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Chron File - March 1993 #1 [2]

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Defense Policy-Bell, Robert

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: U.S.-ROK Bilateral Consultations. (2 pages)	02/25/1993	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	For the Executive Secretary, National Security Council. Subject: Significant Military Exercise - Cobra Gold 93. (1 page)	03/02/1993	P1/b(1)
002b. cable	re: Exercise Cobra Gold 93 Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB). (4 pages)	01/30/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
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Chron File - March 1993 #1 [2]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 2, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH:

ROBERT BELL *RbB*

FROM:

ANNE WITKOWSKY *AW*

SUBJECT:

Administration Support for the Open Skies Treaty
-- Possible March 3 Luncheon Item

At your lunch tomorrow, Secretary Christopher may ask you and Secretary Aspin for confirmation of administration support for the Open Skies Treaty, in light of resumed Senate hearings. Specifically, he may want this confirmation in advance of releasing his letter urging Senate advice and consent (draft at Tab I), which is poised to go to the Hill.

The Open Skies initiative was proposed by the U.S. in May, 1989. While not an arms control agreement in the traditional sense, the Treaty establishes a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over its signatories (currently, the NATO Allies, East European members of the former Warsaw Pact, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan). It is designed to enhance confidence and benefit mutual understanding by giving all participants, regardless of size, a direct role in observing military or other activities of concern to them.

The Treaty was signed by the U.S. and 24 other nations on March 24, 1992, and sent to the Senate for consideration on August 12. Senate consideration will resume on March 4 with a hearing held by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and possibly the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) are expected to hold hearings shortly thereafter. Thus far, Hungary, the CSFR, Canada, and Denmark have ratified the Treaty. Russia has indicated it expects to ratify later this spring, as have several other major signatories.

In the absence of confirmed Administration witnesses who can testify on the Treaty, it is particularly important that Secretary Christopher's letter go to the Hill so that we can make our support a matter of record.

RECOMMENDATION

That if raised at the March 3 lunch, you affirm the President's support for the Treaty on Open Skies.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Letter from SecState to Senator Pell

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VL* NARA, Date *8/23/2016*

2016-052-F

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In advance of resumed Senate consideration of the Treaty on Open Skies, I take this opportunity on behalf of the President to express my strong support for the Treaty.

Proposed by the U.S. in May 1989, the Treaty on Open Skies represents the broadest international effort to date to promote openness and transparency of military forces and activities. The Treaty covers all the territory of its signatories, which include all NATO Allies, the East European members of the former Warsaw Pact, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. Additional states have indicated their interest in becoming parties in the near future.

The Treaty on Open Skies provides the opportunity to conduct flights in unarmed observation aircraft over the entire territory of each State Party and makes available the information gathered during these flights to all States Parties. It will contribute to mutual understanding and confidence-building by giving all States Parties, regardless of size, a direct role in gathering information about military forces and activities of concern to them. The Treaty responds to the desire of many states for innovative means of strengthening security and stability, especially throughout Europe, including the states of the former Soviet Union. The basic principles and modalities of Open Skies could be used to contribute to the reduction of tensions in other regions of the world as well.

I urge the Senate to give favorable consideration to the Treaty, including its annexes, and to offer its advice and consent to ratification at an early date.

Sincerely,

Warren Christopher

The Honorable
Claiborne Pell, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 2, 1993

1080

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ROBERT BELL *RgB*

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President for Meeting
with Secretary Aspin

Per your request, I have prepared the attached memo (Tab I) for your signature to provide the President with background information for his March 3 meeting with Secretary Aspin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memo at Tab I to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary Aspin

Purpose

To provide background information on three topics of discussion for your March 3 meeting with Secretary Aspin: defense budget, base closings and defense conversion, and Tailhook.

Defense Budget

Most of our allies on the Hill agree that your Fiscal Year 1994-1997 defense budget is fully consistent with your campaign position on military spending. They understand that the \$18 billion in pay and benefits adjustments and the \$10 billion hedge against underfunding in the Bush/Cheney baseline should not be seen as contravening your pledge to hold program cuts to \$60 billion.

Some remain concerned, however, about the adverse consequences for defense if our planning assumptions are wrong. For example, Senator Nunn has asked if you will hold defense harmless if the Bush/Cheney shortfall is substantially greater than \$10 billion; if inflation is greater than expected; if Congress votes to increase military pay; or if the military cannot be exempted from the BTU tax.

The Vice President has explained to Senator Nunn that it would be a mistake to offer such a commitment, since it could send a signal to the financial markets that we are prepared to protect defense even if it means our Federal deficit reduction targets are missed by tens of billions of dollars. At the same time, the Vice President assured Senator Nunn that the Administration does not intend to take a wrecking ball to defense. Should our assumptions be proven wrong in some major respect, the Vice President pledged that we would go back to the drawing board and consider the whole range of options for redressing the shortfall.

You should emphasize in your discussion with the Secretary that as he makes decisions on the FY 1994 and outyear defense budgets, he needs to go the extra mile in consulting closely with Senator Nunn. While we may not be able to remain in accord with Senator Nunn in all cases on matters of policy or substance, we should avoid any split over a breakdown in process.

Base Closing and Defense Conversion

Secretary Aspin will announce his recommendations to the independent Base Closing and Realignment Commission next Friday, March 12. The Commission will hold hearings and visit facilities before submitting its own list to you on July 1. If you agree with the Commission's list, you must forward it to Congress by July 15. Congress then has 45 days to reject the recommendations (one vote on the entire list). If you disapprove of the Commission's July 1 report, you can send it back to the Commission one time for revisions, though it is up to the Commission to decide whether to make any changes.

This round of closings will carry with it considerable economic pain: the 1993 list will likely include as many major base closures (more than 40) than the 1988 and 1991 rounds combined. There is, therefore, a special premium on coordinating the targeting of the \$1.7 billion that is available in FY 1993 defense conversion funds to mitigate the impact of these closings. You should explore the degree to which he is taking expected base closings into account in drawing up his recommendations on the defense conversion funds. You should also be aware that others in the White House see merit in using the defense conversion money to further other goals, including reinforcing the economic stimulus package or targeting key re-election states for 1996.

Tailhook

Secretary Aspin does not want to release the DOD Inspector General's report on Tailhook until a new Secretary of the Navy is confirmed. His concerns are threefold:

- Once the report is issued, it will be incumbent on the Administration to begin judicial proceedings immediately. If the Department of the Navy is still being led by Admiral Kelso, critics might later charge that fellow officers were protected.
- The follow-up to the report should be overseen by one person in charge throughout, not handed off in midcourse as competent civilian authority is confirmed.
- Releasing the report now, while Secretary Aspin is the only confirmed official in DOD, will overwhelm him at a time when his attention should be focused on budget and strategy review priorities.

If the naming of the new Navy Secretary cannot be expedited, Secretary Aspin may suggest an alternative: early confirmation of the new DOD General Counsel, who could be tasked with implementation of the Tailhook report.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 2, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: KENT WIEDEMANN *KW*FROM: SANDRA KRISTOFF *SK*SUBJECT: Reply to Dr. Richard Scobie, Executive Director,
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee

Dr. Richard Scobie, Executive Director of the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, has written asking that you forward his letter to the President concerning toxic and environmental cleanup of former military facilities in the Philippines.

The suggested response at Tab I indicates that you appreciate his support of the President's call for American leadership on global environmental concerns. The reply also suggests that you will forward his letter to the relevant Executive Branch agencies for further evaluation.

Concurrences by: *Rob* Bob Bell, *EC* Eileen ClaussenRECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter to Dr. Richard Scobie.

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Dr. Richard Scobie

Tab II Incoming correspondence

T
A
B

II

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dr. Scobie:

Thank you for your letter enclosing correspondence to the President concerning environmental issues in the Philippines. I appreciate your support of the President's call for American leadership on global environmental concerns.

The question of environmental cleanup at U.S. bases in the Philippines was part of our discussions with that government at the time of our withdrawal from Subic Bay. We have proposed a number of projects for cleanup efforts and are committed to fulfilling our obligations under the basing agreement.

I have forwarded your letter to relevant Executive Branch agencies for additional comment, and I welcome learning of your organization's involvement in environmental policy.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Dr. Richard S. Scobie
Executive Director
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee
130 Prospect Street
Cambridge, MA 02139-1845



130 Prospect Street
Cambridge MA 02139-1845
(617) 868-6600 • Fax (617) 868-7102

February 24, 1993

The Honorable Anthony Lake
Director of the National Security Council
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Director:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter that has been sent under my signature to President William J. Clinton concerning the toxic and environmental cleanup of former U.S. military facilities in the Philippines.

I would appreciate any assistance you or your office might bring to bear on resolving this critical issue. If you would like additional information or to set an appointment to discuss possible remedy, please contact this office.

On behalf of the below named organizations, I am yours sincerely,

Dr. Richard S. Scobie
Executive Director, UUSC

encl.

William Schulz, President
Unitarian Universalist Association

Gloria J. Bouis, National Chair
Alliance for Philippine Concerns

Jan Lugibihl, Coordinator
Christian Urgent Action Network for
Emergency Support--Philippines

Kathryn Johnson, Executive Director
Church Coalition for Human Rights in
the Philippines

John McAndrew, Associate Director
Columban Fathers Justice and Peace
Office

Pam Solo, Executive Director
Rob Leavitt, Director of Education and
Public Policy
Cultural Survival

John M. Miller, Director
Foreign Bases Project

Tim McGloin, National Secretary
Daniel B. Schirmer, member
Friends of the Filipino People

Anné Unander, Executive Secretary,
Asia/Pacific
General Board of Global Ministries
United Methodist Church

Tim Wise, Executive Director
Grassroots International

Roger MacPherson Furrer
Hawaii Church Committee for Human
Rights in the Philippines

Larry Wilson, Coordinator of
Environmental Programs and
International Linkages
Highlander Center

Jane Covey, Executive Director
Institute for Development Research

Arjun Makhijani, PhD., President
Institute for Energy and Environmental
Research

John Gershman, Research Associate
Institute for Food and Development
Policy

John Cavanagh, Director, World
Economy Project
Institute for Policy Studies

Lachlan Forrow, Secretary
International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War

Tom O'Brien, M.M., Director
Maryknoll Justice and Peace Office

Marie Moore, Director
Maryknoll Sisters Office of Social
Concerns

Ed Martin, Secretary for Central and
Southern Asia
Mennonite Central Committee

Carolyn Schrock-Shenk, Associate
Director
Mennonite Conciliation Service

Mary O'Dea, S.S.C., U.S. Regional
Superior
Missionary Sisters of St. Columban

Christina Cobourn, Coordinator,
Campaign on Debt and Development
Alternatives
Missionary Society of St. Columban

Dr. Divina Himaya, Convener
National Christian Peace Committee

Gary Cohen, Executive Director
National Toxics Campaign Fund

Antonio Dorono, Chair
Nuclear Free Asia Pacific Committee

Theresa Bonpane, Executive Director
Blase Bonpane, Director
Office of the Americas

Ruth Abad, Polly Taylor, co-chairs
Social Responsibility Committee
Olympia Unitarian Universalist
Fellowship

Julia K. Matsui-Estrella, Executive
Director
Pacific and Asian American Center for
Theology and Strategies (PACTS)

Lenny Siegel, Director
Pacific Studies Center

Carol Jahnkow, Executive Director
Peace Resource Center of San Diego

Dr. Jorge Emmanuel
Philippine Environmental Support
Network

Fe Panalisgan, Chairperson
PhilNet (Philippine Network)

Dr. Robert K. Musil, Director of Policy
and Programs
Physicians for Social Responsibility

Pam Welner, Tropical Timber Campaign
Coordinator
Rainforest Action Network

Grace Aaron, Executive Director
SANE Freeze, Los Angeles Chapter

Nalina Narain, Director
Synapses, Inc.

