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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Legislative Referral Memorandum. [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	02/19/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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Chron File - March 1993 #2 [7]

2016-0152-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 31, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RB*
FROM: STEVEN R. JONES *SJ*
SUBJECT: Commerce Statement for the Record on EDA
Assistance to Communities Adjusting to
Defense Cutbacks

We have reviewed the proposed statement by the Secretary of
Commerce to the Economic Development Subcommittee and concur.

Concurrence by: Jeremy Rogner *JR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I to James Jukes.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to James Jukes
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES J. JUKES

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: Commerce Statement for the Record on EDA
Assistance to Communities Adjusting to
Defense Cutbacks

The National Security Council staff has reviewed the proposed statement by the Secretary of Commerce to the Economic Development Subcommittee and concurs.

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for stat

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

March 30, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TESTIMONY

LRM #M-135

TESTIMONY

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

DEFENSE - Samuel T. Brick, Jr. - (703)697-1305 - 325
LABOR - Robert A. Shapiro - (202)219-8201 - 330
TREASURY - Richard S. Carro - (202)622-1146 - 228
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)395-3723 - 249
NEC - Elizabeth Lindemuth - (202)456-6630 - 429
SBA - Christine Swedin - (202)205-6702 - 315
HUD - Edward J. Murphy, Jr. - (202)708-1793 - 215

FROM: JAMES J. JUKES (for) *Ji*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: Jeffrey WEINBERG (395-3457)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-3454

SUBJECT: COMMERCE Statement for the Record on EDA
Assistance to Communities Adjusting to
Defense Cutbacks

DEADLINE: NOON WEDNESDAY March 31, 1993

COMMENTS: We understand that Secretary Brown's attached statement will be presented by his Chief of Staff. We also expect to circulate Defense testimony for this hearing shortly.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:
Ron Jones
Phebe Vickers
Don Gessaman
Larry Matlack

_____ Concur

_____ No objection

_____ No comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _____

_____ Other: _____

_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this
_____ response sheet

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DRAFT

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RONALD H. BROWN

SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

before the Economic Development Subcommittee

House Public Works and Transportation Committee

April 1, 1993

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to submit this statement for the record on the Economic Development Administration's (EDA) programs to assist communities in adjusting to cutbacks in defense. It has been a long 12 years for this Subcommittee, and we are grateful for your efforts to keep EDA in place. I am pleased EDA is not only included in our budget this year, but forms a critical element in the Administration's program to create jobs.

With the end of the Cold War, the Nation faces the challenge of a major defense transition. With the 1988 and 1991 base closure rounds behind us and the 1993 round of base closure recommendations just announced by Secretary Aspin, numerous communities are being forced to confront wrenching changes to the structure of their economies. Added to these are the regional economic impacts of major defense contract cancellations and reductions, significantly hitting the New England states,

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Southern California, St Louis and other areas. We can also anticipate similar problems associated with the 1995 round of base closures yet to come.

To meet the challenge, the President has announced a Defense Reinvestment and Conversion Initiative. One part of this initiative proposes to invest in the communities to help them build a bridge between their defense-oriented past and their future of growth. The Department of Commerce will be a key player in this initiative and will make defense conversion a top priority. While we recognize the importance of EDA's traditional programs, over the next few years EDA will have an expanded role in the area of defense adjustment, especially in areas that have been hit hardest by the closing of military installations or the loss of military contracts that were the economic lifeblood of the area.

But even with the substantial appropriations that are available and those being requested for this effort, the funds are finite. We are not going to be able to remedy every problem, but we will be as creative and responsive as we can.

EDA is adopting a proactive approach to help impacted communities. Those that meet the economic dislocation threshold criteria -- essentially a comparison of the job loss attributable to the closing measured against the size and relative strength of

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the area's employment base -- will be eligible for Federal assistance. They won't have to come to us - we will go to them. We are also working closely with the Department of Defense Office of Economic Adjustment to accelerate a response to defense closings, including those announced March 12th.

The grant process for communities affected by defense conversion is the same as that for communities affected by natural disasters, plant closures or other types of sudden economic dislocations. It is a two-step process of community adjustment planning, followed by assistance to help implement critical parts of the plan. For base closures, the Department of Defense, Office of Economic Adjustment provides the initial Federal assistance for the reuse planning process, both through its professional staff and with direct grant assistance to the communities. EDA is a primary Federal resource for grant funding of projects designed to carry out the reuse plans.

Through its various economic development programs EDA can provide comprehensive assistance to states, units of local government, and recognized multi-county economic development districts and certain not-for-profit organizations that represent redevelopment areas. The President's 1994 Budget requests over \$223 million for EDA's regular programs, which include economic development planning grants, technical assistance, grants for public works infrastructure, and community economic adjustment assistance

grants. The proposed request includes a significant increase in funds for economic adjustment, over \$52 million, \$33 million of which will be specifically devoted to defense conversion. All of EDA's regular programs mentioned above may be used to assist communities with defense conversion activities, provided that the appropriate program eligibility tests are met. In addition, \$45 million of the \$94 million requested for EDA in the President's Economic Stimulus Proposal will go to the Title IX Program. While these funds will be available for quick response projects to respond to recent disasters and to revitalize Los Angeles, they will also be available to assist communities adversely affected by defense closings and procurement cutbacks.

Due to the need for additional funds for economic adjustment activities, Congress previously appropriated additional funds for use under EDA's Title IX Economic Adjustment Program specifically for defense adjustment assistance. \$50 million was transferred from DoD to EDA in February of 1992, and a second increment of \$80 million, which must be obligated by the end of FY 1994, was transferred from DoD to EDA last week. As of this date, EDA has invited applications totalling almost \$60 million, and approved 18 of them amounting to \$22 million in grants.

With the transfer of the \$80 million and the anticipated funds for FY 1994 for EDA defense adjustment activities, EDA has resumed inviting defense adjustment applications into its project

pipeline. Proposals to carry out adjustment strategies can include such activities as converting military facilities for non-military use, funding related infrastructure improvements, and establishing revolving loan funds to promote the development of a diversified business community by making financial assistance available to local businesses. Other types of activities EDA can fund include such activities as construction of "incubator buildings" to house start-up businesses and the extension of technical assistance. EDA will give priority to innovative proposals, particularly those that effectively link economic recovery with the re-employment of dislocated workers or the commercialization of Federally sponsored and other technology.

Working with the Departments of Defense and Labor, the Small Business Administration and other agencies, Commerce will use the unique flexibility of EDA's programs to identify and, where possible, fill any gaps that exist in the range of Federal assistance available to defense impacted communities, businesses and individuals. To this end the Commerce Department has established a toll free hot-line number that serves as a central clearinghouse for defense conversion assistance information. The number -- 1-800-345-1222 (219-8949 in Washington, D.C) -- is operated by EDA staff, Monday through Friday from 9:00 AM to 5:00 PM, in cooperation with each of the other Federal agencies involved in defense conversion assistance programs. EDA screened

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226 calls during the first two weeks of operation and provided information either directly or through referral to another appropriate Federal agency.

We recognize that this concentration of defense conversion activity, together with the recent emergency appropriation to the Agency for disaster recovery in Florida, Louisiana, Hawaii, Guam and Kansas, has altered the traditional agency programmatic balance. The Title IX Economic Adjustment Program is now about as large as the Title I Public Works Program, which has previously received the largest share of annual funding. To the extent necessary, the agency will reallocate its internal resources to adjust effectively to the new balance. We are also proposing an increase of \$3 million in salaries and expenses to strengthen management and to upgrade EDA management information systems.

Finally, the Department has other resources to address problems associated with the transition. For example, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has been working closely with the Advanced Research Projects Agency (formerly DARPA) and other Federal agencies on technology development and deployment issues that form an integral part of the President's defense conversion initiative. We also have a wealth of economic information at the Department's Economics and Statistics Administration that can be useful. The Census Bureau, for

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example, has information that can be used to draw economic profiles of the number and type of business establishments located in impacted areas, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis makes forecasts of industry impacts of planned defense spending on a national basis and can also supply basic local economic data, including estimates of personal income and employment and earnings. The International Trade Administration will also help our new and changing industries by opening additional foreign markets to U.S. products.

While the challenges are great, the President has outlined a plan that will help ensure the Federal Government does its fair share in helping communities to adjust to the post-Cold War economy. The Department of Commerce intends to put our resources to full use to ensure a coordinated Federal response that minimizes the impact of defense transition on our communities.

Thank you. .

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D C 20506

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March 30, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RAB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Defense Proposed Testimony on Military Unit Cohesion

The proposed testimony of Dr. David H. Marlowe was submitted for our review prior to his March 31 appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings on homosexuals in the military. As Chief of the Department of Military Psychiatry at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, he was asked to testify on the importance of unit cohesion in the military.

The statement provided at Tab II strictly adhered to the Committee's request for his views on "the importance of cohesion to the effectiveness of combat units, and on the factors that contribute to or detract from unit cohesion. No mention is made in the paper of the impact that lifting the ban on homosexuals in the military might have on unit cohesion. An inquiry to Dr. Marlowe's colleagues at Walter Reed (Dr. Marlowe was not available) indicates that no specific research has been done on the potential impact of homosexuals on unit cohesion.

