

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: Chron File - February 1993 #1 [4]				
Staff Office-Individual: Defense Policy-Bell, Robert				
Original OA/ID Number: 43				
Row: 31	Section: 3	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Rescue of UNPROFOR Troops. (4 pages)	02/02/1993	P1/b(1)
002. memo	Duplicate of vz4352_002. Record ID: 9300365. (6 pages)	02/06/1993	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: Advancing NATO Peacekeeping. (6 pages)	02/03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [4]

2016-0152-F

vz4354

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Rescue of UNPROFOR Troops. (4 pages)	02/02/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [4]

2016-0152-F

vz4354

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9300414
RECEIVED: 09 FEB 93 09

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LOWE, RUDY

DOC DATE: 23 JAN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO
DEFENSE POLICY

GERMANY

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR FM LOWE RE CONF OF SECURITY POLICY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 12 FEB 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: LOWENKRON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
LOWENKRON

FOR CONCURRENCE
BELL
FRY
HAHN
HOLL
WITKOWSKY

FOR INFO
TENET
WALKER
WAYNE

COMMENTS: ***THE FULL PAMPHLET IS LOWENCKRON OFFICE***

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

*Concurrence
passed to Cathy
2:04pm
2/19/93
OK*

0.412



STOUFFER *Mayflower* **HOTEL**

1127 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 347-3000 • FAX: (202) 466-9082

TO: NANCY KERNREICH COMPANY: THE WHITE HOUSE
DATE: JAN -23, 1995
FAX NUMBER: 202-456-2337

FROM: RUDY LOWE COMPANY:
TELEPHONE NUMBER/EXTENSION: 703-356-1958
NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER: 5

If all pages are not accounted for, please contact the Concierge's Desk at the Stouffer Mayflower Hotel: (202) 347-3000. *P. J. [Signature]*

Best regards
Ruehl

COMMENTS:

[illegible]

"The Second Best Address in Washington"

A Nestlé Company



Rüdiger Löwe

The Honorable

Bill Clinton

President of the
United States of America

The White House

Washington D.C.

Postfach 9
80331 München 90
Telefon 0 89 / 5 51 11 24
Telefax 0 89 / 5 51 11 24
8000 Bamberg
Telefon 09 51 5 50 49

Office:
Technische Direktion
Bayerischer Rundfunk

Phone: 089/38062864
Fax: 089/38062287

Washington D.C.,

January 23, 1993

*Be
Mergers
John to
Photos requested
from
for*

*Comp. Scheduling
Lafe*

Dear Bill ,

Thank you so much for our fine meeting yesterday. Penny and I enjoyed it immensely, as you can imagine.

Coming back to the 30th "Conference on Security Policy" (formerly known as "Internationale Wehrkunde-Tagung") in Munich from February 5 - 7, I like to ask you for your help, too, in the name of the host, Ewald Heinrich von Kleist.

What is needed are a few outstanding participants from the White House/ NSC side; I think of Mr. Lake, Mr. Berger and/or Mrs. Soderberg. Perhaps you can even ask the Vice President to attend. Last year, Vice President Quayle came, together with the NSC adviser and other distinguished members of the Administration.

Secretary Aspin knows this annual conference quite well and apparently is considering his participation if you approve (see enclosed copy of a letter to Senator Cohen, who has been the chairman of the U.S. delegation in recent years). Aspin knows von Kleist personally quite well.

Chancellor Kohl will also participate in this highest ranking European security conference, organized by a private citizen (former publisher of the magazine "Europäische Wehrkunde").

This conference is always attended by the leading NATO people, by the National Security Adviser and/or the Secretary of Defense, leading State and DoD-officials, many US-Senators and House members plus several foreign and defense-ministers of NATO-states. NATO secretary General Manfred Woerner is one of the great supporters of this conference.

As I heard from von Kleist, Senator Cohen was not able so far to inform him about participants from your Executive side besides Secretary Aspin (and that depending on your approval).

Thank you very much for your interest in this matter. Hopefully, we can see us soon again.

With my best regards and
herzlichen Grüssen

Rüdiger



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

LEE ASPIN
First District
Washington

January 8, 1993

Dear Bill,

Understand you're in Maine today, but I wanted to get back to you about Wehrkunde.

Since we talked yesterday, I reviewed the bidding and wanted to report that I expect to go - with two provisions: that there is an emergency that would keep me from the trip and that Bill Clinton and his team concur that this is an appropriate venture.

I'm asking Jeff Smith to work with you on this so you and your team may want to key on him for all practical purposes.

Thanks for your help.

Warm Regards,

Lee Aspin
Chairman

Sen. William S. Cohen
322 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Rüdiger Löwe

Amalienstraße 9
8000 München 90
Telefon 0 89 / 3 5 1 5 1 7
Arthur-Landspitze-Straße 14
8600 Hamburg
Telefon 09 41 / 5 50 90

Mrs.

Nancy Fernreich

Office of the President

The White House

office:
Fernsehdirektion
Bayerischer Rundfunk
Florianasmühlstr. 60
8000 München 45

Phone: 089/38062864
Fax: 089/38062287

Dear Nancy,

it was so good seeing you again. Thank you for all your help and arrangements.

I hope, you got that bag with the letter of Dr. Pirkel to you, the books and the Lebkuchen. What I forgot yesterday: The Inclosed "Brosche" - I told you that you have always a place in my heart...

Attached is a letter which Bill asked for yesterday: After having read it he wants to call Secretary Aspin and then decide whom to send to the 30th "Conference on Security Policy" in Munich from February 5 - 7. It is a very important, high ranking conference which gets a lot of media attention in Europe - and people are interested in leading members of the Clinton-Administration.

With regard to the Ferenczy-letter (and all the material about his "European Dialogue", American-European dialogue and improving pr in Eastern Europe), I can wholeheartedly support his request for a little meeting with the President. In Germany, von Ferenczy has support from outstanding politicians, economists and other celebrities.

"BILD am SONNTAG" likes to do a nice, warm interview with Bill. They are there very sympathetic to America and to Bill.

It would be very kind to receive pictures with Bill's autograph or personal dedication for the following persons, who are close to me and would love to have it:

- Claudia Bussler (my former fiance. Bill got to know her in Munich. She drove us in her Porsche and sent him Lebkuchen and a letter through me, yesterday)
- Hans-Friedrich von Sömmacher (Special Assistant to Dr. Pirkel, Chairman of the Hanna-Reidel-Foundation. He prepared this trip, too)
- Sonja Scheider (secretary in our Director's office)
- Dimitrios Wassilikos and his family (close Greek friends of me in Munich. The children collect all Clinton items they can get hold of)

These autographed pictures can all be sent to my address in Munich, together with the pictures the White House photographer took of us and with the brand new Presidential pictures Bill wanted to send Penny and me.

Dear Nancy, so little for now. Please, forgive me this unusual type-writing. In the haste I did not find any other typewriter. It is awkward, I know.

With my best regards, also to Kelley,

Rudolf

Zur zukünftigen Industrie- und Technologiepolitik der USA mit Bewertung aus europäischer Industriesicht: Auszüge aus dem Panel-Bericht (Ref. 2)

1. Clinton's Absichten

Während Bush noch bis Ende seiner Amtszeit eine aktivere Rolle der Regierung explizit ablehnte, einschließlich einer Kooperation mit der EG auf Regierungsebene, hat Clinton eindeutig die Mitverantwortung des Staates auch für die zivile Technologieentwicklung und die industrielle Wettbewerbsfähigkeit anerkannt. Der Aufbau einer Technologieinfrastruktur des 21. Jahrhunderts ist die erste von 6 breiten Initiativen. Als zukünftige Schwerpunkte (in dieser Reihenfolge) wurden Materialentwicklung (advanced materials), Informationstechnik und neue Fertigungsprozesse (new manufacturing processes) benannt. Diese Schwerpunkte sowie die Notwendigkeit eines Umdenkens in Europa wie den USA hat auch die EC Task Force on Planning gefordert. Ihr Bericht¹ lag VP Gore im Wahlkampf vor.

