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Chron File - February 1993 #2 [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

Defense Policy-Bell, Robert

Original OA/ID Number:

43

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For Anthony Lake from Keith Hahn. Subject: Significant Military Exercises. Record ID: 9300731. (7 pages)	02/18/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #2 [3]

2016-0152-F

vz4357

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0667

February 17, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ROBERT BELL *R&B*

SUBJECT: Defense Budget

Per your request, attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President describing how the Administration's FY 1994-1997 defense spending plan is consistent with his campaign position on this issue.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Overview of Defense Budget

The \$1.03 trillion Fiscal Year (FY) 1994-1997 defense budget (Budget Authority) contained in the economic plan you will present to Congress this evening is fully consistent with the positions on military spending and reducing the Federal deficit you took during the campaign. Your proposals for military spending reflect defense program reductions from the revised \$1.12 trillion Bush/Cheney FY 94-97 baseline of \$59.968 billion. This figure is just under the \$60 billion you pledged to trim from this mark. Your proposed defense budget also projects actual expenditures (Outlays) in FY 1997 of \$249 billion. This means that defense will contribute its fair share (\$37 billion) to the \$145 billion in total reductions to Federal spending for that year -- thereby meeting your pledge to cut the FY 1997 deficit by half (as compared to the August 1992 CBO estimate for that year).

There are, however, two aspects of your military spending proposals which critics will point to in claiming that you have slashed military spending well beyond the level you promised during the campaign and which, therefore, will require careful explanation.

First, in addition to the \$60 billion in program cuts, your military spending plan for FY 1994-97 includes roughly \$18 billion (BA) which we are calling "Pay and Benefits Adjustments." Critics will add this to the \$60 billion and charge that the resulting total -- \$78 billion -- is 27% deeper than you pledged during the campaign. To rebut this charge, Administration officials and spokespersons must emphasize that military and DOD civilian workers are not having their pay cut, nor are they being singled out for special treatment. Rather, like all government workers, they will not be receiving the same amount of pay increases as had been projected by the last administration. This adjustment is being levied government-wide as part of your austerity program.

Second, critics will point to the \$10 billion (BA) debit which we are labelling "Reductions to offset underpricing of Bush programs" and charge (a) that these additional reductions can

only be achieved through program cuts and (b) that in combination with the pay adjustment and the original \$60 billion in program cuts, you are proposing to slash military spending over the four years by \$88 billion -- 43% more than advertised. We must explain that:

- At the time you made your \$60 billion reduction pledge, you assumed that the Bush/Cheney defense spending plan for FY 1994-1997 would reflect honest budget assumptions.
- Serious questions have since been raised as to whether the Bush/Cheney plan is significantly underfunded due to overestimation of potential management reform savings and underpricing of weapons acquisition programs.
- We do not know if the program is underfunded or, if so, the extent of the underfunding. Secretary Aspin has, however, established a special task force (the Odeen panel) to get to the bottom of this.
- We hope the Odeen panel will report that there is no shortfall. But as a prudent hedge against the possibility that there is a substantial shortfall, we have increased our estimate of the cost of the FY 94-97 Bush/Cheney baseline by \$10 billion (BA) and projected a possible requirement to offset this through additional reductions of the same amount.
- We have made no decisions how this \$10 billion (BA) offset would be achieved if it turns out that a shortfall of this magnitude exists. If we do have to identify another \$10 billion in reductions, we would consider many options, including finding additional efficiencies in defense overhead or operations or achieving greater savings through increased streamlining of Armed Forces roles and missions (changes that go beyond the modest changes recommended in General Powell's recent report).

In sum, both Congress and the military appear favorably disposed to support your defense spending plan as long as it can be shown to be consistent with the position you articulated during the campaign. In this sense, then, our success on the Hill and in the Pentagon will in large measure rest on our ability to explain why the \$18 billion in pay and benefit reductions and \$10 billion in Bush/Cheney shortfall offsets should not be seen as going beyond your campaign position.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0704

February 18, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Transportation Proposed Testimony RE: HR 57,
United States Merchant Marine Utilization and
Preference Act

Tab I provides the Department of Transportation's proposed testimony for a February 24 appearance before the House Subcommittee on Merchant Marine. Most of the testimony describes Transportation's views on cargo preference issues relating to the Governments of Kuwait and Israel.

Regarding the specific legislation contained in HR 57, Transportation feels that since the Maritime Administrator (MARAD) has the legislative authority to establish rules under which preference programs operate, it should be given the opportunity to resolve the issues raised by HR 57 through a collaborative process within the Administration. This is consistent with the views of the Departments of State and Defense.

Don Gross
Concurrence by: Don Gross

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I concurring in Transportation's proposed testimony.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0704

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES J. JUKES

SUBJECT: Transportation Proposed Testimony RE: HR 57,
 United States Merchant Marine Utilization and
 Preference Act

The National Security Council staff concurs in the proposed
Transportation testimony on HR 57.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

TESTIMONY

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503**

February 17, 1993

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

10 pages
TESTIMONY
0704

LRM #1-48

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

AGRIC-CR - Robin Rorapaugh (all testimony) - (202)720-7095 - 230
COMMERCE - Michael A. Levitt - (202)482-3086 - 324
DEFENSE - Samuel T. Brick, Jr. - (703)697-1305 - 325
JUSTICE - Faith Burton - (202)514-2141 - 217
STATE - Matt Winslow - (202)647-4463 - 225
TREASURY - Richard S. Carro - (202)622-1146 - 228
AID - Robert M. Lester - (202)647-8371 - 202
NSC - William H. Itoh - (202)456-6534 - 249
CEA - Francine Obermiller - (202)395-5036 - 242
LABOR - Robert A. Shapiro - (202)219-8201 - 330
FMC - Russell A. Rockwell - (202)523-5911 - 307

FROM: JAMES J. JUKES (for) *JJM*
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference

OMB CONTACT: Jim BROWN (395-3473)
Secretary's line (for simple responses): 395-3454

SUBJECT: TRANSPORTATION Proposed Testimony RE: HR 57,
United States Merchant Marine Utilization and
Preference Act

DEADLINE: 5:00 P.M. February 19, 1993

COMMENTS: A copy of the invitation letter is also attached. If
your views are to be considered in the clearance of this
testimony, they must be received by the deadline.

OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before
advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in
accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or
receipts for purposes of the the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of
Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

CC:

Cyndi Vallina
Meg DiBari
John McClelland
Tom Dorsey
Bob Damus
Roger Adkins

Rodney Bent
Bruce Sasser
Ed Clarke
Tom Dorsey
Ken Schwartz

LRM #I-48

RESPONSE TO LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

If your response to this request for views is simple (e.g., concur/no comment) we prefer that you respond by faxing us this response sheet. If the response is simple and you prefer to call, please call the branch-wide line shown below (NOT the analyst's line) to leave a message with a secretary.

You may also respond by (1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail if the analyst does not answer); (2) sending us a memo or letter; or (3) if you are an OASIS user in the Executive Office of the President, sending an E-mail message. Please include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.

To: Jim BROWN
Office of Management and Budget
Fax Number: (202) 3953109
Analyst/Attorney's Direct Number: (202) 395-3473
Branch-Wide Line (to reach secretary): (202) 395-3454

FROM: _____ (Date)
 _____ (Name)
 _____ (Agency)
 _____ (Telephone)

**SUBJECT: TRANSPORTATION Proposed Testimony RE: HR 57,
United States Merchant Marine Utilization and
Preference Act**

The following is the response of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:

_____ Concur
_____ No objection
_____ No comment
_____ See proposed edits on pages _____
_____ Other: _____
_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this
_____ response sheet

02-17-93 02:08PM

TO 9/395-3109

P002/009

DRAFT

**DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
STATEMENT OF THE ACTING MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR**

RICHARD E. BOWMAN

**BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES**

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

**OVERSIGHT HEARING ON FEDERAL AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH
AND ENFORCEMENT OF CARGO PREFERENCE LAWS**

FEBRUARY 24, 1993

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, my name is Richard Bowman and I am the Acting Maritime Administrator of the Department of Transportation. I am here today at your request to comment on cargo preference issues and respond to your questions.