Dr. Marlowe will testify on a panel that will include Dr. William Henderson (who is expected to support the ban) and Dr. Lawrence Korb (who is expected to oppose the ban). Dr. Marlowe is expected to avoid taking a specific stand, although the Committee members are certain to press him on the issue.

Concurrence by: Jeremy Rosner *[Signature]*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I concurring in the proposed testimony. A phone concurrence was provided at 3:00 p.m., March 30.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab II Proposed Testimony of Dr. David H. Marlowe

RESPONSE TO LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

You may also respond by (1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail if the analyst does not answer); (2) sending us a memo or letter; or (3) if you are an OASIS user in the Executive Office of the President, sending an E-mail message. Please include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.

FROM: _____ (Date)
 _____ (Name)
 _____ (Agency)
 _____ (Telephone)

The following is the response of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:

_____ Concur

_____ No objection

_____ No comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _____

_____ Other: _____

_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this
response sheet

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STATEMENT BY
DAVID H. MARLOWE PH.D.
CHIEF, DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY PSYCHIATRY
WALTER REED ARMY INSTITUTE OF RESEARCH

BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

FIRST SESSION, 103rd CONGRESS

MILITARY UNIT COHESION

31 MARCH 1993

CLEARED
FOR OPEN PUBLICATION

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DIRECTORATE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AND SECURITY (DFOIS)
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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Brief Biography

David H. Marlowe, born Brooklyn, New York, June 30, 1931, married, two children. B.A. Brooklyn College, 1952, M.A., 1955, Ph.D. (Social Anthropology) 1963, Harvard University. Service in U.S. Army 1956 - 1958, carried out research on psychiatric breakdown among Army trainees. Research Associate, Washington School of Psychiatry, 1958 - 1960 (field research on patterns of inter-group conflict among Somali nomads). Research Anthropologist, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 1961 - 1964, carried out research on patterns of delinquency at an Eastern Army Post. 1964, U.S. Army Medical Research Laboratory, Vietnam, research on the stresses of advisor-counterpart relations. 1964 - 1968, U.S. Army Component, SEATO Medical Research Laboratory, carried out research on group structure and socio-medical problems in North Thailand. 1969 - 1975, developed and directed field studies of the ecology and social behavioral aspects of drug and substance abuse at an Eastern Army Post. 1975 to present, Chief, Department of Military Psychiatry, WRAIR. Responsible for research programs in combat stress prevention, unit cohesion and assessment, field studies of the consequences of exposure to trauma in military groups, effects of combat exposure in Panama, head of "Human Dimensions field team assessing issues of cohesion, morale, adaptation and response to stress in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, etc..

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am Dr. David H. Marlowe, Chief of the Department of Military Psychiatry, Division of Neuro-Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. I understand that I have been invited here today in my personal capacity as an expert on cohesion in military units ~~and not as a representative of the Department of the Army.~~

I have a prepared statement on cohesion that I would like to present to the committee and enter into the record.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee and shall be happy to answer any questions you may have.

WRAIR STUDIES BEARING UPON COHESION AND ITS ANALYSIS

From its creation in 1951, in response to the medical and military problems generated by the high levels of "Combat Fatigue" casualties during World War II and the high proportion of combat stress casualties seen in the first phases of the Korean conflict, the Division of Neuro-psychiatry of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) initiated long-term research about the nature of cohesion and cohesive processes in military groups. The experience of World War II (see below) demonstrated that one of the most critical buffers against the effect of combat stress was small group and military unit cohesion. Issues involving military group structure and interaction, interpersonal behavior, soldier bonding, the effects of deviant behavior, such as delinquency and drug abuse, on group bonding and process have been a recurring part of our research agenda. Above all we have been primarily concerned with those aspects of group cohesiveness that enable the soldier to deal with the untoward stresses of combat and dangerous deployments. Our concern has been to define and, hopefully, to enhance both military unit cohesion and those particular aspects of it that buffer and mediate the effects of the acute and chronic stresses to which the soldier can be subjected and to optimize the maintenance of individual and organizational mental health.

From the latter period of the Vietnam conflict through the late 1970's both the line Army and Army medical research community expressed profound concerns about the levels of cohesiveness in U. S. units. Some Units in Vietnam had been polarized and riven by competing sub-groups committed not to their squads, platoons, or companies, but to others who behaved in an extra-military fashion. "Heads" (drug using groups) contended with "Juicers" (alcohol users), "hawks" with "doves", "Lifers" (career soldiers) with "O.S.s" (draftees), African Americans contended with Whites. Polarization and adherence to group identities and structures that were rooted outside the unit and the primary soldier group led to rapid rises in the incidence of "fragging" (attempts to kill unit leaders with fragmentation grenades or other arms) in 1970

and 1971. The 1971 rate per 1000 soldiers was 2.5 times the 1969 rate. Despite the low level of actual combat in the latter phases of the war, the incidence of psychiatric admissions, few of which were traditional combat stress casualties rose markedly. As MG Spurgeon Neal M.D. put it in his study Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam:

"Unlike World War II, in Vietnam the incidence of psychiatric admissions did not co-vary with the incidence of combat injury. Rates rose despite the diminishing combat role in that country in 1969 and 1970...For Vietnam it has been suggested that identity with another peer group, such as one based upon race, political affiliation, or drug use, at the unit level has threatened the integrity of the squad as the sole reference point for the soldier in combat"

Our concerns about levels of cohesion in units continued throughout the 1970's. In studies of the ecology of drug usage at an East Coast Army post we saw groups of drug users organized against the Army and their units. That cohesion which existed seemed primarily designed to enable drug using groups to protect their using behavior, often at the expense of the mission. Care, concern and support, and commitment to mission had eroded markedly in a number of units in both the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany. At the same time analyses of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war demonstrated that modern, highly accurate, highly lethal weaponry had the capacity to create combat stress casualties far more quickly, in days rather than the weeks and months, than at those rates that characterized the slower tempo of battle in previous Twentieth Century warfare. Our concerns, along with those of the senior leadership of the Army during the depths of the "hollow army" period, were obviously convergent and led to 12 years of major research focus on unit cohesion, its relationships and consequences.

In 1979 a group of us from the WRAIR made a presentation to the Army Policy Council on the historically affirmed relationship of military unit cohesion to resistance to combat stress and subsequent breakdown, and the new risks for psychological breakdown in battle demonstrated in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

In 1981, at the request of the ODCSER U.S. Army, the Dept. of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, under my direction, began a program of research and evaluation of a number of significant human issues bearing on soldier mental health, resistance to stress and potential combat performance sustainability of the Army's then new COHORT Unit Manning System, the first of a number of programs designed to enhance primary group and company/battery cohesion. The COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness and Training) program was designed to create conditions that would enable units to develop higher

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levels of cohesiveness and training. A primary reason for the creation of the COHORT program was to create unit climates that would mediate the effects of stress in combat and reduce the numbers of combat stress reactions. The evaluation research was conducted in response to a tasking received from The DCSPER of the Army, and was implemented via a research protocol "Behavioral and attitudinal consequences of social organization: Research study of selected COHORT companies, COHORT battalions, and the 9th Light Infantry Division in the US Army", which integrated a number of sub-studies. In the course of this program (1982 - 1989) quantitative data was gathered from over 225 combat arms units over a seven year period, and extensive individual and group interviewing was carried out in approximately 100 units, a number of which were studied repetitively over a period of years. Our major concerns were factors bearing upon the creation and maintenance of military unit cohesion and their relationship to soldier mental health, psychological readiness for combat and perceived unit effectiveness.

The ultimate tests of any set of ideas are to be found in their consequences in the real world. The world of the garrison and of training, stressful as it may sometimes be, is still a pale reflection of the world of ground combat. In 1989 at the request of the DCSOPS of the Army we began a debriefing program of soldiers in units that had seen combat in Operation Just Cause in Panama, carrying out an extensive interview and questionnaire program. This program, carried out in 13 Combat Arms and Military Police battalions focussed in greatest part on the relationships between unit cohesion and unit interpersonal relationships and the consequences, for the soldier, of exposure to the stresses and traumas of the combat environment.

In September 1990 at the direction of the then VCSA, GEN Sullivan, and the request of the then DCSPER, LTG Reno, we began an extensive program studying stress, adaptation, cohesion, sustainability, psychological readiness for combat and the psychological and psycho-social consequences of combat participation in U.S. Army troops deployed to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Teams were deployed four times to SWA. Once again we utilized a combination of questionnaires and unit interviews and debriefings. Pre and post combat data were gathered from battalions in six brigades both in SWA and upon return to CONUS and USAREUR. Five combat arms brigades were followed extensively, and other data has been and is still being collected on long term effects of deployment on 25000 service members in active duty and reserve units. In all of this work cohesion has thus far proven to be, both quantitatively and qualitatively, a critical variable affecting soldier handling of stress in combat.