Werden die EG wie die USA so vorgehen, wie heute erkennbar beabsichtigt, so wird erstmals in der Geschichte von einer Parallelität der Industrie- und Technologiepolitik in der Triade gesprochen werden können. Das wird zu einem weiten Ausgleich von Unterschieden in den Wettbewerbsrahmenbedingungen führen. Die Spielräume für unternehmerisches Handeln werden enger.

Im folgenden werden Gesichtspunkte zusammengefaßt, die hauptsächlich aus dem Bericht² des Panels on the Government Role in Civilian Technology der USA stammen, und an denen sich das administrative zukünftige Vorgehen der Clinton-Regierung messen läßt. Er wurde mit wesentlich größerem Aufwand aus Industrie und Akademia erstellt als es in USA und der EG bisher üblich war. Über den ganzen Bericht hinweg geht ein Ton, den man verstärkt so ausdrücken kann: Die große Zeit der Physik geht zu Ende, es kommt die Zeit der Anwendung und der zivilen Dienste (Gesundheit, Verkehr, Information).

¹ Europe 2000: Requirements for the Fourth Framework Programme, Juni 1992

² The Government Role in Civilian Technology:
Building a New Alliance, Natl. Acad. Press, August 1992

2. Wesentliche Ergebnisse zur Lagebeurteilung aus dem Bericht des Panel Committees on Science, Engineering and Public Policy (Ref. 2)

2.1 Sechs Prinzipien und Leitziele für ein US Regierungsengagement

- Kostenteilung Industrie/Regierung (bisher war 100% die Regel)
- Projektdesign durch Industrie
- So weit wie möglich von politischen Gesichtspunkten abgekoppelt
- Einbeziehung eines breiten Spektrums von FuE-Zielen
- Offen gegenüber im Auslandsbesitz befindlichen Firmen, wenn sie substantiell zum GDP der USA beitragen
- Programmevaluierung (Erfolgsbeurteilung) durch unabhängige Experten 5 Jahre nach Auflage des Programms.

Diese Leitlinien stimmen mit den Empfehlungen der EC Task Force überein, abgesehen von solchen, die aus der EG-Komplexität erwachsen.

Die Regierung soll nicht nur ihr eigenes FuE-Programm der Zeit nach dem Kalten Krieg anpassen, sondern das Versäumnis des privaten Sektors in Ordnung bringen ("act to correct"), vorwettbewerbliche FuE zu unterhalten.

Dabei soll sich die Regierung nicht nur um das notorische "underinvestment" der Industrie in Grundlagenforschung kümmern, sondern auch Versäumnisse des Markts "somewhat downstream in pre-commercial R&D" sehen und beheben ("alleviate"). Dazu wird der Vorschlag einer "Civilian Technology Corporation" gemacht, die von der Regierung mit \$ 5 Mrd auszustatten sei.

Die Notwendigkeit zu Handeln wird nicht primär mit Defiziten der US Industrie begründet, sondern mit Aufschließen der Hauptindustrieländer an das US-Niveau. Schwach sei allerdings die Fähigkeit zur Übernahme neuer Technologien in der US Industrie und die längerfristige Produktivitätszunahme im Vergleich zu ausländischen Wettbewerbern. Deshalb käme es in Zukunft vor allem auf eine raschere Umsetzung ("technology commercialization") an.

Zu niedrige Produktivitätsfortschritte werden auf folgende Ursachen zurückgeführt:

- (1) Die relativ gut gelungene Aufnahme des Baby-Booms durch die US-Wirtschaft.
- (2) Kapital- und Energiekostenzunahme.
- (3) Abnahme der relativen FuE-Anstrengungen der US-Industrie im zivilen Sektor.

2.2 Auszüge aus den Vorschlägen des Panels

Das Panel empfiehlt an die Adresse der Industrie eine höhere Wertschätzung von gutem Management in Engineering, Design und Produktion gegenüber Marketing, Finanzen und FuE. Ferner soll ein Unternehmensklima geschaffen werden, das längerfristige Investitionen in FuE, Produktion und Mitarbeiterkompetenz fördert. Das deutsche Facharbeitersystem wird (seit langem) als Vorbild dargestellt, ebenso das

japanische Trainingsprogramm für alle Mitarbeiter. Schließlich soll das Verhältnis zwischen Zulieferern, Herstellern und Kunden verbessert werden.

An die Adresse der Regierung geht generell die Aufforderung, neben der traditionell guten Förderung der Grundlagenforschung die Unterstützung "Beyond Basic Research" auszudehnen, zumal es bereits erfolgreiche Ansätze für die Sektoren Landwirtschaft, Computer und Mikroelektronik, Biomedizin, Biotechnologie, die Flugzeugindustrie und Synthetische Treibstoffe besonders über das DoA, das DoD, DoE, die DARPA, das NIH (National Institute of Health), die NASA, den NACA und die SFC gab. Als Erfolgsfaktoren gelten

- Enge Verbindungen zwischen Technologieanwender und geförderten FuE-Projekten
- Investitionen beider Seiten (Staat und Industrie) in die Diffusion neuer Technologien
- Stabile Förderpolitik mit längerfristigem Horizont
- Begrenzte politische Einflußnahme in die Programmabwicklung
- Vermeidung von Einzelentscheidungen der Programm-Manager über kommerzielle Technologieeinsätze
- Kostenteilung statt Subventionen
- Vermeidung zu großer Risiken in Termin-Programmen.

Besonderes Lob bekam die DARPA (Besuch der Task Force 1991 im Pentagon), die mit minimaler Bürokratie als "Technology Broker" (132 Mitarbeiter) ein Jahresbudget von 1,43 Mrd \$ überwiegend für die Exploration von Spitzentechnologie durchzog und dabei insbesondere für Materialforschung, Computernetze, AI, RISC, Paketvermittlung und Parallelverarbeitung mit bedeutendem Überlauf in zivile Technologie stimulierte. Das Panel schlägt vor, die traditionelle Rolle der DARPA in der Förderung von dual use technology (militärisch und zivil) zu stärken, weil die zu langen rein militärischen Technologiezyklen (15 Jahre) dringend von den kürzeren der zivilen Technologie abgelöst werden. Dabei soll sich DARPA weiterhin auf die Förderung der Informationstechnik stützen. Außerdem müsse das in den letzten Jahren stärker gewordene Micromanagement (Hineinregieren) durch Kongress und Exekutive zwischen einer stabilen, unabhängigen DARPA-Policy wieder zurückgedrängt werden.

Das SBIR (Small Business Research Programme), das z.Z. 1,25 % des öffentlichen FuE-Budgets ausmacht, soll ausgedehnt werden.

Die Bedeutung der 700 Regierungslabors (20,9 Mrd. \$ 1991) für die Wirtschaft sei überschätzt worden. Vor allem seien sie kein System mit einem für die Wirtschaft brauchbaren Zusammenhang, zu fragmentiert. Nur von ganz wenigen könne erwartet werden, daß sie mit der Wirtschaft erfolgreich kooperierten, im Gegensatz zur Meinung vieler Parlamentarier: Die GOCOs (Government owned Contractor operated - durch Unternehmen oder Universitäten) kämen infrage, die GOCOs (Government operated) nicht, weil sie den Regeln des öffentlichen Dienstes unterliegen (Personalfragen, Akquisition von Projekten, Rahmenvorgaben des Geldgebers).

