

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title: Chron File - March 1993 #2 [8]				
Staff Office-Individual: Defense Policy-Bell, Robert				
Original OA/ID Number: 43				
Row: 31	Section: 3	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief. (1 page)	02/17/1993	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Anne Witkowsky. Subject: Expanding the Open Skies Treaty. Record ID: 9302043. (2 pages)	03/31/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	The Treaty on Open Skies. (1 page)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)
002c. memo	For Robert Bell. Subject: Use of the Treaty on Open Skies for Environmental Monitoring. (6 pages)	02/05/1993	P1/b(1)
002d. cable	re: Open Skies: Russian Treaty Ratification Status. (4 pages)	01/15/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - March 1993 #2 [8]

2016-0152-F

vz4374

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2023

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 31, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *Ret*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *OK*

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise BULGARIAN PASSEX
93-3

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, approving military exercise BULGARIAN PASSEX 93-3. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

BULGARIAN PASSEX 93-3 is a small scale surface ship passing exercise involving one U.S. ship and 1-3 Bulgarian ships. It is scheduled to take place in the Black Sea off the coast of Bulgaria on April 15. The exercise will take place after the USS Kaufman's port visit to Burgas, Bulgaria.

The critical cancellation date is April 8, 1993.

Concurrence by: Charles Kupchan *CK*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I approving the exercise.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab II OSD Executive Secretary Memorandum, March 29, 1993

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *VL* NARA, Date *8/23/2016*

7016-0152-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise BULGARIAN PASSEX
93-3

Military exercise BULGARIAN PASSEX 93-3 is approved.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2023

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000


29 MAR 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise - BULGARIAN PASSEX 93-3

The Department of Defense recommends NSC approval of the attached Significant Military Exercise Brief, Exercise BULGARIAN PASSEX 93-3. The Department of State concurs with this recommendation.

Please note the critical cancellation date is 8 April 1993.


Michael B. Sherfield
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated

This memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED without attachments.

Sec Def Com Nr. X61167

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 22, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RB*
FROM: RICHARD HOOKER *RHW*
SUBJECT: Battle Training Center at Ft. Chaffee

On March 15 Governor Tucker of Arkansas faxed a letter to Mr. McLarty requesting support for a proposal to transfer Ft. Chaffee from the active Army to the National Guard. Ft. Chaffee is scheduled to transition to semi-active status as a result of the 1991 Base Closure Commission process. The Army's Joint Readiness Training Center will move from Ft. Chaffee to Ft. Polk in July. The National Guard Bureau would like to build a reserve component Battle Training Center (BTC) at Ft. Chaffee, similar to the Army's National Training Center at Ft. Irwin, California.

The Army has no objection to the transfer, but is concerned about the possibility of future demands that it fund and man this BTC. Start-up costs are estimated at \$80 million, with annual operating costs of \$65 million. The National Guard Bureau will brief its concept to the Acting Secretary of the Army on May 25th. This action is currently unfunded in the FY94 budget.

We have prepared a letter from the Chief of Staff to Governor Tucker expressing the Administration's support for enhanced training for the National Guard and its interest in working with the Department of Defense to make the best possible use of Ft. Chaffee.

Concurrences by: Keith Hahn *✓*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the cover memo at Tab I forwarding a draft letter from Mr. McLarty to Governor Tucker.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Mr. McLarty
Tab A Letter from Mr. McLarty
Tab B Fax from Governor Tucker

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D C 20506

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MACK MCLARTY

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Battle Training Center at Ft. Chaffee

We have looked into the Army's plans for Ft. Chaffee and proposals by the National Guard Bureau to establish a Battle Training Center (BTC) there. DOD and the Department of the Army are formulating plans to transfer the post to the National Guard Bureau, although the specifics have yet to be worked out. The Army's Joint Readiness Training Center will move to Ft. Polk, Louisiana in July, but funding for a BTC at Ft. Chaffee (approx. \$80 million for start-up costs) is not currently in the FY94 budget. The Army and the National Guard Bureau are scheduled to present their final plans to Acting Secretary of the Army Shannon in late May. We have drafted a letter to Governor Tucker for your signature assuring him of the Administration's interest in keeping a viable role for Ft. Chaffee in reserve component training.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A to Governor Tucker.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Governor Tucker



**STATE OF ARKANSAS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR**

State Capitol
Little Rock 72201

Jim Guy Tucker
Governor

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Mack McLarty, Chief of Staff
FROM: Governor Jim Guy Tucker *JGT*
RE: Proposed Battle Training Center, Fort Chaffee, AR
DATE: March 15, 1993

I understand Mr. John Shannon, Acting Secretary of the Army, will be briefed this afternoon concerning the Arkansas National Guard's proposal to place a Battle Training Center (BTC) at Fort Chaffee.

I would like to reiterate my support of this plan, and hope you will ask the President and Secretary of Defense to give it full consideration.

Thanks, Chief!



MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF ARKANSAS

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
NORTH LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72118-2200

JIM GUY TUCKER
GOVERNOR

JAMES A. RYAN
MAJOR GENERAL
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

15 March 1993

TAG-2

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Jim Pledger, Governor's Office

SUBJECT: Proposed Battle Training Center, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

1. Mr. John Shannon, Acting Secretary of the Army, will be briefed today after lunch concerning the Arkansas National Guard's proposal to place a Battle Training Center (BTC) at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.
2. President Clinton has said that he wants the Guard and Reserve to play a larger role in national defense thereby insuring national military readiness while reducing the size of the active military services. For the Army Guard and the Army Reserve to achieve maximum readiness, the combat battalions and brigades must train to the same high standards as the active Army combat units.
3. Since the active Army cannot accommodate the 89 combat battalions at the National Training Center (NTC) at Ft Irwin, CA, or the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) (moving in July from Ft Chaffee, AR, to Ft Polk, LA) and also run all their combat battalions through these two high intensity training centers, it becomes apparent that the Guard and Reserve need a high intensity training center of their own in order to meet the standards required to support President Clinton's increased reliance on the Guard and Reserve.
4. We (the Arkansas National Guard) have put together a proposal for an BTC to be located at Ft Chaffee. The center would use a combination of scenarios from NTC and JRTC and be aimed primarily at mechanized infantry battalions and armor battalions but would also have the capability to train 'straight' or regular walking infantry battalions. The rotations would be (2) two weeks in duration and would run ten (10) months out of the year thereby giving two (2) months for annual training periods for other Reserve Component units.
5. The National Guard Bureau has bought off on the plan but will only put the BTC at Ft Chaffee if the National Guard has control of the installation (the United States Army Reserve (USAR) also wants Ft Chaffee as a Regional School Center). We have agreed that we can work with the USAR in any type school operations they want at Ft Chaffee. We would employ 569 people to run Ft

TAG-2

SUBJECT: Proposed Battle Training Center, Ft Chaffee, Arkansas

Chaffee and the BTC. There would be a combination of Active Guard/Reserve, Civil Service and a few state employees. The employees would come on duty incrementally as we begin the transition of ownership of Ft Chaffee and work up to full BTC operation.