U.S. cargo preference programs are part of the overall statutory scheme to support the privately owned and operated, U.S.-flag merchant marine. They require that a certain percentage of government-impelled cargo be carried on U.S. vessels. This is a very important program for the maintenance of a U.S. merchant fleet. Our Nation continues to require militarily useful U.S.-flag vessels.

02-17-93 02:08PM

TO 9/395-3109

P003/009

2

As this Committee knows well, the ships that carry these cargoes provide important jobs for American seafarers.

In your letter of invitation, Mr. Chairman, you requested that the Department of Transportation express its views on cargo preference as it relates to the Government of Kuwait's efforts to rebuild its country, and to the Government of Israel's use of U.S. goods and services in connection with the five-year loan guarantee program passed by Congress last year.

MARAD is extremely disappointed that the Government of Kuwait has avoided significant utilization of U.S. carriers in the rebuilding of its country. The response to our attempts to secure Kuwait's reconstruction cargo has been particularly disheartening given the major role that the U.S. military played in helping to free Kuwait from Iraqi aggression, and the role of the U.S. merchant marine in carrying military cargo to support that effort.

02-17-93 02:08PM

TO 9/395-3109

P004/009

3

U.S.-flag ships have been virtually excluded due to a clause in Kuwait's Council of Minister's Resolution 47/86 which gives the right of first refusal for cargo to the United Arab Shipping Company. For almost two years MARAD has worked with the Department of State to encourage Kuwait to rescind this discriminatory policy. A MARAD representative and State Department officials met many times trying to convince the Kuwaitis to change this policy. The U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait was personally involved. At his most recent meeting with Kuwaiti government officials on January 6, he relayed a letter from the former Maritime Administrator denying Kuwait a retroactive waiver to carry Export-Import Bank cargoes on Kuwaiti-flag vessels. MARAD's denial of the waiver was based on Kuwait's continued discriminatory treatment of U.S.-flag vessels. Unfortunately, these efforts have produced no results.

We are also concerned about the absence of specific cargo preference requirements in the program for loan guarantees to Israel that was established by Title VI of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY 1993. These guarantees provide a

02-17-93 02:08PM

TO 9/395-3109

P005/009

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significant economic benefit for Israel, and the law anticipates that the amount of U.S. investment goods and services purchased for Israel's use will substantially increase. Logically, U.S.-flag vessels should benefit.

On December 3, 1992, the former Administrator wrote to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs requesting his assistance in ensuring that specific cargo preference language be included in the \$10 billion agreement. The Maritime Administration received a response on January 6, 1993. The Department of State pointed out that the authorizing legislation did not contain any preference requirement, and further stated that individual projects would be extremely difficult to break out. Subsequently, we wrote to the Minister for Economic Affairs at the Embassy of Israel on February 17, 1993, requesting a meeting for the purpose of drafting a side letter that would assure utilization of U.S.-flag vessels to transport commodities generated by the loan guarantee program. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I have copies of these letters to be submitted for the record of this hearing.

02-17-93 02:08PM

TO 9/395-3109

P006/009

5

Mr. Chairman, you have also requested the Department's views on H.R. 57, introduced by Congresswoman Bentley, to amend the Cargo Preference Act of 1904 in title 10 of the United States Code, to clarify the preference for U.S.-flag merchant vessels in the carriage of Department of Defense (DOD) cargoes. The 1904 Act requires only U.S.-flag vessels to be used in the transportation by water of supplies bought for the armed forces, unless the freight charged for those vessels is excessive or otherwise unreasonable. This bill would revise the 1904 Act to update and codify the Wilson-Weeks Agreement of 1954 between the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Commerce, dealing with the utilization, transfer, and allocation of merchant ships for use by DOD.

The Department believes that, before any legislation dealing with the important issues raised in H.R. 57 is considered by this Subcommittee, the Secretary of Transportation should be given the opportunity to attempt to resolve these issues through the collaborative process within the Administration. The guiding principles are to preserve the military's flexibility to meet

02-17-93 02:08PM

TO 9/395-3109

P007/009

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international crises and to proscribe competition by the government with the commercial sector.

As we noted at this Subcommittee's first oversight hearing on cargo preference issues, MARAD takes its mandate to monitor the implementation of the cargo preference laws by other government agencies very seriously. MARAD has the legislative authority to establish rules under which preference programs operate; however, our lack of enforcement authority impacts our effectiveness. In spite of this, our record of achieving compliance for military cargoes is close to 100 percent. At his Senate confirmation hearing, Secretary Peña stated his support for our Nation's cargo preference laws. MARAD will continue to aggressively monitor compliance by both military and civilian agencies.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement and I will be glad to answer any questions that you and members of the Subcommittee may have.

##

02-17-93 02:08PM

TO 9/395-3109

P008/009

02/17/1993 11:34 FROM

TD

67153 P.83

[illegible][illegible]

**U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Room 1234, Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-6230**

February 5, 1993

The Honorable Federico Pena
The Secretary of Transportation
Department of Transportation
Washington, D.C. 20590

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

On Wednesday, February 24, 1993, the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine will hold an oversight hearing to review the compliance of various Federal agencies with the current cargo preference laws. The hearing will begin at 10:00 a.m. in 1334 Longworth House Office Building.

The subcommittee held a hearing on September 20, 1992, with regard to cargo preference as it relates to Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty cargo, Meals Ready to Eat (MRE), and Agency for International Development (AID) waivers. Part II of these cargo preference hearings will deal with the Government of Kuwait's response to shipping on U.S. carriers, the Israel loan guarantee and U.S. shipping, and the carriage of military cargo on U.S. vessels.

It is requested that the Department of Transportation appear to express its views on cargo preference as it relates to the Government of Kuwait and its commitment to significantly use U.S. companies, including U.S. carriers, in the rebuilding of its country. It is further requested that the Department testify as to its actions in working with the State Department to find agreement with the Government of Israel to buy U.S. goods and to ship them on U.S.-flag vessels with U.S. loan-guaranteed funds. Finally, the Subcommittee would like the Department's view on H.R. 87, a bill to clarify the preference for U.S.-flag merchant vessels in the carriage of Department of Defense cargoes.

THIS STATEMENT FURNISHED ON FORM 1040 IN PREVIOUS YEARS

02-17-93 02:08PM

TO 9/395-3109

P009/009

02/17/1993 11:33 FROM

TO

57153 P.02

The Honorable Rodanina Penn
February 8, 1993
Page Two

I would appreciate hearing from you or your designated representative as soon as possible. If you have any further questions, please contact Cher Brooks, the Subcommittee Chief Counsel, at 202.226-3533. The Minority Counsel for this hearing is Hugh W. (Rusty) Johnston at 202.226-3492.

Sincerely,

William O. Lipinski
William O. Lipinski
Chairman

cc: The Honorable Herbert M. Bateman
MARAD (Richard E. Bowman, Acting Administrator)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 19, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY SODERBERG

FROM:

DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*

SUBJECT:

GAO Information Request

Attached at Tab A is information on NSC staff travel expenses in support of Nunn-Lugar, in response to a January 6 request by GAO (Tab II). The total was only around \$10,000, plus Mil Air. Such administrative information has been provided in the past and we are advised by the State Department Legal Advisor's office that there is no legal or prudential impediment from an Executive Branch perspective to complying with this GAO request.

We are more concerned, however, about the precedential effect of providing the additional "interagency decision documents" GAO seeks in its letter. We are continuing to consider that question, with a view to withholding documents that are deliberative or pre-decisional in nature.

Meanwhile, GAO has obtained travel information from the agencies and has told us that, if they do not have the information at Tab A by **Monday, February 22**, they will include a footnote in their report to Senator Hank Brown that NSC failed to report.

Senator Brown, who is disappointed that Nunn-Lugar monies have not flowed more quickly to U.S. companies such as Bechtel and Westinghouse, wants GAO to show that the Nunn-Lugar bureaucracy is bogging the system down. As noted above, though, the NSC figures are quite modest and it may be more harmful to be criticized as uncooperative rather than simply providing the information.