Die extrem magere Ausbeute von Regierungslabors für die Wirtschaft wird auch belegt durch die Lizenz-Gesamtsumme von 6 Mio \$ 1989 nach vielen Jahren staatlicher Förderung mit 23 Mrd \$ pro Jahr.

Das Panel schlägt vor, daß jede staatliche Stelle (Agency) eins ihrer Laboratorien zur Transfer-Demonstration auswählt und ihm die Freiheit gibt, FuE nach markt-orientierten Gesichtspunkten zu betreiben. *(Das kann auch als Killer-Empfehlung aufgefaßt werden).*

Allianzen in FuE wurden 1984 erleichtert durch den National Cooperative Research Act, der bei Registrierung im Justizministerium vor Antitrust-Verfahren (Wettbewerbsverletzung) schützt. Das Panel empfiehlt das Department of Commerce als bestgeeigneten Träger einer Ausweitung der Regierungsaktivitäten zur Unterstützung der Einführung neuer Fertigungsprozesse und Produkttechnologien (best practice manufacturing systems), aber auch weiterführende Studien zu Technologietransferprozessen der Zukunft.

Schließlich empfiehlt das Panel eine Civilian Technology Agency (CTA) im Department of Commerce, dort geführt in einem Department of Industry and Trade (vgl. MITI) mit einem board of directors aus Industrie, Regierung und Wissenschaft. Wegen Schwierigkeiten mit dem Congress (Micromanagement) wird als Alternative auch der Aufbau einer Civilian Technology Corporation (CTC) mit einer einmaligen Dotation von 5 Mrd \$ erwogen. Der board of directors würde vom Präsidenten aus "private citizens" nominiert, und soll mit den nationalen Organisationen (z.B. den Direktoren der National Science Foundation und dem OSTP) zusammenarbeiten. Wegen des Vorteils der Unabhängigkeit bevorzugt das Panel die CTC-Variante.

Die Ausarbeitung der CTA/CTC-Alternativen ist im Vergleich zu dem analytischen Teil des Berichts relativ kurz und unverbindlich. Das liegt aber in der Natur neuer, noch nicht etablierter Verfahren: Je genauer man sie beschreibt, umso mehr Gegner ruft man auf den Plan.

Anhang: Der Innovationsprozeß nach Ref (2)

Ref (2) unterteilt ihn in 4 Aktivitäten:

- A. Technology Creation (Invention)
- B. Commercialization (Umsetzung)
- C. Adoption
- D. Technology Transfer

Zu (A) wird festgestellt, daß die USA hierfür zwar sehr viel getan haben (2/3 Regierungsanteil), daß die vielen Veröffentlichungen, Nobelpreise und Patente aus dieser Phase aber kaum in kommerziellen Nutzen oder gar Profite verwandelt wurden. Daraus wird geschlossen, daß die USA eine ausgeglichene Technologiepolitik brauchen, in der die Phasen B, C, D eine entscheidende Bedeutung haben.

Bewertung:

Die USA haben ihr Geld in der Tat in zu lang- und zu kurzfristige, aber nicht in die kommerziell entscheidenden mittelfristigen (2-7 Jahre) Innovationshorizonte gesteckt (EC Task Force). Das steht in Einklang mit Ergebnissen der Innovationsforschung, wonach es häufig eine zweihöckerige Patentstatistik gibt: Der erste entspricht der Invention (Entdeckungsphase, Invention), der zweite der Umsetzung (A, B, C / Produktentstehung). Zwischen beiden liegen 10 - 15 Jahre verminderter Aktivität, in denen die Hauptakteure wechseln.

Hierfür sind zwei Gründe maßgeblich: Erstens liegt zwischen den Phasen ein Generationenwechsel der Entscheidungsträger für die Produktentwicklung³. Man wartet zu oft, bis die Konkurrenz droht, und verliert wertvolle Zeit. Die Japaner sind hier eindeutig besser. Sie riskieren mehr und sind experimentierfreudiger im rechtzeitigen Aufbau neuer Fertigungen.

Der Schritt zwischen FuE und Produktion darf besonders in der Informationstechnik (neue Produktionskulturen) nicht zu früh gemacht werden. Er muß auch fließend sein. Zu früh in die Fertigungspfeife gehen macht Anpassungen unmöglich oder sehr schwer und damit die Lernkurve zu teuer. Die Antwort heißt früher, noch in der FuE-Phase, mit der Lernkurve anfangen, die beteiligten Mannschaften von FuE und Produktion mischen.

Der zweite Grund für die Zweihöckerigkeit liegt in der Natur des FuE-Prozesses selbst. Die "technology creation" (Invention) fordert selbstmotivierte Köpfe, denen wirklich Neues (revolutionäres) einfällt, und ein sensibles Forschungsmanagement, das Erkenntnisstreben fördert, darüber hinaus aber möglichst wenig eingreift. Das gibt mit der Zeit (10-15 Jahre) eine akademiehafte Kultur, die sich sehr leicht führen läßt, aber (wie die USA jetzt gemerkt haben) wenig nützt (AT&T Bell Labs Area 11 oder ein Drittel IBM Rueschlikon). Die "commercialization" (Umsetzung) erfordert Teams aus gut zusammenarbeitenden Köpfen, und ein zielbewußtes Projektmanagement, das das Lösungsbewußtsein fördert. Das gibt mit der Zeit (5-10 Jahre) eine industrielle Entwicklungskultur, die sich wiederum sehr leicht führen läßt und dem Unternehmen momentan viel nützt, mit der Zeit aber austrocknet und als Befruchtungs- und Beratungsorgan mit Bandbreite und Dynamik wertlos wird.

Industrielle FuE kann also keine Kultur des "entweder - oder", sondern nur des "sowohl - als auch" pflegen, und zwar jeweils auf internationalem Spitzenniveau, was höchste Anforderungen an das FuE-Management stellt. Das gilt insbesondere für die Produkte der Informationstechnik. Sie erfordert in der gemeinsamen Entwicklung von neuen Komponenten und Herstellungsverfahren eine extreme Integrationsfähigkeit vieler (bisher getrennt ausgebildeter) Fächer von Chemie über Physik, Elektrotechnik und Informatik bis zur Verfahrenstechnik. Im Maschinenbau oder der chemischen Industrie sind die Schnittstellen zwischen den beiden Phasen (Invention und Umsetzung, Grundlagenforschung und Produktentwicklung) nach wie vor viel abrupter als in der Elektrotechnik / Informationstechnik. Deren Wertschöpfungspotential liegt bereits in ihrer Integrationsfähigkeit für Komponenten - nicht erst in der Integration zum Endprodukt. Dadurch steht die Informationstechnik

³ A. Einstein: Eine Idee setzt sich nicht aus eigener Kraft durch, sondern weil ihre Gegner aussterben.

ob gewollt oder nicht vor einer besonderen Aufgabe, der nicht nur von der Unternehmensseite, sondern auch von staatlicher Seite in FuE wie Industriepolitik Rechnung getragen werden muß. Deshalb gibt es auch relativ wenige Chemie- und Kraftfahrzeug-, aber recht viele Elektrotechnik-Forschungsinstitute.

Zum Verhältnis zwischen B (Nutzung von A durch eigenes Unternehmen), C (Nutzung durch andere Unternehmen) und D (allgemeine Hürden wie z. B. das not invented here Syndrom) wird an wichtigster Stelle die kooperative Arbeit zwischen Entwicklern, Forschern und Fertignern genannt, die die traditionelle Sicht von der Technology-push-pipeline abgelöst hat: Fortschritt durch ein kontinuierliches Wechselspiel der Anstöße zwischen Forschung und Fertigung, mit "shared technical visions, shared technical goals", industriell abgestimmt auf die jeweilige Komponente, die nächsten Generationen bereits im Auge: "Innovation is a continuum". Auch diese Erkenntnis ist für die Wirkung einer FuE- und Industrie- und Unternehmenspolitik besonders in der Informationstechnik (wie in allen neuen Technologien) von entscheidender Bedeutung. Invention in der Fertigung ist genauso wichtig wie Invention im Komponentendesign, sie bedingen sich gegenseitig.