6. Mr. Shannon is in agreement with us for an BTC and wants to transfer Ft Chaffee to us on 1 Oct 93. We must have the 16 million allocated to run Ft Chaffee during FY-94 (begins 1 Oct 93) while we gear up for the first rotation in '95. Full operation beginning in FY-95 would cost 68-70 million per year. Our opposition is the active Army who has not yet realized that the President intends to rely more heavily on the Reserve Component. We will have to get Congress to appropriate the operational funding. Both Congressman Hutchinson and Senator Bumpers have been briefed on the BTC and are highly supportive of our proposal. President Clinton was briefed on the BTC back in September '92 and was supportive of the BTC.



JAMES A. RYAN
Major General
The Adjutant General

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 29, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *268*FROM: RICHARD HOOKER *RH*

SUBJECT: Defense Draft Bill RE DOD Legislative Program for the First Session of the 103rd Congress (DOD 103-001, Section 102)

Section 102 of the draft Defense bill requests relief from the current requirement to conduct live fire tests and evaluation of military systems under development. It would substitute component testing in place of full-scale unit testing. We recommend that this provision be dropped from the Defense bill.

Under current law, military combat systems must undergo live fire testing and evaluation before reaching full-scale development. The Secretary may grant an internal waiver at any time up to this point (Milestone II), after notifying the Congress. This becomes an issue for very expensive systems which may otherwise be destroyed during the testing process. After Milestone II, Congress must grant the waiver.

The current requirement followed development problems with the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, which was not subjected to full scale live fire testing initially. Coordination with the Armed Services Committees suggests that this proposal would meet with moderate resistance in the SASC and significant resistance in the HASC. Congressional staffers report that to date, DOD has never requested a congressional waiver.

The current legislation appears to satisfy congressional concerns that testing be conducted legitimately and comprehensively without unduly burdening the Defense Department. The proposed change will raise oversight issues with the Congress and will require a commitment of energy and political capital which can be used to better effect elsewhere.

Concurrence by: *in draft*
Keith Hahn

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I nonconcurring with the proposed legislation for the reasons stated.

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to Ron Peterson
Tab II	Description of Proposed Legislation
Tab III	Section Analysis

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: Defense Draft Bill RE DOD Legislative Program for
the First Session of the 103rd Congress (DOD 103-
001, Section 102)

The National Security Council staff nonconcurs with the proposal to alter existing legislation requiring live fire testing and evaluation of combat systems. Existing law provides a ready means of relief in unusual circumstances, such as very expensive systems whose destruction during testing is not economically feasible, by permitting internal DOD waivers at any time prior to entering full scale development. A change in the current law would face significant congressional resistance. Absent strong arguments that the current law materially hinders the program development process, we recommend that section 102 be dropped from the draft Defense bill.

A BILL

To authorize certain military activities of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States*
2 *of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Legislative Program
5 for the First Session of the 103d Congress".

SEC. 102. LIVE FIRE TEST AND EVALUATION PROCEDURES.

Section 2366 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking out "survivability" wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "vulnerability";

(2) in subsection (c)—

(A) by striking out ", before the system or program enters full-scale engineering development,"; and

(B) by inserting ", unsafe, or environmentally unsound" after "unreasonably expensive and impractical";

(3) in subsection (e)(3), by inserting "or, in the case of high value systems,

1 at components, subsystems, and subassemblies or realistic replicas or
2 surrogates, and through the design analyses, modeling and simulation, and
3 analysis of combat data" after "at the system configured for combat"; and
4 (4) in subsection (e)(4), by inserting "or, in the case of high value systems,
5 at components, subsystems, and subassemblies or realistic replicas or
6 surrogates, and through the design analyses, modeling and simulation, and
7 analysis of combat data" after "at appropriate targets configured for combat".

Section 102. Live Fire Test and Evaluation Procedures.

Section 102 eliminates the requirement for Live Fire Testing of high value weapons systems but retains the requirement for component testing of these high value systems.

Section 102 extends the time in which waivers may be granted. Under current law, a waiver is required for those cases where testing of complete combat systems is not accomplished. The waiver only would be granted by the Secretary of Defense prior to Milestone II. The Department of Defense currently must seek legislative relief on a case-by-case basis for each weapons system that has gone beyond Milestone II. Section 102 would authorize the Department of Defense broad authority to carry out Live Fire Test and Evaluation activities and provide for better long-term program management.

Specifically, section (1) of 102 amends section 2366 of title 10, United States Code, to provide a more workable and better understood LFT&E. Throughout section 2366 of title 10, United States Code, the word "Survivability" has been changed to read "Vulnerability." "Survivability" encompasses the entire spectrum of considerations from target acquisition, maneuver, jamming, and tactics (gained from Operational Test and Evaluation) to warhead lethality and target vulnerability (gained from LFT&E). The proposed change by subsection (1) makes clear that LFT&E specifically addresses the probability of kill given a hit, including both platform and crew vulnerability.

Subsection (2) amends subsection (c) of section 2366, to authorize the Secretary of Defense to waive the application of the Live Fire Tests to a covered system, munitions program,

missile program, or covered product improvement program if the system or program would be unreasonably expensive and impractical. This amendment deletes the phrase, "before the system or program enters full-scale engineering development," to eliminate the need for the Department to seek legislative relief on a case-by-case basis for each weapons system that has gone beyond Milestone II. This is important for high value systems where an alternative approach to full-up live fire testing is required.

Subsection (3) amends subsection (e) (3) of section 2366, which currently defines the term "realistic survivability testing." Section (3) inserts the phrase "or, in the case of high value systems, at components, subsystems, and subassemblies or realistic replicas or surrogates, and through the design analysis, modeling and simulation, and analysis of combat data," after "at the system configured for combat." Section 102 allows the Secretary to evaluate the vulnerability or lethality of a system or program by using possible alternatives to the Live Fire Testing of a full-up, high value system or program for determining the inherent strengths and weaknesses of U.S. weapon systems. It also provides for better long-term management.