Concurrences by:

Indraft *Indraft* *RG*
Nancy Menan, Don Gross, ~~Bob Bell~~
Rose Gottemoeller
*Indraft*RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Will Itoh to sign the letter attached at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Proposed Letter to GAO

Tab A NSC Staff Travel Information

Tab II Incoming from GAO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Dear Mr. Toureille:

Attached please find the data concerning NSC staff travel to the Former Soviet Union in support of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act requested in your letter of January 6, 1993.

We understand you need this data first, and we are continuing to review the request for additional materials.

Sincerely,

William Itoh
Executive Secretary

Mr. Pierre Toureille
Senior Evaluator
General Accounting Office
1215 Jefferson Davis Highway
Crystal Gateway 3, Room 1101
Arlington, VA 22202

Attachment

NSC STAFF TRAVEL IN SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION ACT

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>TOTAL COST</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>WHO PAID</u>
Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control	Kiev Moscow Paris	1-10 Oct 92	\$2,235.00	Meetings	NSC
Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control	Moscow Kiev Minsk Alma Ata Brussels	14-22 Jan 92	\$1,423.75 (Mil Air provided)	Meetings	NSC
Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control	Moscow	13-17 Dec 92	_____	Meetings	DOE
Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control	Moscow	15-25 Jan 92	\$2,764.50	Meetings	NSC
Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control	Moscow	3-17 Mar 92	\$4,305.64	Meetings	NSC
Senior Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control	Moscow	13-17 Feb 92	_____	Meetings	Air Force
Senior Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control	Moscow	12-14 Jul 92	_____	Meetings	Air Force
Senior Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control	Moscow	4-9 Oct 91	_____	Meetings	Air Force



United States
General Accounting Office

National Security and
International Affairs Division

Held for signed action

*Copies to
Secretary
Goss/Ardis
Bell/Davis/
Gottschalk*

20080

January 6, 1993

Mr. Daniel Poneman
Director, Defense Policy and Arms Control
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building, Room 389
Washington, D.C., 20506

Dear Mr. Poneman:

As you know, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and Senator Hank Brown have asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to review the implementation of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act. The topics that we have been asked to address include the following.

- Executive branch plans to help Russia design and build a fissile material storage facility.
- Executive branch consideration of non-storage options for disposing of Russian plutonium and comparisons of their long-term costs with those of storage.
- U.S. plans to use Russian highly enriched uranium, or products derived from such uranium, to produce low-enriched reactor fuel.
- The executive branch's development of a prioritized list of all factors affecting the destruction of former Soviet nuclear weapons.
- The number, length, total cost, and source of funding of all executive branch travel to the former Soviet Union in support of the Act.


To insure that GAO can fully address these topics, it will require access to

- interagency decision documents concerning the ultimate disposition of Soviet weapons grade fissile material and the construction of a Russian fissile materials storage facility;

- interagency plans or budgets for allocating all Nunn-Lugar funds; and
- data concerning NSC staff travel to the former Soviet Union in support of the Act.

Access to these documents and data should be provided as soon as possible to allow GAO to meet its scheduled reporting obligations to the Committee and Senator Brown. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at (703) 557-1503.


Yours truly,



Pierre Toureille
Senior Evaluator

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER
UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
1215 JEFFERSON DAVIS HIGHWAY
CRYSTAL CATELBY BLDG. #3
NSA/AT&T ROOM 1101
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
ARLINGTON, VA. 22202

Mr. Daniel Poneman
Director, Defense Policy and Arms Control
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
17th & Pennsylvania Ave. NW., Room 389
Washington, D.C. 20506



UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9320080
RECEIVED: 05 FEB 93 17

TO: PONEMAN

FROM: TOUREILLE, P

DOC DATE: 06 JAN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ADMINISTRATIVE FOREIGN TRAVEL
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES ARMS CONTROL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: GAO REVIEW

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR SODERBERG DUE DATE: 09 FEB 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: MENAN

LOGREF:

FILES: ADMIN

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
MENAN

FOR CONCURRENCE
BELL
BURNS
GATI
PONEMAN

FOR INFO

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJSL

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMO TO: Nancy Menan
cc: Tony Lake/Sandy Berger

FROM: Nancy Soderberg

DATE: 2/5/93

RE: GAO Review

Can your office please review the attached GAO request for interagency decision documents, interagency plans for Nunn-Lugar funds and data concerning NSC travel and advise me on how we should respond?

The GAO wants the information, at least about NSC travel expenses, by the middle of next week.

Thanks.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 20, 1993

Dear Sam:

Thank you for your letter of February 19 on my defense spending proposals. I appreciate your kind words about my speech Wednesday night and look forward to working with you in securing Congressional approval of our plans for economic renewal and reducing the deficit.

I was concerned to learn that you have questions about the defense budget but am confident that our numbers and economic assumptions will stand up to close scrutiny. I have asked Secretary Aspin to get in touch with you immediately to discuss our Fiscal Year 1994 - 1997 defense spending plan in detail.

Please let me know how I can be of further assistance as we work together on this and other matters.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "Bill", with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

The Honorable Sam Nunn
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

cc: Howard Paster

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0828

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 22, 1993



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: TORSEL PATTERSON *TP*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ann Mills Griffiths --
3:00 p.m., February 23, 1993

Ann Mills Griffiths, Executive Director of National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, wants to discuss with you U.S. policy towards Vietnam. Ann has heard that there will be a Deputies Meeting on Vietnam and absent appropriate level contacts at DoD and State, wants to ensure that you are aware of the National League of Families' views prior to the meeting.

There are at least two issues that may come up in the meeting. The first is the nature of this administration's Vietnam policy. The second, is what role, if any, private sector groups should play in intergovernmental policy debates.

KEY POINTS TO BE MADE

- We sincerely appreciate the good service you have done for your country.
- Our Vietnam policy is currently under review. POW/MIA policy is an essential part of that review. President Clinton strongly supports the fullest possible accounting of POW/MIA's.

IF ASKED ABOUT IWG/DEPUTIES COMMITTEE PARTICIPATION:

- We understand the necessity to accurately convey your feelings and those of the family members of POW/MIA in our governmental discussions.

___ I assure you that your views will be taken into account.

Our policy toward Vietnam is currently under review. While not precluding any options, the IWG paper that will be forwarded to the Deputies later this week takes a more activist approach to resolving the current impasse, in light of the fact that our leverage has rapidly faded and that U.S. economic interests will

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VL* NARA, Date *8/23/06*

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2016-0152-P

suffer significantly if the economic embargo is maintained. The Deputies will have an option, supported by Treasury, State, OSD and JCS, for the U.S. to take initial steps to improve relations with Vietnam as part of a strategy to move the POW/MIA issue off dead center. Ann will strongly urge that the Administration take a firm line against Vietnam. This will also be an option -- but it has almost no interagency support.

Ann may also seek to have a seat at deputies meetings or IWGs. During the previous two administrations she participated in an interagency group and was able to significantly influence administration policy. DoD, State and the NSC staff strongly oppose continuing outside participation in the IWG and oppose any standing IWG on Vietnam or POW/MIA.

Concurrences by:  Robert Bell,  Helen Walsh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0483

February 18, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: TORCEL PATTERSON *TP*

SUBJECT: Reply to Senator Rockefeller Concerning Informal
Working Group on Japan

Senator Jay Rockefeller has written you asking for the establishment of an informal group with representatives from relevant agencies, the Congress and the private sector to make recommendations concerning Japan policy. He suggests that the group meet for two months and then make its report privately and directly to the President.

This would have been a better idea during the transition. At this point there is not much enthusiasm for it among USTR, State or Defense. There have been press stories about this in general terms, labeling it a call for a "Team B" approach, and some of the names associated with it in the press articles would not be supportive of the administration, although I presume we would have some say in who would be on such a group.

I recommend that we include the establishment of such a group as an option for the deputies to consider when they review Japan policy in the next few weeks.

The reply at Tab I expresses appreciation for the idea and indicates that the suggestion will be reviewed at a senior policy level.

Concurrences by: *RB* Robert Bell, Don Gross, Helen Walsh,
MS Michael Froman *HW*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Senator Rockefeller at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Reply to Senator Rockefeller
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *RL* NARA, Date *8/23/2016*
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Rockefeller:

Thank you for your letter suggesting the establishment of a special group to advise the President on Japan policy.