Rev. Milton Winkler, Convener
Southern California Christian Peace
Committee

Rochelle McAdam, Chairperson
Southern California Unit Board
UUSC

Greg Payton, International
Representative
War Resisters League

Charles Scheiner, co-chair
Westchester People's Action Coalition
(WESPAC)

Larry Wilson
Yellow Creek Concerned Citizens

Sun-Mo Yoo, President
Young Koreans United, Los Angeles
Chapter



Unitarian Universalist Service Committee

130 Prospect Street
Cambridge MA 02139-1845
(617) 868-6600 • Fax (617) 868-7102

February 23, 1993

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, the undersigned members of the Philippine Development Forum, a U.S.-based network actively engaged in supporting equitable, sustainable development in the Philippines, and other undersigned individuals wish to welcome you to your new office.

We are delighted to have a President and administration committed to socio-economic and environmental justice and calling for citizen participation to tackle the enormous problems facing our nation.

We were heartened when you declared in the inaugural address, "Posterity is the world to come -- the world for whom we hold our ideals, from whom we have borrowed the planet, and to whom we bear sacred responsibility."

It is in this spirit that we wish to draw to your attention the urgent issue of toxic and environmental damage left at former U.S. military facilities in the Philippines. This issue presents great opportunity to meet the challenges you have set forth: to provide global leadership on environmental issues; to redirect national security concerns to supporting the health and well-being of the world's people; and to take initiative in resolving problems.

On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected a treaty to extend the presence of U.S. military bases in the Philippines into the next century. U.S. officials have since stated they want to forge a new relationship, but the ability to do so is being undermined by a policy set by the passion of defeat rather than the art of diplomacy.

As the U.S. military exited the Philippines in November 1992, it left in its wake a host of unresolved problems including AIDs, AmerAsian children, shattered economies, toxic and environmental damage, and a legacy of mistrust. All of these problems deserve attention and yet, to date, the U.S. has been willing to entertain only the issue of protection of a rainforest watershed at Subic Bay Naval Base.

Although we support Philippine-led efforts to preserve the rainforest, we strongly feel your administration should give priority to resolving the more over-arching issue of the toxic legacy. Resolution of this problem would go far in promoting more equitable bilateral relations between the two nations.

Our concern over the toxic legacy is two-fold. First, how will environmentally sustainable development be affected in areas containing toxic waste and other environmental hazards? Will the toxic material affect the health and safety of current inhabitants and that of future generations? Second, we are concerned about the implications this holds for similar situations at U.S. military bases, nuclear and chemical weapons production and storage sites.

Initial documentation of the toxic problem is contained in a January 1992 Government Accounting Office (GAO) report on "Military Base Closures: U.S. Financial Obligations in the Philippines" (appendix 1). The report acknowledges that "the Air Force and Navy have identified significant environmental damage at both Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay Navy Facility," but adds that identification of contamination was "based on limited environmental surveys.... No soil and water testing has been conducted...therefore, the extent of the damage is not known." The report ends with the declaration that U.S. liability on cleanup is "moot" because of the 1991 treaty rejection.

The UUSC obtained a six-page excerpt (appendix 2) from a September 13, 1991 report on Clark Air Base released by the U.S. Department of the Air Force under a Freedom of Information (FOIA) request. The excerpt details specific sites and known environmental issues, inadequate safeguards, and flagrant hazards such as on-going PCB contamination, and asbestos-containing materials in military family housing units, hospital facilities and schools at Clark Air Base that may have become "airborne and friable" following the Mt. Pinatubo eruption.

Written notice that no further data will be released, by either the Departments of Navy (appendix 3) or Air Force (appendix 4), without the FOIA search being more "reasonably described" and that the cost of a search and processing could "far exceed \$10,000.00," has since been received by UUSC.

In late November 1992, The Christian Science Monitor (appendix 5) and San Francisco Examiner (appendix 6) ran exposés on the toxic threat which included additional documentation supplied by PDF member and environmental engineer, Dr. Jorge Emmanuel. U.S. officials in Manila, led by Ambassador Richard Solomon, heatedly denied the allegations. Embassy spokesman, Morton Smith, declared, "We have no obligation, therefore, it's not a question."

The U.S. and Philippine military signed a joint agreement on November 6, 1992 that allows for continued U.S. military access to the Philippines.

Mr. President, we are deeply concerned that obsolete and myopic national security concerns are being used as a shield to deflect responsibility for the cleanup of toxic and environmental damage at the former U.S. military facilities.

Official Philippine response to the threat of a toxic legacy has been constrained, we believe, by the desire not to offend a major military ally and aid supplier. We are aware that Philippine Department of Environmental and Natural Resources officials, as well as other cabinet ministers, are very concerned about the toxic issue, but action is inhibited by lack of capacity or funds to pursue even an initial assessment. Failure by the U.S. to adequately respond to the issue creates a destabilizing political atmosphere that affects the credibility of the Philippine executive branch.

The Philippines cannot afford to leave the former base areas, which encompass well over 250 square miles, unoccupied. Despite ongoing threats from the Mt. Pinatubo volcano, Philippine President Fidel Ramos is suggesting that former Clark Air Base be used as a permanent relocation site for refugees and the land may also be utilized under the Philippine's land reform program. Local government officials at both former base areas are working hard to attract foreign investment. Nearly 100,000 skilled workers lost their living with the base closures; tens of thousands more were employed in auxiliary enterprises. Attracting foreign investment to the areas may be hampered by concern over remaining toxic wastes.

Mr. President, it will be a tragic human and policy error if the U.S. continues its current course on this matter -- the U.S. must accept responsibility for the cleanup.

We respectfully suggest the following three points be seriously considered in your deliberations on this issue:

1. full public release of available documentation pertaining to toxic and environmental damage at the former U.S. military facilities and formation of a independent, bilateral body to look into possible remedy and action;
2. support for additional, comprehensive environmental assessment(s) by impartial, qualified experts; and
3. where toxic or environmental damage is found, undertaking of the cleanup and restoration with substantive input by local communities and Philippine non-governmental organizations on reclamation, rehabilitation, and conversion, along with retraining of retrenched base workers.

There are nearly one hundred years of shared history between the Filipino and American people. In her inaugural poem, Maya Angelou advised:

History, despite its wrenching pain,
Cannot be unlived, and if faced,
With courage, need not be lived again.

We would like to meet with you or your designated representative(s) to discuss this critical issue and possible remedy; please contact this office at your earliest convenience. We look forward to working with you on resolving this problem.

On behalf of the below named organizations, I am yours sincerely,

Dr. Richard S. Scobie
Executive Director, UUSC

encl.

William Schulz, President
Unitarian Universalist Association

Gloria J. Bouis, National Chair
Alliance for Philippine Concerns

Jan Lugibihl, Coordinator
Christian Urgent Action Network for
Emergency Support--Philippines

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Institute for Development Research

Arjun Makhijani, PhD., President
Institute for Energy and Environmental
Research

John Gershman, Research Associate
Institute for Food and Development
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John Cavanagh, Director, World
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War Resisters League

Charles Scheiner, co-chair
Westchester People's Action Coalition
(WESPAC)

Larry Wilson
Yellow Creek Concerned Citizens

Sun-Mo Yoo, President
Young Koreans United, Los Angeles
Chapter

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

Report to Congressional Requesters

January 1992

MILITARY BASE CLOSURES

U.S. Financial Obligations in the Philippines



GAO/NSIAD-92-51

Environmental Cleanup and Restoration

Although the Air Force and the Navy have identified significant environmental damage at both Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay Navy Facility, the current basing agreement does not impose any well-defined environmental responsibility on the United States for environmental cleanup and restoration. However, according to Air Force and Navy officials, if the United States unilaterally decided to clean up these bases in accordance with U.S. standards, the costs for environmental cleanup and restoration could approach Superfund proportions.¹

Contaminated Sites Have Been Identified at Both Bases

Although the services are not generally required to comply with U.S. standards at overseas locations, some service regulations indicate that they are intended to apply overseas. Environmental officers at both Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay Navy Facility have identified contaminated sites and facilities that would not be in compliance with U.S. environmental standards. Their identification of contamination is based on limited environmental surveys of Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay Navy Facility. No soil and water testing has been conducted in the contaminated areas; therefore, the extent of the damage is not known. According to one Air Force official, testing alone would be very costly, and the cost of cleanup and restoration would be significantly greater. According to base officials, both Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Navy Facility have common environmental problems with underground storage tanks and fire-fighting training facilities that do not comply with U.S. standards. For example, the underground storage tanks lack leak detection equipment, and fire-fighting facilities have no drainage systems. Instead, the fuel and chemicals used in fire-fighting exercises seep directly into the soil and water table, and at the Navy facility, the overflow goes directly into Subic Bay.

Navy environmental officials have identified the following sites at the Subic Bay Navy Facility that, in their opinion, represent significant environmental damage:

- The Subic Bay Navy Facility does not have a complete sanitary sewer system and treatment facility. Instead, sewage and process waste waters from the naval base and air station industrial complexes are discharged directly into Subic Bay. Only 25 percent of the 5 million gallons of sewage generated daily is treated.
- Lead and other heavy metals from the ship repair facility's sandblasting site drain directly into the bay or are buried in the landfill. Neither

¹The Superfund is administered by the Environmental Protection Agency to clean up the nation's worst hazardous waste sites. Currently, the average cost of construction per site is about \$25 million. GAO/T-RCED-92-15 provides further information on the Superfund.

procedure complies with U.S. standards, which require that lead and heavy metals be handled and disposed of as hazardous waste.

- The Subic Bay Navy Facility's power plant contains unknown amounts of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) and emits untreated pollutants directly into the air. No testing has been performed to analyze the content of emissions, but officials stated that air emissions would not meet U.S. clean air standards.

At the time of our review, the Air Force and the Navy had no plans to clean up these sites. However, the Navy had plans to build a sewage treatment plant.

