic Course and Ranger Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
Apr 63	Jun 64	Platoon Leader, Company B, 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173 Airborne Brigade (Separate), United States Army Pacific, Okinawa
Jun 64	Sep 64	Liaison Officer, 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173 Airborne Brigade (Separate), United States Army Pacific, Okinawa
Dec 64	Oct 65	Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, 173d Airborne Brigade, United States Army Pacific and United States Army Vietnam
Oct 65	Apr 66	S-2/S-5 (Intelligence/Civil Affairs) Officer, 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry Regiment, 173d Infantry Brigade (Separate), United States Army Vietnam
Apr 66	Aug 67	Instructor, Tactics, Internal Defense and Development Committee, Tactics Group, Brigade and Battalion Operations Department, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
Aug 67	Jan 68	Commander, Company E, 3rd Battalion, 1st Training Brigade, United States Army Training Center, Infantry, Fort Benning, Georgia
Jan 68	Sep 68	Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia

WAYNE ALLAN DOWNING, Lieutenant General

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Sep 68	Dec 68	Commander, Company A (Counterinsurgency), 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, United States Army Vietnam
Dec 68	Sep 69	S-3 (Operations) Officer, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, United States Army Vietnam
Sep 69	Oct 69	S-3 (Operations) Officer, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, United States Army Vietnam
Dec 69	Jan 72	Student, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana
Feb 72	Jun 72	Student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia
Jun 72	Feb 75	Senior Operations Research/Systems Analyst, Special Regional Studies Division, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC
Mar 75	Dec 76	S-3 (Operations) Officer, later Executive Officer, 1st Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry, Fort Stewart, Georgia
Dec 76	Mar 77	Commander, Task Force (Alaska), 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia
May 77	Jul 79	Commander, 2d Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry, Fort Lewis, Washington
Aug 79	May 80	Student, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
Jun 80	Apr 82	Secretary to the Joint Staff, United States European Command
May 82	Apr 84	Commander, 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe
May 84	Nov 85	Commander, 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger), Fort Benning, Georgia
Nov 85	Jun 87	Deputy Commanding General, 1st Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
Jun 87	May 88	Director, Washington Office, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, with duty station in Washington, DC
May 88	Dec 89	Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia
Dec 89	Aug 91	Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

PROMOTIONS

	<u>DATES OF APPOINTMENT</u>	
	<u>Temporary</u>	<u>Permanent</u>
2LT		6 Jun 62
1LT	6 Dec 63	6 Jun 65
CPT	10 Nov 65	6 Jun 69
MAJ	6 Jan 69	6 Jun 76
LTC	1 Jun 76	
COL	1 Sep 80	15 Mar 82
BG		1 Nov 85
MG		1 Oct 88
LTG	5 Aug 91	

WAYNE ALLAN DOWNING, Lieutenant General

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Silver Star (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Distinguished Flying Cross (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Soldier's Medal
Bronze Star Medal with V Device (with 5 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Purple Heart
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Air Medals with V Device
Army Commendation Medal with V Device (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Master Parachutist Badge
Ranger Tab

SOURCE OF COMMISSION USMA

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Grade</u>
Senior Operations Research/Systems Analyst, Special Regional Studies Division, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC	Jun 72-Feb 75	Major
Secretary to the Joint Staff, United States European Command, Vaihingen, Germany	Jun 80-Apr 82	Colonel
Director, Washington Office, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, with duty station Washington, DC	Jun 87-Aug 88	Brigadier General
Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina	Dec 89-Aug 91	Major General

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No.
(703) 697-5131 (info)
(703) 697-3189 (copies)
(703) 697-5737 (public/
industry)

GENERAL OFFICER ANNOUNCEMENT

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced today that the President has nominated Lieutenant General Wayne A. Downing, United States Army, for appointment to the grade of general and assignment as Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Since August 1991, he has served as the Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Lieutenant General Downing was born on May 10, 1940, Peoria, Illinois

-END-

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

April 7, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RBB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KA*

SUBJECT: President's Visit to the Pentagon

The President will be briefed by Secretary Aspin, Chairman Powell and the Joint Chiefs during his visit to the Pentagon on April 8. The briefings will be divided into three main areas: (1) the main challenges and issues facing the operational Commander-in-Chiefs; (2) the principal problems confronting the military Services; and (3) the status of Secretary Aspin's Bottom-Up Review and its relationship to Chairman Powell's recent roles and mission report.