COHESION

since the beginning of recorded history Armies and their leaders have had a profound concern about the cohesiveness of their constituent units. In its simplest form cohesion could be

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viewed as that set of factors and processes that bonded soldiers together and bonded them to their leaders so that they would stand in the line of battle, mutually support each other, withstand the shock, terror and trauma of combat, sustain each other in the completion of their mission and neither break nor run. Cohesion and the sense of mutual support were seen as essential in dealing with the fears and apprehensions that came as forces moved to battle and as even more critical in maintaining them in battle itself.

In psychological and social terms both pre-modern and modern warfare have demanded, within their tactical doctrines, differing technologies of warfare and the social organization of their combat forces, the systematic provision of high levels of group and psycho-social support to the soldier committed to battle if combat success is to be achieved. The earliest commentators understood the nature of the profound ties that should characterize the primary groups - those small groups of soldiers involved in face to face daily relationships upon whom success in battle depended.

Wu Ch'i, the great contemporary of Sun Tzu, writing some 2300 years ago described a victorious army in terms of proper discipline stating:

"What is called discipline is that when encamped their conduct is proper; that when on the move the army is awe inspiring, so that in advance it cannot be opposed. In retirement it cannot be pursued. In advance or retirement it is in good order....Though cut off they can reform; though dispersed they retain their files. Whether the position is secure or perilous the troops can be assembled and cannot be isolated."

In terms of creating such an Army Wu Ch'i goes on to say:

"Put men from the same villages together and the sections of ten and the squads of five will mutually protect each other."

This concept of small, tightly bonded, highly interdependent groups as the foundation and essential building block of the disciplined mass of pre modern armies was well understood from the classical period onward. In the Roman Legion, for example, it was acknowledged that the discipline and ordering of training, drill, and skills was dependent upon the social ordering, group identification and bonding of the Legionnaires.

Each legion was divided into 10 Cohorts of 1000 men, each Cohort into 10 Centuries under the command of a Centurion, and each Century was divided into squads or messes of 10 men under the command of a Decanus. These ten men, a Conturbina or Manipulus, trained, ate, lived and fought together as the equivalent of

a contemporary squad. One may trace a direct line of social descent, if you will, from the Conturbina through the squad comprised of the group of tent and mess mates that characterized the units of the American Civil War, to the squads, teams and crews that are the foundations of our contemporary military forces.

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Armies are not and never have been built on undifferentiated masses of soldiers operating singularly or as individuals, but are built out of highly interdependent small groups.

WORLD WAR II: THE EXTENSION OF THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF COHESION; COMBAT FATIGUE, SUSTAINMENT, AND PERFORMANCE

With the adoption of Selective Service and the expansion of U.S. military forces in preparation for possible involvement in World War II American psychiatry relied, initially, on its interpretations of the experience of World War I in considering the psychological sustainability of troops committed to combat. World War I military psychiatrists had correctly come to the conclusion that the large numbers of casualties classified as victims of "Shell Shock" or "War Neurosis" were essentially suffering from a class of psychological disorders rather than physically induced illnesses. Most had come to the conclusion, based upon both the psychiatric and neurological assumptions of the time, that the problem was one of individual predisposition and vulnerability based upon individual psychological and constitutional factors. Most authorities reasoned that "truly" normal men - the "psychologically strong" were at very low risk for psychological or performance breakdown in battle. Thus, with the initiation of the Draft in 1940, attempts to screen out the potentially vulnerable were central to thinking about the prevention of psychological casualties in war. Initially 5,250,000 were rejected by Selective Service and of these 1,686,000 (32%) were excluded for emotional, mental or "educational" disorders. An additional 504,000 were separated from the Army on psychiatric or behavioral grounds (Ginsberg, The Lost Divisions, Kings Press, Columbia University, New York, 1959). In addition to these outright rejections and separations, a consistent process of weeding out of those thought to be psychiatrically at risk and their movement to non-combatant service and service support units and positions, took place throughout World War II. This process was carried out by psychiatrists, other medical officers and commanders.

Despite this massive screening and purging of the potentially vulnerable, U.S. forces suffered high numbers of psychological casualties, primarily in the form of transient or more prolonged emotional and behavioral breakdown with inability to perform, called combat fatigue or combat exhaustion. Approximately one out of every five combat casualties suffered by U.S. forces was psychiatric/psychological. In addition it was observed that these overt combat fatigue casualties were but one category of risk generated by stress and concurrent psychological and psychophysiological breakdown. The breakdown of behavior came in many guises including death or wounding due to errors of judgment, sensory decrements or performance deficits generated by combat stress, an increase in illnesses known to have a psychogenic or psychosomatic component, increases in rates of injury and physical illness, and increases in illness that are preventable through volitional behavior, such as frostbite and malaria.

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between divisions in roughly equivalent actions and within divisions for different actions. In the latter case the most powerful single factor accounting for differences in rates is intensity and severity of combat, although other factors such as initial exposure to severe combat load the outcome. In the former case other factors, particularly cohesion and morale were consistently stated to be the major affectors of the rates.

The U.S. Army's intense attention to psychological breakdown in battle, its causes, and those factors that might prevent it or lower the levels of risk and enhance the sustainability of soldiers in combat came early in the war at the beginning of our commitment to offensive warfare in North Africa. At that time green units meeting a skilled and powerful enemy, the Afrika Korps, had unexpectedly massive numbers of combat psychological casualties, reaching levels as high as 15% of all casualties at the battles of the Kasserine and Faid passes.

In 1943 CPT Herbert Spiegel M.D., an Army psychiatrist, was sent to evaluate the factors that had affected performance and the levels of combat psychiatric casualties seen in the Tunisian campaign. Spiegel reported, in an article published in the Journal of the American Psychiatric Association in 1944, on the sustainment of performance of men in battle that:

"If abstract ideas - hate or desire to kill - did not serve as strong motivating forces, then what did serve them in that critical time? What enabled them to attack and attack, and attack week after week in mud, rain, dust and heat until the enemy was smashed? It seems to me that the drive was more a positive than a negative one. It was love more than hate. Love, manifested by 1) regard for their comrades who shared the same dangers, 2) respect for their platoon leader or company commander who led them wisely and backed them with everything at his command, 3) concern for their reputation with their commander and leaders, and 4) an urge to contribute to the task and success of their group and unit.

In other words, interpersonal relationships among men and between the men and their officers became more intense, and rank less important. These cohesive forces enabled them to identify themselves as part of their unit. It enabled them to muster and maintain their courage in the most trying circumstances. It even led them, at times to surprise themselves with gallant and heroic actions...."

This core issue of the powerful controlling role played by group relationships to effectiveness, sustainability and the maintenance of soldier mental health was underlined by the conclusions of the commission of civilian psychiatrists sent by the War Department to investigate the problem of combat fatigue in 1945. Their primary conclusion was that:

"...we mean to emphasize the fact that the organized pattern of the unit and its emotional bonds constitute

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the dominant constructive and integrative force for the individual soldier in his fighting function. This group life is his inner life. When an individual member of such a combat group has his emotional bonds of group integration seriously disrupted, then he, as a person, is thereby disorganized. The disruption of group unity is, in the main, a primary causal factor, not a secondary effect, of personality disorganization.

We find that American psychiatrists and other physicians have considerable difficulty in grasping the significance of the group as the core of personality organization for the soldier in his fighting function...."

COL Albert Glass M.D. summed it up, first at the WRAIR 1957 International Symposium on Preventive and Social Psychiatry, reviewing his experience in W. W. II and Korea:

"Available epidemiological data indicated that the mental illness of troops in warfare, exclusive of psychotic disorders, is more significantly related to circumstances of the combat situation than to any personality attributes or characteristics of the individuals who are exposed to battle stress. Pertinent combat circumstances include the intensity and duration of battle which can be measured by the battle casualty rate and the days of continuous action. However, of equal importance in determining the frequency of psychiatric cases are less measurable elements of battle; to wit, the degree of support given the individual by buddies, group cohesiveness, and leaders. These less tangible influences explain the marked differences that may occur in combat effectiveness and the frequency of psychiatric cases among units which are exposed to the same intensity and duration of battle."

And then in his landmark history of neuro-psychiatry in W.W.

II:

"Perhaps the most significant contribution of World War II military psychiatry was recognition of the sustaining influence of the small combat group or particular members thereof, variously termed "group identification," group cohesiveness," the buddy system, and "leadership."....

Awareness of the foregoing social and situational determinants facilitated the use of preventive measures to enhance group identification, improve leadership and generally raise the level of group morale."

A non psychiatrist, BG S. L. A. Marshall put the issue simply and forthrightly:

"The greatest enemy of the rifleman is individual loneliness. Man is a gregarious animal. His greatest steadying force is the touch of his fellows. Under battle's pressure, he cannot long endure out of sight and voice contact with them. It was so in the time of the

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Medas and the Persians; it will be so in the wars of undefined dimension in a terrible tomorrow. Such marvels as radio and television do not change it. We need the touch of the hand, even as we need the conviction that we are a useful part of something much larger and more important than ourselves, whenever the pressures of life put inordinate demands upon our frail persons."