I strongly agree with you that the U.S. relationship with Japan is very important. We are currently reviewing administration policy toward Japan and I will ensure that your suggestion is fully considered at the appropriate senior policy level.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the
President for
National Security
Affairs

The Honorable Jay Rockefeller
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

T
A
B

II

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4802

February 3, 1993

Dear Tony,

I am writing to follow up my previous correspondence with President Clinton last December regarding the idea of setting up an informal working group to develop a policy toward Japan.

As you may know, I have had a long standing special interest in Japan stemming from my years there as a student in the late 1950s and have worked hard over the years to promote good relations and an honest dialogue with the Japanese. I want to do what I can to continue that role in a way that will be supportive of the Administration.

In the short term, the change in administrations as well as the changed international situation in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union provides an excellent opportunity to make a serious effort to develop a Japan policy. The Bush Administration had no coherent vision of what shape the relationship should take and usually contented itself with reacting to the various sectoral crises that came along. The new world we face opens the door to a policy reappraisal, and Japan's record trade surplus last year, not to mention our increased bilateral deficit, are creating the political demand for it. With trade legislation likely at some point in 1993, it is important to have a coherent Administration view on how to deal with Japan.


To help develop that, I have in mind an informal group that includes insiders from the relevant economic, foreign policy and national security agencies, as well as people from the Congress and the private sector. There is a wealth of talent in the country on Japan which has not been well-used over the past four years. When the group's work is finished, which should be only a few months, it should report to the President directly and privately. The idea is that this is a policy exercise, not a rhetorical one.

I also discussed this idea with Warren Christopher in December, and I hope you are all prepared to move forward with it. It's overdue and would send the right signal to American business and the Japanese that we take the relationship seriously.

Mr. Tony Lake
February 3, 1993
Page 2

I am prepared to follow up on this directly with the President and with Warren, but it might be simpler to start the process in your shop, if you think it's a good idea. I would welcome your comments on the suggestion and your advice on how to proceed.

Sincerely,



John D. Rockefeller IV

Mr. Tony Lake
National Security Advisor
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Tony, I think this is a
sound idea. I am worried
about a
Japan
deficiency
in the
Administration.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0819

February 22, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RB*
FROM: STEVEN R. JONES *SJ*
SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Bumpers with Recommendation
for NSC Staff

At Tab II is a letter from Senator Dale Bumpers recommending Captain Nicholas Naclerio, USAF, currently at DARPA, for the newly established NSC staff position overseeing defense conversion efforts. This is the Director position within Defense Policy and Arms Control that I have recently filled.

At Tab I is a proposed reply, informing Senator Bumpers that the position has been filled, and thanking him for his interest in this matter.

Concurrence by: Don Gross *DG*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I to Senator Bumpers.

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Senator Bumpers
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Bumpers:

Thank you for your recent letter recommending Captain Nicholas Naclerio as a candidate to serve on the National Security Council staff. I agree with your view of the importance of ongoing defense conversion efforts and other industrial and technology base issues. I have established a position within our Defense Policy and Arms Control Directorate to assist in overseeing and coordinating this important area.

We have, however, already filled this Director position. Colonel Steve Jones, USAF, who is coming to us from the Defense Conversion Commission, will be the NSC Director responsible for defense transition, and will be working very closely with the National Economic Council on these issues.

I appreciate your interest regarding this matter, and have asked my staff to keep Captain Naclerio in mind for any defense transition or technology positions that we may become aware of in the future.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable Dale Bumpers
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

FAX

from _____

Senator Dale Bumpers

(202) 224-4843 229 Dirksen Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20510

DATE: 1/26/93TO: TONY LAKE / SANDY BERGERFAX NUMBER TO: 456-2219FROM: SEN. BUMPERS / BRUCE MACDONALDPHONE: 224-6430TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES, 3 INCLUDING COVER PAGE.COMMENTS: Tony & Sandy,
Nick Nadlerio is doing a
great job at DARPA, and his
assignment as an Air Force officer
to the NSC would be a big plus
for you.
All the best to you in your
new responsibilities!
Bruce

DALE BUMPERS
ARANSASCOMMITTEES:
APPROPRIATIONS
ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES
SMALL BUSINESS

United States Senate

Bob,

Any advice on this one?
Are we creating a conversion
office?

Michael

The Honorable An
National Security
Executive Office
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Lake:

I understand that you are considering the National Security Council staff that would oversee and coordinate interagency efforts for defense conversion and other industrial and technology base issues. I think this is an excellent idea and heartily endorse such a step. At the same time, I wanted to encourage you to select Captain Nicholas Naclerio to head this office.


Captain Naclerio has an ideal background to handle the responsibilities of such a position. He combines a strong technical background, holding a PhD in electrical engineering and having worked at IBM's Corporate Research Labs, with in-depth military experience managing high technology R&D programs in such areas as software, electronics, and manufacturing, most recently at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

Beyond Nick's technical competence is his experience and skills in interacting across a broad spectrum of the electronics industry. This industry is an important and representative example of the problems of defense conversion. Nick has had first-hand experience at DARPA with the major retrenchment in the defense electronics sector, as the country adjusts to a post-Cold War world. At the same time, he is intimately familiar with the exploding commercial electronics sector and knows well all its key elements, including technology issues, infrastructure issues, global competition, and the roles that industry, government, and academia need to play to assure a strong U.S. competitive position.

The Honorable Anthony Lake
January 26, 1993
Page Two

In short, Nick would be an extraordinarily effective member of the NSC staff and a real asset to you and Sandy. I strongly encourage you to recruit Nick for your team.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Dale", with a large, sweeping initial "D" and a stylized "Bumpers" following.

Dale Bumpers

DB:bwm

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0819

February 22, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL 

FROM: STEVEN R. JONES 

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Bumpers with Recommendation
for NSC Staff

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At Tab I is a proposed reply, informing Senator Bumpers that the position has been filled, and thanking him for his interest in this matter.

Concurrence by: Don Gross 

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I to Senator Bumpers.

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Senator Bumpers
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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I appreciate your interest regarding this matter, and have asked my staff to keep Captain Naclerio in mind for any defense transition or technology positions that we may become aware of in the future.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable Dale Bumpers
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

FAX

from _____

Senator Dale Bumpers

(202) 224-4843 229 Dirksen Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20510

DATE: 1/26/93TO: TONY LAKE / SANDY BERGERFAX NUMBER TO: 456-2219FROM: SEN. BUMPERS / BRUCE MacDONALDPHONE: 224-6430TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES, 3 INCLUDING COVER PAGE.COMMENTS: Tony & Sandy,

Nick Naderio is doing a
great job at DARPA, and his
assignment as an Air Force officer
to the NSC would be a big plus
for you.

All the best to you in your
new responsibilities!

Bruce

DALE BUMPERS
ARKANSAS

COMMITTEES:
APPROPRIATIONS
ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES
SMALL BUSINESS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0401

January 26, 1993

The Honorable Anthony Lake
National Security Advisor
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Dr. Lake:

I understand that you are considering creating an office within the National Security Council staff that would oversee and coordinate interagency efforts for defense conversion and other industrial and technology base issues. I think this is an excellent idea and heartily endorse such a step. At the same time, I wanted to encourage you to select Captain Nicholas Naclerio to head this office.


Captain Naclerio has an ideal background to handle the responsibilities of such a position. He combines a strong technical background, holding a PhD in electrical engineering and having worked at IBM's Corporate Research Labs, with in-depth military experience managing high technology R&D programs in such areas as software, electronics, and manufacturing, most recently at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

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The Honorable Anthony Lake
January 26, 1993
Page Two

In short, Nick would be an extraordinarily effective member of the NSC staff and a real asset to you and Sandy. I strongly encourage you to recruit Nick for your team.

Sincerely,



Dale Bumpers

DB:bwm

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C. 20506

0438

February 23, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *REB*

FROM: STEVEN ANDREASEN *SAA*

SUBJECT: Letter from Senator Harkin on LTBT

Senator Harkin wrote to bring to your attention a report by Parliamentarians for Global Action on using the amendment mechanism of the LTBT of 1963 as a vehicle for rapidly concluding a global ban on all nuclear weapons tests.