Die EC Task Force on Planning hat die Rolle von Fertigung, besonders in der Informationstechnik, mehrfach in ihre Bericht betont. Die im ursprünglichen Entwurf des 4. Rahmenprogramms enthaltenen vier Manufacturing-Themen (Industrial Technologies) müssen erhalten bleiben.

Prof. Dr. H. G. DANIELMEYER
Mitglied des Vorstands der Siemens AG

Horn
Rüdiger Löwe
Energieabteilung
Bayr. Rundfunk
Florianmühle 80

8000 München 45

München, den 13.1.93

Sehr geehrter Herr Löwe,

den Task Force Report und den kommentierten Auszug aus dem Panelbericht "The Government Role in Civilian Technology" haben Sie inzwischen bekommen. Letzterer ist nicht freigegeben.

Ihre Frage nach Siemens-Niederlassungen: Wir haben eine manufacturing operation in 14000 Dineen Drive, Little Rock, AR 72206 (Tel. (501)897-4905) unserer Siemens Energy and Automation Inc., Motors & Drives Division, motors from one to 10,000 horsepower. Die SE&A group hat in USA insgesamt 6,500 Mitarbeiter, 18 manufacturing plants und \$940 million Umsatz. Zu Little Rock beiliegendes Fax. Viel Erfolg für Ihre Mission und Grüße aus dem Hause Siemens!

Ihr

H.G. Danielmeyer

SIEMENS

LITTLE ROCK OPERATION

FACTS AND INFORMATION

PLANT INFORMATION:

The facility was originally built in 1970 by Allis-Chalmers, which was then headquartered in Milwaukee, Wis. In 1978, Allis-Chalmers and Siemens created Siemens-Allis which was jointly owned. Then, in 1985 Siemens became the sole owner of the company and changed its name to Siemens Energy & Automation in 1986.

An office addition was constructed in 1986. The groundbreaking ceremony was attended by many civic leaders, the media and former Governor and now President-elect Bill Clinton.

The facility sits on approximately 100 acres of land.

The building has 147,000 square feet of space as follows:

- Manufacturing	--	80,000
- Office	--	28,500
- Warehouse	--	38,500

~~The average age of the plant's equipment is 15 years old.~~ (1)

EMPLOYEE AND PRODUCT INFORMATION

There are currently 314 employees:

Hourly -- 233
Salaried - 81

Current production consists of 100 to 120 electric motors, ranging in size from one to 300 horsepower, that are manufactured in the plant each day.



EUROPE 2000:

**REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
FOURTH
FRAMEWORK PROGRAMME**

EC TASK FORCE ON PLANNING
June 1992

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9300410
RECEIVED: 09 FEB 93 09

TO: FUERTH, L

FROM: SODERBERG

DOC DATE: 09 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CANADA
DEFENSE BUDGET

DEFENSE POLICY
Q+A

OK

PERSONS: GORE, A

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND Q+A FOR VP TOWN MTG IN ONTARIO CALIFORNIA ON 10 FEB

ACTION: SODERBERG SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 12 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: JONES

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
EXECSEC
JONES

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0410

February 9, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR LEON FUERTH

FROM: NANCY SODERBERG


SUBJECT: Background Qs and As for the Vice President's
Town Meeting in Ontario, California,
February 10, 1993

As requested by Joseph DeSutter, attached are Qs & As for the Vice President's Town Meeting on Wednesday, February 10.

I've also attached Qs & As we've prepared for the President on a variety of foreign issues.

Attachments

Tab A Requested Qs & As
Tab B President's Qs & As



TAB A

DEFENSE CONVERSION AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Q: What was the Clinton-Gore position on defense conversion during the campaign and transition?

A: The President has discussed defense conversion on several occasions, including his August speech in Los Angeles. He strongly believes that the communities, people and defense firms that helped win the Cold War must not be left out in the cold. A strong economy is the bedrock for a strong defense. A tremendous opportunity now exists to redirect some of our defense resources, both human and physical, to fulfilling unmet domestic needs. As we downsize our defense infrastructure, we must do it smartly, to maintain a superior, agile and ready military force.

Our ideas for a more aggressive approach to defense conversion have included:

- Reinvesting defense dollars into our civilian economy, in infrastructure, information and environmental areas.
- Reusing surplus military facilities for economic development.
- Assisting small business with grants and assistance through manufacturing technology extension centers.
- Investing more in dual-use technologies.
- Achieving greater integration of military and commercial production.

- Creating a coherent national technology policy with appropriate joint ventures between industry and government.

Q: What is in this year's (FY 1993) legislative package on defense conversion and what is its status?

A: Congress appropriated approximately \$1.7 billion for defense conversion related activities this year, including:

- \$686 million for DoD personnel assistance programs.
- \$200 million for community adjustment and assistance.
- \$575 million for defense industry and technology base (an additional \$300 million was provided for ongoing technology programs labeled "conversion").

The legislation also included several organizational initiatives to monitor critical technologies, the industrial base and technology transfer. Funding for several of the new conversion programs are still being reviewed. We will be working closely with Congress to further develop our defense transition plans and programs.

Q: What will be the impact of the drawdown on Southern California?

A: We recognize that the effect of the defense drawdown is substantial in areas highly dependent upon defense spending.

- In 1992 California received about \$51 billion in U.S. defense expenditures, or about 21% of total U.S. defense spending. This is almost twice California's share of the nation's population and economy. Three-quarters of that \$51 billion comes from defense

contracts, much of it with aerospace firms in southern California. California's unemployment rate has increased from approximately 5% in 1990 to over 9% in recent months. Defense and aerospace reductions have no doubt contributed to this rise. The overall U.S. economic recovery and a successful defense transition depend upon our ability to stimulate broad, long-term economic growth.

Q: What will be the Administration's plan to assist in the defense transition?

A: The long-term success of defense conversion is directly tied to economic growth, and the success of the Clinton Administration's overall economic plan. Working with the newly establish NEC and appropriate government agencies, we will look at the entire range of assistance programs, ways to reuse surplus military bases for economic development, and new ways to focus our R&D investments.

In addition, we will consider a broad range of technology policy initiatives, which we suggested during the campaign, including:

- Investing in a 21st century infrastructure.
- Establishing education and training programs for a high-skill workforce.
- Investing in technology programs that empower America's small businesses.

- Refocusing federal R&D programs on critical technologies that enhance industrial performance.
- Leveraging the national R&D investment, and
- Creating a world-class business environment for private sector investment and innovation.



B

FOREIGN POLICY Os and AS

Updated February 9, 1993

1. U.S. Assistance to Armenia
2. Belarus
3. China - MFN
4. Foreign Policy Involvement
5. Haiti - HIV Cases
6. Middle East Peace Process
7. Next Steps on NAFTA
8. Palestinian Deportees
9. Salman Rushdie
10. Vietnam
11. Visit by Japanese Foreign Minister Watanabe
12. Former Yugoslavia

U.S. Assistance to Armenia

Q: What is the U.S. doing to assist Armenia?

A: -- In response to President Ter-Petrosian's (ter pe-tro-SYAN) December 8 declaration of a national emergency and December 22 appeal to former President Bush, the U.S. has taken a series of steps to provide relief.

-- We are actively seeking ways to assist Armenia with its humanitarian needs bilaterally and multilaterally.

-- To date, the U.S. has delivered 66,000 tons of wheat with 50,000 tons of feed grain on its way. Several million dollars worth of medicines and medical supplies have been airlifted to Armenia as well as 225 tons of infant formula.