At Tab A we have provided some suggested questions for the President's use during these discussions.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Meeting Memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Meeting Memorandum for the President

Tab A Topics for Discussion with Military Leaders

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFDATE: April 8, 1993
LOCATION: Pentagon
TIME: 12:00-1:30 P.M.

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To meet with Secretary Aspin and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss current national security and military service-related issues of concern.

II. BACKGROUND

During your January 25 meeting with Secretary Aspin and the Joint Chiefs, you promised that your next meeting would be held at the Pentagon. Your meeting with Secretary Aspin, Chairman Powell, and the Joint Chiefs will be broken into three parts: (1) discussions about issues of concern to the regional and functional Commander-in-Chiefs, (2) topics of interest to the Service chiefs, and (3) a progress report on Secretary Aspin's Bottom-up Review and its relationship to the Chairman's Roles and Mission report. Suggested questions for your use during these discussions are at Tab A.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank Kelso
Chief of Staff, Army, General Gordon Sullivan
Chief of Staff, Air Force, General Tony McPeak
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl Mundy
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
Anthony Lake
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, Samuel Berger
Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, Robert
Bell

IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo opportunities will exist during your arrival at the Pentagon, as you walk down the Bradley Corridor and greet officers and NCO's assembled there from the Joint Staff, and at the beginning of your meeting in the Chairman's Conference Room ("the Tank").

V. SEQUENCE

General Powell will first summarize the major challenges confronting each of the regional and functional commands. Each Service Chief will then outline the major problems they are dealing with in their Service. Lastly, Secretary Aspin will present a status report on his Bottom-Up Review and discuss its relationship to his review of Service roles and missions. Following this briefing, you will meet briefly with the Senior NCO Advisers to each Service.

Attachment

Tab A Suggested Questions for Use During Briefings

SUGGESTED QUESTIONS

I. Regional and Functional Commands

U.S. Strategic Command

- I have just returned from the Summit at Vancouver where I emphasized that our relationship with Russia is now one of partnership. How should our nuclear targeting doctrine change in the years ahead as we implement this new relationship with our former adversary?
- President Bush began the process of reducing our nuclear alert posture by taking strategic bombers off of day-to-day alert. What further changes in our relationship with Russia would you want to see before you would feel comfortable reducing the alert rates of our ICBMs or standing our ballistic missile submarines down from routine peacetime patrols?
- How far along are we in the process of reorienting nuclear heavy bombers to conventional roles? For example, how did the deployment of B-1 bombers to Korea for Team Spirit work out?

U.S. Atlantic Command

- I was very impressed with the new flexibility in battle group deployments that I was briefed on when I visited the Theodore Roosevelt. How is the inter-service effort working out, in practice, now that the carrier is engaged in operations in support of our efforts in Bosnia?
- Under the new Roles and Missions study, LANTCOM will assume responsibility for coordinating joint training efforts for units based in the United States that would deploy abroad. How do you plan to implement this change? How long do you think it will take to do this?

U.S. Pacific Command

- With the pullout from the U.S. Air Force base at Clark and the Navy base at Subic, what will be the implications with regard to our military presence in the Pacific? Do we need to make additional efforts to gain access to other facilities in the region?
- Congress continues to press for greater burdensharing from our allies -- particularly in Japan and Korea. How much more can we press our allies in this area? Are there any other ways that our Pacific allies can contribute without significantly expanding their military forces?

- As we pursue efforts to get North Korea to remain a party to the NPT and to discontinue its nuclear program, what level of military presence should we maintain on the peninsula and what kinds of military exercises should we consider? Why did the Air Force propose withdrawing F-16 units during the FY 1994 budget preparation process?

U.S. Central Command

- What lessons have we learned from our humanitarian relief operations in Somalia that might be applied to other similar contingencies?
- How do you view Iran's stepped up weapons purchases over the last two years? How would you compare Iran's military capabilities now to those of Iraq in 1990?
- I have identified strategic lift as a very important component of our military capability. Given budgetary realities, what priority do we need to place on air and sealift programs?