The response from you to Senator Harkin notes that Bob met with three representatives of Parliamentarians for Global Action last week to discuss this process in detail and that amending the LTBT is one of the ideas we will take a close look at during the policy review on nuclear testing and a CTB.

Concurrences by: Donald Gross *DG*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Senator Harkin at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Senator Harkin
Tab II Letter from Senator Harkin

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Harkin:

I want to thank you for bringing to my attention the proposal by Parliamentarians for Global Action for using the amendment mechanism of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 as a vehicle for rapidly concluding a global ban on all nuclear weapons tests.


Last week, Robert G. Bell, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, met with three members of Parliamentarians for Global Action to discuss their proposal. As we begin reviewing our policy on nuclear testing and questions relating to the forum and modalities for negotiating a CTB, amending the LTBT is one of the approaches we will be looking at.

I look forward to future discussions with you on this and other issues.

Sincerely,

Samuel R. Berger
Deputy Assistant to the
President for National
Security Affairs

The Honorable Tom Harkin
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510



Don Gross

(Don - this came out of a
box of transition files
that I've been culling
through. I thought you should
be aware of them - M)


✓



United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

January 11, 1993



Samuel R. Berger
Director, National Security Department
1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20270

Re: Multilateral Negotiation for a Comprehensive Test Ban

Dear Sandy:

As a follow-up to my December 16, 1992 letter regarding a CTB, I am enclosing a more detailed description of the proposed process by Parliamentarians for Global Action. This is the organization composed of parliamentarians from around the globe that first proposed using the amendment mechanism of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 as a vehicle for rapidly concluding a global ban on all nuclear weapons tests.

As I summarized in my previous letter to you, the advantages of this multilateral negotiation process include:

- * The ability to capture 117 nations "wholesale" through the LTBT amendment process, not "retail" through nation-by-nation negotiation;
- * Celebration of the 30th anniversary of JFK's LTBT achievement by convening an amendment conference in Washington on August 5, 1993;
- * Demonstration of the new administration's willingness to utilize a multilateral forum; and
- * Optimizing the chances for a successful NPT extension in 1995 (or before the 1996 election) by concluding a verifiable, global CTB by 1994.

I commend the more detailed description of this process by the Parliamentarians for Global Action to your attention.

Sincerely,

Tom Harkin
United States Senator

210 WALNUT ST.
ROOM 733 FEDERAL BLDG.
DES MOINES, IA 50309
(515) 284-4574

880 LOCUST ST.
SUITE 125
DUBUQUE, IA 52001
(319) 582-2130

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0814

February 23, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RBB*

FROM: STEVEN ANDREASEN *SAS*

SUBJECT: Letter from Former Congressman Bill Green on LTBT

Former Congressman Bill Green wrote to the President during the transition to bring to his attention a report by Parliamentarians for Global Action on using the amendment mechanism of the LTBT of 1963 as a vehicle for rapidly concluding a global ban on all nuclear weapons tests.

The response from the President notes that Bob met with three representatives of Parliamentarians for Global Action last week to discuss this process in detail and that amending the LTBT is one of the ideas we will take a close look at during the policy review on nuclear testing and a CTB.

Concurrences by: Donald Gross *DG*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to Bill Green
Tab B Letter from Bill Green

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
HOWARD PASTER

SUBJECT: Letter from Former Congressman Bill Green

Purpose

To respond to former Congressman Bill Green's letter to you on nuclear testing and a CTB.

Background

Former Congressman Bill Green wrote to you to bring to your attention a report by Parliamentarians for Global Action on using the amendment mechanism of the LTBT of 1963 as a vehicle for rapidly concluding a global ban on all nuclear weapons tests.

The response from you notes that Bob Bell met with three representatives of Parliamentarians for Global Action last week to discuss this process in detail and that amending the LTBT is one of the ideas we will take a close look at during the policy review on nuclear testing and a CTB.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to former Congressman Bill Green at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Bill Green
Tab B Letter from Bill Green

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Green:

I want to thank you for bringing to my attention the proposal by Parliamentarians for Global Action on using the amendment mechanism of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 as a vehicle for rapidly concluding a global ban on all nuclear weapons tests.

Last week, Robert G. Bell, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, met with three members of Parliamentarians for Global Action to discuss their proposal. As we begin reviewing our policy on nuclear testing and questions relating to the forum and modalities for negotiating a CTB, amending the LTBT is one of the approaches we will be looking at.

I want to thank you for all of the work you have done over the years on this issue, and I hope I can call on you in the months ahead for advice on this and other matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Bill Green
Suite 702
14 East 60th Street
New York City, N.Y. 10022

0814

To Bob Bell

MEMORANDUM

TO: Nancy Soderberg
FROM: Ann Walker
DATE: January 11, 1993
RE: BC Request to Forward

Per the
"Concordat" of
February 2nd of
is you have a trial - this
mainly as testing - I'd
just like to encourage from
narrow perspective.
Cheers,
Ann

Attached is a letter former Congressman Bill Green sent to BC regarding the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

Would you please draft letter of response. Thanks.


To Don Peneman

To: ~~John Walker~~

From: Nancy

pls handle + cc Congress. Relations.

Sent to us by
mistake. your action.



BILL GREEN
15TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEES:
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
VA-HUD-INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Memo
1/4/93

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Repho
cc Nancy S.

to
memo

0814
WASHINGTON OFFICE:
2301 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-2436

NEW YORK OFFICE:
LINCOLN BUILDING
60 EAST 42ND STREET, ROOM 2306
NEW YORK, NY 10165-0015
(212) 826-4466

President-Elect Bill Clinton
Governor's Mansion
Little Rock, Arkansas, 72203

Dear Mr. President-Elect,

I take this opportunity to write to you about my longstanding interest in the nuclear test-ban issue, because I believe that your interest in this matter is motivated by the same concern that has motivated me these many years: nuclear proliferation. I regret to say that the two previous Administrations failed to appreciate the central role that a nuclear-weapon test ban ought to have in U.S. non-proliferation efforts. As a result U.S. policy was hamstrung and precious years were lost. I write in the hope that this error is not perpetuated another four years.

I also write because, stymied in Washington, I have had to look beyond the Beltway, indeed beyond our shores, for encouragement to press on against the odds. This I found in abundance, and would like to share with you.

Easily the most impressive international initiative for a test ban in the 1980s has been the Partial (Limited) Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference. It embodies the determination of international community not to let the test-ban issue fade into obscurity. In 1988, on the 25th anniversary of the LTBT, six nations did something unprecedented in the annals of nuclear arms control: they proposed a substantive amendment to a treaty. Within seven months, 40 parties to the treaty had requested a conference to consider the amendment, establishing another precedent: non-nuclear nations setting the nuclear arms control agenda. So it was that the U.S. Government was obliged to sit down with a hundred other states in January 1991 to discuss ending all nuclear weapon testing. It is a pity that the Amendment Conference was so overshadowed by the Gulf War.

Allow me to mention my personal involvement in these developments, although I must emphasize that I am far from being alone among my Congressional colleagues, on both sides of the aisle, in this work. When resolutions were adopted in the UN General Assembly in the mid-80s advocating this new approach to test-ban negotiations, I join over 70 other Representatives in writing to Secretary of State George Shultz. We raised with him our concern that U.S. opposition to the proposal must not compromise the longstanding U.S. policy of scrupulously adhering to our treaty responsibilities; in this case to convene an amendment conference if so requested by one-third of the then 118 parties.

In 1990, I became particularly active on this matter. I was

concerned that the United States was pursuing a test-ban policy that could seriously jeopardize the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. My sense of urgency centered on the upcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. In June 1990, I attended the "Organizational Meeting" for the Amendment Conference at UN Headquarters. The warning signs could not have been clearer. State after state criticized the failure of the nuclear powers to fulfill the pledge they had made in 1963 and reiterated in the NPT to continue negotiations for a CTB. The State Department, nonetheless, went into the August NPT Review Conference confident that all was well. As I saw for myself in Geneva, all was not well. The refusal of the United States to acknowledge any obligation to begin CTB negotiations within the first term in force of the NPT led to a total deadlock. To many countries Article VI of the NPT means what it says: "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date." In their minds, the test ban is the foremost "effective measure relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race," and if "an early date" does not mean within the treaty's initial 25-year term, it means nothing. One can hardly take issue with this.