These observations and the other studies carried out during World War II and subsequent conflicts are responsible for the extensive research commitment of contemporary military psychiatry to the issue of cohesion, the analysis of the social organization and structure of military groups. For three decades my colleagues and I have been working to try to better understand the group processes, issues of individual and group identity, the patterns of interpersonal relationship and those other factors that protect the soldier against psychological and behavioral breakdown or that may conduce to it.

We have focussed on and explored the definition of the major psycho-social correlates and predictors of unit effectiveness and performance and sustainment of individuals and groups under stress and the nature, structure and processes of group bonding and identification.

The psycho-social factors involved have variously been referred to in military studies as "unit cohesion," "cohesion," "morale," "unit esprit," "leadership," and "unit climate." When they are analyzed they can be separated out into a set of differentiable but interrelated components. These component factors interact and cumulate to have powerful consequences for the performance and readiness of units as corporate endeavors, and their individual members in peacetime, and the effectiveness and sustainability of both in combat.

CLASSES AND CONTEXT OF MILITARY UNIT COHESION

Cohesion is neither an entity or a thing. It is not, as I have tried to indicate, a single or singular factor. It is partly a state, i.e., the unit existing as a cohesive corporate body. In other aspects it is a process comprised of ongoing interactions, judgments, perceptions, sentiments and relationships within the squad, crew, company or battery. In our work over the past years we have divided cohesion into two general categories, each has strong effects on the other but each is amenable to fairly independent analysis. These are Horizontal and Vertical cohesion. Horizontal cohesion comprehends those factors that bond and integrate the primary group, team, crew, squad and section and the extended primary group; the platoon. When we speak of horizontal cohesion we refer then to soldiers who are essentially peers as junior enlisted and junior non commissioned officers. When we speak of vertical cohesion we are speaking of the components of that bonding that exists between these soldiers and their leaders, senior non-commissioned officers and officers at the company/battery level. It is important to point out that the

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unit of analysis in which we define and measure cohesive processes and cohesion in ground combat forces is the company or battery.

Based on a large number of studies done since World War II and the body of evidence provided by Military History, memoirs and novels by active combatants, oral historical sources and our own past research, the company or battery is the largest unit in which actual interactive cohesive processes exist for most soldiers. If it is a truism that soldiers, once committed to combat, fight for each other more than for any other value or end it is critical to underline that under normal circumstances the group involved is limited to the company or battery. The strongest relationships are to be found between members of the same squad, crew or section, the next strongest within the platoon, and the outer boundary is essentially the company or battery. Our observations have underlined the fact that it is the strength of the ties within a soldier's basic primary group (squad, crew or section), seconded by his ties to his wider interactive groups (platoon and company) and the degrees to which he feels confidence and trust in the company and platoon and his unit leaders, that most effect performance.

The company is the human environment in which the soldier's face to face relationships take place. These are the relationships which provide the soldier with the primary social and psychological support that are critical to mediating the stresses of training and combat.

It must be realized that the overwhelming majority of influences on the soldier's life, commitment, satisfaction, and feelings and perceptions about the possibility of going into combat and the Army in general, are focused upon and attributed to the company/battery level. Generalities of command and organizational climate, decisions made at higher levels that affect the soldier's or his family's life for good or ill are reallocated within the company and attributed in part or in full to the company chain of command. The command climate of the wider organization, particularly of the battalion, can have powerful effects on relationships between leaders and soldiers, and between soldiers within a company or battery.

However, while a Battalion Commander, or even a Brigade or Division Commander, who is perceived as an extraordinary leader may increase a sense of common identity among his troops, such a leader may have little or no effect on patterns of face to face interaction. As in the past, and for all but its most senior leaders, the company is the arena of the overwhelming majority of intimate social, recreational and supportive interaction and relationships. During duty hours and, above all during deployments, the company defines the soldiers possible social universe.

A measure of the powerful degree to which the company and its constituents, platoon, squad etc., order relationships may be seen in a large scale sociometric study which we carried out at an Eastern Army Post in 1973. Soldiers were asked to indicate friends on Post by unit and individuals with whom they shared off

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duty recreational interests. There were over a thousand respondents who made over 4000 choices. The overall results were:

Choices within own unit (Company)	3,438
Choices in other units.....	741
Percent of choices in own Company.....	82.2%

The company level, then, is that at which we analyze and evaluate cohesion. It is at this level that we find the components of the relationships that are critical to the soldier's confidence and to his ability to survive and win in combat. The greater the personal trust that the soldier has in his peers, the greater the confidence that the soldier has in the skills of his fellow soldiers and the tactical skills of his company level leadership, the effectiveness with which his company operates and uses its weapons systems, the greater, in general, will be the units capacity to fight effectively and to sustain itself. The greater, also will be the capacity of its soldiers to sustain themselves and perform effectively for long periods in face of the stresses and trauma of combat and commitment of going against fire.

Soldiers' affiliations with larger organizations, battalions, Brigades, Regiments, Divisions, are essentially symbolic. They may play important roles in defining the soldiers self image, his expectations, and his belief in the power and effectiveness of his organization to execute its mission but they play little part in the soldiers daily routine or in the universe of his face to face behavior.

THE COMPONENTS OF COHESION MEASUREMENT AND ASSESSMENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL READINESS FOR COMBAT AND PROJECTED SUSTAINABILITY OF UNITS AND SOLDIERS

In our NRAIR studies of cohesion and in its analysis, assessment, and evaluation we see it as a major contributor to psychological readiness for, and sustainability in, combat of companies and batteries, and as critical to the maintenance of the mental health of soldiers in face of the exposure to peacetime and wartime stresses and trauma. We have developed an analytic framework for assessing, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the various components of both cohesion classes, horizontal and vertical. For the past twelve years these assessments have been carried out utilizing a combination of unit interviewing/debriefing and a series of questionnaires based upon and developed out work carried out in the U.S. and other armies since 1941. Such data have served as an excellent guide, at very high levels of correlation, to actual combat performance in both the U.S. (particularly during World War II in ETO) and other armies (particularly the Israeli Defense Force).

The data base out of which our assessment instruments were developed is, therefore, a wide scale one involving convergent

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quantitative and qualitative data sources. The sources are: historical; sociological; psychological; and observational with a bias towards measuring and evaluating those factors that have correlated best with assessed performance, combat outcomes, and measures of soldier mental health. Among the sources utilized in the framework and development of our work were: the results of the "Field Forces" surveys undertaken by the AG Research Branch in World War II (some published in Stouffer et al., The American Soldier, others archived as "special studies"); extensive analysis of unit performance and levels of generation or combat stress casualties in WW II and Korea undertaken by Division Psychiatrists and Corps and Theater Psychiatric consultants; oral historical materials; military historical and climetric materials; post combat debriefings carried out by WRAIR and other personnel in Korea, Viet Nam, Grenada, and Panama; pre and post combat interview data gathered in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm; and data gathered in the course of assessing cohesion processes and levels in the Army's COHORT program and in the development of the Army's light infantry divisions. A number of studies carried out by the Israeli Defense Forces since 1973 have also been utilized.

Based upon these data sources we define each class of "military unit cohesion" as containing the following specific components:

A. EXTENDED HORIZONTAL COHESION:

By extended horizontal cohesion we mean the bonding established between soldiers at junior enlisted through junior NCO ranks (e.g. essentially pay grades E-1 through E-5). The major components of this class of military unit cohesion include:

1. Belief that members of the primary group have the skills and abilities to successfully carry out their military tasks.

2. Belief that members of ones group will fully participate in organizational tasks and pull "their own weight."

3. Belief that the group can functionally organize itself for effective optimum performance because of its members' extensive knowledge of each others strengths and weaknesses.

4. Affective or emotional ties between soldiers as friends or buddies characterized by mutual trust and confidence and belief in group members' personal reliability.

5. Significant openness of relationships and expectation that support will be provided by other soldiers to help group members to deal with personal, family and organizational stress and minimize its effects.

6. Belief that members of the primary group are committed to taking care of each other and that in situations of stress, pressure, challenge or danger, will look out for, protect and aid each other.

Analytically we normally assess these components of Horizontal Cohesion in terms of three more inclusive factors:

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1. Affective bonding in the groups.
2. Military skill, competence and effectiveness.
3. Instrumental ties, e.g., reciprocal obligations to protect and "look out for" each other.

B. EXTENDED VERTICAL COHESION:

Of equal importance to horizontal cohesion as a sustaining factor in combat are the soldiers perceptions of and relationships with his leaders. Like extended horizontal cohesion, extended vertical cohesion is also a multiplex measure. It integrates the soldier's perceptions and evaluations of the key leaders in his chain of command and is an expression of general leader-soldier "integration". It is also weighted by the soldier's perception of the unit's key and critical leaders. In establishing the company or battery context and climate these leaders are; the Company/Battery Commander, the First Sergeant and the Platoon Sergeant. When deployed, the Platoon leaders importance rises dramatically.