-- We are working to secure fuel deliveries to the area and continue to push for additional contributions from other G-7 countries.

Q: What are you doing to help the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh?

A: -- The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is exacerbating humanitarian problems in the area.

-- We are urging all parties to this conflict to participate in good faith in the ongoing negotiations under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Belarus

Q: Why did you call the Belarus leader?

A: -- This morning I spoke for 15 minutes with Belarus Supreme Soviet Chairman Shushkevich. The purpose of the call was to congratulate Belarus on its ratification of the START I Treaty and its decision to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state.

-- We welcome this action, which furthers the goal of bringing Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan into the family of non-nuclear weapons states. I reiterated our commitments to non-aggression, territorial integrity, and the non-use of nuclear weapons.

-- I assured the Chairman that we are committed to providing substantial resources through the Nunn-Lugar funding to assist in the denuclearization process in Belarus. We agreed that Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister Kravchanka will meet to discuss concrete proposals.

Q: How does this affect START II?

A: -- START II, by its own terms, cannot enter into force before the START I Treaty does.

-- With the vote by Belarus, all parties to the START I Treaty, with the exception of Ukraine, have ratified the Treaty.

-- We look forward to Ukraine's prompt ratification of the START I Treaty, which will facilitate implementation of both START and START II.

China - MFN

Q: Some of America's most prominent Asia experts released a report yesterday urging you to abandon your commitment to place conditions on Most-Favored-Nation status for China. Do you intend to ignore this advice?

A: -- I welcome the opinions of all Americans and will certainly take these views under consideration.
No decision has been made.

-- I continue to believe our extension of MFN to China should be conditioned on progress in key areas such as human rights, trade and proliferation. We are currently reviewing our options on how best to achieve progress on these issues.

Q: The report also criticizes the creation of a "Radio Free Asia." Will you drop your support for this idea?

A: -- I have endorsed the basic concept of Radio Free Asia, which would ensure that all Asians have access to uncensored information.

Foreign Policy Involvement

Q: How do you respond to **The New York Times** article Monday suggesting you are not fully engaged in the foreign policy decision-making process?

A: -- I am placing a special emphasis on the economic and domestic issues that affect the every day lives of millions of Americans.

-- However, I remain fully engaged in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. If we don't pursue policies that seek to resolve old crises and anticipate new ones, crises will engulf us. So I am actively engaged.

Haiti - HIV Cases

Q: Have you made a decision on the 270 HIV-positive Haitians at Guantanamo Bay?

A: -- I am aware there is a very serious humanitarian concern for the Haitians at Guantanamo. We are reviewing the policy, and will have details once a decision is made.

Q: Does that mean you are backing away from your campaign promise to drop the ban on HIV-positive persons from entering the U.S.?

A: -- This is an issue we are concerned about and working on. We have no decision yet on timing.

Middle East Peace Process

Q: Where do we stand on the peace process?

A: -- The United States believes it is time to look ahead and to concentrate our efforts on invigorating the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.

-- After contacts with the parties in the region, the United States and Russia, as co-sponsors of the Madrid process, have decided to reschedule the next round of multilateral negotiations in mid-April.

-- This decision was based on a number of factors, including our decision to send Secretary Christopher to the region next week and the importance of getting a first-hand assessment of the situation and appropriate next steps in the peace process.

Q: What about the resumption of the bilaterals?

A: -- We are consulting with the parties about resumption of the ninth round of negotiations.

Next Steps on NAFTA

Q: What did you tell Prime Minister Mulroney about your intentions with regard to NAFTA?

A: -- We had a good discussion on NAFTA. I told Prime Minister Mulroney that I support the agreement and that I have no intention of reopening the NAFTA text.

-- But I also told the Prime Minister, as I told President Salinas, that I believe supplemental agreements are needed to address concerns about labor standards and safety, the environment and possible import surges.

-- We have already begun to examine these issues within the Administration. We hope we can start talks with Mexico and Canada soon.

Q: When will you start talks with Canada? With Mexico?

A: -- Ambassador Kantor held informal meetings with Canadian Trade Minister Michael Wilson on Monday and will meet with Mexican Secretary of Commerce Jaime Ferra Puche on Wednesday, February 17.

Palestinian Deportees

Q: Do we consider the deportation issue resolved?

A: -- We are pleased that Israel is taking significant action towards resolving this issue. As a result, a process has now begun that is consistent with UNSC resolution 799.

-- We believe that further action in the UNSC is unnecessary and could undercut this process. We should now turn our attention to resuming the Middle East peace process.

Q: What is your reaction to Prime Minister Rabin's assertion that Israel retains the right to order further deportations?

A: -- Our policy on the practice and principle of deportations is unchanged.

-- We continue to strongly oppose deportations as a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention as it pertains to the treatment of inhabitants of the occupied territories and we supported UNSCR 799 in this respect.

-- The United States believes that charges of wrongdoing should be brought in a court of law based on evidence to be argued in a fair trial which would afford full judicial process.

Salman Rushdie

Q: What is your position on the Iranian "fatwa" sentencing Salman Rushdie to death?

A: -- I condemn this sentence. It is one of the many examples of Iran's support for international terrorism that deeply troubles this Administration. This Administration strongly opposes terrorism and strongly supports freedom of speech.

Q: Will you meet with Rushdie?

A: -- I have no such request.

Vietnam

Q: When will you lift the embargo on trade with Vietnam?

A: -- The problem remains whether or not we have obtained full cooperation on the POW/MIA issue.

-- We are reviewing our relationship with Vietnam in the context of this issue.

-- There is, however, no decision or timetable for taking any specific steps with Vietnam.

[If pressed]:

Q: Is the Roadmap policy still in effect?

A: -- We continue our support for proceeding along the Roadmap, which has resulted in our obtaining a fuller POW/MIA accounting and taking steps toward normalization.

-- We will continue to follow the Roadmap, but we are reviewing the situation and will decide on specific steps as we see progress in the areas of concern to us.

Visit by Japanese Foreign Minister

Q: Will you meet with Japanese Foreign Minister Watanabe during his visit to Washington this week?

A: -- I will have the opportunity to meet with
Mr. Watanabe this Thursday.

-- Watanabe will also meet with Secretary
Christopher and National Security Adviser
Anthony Lake.

Former Yugoslavia

Q: Where do you stand on your review of policy towards Bosnia? On the Vance/Owen plan?

A: -- My advisers and I are giving the Bosnia situation our urgent consideration.

-- That process is ongoing.

-- We support the effort that Vance and Owen are engaged in to try to get an agreement among the parties.

-- But the agreement must be acceptable to the parties.

-- When we make a final decision, we will announce them clearly and follow through.

Q: You said the policy would be decided in a few days?

A: -- Yes, very soon.

Q: Does working with Yeltsin mean no military options?

A: -- It means we are consulting closely with the Russian Government.

Q: Is the U.S. willing to use its forces to implement a solution?

A: -- We will soon address all such questions.

Q: Are you contemplating sending 15,000 troops to support a UN force in the former Yugoslavia, as reported on ABC?

A: -- We have made no decision to do so.

Q: Do you plan to replace Vance/Owen?

A: -- Secretary Christopher and I have made clear our support for the process that Vance/Owen are engaged in.

-- We will do all we can to help the Vance/Owen process achieve an agreement that all parties can accept in good faith.

-- An agreement must be fair if it is to meet the test of whether it can be accepted by the parties and enforced.

Q: What about a war crimes tribunal? Air drops? Bombing of Serb positions? Lifting arms embargo? Ground troops?

A: -- We are reviewing our policy. I will not comment on the specifics of this or any other issue until decisions are made.

Q: Did you attend the NSC meeting on Friday?

A: -- I did attend a meeting with my top advisers Friday. It was one of several Principals Committee meetings that have occurred since I took office. I will not comment on any details of this meeting.