1890

SPECIAL

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

February 19, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #D-21
DRAFT #12

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

ENERGY - Bob Rabben - (202)586-6718 - 209
EPA - Thomas C. Roberts - (202)260-5414 - 326
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)456-6534 - 249
TRANSPORTATION - Tom Herlihy - (202)366-4687 - 226

FROM: RONALD K. PETERSON (for) *Ronald K. Peterson*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: MIKE GOAD (395-7301)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-6194

SUBJECT: DEFENSE Draft Bill Department of Defense
Legislative Program for the First Session of
the 103d Congress (DOD 103-001)

DEADLINE: MONDAY, March 15, 1993

COMMENTS: The Department of Defense proposed draft bill (DOD 103-001) is an omnibus bill consisting of more than 80 sections that would authorize various activities. Only section 102 of DOD 103-001, as well as the transmittal letter and applicable sectional analysis, is attached.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:
R. Dotson
K. MacIntyre
B. Thierwechter
B. Civiak
C. Vallina

Greg Henry
6/4/93
DIR / off
TEST Eval
John Gehrig
697-3898

You may also respond by (1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail if the analyst does not answer); (2) sending us a memo or letter; or (3) if you are an OASIS user in the Executive Office of the President, sending an E-mail message. Please include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.

FROM: _____ (Date)
 _____ (Name)
 _____ (Agency)
 _____ (Telephone)

The following is the response of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:

_____ Concur

_____ No objection

_____ No comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _____

_____ Other: _____

_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this
_____ response sheet

**DRAFT
FOR
OMB A-19
REVIEW**

Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Enclosed is a legislative proposal of the Department of Defense, "To authorize certain military activities of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes."

This proposal is part of the Department of Defense Legislative Program for the 103d Congress. The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of Congress.

Purpose of the Proposal

The proposed legislation would provide needed authorities and revisions to existing authorities to better manage the Department of Defense. The specific purposes of the bill are explained in the enclosed sectional analysis.

Cost and Budget Data

Enactment of this proposal will cause no overall increases in the budgetary requirements of the Department of Defense. Savings made from the enactment of some proposals will offset the minimal costs of others. Specific costs are set forth in the sectional analysis.

Sincerely,

Enclosures:
Draft bill
Sectional Analysis

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 30, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RB*FROM: RICHARD HOOKER *RH*

SUBJECT: Defense Draft Bill RE DOD Legislative Program for the First Session of the 103rd Congress (DOD 103-001, Sections 103, 501, 502, and 616)

We reviewed and recommend approval for the legislative proposals cited above, except for section 502. Section 103 provides and authorizes the Marine Corps to expend \$150,000 to maintain Pacific Battle Monuments. Section 501 authorizes the National Defense University to grant graduate degrees to students upon completion of its courses of instruction. Section 616 authorizes the Secretary of the Air Force to establish an Aviation Leadership Program to train officers from foreign air forces.

We recommend that you not approve section 502, which authorizes the Air University to grant graduate degrees to its graduates. This program has not received appropriate civilian accreditation and therefore does not meet the prerequisites set by Congress for favorable review.

Concurrence by: *KH* Keith HahnRECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum concurring with all proposals except section 502.

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to OMB
Tab II	Section 103 Draft Language
Tab III	Section 501 and 502 Draft Language
Tab IV	Section 616 Draft Language

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: Defense Draft Bill Review (DOD 103-001, Sections
103, 501, 502, 616)

The National Security Council staff concurs with draft proposals discussed in DOD 103-001, sections 103, 501, and 616. We nonconcur with section 502, which authorizes the Air University to award graduate degrees without appropriate civilian accreditation.

8 **SEC. 103. PACIFIC BATTLE MONUMENTS MAINTENANCE.**

9 (a) **AUTHORITY.**—The Commandant of the United States Marine Corps may
10 provide necessary minor maintenance and repairs to Pacific battle monuments
11 until such time as the Secretary of the American Battle Monuments
12 Commission and the Commandant of the Marine Corps agree that the repair
13 and maintenance will be performed by the American Battle Monuments
14 Commission.

15 (b) **FUNDING TO REPAIR AND RELOCATE PACIFIC BATTLE MONUMENTS.**—Of the
16 amounts made available to the Marine Corps for operation and maintenance in
17 each fiscal year, not more than \$15,000 each fiscal year shall be available to
18 repair and maintain Pacific battle monuments. Of the amounts available to
19 the Marine Corps for operation and maintenance in fiscal year 1993, \$150,000
20 shall be available to repair and relocate a monument located on Iwo Jima
21 commemorating the sacrifice of American military personnel during World War
22 II.

1 **SEC. 501. AUTHORIZATION FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF**
2 **SCIENCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY DEGREE**
3 **AND THE MASTER OF SCIENCE OF NATIONAL**
4 **RESOURCE STRATEGY DEGREE.**

5 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Chapter 108 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
6 inserting after section 2162 the following new section:

7 **"§ 2163. National Defense University: master of science of**
8 **national security strategy and master of science of**
9 **national resource strategy**

10 **"(a) MASTER OF SCIENCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY.**—Under regulations
11 prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, and upon recommendation by the
12 faculty and commandant of the National War College, the President of the
13 National Defense University may confer the degree of master of science of
14 national security strategy upon graduates of the National War College who
15 have fulfilled the requirements for that degree.

16 **"(b) MASTER OF SCIENCE OF NATIONAL RESOURCE STRATEGY.**—Under regulations
17 prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, and upon recommendation by the
18 faculty and commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the
19 President of the National Defense University may confer the degree of master
20 of science of national resource strategy upon graduates of the Industrial College
21 of the Armed Forces who have fulfilled the requirements for that degree."

22 (b) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of sections at the beginning of such
23 chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 2162 the
24 following new item:

- 1 "2163. National Defense University: master of science of national security strategy and master of science of
- 2 national resource strategy."

3 **SEC. 502. AUTHORIZATION FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF**
4 **AIRPOWER ARTS AND SCIENCES DEGREE.**

5 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Chapter 901 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
6 inserting after section 9316 the following new section:

7 **"§ 9317. Air University: master of airpower arts and sciences**

8 Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Air Force, and upon the
9 recommendation of the faculty of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, the
10 Commander of the Air University may confer the degree of master of airpower
11 arts and sciences upon graduates of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies
12 who fulfill the requirements for that degree."

13 (b) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of sections at the beginning of such
14 chapter is amended by inserting after the item related to section 9316 the
15 following new item:

16 **"9317. Air University: master of airpower arts and sciences."**

University: Master of Science of National Security Strategy and Master of Science of National Resource Strategy. This would authorize the President of the National Defense University to confer a master of national security strategy and master of national resource strategy degree upon graduates of the National War College and Industrial College of Armed Forces, respectively.

Section 502. Authorization for the Award of the Master of Airpower Arts and Sciences Degree.

Section 502 adds a new section (9317) to title 10, United States Code. This section authorizes the Commander, Air University, to confer upon graduates of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies who have completed all requirements, the degree of Master of Airpower Arts and Sciences. The authority to award the degree is to be exercised under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Air Force.

(B) in part III of subtitle D the second occasion it appears, by inserting after the item relating to section 9355 the following new items:

"CHAPTER 905—AVIATION LEADERSHIP PROGRAM

"Sec.

"9381. Findings.

"9382. Establishment of program.

"9383. Supplies and clothing.

"9384. Allowances."