The primary components of extended vertical cohesion include the following basic elements which bear on unit effectiveness and psychological resiliency:

1. Perceived technical and tactical competency of leaders.
2. Perceived degree to which leaders are concerned about the personal lives, needs and "dignity" of their subordinates, including perceived equity and lack of favoritism.
3. Perceived degree of predictability of leader actions, decisions, time management and prioritization of soldier activities and needs, particularly as it reflects upon (2) above.
4. Perceived level and accuracy of leader-soldier communication.
5. Leader abilities to impart skills to soldiers and provide effective training.

These components are normally subsumed into two broader factors characterizing extended vertical cohesion. These are:

1. Perceived professional and technical competency, trustworthiness to lead in combat.
2. Perceived care and concern for the soldier,

A number of other perceptions, grounded in the soldiers actual experiences in the unit, the challenges that the unit has met together through time, ongoing patterns of training, weapons system operation and maintenance, trust in the tactical competency of the unit overall, and perceived unit concern for soldiers' families also contribute to the development of patterns of cohesion and to the psychological readiness of the unit to enter combat and sustain itself.

FACTORS THAT ESTABLISH UNIT COHESION

Horizontal and Vertical cohesion and the interactive, behavioral and perceptual components discussed above do not exist

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as an isolated set of interpersonal actions. They are the product of a set of powerful contextual factors that establish the environment and conditions in which the interactive and interpersonal actions and perceptions take place. These contextual factors shape and order the perceptions and acts that we measure as "cohesion".

The contextual factors necessary to create small unit cohesion in Army organizations are derived from the following wider patterns:

1. A common and shared organizational culture and values.
2. Common status and primary identity as soldiers, for all members of the unit.
3. A commonly shared language, constructs, and metaphors characterizing members of the primary group.
4. Experiences in which the group collectively undergoes a series of challenges and stresses and successfully achieves a set of goal in which the members of the group see themselves as having successfully mastered a set of skills and demonstrated their competency executing these skills in order to achieve their goals.
5. Minimal unnecessary turbulence and continuity of tenure within units.

THE CREATION OF A COMMON ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND VALUES

The primary mechanism and process utilized by the U. S. Army for socializing soldiers into a common organizational culture with common values and language, and a common identity is Initial Entry Training. We have had occasion to study IET four times in the past 30 some odd years. It consistently proves to be the most powerful creator of the contextual bases for cohesion as well as to be the single most powerful bonding experience and model of the behavior required to be part of a military group for first term soldiers.

IET provides, for almost all soldiers who complete it, a series of both individual and group successes in the form of tasks accomplished and mastery gained. In its collective tasks, its buddy system, its structured demands for interdependent and cooperative behavior, its highly defined requirement for group support to ensure success, and its well structured feedback and reward system for task mastery and "jobs well done", it provides both the opportunity for and the experience of extraordinary bonding to the soldiers who are members of the primary group.

The primary group may center on the squad, but usually extends to include the entire IET platoon and secondarily the company. This experience creates much of the internal model the young soldier will carry into the field Army. For the overwhelming majority of young soldiers, the IET experience is unique and represents a significant discontinuity from previous patterns of living and social relationships centered on individual performance and individual need satisfaction.

Most critically, the individual undergoes a positive identi-

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ty transformation, from civilian to soldier. This new identity establishes the young soldier's new status position and creates that set of expectations and cultural norms about the bounds and content of soldierly behavior expected of self and others. The new soldier almost invariably sees this IET period and identity transformation as a transition involving great personal growth and maturation.

For the overwhelming majority of trainees the experience of IET is also charismatic in the traditional sense of that word. Part of the identity transformation and extraordinarily positive response that the new soldier feels comes from the powerful experience of bonded membership in highly organized and effective primary and secondary groups: the IET squad and platoon, and the company and the Army. The new soldier sees himself as possessing greatly increased personal confidence, competency and ability. There is a new sense of power to meet challenges and conquer obstacles derived membership in his military group, its support and the successes achieved in the course of the training process. This transformation is buttressed by the strong bonding of trainees to their primary group leaders, their Drill Sergeants- who serve as powerful role models after whom trainees begin to shape and mold their own behavior. Drill Sergeants are perceived as embodiments of competency and effectiveness. Highly skilled leaders and teachers, taking care of their men and solving the problems of group members. They are also perceived as possessing exceptional power and authority, particularly to make the Army system responsive to soldiers' real needs.

The leaders greatest potency in defining the military group and creating its significance for new soldiers comes from their capacity to lead and teach, bringing the group from one measurable success to another. The training process and its leaders create a cognitive model of the cohesive, effective, military unit. They create the conditions in which new soldiers internalize this model and as esteemed leaders work to enhance to the bonding of the group, the importance of this bonding, both individual and collective self esteem, confidence and interdependence.

This takes place through continuous drill sergeant and trainee interaction and continuous role modeling and encouragement of bonding within a structure that tries to achieve continuous interplay between individual and collective success in achieving a high density of visible goals.

This pattern of events and experiences in training, underlain by the continuing and consistent support and help that trainees must give each other, develops powerful ties between the members of the group. It also creates the anticipation that such ties are critical to the maintenance and sustenance of all future primary military groups the soldier will enter. Initially, the reasons for the necessity for such strong bonding are primarily instrumental and operational, but they also develop significant affective and emotional content. This content is primarily expressed, particularly in the latter part of the training

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cycle, in the concept of the primary group "being like a family". As fellow trainees and "buddies", particularly building upon the required buddy pairings and primary group responsibilities in training. While in most cases the bonding of the group in the training company is seen as transient, it creates a powerful and important template. The effective primary group is to be a family or like a family. The more cohesive the group the more extensively and intensively soldier relationships are seen as familial and primary group obligations and commitments as those siblings are expected to have to each other imbued with the same level of commonality and trust that siblings should feel.

This socialization or "soldierization" process experienced in the Army Training Center, critically defines for the new soldier a new and powerful status and appended role - soldier, and the behaviors to be expected from those who play that role.

Initial Entry Training does not replace the previous personality or values brought into the Army by the new soldier. Rather it adds to these a new role with a new set of behaviors and standards, those that are to be exhibited, expected of others, and acted in terms of while serving as a soldier and as a member of a squad, team or crew.

These new role perceptions and the new and powerful knowledge that the group and its members' behavior are critical to ones own performance and potential survival have important consequences, both in the IET company and in future assignments. The trainees become more attentive over time to the abilities and behavior of their fellows. In the forcing ground of the training company, one's behavior comes under a searching scrutiny that seldom, if ever, exists in civil life. Both gross behavior and nuances are continually evaluated by other trainees. The poor performer, the non-adaptor or non-learner, the probable delinquent, the individual who places his or her own immediate needs above the welfare of the group, and others who impress their peers over time as potential ineffectives come to be seen as long term dangers to the group.

Initially the group will support, help, and try to work with each of its members. Ultimately, however, the group will reject the individual who appears to embody a threat based upon his or her behavior. That person will be extruded and isolated. The group will behaviorally disengage from the extruded member and psychologically bound itself against him and leave him to fail by himself.

COMMON STATUS AND PRIMARY IDENTITY

Each time a soldier enters a new unit, he or she is the object of a quiet but searching assessment by the members of the primary group already there. While some people are accepted and bonded into the unit almost immediately, much of our data has demonstrated a two phased aspect to the incorporation process. The first phase involves assessment of the soldier as member of

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the group in garrison. Most soldiers maintain that it takes between two and five weeks to determine whether a new squad or platoon member is trustworthy, meets standards, and shares enough of a common culture to be bonded into the group. The process is more intense for those who live in the barracks, where off duty as well as duty time is shared, and more focussed on duty performance and behavior for the married soldier who lives off post. The second phase takes place during the first shared prolonged field exercise where the newcomer is again assessed, both in terms of field and potential combat skills, and in terms of his or her ability to get along with others under conditions of stringency and deprivation. During duty hours, in the field or when deployed the individual is continuously evaluated by his or her peers as a "person", as a group member demonstrating primary loyalty and trustworthiness to the group, and in the exhibition of technical competence. Presenting a non-group based identity or commitment to the group has the potential to rupture group bonding. If such an identity is perceived as threatening to the survival of the group in combat as, for example, the occasional insistence of drug users in Vietnam on using drugs when on patrol, the group will take extreme and hostile action. The soldier must "belong" and belonging depends upon each member of the group playing his or her appropriate role while on duty.

The profound interdependency that characterizes military groups is grounded in the need for extraordinary levels of interpersonal trust. Common language, values and perceptions are the modes of communicating and expressing this trust. It is the foundation of that ultimately selfless and extraordinarily intimate agape like love that characterizes the primary group in combat. As one wounded veteran put it during World War II, as quoted in The American Soldier:

"You know the men in your outfit. You have to be loyal to them. The men get close knit together. They like each other - quit their petty bickering and having enemies. They depend on each other - wouldn't do anything to let the rest of them down. They'd rather be killed than do that. They begin to think the world of each other. It's the main thing that keeps a guy from going haywire."