Environmental Cleanup Projects Are Proposed but Often Unfunded

Environmental officers at both the Subic Bay Navy Facility and Clark Air Base have proposed a variety of projects to correct environmental hazards and remedy situations that pose serious health and safety threats. Environmental officers at the Subic Bay Navy Facility have proposed projects estimated to cost approximately \$15 million. For example, they have identified the need for a new sanitary waste water system, estimated to cost \$12.7 million, because, according to these officials, the current system does not comply with U.S. standards. They have also proposed several oil/water separator projects, hazardous material storage structures, and improvements to fuel storage tanks. However, none of these projects had been funded as of May 1991.

Prior to the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, environmental officers at Clark Air Base had proposed pollution abatement and environmental projects at an estimated cost of approximately \$8.4 million for the next 2 years, including PCB removal projects, asbestos abatement, and hazardous waste removal. Clark's Environmental Planning Branch had proposed several projects to remove all PCBs from Clark by the end of 1992 to comply with an Air Force-wide goal. These PCB removal projects, estimated to cost about \$3.8 million, remained unfunded due to funding constraints. Additional PCB projects had been programmed for fiscal years 1993 and 1994. At the time of our review, the Branch was also identifying buildings containing asbestos and planning projects for asbestos removal. However, the cost for removal had not been estimated, and because of the U.S. decision to leave Clark Air Base, these projects will not be undertaken.

The United States Is Not Liable Under the Current Basing Agreement

The current basing agreement does not impose any well-defined environmental responsibilities upon the United States, either while it operates the bases or for cleanup upon withdrawal. The agreement contains a provision that holds the United States "harmless" for damage to base buildings and structures from "any cause whatsoever." Moreover, it states that the United States is not required to return the bases to the Philippines in their original condition.²

The agreement does contain a claims provision, which would cover injuries to persons and property arising from environmental problems caused by U.S. forces. The provision, however, is limited in several key respects. To be considered, claims must be presented within a year of the occurrence of the accident or incident provoking them. Also, such claims are limited to private property damage, and they are adjudicated by U.S. military personnel, rather than by the Philippine or U.S. courts. Furthermore, the United States and the Philippines have concluded relinquishment agreements that include "hold-harmless" clauses. The clauses hold the United States harmless from any and all actions, claims, or expenses that could arise after relinquishment of a base. This type of provision appears to cover claims for environmental damage as well as other claims.³

Service regulations vary somewhat but generally require forces overseas to comply with "Environmental Pollution Control Standards of General Applicability in the Host Country."⁴ These regulations generally indicate that U.S. forces are required to comply with all host country standards, as those standards are generally enforced by the host country. For example, although the Philippine water and air quality standards generally mirror U.S. standards, U.S. service officials in the Philippines told us that it does not appear that the Philippine government enforces these laws, either on its own citizens or on military bases.

Some service regulations apply a more rigorous standard. For example, Navy regulations on "Hazardous Waste and PCB Management Ashore" and "Underground Storage Tanks" state that hazardous materials, hazardous wastes, PCBs, and underground tanks in foreign countries shall be managed

²The agreement does, however, contain several provisions imposing limited responsibilities upon the United States for protecting the Subic watershed and for ordnance disposal at the Crow Valley air gunnery range.

³A DOD official anticipates that this kind of agreement will be signed for Clark Air Base.

⁴These regulations appear to be derived from Executive Order 12088, which establishes the same general standard.

and controlled in substantially the same manner as in the United States to ensure protection of public health and the environment. Nevertheless, service regulations are internal requirements only, and the Philippine government or Philippine nationals cannot base environmental damage claims on these regulations.

In contrast to the current basing agreement, the proposed new agreement signed in August 1991 included a specific environmental protection provision for dealing with hazardous and toxic waste. It would have required that the commanders of U.S. and Philippine forces establish an environmental program and formulate substantive environmental protection standards governing the disposal of hazardous or toxic waste consistent with laws of general applicability in the Philippines. It would also have empowered the Philippine government to monitor and verify U.S. adherence to the substantive standards. However, with the rejection of the agreement by the Philippine Senate, the issue of potential liability under a new agreement became moot.

(Appendix 2)

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND MITIGATIVE ACTIONS

4.1 GENERAL

This section addresses the environmental issues associated with the proposed action at Clark Air Base. Although the final disposition of the U.S. Air Force facilities has not been finalized at this time, it is anticipated that most of the buildings will ultimately be returned to their current use by the "new host."

The reduction-in-force (RIF) of US civilian employees and non-US employees caused by the closure of Clark AB will affect the economy, employment status, and standard of living of the local population. For the 236 (maximum) US civilian employees, assistance will be provided to place them within the activity (PACAF), or relocate them in other AF, DOD, or Federal activities. The Clark AB Civilian Personnel Office is working with the US Embassy, Manila; the American Chamber of Commerce, Manila; and Subic Bay Naval Station to provide information on out-placement opportunities to the 2186 non-US civilian employees facing separation. This is IAW the Filipino Employment Personnel Instructions (FEPI), USCINCPACREPPHILINS 12000.5B, Section 2, Para 2-4e.

4.2 DRAWDOWN PROCESS

The drawdown process involves the handling and disposition of material, wastes, and treatment systems which have the potential for creating environmental, health, and safety problems. It also provides the opportunity to remove the residuals of accessible spills and spills during the drawdown process.

The purpose of this section is to highlight those activities and actions important to assuring that the drawdown is conducted in an environmentally benign manner consistent with USAF policy. It emphasizes prior planning and coordination details instead of specific procedures or protocols for individual activities.

4.2.1 Handling of Hazardous Wastes

The procedures directed by the Clark AB Hazardous Waste Management Plan²; the Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan for Clark AB, which is part of the Spill Prevention and Response Plans (SPR)³ and the Petroleum and Hazardous Waste Management Plan⁴ provide the framework for the handling and disposition of hazardous waste (HW).

4.2.2 Inventory Materials and Disposition

The civil engineers must start with an inventory of hazardous materials (HM) and hazardous waste (HW) to identify the types, amounts and locations so proper collection and removal actions may be planned. The HW/HM inventoried shall include herbicides and pesticides. Materials presently at Clark AB must be identified as to whether they are staying at Clark AB or going to other waste contractors.

An inspection program for assuring that all environmental hazards are mitigated or minimized shall be performed by the civil engineers.

A collection system shall be kept in place up to the last day of closure of the base. A portable accumulation point (AP) (one truck with several drums) might suffice after other APs have been removed.

The drawdown activities associated with the primary base functions and their potential material inventories are indicated in the following sections.

4.2.2.1 Industrial Activities

Aircraft were transferred to other locations for the protection of AF property prior to the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. Associated aircraft maintenance functions were temporarily halted and will reconvene at the gaining air base. Required actions for the drawdown of Clark AB involve the transportation of existing hazardous material/hazardous waste (HW/HM) and any potential spill that should occur during the drawdown. The danger posed by a possible chemical spill will be handled IAW the procedures outlined in OPLAN 19-2.

All oil/water separators will be identified for further actions by the new host. Maintenance records of the oil/water separators will be forwarded to the new host.

POL systems will be deactivated as described in section 3.6.2.8.

All damaged buildings will be identified to the new host for further action. Some of the damaged buildings contain asbestos. It is recommended that the new host exercise caution and take the appropriate measures to protect public health and safety.

Water and electrical power supplies, and sewage and storm systems will be recovered to the capacities necessary to ensure the protection, security, and safety of the personnel executing drawdown procedures, and to ensure the security and protection of Air Force facilities, property and equipment. The recovery of these utilities will be performed in an environmentally sound manner.

4.2.2.2 Flightline Activities

Due to the damage caused by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, the airfield has remained closed since the date of eruption to all but minimal helicopter operations. There are no plans to further recover the airfield.

4.2.2.3 Administrative Activities/Housing Area

Evacuation of Administrative activities was initiated prior to and immediately after the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. Military dependents were evacuated and operations are continuing to forward household goods. As the drawdown continues, the administrative activities will gradually decrease and so will the number of personnel. All hazardous materials in these areas will be inventoried and transferred to the new host or contracted for disposal with locally approved waste contractors.

4.2.2.4 Ordnance Storage Area

Explosives will be removed from the area and redistributed or disposed of as appropriate and/or as directed by HQ PACAF. All explosives will be handled in accordance with appropriate Air Force regulations (e.g., AFR 127-100).

4.2.3 Identify Wastes and Disposal Requirements

A significant activity is the identification and proper labeling of materials and wastes during the drawdown.

The Hazardous Waste Management Plan contains procedures for identification, accumulation, labeling, and storage of hazardous materials and wastes. Each activity of the industrial areas must develop a clear understanding of the means for cleaning equipment and for the disposition of equipment and supplies. Plans for dealing with residual hazardous materials and wastes should include proper use of the alternatives of consumption, reutilization, recycling, and disposal. Opportunities for waste minimization should be exploited where possible. The plans should account for prohibitions against transporting partially-full containers of hazardous materials. Use and disposal schedules may be planned to minimize this occurrence. Usable hazardous materials in tanks or containers, such as heating fuel, solvents, paints, etc., may remain and be transferred to the new host or contracted for disposal with a locally approved waste contractor.

The amount of materials left on the base, the locations, and container conditions should be documented to limit future liability from leaks, spills, etc. occurring when the materials are no longer under the control of the USAF.

The remaining occupants of Administrative Areas and residents of the Housing Area, if any, must be educated in the identification of hazardous materials and the requirement to separate them from normal trash. Newsletters or postings can be used to identify the location of waste accumulation points in the Administrative and Housing Areas.

The efficient removal of materials and waste from Clark AB is based upon establishing specific guidelines for the identification, packaging, transportation to an accumulation area and contracting arrangements with a locally approved waste contractor. The contracting requirements should include a receipt for all items released to a locally approved waste contractor. This receipt should accompany the inventory of hazardous materials that will be transferred to the new host.

4.2.4 Base Sanitary Landfill and Base Asbestos Landfill

Plans should be made to close and/or transfer operations of this landfill to the new host. During drawdown, controlled access to the landfill should be insured to prevent unauthorized dumpings of hazardous wastes or hazardous materials.

The base asbestos landfill's location and operating records should be identified for transfer to the new host. During drawdown, controlled access to the landfill should be insured to prevent unauthorized dumpings of hazardous wastes or hazardous materials.

4.2.5 Drummed Waste

Drummed waste should be inventoried and removed for proper disposal. The storage areas should be checked for spills and stained soil.

4.3 ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY ISSUES FOR REAL PROPERTY TRANSFERS

The issues addressed in this section are those that could affect the health, safety, and environment of a new host in areas and facilities now occupied exclusively, or in joint use, by the USAF. They are issues that are to be disclosed to the new host and do not necessarily require action on the part of the USAF.