In November 1990, I joined a delegation of Soviet, British, and U.S. legislators to our respective capitals. We had with us an Open Letter addressed to President Mikhail Gorbachev, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and President George Bush. Circulated by Parliamentarians for Global Action (the group which pioneered the amendment approach) in the legislatures of over 40 non-nuclear countries, this letter had gathered over 2200 signatures, representing over a quarter of a billion constituents. President Gorbachev received our delegation for almost an hour; later he sent a personal message of support to the Amendment Conference. We were in London on the day the ruling party changed leadership and were informed by Deputy Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg there would be no change in the British position on testing. The delegation's final appointment was in the White House with Brent Scowcroft. He stated his belief that proliferation could be successfully controlled without any "concession" on nuclear-weapon testing.

At each stop, we proposed that sanctions be part of any agreement prohibiting nuclear explosions. We could see little hope of the United States leading international efforts against testing by a new nation as long as testing continued in Nevada. If, on the other hand, we would practice what we preach, America's claim to leadership would be greatly enhanced.

In January 1991, I was one of several members of Congress who went to UN Headquarters for the LTBT Amendment Conference. By the end of the conference it was clear that the United States and Britain were badly isolated. None of our allies would join us in opposing continuation of the amendment effort. Seven Western states broke ranks and voted for the motion put forward by the non-aligned states. By that motion, the Conference President, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas of Indonesia, was empowered to call the parties together to resume to work of the Amendment Conference "at an appropriate time."

Many states, and many of us on the Hill, are wondering whether the appropriate time has now come, given the support you have expressed for bringing nuclear testing to an end. On 7 December 1992, the UN General Assembly voted for a special meeting of the parties to the LTBT to look into the "feasibility" of resuming work in 1993. In short, Mr. President-Elect, they await your signal. I think you should give it. Here is why.

Of course, you could negotiate a brand new CTB treaty. But who in the end would sign it, when would they sign it, and what would they expect in return for signing it? It took years (even a decade or more) and considerable bargaining to get key countries to sign the NPT. Still a number of crucial states are not parties. It is all too easy for states to postpone from year to year tough decisions. In the states we worry most about, the internal politics are very tough indeed. Leaders will want to be able to show something in return for renouncing the option of testing nuclear weapons. This will mean bargaining with a wide range of countries. This is a long and difficult route.

It is also completely unnecessary. Through the LTBT amendment process you will lock up nearly every threshold state in one shot, at no charge. Often when people learn this they say it is too good to be true. But it is true, it is right there in black and white in Article II of the LTBT. Paragraph two stipulates that at the moment a majority of the parties have ratified an amendment the amended treaty enters into force for all parties. The only qualification is that the United States, Britain and Russia must be part of that majority; which of course protects us from having an amendment imposed upon us. We cannot lose, and we have the world to gain.

The countries that proposed the amendment, that requested the conference, that voted for the conference to continue, etc. are fully aware that at the end of this process they will have a test ban enter into force upon them in this manner. That is how much they want testing to stop.

It is a rare to have an opportunity of this magnitude.

Are there complications? Of course, one. France and China are not parties to the LTBT. Neither is likely to become parties while an amendment to the treaty is under discussion. They can, of course, observe the Amendment Conference, but that might not be enough to ensure that they will be willing to adhere to the treaty once it is amended. Parliamentarians for Global Action has advanced a proposal which should resolve this matter. After extensive consultation with diplomats at the United Nations, they propose that in 1993 the Amendment Conference commission the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to undertake the detailed negotiation of the amendment text (verification protocols, sanction provisions, etc.). When the Conference on Disarmament is ready to report on the results of its efforts, the Amendment Conference would meet for a final time and approve the draft amendment. What this would mean for France and China is that, as members of the

Conference on Disarmament, they would have equal input into the final form of the amended treaty.

The only other important states that are not parties to the LTBT are North Korea and Kazakhstan. (Belarus and Ukraine are parties.) But these states, as well as France and China would have to make independent decisions about signing a test ban agreement whether it were a new treaty or an amended one. But all the other threshold powers or nuclear aspirants - Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Pakistan, South Africa, and Ukraine - are, as I have said, locked up.


I should advise that, as you and your officials discuss with the declared nuclear powers such things as how much more testing is really required to wind things up, you press them immediately on this question of multilateral negotiations. Mr. President-Elect, you hold a strong hand. By law, Britain can test at most three more times in Nevada - and only if you support their request and Congress allows it. As new parties to the NPT, France and China too are under an obligation to pursue negotiations for a CTB. Standing in the way of such multilateral negotiations would only isolate them again. Russia? Russia wants a test ban. Furthermore, all these powers can see as well as us the advantage of binding the threshold powers to a CTB. In my judgment, if the United States wants to proceed this way, it can succeed.

Although, because of my defeat on November 3rd, I will not be among their number, I am sure that Congress will support you if you take the LTBT route. The votes on the testing amendment to the FY1993 Energy and Water Appropriations demonstrate that. The Senate, I suspect, will be particularly pleased to know that when it comes time to give its consent to ratification of the treaty, that act will bind not just the United States, but the entire list of parties, to a total ban.

You, no doubt, appreciate that there is a particular urgency to this matter. March 1995, when the NPT will expire unless renewed by its parties (Article X), is not that long from now. If open multilateral negotiations are not zeroing in on a CTB agreement by that time, the NPT Extension Conference could be a fiasco. 1993 is the 30th anniversary of the LTBT; why not get off to a fast start?

I have just touched on a small part of the history of the LTBT amendment effort. I should be happy to provide further details. However, this history is a mere prelude to what could be accomplished with real American leadership. The stage has been set; it is for you, Mr. President-Elect, to act.

Yours truly,



Bill Green

News 5

Mexico Signals Clinton Before Meeting

Salinas's Cabinet Shifts Anticipate U.S. Debate on Free Trade Pact

By Tod Robberson
Washington Post Foreign Service

MEXICO CITY, Jan. 5—Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari has removed two high-profile cabinet ministers just before his meeting this week with President-elect Clinton, underlining plans for a crackdown here on political corruption, human rights abuses and drug trafficking.

Government officials and political analysts described Monday's ouster of Attorney General Ignacio Morales Lechuga and Interior Minister Fernando Gutierrez Barrios as a signal that Salinas is pressing to improve Mexico's image before U.S. debate on the North American Free Trade Agreement, which awaits ratification.

Congressional critics have used Mexico's history of electoral fraud, corruption and human rights abuses to argue that the United States is being too hasty in joining Mexico in the pact, which already has been signed by the leaders of Mexico, Canada and the United States.

A Mexican official said recently that the Salinas administration was preparing for an onslaught of bad publicity in Washington preceding Senate debate on the pact. "They're going to drag all of the skeletons out of the closet for this," the official said.

Salinas appointed as attorney general Jorge Carpizo MacGregor, who was head of the government's commission on human rights and thus in charge of investigating hundreds of cases involving police torture and official corruption.

Replacing Gutierrez Barrios in the key security post of interior minister is Patrocinio Gonzalez Garrido, governor of the southern state of Chiapas.

The ministry also oversees federal, state and local elections, and hence Gutierrez Barrios policed a politically disastrous period during which three governors from Salinas's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) were ousted amid opposition charges of electoral fraud.

"There are definite messages to be seen in the arrival of these new men," a presidential spokesman said. "The mandate is very clear."

strengthen the fight against [official] impunity and carry on the struggle for respect of human rights," he added.

John G. Healey, executive director of Amnesty International U.S.A., said: "We would hope that the person who has seen the increasing documentation of human rights abuses in Mexico will now, as attorney general, see the need to prosecute the abusers. Without this level of commitment, human rights violations will continue."

Although the presidential spokesman denied there was any correlation between the shake-up and Salinas's meeting with Clinton in Austin on Friday, other analysts said replacement of the attorney general clearly was meant to send a message to Washington.

"Carpizo's appointment obviously was intended for the international audience, to send a message that Mexico is trying to take a stronger stance on human rights and drugs," said Mexican political scientist Denise Dresser. "Salinas has always been particularly effective in sending signals at opportune moments."