This same deep intimacy is implicit in the following passage from Roger Little's study of an infantry company in Korea when he was assigned to WRAIR during the Korean Conflict:

"...From comments of these men and others, and the way they behaved, a set of norms that seemed to guide the behavior of buddies can be formulated.

First, a buddy had to "understand" in a deeply personal sense. Buddies became therapists to one another. Infantrymen were most likely to encounter situations provoking unusual and deviant reactions. One man said of another whom he had chosen as a buddy, "Our minds seem to run together."

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 "A buddy understands you and is interested in your story. Some big mouths talk as if everyone is interested in their story, but they're not. You've got to find a guy you like and he likes you, then you're buddies and you know he'll listen to you when you want to talk. A buddy shares everything; if you don't get mail, he lets you read him."

This same profundity of the relationship between combat soldiers (in this case Marines) in Vietnam was feelingly put by Philip Caputo in his introduction to *A Rumor of War*:

"I have also attempted to describe the intimacy of life in I (infantry) battalions, where the communion between men is as profound as any between lovers. Actually, it is more so. It does not demand for its sustenance the reciprocity, the pledges of affection, the endless reassurances required by the love of men and women. It is, unlike marriage, a bond that cannot be broken by a word, by boredom or divorce, or by anything other than death. Sometimes even that is not strong enough. Two friends of mine died trying to save the corpses of their men from the battlefield. Such devotion, simple and selfless, the sentiment of belonging to each other, was the one decent thing we found in a conflict otherwise notable for its monstrosities"

In our work in both Operation Just Cause and Operation Desert Storm we heard the same theme expressed over and over again. In squad after squad, in its simplest and most powerful form we were told:

"We are family. We are brothers. We can make it only because we have each other."

OTHER FACTORS BEARING UPON COHESION

A number of other factors that bear upon military unit are worth mentioning at this point. Continuity and tenure in the military unit with ample time for both mastery of collective skills and establishment of the deep relationships of trust is critical. Such tenure, combined with prolonged, demanding and challenging field training provided the basic conditions for soldiers getting to know each other in depth. It brings with it the intimate knowledge of each other, of skills, strengths and weaknesses, and knowledge of how to provide both emotional and technical support that both creates and sustains the highly effective unit. The highest average levels of cohesion that we have ever measured in regular Army units that are not "hyper-elite" like the Ranger battalions, were units in Saudi Arabia in November/December of 1990 and early January of 1991. In all of our interviews, as well as our quantitative data, soldiers were agreed that the prolonged period of living together with each other and their leaders, working together, training hard, and

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becoming "a family" was critical to their ability to withstand the prolonged stresses of the Shield period (separation, heat, crowding, isolation, etc.). It was also widely perceived as having been critical to the achievement of the extremely high level of effectiveness and success when committed to combat. There was a widespread feeling that the very high levels of cohesion and corporate skill achieved in the desert had been critical in the absolute minimization of the number of casualties that U.S. ground forces had taken in combat.

It should be pointed out that our follow up work on ODS has shown a drop in the high levels of cohesion that characterized the force in ODS. While some of this was predictable our interviews have indicated that an appreciable amount of this drop is probably due to the high levels of turbulence and turnover that have come with the downsizing of the army and the withdrawal of troops from Germany.

The issue of continuity and prolonged field and training time together is of special importance given the demography of the new volunteer, professional army with its high married content. In the era of the draft army the majority of off duty time was spent with other soldiers in ones unit, today this true only of the single, unmarried soldier living in the billets. The married soldier spends his or her off duty time with spouse and children. Overall this has lessened the degree to which informal, off duty relationships and interaction extend and support interpersonal bonding in the company or battery. High levels of bonding thus appear to require more continuity of tenure and field experience than they may have in the past.

COHESION AND FUTURE WARFARE

We face grave difficulties whenever we attempt to extrapolate from today to "the day after tomorrow." However I believe that only in understanding the compelling enduring human realities of combat and military organization can we contend with the future. I would offer the thought that technological advances, smaller forces, battlefield dispersal and the shift to a force projection modality have made the continuing maintenance of highly cohesive military units more important to the future than they even have been in the past and the immediate present. In the past, in time of danger we have usually been, one way or another, afforded the luxury of time in which to create highly cohesive units to counterpunch or strike the enemy. When we have not had that luxury the results, as in the initial weeks of the Korean Conflict, were disastrous for our soldiers. The speed with which events and their consequences now overtake us make it imperative that our forces be able to make an immediate transition from peace to war. High continuing levels of cohesion are critical to making that transition with maximum unit effectiveness and minimal short or long term negative effects on the mental and physical health of the soldier. We must always remain aware of the admonition of Cato the Elder and it should

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constantly underlie our concerns that:

"...misconduct in the common affairs of life may be retrieved, but that it is quite otherwise in war, where errors are fatal and without remedy, and are followed by immediate punishment."

COHESION, STRESS, TRAUMA AND MENTAL HEALTH: SOME FINDINGS FROM JUST CAUSE AND DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

In the last two armed conflicts that U.S. Army units have been engaged in we have, among many other factors and findings been able to establish quantitatively as well as qualitatively that:

1. Buddy and fellow squad and platoon members are the primary sources of social support enabling the soldier to deal with the anticipatory stresses of combat, the stresses of the combat situation and post-combat feelings.
2. That both horizontal and vertical cohesion of the unit during the combat period and the unit in the post combat period have strong effects on the post combat adjustment and the levels of post combat stress symptoms that the soldier experiences.
3. That both pre and post combat psychological symptoms are significantly affected by levels of unit cohesion. Expected apprehension about potential commitment to combat is not simply an individual and independent phenomenon but is mediated and affected by unit cohesion levels.
4. The primary factors in the management of deployment stress were squad/platoon cohesion and leader behavior and image.
5. Perception of leaders exerted a strong effect on levels of report of psychological symptoms by soldiers.
6. Consistently, our longer term follow up shows that post combat stress symptoms and post combat adjustment are both mediated by levels of past and present unit cohesion.

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4000

March 24, 1993

Major General Jerry C. Harrison
Chief, Legislative Liaison
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310-1600

Dear General Harrison:

The Senate has directed the Committee on Armed Services to "conduct comprehensive hearings with respect to the service of homosexuals in the military services." The Committee intends to begin those hearings later this month.

The Committee's opening hearings will set the context for our review by examining the historical and legal background of current Defense Department policies, and the relevance of unit cohesion and its implications on readiness.

We would like to invite Dr. David Marlowe, Chief, Department of Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, to testify before the Committee on Wednesday, March 31 on work the Institute has done on unit cohesion. The hearing will start at 9:30 a.m. in room SN-218 of the Senate Hart Office Building. The Committee would like Dr. Marlowe to submit his prepared remarks for this hearing to the Committee at least two full working days prior to the hearing.

The Committee would like Dr. Marlowe to provide as broad a survey as possible on the recent research done in the area of unit cohesion. The Committee is particularly interested in Dr. Marlowe's views on the importance of cohesion to the effectiveness of combat units, and on the factors that contribute to or detract from unit cohesion.

Dr. Marlowe will be testifying on a panel that will include Dr. William Darryl Henderson, Colonel, USA (Ret.), and Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, of the Brookings Institution.

03/29/93

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We appreciate your assistance in this important matter, and look forward to Dr. Marlowe's testimony before the Committee. If you or Dr. Marlowe have any questions, please contact us or Mr. Fred Pang of the Committee staff at (202) 224-3128.

Sam M

**Sam Hutton
Chairman**

Sincerely,

John H. Harned

Strom Thurmond
Ranking Minority Member

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D C 20506

0850

March 30, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Defense Draft Bill DoD Legislative Program for the First Session of the 103rd Congress (DoD 103-001)

At Tab II Defense recommends the repeal of section 2403 of title 10, United States Code, which would eliminate the requirement that a contract for the production of a weapon system either contains written guarantees or a waiver is obtained from the Secretary of Defense with Congressional notification.

DoD recently conducted a case study review of the administration of DoD warranties to determine the extent to which warranty benefits (as stated in contract warranty provisions) are realized by DoD. This review concluded that there are significant limitations in the ability of the military services to effectively administer these warranties. They are time consuming and add to the cost of administering programs. Finally, warranty benefits are not fully realized on DoD contracts.

The proposed repeal recognizes the fact that the decision to include a warranty in a contract is best determined on a case-by-case basis. Repeal of this legislation would give DoD the flexibility to selectively apply and to tailor guarantees for each weapon system. Other big "buyers" in the government, such as GSA, NASA and OSTP, agree with proposal.

While this proposal is in keeping with the Administration's efforts to streamline defense acquisition and make our programs more affordable, repealing the warranty requirement without instituting alternative means for holding contractors accountable runs counter to the intent of Congress and opens the way for possible procurement abuses.