4.3.1 Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs)

All transformers have been tested and all PCB containing transformers have been identified. The following is a breakdown of location and number of PCB transformers to be turned over to the new host:

LOCATION	NO. TRANSFORMERS
2228, 2234	2
606, 1084, 1771, 1092,	22
5788, 6840, 7140, 7167,	
7273, 7285, 7579, 7648,	
7705	
3700	3
6318	1
829, 826, 859	8
2702, 5396, 5402, 5407,	15
5411, 2539, 5426, 5428,	
7168, 7251, 7258, 14711	

Four cleanup attempts in the transformer vault of building 7509 have failed to reduce the PCB levels below the standard of 10 micrograms per 100 square centimeters (ugm/cm²) of surface area. The results of the six (6) most recent swipe samples on the wall ranged from 13.2 to 62.1 ugm/cm². Two samples on the ceiling yielded 8.3 and 15.0 ugm/cm². These levels are relatively unchanged from the samples collected after the second and third cleanup attempts. No further actions will be taken by the USAF. This transformer vault will be transferred to the new host. It is recommended that the new host try other methods of cleanup, such as removing the interior layer of the concrete by pneumatic chipping and disposing of it as hazardous waste, investigating foam products, or investigating other means of removing PCB from concrete surfaces.

It is recommended that the new host seal all concrete surfaces in vaults housing PCB containing transformers.

4.3.2 Asbestos

A. Prior to Mt. Pinatubo eruption.

Asbestos surveys conducted reveal the presence of asbestos containing materials in Military Family Housing (MFH) units, hospital facilities and DODDS schools; however, they are either non-friable or well contained and do not pose an immediate danger.

B. After Mt. Pinatubo eruption.

The fallout of volcanic ash has caused damage to a significant number of buildings. Some of these buildings may contain asbestos that is no longer contained. That is, the nature of the damage may have caused the fibers in the construction to become airborne and friable. The new host should exercise caution to ensure the public health and safety of workers, occupants, or trespassers.

4.4.3 Radon...

Based on the radon gas survey conducted from 2 December 1987 through 1 March 1988 by 13AFMC/SGPB, it was determined that Clark AB is a "low risk" base. All of the samples collected were well below 4 picocuries/liter.

4.4.4 Underground Storage Tanks (UST)

All known locations of UST/POL bulk storage tanks shall be identified. UST/POL storage tanks will be deactivated as described in section 3.6.2.8.

4.4.5 Clark-Subic Resupply Line

The Clark-Subic resupply line will be deactivated as described in section 3.6.2.8.

4.4.6 Waste Water System

No work will be completed on the waste water system.

4.4.7 Known Contaminated Sites

Prior to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, there were no known contaminated sites that posed an imminent threat to human health and safety. Ash cover from Mt. Pinatubo eruption has made it virtually impossible to identify locations of stained soil. Any visible sites with contamination will be removed during the drawdown process. Consistent with current USAF policy and Military Bases Agreement, no investigations will be implemented to attempt to uncover heretofore undiscovered pollution areas.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII 96860-7000

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5720
Ser 04EC/09458
27 NOV 1992

Mr. Gilbert Aviles
9060 Santa Monica Blvd #218
West Hollywood, CA 90069

Dear Mr. Aviles:

This refers to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of September 24, 1992 which was forwarded by the Chief of Naval Operations and received by this command on November 2, 1992. Processing of your request was delayed pending receipt of the documents from the Philippines which arrived on November 17, 1992. You seek information on:

"Any and all reports, surveys, minutes, memos, correspondence and writings related in any manner to toxic substances, hazardous wastes and other contamination located on lands and waters at the site of Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base in the Philippines."

This command holds no files concerning Clark Air Base. Regarding Subic Naval Base, we wish to fully cooperate in furnishing you information that may be releasable; however, requested records must be reasonably described and specific information furnished, so that a thorough search may be conducted. A search of records for such a broad category of documents involves a multitude of records. Based upon the description of requested documents, over 80,000 documents -- over 30 boxes -- may be responsive to your request.

FOIA does not require agencies to attempt to determine what records would contain the type of information sought by the public. Requested records must be "reasonably described" with sufficient particularity to permit a knowledgeable official of the agency to identify the records being sought.

If you determine that you desire all 80,000 documents, please be advised that your fees to process the request will far exceed \$10,000.00. The U.S. Navy is permitted by FOIA to require full payment of estimated charges prior to processing the information request. A more accurate estimate of charges will be determined when you indicate a willingness to pay fees of this magnitude.

- In view of the above, your request is returned. If you can provide details to further identify the type of records you are seeking, you may resubmit your request to this office.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D L Mandsager", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

D. L. MANDSAGER
Captain, JAGC, U.S. Navy
Fleet Judge Advocate



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
PACIFIC AIR FORCES



30 NOV 1992

HQ PACAF/IMD (FOI)
25 E ST STE G103
Hickam AFB HI 96853-5419

Mr. Gilbert Aviles
9060 Santa Monica BL. #218
West Hollywood CA 90069

Dear Mr. Aviles

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of 24 September 1992 addressed to Secretary Richard Cheney, Department of Defense. Your request was referred for this command's action by the Air Force Freedom of Information Act Manager (SAF/AAIA).

A search was conducted within HQ PACAF/DEV (Directorate of Environmental Management) and HQ PACAF/SGPB (Bioenvironmental Engineering Division) for records responsive to your request. A document on file containing information relevant to your request is the Environmental Review which assessed the environmental impact of the withdrawal of USAF operational and support organizations from Clark Air Base. Applicable portions of this document responsive to your request have already been identified by the Air Force Office of Civil Engineering and released to you by the Air Force FOIA office. The Environmental Review and supporting documentation concluded that the withdrawal action did not pose any significant adverse environmental impacts and noted there were no known contaminated sites that posed an imminent threat to human health and safety.

Prior to proceeding with any further search on your behalf, we need you to provide us with more specific information on records you are seeking. Guidance regarding specificity in requests is attached (DOD 5400.7-R, paragraphs 1-507a through e).

We also require your agreement to pay fees associated with processing your request. Fees will be based on processing costs of search, review, and duplicating as shown on attached DD Form 2086, Record of Freedom of Information (FOI) Processing Cost. Please provide information on intended use of any records located in order that we can determine appropriate fees category i.e., commercial, educational institution, noncommercial scientific institution, news media, or all others. As a matter of information, a charge may be made for search time even if no records responsive to your request are located.

Sincerely


SHIRLEY SONTAG

Freedom of Information Act Manager
Directorate of Information Management

2 Atch
DOD 5400.7-R (Excerpt)
DD Form 2086

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TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1992

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

US Leaves Toxins At Subic Navy Base

*Government and military reports indicate that
Pentagon felt it was not responsible for cleanup*

By Teresa Albor

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

MANILA

THE United States military is knowingly leaving behind a serious contamination and hazardous waste problem at Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines. According to confidential US government and military reports and studies done by US scientists, the US military operated for years in a manner that violated US environmental standards and Philippine air- and water-safety laws. Cleanup will cost millions.

The reports indicate the US has determined that it is not legally responsible and has not taken any significant steps to clean up the contamination.

The 40,000-acre Subic Bay naval complex, which Washington will turn over to Manila today, had been operated by the US for almost a century until the Philippine Senate rejected a new agreement and then-President Corazon Aquino requested full US withdrawal by the end of December 1992.

"The US is vacating Subic Bay Naval Base while leaving behind an environmental disaster," says Jorge Emmanuel, a Philippine-born environmental scientist and president of Environmental Engineering Research Group, a consulting firm in Hercules, Calif.

After a year-long investigation, Dr. Emmanuel's team this week will release a preliminary study of toxicity levels based on samples taken from Clark Air Base, which was returned to the Philippines last year, and the Subic base perimeter. Emmanuel's concerns echo what scientists and US officials

have been saying quietly for years.

"If there's a horror story out there, Subic may be it," Defense Department official David Berteau told the Los Angeles Times in June 1990. The Times also quoted a US Air Force official in Washington, D.C., as saying: "We comply with host-country laws. In the Philippines, there are none, so we are not in violation of any."

In fact, while illegal industrial pollution is common and enforcement is notoriously lax, the Philippines has comprehensive environmental laws modeled on US laws and standards. Air- and water-safety laws have been on the books since 1976. Hazardous-waste laws were enacted in 1990.

A January 1992 report by the US Congress's investigative arm, the General Accounting Office (GAO), lists some of the known damage and cites

examples such as the seepage of chemicals directly into the soil and water table. In addition, US military documents obtained through the US Freedom of Information Act by the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (UUSC), a private development organization, point to contamination by polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),

considered carcinogenic. The documents state that the US had no plans to rectify problems before turning over the facility to the Philippines.

US Ambassador Richard Solomon denied the charges yesterday, saying that toxic wastes, particularly the PCBs, had been sent to the US at a cost of \$3 million. The GAO report says that Navy environmental officers estimated in 1991 that cleanup projects at Subic alone would cost \$15 million.

See SUBIC BAY page 4

**'The US is ...
leaving behind
an environmental
disaster.'**

**- US-based
environmental
scientist**



Unitarian Universalist Service Committee

130 Prospect Street • Cambridge, MA 02139-1845

SUBIC BAY from page 1

A US Embassy official in Manila says that some cleanup work was carried out before the withdrawal.

"The US Navy thinks hazardous waste at Subic Bay Naval Base has been handled in an exemplary manner," the official says. "The bottom line is that the US has spent over \$1 million to make sure the place was cleaned up to standard."

"The Navy will say it is no big problem, but the GAO would not write such a report without evidence," says Polly Parks, a Philippine development expert at UUSC, which is based in Cambridge, Mass. "It is a question of precedent - because the US military could be held liable for cleanup at their bases all over the world - and a question of money; the US military simply does not have the budget."

US Rep. Richard Ray (D) of Georgia says that during a 1990 visit to Subic, Navy officials told him the Navy was waiting for translations of Philippine environmental laws. Philippine laws are written and published in English.

Mr. Ray concluded that environmental policies were largely ignored at the US bases. He expressed concern for the health of US Defense Department personnel and their families at Subic and recommended toxicity screening.

EMMANUEL also tried to visit Subic. "We were not allowed into Subic so we investigated the area surrounding the base," Emmanuel says. "Our studies indicate that we should be very concerned with toxic waste left behind as well as contaminated areas in the baselands due to fuel leaks, unexploded ordnance, etc."


Emmanuel's study could provide evidence of lingering problems acknowledged in confidential reports prepared by the US government.

"The Air Force and the Navy have identified significant environmental damage to their facilities in the Philippines," the January 1992 GAO report says.

The report adds: "The fuel and chemicals used in firefighting exercises seep directly into the soil and water table, and at the Navy facility, the overflow goes directly into Subic Bay.... Sewage and process waste waters from the naval base and air station industrial complexes are discharged directly into Subic Bay...."

"Lead and other heavy metals from the ship repair facility's sandblasting site drain directly into the bay or are buried in the

SHIRLEY HORN - STAFF



landfill. Neither procedure complies with US standards.... The Subic Bay Navy facility's power plant contains unknown amounts of PCBs and emits untreated pollutants directly into the air.... Officials stated that air emissions would not meet US clean-air standards." This contamination also would be against Philippine law.

The report concludes: "At the time of our review the Air Force and Navy had no plans to clean up these sites.... The current basing agreement does not impose any well-defined environmental responsibility on the United States either while it operates the base or for cleanup upon withdrawal."