(2) The table of chapters of subtitle D of title 10, United States Code, at the beginning of such subtitle, and the table of chapters of part III of subtitle D of title 10, United States Code, at the beginning of such part, are amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 903 in both instances the following new item:

"905. Aviation Leadership Program..... 9381".

chartered aircraft.

Section 616. Aviation Leadership Program.

Section 616 amends title 10, United States Code, by adding Chapter 905, entitled "Aviation Leadership Program." Chapter 905 would authorize the Secretary of the Air Force to establish an Aviation Leadership Program. This program would provide undergraduate pilot training and related training to personnel of the air forces of friendly foreign, less-developed nations. Section 616 would authorize the Secretary to provide transportation, supplies, equipment, and special clothing for the use of such personnel, and may pay them a living allowance. Section 616 would become effective on October 1, 1993.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

February 19, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #D-22
DRAFT #12

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

ABMC - Col. William E. Ryan, Jr. - (202)272-0536 - 268
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)456-6534 - 249
STATE - Matt Winslow - (202)647-4463 - 225

FROM: RONALD K. PETERSON (for) *Ronald K. Peterson*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: MIKE GOAD (395-7301)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-6194

SUBJECT: DEFENSE Draft Bill Department of Defense
Legislative Program for the First Session of
the 103d Congress (DOD 103-001)

DEADLINE: MONDAY, March 15, 1993

COMMENTS: The Department of Defense proposed draft bill (DOD 103-001) is an omnibus bill consisting of more than 80 sections that would authorize various activities. Only section 103 of DOD 103-001, as well as the transmittal letter and the applicable sectional analysis, is attached.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:
T. Stanners
K. MacIntyre
B. Thierwechter

Janet Hober

3781

**DRAFT
FOR
OMB A-19
REVIEW**

Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Enclosed is a legislative proposal of the Department of Defense, "To authorize certain military activities of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes."

This proposal is part of the Department of Defense Legislative Program for the 103d Congress. The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of Congress.

Purpose of the Proposal

The proposed legislation would provide needed authorities and revisions to existing authorities to better manage the Department of Defense. The specific purposes of the bill are explained in the enclosed sectional analysis.

Cost and Budget Data

Enactment of this proposal will cause no overall increases in the budgetary requirements of the Department of Defense. Savings made from the enactment of some proposals will offset the minimal costs of others. Specific costs are set forth in the sectional analysis.

Sincerely,

Enclosures:
Draft bill
Sectional Analysis

A BILL

To authorize certain military activities of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States*
2 *of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Legislative Program
5 for the First Session of the 103d Congress".

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

February 19, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #D-23
DRAFT #12

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

EDUCATION - John Kristy - (202)401-2670 - 207
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)456-6534 - 249

FROM: RONALD K. PETERSON (for) *Ronald K. Peterson*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: MIKE GOAD (395-7301)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-6194

SUBJECT: DEFENSE Draft Bill Department of Defense
Legislative Program for the First Session of
the 103d Congress (DOD 103-001)

DEADLINE: MONDAY, March 15, 1993

COMMENTS: The Department of Defense proposed draft bill (DOD 103-001) is an omnibus bill consisting of more than 80 sections that would authorize various activities. Only sections 501 and 502, as well as the transmittal letter and applicable sectional analyses, are attached. NOTE: During the 102d Congress, OMB circulated, and your agency reviewed, section 502 as a stand-alone bill (LRM #D-600; DOD 102-101).

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:

T. Stanners
K. MacIntyre
B. Thierwechter
B. White

You may also respond by (1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail if the analyst does not answer); (2) sending us a memo or letter; or (3) if you are an OASIS user in the Executive Office of the President, sending an E-mail message. Please include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.

FROM: _____ (Date)
 _____ (Name)
 _____ (Agency)
 _____ (Telephone)

The following is the response of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:

_____ Concur

_____ No objection

_____ No comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _____

_____ Other: _____

_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this
response sheet

**DRAFT
FOR
OMB A-19
REVIEW**

Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Enclosed is a legislative proposal of the Department of Defense, "To authorize certain military activities of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes."

This proposal is part of the Department of Defense Legislative Program for the 103d Congress. The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of Congress.

Purpose of the Proposal

The proposed legislation would provide needed authorities and revisions to existing authorities to better manage the Department of Defense. The specific purposes of the bill are explained in the enclosed sectional analysis.

Cost and Budget Data

Enactment of this proposal will cause no overall increases in the budgetary requirements of the Department of Defense. Savings made from the enactment of some proposals will offset the minimal costs of others. Specific costs are set forth in the sectional analysis.

Sincerely,

Enclosures:
Draft bill
Sectional Analysis

A BILL

To authorize certain military activities of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States*
2 *of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Legislative Program
5 for the First Session of the 103d Congress".

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

SPECIAL


February 19, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #D-31
DRAFT #12

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

JUSTICE - Faith Burton - (202)514-2141 - 217
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)456-6534 - 249
OPM - James N. Woodruff - (202)606-1424 - 331
STATE - Matt Winslow - (202)647-4463 - 225

FROM: RONALD K. PETERSON (for) 
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: MIKE GOAD (395-7301)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-6194

SUBJECT: DEFENSE Draft Bill Department of Defense
Legislative Program for the First Session of
the 103d Congress (DOD 103-001)

DEADLINE: MONDAY, March 15, 1993

COMMENTS: The Department of Defense proposed draft bill (DOD 103-001) is an omnibus bill consisting of more than 80 sections that would authorize various activities. Only section 616, as well as the transmittal letter and applicable sectional analysis, is attached.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:
R. Dotson
K. MacIntyre
B. Thierwechter
B. Sasser

You may also respond by (1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail if the analyst does not answer); (2) sending us a memo or letter; or (3) if you are an OASIS user in the Executive Office of the President, sending an E-mail message. Please include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.

FROM: _____ (Date)
 _____ (Name)
 _____ (Agency)
 _____ (Telephone)

The following is the response of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:

_____ Concur

_____ No objection

_____ No comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _____

_____ Other: _____

_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this
response sheet

**DRAFT
FOR
OMB A-19
REVIEW**

Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

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This proposal is part of the Department of Defense Legislative Program for the 103d Congress. The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of Congress.

Purpose of the Proposal

The proposed legislation would provide needed authorities and revisions to existing authorities to better manage the Department of Defense. The specific purposes of the bill are explained in the enclosed sectional analysis.

Cost and Budget Data

Enactment of this proposal will cause no overall increases in the budgetary requirements of the Department of Defense. Savings made from the enactment of some proposals will offset the minimal costs of others. Specific costs are set forth in the sectional analysis.

Sincerely,

Enclosures:
Draft bill
Sectional Analysis

A BILL

To authorize certain military activities of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States*
2 *of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Legislative Program
5 for the First Session of the 103d Congress".