U.S. Special Operations Command

- In the new international security environment, there will likely be more circumstances where we will need to use small, discrete military forces. What lessons did we learn from the operation in Panama about how we should structure and employ these forces?
- How effectively did we integrate Special Operations into operational planning in Desert Storm? Were you satisfied with their performance?

U.S. European Command

- Given the planned drawdown of U.S. troops in Europe to 100,000 by 1996 and the cuts that our allies are making, what strategic assumptions are guiding our restructuring of NATO's multinational forces? What is the biggest challenge we face in this process?
- What progress have we made in preparing a NATO-led peacekeeping force for implementing a peace plan in Bosnia? Where do we stand in resolving our chain-of-command differences with the French?

U.S. Southern Command

- How are preparations proceeding for the transfer of control over the Panama Canal?

- What role can our armed forces play in making sure the Haitian military understands the need for a democratic regime?
- Are you getting enough support from the Services on our drug interdiction efforts?

II. Service Chiefs

U.S. Navy (Admiral Frank Kelso)

- If the decision is made to open some combat positions to women, how long will it take to implement the program? How many more positions will this open for women? What are some of your major considerations from an operational perspective?
- When the Tailhook report is released, there will be a lot of pressure for speedy prosecution of those who are implicated. What steps can we take to ensure that those who are charged receive due process under the UCMJ? What actions should we take to reassure the vast majority of those who serve honorably and with the highest standards of conduct in the Navy and Marine Corps that we understand that they should not be tainted by this episode?

U.S. Air Force (General Tony McPeak)

- Will the Air Force plans to discontinue basic pilot instruction in supersonic aircraft for women and to cease training them in air combat tactics unnecessarily foreclose options while DoD addresses the role of women in combat?
- Do you think that we have the C-17 problems under control? Do we now have the credibility and support in Congress needed to upgrade our future airlift capability?

U.S. Army (General Gordon Sullivan)

- Our goal is to bring the size of our armed forces down at a rate that minimizes the pain and dislocation on both the individuals and the Services. What kinds of problems do you see the reduction in forces causing the average soldier or sailor? Are we doing everything we can to mitigate the impact of the drawdown?
- As the defense budget gets smaller, we are going to have to make some more hard calls on force structure versus modernization. How do you assess these tradeoffs? What guidelines should we follow in considering the tradeoffs between reserve personnel and active duty strength?

U.S. Marine Corps (General Carl Mundy)

- There is strong support on Capitol Hill to eliminate many redundancies among the military Services. During Desert Storm, Army and Marine units operated side-by-side in major ground battles. Can we reduce some apparent redundancies in ground combat capabilities, including armor units, between these two Services without losing their unique capabilities?
- Over the past several years we have called upon our amphibious capabilities for a wide range of contingencies, from peacekeeping to humanitarian operations to war. What is the state of our amphibious assault capabilities now? Do we have what we need? When will it approach obsolescence?

III. Secretary Aspin

Bottom-up Review and Roles and Missions

- What assumptions will the Review make about the course of reform in Russia? Do we assume that the democrats prevail or the hardliners take power? If the latter, do we assume a return to Cold War foreign policies in Russia?
- The Bottom-up Review is intended to demonstrate the relationship between our projected defense budgets and the ability of the military forces these budgets will fund to cope with the new security dangers and challenges our country now faces. In this regard, the Odeen Panel report will obviously be a critical input in clarifying the real budget top line the Bottom-up Review has to work with. How big a shortfall has the Odeen Panel identified?
- Does the Bottom-up Review presume that roles and missions consolidations beyond those recommended in Chairman Powell's recent report will be endorsed, or is the question of additional roles and missions streamlining to be decided as a sub-tasking within the Review?
- What assumptions does the Review make about the number of regional contingencies or crisis deployments we must be able to undertake simultaneously? In other words, what are our assumptions in relation to what used to be called the 1 & 1/2 or 2 & 1/2 "war" strategy?