Most alarming is PCB contamination at Clark Air Base as detailed in a September 1991 US Air Force document obtained by UUSC through a US Freedom of Information Act request: "Four cleanup attempts in the transformer vault of building 7509 have failed to reduce the Polychlorinated Biphenyl [PCB] levels below the standard 10 micrograms per 100 square centimeters ($\mu\text{gm}/\text{cm}^2$) of surface area. The results of the six most recent swipe samples on the wall ranged from 13.2 to 62.1 $\mu\text{gm}/\text{cm}^2$ No further actions will be taken by the USAF."

The US military generates more than 400 tons of hazardous waste in the US each year, based on a Department of Defense Environmental Status Report. Data about hazardous wastes at foreign base sites are more difficult to come by. After protests by environmental groups, the US has implemented some cleanup actions in other countries where they have abandoned bases.

"The irony is that the US may well end up paying for the cleanup of its toxic mess in Germany, Japan, and other rich countries," Emmanuel says, "but leave the Philippines - a country with neither the money nor the technology to deal with toxic contamination - to cope with its toxic legacy."

IF the toxic waste problem is as serious as these reports suggest, the question of who pays for the cleanup could affect future US-Philippine relations, including discussions of US military access to Subic and Manila's plans to convert the facility to a commercial port.

"Before these bases can be converted to civilian and productive uses, an environmental investigation, cleanup, and restoration of the baselands are necessary to ensure that the areas will not further threaten human health and the environment," Emmanuel says.

NOVEMBER 22, 1992

Toxic U.S. legacy in the Philippines

Decades of military dumping will cost millions to clean

By Benjamin Pimentel
and Louella J. Lasola
SPECIAL TO THE EXAMINER

When the last American troops ship out of the Philippines on Tuesday, they will leave behind land and facilities tainted by nearly half a century of toxic and hazardous waste dumping at Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base.

For more than 40 years, the U.S. Navy and Air Force stored and improperly disposed of tons of military and industrial wastes on and around the two American bases, causing damage that could cost \$50 million to clean up, according to U.S. government documents and a

preliminary investigation by Filipino scientists and the Manila-based Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ).

"We found enough evidence for people to be concerned," said Dr. Jorge Emmanuel of San Francisco, a Filipino American environmental scientist who led the scientists.

This toxic legacy has focused attention on the U.S. armed forces' environmental policies at overseas facilities. It could also affect an already troubled relationship between the United States and the Philippines, triggered by the Philippine Senate's rejection in September 1991 of a treaty to let the bases remain another 10 years.

In the wake of the Mount Pinatubo eruption, the U.S. military abandoned Clark and is set to pull out of Subic, ending 94 years of

military presence in the Philippines.

But it could be a messy withdrawal. According to U.S. government reports and the PCIJ investigation, the military's toxic legacy

Philippines inherits U.S. toxic legacy

► Improper storage and use of hazardous materials banned in the United States, such as asbestos and polychlorinated biphenyl or PCB, a cancer-causing chemical used in transformers.

► Thousands of gallons of highly corrosive aviation fuel left behind in a decrepit 42-mile underground pipeline connecting Subic and Clark.

► Live bombs and ammunition, left behind in firing ranges at Subic and Clark.

The U.S. Embassy in Manila denied its own government's reports, including studies done by the General Accounting Office (GAO), Congress' investigative arm.

"All they're doing is reporting hearsay evidence," said embassy spokesman Morton Smith. "We know what our standards are. We know what our actions are. We are fully in keeping with the requirements laid down by the U.S. government and U.S. Navy practice."

Even if allegations of pollution were true, he added, the United States would not have to clean up the mess. A 1988 amendment to the 1947 Military Bases Agreement said the United States is not required to return the bases in their original condition.

"We have no obligation, therefore it's not a question," Smith said in an interview in Manila. "If you're worried about it, you can conduct whatever tests you want. Go ahead, do it."

Besides, Smith noted, the U.S. is leaving behind property worth about \$2 billion.

"It's not like the United States is running away without giving the Philippine government something," said GAO Deputy Director Louis Zanardi, who supervised a study of the Subic base closure. "They are, in fact, giving them some very valuable property."

Military as major polluter

The U.S. military generates a lot of pollution. By 1991, the Defense Department identified more than 17,000 potentially contaminated sites at more than 1,800 bases in the United States, according to the Center for Defense Information in Washington, D.C.

The picture is as disturbing at overseas bases. A 1991 GAO report said most overseas U.S. facilities had poor hazardous-waste management programs.

A GAO report released in January 1992 said U.S. military officials in the Philippines identified "significant environmental damage" at both Clark and Subic.

At Clark, the PCIJ team found more than 300 barrels of toxic chemicals, including acids and solvents, abandoned in an open field at the base supply yard. Many of the barrels were covered with rust, and a few were leaking.

The Air Force also poured toxic chemicals into open drains and used underground fuel storage tanks without proper leak detection equipment, the GAO said.

The situation may be more serious at Subic.

"If there is going to be a horror story, Subic could be it," said GAO investigator Jacob Sprouse, who supervised two studies of U.S. overseas facilities in 1986 and 1991. "It is a larger user of hazardous materials."

'Enlightened management'

Smith of the U.S. Embassy bristled at suggestions of damage at Subic, which is known for a preserved virgin forest.

"Subic is an excellent example of enlightened environmental management," Smith said in an interview in Manila. "Anybody who's been out at Subic will say 'My God, if there were more places like this, the whole Philippines will be a paradise.'"

But GAO Deputy Director Zanardi said the problems at Subic "are underground and in things you don't see."

U.S. Navy environmental reports say Subic generated more than 500 tons of hazardous waste a year in 1990 and 1991, but disposed of less than 20 percent.

Improper waste storage and disposal have turned Subic's major facilities into potential toxic hot spots, said the January 1992 GAO report and a 1991 Defense Department report called Environmental Compliance Evaluation.

The base's public works center, where the Navy stored hazardous wastes — including PCBs — lacked adequate facilities to store toxic materials, according to the 1991 Subic report.

The Navy also dumped lead and heavy metals into Subic Bay during maintenance and repair operations at the Ship Repair Facility, the January 1992 GAO report said.

"We were endlessly producing industrial toxic chemicals and discarding them without due regard for the pollution," recalled former Rear Adm. Eugene Carroll, a 37-year Navy veteran now deputy director of the Center for Defense Information in Washington, a liberal think tank.

As a Pacific fleet officer, Adm. Carroll commanded U.S. carriers and battleships into Subic for repairs and maintenance.

"In working on those ships, we had to purge them, flush them out, strip the paint off them with caustic chemicals," he said in an interview in Washington. "Behind us we just left trails of waste and garbage and toxic materials."

Some of the materials were collected and dumped into the sanitary landfill where the Americans brought most of their household and industrial garbage, including, a Navy environmental report said, raw infectious medical wastes from the Navy hospital.

Unaware workers

The U.S. military also left behind highly corrosive aviation fuel in an underground 42-mile pipeline used to transport fuel from Subic to Clark. The exact amount is unknown, but some Philippine military officials estimated it to be in the thousands of gallons.

U.S. Air Force documents retrieved by PCIJ reporters near Clark said the pipeline, which cuts across private and public lands, was known to leak at different points between the bases.

Filipino workers at Subic also were exposed to hazardous materials banned in the United States.

Ed Pugay, 33, a former worker at the Ship Repair Facility, said

they were never told about the dangers of asbestos and other heavy metal wastes they inhaled while repairing or cleaning ships.

"If you wanted to, you could cover your mouth and nose with a handkerchief," he said.

Exposure to PCB, a highly toxic chemical used in transformers, was also a major problem. PCB was banned in the United States in 1976. But base workers say it was only in 1991 that Subic officials warned them about dangers.

Former Subic worker Edgar Magalang said workers soaked

their gloved hands in PCB-contaminated fuel, and did not use respirators.

It was only in the months leading up to the closing of the base that workers learned about the dangers of PCB. When PCB-contaminated fuel would spill, the soiled ground would be dug up and isolated by hazardous waste workers wearing full protective clothing and respirators.

"This worried many of us, because they only started doing this last year," Magalang said. "What about those other years?"

Other U.S. military practices in the Philippines would have been illegal in the United States.

Despite the dumping of asbestos, heavy metals and other hazardous wastes into the Subic landfill, Subic authorities allowed Filipino scavengers from Olongapo and nearby towns to work the dump site. Scavengers sell most of the garbage, including barrels with hazardous waste labels and cans of grease and paint, at shops along the highway leading to Subic.

"We would never do that in the United States," said GAO investigator Suzanne Nagy, who witnessed the scavengers in action.

Another lethal legacy is found at military firing ranges. Residents of Kinabuksan, west of Subic, say a large area once used as an assault and bombing practice range behind their small village is now a virtual minefield — littered with bombs and bullets that didn't go off.

"It's dangerous to leave them there," said Fernando Velonza, the village leader, as he took reporters and scientists on a tour of sand-covered land strewn with barbed wire, spent M-16 shells and other military junk. "What happens if you plant bananas or yams, what happens if you hit a bomb while doing so? What if it explodes?"

Velonza knew the answers. In December 1989, his 13-year-old son, Anding, was severely burned on the face and body when a piece of ammunition exploded in the range. He survived. Five months later, Velonza's 8-year-old son, Dante, was killed when another exploded.

Smith of the U.S. Embassy said American forces set environmental standards on Subic and Clark far more stringent than those imposed by the Philippines.

"There's no question that if you have ships and planes coming into a place like Subic for as many years as they have been, there's gonna be a certain measure of environmental damage," Smith said. "Question is, how does it compare to the rest

of the Philippines?"

"That kind of an attitude is very insensitive," Philippine Sen. Orlando Mercado said in an interview. "Just because we're a poor country, it doesn't mean you would allow a person to be exposed to the germs that you are carrying."

Benjamin Pimentel and Louella Lasola, students in the UC-Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism, prepared this report with the support of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism in Manila and the Center for Investigative Reporting in San Francisco.

Monday: The Philippines prepares to take over Subic Bay Naval Base.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 2, 1993

1080

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ROBERT BELL *RGB*

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President for Meeting
with Secretary Aspin

Per your request, I have prepared the attached memo (Tab I) for your signature to provide the President with background information for his March 3 meeting with Secretary Aspin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memo at Tab I to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary Aspin

Purpose

To provide background information on three topics of discussion for your March 3 meeting with Secretary Aspin: defense budget, base closings and defense conversion, and Tailhook.

Defense Budget

Most of our allies on the Hill agree that your Fiscal Year 1994-1997 defense budget is fully consistent with your campaign position on military spending. They understand that the \$18 billion in pay and benefits adjustments and the \$10 billion hedge against underfunding in the Bush/Cheney baseline should not be seen as contravening your pledge to hold program cuts to \$60 billion.