[If Raised]:

Q: Will the U.S. be proposing a special envoy to the UN to support the Vance/Owen negotiations?

A: -- The United States has been very supportive of the process to bring the parties together to negotiate a settlement.

-- Inasmuch as our policy review is still ongoing, I will not comment on any specific aspects until decisions are made.

Q: Why did you allow Radovan Karadzic into the U.S.?

A: -- So he can attend negotiations at the United Nations. His entry would not preclude efforts later to hold him legally accountable for his actions.

February 9, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

1: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*

STEVEN R. JONES *SRJ*

: Background Qs & As for the Vice President's
Town Meeting in Ontario, California, **February 10,**
1993

are background Qs and As for a Town Meeting the Vice
President will be conducting in Ontario, California on Wednesday
February 10th. We expect defense conversion to be a
major interest during this meeting.

DATION

authorize Will Itoh to sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

ts
Memo Leon Fuerth
A Qs & As

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9300365
RECEIVED: 06 FEB 93 15

TO: LAKE

FROM: BELL

DOC DATE: 06 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE BUDGET

DEFENSE POLICY

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FORCES / CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT OF OMB DEFENSE BUDGET CUTS

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 10 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BELL

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL

NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/23/2016
2016-0152-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEM

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	Duplicate of vz4352_002. Record ID: 9300365. (6 pages)	02/06/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [4]

2016-0152-F

vz4354

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

WASHFAX RECEIPT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B
S/S # **C**

2/11 10:15
Cleared last
night by
phone.
RJB

MESSAGE NO. **093045** CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages **6**

FROM: GLYN DAVIES S/S 647-8448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE TO USNATO: ADVANCING NATO PEACEKEEPING

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	NANCY SODERBERG	456-6534	WH SITRM
	WILL ITOH		
	SEAN DARRAGH		
	EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT		
	LOWENKRON / BELL	WAYNE	
	FNY / WALKER		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: MUST GO FOR 2/11
ambassadorial-level meeting of NACC -
Thanks

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: R Date: 8/25/2011

S/S Officer: Gavin 2/10

GLYN DAVIES

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. cable	re: Advancing NATO Peacekeeping. (6 pages)	02/03/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [4]

2016-0152-F
vz4354

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10-Feb-1993 18:43 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Wendy E. Gray

(GRAY)

FROM:

Robert G. Bell
(BELL)

SUBJECT:

RE: Crosshatch 92963: US Vienna

Anne Witkosky cleared this cable earlier today on behalf of the Defense Policy & Arms Control office (which, by definition, means I should be recorded as "cleared" as well).Cheers.

CC: Sandra L. Kelly

(KELLYS)

CC: Marion H. Blieberger

(BLIEBERGER)

CC: Daniel B. Poneman

(PONEMAN)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10-Feb-1993 18:47 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Robert G. Bell
(BELL)

SUBJECT: RE: crosshatch 92766: Moscow

My recollection is that before Susan Koch departed she cleared this cable on behalf of the Defense Policy & Arms Control office -- again, I had thought, effectively put me down as a "cleared" as well.

Distribution:

FOR: Wendy E. Gray	(GRAY)
CC: Sandra L. Kelly	(KELLYS)
CC: Marion H. Blieberger	(BLIEBERGER)
CC: Elaine M. Mitsler	(MITSLER)
CC: Patty A. Daniel	(DANIEL)
CC: Nancy H. Maxfield	(MAXFIELD)
CC: Daniel B. Poneman	(PONEMAN)
CC: Rose E. Gottemoeller	(GOTTEMOELLER)
CC: R. Nicholas Burns	(BURNS)
CC: Helen C. Walsh	(WALSH)
CC: Toby T. Gati	(GATI)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10-Feb-1993 17:27 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Anne A. Witkowsky
(WITKOWSKY)

SUBJECT: Upcoming visits of foreign officials

FYI, all. Pursuant to our staff meeting discussion this morning:

- The Danish Foreign Minister will see Tony Lake on Tuesday, 16 Feb.

- German Defense Minister Ruehe will be here next week. NSC has not yet received an appointment request.

Anne

Distribution:

FOR: Anne A. Witkowsky	(WITKOWSKY)
FOR: Michael D. Fry	(FRY)
FOR: Sandra L. Kelly	(KELLYS)
FOR: Angelyn D. Moody	(MOODY)
FOR: Rita P. O'Flinn	(OFLINN)
FOR: Mary E. Quinn	(QUINN)
FOR: Patrick H. Linhares	(LINHARES)
FOR: Steven R. Jones	(JONES)
FOR: Marion H. Blieberger	(BLIEBERGER)
FOR: Daniel B. Poneman	(PONEMAN)
FOR: Keith D. Hahn	(HAHN)
FOR: Jonathan M. Spalter	(SPALTER)
FOR: Robert G. Bell	(BELL)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/23/2016
2016-0452-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10-Feb-1993 18:25 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Wanda D. Lindsey
(LINDSEY)

SUBJECT: Budget

NOTE TO SENIOR DIRECTORS AND DIRECTORS

FROM: ERNEST WILSON

SUBJECT: Budget Situation

We are told that the Budget passbacks from OMB to State and Defense will not occur until February 17. The agencies will then have between February 18 and February 24 to respond.

We will keep you posted as we get new information.

Thanks.

Distribution:

FOR: George M. Andricos	(ANDRICOS)
FOR: Christina L. Funches	(FUNCHES)
FOR: Donald G. Gross	(GROSS)
FOR: Norma D. Schillaci	(SCHILLACI)
FOR: John M. Ordway	(ORDWAY)
FOR: Torkel Patterson	(PATTERSON)
FOR: Cheryl C. Washington	(WASHINGTON)
FOR: Deborah M. Lehr	(LEHR)
FOR: Debra M. Steen	(STEEN)
FOR: Anne A. Witkowsky	(WITKOWSKY)
FOR: Michael D. Fry	(FRY)
FOR: Sandra L. Kelly	(KELLYS)
FOR: Angelyn D. Moody	(MOODY)
FOR: Rita P. O'Flinn	(OFLINN)
FOR: Mary E. Quinn	(QUINN)
FOR: Patrick H. Linhares	(LINHARES)
FOR: Steven R. Jones	(JONES)
FOR: Marion H. Blieberger	(BLIEBERGER)
FOR: Daniel B. Poneman	(PONEMAN)
FOR: Keith D. Hahn	(HAHN)
FOR: Jonathan M. Spalter	(SPALTER)
FOR: Robert G. Bell	(BELL)
FOR: R. Nicholas Burns	(BURNS)
FOR: Toby T. Gati	(GATI)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Chen

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0493

February 11, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM:

ROBERT BELL *RbB*

SUBJECT:

General Powell's Roles & Missions Report

General Powell is scheduled to release his long-awaited report on roles and missions at noon on Friday. The public/congressional reaction is likely to take its cue from the old Peggy Lee song, "Is That All There Is?" Put simply, there is no "there" there.

Background

By statute, the Chairman of the JCS is required to submit a report every three years recommending changes in the functions (or roles and missions) of the military Services and combatant commands as he deems necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness and streamlining of the Armed Forces. General Powell's report has gone through several drafts over the past months, each representing a further retreat from the kind of "no holds barred, top-to-bottom review" Senator Nunn had called for in his July 2, 1992, speech (a speech which, as you know, the President endorsed during the campaign).