Suggested Questions for Senior NCOs

1. As we downsize the military, what are the main uncertainties that your personnel must grapple with in terms of reaching a decision on whether to make the service a career?
2. We have proposed a government-wide freeze on pay for FY 1994 and reductions in the planned pay increases thereafter. I believe this is necessary as part of an overall approach of "shared sacrifice" if we are to achieve economic recovery in this country. Do your troops understand and accept the need for such sacrifices?
3. How do you rate the quality of your personnel today compared with five or ten years ago? Are they better educated, better trained, more motivated?
4. In your opinion, how does the level of medical care provided the troops today compare with years past? Are your personnel worried about the kind of medical care they will be able to receive once they have retired?

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 7, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *R6B*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *HK*

SUBJECT: President's Visit to the Pentagon

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- What assumptions does the Review make about the number of regional contingencies or crisis deployments we must be able to undertake simultaneously? In other words, what are our assumptions in relation to what used to be called the 1 & 1/2 or 2 & 1/2 "war" strategy?

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 7, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RG*

FROM: RICHARD HOOKER *RM*

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Letter to LTG Downing

We were asked to prepare a presidential letter of congratulations for LTG Wayne Downing recognizing his nomination for promotion to General and assignment as Commanding General, United States Special Operations Command. The letter is at Tab A.

Concurrence by: Keith Hahn *KH*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I forwarding the congratulatory letter to John Podesta.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to John Podesta
Tab A Letter of Congratulation
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN PODESTA

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Letter for LTG Downing

We have prepared a presidential letter of congratulations for LTG Downing recognizing his nomination for promotion to General and assignment as Commanding General, United States Special Operations Command.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to General Downing

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear General Downing:

It is a personal pleasure for me to congratulate you on your nomination for promotion to General and assignment as Commanding General, United States Special Operations Command. Your record of heroism and achievement, on many battlefields and in many challenging tours of duty, is an inspiration to those you lead and to all who wish our military well. Our Special Operations units play a critical role in the defense of our nation, and I know you will provide truly outstanding leadership to the Special Operations community.

Hillary and I wish you every success as you assume these heavy responsibilities. Good luck!

Sincerely,

Lieutenant General Wayne A. Downing, USA
Commanding General
U.S. Army Special Operations Command
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307



WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 4/6/93 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 4/10/93

MILITARY NOMINATIONS: LT.GEN. WAYNE A. DOWNING, USA

SUBJECT: _____

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	PASTER	☐	☐
McLARTY	☐	☐	RASCO	☐	☐
GEARAN	☐	☐	RUBIN	☐	☐
PANETTA	☐	☐	SEGAL	☐	☐
EMANUEL	☐	☐	STEPHANOPOULOS	☐	☐
GIBBONS	☐	☐	VARNEY	☐	☐
HALE	☐	☐	WATKINS	☐	☐
HERMAN	☐	☐	WILLIAMS	☐	☐
LAKE	☐	☐	BOB BELL	☒	☐
LINDSEY	☐	☐	CLERK	☐	☒
MONTOYA	☐	☐		☐	☐
NUSSBAUM	☐	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

COMMENT DUE NO LATER THAN 4/10/93

RESPONSE:

cc: H. Hahn

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 2, 1993

93 APR 5 11:25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

JOHN A. GAUGHAN *for*
DIRECTOR, WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE

SUBJECT:

Army General Officer Nomination

Forwarded for your approval and signature is the nomination of Lieutenant General Wayne A. Downing, United States Army, for appointment to the grade of general and a recommendation for his assignment as Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command.

The Secretary of Defense has attached an evaluation of General Downing's performance in joint duty assignments from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This nomination was staffed by the Acting Secretary of the Army and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

Recommendation

That you approve and sign the attached.

Attachment



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

31 MAR 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Army General Officer Nomination

I recommend the assignment of Lieutenant General Wayne A. Downing, United States Army, as Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command, and his nomination for appointment to the grade of general. General Downing, who is 52 years of age, is currently serving as Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command. He will succeed General Carl W. Stiner, United States Army, who is retiring.

In order to carry out the duties and responsibilities of the proposed assignment, an officer must have demonstrated highly effective performance in senior leadership positions. He must be knowledgeable of the overall management of a unified command and extensively trained and experienced in the application of joint doctrine and special operations. He must be capable of supervising the development of new and progressive methods for deployment of joint forces. He must have successfully worked with other Services in the integrated employment of military force. General Downing meets these requirements.