Concurrence by: Don Gross *DG* JEREMY ROSNER *JR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I nonconcurring in the proposal and recommending that Defense investigate alternatives for addressing Congressional concerns on this issue before resubmitting this proposal.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D C 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: Defense Draft Bill DoD Legislative Program for the
First Session of the 103rd Congress (DoD 103-001)

The National Security Council staff nonconcurs in the Defense proposal to repeal section 2403 of title 10, United States Code. While this proposal is in keeping with the Administration's efforts to streamline defense acquisition and make military programs more affordable, repealing the contractor warranty requirement without instituting alternative means for holding contractors accountable runs counter to the intent of Congress and could lead to abuses in the procurement system.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

SPECIAL

February 19, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #D-32
DRAFT #12

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

ENERGY - Bob Rabben - (202)586-6718 - 209
GSA - Gerald L. Grant - (202)501-0563 - 237
NASA - Mary D. Kerwin - (202)358-1948 - 219
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)456-6534 - 249
TRANSPORTATION - Tom Herlihy - (202)366-4687 - 226

FROM: RONALD K. PETERSON (for). *Ronald K. Peterson*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: MIKE GOAD (395-7301)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-6194

SUBJECT: DEFENSE Draft Bill Department of Defense
Legislative Program for the First Session of
the 103d Congress (DOD 103-001)

DEADLINE: MONDAY, March 15, 1993

COMMENTS: The Department of Defense proposed draft bill (DOD 103-001) is an omnibus bill consisting of more than 80 sections that would authorize various activities. Only section 620 of DOD 103-001, as well as the transmittal letter and applicable sectional analysis, is attached.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:
R. Dotson
K. MacIntyre
B. Thierwechter
C. Vallina

DRAFT FOR OMB A-19 REVIEW

Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Enclosed is a legislative proposal of the Department of Defense, "To authorize certain military activities of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes."

This proposal is part of the Department of Defense Legislative Program for the 103d Congress. The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of Congress.

Purpose of the Proposal

The proposed legislation would provide needed authorities and revisions to existing authorities to better manage the Department of Defense. The specific purposes of the bill are explained in the enclosed sectional analysis.

Cost and Budget Data

Enactment of this proposal will cause no overall increases in the budgetary requirements of the Department of Defense. Savings made from the enactment of some proposals will offset the minimal costs of others. Specific costs are set forth in the sectional analysis.

Sincerely,

Enclosures:
Draft bill
Sectional Analysis

A BILL

To authorize certain military activities of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States*
2 *of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Legislative Program
5 for the First Session of the 103d Congress".

23 **SEC. 620. REQUIREMENT FOR CONTRACTOR GUARANTEES FOR**
24 **WEAPON SYSTEMS REPEALED.**

1 Section 2403 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.

**Section. 620. Requirement for Contractor Guarantees for Weapon
Systems Repealed.**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 30, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*FROM: RICHARD HOOKER *RH*SUBJECT: Defense Draft Bill RE DOD Legislative Program for
the First Session of the 103rd Congress (DOD 103-
001, Sections 103, 501, 502, and 616)

We reviewed and recommend approval for the legislative proposals cited above, except for section 502. Section 103 provides and authorizes the Marine Corps to expend \$150,000 to maintain Pacific Battle Monuments. Section 501 authorizes the National Defense University to grant graduate degrees to students upon completion of its courses of instruction. Section 616 authorizes the Secretary of the Air Force to establish an Aviation Leadership Program to train officers from foreign air forces.

We recommend that you not approve section 502, which authorizes the Air University to grant graduate degrees to its graduates. This program has not received appropriate civilian accreditation and therefore does not meet the prerequisites set by Congress for favorable review.

Concurrence by: Keith Hahn *KH*RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum concurring with all proposals except section 502.

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to OMB
Tab II	Section 103 Draft Language
Tab III	Section 501 and 502 Draft Language
Tab IV	Section 616 Draft Language

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: Defense Draft Bill Review (DOD 103-001, Sections
103, 501, 502, 616)

The National Security Council staff concurs with draft proposals discussed in DOD 103-001, sections 103, 501, and 616. We nonconcur with section 502, which authorizes the Air University to award graduate degrees without appropriate civilian accreditation.

8 **SEC. 103. PACIFIC BATTLE MONUMENTS MAINTENANCE.**

9 (a) **AUTHORITY.**—The Commandant of the United States Marine Corps may
10 provide necessary minor maintenance and repairs to Pacific battle monuments
11 until such time as the Secretary of the American Battle Monuments
12 Commission and the Commandant of the Marine Corps agree that the repair
13 and maintenance will be performed by the American Battle Monuments
14 Commission.

15 (b) **FUNDING TO REPAIR AND RELOCATE PACIFIC BATTLE MONUMENTS.**—Of the
16 amounts made available to the Marine Corps for operation and maintenance in
17 each fiscal year, not more than \$15,000 each fiscal year shall be available to
18 repair and maintain Pacific battle monuments. Of the amounts available to
19 the Marine Corps for operation and maintenance in fiscal year 1993, \$150,000
20 shall be available to repair and relocate a monument located on Iwo Jima
21 commemorating the sacrifice of American military personnel during World War
22 II.

**SEC. 501. AUTHORIZATION FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF
SCIENCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY DEGREE
AND THE MASTER OF SCIENCE OF NATIONAL
RESOURCE STRATEGY DEGREE.**

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 108 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 2162 the following new section:

**"§ 2163. National Defense University: master of science of
national security strategy and master of science of
national resource strategy**

"(a) MASTER OF SCIENCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY.—Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, and upon recommendation by the faculty and commandant of the National War College, the President of the National Defense University may confer the degree of master of science of national security strategy upon graduates of the National War College who have fulfilled the requirements for that degree.

"(b) MASTER OF SCIENCE OF NATIONAL RESOURCE STRATEGY.—Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, and upon recommendation by the faculty and commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the President of the National Defense University may confer the degree of master of science of national resource strategy upon graduates of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces who have fulfilled the requirements for that degree."

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 2162 the following new item:

- 1 "2163. National Defense University: master of science of national security strategy and master of science of
- 2 national resource strategy."

3 **SEC. 502. AUTHORIZATION FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF**
4 **AIRPOWER ARTS AND SCIENCES DEGREE.**

5 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Chapter 901 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
6 inserting after section 9316 the following new section:

7 **"§ 9317. Air University: master of airpower arts and sciences**

8 Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Air Force, and upon the
9 recommendation of the faculty of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, the
10 Commander of the Air University may confer the degree of master of airpower
11 arts and sciences upon graduates of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies
12 who fulfill the requirements for that degree."

13 (b) **CLERICAL AMENDMENT.**—The table of sections at the beginning of such
14 chapter is amended by inserting after the item related to section 9316 the
15 following new item:

16 **"9317. Air University: master of airpower arts and sciences."**

University: Master of Science of National Security Strategy and Master of Science of National Resource Strategy. This would authorize the President of the National Defense University to confer a master of national security strategy and master of national resource strategy degree upon graduates of the National War College and Industrial College of Armed Forces, respectively.

Section 502. Authorization for the Award of the Master of Airpower Arts and Sciences Degree.

Section 502 adds a new section (9317) to title 10, United States Code. This section authorizes the Commander, Air University, to confer upon graduates of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies who have completed all requirements, the degree of Master of Airpower Arts and Sciences. The authority to award the degree is to be exercised under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Air Force.

(B) in part III of subtitle D the second occasion it appears, by inserting after the item relating to section 9355 the following new items:

"CHAPTER 905—AVIATION LEADERSHIP PROGRAM

"Sec.

"9381. Findings.

"9382. Establishment of program.

"9383. Supplies and clothing.

"9384. Allowances."

(2) The table of chapters of subtitle D of title 10, United States Code, at the beginning of such subtitle, and the table of chapters of part III of subtitle D of title 10, United States Code, at the beginning of such part, are amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 903 in both instances the following new item:

"905. Aviation Leadership Program..... 9381".

chartered aircraft.

Section 616. Aviation Leadership Program.

Section 616 amends title 10, United States Code, by adding Chapter 905, entitled "Aviation Leadership Program." Chapter 905 would authorize the Secretary of the Air Force to establish an Aviation Leadership Program. This program would provide undergraduate pilot training and related training to personnel of the air forces of friendly foreign, less-developed nations. Section 616 would authorize the Secretary to provide transportation, supplies, equipment, and special clothing for the use of such personnel, and may pay them a living allowance. Section 616 would become effective on October 1, 1993.

0850
SPECIAL

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

February 19, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #D-22
DRAFT #12

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

ABMC - Col. William E. Ryan, Jr. - (202)272-0536 - 268

NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)456-6534 - 249

STATE - Matt Winslow - (202)647-4463 - 225

FROM: RONALD K. PETERSON (for) *Ronald K. Peterson*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: MIKE GOAD (395-7301)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-6194

SUBJECT: DEFENSE Draft Bill Department of Defense
Legislative Program for the First Session of
the 103d Congress (DOD 103-001)

DEADLINE: MONDAY, March 15, 1993

COMMENTS: The Department of Defense proposed draft bill (DOD 103-001) is an omnibus bill consisting of more than 80 sections that would authorize various activities. Only section 103 of DOD 103-001, as well as the transmittal letter and the applicable sectional analysis, is attached.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:

T. Stanners
K. MacIntyre
B. Thierwechter

Iaman Haber

3781

**DRAFT
FOR
OMB A-19
REVIEW**

Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Enclosed is a legislative proposal of the Department of Defense, "To authorize certain military activities of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes."