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9301913
RECEIVED: 29 MAR 93 08

TO: KELSO, F

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 31 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NAVY

PERSONS: KELSO, F

SUBJECT: CHEIF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS HOSPITALIZED

ACTION: PRES SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 01 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
HAHN
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSASK

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 3, 1993

Dear Admiral Kelso:

It is good to have you back to work after your recent medical treatment. I hope you are fully recovered and can continue to do your outstanding work as the "dual-hatted" Chief of Naval Operations and Acting Secretary of the Navy.

I sincerely appreciate your dedication to duty during this challenging period.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style with a large initial "B".

Admiral Frank B. Kelso, II, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

93 MAR 31 P6:19

March 31, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

FROM:

ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT:

Chief of Naval Operations Hospitalization

Purpose

To wish the Chief of Naval Operations and acting Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Frank Kelso, a full and speedy recovery after his recent hospitalization.

Background

Admiral Frank Kelso was recently hospitalized for three days for medical treatment to correct an arterial fibrillation problem. He returned to work last Friday. The condition, which is manifested as an irregular rhythm of the heart is corrected by electro-shock treatment and long-term medication.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Admiral Kelso at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Admiral Frank Kelso, Chief of Naval Operations

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1913

March 27, 1993

Handwritten: Kelso's letter

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RGB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Chief of Naval Operations Hospitalization

The Chief of Naval Operations and acting Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Frank Kelso, was recently hospitalized for three days for medical treatment to correct an arterial fibrillation problem. He returned to work Friday.

The condition, which is manifested as an irregular rhythm of the heart is corrected by electro-shock treatment and long-term medication. This is different from the condition that Secretary Aspin was treated for.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the letter at Tab A to the President for signature.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to Admiral Frank Kelso, Chief of Naval Operations

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Anne Witkowsky. Subject: Expanding the Open Skies Treaty. Record ID: 9302043. (2 pages)	03/31/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - March 1993 #2 [8]

2016-0152-F

vz4374

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1** National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2** Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3** Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4** Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5** Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6** Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1)** National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2)** Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3)** Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4)** Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6)** Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7)** Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8)** Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9)** Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. paper	The Treaty on Open Skies. (1 page)	03/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - March 1993 #2 [8]

2016-0152-F

vz4374

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. memo	For Robert Bell. Subject: Use of the Treaty on Open Skies for Environmental Monitoring. (6 pages)	02/05/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - March 1993 #2 [8]

2016-0152-F

vz4374

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. cable	re: Open Skies: Russian Treaty Ratification Status. (4 pages)	01/15/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - March 1993 #2 [8]

2016-0152-F

vz4374

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9302355
RECEIVED: 13 APR 93 16

TO: LAKE

FROM: HOUGH, JERRY

DOC DATE: 23 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RUSSIAN POLITICS

ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY

DUE DATE: 16 APR 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
BURNS

FOR CONCURRENCE
GATI
GOTTEMOELLER

FOR INFO
ANDREASEN
BELL
FORSYTHE
TENET
WAGUESPACK

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWD

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

2355

Duke University

DURHAM
NORTH CAROLINA
27708

CENTER ON EAST-WEST TRADE,
INVESTMENT, AND COMMUNICATIONS
2114 CAMPUS DRIVE

TELEPHONE (919) 684-5551
TELEFAX (919) 684-0749

FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL FORM

DATE: March 23, 1993

TO: Anthony Lake

LOCATION: National Security Council

FAX #: 202-395-3380

OFFICE #: _____

FROM: Jerry Hough

LOCATION: East-West Center

Duke University

FAX #: (919) 684-8749

OFFICE #: (919) 684-5551

COMMENTS: _____

THIS DOCUMENT CONSISTS OF 56 PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVER
SHEET. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR TRANSMISSION PROBLEMS,
CALL (919) 684-5551.

Duke University

DURHAM
NORTH CAROLINA
27706

CENTER ON EAST-WEST TRADE,
INVESTMENT, AND COMMUNICATIONS
2114 CAMPUS DRIVE

TELEPHONE (919) 684-5351
TELEFAX (919) 684-8749

March 23, 1993

Mr. Anthony Lake
The National Security Advisor
National Security Council
The White House
(202) 395-3380

Dear Mr. Lake:

I have been in Russia for the last 10 days. I spent part of my time organizing a nationality-oriented public opinion poll in the Russian republic of Bashkortostan, but most of my time talking with one of Vice President Rutskoi's top adviser--essentially his liaison with Arkady Volsky. I have a very clear sense of the strategy and anticipations of Civic Union. As I assume that the charge d'affaire reported, I was in Rutskoi's Kremlin office with him on the morning of the 20th and was in his office when the call from Yeltsin came in.

I have been out of touch with Washington, but I genuinely am confused and disturbed by what I seem to see and by what was reported on BBC.

(1) I really think Rutskoi is far more of a constitutional democrat than Yeltsin. Yeltsin is a 62-year old former party secretary in one of the most conservative regions in the country, and he seems incapable of compromise with equals; Rutskoi is a 45-year old, who, as I say in the enclosed article, clearly sees himself as of Clinton's generation and as a man who wants to have an alliance with America against instability in Asia. It really matters that Rutskoi was captured by fundamentalists and has seen Asian instability first-hand in Afghanistan.

(2) If there is a major constitutional crisis in any country, the army decides. The army hates Yeltsin for breaking up the Soviet Union, and Gromov and the other deputy ministers of defense are very close with Rutskoi. How can Yeltsin impose an undemocratic solution if the man who wants a democratic solution has the army behind him? We are backing a loser.


(3) The Clinton Administration seems to be supporting a Pinochet-like plebiscite and a Pinochet-like presidential rule as an acceptable--even an encouraged--definition of democracy. Surely it will pay for this repeatedly in de-democratization of the Third World unless it backs off.

(4) The people who are demonizing Rutskoi--like Eagleburger this morning--want to protect the military budget and make the economic problems of the Clinton Administration impossible to resolve. What is the president's interest in demonizing the man who almost surely will be Russian president within a year and maybe by April--a man who says that he likes the president and wants an alliance against instability in Asia?

I hope that the president will support democratic elections as a way out of the Russian impasse in his press conference.

I really do think that the United States has been very slow to try to understand complicated Russian politics in a sophisticated way. We at the East-West Center are collecting an enormous amount of information about this politics. This time I returned time with the poll of provincial governors held in February that we commissioned and that I discuss in the enclosed article, with 500 pages of annotations on all the roll-calls on the first six congresses, and with descriptions of the economic characteristics of all 900 districts from which the legislators come to go with the roll-call data we already have. I would be happy to be part of any foreign policy review that you decide to have.

Sincerely,



Jerry F. Hough
James B. Duke
Professor of Political Science
and
Director
Center on East-West Trade,
Investment, and Communications
Duke University

Jerry F Hough

1

For years Americans have understood an extraordinarily complex political situation in Russia as a simple morality play between the forces of good (reform and democracy) and evil (conservatism or Communism). Now we have reached to the point of defining democracy in a way that is disastrous for our effort to promote it around the world.