The replacement of Gutierrez Barrios also was seen as a political maneuver by Salinas in preparation for the presidential election in 1994. The PRI, which has ruled Mexico for six decades, traditionally allows the president to name the party's next presidential candidate—which has been tantamount to naming his successor.

Political analysts say the jockeying already has begun among contenders seeking Salinas's favor. Gutierrez Barrios had been rumored as a potential contender, but his ouster appears to have ended his presidential aspirations.

"He was following his own agenda and not the agenda of Salinas," said a foreign political analyst.

A government source said Gonzalez Garrido, the new interior minister, can be considered a contender for the presidential candidacy, along with such longtime hopefuls as Mexico City Mayor Manuel Camacho Solis, Treasury Secretary Pedro Aspe and Social Development Minister Luis Donaldo Colosio.

As governor of Chiapas, Gonzalez Garrido had a checkered record regarding human rights and political

openness, according to several observers. "He's not the person to have a dialogue with if you're in the opposition," the foreign analyst said.

Also on Monday, Salinas named a close friend, Emilio Lozoya Talamann, as secretary of energy and mines. He also is regarded as a strong presidential contender, various sources said.

Dresser described the shake-up as one of "a series of smokescreens" that will be used by Salinas to keep the contenders off balance and maintain his control over the PRI as the presidential race approaches.

News 5

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37

U.S. 'Concerned' Over Iraqi Missile Deployments

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

White House spokesman Martin Fitzwater said yesterday the administration is "very concerned" about a new Iraqi grouping of surface-to-air missiles in the southern part of the country patrolled by U.S. and allied warplanes.

"We're monitoring the missiles," Fitzwater told reporters traveling with President Bush to West Point, N.Y., yesterday morning. Other officials said the antiaircraft weapons were Russian-made SA-2s recently deployed in three major groups along the 32nd parallel, the northern border of a zone where the U.N. Security Council has barred Iraqi military flights.

Officials said the administration is reviewing military options for responding to any Iraqi missile attack against U.S. and allied warplanes. But a senior official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said "no imminent action will take place."

Iraq's action follows the downing of an Iraqi MiG-25 by an American F-16 on Dec. 27 and is assumed by some officials to be in response to that event. It may also be timed to signal defiance to the incoming Clinton administration, which takes office later this month.

While Fitzwater's remarks raised the possibility the United States would do something to respond to the Iraqi deployment, Defense Department spokesman Bob Hall appeared to play down the development in a midday briefing for reporters.

"In and of itself, it's not that big a deal," Hall said, adding that Iraq's action was "an item of particular interest" only when taken together with other recent Iraqi moves that he said were aimed at undermining U.N. authority in the area.

Officials said these actions include interference with humanitarian relief for Kurds in northern Iraq and with U.N.-ordered inspections of suspected weapons sites, as well as continued attacks against Shiite rebels in southern Iraq.

Within the past few days, Hall said, Iraq has flown a few warplanes along the 32nd Parallel and gone "across it some days" in an operation aimed at "teasing" Western forces.

Hall said Iraqi antiaircraft missiles previously have been deployed within range of U.S. and allied aircraft that fly near the 32nd parallel to enforce the U.N.-mandated "no fly" zone. He added that some Iraqi antiaircraft missiles also have been deployed south of the 32nd parallel inside the zone where Iraqi aircraft are forbidden to fly.

The new missile deployments were first reported yesterday by CBS News and the New York Times.

The no-fly zone was created in August 1992 after Baghdad intensified military flights against Shiite rebels in southern Iraq. But the deployment of Iraqi antiaircraft missiles previously has not been a subject of controversy between Washington and Baghdad.

In the cat-and-mouse game played by Iraqi and Western mili-

tary aircraft in the region, the Bush administration has objected only to Iraqi flights inside the prohibited region and to the switching-on of missile-related radars as U.S. planes flew overhead.

After a U.S. warning in April that it would not tolerate such radar operation, Iraq halted the activity.

Iraq has not turned on any radars associated with the new deployments, officials said. But one cautioned that the groupings "appear to have some purpose" and another said "it is the most coherent action" taken by Iraq to threaten Western planes.

"Let me, as a generic point . . . say that we have made it very clear to the Iraqis that we are determined to enforce the no-fly zones," Hall said. "We will do it in the safest possible way for our pilots, and we will not allow them to be put at risk."

In the past two weeks, U.S. warplanes have flown 661 sorties over Iraq, making 32 to 73 flights each day, the Pentagon said.

WP
1-6-93 25

JOHN BELL AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF AMERICA

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0814

February 23, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: STEVEN ANDREASEN *SA*

SUBJECT: Letter from Former Congressman Bill Green on LTBT

Former Congressman Bill Green wrote to the President during the transition to bring to his attention a report by Parliamentarians for Global Action on using the amendment mechanism of the LTBT of 1963 as a vehicle for rapidly concluding a global ban on all nuclear weapons tests.

The response from the President notes that Bob met with three representatives of Parliamentarians for Global Action last week to discuss this process in detail and that amending the LTBT is one of the ideas we will take a close look at during the policy review on nuclear testing and a CTB.

Concurrences by: Donald Gross *DF*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to Bill Green
Tab B Letter from Bill Green

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
HOWARD PASTER

SUBJECT: Letter from Former Congressman Bill Green

Purpose

To respond to former Congressman Bill Green's letter to you on nuclear testing and a CTB.

Background

Former Congressman Bill Green wrote to you to bring to your attention a report by Parliamentarians for Global Action on using the amendment mechanism of the LTBT of 1963 as a vehicle for rapidly concluding a global ban on all nuclear weapons tests.

The response from you notes that Bob Bell met with three representatives of Parliamentarians for Global Action last week to discuss this process in detail and that amending the LTBT is one of the ideas we will take a close look at during the policy review on nuclear testing and a CTB.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to former Congressman Bill Green at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Bill Green
Tab B Letter from Bill Green

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Green:

I want to thank you for bringing to my attention the proposal by Parliamentarians for Global Action on using the amendment mechanism of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 as a vehicle for rapidly concluding a global ban on all nuclear weapons tests.

Last week, Robert G. Bell, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, met with three members of Parliamentarians for Global Action to discuss their proposal. As we begin reviewing our policy on nuclear testing and questions relating to the forum and modalities for negotiating a CTB, amending the LTBT is one of the approaches we will be looking at.

I want to thank you for all of the work you have done over the years on this issue, and I hope I can call on you in the months ahead for advice on this and other matters.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Bill Green
Suite 702
14 East 60th Street
New York City, N.Y. 10022

0814

To Bob Bell

MEMORANDUM

TO: Nancy Soderberg
FROM: Ann Walker
DATE: January 11, 1993
RE: BC Request to Forward

Per the
"Concordat" of
February 2nd of
is you have action - this
mainly as testing - I'd
just like to concur from
narrowly perspective.
Cheers,
Ann

Attached is a letter former Congressman Bill Green sent to BC regarding the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

Would you please draft letter of response. Thanks.


To Don Peneman

To: ~~John Walker~~

From: Nancy

pls handle + cc Congress. Relations.

Sent to us by
mistake. your action.



BILL GREEN
15TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEES:
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
VA-HUD-INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Memo
1/4/93

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

0814

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
2301 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-2436

NEW YORK OFFICE:
LINCOLN BUILDING
60 EAST 42ND STREET, ROOM 2306
NEW YORK, NY 10165-0015
(212) 826-4466

President-Elect Bill Clinton
Governor's Mansion
Little Rock, Arkansas, 72203

Dear Mr. President-Elect,

I take this opportunity to write to you about my longstanding interest in the nuclear test-ban issue, because I believe that your interest in this matter is motivated by the same concern that has motivated me these many years: nuclear proliferation. I regret to say that the two previous Administrations failed to appreciate the central role that a nuclear-weapon test ban ought to have in U.S. non-proliferation efforts. As a result U.S. policy was hamstrung and precious years were lost. I write in the hope that this error is not perpetuated another four years.

I also write because, stymied in Washington, I have had to look beyond the Beltway, indeed beyond our shores, for encouragement to press on against the odds. This I found in abundance, and would like to share with you.