This action will not result in the Army exceeding the number of officers authorized to be serving in the grade of general. As required by title 10, United States Code, section 601(d)(1), I have attached an evaluation of General Downing's performance in joint duty assignments from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Attachments

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "J. A. ...", is located in the bottom right corner of the page.



CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0001

CN-11-93
15 January 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Through: Deputy Secretary of Defense

Subject: General Officer Nomination

1. In accordance with the provisions of title 10, United States Code, and DOD Instruction 1320.4, the Secretary of the Army has recommended Lieutenant General Wayne A. Downing for assignment as Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command, and appointment to the grade of general.
2. I have reviewed Lieutenant General Downing's performance in four joint assignments. He was selected personally by USCINCSOC to establish and be the Director of the Washington Office, United States Special Operations Command. He responded to this challenge with characteristic enthusiasm and competence. Bright, organized, and articulate, General Downing served as a special operations role model in representing USSOCOM interests with Congress, the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, and other government agencies. Today, he serves as Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command. A brilliant thinker, superb tactician, and the finest trainer in the military today, he is the ultimate leader and warrior. He personally led the Joint Special Operations Command in the most challenging mission in its history: JUST CAUSE in Panama. I am confident he is well qualified for this assignment and advancement.
3. After consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I concur in the Secretary of the Army's nomination of Lieutenant General Downing for this assignment and appointment to the grade of general. Accordingly, I recommend you forward the enclosed nomination to the President approving these actions.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "C. L. Powell", is positioned above the printed name.

COLIN L. POWELL
Chairman
of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

WAYNE ALLAN DOWNING, Lieutenant General

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Sep 68	Dec 68	Commander, Company A (Counterinsurgency), 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, United States Army Vietnam
Dec 68	Sep 69	S-3 (Operations) Officer, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, United States Army Vietnam
Sep 69	Oct 69	S-3 (Operations) Officer, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, United States Army Vietnam
Dec 69	Jan 72	Student, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana
Feb 72	Jun 72	Student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia
Jun 72	Feb 75	Senior Operations Research/Systems Analyst, Special Regional Studies Division, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC
Mar 75	Dec 76	S-3 (Operations) Officer, later Executive Officer, 1st Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry, Fort Stewart, Georgia
Dec 76	Mar 77	Commander, Task Force (Alaska), 24th Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia
May 77	Jul 79	Commander, 2d Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry, Fort Lewis, Washington
Aug 79	May 80	Student, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
Jun 80	Apr 82	Secretary to the Joint Staff, United States European Command
May 82	Apr 84	Commander, 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe
May 84	Nov 85	Commander, 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger), Fort Benning, Georgia
Nov 85	Jun 87	Deputy Commanding General, 1st Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
Jun 87	May 88	Director, Washington Office, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, with duty station in Washington, DC
May 88	Dec 89	Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia
Dec 89	Aug 91	Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

PROMOTIONS

DATES OF APPOINTMENT

	<u>Temporary</u>	<u>Permanent</u>
2LT		6 Jun 62
1LT	6 Dec 63	6 Jun 65
CPT	10 Nov 65	6 Jun 69
MAJ	6 Jan 69	6 Jun 76
LTC	1 Jun 76	
COL	1 Sep 80	15 Mar 82
BG		1 Nov 85
MG		1 Oct 88
LTG	5 Aug 91	

WAYNE ALLAN DOWNING, Lieutenant General

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Silver Star (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Distinguished Flying Cross (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Soldier's Medal
Bronze Star Medal with V Device (with 5 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Purple Heart
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Air Medals with V Device
Army Commendation Medal with V Device (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Master Parachutist Badge
Ranger Tab

SOURCE OF COMMISSION USMA

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Grade</u>
Senior Operations Research/Systems Analyst, Special Regional Studies Division, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC	Jun 72-Feb 75	Major
Secretary to the Joint Staff, United States European Command, Vaihingen, Germany	Jun 80-Apr 82	Colonel
Director, Washington Office, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, with duty station Washington, DC	Jun 87-Aug 88	Brigadier General
Commanding General, Joint Special Operations Command, United States Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina	Dec 89-Aug 91	Major General

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

No.
(703) 697-5131 (info)
(703) 697-3189 (copies)
(703) 697-5737 (public/
industry)