The fact of the matter is that the 1990 election of the Russian legislature was far more democratic than the 1989 USSR election, with almost all the seats contested and with the voters often in an anti-party mood. The reason that the legislature does not want the Polish shock model of economic reform is that the majority of the people do not want the Polish shock treatment.

The reason that Boris Yeltsin wants to destroy the present legislature and make any new one powerless is that he knows a new election will not produce a legislature greatly different from the current one. We should never forget that 52 percent of deputies are elected in districts in which the largest town has under 100,000 people. Just as downstate America votes differently from New York City and San Francisco, so "downstate" Russia naturally votes differently from Moscow and St. Petersburg and always will.

If we defend what Boris Yeltsin has done, we are saying that if a democratic--even the preferred democratic solution--presidential-congressional gridlock is for the president to dissolve the congress and introduce plebiscitary presidential dictatorship, even if the gridlock was produced in substantial part by presidential intransigence.

We are saying that in a huge country with eight time zones a democratic solution is to end any significant role for state legislatures and city councils and to instituted appointed governors and mayors. That is precisely what Boris Yeltsin has now done.

If this model of democracy is successfully instituted in Russia with American support, it will undoubtedly be introduced by authoritarian leaders to destroy democracy in country after country in the Third World.

The United States cannot insist on liberal democracy throughout the world, but it must correctly define what it wants. Historically, as in England in the 18th and 19th century, constitutional government comes (before real democracy. As a result, when democratically elected representatives come to power, they have an inherent conception of government as constitutionally limited.

One reason that the introduction of constitutional democracy is usually such a long and tortured process is that the proponents of democracy in absolute states find it difficult even to conceive of any other kind of governmental power than that under which they always lived. They unconsciously assume that democratically-elected leaders--

themselves--should retain much of the authority and power of non-elected officials. This is clearly Boris Yeltsin's problem.

Democracy came to the United States very early in our development, and, as a result, we instituted a system of checks and balances between the three branches of government and between the federal government and the states. It is crucial that Russia have a similar kind of system of checks and balances while its political leaders gain a sense of what constitutional, limited government means. A country of its size must have a federal system with regional leaders who are elected rather than appointed from Moscow like the old regional first secretaries.

We should not fear the results of constitutional democracy in Russia. The Yeltsin forces have been demonizing their opponents, and we have been accepting their spin. This is wrong. As already indicated, the policy of the legislature is much closer to public opinion than that of Yegor Gaidar. Speaker of the House Ruslan Khasbulatov was rightly called a radical economist three years ago, and he still is.

A recent poll of the 55 provincial heads of administration (provincial governors), most of them former managers and party officials, does show that nearly 61 percent of them think that the privatization of heavy industry should be done gradually over a 5-to-10 year period or longer, while 82 percent believe that some price controls be kept on petroleum for at least three years. Only 8 percent want quick de-collectivization.

However, this does not mean that they are reactionary. Instead, 85 percent see privatization in highly positive terms. The provincial leaders are also basically democratic: 51 percent want popular election for their post, 6 percent election by a popular elected soviet, and 18 percent appointment by the president on nomination by the local soviet. Only 16 percent wanted direct presidential appointment.

We should never forget that few Americans want a "Polish shock treatment" to end the federal deficit. The heads of administration understand that even more difficult reform in Russia must be gradual and pragmatic if it is to have popular support and if they are to win an election.

The leader of the opposition, Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, who almost surely would defeat Yeltsin in a free election, also gives little cause for alarm. I was in his Kremlin office for an hour-long interview on the morning of March 20th, and happened to be present when Yeltsin called at 11:00 to inform Rutskoi about the forthcoming presidential decree.

In the interview, Rutskoi spoke elegantly about the essence of democracy as the rule of law--as government that actually works, with a legal system that establishes enforceable rules and contracts for a market. "All should be equal before the law and subordinated to the law," he said, "including myself." Yeltsin always talks of power and

democracy, almost never about the law and the subordination of government to it.

Rutskoi is 45 years old, essentially President Clinton's age, and at the end of the interview he spoke warmly of the American president as "a man of the future ... I like him." He sees his experience in Afghanistan where he was captured by fundamentalist rebels and the experience of Vice President Albert Gore in Vietnam as creating an analogous understanding of those types of war and the problems of Asia.

Most encouraging of all is Rutskoi's geopolitical vision of the future. The lesson that Rutskoi says he has drawn from his years in Afghanistan is the danger of future instability in "the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Far East" and the need for Russian-American cooperation to try to preserve stability there.

When asked his attitude towards foreign investment even in sensitive defense spheres (I had just talked with the former director of the Ufa plant that produces the machines that code secret diplomatic and security messages and I cited the example), Rutskoi did not answer as a xenophobe. Instead he referred specifically to other old enemies--Germany and Japan--and called for an America relationship to Russia similar to what it now has with them.

Rutskoi favors ill-defined price controls and an industrial policy, but he declares fervently, "I am a market man (rynochnik)." He has selected as his chief counselor for economic and social policy a man who worked for a long time as Stanislav Shatalin's assistant and is a close friend of Aleksandr Shokhin, deputy premier for foreign trade under Yegor Gaidar.

When there was presidential-congressional deadlock in the United States, Bill Clinton did not call for a presidential dissolution of Congress, but a election that produced a president and congress of the same party. That is the democratic solution to gridlock in Russia as well, and we should support it wholeheartedly.

An Administration that promotes democracy and human rights must stand for constitutional democracy in Russia rather than a Pinochet-like plebiscite. We should be calling for presidential and legislative elections in Russia by fall and for a constitution that establishes elected organs in the regions and cities of Russia as well as at the national level. Let Yeltsin run against Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi and let the Russian people have a real choice for president.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

1751

WASHINGTON

March 30, 1993

03 MAR 30 All : 47

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: C-17 Aircraft

You sent a copy of the March 9th Washington Post article entitled "Turbulent Times for a Transport" with a note asking whether there had been any change in our support for the C-17 program as a result of the difficulties that have been highlighted in recent Congressional hearings. The answer is no, although we have decided to delay procurement by two years in light of recent development and test setbacks.

DoD is currently conducting a "Bottom Up Review" of our major defense programs. However, unless some unforeseen calamity in the test program occurs, it is unlikely that we will change our support for the C-17. Secretary Aspin's defense budget for FY94 continues full funding for R&D for the aircraft, but it defers full production funding until FY96, when it is estimated that test and evaluation will be completed. This deferment produces \$1.15 billion in savings in FY94-95.