Easily the most impressive international initiative for a test ban in the 1980s has been the Partial (Limited) Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference. It embodies the determination of international community not to let the test-ban issue fade into obscurity. In 1988, on the 25th anniversary of the LTBT, six nations did something unprecedented in the annals of nuclear arms control: they proposed a substantive amendment to a treaty. Within seven months, 40 parties to the treaty had requested a conference to consider the amendment, establishing another precedent: non-nuclear nations setting the nuclear arms control agenda. So it was that the U.S. Government was obliged to sit down with a hundred other states in January 1991 to discuss ending all nuclear weapon testing. It is a pity that the Amendment Conference was so overshadowed by the Gulf War.

Allow me to mention my personal involvement in these developments, although I must emphasize that I am far from being alone among my Congressional colleagues, on both sides of the aisle, in this work. When resolutions were adopted in the UN General Assembly in the mid-80s advocating this new approach to test-ban negotiations, I join over 70 other Representatives in writing to Secretary of State George Shultz. We raised with him our concern that U.S. opposition to the proposal must not compromise the longstanding U.S. policy of scrupulously adhering to our treaty responsibilities; in this case to convene an amendment conference if so requested by one-third of the then 118 parties.

In 1990, I became particularly active on this matter. I was

concerned that the United States was pursuing a test-ban policy that could seriously jeopardize the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. My sense of urgency centered on the upcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. In June 1990, I attended the "Organizational Meeting" for the Amendment Conference at UN Headquarters. The warning signs could not have been clearer. State after state criticized the failure of the nuclear powers to fulfill the pledge they had made in 1963 and reiterated in the NPT to continue negotiations for a CTB. The State Department, nonetheless, went into the August NPT Review Conference confident that all was well. As I saw for myself in Geneva, all was not well. The refusal of the United States to acknowledge any obligation to begin CTB negotiations within the first term in force of the NPT led to a total deadlock. To many countries Article VI of the NPT means what it says: "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date." In their minds, the test ban is the foremost "effective measure relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race," and if "an early date" does not mean within the treaty's initial 25-year term, it means nothing. One can hardly take issue with this.

In November 1990, I joined a delegation of Soviet, British, and U.S. legislators to our respective capitals. We had with us an Open Letter addressed to President Mikhail Gorbachev, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and President George Bush. Circulated by Parliamentarians for Global Action (the group which pioneered the amendment approach) in the legislatures of over 40 non-nuclear countries, this letter had gathered over 2200 signatures, representing over a quarter of a billion constituents. President Gorbachev received our delegation for almost an hour; later he sent a personal message of support to the Amendment Conference. We were in London on the day the ruling party changed leadership and were informed by Deputy Foreign Minister Douglas Hogg there would be no change in the British position on testing. The delegation's final appointment was in the White House with Brent Scowcroft. He stated his belief that proliferation could be successfully controlled without any "concession" on nuclear-weapon testing.

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Many states, and many of us on the Hill, are wondering whether the appropriate time has now come, given the support you have expressed for bringing nuclear testing to an end. On 7 December 1992, the UN General Assembly voted for a special meeting of the parties to the LTBT to look into the "feasibility" of resuming work in 1993. In short, Mr. President-Elect, they await your signal. I think you should give it. Here is why.

Of course, you could negotiate a brand new CTB treaty. But who in the end would sign it, when would they sign it, and what would they expect in return for signing it? It took years (even a decade or more) and considerable bargaining to get key countries to sign the NPT. Still a number of crucial states are not parties. It is all too easy for states to postpone from year to year tough decisions. In the states we worry most about, the internal politics are very tough indeed. Leaders will want to be able to show something in return for renouncing the option of testing nuclear weapons. This will mean bargaining with a wide range of countries. This is a long and difficult route.

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
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Yours truly,



Bill Green

Handwritten: Navy 3

Mexico Signals Clinton Before Meeting

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By Tod Robinson
Washington Post Foreign Service

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openness, according to several observers. "He's not the person to have a dialogue with if you're in the opposition," the foreign analyst said.

Also on Monday, Salinas named a close friend, Emilio Lozoya Thalman, as secretary of energy and mines. He also is regarded as a strong presidential contender, various sources said.

Dresser described the shake-up as one of "a series of smokescreens" that will be used by Salinas to keep the contenders off balance and maintain his control over the PRI as the presidential race approaches.

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U.S. 'Concerned' Over Iraqi Missile Deployments

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said yesterday the administration is "very concerned" about a new Iraqi grouping of surface-to-air missiles in the southern part of the country patrolled by U.S. and allied warplanes.

"We're monitoring the missiles," Fitzwater told reporters traveling with President Bush to West Point, N.Y., yesterday morning. Other officials said the antiaircraft weapons were Russian-made SA-2s recently deployed in three major groups along the 32nd parallel, the northern border of a zone where the U.N. Security Council has barred Iraqi military flights.

Officials said the administration is reviewing military options for responding to any Iraqi missile attack against U.S. and allied warplanes. But a senior official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said "no imminent action will take place."

Iraq's action follows the downing of an Iraqi MiG-25 by an American F-16 on Dec. 27 and is assumed by some officials to be in response to that event. It may also be timed to signal defiance to the incoming Clinton administration, which takes office later this month.

While Fitzwater's remarks raised the possibility the United States would do something to respond to the Iraqi deployment, Defense Department spokesman Bob Hall appeared to play down the development in a midday briefing for reporters.

"In and of itself, it's not that big a deal," Hall said, adding that Iraq's action was "an item of particular interest" only when taken together with other recent Iraqi moves that he said were aimed at undermining U.N. authority in the area.

Officials said these actions include interference with humanitarian relief for Kurds in northern Iraq and with U.N.-ordered inspections of suspected weapons sites, as well as continued attacks against Shiite rebels in southern Iraq.

Within the past few days, Hall said, Iraq has flown a few warplanes along the 32nd Parallel and gone "across it some days" in an operation aimed at "teasing" Western forces.

Hall said Iraqi antiaircraft missiles previously have been deployed within range of U.S. and allied aircraft that fly near the 32nd parallel to enforce the U.N.-mandated "no fly" zone. He added that some Iraqi antiaircraft missiles also have been deployed south of the 32nd parallel inside the zone where Iraqi aircraft are forbidden to fly.

The new missile deployments were first reported yesterday by CBS News and the New York Times.

The no-fly zone was created in August 1992 after Baghdad intensified military flights against Shiite rebels in southern Iraq. But the deployment of Iraqi antiaircraft missiles previously has not been a subject of controversy between Washington and Baghdad.

In the cat-and-mouse game played by Iraq and Western mili-

tary aircraft in the region, the Bush administration has objected only to Iraqi flights inside the prohibited region and to the switching-on of missile-related radars as U.S. planes flew overhead.

After a U.S. warning in April that it would not tolerate such radar operation, Iraq halted the activity.

Iraq has not turned on any radars associated with the new deployments, officials said. But one cautioned that the groupings "appear to have some purpose" and another said "it is the most coherent action" taken by Iraq to threaten Western planes.

"Let me, as a generic point . . . say that we have made it very clear to the Iraqis that we are determined to enforce the no-fly zones," Hall said. "We will do it in the safest possible way for our pilots, and we will not allow them to be put at risk."

In the past two weeks, U.S. warplanes have flown 661 sorties over Iraq, making 32 to 73 flights each day, the Pentagon said.

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Message:

Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., Host, and Christine MJ Dolan, Executive Producer of THE WORLD THIS WEEK are pleased to invite you to watch the debut of this new weekly PBS television series on international security policy issues beginning the weekend of February 27/28, 1993. The first show, The Future of the Defense Industrial Base, will feature former Defense Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, Chairman of Martin Marietta Corporation, Norm Augustine, and Senators John McCain and Jeff Bingaman, with commentary by Jack Kemp. Please check your local listings or call The Center for Security Policy at (202) 466-0515 for more information.

Viewers in the D.C. area can see the show on station WNVT, Tuesday at 8:00pm, or on WETA at a time to be determined.

General inquiries concerning the Center and specific name or fax number changes should be directed to extension 268 at the number below.

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