Some remain concerned, however, about the adverse consequences for defense if our planning assumptions are wrong. For example, Senator Nunn has asked if you will hold defense harmless if the Bush/Cheney shortfall is substantially greater than \$10 billion; if inflation is greater than expected; if Congress votes to increase military pay; or if the military cannot be exempted from the BTU tax.

The Vice President has explained to Senator Nunn that it would be a mistake to offer such a commitment, since it could send a signal to the financial markets that we are prepared to protect defense even if it means our Federal deficit reduction targets are missed by tens of billions of dollars. At the same time, the Vice President assured Senator Nunn that the Administration does not intend to take a wrecking ball to defense. Should our assumptions be proven wrong in some major respect, the Vice President pledged that we would go back to the drawing board and consider the whole range of options for redressing the shortfall.

You should emphasize in your discussion with the Secretary that as he makes decisions on the FY 1994 and outyear defense budgets, he needs to go the extra mile in consulting closely with Senator Nunn. While we may not be able to remain in accord with Senator Nunn in all cases on matters of policy or substance, we should avoid any split over a breakdown in process.

Base Closing and Defense Conversion

Secretary Aspin will announce his recommendations to the independent Base Closing and Realignment Commission next Friday, March 12. The Commission will hold hearings and visit facilities before submitting its own list to you on July 1. If you agree with the Commission's list, you must forward it to Congress by July 15. Congress then has 45 days to reject the recommendations (one vote on the entire list). If you disapprove of the Commission's July 1 report, you can send it back to the Commission one time for revisions, though it is up to the Commission to decide whether to make any changes.

This round of closings will carry with it considerable economic pain: the 1993 list will likely include as many major base closures (more than 40) than the 1988 and 1991 rounds combined. There is, therefore, a special premium on coordinating the targeting of the \$1.7 billion that is available in FY 1993 defense conversion funds to mitigate the impact of these closings. You should explore the degree to which he is taking expected base closings into account in drawing up his recommendations on the defense conversion funds. You should also be aware that others in the White House see merit in using the defense conversion money to further other goals, including reinforcing the economic stimulus package, ~~or targeting key re-election states for 1996.~~

Tailhook

Secretary Aspin does not want to release the DOD Inspector General's report on Tailhook until a new Secretary of the Navy is confirmed. His concerns are threefold:

- Once the report is issued, it will be incumbent on the Administration to begin judicial proceedings immediately. If the Department of the Navy is still being led by Admiral Kelso, critics might later charge that fellow officers were protected.
- The follow-up to the report should be overseen by one person in charge throughout, not handed off in midcourse as competent civilian authority is confirmed.
- Releasing the report now, while Secretary Aspin is the only confirmed official in DOD, will overwhelm him at a time when his attention should be focused on budget and strategy review priorities.

If the naming of the new Navy Secretary cannot be expedited, Secretary Aspin may suggest an alternative: early confirmation of the new DOD General Counsel, who could be tasked with implementation of the Tailhook report.

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If the naming of the new Navy Secretary cannot be expedited, Secretary Aspin may suggest an alternative: early confirmation of the new DOD General Counsel, who could be tasked with implementation of the Tailhook report.

WHITE HOUSE
630-212-2100

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

*Cleared 3/3
RGS*

MESSAGE NO. **094149** CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages **2**
FROM: DAVID SATTERFIELD S/S 7-8448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE TO SEOUL: US-ROK BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	NANCY SODERBERG	456-6534	WH SITRM
	WILL ITOH		
	KRISTIE KENNEY		
	EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT		
	<i>Patterson Bell</i>		
	<i>Poneman</i>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: 3/3

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: *VZ* Date: *8/26/2016*

S/S Officer: *[Signature]*
DAVID SATTERFIELD

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: U.S.-ROK Bilateral Consultations. (2 pages)	02/25/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - March 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F
vz4361

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 3, 1993

MEMORANDUM TO ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: Robert Bell

SUBJ: Senate Trip to Moscow re START

Cover memo changed per your instruction.
New sentence added at end of second
paragraph under Background.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
HOWARD PASTER

SUBJECT: Invitation to Senate Arms Control Observer Group
to Travel to Moscow on START II Mission

Purpose

To extend a formal invitation to the Senate Arms Control Observer Group (SACOG) to travel to Moscow for joint discussions with Russian parliamentarians on the mutual benefits of the START II Treaty.

Background

Our Embassy in Moscow has advised that the Russian Foreign Ministry and the leadership of key Supreme Soviet committees have proposed that U.S. Senate committees and their Russian counterparts cooperate closely during the START II ratification proceedings in each country. We believe such activities are especially important in light of some assessments suggesting that START II may face a stiff challenge from conservative forces in the Supreme Soviet.

We have consulted informally with the Senate Leadership and the Co-Chairmen of the SACOG and confirmed that the Observer Group would be willing to travel to Moscow this month for joint discussions on the treaty. Senators Mitchell and Dole believe this is an important mission for the Senate and have agreed to protect votes on a Friday and the following Monday to allow the Observer Group to accomplish the trip over a long weekend, without interfering with priority legislation.

Since its inception in 1985, the Observer Group has played a crucial role in the successful negotiation and ratification of the CFE, INF, and START treaties. The Vice President was a charter member, and its current membership includes Senators Mitchell and Dole and leading Senators from the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence committees. To encourage maximum participation by SACOG members in this trip, the Observer Group has suggested it would be helpful if you formally invited the Group to undertake this important mission.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letters to Senators Mitchell and Dole asking the Senate Leadership to authorize the Observer Group trip.

Attachment

Tab A Proposed Letters to the Senators Mitchell and Dole

Redo

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 2, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR SANDY BERGER

FROM: BOB BELL *BB*

SUBJECT: SACOG Invitation to Travel
to Moscow

Per your note, I have revised in per your
instructions.

Attachment as stated

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1040

→ Bob - Very good work. Could you do this + return to me? Photos. R

March 1, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ROBERT BELL *RBB*

SUBJECT: Invitation to Senate Arms Control Observer Group to Travel to Moscow on START II Mission

It sounds like a good idea. you might tell the Pres (FBI) who/what the SACOG is.

Embassy Moscow has reported that the Russian Foreign Ministry and the leadership of key Supreme Soviet committees have proposed an unprecedented degree of U.S./Russian interparliamentary cooperation during each state's respective START II ratification proceedings. This proposal was reinforced during a visit to my office last month by Alexander Churilin, a Counselor in the Russian Embassy.

Embassy Moscow and Churilin both suggested joint hearings between the relevant Senate committees and their Russian counterparts. As I explained to Churilin, this idea is impractical, since Senate committees rarely travel abroad en mass and have traditionally eschewed joint hearings, even with their House counterparts. In addition, I pointed out that it would be awkward for a Senate committee to go to Moscow to argue the mutual benefits of START II before it had received testimony on the Treaty here. The committees might well feel an obligation to maintain their "neutrality" until they have reviewed START II formally.

Not wanting to risk offending the Russians by turning them down flat, I suggested to Churilin the possibility of engaging the Senate Arms Control Observer Group (SACOG) in "joint meetings" with equivalent Supreme Soviet bodies or committees. The Observer Group routinely travels abroad (including numerous visits to Geneva during the negotiation of START I) and is better informed at this stage about the negotiation of START II than the three Senate committees of jurisdiction and expertise (Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence). Indeed, one of the functions of the SACOG is to educate the Senate as to the negotiating history of pending arms control treaties. Since

1985, the SACOG has also met regularly with Former Soviet Union (FSU) arms control negotiating teams and met with FSU parliamentarians. On some occasions, the Supreme Soviet's "arms control observer group" made it a point to visit Geneva when the SACOG was there.

During the Interagency Working Group meetings on PRD-4, my suggestion for engaging the SACOG in this undertaking was enthusiastically received by all agencies and has been included in the final document and in the draft PDD. On February 19, I met with the SACOG staff informally to sound out the Group's interest in possibly making such a trip. In light of past instances in which the SACOG scheduled a trip, only to cancel at the last minute, I emphasized that if we told the Russians the SACOG was coming on this mission, the Group would have to deliver. ✓

After consulting with their Senators (including Senators Mitchell and Dole), the SACOG staff advised me late last week that the Group readily agreed this would be an important mission. Several Senators are apparently willing to make the trip between March 11-15. To facilitate maximum participation among SACOG members, Senators Mitchell and Dole have agreed to protect votes during the period of the trip. The SACOG has suggested that a letter from the President formally asking the Group to undertake this important mission would also help ensure a high turnout.

Concurrence: ^{RG} Rose Gottemoeller, Don Gross 

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I forwarding the letters (Tab A) for his signature inviting the Senate Leadership to authorize the Observer Group trip.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Proposed Letters to the Senate Leadership

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

1040

March 1, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM:

ROBERT BELL *Rb*

SUBJECT:

Invitation to Senate Arms Control Observer Group
to Travel to Moscow on START II Mission

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Concurrence: ^{RG} Rose Gottemoeller, Don Gross 

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I forwarding the letters (Tab A) for his signature inviting the Senate Leadership to authorize the Observer Group trip.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Proposed Letters to the Senate Leadership

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
HOWARD PASTER

SUBJECT: Invitation to Senate Arms Control Observer Group
to Travel to Moscow on START II Mission

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RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letters to Senators Mitchell and Dole asking the Senate Leadership to authorize the Observer Group trip.

Attachment

Tab A Proposed Letters to the Senators Mitchell and Dole

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Mitchell:

As the United States and Russia continue to move from confrontation to cooperation, one of the most important tasks our two nations face is bringing the recently-concluded START II Treaty into force. Doing so will set us on a course toward enhanced stability at dramatically reduced levels of strategic forces. I strongly support the START II Treaty, and hope that both the United States Senate and the Russian Supreme Soviet will act promptly to approve it.

Over the past month, Russian legislators and Russian government officials have called for unusually close consultation between the Senate and the Supreme Soviet in the consideration of START II. These calls, which include requests by the leadership of the Supreme Soviet and its International Affairs and Defense Committees, reflect the evolving state of our relationship in which we increasingly value dialogue and cooperation. While I have directed the Executive Branch to support the Supreme Soviet's requests for information to the maximum extent possible, Russian parliamentarians particularly desire direct dialogue with their American counterparts.

The Senate Arms Control Observer Group offers a perfect vehicle for undertaking such consultation and dialogue. As you know, the Observer Group has played an important role in the success of U.S. arms control initiatives in recent years. I believe that the experience of the Observer Group could be immensely valuable to your Russian counterparts as they take up consideration of the START II Treaty.

Accordingly, I would request that you and Senator Dole consider asking the Observer Group to undertake a visit to Moscow in order to discuss START II with the leadership of the Supreme Soviet, especially its Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Ties and its Committee on Defense and Security Issues. Since the Russian government hopes for early consideration of START II, such a visit would be of greatest benefit if it were to occur this month.

Should the Observer Group undertake such a trip, I hope it would convey to your Russian counterparts my strong personal support for prompt ratification and early entry into force of START II. Doing so will put the last legacy of the Cold War firmly behind us and allow the United States and Russia to concentrate on forging a new relationship based on economic and political cooperation and common interests.