With five C-17s in the flight test program and a sixth to be delivered this month, developmental progress is well-along. Nevertheless, there remain several significant problems that the Air Force must continue to address. Perhaps the most significant problem to date is the cost overrun on the initial C-17 fixed price development contract. It now appears that McDonnell Douglas will exceed the \$6.7 billion ceiling on this contract by at least \$1.1 billion. A loss of this magnitude reduces some of the contractor's flexibility in solving the normal development problems that arise in the aircraft test program, such as the recent wing static test failure. The Air Force now has a straight forward technical solution to meet the original strength requirement for the C-17 wing.

Another issue which has drawn attention is the deficiency in range/payload. Currently, the aircraft falls short of meeting the 2400 nautical miles/160,000 pounds specification by about 6% in cargo capacity. The Air Force has instituted a low risk/low cost plan that will reduce the shortfall to approximately 1.3%.

An additional area of concern is delays in the flight test program as a result of late aircraft deliveries, lower than planned fly rates, incorporation of deferred work and lower than planned flight test efficiency. The Air Force has improved mission planning, data management, and flight, ground and

management operations to raise overall flight test program efficiency by approximately 30% over the earlier test flights.

Finally, there remains concern about the contractor's ability to produce and deliver aircraft on schedule at a cost acceptable to the government. Previous cost projections for the C-17 were, of necessity, based on preliminary data derived from the initial production of test aircraft. With more production data now available, the Air Force can provide a more accurate estimate of overall program costs. This new estimate will be included in the budget submission Secretary Aspin will announce on March 27.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN $\frac{3}{2}$ 2

Spencer
This is an original
but got it from
to say in their hand
↓

Turbulent Times for a Transport

C-17 Project Facing Key Hill Hearings

By John Mintz
Washington Post Staff Writer

The lumbering U.S. Air Force cargo planes dropping relief supplies over Bosnia haven't encountered antiaircraft fire, but the Pentagon's planned \$40 billion replacement plane, the C-17 now being assembled in California, is taking so much flak from Washington that its supporters fear it could crash.

Critics of the C-17 airlifter point out it is \$1 billion over budget, two years late and plagued by seemingly endless technical problems.

Supporters say the problems are as much a fault of the Pentagon's contracting system as of the contractor. The plane is needed, the Air Force says, to modernize the United States' aging cargo fleet, especially for missions such as sending food to Somalia or the former Yugoslavia, delivering supplies in the former Soviet Union and helping hurricane victims in Florida and Hawaii.

McDonnell Douglas Corp.—which is suffering financial woes across its product line, from commercial airliners to the space station—has a lot staked on the C-17's success. Cancellation of the C-17—coming on the heels of other setbacks in recent years—could be devastating to the company, according to industry analysts.

A critical period for the plane starts today with the first of a series of congressional hearings, this one in the House Armed Services Committee. Rep. Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.), the chairman, rescheduled his hearings to get in front of the rival House Government Operations Committee, chaired by Rep. John Conyers Jr. (D-Mich.), whose own hearings are set to begin March 17.

Dellums heads a committee that has been generally supportive of the C-17. Conyers has called for criminal investigations of Air Force payments to McDonnell Douglas and a suspension of the program.

Defense Secretary Les Aspin said at his confirmation hearing that he and

President Clinton are "strong supporters" of the C-17, partly because the Persian Gulf War revealed inadequacies in the United States' airlift abilities. Administration officials from Clinton down have worried aloud about the aerospace industry in particular and the loss of high-tech jobs in general.

The Air Force likes the C-17 because it can do what other transports can't. The biggest transport currently in service, the Lockheed C-5, can carry heavy equipment such as the Army's colossal M-1 tank, but can't land on short, bumpy runways common in the Third World and near battle lines. The C-17 can do both.

The C-17 has a crew of three instead of the seven people needed on other huge military transports. The Air Force says the C-17 can be unloaded more quickly than planes now in service and had it been used in Somalia, it could have delivered 41 percent more equipment in the same amount of time.

The C-17's computers and radar

scanners are "three generations" ahead of other airlifters, according to Air Force Gen. Ronald R. Fogelman, and would make it "the airlift of choice" in drops over Bosnia, he said. Fogelman, who heads the command that supervises delivery of troops and materiel, said "We're going to put ourselves in a very, very bad posture if we don't get this plane or something like it."

One subtle critic of the C-17 is Lockheed Corp., which built almost all U.S. the cargo planes in recent decades but lost the C-17 contract to McDonnell Douglas in 1981. Lockheed has made an unsolicited proposal to extend the life of its 1960s-era C-141 transports for \$4.4 billion to fill in for the C-17 if it is delayed. Many C-141s are restricted in the altitude they fly or the weight they carry.

McDonnell has lost \$1.1 billion to \$1.8 billion on the C-17 project. The firm predicts the C-17 eventually will be profitable, but says the program's history exemplifies the problems of

fixed-price Pentagon contracts, in which contractors develop weapons systems for a set price but pay for overruns themselves.



The biggest controversy about the C-17 involves allegations by Conyers and the Pentagon's inspector general that in 1990, when McDonnell Douglas was suffering cash shortages, the Air Force prematurely paid \$442 million to the firm to keep it and the C-17 alive. The firm and some Air Force officials strenuously deny the allegations, which are being investigated by an Air Force panel.

McDonnell Douglas officials say the plane's cost soared as the Pentagon twice delayed it, in 1977 and 1981. Revived in 1985, the plan called for 210 of the transports, but in 1990 it was cut to 120, which drastically increased the cost of each C-17. Congress has scaled back C-17 budgets every year since 1986, and throughout the 1980s the Air Force pressured McDonnell Douglas into making greater concessions on the contract's

TRANSPORT...Pg. 19

FIGHTING FOR THE C-17

The C-17 was developed to replace some of the country's aging military transport aircraft, such as the C-141 and C-5. While it has encountered problems during testing, contractor McDonnell Douglas argues the new plane has features that warrant its continued development, such as greater cargo capacity and the ability to land on short runways, which are common in the Third World. So far, the project is \$1 billion over budget.



SOURCE: McDonnell Douglas

BY MICHAEL DREW—THE WASHINGTON POST

The crash occurred shortly after a group boarded the helicopter at Sea-world Amusement Park in Queensland, Australia, the lawsuit states.

GOP...from Pg. 7

What was not routine was that the bundles were dropped from nearly two miles up, instead of the usual drop altitude of a few thousand feet or less.

The parcels were suspended from smaller parachutes than typically are used so that they would drop quickly and be less likely to be pushed off-target by winds.

To cushion the resulting impact with the ground at 45 mph, the parcels were mounted on a 2-foot-thick layer of shock-absorbing material.

But the crews dropping the bundles still had to allow for the effect of crosswinds on the trajectory of the parcels.

Brig. Gen. Donald Loranger Jr., commander of the air wing conducting the drops, told reporters March 3 that a pallet dropped from 10,000 feet would be carried 800 yards off course by a 10-knot crosswind.