The first indication we on the Armed Services Committee had that all was not well was at a committee hearing on the START treaties last July. On that occasion, General Powell and Senator McCain engaged in an "Amen, brother" colloquy on the pivotal question of carrier-based fighter bombers (i.e., the Navy's cherished A/F-X) versus heavy bombers (e.g., the Air Force's B-1 and B-2). General Powell unequivocally endorsed Senator McCain's assertion that these two means of delivering conventional ordnance against targets in foreign lands were in no way whatsoever in competition. General Powell "thanked God" the Congress had had the wisdom and foresight to appropriate funds for 15 carriers' worth of strike fighters and the strategic bomber fleet. As Senator Nunn swivelled in his chair, looked our way, and arched

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *VL* NARA, Date *8/23/06*

716-052-f

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

his eyebrows, we knew the reassuring "spin" we had been getting from General Powell's staff about the seriousness of the review was without foundation.

This forewarning of trouble was confirmed in December by the leak of an early draft of the report to Michael Gordon. As Michael so concisely captured it in a neat little "box score" sidebar to his article in the December 31, 1992, New York Times (Tab III), of the seven main areas where Senator Nunn had pointedly suggested streamlining or consolidation might be warranted, General Powell's draft concluded that five required no change. The two areas where the December 18 draft did recommend change were basically second-order organizational issues -- consolidating the Services' separate space commands and strengthening the staffs of the theater commands.

It was hard to believe things could go downhill from there, but they did. On January 29, Michael published a story based on a later version of the report -- one dated January 22. I have copies of both drafts if you care to see them. Attached (Tab II) is a side-by-side comparison of the two. Let me warn you, this makes for pretty gruesome reading. As you will see, virtually every role or mission Powell had marked for change in the already meager December draft was granted a reprieve in the January draft. Where a Service had proved unable to save a mission outright, they managed to water the recommendation down to a "let's do a study to see whether the mission ought to be retained" status. In short, the January draft reflected a near-total capitulation by the Chairman to his Chiefs.

The report to be released Friday apparently does not move back in the direction of the December draft. If anything, I am told, it subtracts even more proposed consolidations from the January draft -- though that seems mathematically impossible, since the January report was pretty much a null set. We will, of course, have to do a quick scrub of the final text to confirm this as soon as we can obtain an advance copy.

Given the media spotlight Michael Gordon and others have already focused on General Powell's steady retreat, I do not think it will do to have the White House take a "no comment because we have not read the report" stance on Friday. However, I would recommend we keep the President out of this in terms of any direct statements by him personally. For starters, a direct quote by the President of a negative nature would throw gasoline on the already burning fire of unfounded press reports to the effect that the White House and the Pentagon are "at war."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

Secretary Aspin should take the lead in on-camera comments to the press, though I suspect he will want to avoid engaging in any discussion of or comment on specific roles and missions streamlining options for the time being.

That having been said, George Stephanopoulos will obviously have to say something. I recommend using subtle humor to try to make the point that we had hoped for more. Using the Peggy Lee quote would not be a bad idea, and it could be followed by a statement that the President has asked Secretary Aspin to review the report and give the White House a thorough assessment at an early date. A proposed script is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the Press Guidance at Tab I to George Stephanopoulos.

Attachments

Tab I Proposed Press Guidance
Tab II Two Draft Report Comparison
Tab III New York Times December 31, 1992, Article

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESS GUIDANCE ON
GENERAL POWELL'S ROLES AND MISSIONS REPORT

Q: What does the President think of Chairman Powell's report on roles & missions? Doesn't it fall well short of what Senator Nunn called for last July?

A: -- During the campaign, the President strongly endorsed Senator Nunn's call for a "no holds barred, top-to-bottom" review of duplicative roles and missions among the four military Services.

-- As we consider reductions in military spending that are necessary if we are to restore the economic well-being of our Nation, it is even more essential that we eliminate unnecessary overlap and redundancy to the maximum degree consistent with U.S. national security interests.

-- The President has asked Secretary Aspin to review the report carefully and provide him with a thorough assessment as soon as possible. We will have more to say about the report after the President has had the benefit of hearing the Secretary's views.

PRESS GUIDANCE ON
GENERAL POWELL'S ROLES AND MISSIONS REPORT

Q: What does the President think of Chairman Powell's report on roles & missions? Doesn't it fall well short of what Senator Nunn called for last July?

A: -- During the campaign, the President strongly endorsed Senator Nunn's call for a "no holds barred, top-to-bottom" review of duplicative roles and missions among the four military Services.

-- As we consider reductions in military spending that are necessary if we are to restore the economic well-being of our Nation, it is even more essential that we eliminate unnecessary overlap and redundancy to the maximum degree consistent with U.S. national security interests.

Delete / -- We have not had time to study General Powell's report in detail, but at first glance one can't help think of the old Peggy Lee song, "Is That All There Is?" }

-- The President has asked Secretary Aspin to review the report carefully and provide him with a thorough assessment as soon as possible. We will have more to say about the report after the President has had the benefit of hearing the Secretary's views.

**COMPARISON OF TWO DRAFT REPORTS OF
ROLES AND MISSIONS STUDY**

First Draft

Second Draft

Continental Air Defense

eliminate dedicated air
defense forces and use other
interceptor-capable aircraft
if needed

eliminate or sharply reduce
the force dedicated to this
mission

Bombers vs. carrier aircraft

no recommended changes
in current situation

same as first draft

Close Air Support (CAS)

CAS should be responsi-
bility of all services

same as first draft

Marine Corps Aviation

no changes from current
Marine Corps plans

same as first draft

Flight Training

"all [service] students
will enter a common flight
training program

same as first draft

all initial helicopter pilot
training by Army

study the problem to see
if it would make sense to
have all training done by
Army

Navy/AF joint primary
training squadrons

same as first draft

Aircraft Inventory Requirements

adopt standardized
inventory system

same as first draft

Airborne Command/Control

retire AF EC-135s, and
rely on Navy E-6As

same as first draft

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) Helicopters

Transfer AF CSAR helos to
Army

all four Services retain
responsibility for CSAR
operations

Operational Support Aircraft

transfer operational
control to Transportation
Command

Further study is necessary
to determine which alter-
native will provide the best
balance of efficiency and
effectiveness

Some specialized support
aircraft will not be included
in this initiative.

Attack Helicopters

keep in Army and MC, but
consolidate initial training

same as first draft

Special Operations Helos

transfer Air Force SOF
helos to Army

no reference in new draft

General Support Helos

transfer Air Force helos
to Army

study consolidation of over-
lapping Service support
functions

Tactical Airlift/tankers

transfer C-130s to Air
Force

Consolidating C-130s under
one Service would not be cost-
effective. Consolidation is
not recommended.

transfer KC-130 tankers
to Marine Corps

Consolidation is not recom-
mended.

keep MC/AC-130 aircraft in
AF special operations units

same as first draft

Jammer Aircraft

retain EF-111s in Air Force
and EA-6Bs in Navy -- i.e.
no consolidation

same as first draft -- no
consolidation

Electronic Surveillance Aircraft

retain RC-135s in Air Force
and EP-3Es in Navy -- i.e.
no consolidation

same as first draft -- no
consolidation

Unified Command Plan

assign new responsibilities
to USLANDCOM for peacekeeping
disaster response, joint
training, joint doctrine
development and operational
command of CONUS forces in
peacetime

same as first draft

shift responsibility of
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia
away from Chairman, JCS, to
USEUCOM area of responsibility

no reference in new draft

Former Soviet Union remain
under Chairman, JCS, until
nuc weapons/Russian army
removed

no reference in new draft

Forward Presence

maintain current rate of
reductions in forward-
stationed forces

same as first draft

shift forward-presence
operations to joint task
forces

same as first draft

Contingency/Expeditionary Forces

Army/Marine Corps are
"complementary" and no
additional reduction below
the "Base Force" is
justified

same as first draft

Tanks/MLRs for the Marine Corps

MC to keep tank battalions

same as first draft

MC not add MLRS battalions
but continue to rely on
Army

same as first draft

Space Infrastructure

Army and Navy space compon-
ents will be disestablished

Army and Navy components will
not be disestablished

AF will operate for all services under a unified SPACECOM.