Thank you in advance for your willingness to consider this request. Undertaking this important mission would reaffirm the enduring value of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group and underscore the close cooperation between our two branches which I hope will be the hallmark of the next four years.

Sincerely,

The Honorable George J. Mitchell
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Dole:

As the United States and Russia continue to move from confrontation to cooperation, one of the most important tasks our two nations face is bringing the recently-concluded START II Treaty into force. Doing so will set us on a course toward enhanced stability at dramatically reduced levels of strategic forces. I strongly support the START II Treaty, and hope that both the United States Senate and the Russian Supreme Soviet will act promptly to approve it.

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Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert J. Dole
Republican Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1149

March 4, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH:

~~ROBERT BELL~~ *RAB*

FROM:

KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise COBRA GOLD 93

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, approving military exercise COBRA GOLD 93. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

COBRA GOLD 93 is a major air, land, maritime, amphibious and special operations exercise with Thailand scheduled to take place March 25-July 3. In addition to exercising operational capabilities, COBRA GOLD includes a significant humanitarian assistance and construction component, including mobile medical and dental teams and U.S. military construction teams.

The military exercise part of last year's COBRA GOLD was cancelled due to civil unrest in Bangkok, Thailand. However, the humanitarian assistance and construction parts of the exercise were continued.

The critical cancellation date is March 18, 1993.

Concurrence by: Torkel Patterson *TP*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I approving the exercise.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab II OSD Executive Secretary Memorandum, March 2, 1993

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VZ* NARA, Date *8/23/2016*
2-16-0152-f

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C. 20506

1149

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise COBRA GOLD 93

Military exercise COBRA GOLD 93 is approved.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	For the Executive Secretary, National Security Council. Subject: Significant Military Exercise - Cobra Gold 93. (1 page)	03/02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - March 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4361

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. cable	re: Exercise Cobra Gold 93 Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB). (4 pages)	01/30/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - March 1993 #1 [2]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1191

March 5, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*FROM: JONATHAN SPALTER *JS*SUBJECT: Request for a Meeting Between the General Officers
Who Endorsed the Campaign and the President

In order to maintain cordial relations between the White House and the 24 retired flag officers who endorsed the campaign, we would like to submit a request for a meeting between the officers and the President during the week prior to the April 5 submission of the defense budget.

In coordination with Secretary Aspin's office and the White House office of Public Liaison, we also are hoping to arrange relevant briefings for the flags at the Pentagon, and social activities in their honor.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached Schedule Proposal (Tab I) to Marcia Hale for a meeting between the President and the 24 general officers who endorsed the campaign.

Attachments

Tab I Schedule Proposal

Tab A List of Participants

THE WHITE HOUSE

Schedule Proposal

WASHINGTON

date ____/____/____

____ ACCEPT

____ REGRET

____ PENDING

TO: Marcia L. Hale
Assistant to the President and Director
of Scheduling and Advance

FROM: Anthony Lake

REQUEST: Meeting between the President and the
flag officers who endorsed the campaign
in October.

PURPOSE: To maintain cordial working relations
with the retired flag officers who
endorsed the President during a critical
moment of the campaign, and to further
attempts to manifest White House concern
for the uniformed military.

BACKGROUND: The 24 general officers issued a public
endorsement of the President in in
Philadelphia on October 12. They were
organized by Admiral William Crowe,
Colonel Dick Klass, and staffer Dan
Sakura. Our hope is that the flag
officers will be able to meet with the
President before the April 5 submission
of the defense budget.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: The President received the endorsement
of the flag officers in Philadelphia in
October, the day after the debate. In
addition, he has met on previous
occasions with Admiral Crowe.

DATE AND TIME: The week prior to April 5.

DURATION: 30 minutes

LOCATION: Indian Treaty Room

PARTICIPANTS: List of Participants at Tab A.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Prior to a briefing on the defense
budget for the retired flags to be
conducted by an official from the
Department of Defense, the President
"drops by" for an informal meeting with
the assembled officers.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief remarks and talking points, to be prepared by the Office of Defense Policy and Arms Control.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Stills

FIRST LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

VICE PRESIDENT'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

SECOND LADY'S ATTENDANCE: Not required

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert G. Bell

CONTACT: Jonathan Spalter (extension 3330)

Attachment
Tab A List of Participants



Endorsing the Clinton/Gore ticket today (* = not able to be present at announcement)
are:

Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - Reagan and Bush Administrations

Admiral William Crowe, USN (Ret.)
Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Mike Dugan, USAF (Ret.) *
Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

General John Wickham, USA (Ret.) *
Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Heads of Major Government Agencies

Vice Admiral Richard H. Truly, USN (Ret.)
Naval Test Pilot
Former Commander, Naval Space Command
Former Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (Ret.)
Former Director of Central Intelligence

Senior Military Officers

Brigadier General Hugh S. Aitkin, USMC (Ret.)
Former Director, Manpower, Plans and Policy Division
Korean War Veteran

Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, (Ret.) *
Vietnam Veteran
Former Director of Naval Intelligence

Major General Arthur Clark, USAF (Ret.)
World War II Combat Veteran
Served in the "Flying Tigers"

Major General Clay Comfort, USMC (Ret.)
Former Commanding General, Third Marine Aircraft Wing, El Toro, California
Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command
Former Commanding General, Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic

-more-

Rear Admiral Craig Dorman, USN (Ret.)

U.S. Navy SEAL

Vietnam Veteran

Former Program Director, Antisubmarine Warfare, U.S. Navy

Rear Admiral Cathal Flynn, USN (Ret.) *

U.S. Navy SEAL

Vietnam Veteran

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict

Brigadier General E. Pat Foote, USA (Ret.)

Former Commanding General, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

Vice Admiral Al Herberger, USN (Ret.) *

Former Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Transportation Command

Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard, USA (Ret.)

World War II, Korean War and Vietnam War Veteran

Former Chief of Staff, Second Field Force in Vietnam (1969-1970)

Lieutenant General William E. Odom, USA (Ret.)

Brigadier General Gail Reals, USMC (Ret.)

First Woman Selected for Promotion to Brigadier General in the Marine Corps

Former Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia

Brigadier General William T. Seawell, USAF (Ret.)

Former Commandant of Cadets, U.S. Air Force Academy

World War II Combat Veteran

Major General James Taylor, Jr., USAF (Ret.) *

Deputy Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force

Lieutenant General Vern Weber, USA (Ret.) *

Lieutenant General Calvin A.H. Waller, USA (Ret.) *

Vietnam Veteran

Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command

Second highest ranking officer in Operation Desert Storm

General Fred F. Woerner, USA (Ret.)

Vietnam Veteran

Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

March 5, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RBG*

FROM: STEVEN R. JONES *2*

SUBJECT: Meeting with NEC on Defense Conversion Issues

I attended an NEC meeting today hosted by Bo Cutter to discuss defense conversion issues and potential interrelationships with Secretary Aspin's March 12th announcement recommending base closures. This is a brief summary of main points and actions.

Attendees -- NEC: Bob Rubin, Gene Sperling, Bo Cutter, Sylvia Mathews, David Lane, Dorothy Robyn; OMB: Gordon Adams; NSC: myself; DoD: John Deutsch and Alice Maroni.

Concerns: We need to have a well-planned approach to respond to expected reaction to the March 12th DoD base closure announcement (see Tab A for key dates), and this needs to be coordinated with the Administration's broader plan for defense conversion (more properly defense reinvestment and transition).

DoD has the technology piece of its conversion plan defined (see Tab B), but still is a day away from having its broader program (including personnel transition and community assistance) completed. There is still debate as to how best to define the '93/'94 budget picture for defense conversion, and answer the question of "how much has the Clinton administration added in '94 for conversion?"

Actions prior to Saturday:

1. Finalize '93/'94 budget table for "defense conversion" - DoD/OMB (Alice Maroni and Gordon Adams)
2. Define the conversion package for '93 (including '93 appropriations now being released and DARPA package) - DoD
3. Plan for Secretary Aspin's Base Closure Announcement - DoD
4. Overall plan and memo for the President - NEC (I will be assisting David Lane and Dorothy Robyn)

This group, along with someone from Communications, will meet again Saturday at 11:00 a.m. in Cutter's office.

Attachments

Tab A Key Base Closure Dates

Tab B Defense Reinvestment/Technology Initiatives (DoD Draft)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *W* NARA, Date *8/23/2016*

2016-01527

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

KEY 1993 BASE CLOSURE DATES

March 15 (Announcement March 12 th)	Secretary of Defense must forward a list of recommended base closures to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (also published in Federal Register and sent to Congressional Defense Committees)
March - June	The eight member Commission holds hearings around the country, visits the bases, and makes an independent review of the DoD recommendations (evaluates any deviation from the selection criteria)
Apr 15	GAO Report due to Commission on the DoD base closure recommendations and selection process
July 1	The Commission must recommend bases for closing or realignment to President Clinton
July 15	The President must accept, reject or suggest changes to the list. He either sends it back to the Commission, or approves it and forwards it to Congress
Sep 1	Final opportunity for President to approve Commission's recommendations and forward them to Congress
45 days	Congress then has 45 legislative days in which to pass a motion of disapproval in both houses, or the Commission's recommendations become law.

SUMMARY OF SELECTION CRITERIA

MILITARY VALUE

- Current and future mission requirements
- Availability and condition of land, facilities and air space
- Contingency and mobilization requirements
- Cost and manpower implications

RETURN ON INVESTMENT

- Extent and timing of potential costs and savings

IMPACTS

- Local economic impact
- Impact on community infrastructure
- Environmental impact

Defense Reinvestment and Economic Growth Initiatives
(\$ in millions)

04-Mar-93
03:02 PM

Program	FY 1993 Appn	FY 1993 Current	FY 1994 Budget
⇒ Defense Reinvestment Technology Programs			
Reinvestment Programs	345	327	377
Dual Use Technology Partnerships	100	95	152
Commercial-Military Integration Partnerships	50	48	35
Regional Technology Alliances	100	95	87
Agile Manufacturing/Enterprise Integration	30	29	20
Advanced Materials Partnerships	30	29	24
Advanced Manufacturing Technology Partnerships	25	23	34
Manufacturing Engineering Education Program	30	29	20
US Japan Management Training	10	9	5
Less Earmarked Ongoing Programs	-30	-30	0
Manufacturing/Technology Extension 2/	200	190	25
Subtotal	545	517	402
Electronics and Materials Initiatives	261	243	210
High Definition Systems	100	92	60
Optoelectronics	25	23	25
Metal Matrix and Ceramics	10	9	10
Diamond Substrates	10	9	10
Multi Chip Modules/High Temperature			
Superconductivity	15	14	15
Battery Technology	0	0	6
Multi Chip Modules	26	25	30
Advanced Lithography	75	71	50
Composite Materials Manufacturing	-	-	4
Dual-Use in DARPA Base Program	717	689	924
SEMATECH	100	95	100
Basic Research	80	80	80
Manufacturing/Emerging Technologies	537	514	744
Total DARPA Dual-Use Program	1,523	1,449	1,536
Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support (ARMS) Initiative	200	200	0
Subtotal	1,723	1,649	1,536
SBIR Refocused to Dual Use			122
Total Dual-Use Program	1,723	1,649	1,658
Total DARPA Program	2,247	2,247	2,184

1/ \$30 million included in Dual Use Technology Partnerships

2/ Program to be managed by DoC(NIST) with active DoD participation.