This proposal is part of the Department of Defense Legislative Program for the 103d Congress. The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of Congress.

Purpose of the Proposal

The proposed legislation would provide needed authorities and revisions to existing authorities to better manage the Department of Defense. The specific purposes of the bill are explained in the enclosed sectional analysis.

Cost and Budget Data

Enactment of this proposal will cause no overall increases in the budgetary requirements of the Department of Defense. Savings made from the enactment of some proposals will offset the minimal costs of others. Specific costs are set forth in the sectional analysis.

Sincerely,

Enclosures:
Draft bill
Sectional Analysis

A BILL

To authorize certain military activities of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States*
2 *of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Legislative Program
5 for the First Session of the 103d Congress".

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

ST-100002

February 19, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #D-23
DRAFT #12

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

EDUCATION - John Kristy - (202)401-2670 - 207
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)456-6534 - 249

FROM: RONALD K. PETERSON (for) *Ronald K. Peterson*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: MIKE GOAD (395-7301)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-6194

SUBJECT: DEFENSE Draft Bill Department of Defense
Legislative Program for the First Session of
the 103d Congress (DOD 103-001)

DEADLINE: MONDAY, March 15, 1993

COMMENTS: The Department of Defense proposed draft bill (DOD 103-001) is an omnibus bill consisting of more than 80 sections that would authorize various activities. Only sections 501 and 502, as well as the transmittal letter and applicable sectional analyses, are attached. NOTE: During the 102d Congress, OMB circulated, and your agency reviewed, section 502 as a stand-alone bill (LRM #D-600; DOD 102-101).

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:

T. Stanners
K. MacIntyre
B. Thierwechter
B. White

You may also respond by (1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail if the analyst does not answer); (2) sending us a memo or letter; or (3) if you are an OASIS user in the Executive Office of the President, sending an E-mail message. Please include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.

FROM: _____ (Date)
 _____ (Name)
 _____ (Agency)
 _____ (Telephone)

_____ Concur

_____ No objection

_____ No comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _____

_____ Other: _____

_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this
response sheet

**DRAFT
FOR
OMB A-19
REVIEW**

Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Enclosed is a legislative proposal of the Department of Defense, "To authorize certain military activities of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes."

This proposal is part of the Department of Defense Legislative Program for the 103d Congress. The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of Congress.

Purpose of the Proposal

The proposed legislation would provide needed authorities and revisions to existing authorities to better manage the Department of Defense. The specific purposes of the bill are explained in the enclosed sectional analysis.

Cost and Budget Data

Enactment of this proposal will cause no overall increases in the budgetary requirements of the Department of Defense. Savings made from the enactment of some proposals will offset the minimal costs of others. Specific costs are set forth in the sectional analysis.

Sincerely,

Enclosures:
Draft bill
Sectional Analysis

A BILL

To authorize certain military activities of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States*
2 *of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Legislative Program
5 for the First Session of the 103d Congress".

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

SPECIAL


February 19, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #D-31
DRAFT #12

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

JUSTICE - Faith Burton - (202)514-2141 - 217
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)456-6534 - 249
OPM - James N. Woodruff - (202)606-1424 - 331
STATE - Matt Winslow - (202)647-4463 - 225

FROM: RONALD K. PETERSON (for) 
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: MIKE GOAD (395-7301)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-6194

SUBJECT: DEFENSE Draft Bill Department of Defense
Legislative Program for the First Session of
the 103d Congress (DOD 103-001)

DEADLINE: MONDAY, March 15, 1993

COMMENTS: The Department of Defense proposed draft bill (DOD 103-001) is an omnibus bill consisting of more than 80 sections that would authorize various activities. Only section 616, as well as the transmittal letter and applicable sectional analysis, is attached.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:
R. Dotson
K. MacIntyre
B. Thierwechter
B. Sasser

DRAFT FOR OMB A-19 REVIEW

Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Enclosed is a legislative proposal of the Department of Defense, "To authorize certain military activities of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes."

This proposal is part of the Department of Defense Legislative Program for the 103d Congress. The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of Congress.

Purpose of the Proposal

The proposed legislation would provide needed authorities and revisions to existing authorities to better manage the Department of Defense. The specific purposes of the bill are explained in the enclosed sectional analysis.

Cost and Budget Data

Enactment of this proposal will cause no overall increases in the budgetary requirements of the Department of Defense. Savings made from the enactment of some proposals will offset the minimal costs of others. Specific costs are set forth in the sectional analysis.

Sincerely,

Enclosures:
Draft bill
Sectional Analysis

A BILL

To authorize certain military activities of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States*
2 *of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Legislative Program
5 for the First Session of the 103d Congress".

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 31, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*

FROM: RICHARD HOOKER *RH*

SUBJECT: Defense Draft Bill RE DOD Legislative Program for
the First Session of the 103rd Congress (DOD 103-
001, Section 614)

Section 614 amends current legislation which requires informed consent before medical research may be performed on humans. In the case of incompetent subjects, a legal representative may provide consent only if the research is intended to benefit the subject. This proposal would permit research on incompetent subjects if approved by a legal representative, if the research is beneficial to the subject or to others, and if the risk to the subject is minimal or nonexistent.

We recommend that you not approve section 614. The proposal has not been reviewed by senior Department appointees from the current Administration. Medical research on live subjects who cannot give their consent, and for purposes which may not adduce to their personal benefit, will be politically contentious. Without strong arguments from DOD expressing significant benefits to be realized from this change, we recommend deferring this action for possible separate legislative action and further review.

Concurrence by: Keith Ham *KH*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I nonconcurring with the proposed legislation.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Ron Peterson

Tab II Section 614 Draft Language

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2021

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: WILLIAM H. ITOH

SUBJECT: DOD 103-001, Section 614 (Informed Consent of
Persons Participating in Human Medical Research)

The National Security Council Staff nonconcurs with section 614. Currently, research may only be performed on incompetent medical subjects if consent is given by a legal representative and if such research is intended to benefit the patient. This proposal, which permits medical research to be conducted on incompetent subjects which may not be intended for their personal benefit, is potentially contentious. We recommend further review and study before raising this issue.

16 **SEC. 614. INFORMED CONSENT OF PERSONS PARTICIPATING IN**
17 **HUMAN MEDICAL RESEARCH.**

18 Section 980 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

19 **"§980. Limitation on use of humans as experimental subjects**

20 "Funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may not be used for
21 research involving a human as an experimental subject unless the research is
22 conducted in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
23 Defense. Such regulations shall be consistent with the regulations prescribed
24 by the Secretary of Health and Human Services and other agencies establishing

1 a common Federal policy for the protection of human subjects.".

Section 614. Informed Consent of Persons Participating in Human Medical Research.

Section 614 amends section 980 of title 10, United States Code, concerning the use of humans in experimental research. Currently, the subject must provide informed consent. In the case of an incompetent person, a legal representative may provide consent if the research is intended to be beneficial to the subject. Section 614 would permit an incompetent person's representative to consent to research that specifically is not intended to be beneficial to the subject, but which would be of minimal or no risk and which could be beneficial to the subject or to others.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Legislative Referral Memorandum. [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	02/19/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

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Chron File - March 1993 #2 [7]

2016-0152-F

vz4373

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

2009
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503

ST-ECU-11

February 19, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

LRM #D-29
DRAFT #12

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

CIA - (b)(3)
HHS - Frances White - (202)690-7760 - 328
JUSTICE - Faith Burton - (202)514-2141 - 217
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)456-6534 - 249
NSF - Charles H. Herz - (202)357-9435 - 248
OPM - James N. Woodruff - (202)606-1424 - 331
OSTP - Damar Hawkins - (202)456-6272 - 288

[001]

FROM: RONALD K. PETERSON (for) *Ronald K. Peterson*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: MIKE GOAD (395-7301)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-6194

SUBJECT: DEFENSE Draft Bill Department of Defense
Legislative Program for the First Session of
the 103d Congress (DOD 103-001)

DEADLINE: MONDAY, March 15, 1993

COMMENTS: The Department of Defense proposed draft bill (DOD 103-001) is an omnibus bill consisting of more than 80 sections that would authorize various activities. Only section 614 of DOD 103-001, as well as the transmittal letter and applicable sectional analysis, is attached.
NOTE: During the 102d Congress, OMB circulated, and your agency reviewed, section 614 as a stand-alone bill (LRM #D-463; DOD 102-087).

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:

J. Fish
T. Westby
B. Thierwechter
K. MacIntyre
R. Kogut
R. Turman

Jim fish
377b

A BILL

To authorize certain military activities of the Department of Defense, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States*
2 *of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the "Department of Defense Legislative Program
5 for the First Session of the 103d Congress".