On the first mission, flown Feb. 28 to the enclave of Cerska, the 30-knot winds would have carried the laden parachutes 2,400 yards from their intended targets.

But by allowing for that factor, Loranger contended, the crews had managed to drop the parcels within the slightly oblong drop zone with an area of about two-thirds of a square mile.

Pentagon officials said about half the 30 pallets dropped on that mission later were spotted on the ground. Of the ones located, Loranger said, "not one of them is more than 500 yards from the intended impact point — which is, quite frankly, shooting their eyes out."

Unfinished Operation

Late on the afternoon of March 2, while the third airdrop mission still was in progress, Aspin indicated to reporters that it might be the last one for a while.

In addition to insisting that a large portion of the food and medical supplies dropped had landed where they were aimed, Aspin argued that the three missions appeared to have accomplished a second objective of persuading Serbian forces to lift their blockade on overland supplies to the Muslim enclaves.

The following morning, however, Clinton and Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher said that the airdrops would continue, citing reports of vigorous continued Serbian attacks on the enclaves.

"The secretary asked for a reassessment," Pentagon spokesman Bob Hall said of Aspin. "The [U.N. office for refugees] said: 'No, there is a definite need, a desperate need. You need to keep doing this.'"

By Pat Towell

Rocketing Costs

WOULD YOU PAY MILLIONS OF DOLLARS FOR SOMETHING YOU don't need, don't want and won't use? If you're an American taxpayer, you may have no choice. Israel has staged a successful rocket launch with its ARROW anti-tactical missile system, a feat that will help bolster arguments that U.S. funding of the Israeli project should continue. To strengthen Israel's security, the U.S. has spent \$126 million on the Arrow and plans to pick up two-thirds of the projected \$322 million in future development costs. The U.S. has no plans to purchase the system for itself, but when the rockets go into production, America may help buy some for Israel. Some Pentagon officials are seething because they see the Arrow as redundant: the U.S. has three similar anti-tactical missile systems, including an updated version of the Patriot, that could be given or sold to Israel.

By CHRISTOPHER JOHN FARLEY

No. 357—Mr. Aspin Will See You Now

IF YOU WANT TO MEET SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LES ASPIN, take a number. According to a recent procedural memo (circulated before Aspin fell ill from a heart ailment), Pentagon officials have to cut through a lot of red tape to get a face-to-face with Aspin. The process: 1) fill out an "initial schedule bid." If Aspin approves, 2) complete an "amended schedule proposal format." And finally 3a) meet with Aspin—unless he doesn't like your final proposal, in which case 3b) you return to Step 1.

By CHRISTOPHER JOHN FARLEY

WASHINGTON TIMES

Mar. 9, 1993 Pg. 2

War wives report many miscarriages

The wives of Gulf war veterans afflicted with puzzling, flu-like symptoms are experiencing a high rate of miscarriages and other illnesses, a family support group says.

TRANSPORT...from Pg. 14

terms, so that "the C-17 was going to lose money no matter who ran it," said Herbert Lanese, the firm's chief financial officer.

The most publicized of the technical problems stemmed from the military's need for the C-17 to be both sturdy and light weight, to conserve fuel and allow for heavier cargo. So C-17 designers shaved every ounce they could from the plane, including lightening metal supports in the wings.

In tests in October, the wings broke when stressed at 130 percent of what is defined as normal. The specifications require that the wings withstand stresses of 150 percent.

That problem further delayed delivery of the plane and generated a new round of rumors. C-17 critics said repairing the wings would cost up to \$1 billion and kill the program. In fact, the repairs will cost \$60 million and add 600 pounds to the C-17—which still lives. It also has had troubles with fuel leaks, its computer software and landing gear.

The company thinks it has solved the technical problems. "It's a hell of a plane," Lanese said. "We've just got to get through '93."

Dorothy Brooks, head of the Military Families Support Network based in Buies Creek, N.C., yesterday said numerous children of sick veterans are also suffering from chronic health problems that antibiotics fail to relieve.

She said her group has compiled records of more than 1,000 Persian Gulf veterans who came back with mysterious ailments and found that 75 percent of their wives had health problems.

The Department of Veterans Affairs said preliminary studies found the patterns of disease distribution were similar between 837 who saw action in the war and veterans from the same period who did not serve in the Gulf.

Commission, as Mr. Courter's panel officially is known, has until July 1 to accept or amend it. After that, the president and Congress must accept or reject the commission's list in its entirety.

The commission will hold public hearings, Mr. Courter said, and take public votes on its final recommendations by the July 1 deadline.

The services sent their confidential recommendations to Defense Secretary Les Aspin last month. Mr. Courter is the only member of the 1991 commission whose appointment has not expired. On Thursday, the Senate confirmed the seven other members. They are:

■ Peter Bowman of Maine, vice president for quality assurance for Gould Inc., a defense firm.

■ Former Rep. Beverly Byron, D-Md., a member of the House Armed Services Committee before her defeat last year.

■ Rebecca Gernhardt Cox of Washington, D.C., vice president for government affairs of Continental Airlines and wife of Rep. Christopher Cox, R-Calif.

■ Hansford T. Johnson, a Texan, chief of staff for the United Services Automobile Association, an insurance firm, and a former Pentagon official.

■ Arthur Levitt of New York, chairman of the board of Levitt Media Co. and a veteran of the 1991 base-closing commission.

■ Harry C. McPherson Jr. of Maryland, a lawyer who served as a special assistant to President Lyndon B. Johnson and is a former deputy undersecretary of the Army.

■ Robert D. Stuart Jr., president of Conway Farms of Illinois, also a member of the 1991 commission.

LONDON FINANCIAL TIMES

Mar. 8, 1993

Pg. 3

German influence in Nato in 'rapid decline'

GERMANY'S influence in Nato is rapidly declining, its credibility is being questioned, and it no longer deserves special treatment now that the cold war is over, General Klaus Naumann, the country's chief of staff, said yesterday, writes Judy Dempsey in Berlin.

His comments follow debate among the country's political parties about how far the Bundeswehr, or armed forces, should become involved in activities outside Nato territory, as well as playing a role

in UN peace-keeping and conciliation operations.

They coincide with remarks by Mr Hans Dietrich Genscher, the former foreign minister, who yesterday told the Welt am Sonntag newspaper that the country's soldiers had the right to know about cuts in personnel as well as future activities.

Bundeswehr operations are restricted by the 1949 constitution, which limits German troops to operations on Nato territory.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 23, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RGB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: C-17 Aircraft

The President passed a copy of the article at Tab II with a note penned in the margin asking whether there had been any change in support for the C-17 as a result of the difficulties that had been raised in Congressional hearings on the aircraft. The memorandum at Tab I reaffirms support for the C-17 and provides background on the progress the Air Force has made in correcting deficiencies in the program.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the information memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President on C-17 Aircraft
Tab II Washington Post Article, "Turbulent Times for a Transport"