GENERAL OFFICER ANNOUNCEMENT

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced today that the President has nominated Lieutenant General Wayne A. Downing, United States Army, for appointment to the grade of general and assignment as Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Since August 1991, he has served as the Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Lieutenant General Downing was born on May 10, 1940, Peoria, Illinois

-END-

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 7, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: ROBERT G. BELL

SUBJECT: Blanket Travel Orders for Steven R. Jones

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Colonel Sherfield requesting blanket travel orders be issued to cover costs incurred by Steve Jones on official travel.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to Colonel Sherfield

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	[Personally Identifiable Information] [partial]. Record ID: 9302223. (1 page)	04/07/1993	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 44

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - April 1993 #1 [4]

2016-0152-F

vz4378

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D C 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Travel Orders for Colonel Steven R. Jones,
Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control

Colonel Steven R. Jones, (b)(6), has been designated the [002]
Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control for the National
Security Council. It is requested that Air Force blanket travel
orders be issued to cover costs incurred by Colonel Jones on
those occasions when he travels in direct support of the National
Security Council.


William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20332



April 7, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RB*

FROM: ANNE WITKOWSKY *AW*

SUBJECT: PRD on the Future of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

Attached is a draft Presidential Review Directive on the Future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It has been cleared by the State Department (Davis), ACDA (Graham), OSD (Gordon), CIA (Chellis), JCS (Curtin), and DOE (Alessi). We have placed this on a fast track, with the goal of completing a decision paper by Wednesday, April 21.

Concurrences: Nancy Menan *MM* and Dan Poneman *DP*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed Presidential Review Directive at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Proposed PRD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VL* NARA, Date *8/23/06*
2016-0152-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20332

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE/NSC-

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE
UNITED NATIONS
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: The Future of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (U)

In confronting the changed security environment of the post-Cold War era, the United States will continue to assign the highest priority to arms control and nonproliferation. Although the danger of a massive, coordinated nuclear strike against the United States is greatly diminished, the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological and enhanced conventional weapons and their delivery systems will constitute a fundamental security threat to the United States, its friends and allies, in the coming decade. The strategic nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons agreements successfully negotiated during the last several years must be ratified, implemented and their compliance assured. At the Vancouver summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that "negotiations on a multilateral nuclear test ban should commence at an early date." The two countries are also preparing to resume their dialogue on the ABM Treaty and cooperation in the area of strategic defense. Finally, arms control and confidence building measures in regional areas of tension could well take on added importance in the years ahead.

~~(S)~~

The U.S. Government must be efficiently organized to address the tasks associated with fulfilling these arms control and non-proliferation priorities. Some agencies have already taken steps to that end, particularly in terms of placing greater emphasis on addressing nonproliferation concerns. However, decisions have yet to be made with regard to one paramount issue: the future of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). ~~(S)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

12 10/23/2012

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Given our commitments to stemming proliferation, implementing existing arms control agreements, and pursuing more vigorously new arms control priorities, the following organizational issues must be expeditiously addressed:

- Does having a separate agency devoted solely to representing arms control and nonproliferation point of view best serve U.S. interests?
- If so, what are the options for revitalizing and/or restructuring ACDA?
- If not, how should the State Department be reorganized to assume ACDA's responsibilities?
- What are the policy and resource implications of each alternative? ~~(C)~~

Part II: Tasking

This review will be conducted by the Interagency Working Group on Arms Control, under the chairmanship of the Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council Staff, in consultation with the Interagency Working Group on Nonproliferation and Export Controls. The review will focus on two written products: (1) The March 28, 1993 State Department paper entitled "The Future Role of ACDA", which was prepared by the Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs in informal consultation with representatives from DOD, ACDA and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and (2) a separate paper to be prepared by ACDA which will make the case for its continued existence, as concisely as possible. ~~(C)~~

All agencies should provide comments on the State Department paper and the options it outlines no later than Wednesday, April 14, 1993. The separate ACDA paper should be submitted to the NSC by this date as well. ~~(C)~~

The review should be completed by April 21, 1993. It should include clear policy options/recommendations which will reflect analysis of the reasonable spectrum of possibilities for the future of ACDA. Differences in view among agencies should be noted. ~~(C)~~

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~