FY 1993 funds support program over a two year period.

3/ Excludes impact of broadened scope of allowable IR&D reimbursement.

3/5/93

Arms Control Admin.
Questionnaire -
3/92

ACA Questionnaire: Clinton Response -- page two

Weapons reduction proposals should continue to be guided by an emphasis on stability, but stability for the new age. In addition to moving toward weapons with fewer warheads, we should also put a premium on weapons that can be more easily controlled by central authorities. As president, I would seek a ban on mobile, land-based missiles and a ban on land-based missiles with more than one warhead.

In the new environment, would you cut the defense budget more than is now planned? If so, by how much? Are there specific systems you would cancel, or others you particularly support?

Any discussion of defense spending must necessarily look at what we want our defense posture to defend against. I believe a prudent set of coherent, integrated reductions across force structure, procurement, and research and development can maintain a strong defense posture of the United States. I would emphasize systems and forces that are more relevant to the types of conflicts we are likely to face in the future than those we have faced in the past. President Bush's \$50 billion reduction in a \$1.5 trillion, five-year defense budget is inconsistent with the implications of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. I would reduce the five-year budget by a net of at least \$50 billion more, with further cuts possible if current favorable trends in the international climate continue. This net figure would include some increases in areas that I believe are not being adequately addressed by the Bush administration.

First, we should stop production of the B-2 bomber. I would make significant cuts in Strategic Defense Initiative funding, while fully funding theater missile defense and preserving the option of deploying a limited, ground-based defense for the United States. I would make major cuts in research and development for new nuclear bombs, maintain a force of 10 aircraft carriers rather than 12, further reduce our forces in Europe, and make some reductions in our intelligence resources that are directed toward the former Soviet Union.

At the same time, I would integrate the lessons of Desert Shield and Desert Storm into our defense planning. As part of this, I would step up production of fast sealift ships, which Desert Shield showed was a critical weakness for the United States, and enhance our airlift modernization through procurement of the C-17.

We need to plan for the conflicts of the future, not those of the past, and as president I would ensure that our force posture reflects tomorrow's security needs.

Clinton Shines New Light On Defense Views As Nomination Nears


National defense has not yet emerged as a major presidential campaign issue but it surely will as the general election heats up this summer. In assessing Bill Clinton's commander-in-chief credentials, voters doubtless will shift from relatively unimportant questions of how as a 20-year-old he avoided the draft to how he'd steer the nation's military in the post-Cold War world.

What follows are exclusive answers prepared by Clinton's aides and endorsed by the governor late Friday based on questions posed by *Defense Week* deputy editors Tony Capaccio and Eric Rosenberg.

They constitute the most detailed view to date on Clinton's defense views. The broad strokes of his national security approach were first outlined in December during a speech at Georgetown University.



DW: Walk us through how the campaign came up with the plan for cumulative savings of \$60 billion beyond the Bush plan. What systems would take the bulk of the cuts? I assume much would come from SDI and force structure.



Clinton: We must take a clear look at the threats posed to our national security over the coming decade; think through the forces we will need to meet those threats, and then calculate the defense savings possible in the post-Cold War world.

The Soviet threat may have dissipated, but the world is still dangerous—and indeed, all the more disorderly. And, it is an uncertain world, so we must not lock ourselves into calling for specific force reductions beyond a five-year planning period.

Last December after consultation with defense experts and Democratic leaders in Congress including Senator [Sam] Nunn, Congressman [Les] Aspin and Congressman [Dave] McCurdy, I proposed a five-year plan for defense that would restructure our armed forces along three lines.

One, maintaining a survivable nuclear deterrent at substantially lower levels of weaponry; two, shifting the focus of our conventional forces from defending against Soviet invasion of Western Europe to projecting power whenever and wherever our national interests are threatened; and, three, preserving the two attributes that have made the American military the best in the world—the outstanding quality of our personnel and the overwhelming superiority of our technology.

Using calculations by the Congressional Budget Office, I estimated that the plan would save over \$100 billion through 1997 from the current Pentagon plans. This is about \$60 billion more than the reductions that President Bush announced in his State of the Union address in January. And, it is roughly comparable to the alternative plans proposed by Les Aspin, Sam Nunn and other moderate Democrats in Congress.

The plan would focus cuts on force structure and weapons systems designed for the Cold War that are now no longer needed. Two items stand out. First, I would cut Cold War force structure. President Bush leaves a military too heavily oriented toward defeating a now non-existent Soviet threat.

Tens of billions of dollars can be saved by developing a smaller force structure more oriented to the more mobile

projection forces needed in a post-Cold War world.

Second, the President continues to allocate massive amounts of scarce funds—more than \$40 billion in 1993-97 period—for the Star Wars program to pursue the illusion of an impenetrable Astrodome over the U.S.

A substantial amount of this sum could be saved and our security enhanced if we abandoned the Astrodome and focused on the more realistic goal of limited missile defenses identified by Congressional Democrats.

It is imperative to reduce prudently. While we will need a smaller military in the post-Cold War world, we must retain our superior technology, high quality personnel and strong industrial base. A moderate reduction path will protect these vital attributes while producing substantial savings in the long run.

DW: How detailed can we expect you to be in laying out your defense budget choices?

Clinton: It is important for the American people to understand the basic premises and philosophy that underlie my views on national security. In speeches throughout the primaries, I have identified the major areas I would reduce and those I would protect or expand. But it is not possible or prudent to take a position on every line item in the defense budget.

The specifics of implementing my post-Cold War defense program should be left until after I am elected and would have the benefit of consultation with the military and civilian leadership of the Pentagon, as well as the Congress.

DW: How can you come up with cumulative savings of over \$100 billion if you're endorsing expensive systems like the \$35 billion C-17 transport?

Clinton: I have been clear from the start of this campaign that we must protect the technological superiority of the U.S. forces, which is one of the means of ensuring that any conflicts are short with a minimum of casualties. This means continuing the modernization of key elements of the force, particularly those oriented to power projection missions.

Accordingly, the bulk of the reductions that I have proposed would come from reducing Cold War force structure, re-orienting the SDI program and curtailing nuclear weapons spending.

DW: How did the Seawolf issue come about? On the surface, it seemed like you pandered to the Connecticut voter. Do you endorse two or three Seawolfs? What's your industrial base logic here?

(Continued on page 14.)

We Americans love peace. But we will not shrink from force of arms if arms are required to keep the peace and defend our interests.

In the end, every decision must be guided by principle as well as experience. Just after his election, with the prospects of war appearing imminent, Lincoln told his neighbors in Springfield that defending the nation in a civil war was a task "more difficult than that which devolved upon General Washington. Unless the great God who assisted him shall be with and aid me," he said, "I must fail. But if the same omniscient mind, and Almighty arm that directed and protected him shall guide and support me, I shall not fail, I shall succeed."

No one knows better than those of you in this room the solemn responsibility of the decision to use force to protect our nation's security and interests. When the American people choose a president, they want someone who they can trust to act when those moments arise. Every president in the last half-century has had to confront the fateful decision to send Americans into combat. I do not relish this prospect, but neither do I shrink from it.

I know we must have the resolve constantly to deter, sometimes to fight, always to win. And as Commander-in-Chief, I will fight to ensure that our troops who must go to battle are the best trained, best equipped and best supported in the world. Good people ensure victory on the battlefield.

As we scale back the force structure, we must restructure those that remain to meet the new, less predictable threats in the post-Cold War Era. Our forces must be ready and sustainable. They must be more mobile, more precise, and more flexible. And they must have the technologically advanced weapons they need to get the job done.

I will never allow a hollow army. My five-year defense budget over the next five years totals \$1.36 trillion compared to the President's level of \$1.42 trillion -- a difference of only 5%.

There are differences between these proposals. This administration would keep more troops in Europe and spend more on SDI; I would shift the focus to real threats we are likely to face in the coming decade: aggressive tyrants like Saddam Hussein, new regional conflicts, terrorists, and the threat of nuclear proliferation. I would preserve a more limited SDI option and support more emphasis on some military weapons, including the V-22 and fast sealift ships.

I still believe we should strive for an American, not a Republican or a Democrat, but an American national security and defense policy. I supported President Bush's efforts in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. I support the tough line the Administration has taken with Saddam Hussein recently. I urged the policies the Administration has adopted in Bosnia and Somalia.

The American people do not believe either political party has a monopoly on love of country. Patriotism is not partisan.

Nor does patriotism require a blind devotion to the status quo. Indeed, the risk of staying put; the costs of standing pat; the dangers of the status quo are far greater: for more economic decline, more defense cuts without a conversion plan to protect

In times of emergency in our own state, I've called on the Guard to help with missions from helping communities recover from ice storms and floods and deathly sweeping tornadoes, to destroying buildings used by drug dealers, to putting down a riot by refugees at Ft. Chafee in 1980.

And I know that is typical of the good work which has been done by the Guard in every state in this country, and often in situations that require the highest order of skill and sensitivity, such as was required of the California National Guard when they helped to restore order after the disturbances in Los Angeles.

You are the nation's oldest military service, and well aware that now, in the aftermath of the Cold War, crucial decisions are being made and a great debate is underway about how to meet our national security needs in this new era.

Now that the Cold War is over, and the Soviet Union is no more, leaders from the administration and from Congress and from both political parties agree that we must scale back our armed forces.

The question is, how we should do it, and what kind of force structure we need to maintain the world's strongest defense. For while we no longer face a hostile superpower, we do face challenges in a changing and still dangerous and perhaps even more chaotic world.

The challenges we face are less predictable, but no less real. We still must have the best equipped and best trained military to meet today's threats.

We have to shift the focus of our military to meet the real threats that we face today and those we think we are likely to face tomorrow: aggressive tyrants like Saddam Hussein; new regional conflicts; ethnic and racial strife that could spread beyond the borders of particular nations; terrorism and the threat of proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. A major threat we will have to face for several years to come.

Our forces must be more mobile, more precise, and more flexible, and they must have the technologically advanced weapons they need to prevail and to prevail quickly. That is why I support more emphasis on some weapons systems, including the V-22, and fast sealift and airlift.

I will never allow a hollow Army. It is true, as the president said this morning, that my five-year defense budget contains somewhat less money than his does. But listen to the difference. \$1.36 trillion in my budget, as opposed to \$1.42 trillion in his over five years, a difference of only five percent. And we provide in our budget for fewer troops in Europe, less spending on the Brilliant Pebbles portion of Star Wars, but more reliance on new weapons systems, and more reliance on the Guard and the reserve here at home.