conduct study to determine if space mission should be assigned to STRATCOM

Theater Air Defenses

No change at this time -- direct a study for potential changes in the future

same as first draft

Training, Test and Evaluation Infrastructure

New vision: integrated test, evaluation and training infrastructure managed by single agency

same as first draft

service maintain existing ranges on behalf of everyone

same as first draft

Depot Maintenance Consolidation

some type of consolidation is needed

establish a Joint Depot Maintenance Command to recommend depot closures and consolidations to BRAC

Service recommend closures to BRAC

consider creation of Joint Depot Maintenance Command

Construction Engineers

do not consolidate wartime construction units

do not consolidate any engineering units

do consolidate heavy construction squadrons under Army

Initial Skills Training

Services to conduct review of military skill training to eliminate redundant training

same as first draft

Chaplain Corps

the chaplaincy is in place and working well, there is no need to fix it.

same as first draft

Legal Corps

maintain the present DOD legal service system

same as first draft

Intelligence

review options to consolidate production centers

DIA complete study and implement measures which increase responsiveness to operational commanders

Reserve Components

consider realignment and consolidation of parallel National Guard and Reserve headquarters/staffs

evaluate RAND AC/RC study

Reorganizing the Military

With the end of the cold war and cuts in military spending, the Pentagon has been urged to eliminate duplication of military missions.

President-elect Bill Clinton has said the services' roles and missions need to be re-examined. And Senator Sam Nunn raised some of the primary issues in July. Gen. Colin L. Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addresses those issues in a new report.



SENATOR NUNN'S QUESTIONS

What is the proper balance between land-based bombers and aircraft based on Navy carriers?

Should a single service be in charge of all electronic warfare aircraft?

Should one service be in charge of conducting electronic surveillance by long-range aircraft?

Should the Marine Corps or the Army have primary responsibility for expeditionary forces for quick intervention in regional crises?

Should the mission of defending troops, airfields and other important installations from missiles and planes be consolidated under the control of the Air Force?

Should military operations in space be consolidated under a single service?

Should the staffs of the theater commands, like the United States Central Command and the European Command, be strengthened?



GENERAL POWELL'S RECOMMENDATIONS

No change. A mix of Air Force and Navy aircraft are needed. Levels of the balance are not specified.

No change. Maintain separate Air Force and Navy electronic jamming fleets.

No change. Maintain separate Air Force and Navy programs.

No change. Maintain separate Army and Marine expeditionary forces. Examine the issue at a later date.

No change. Maintain separate Army and Air Force air defense forces.

A change is needed. Assign responsibilities for space operations to the Air Force.

A change is needed. Create a major new command based in the United States that would have the responsibility for joint training of forces from the different services. The command would make sure that the forces were ready for interventions overseas, could support United Nations peacekeeping operations and respond to natural disasters, like the hurricane in Florida.



February 15, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
SAMUEL BERGER
NANCY SODERBERG

FROM: DONALD GROSS 

SUBJECT: Organizational Structure for Coordinating
Administration's Legislative Strategy on Arms-
Control Issues

In discussing a March 4 Senate Intelligence Hearing on the Open Skies Treaty, State's Bureau of Legislative Affairs recently sent over an "Interagency Arms Control Legislative Coordination Plan" (Tab A) that was utilized during the Bush Administration. State has informally asked if we will adhere to the outlines of this legislative plan for the purposes of producing an Administration position on ratification strategy for the Open Skies Treaty.

BUSH ADMINISTRATION PLAN FOR COORDINATING LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS ON
ARMS-CONTROL

The Bush Administration plan created two permanent groups:

- o A senior-level arms-control Legislative Strategy Group (LSG); and
- o A staff-level arms-control Legislative Working Group (LWG).

It also provided for the creation of any Treaty Working Groups (TWGs) that were needed on the working-level for each ratification effort.

Under the Bush Plan, State chaired both legislative groups and invited to its meetings representatives from NSC, OSD, ACDA, JCS, IC and other relevant agencies as well as the Treaty negotiators.

The Legislative Strategy Group essentially provided legislative policy guidance, approved decisions and activities of the Legislative Working Group, and coordinated all Administration-wide arms-control legislative activities related to ratification.

The Legislative Working Group provided staff-level support to the Legislative Strategy Group, developed legislative strategies, served as the primary point of contact with Congressional staff, tasked and coordinated all Administration testimony, coordinated congressional briefings, and carried out other activities to implement the Administration's legislative strategy.

(The Treaty Working Group, directed by the Chief Negotiators for each arms-control agreement, drew upon existing substantive expertise to support the ratification effort directed by the LSG. This effort included preparing and coordinating testimony as well as providing briefings and background material).

NEED FOR A LEGISLATIVE STRATEGY ON ARMS CONTROL COORDINATED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

In the arms-control field, much of the Clinton Administration's early effort will be devoted to legislative ratification of key treaties, including Open Skies, the Chemical Weapons Convention and START II. For this reason, it seems essential that the Administration approach ratification strategies with an effectively coordinated interagency process that is well-informed by policy matters. Such a process would best be chaired by the NSC.

This is especially true at a time when the legislative affairs offices of other key departments and agencies, including State and Defense, are not fully organized on a political level. It is also important to note that the interagency process we adopt for the Open Skies Treaty will likely set an important precedent for the future.

RECOMMENDATION:

I would therefore propose that NSC chair the **Legislative Strategy Group** on arms-control issues that in the past was chaired by State. In view of his extensive background on the Hill and expertise in arms control, Bob Bell would be an ideal person to serve as Chair (supported by me and by Bell's staff).

I would recommend that State continue to chair the **Legislative Working Group**, and remain the front-line agency for communicating with the Hill, developing testimony, and providing the essential staff resources that are required to implement the Administration's arms-control strategy.

Undoubtedly, we will want to carefully coordinate with State on how best to permanently structure the Legislative Strategy Group and the Legislative Working Group. However, in light of the urgency of developing legislative strategy for ratifying the Open

Skies Treaty, START II and the CWC, I would propose that Bob initiate an Ad Hoc Interagency Working Group, on an interim basis, to discuss strategy issues. This Interagency group would consider the sequencing of arms-control treaties in the Senate this year and review Administration preparations for handling the Open Skies Treaty, when it comes before the Senate next month.

Thanks very much for your consideration of this matter.


Concurrence by: Robert Bell

Attachment

Tab A Interagency Arms Control Plan

INTERAGENCY ARMS CONTROL LEGISLATIVE COORDINATION PLAN

OBJECTIVES

- o To obtain expeditious Senate advice and consent to ratification (or, in the case of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement, Congressional approval) of arms control agreements, with the fewest complications possible;
- o To coordinate and ensure consistency in Administration presentations to the Congress on arms control issues related to the ratification effort through the establishment of a centralized supervisory body;
- o To ensure that participants are utilizing relevant technical-level expertise, and are drawing from fully-cleared, fully-coordinated briefing and background materials;
- o To ensure that all relevant Executive Branch agencies are aware of Congressionally-related arms control initiatives, and are, to the full extent appropriate, involved in these activities;
- o To avoid duplication of effort among relevant Executive Branch agencies, and to ensure appropriate representation in all presentations to the Congress;
- o To task and clear information for dissemination to the Congress in a timely and efficient manner;
- o To establish a coordinating mechanism that will allow effective and efficient management of multiple ratification efforts simultaneously.

ORGANIZATION

- o Three levels of working groups are established including, two permanent groups; a senior-level arms control Legislative Strategy Group (LSG), and a staff-level arms control Legislative Working Group (LWG); and several Treaty Working Groups (TWGs) for the duration of the ratification effort and necessary follow-on for each arms control agreement. The existing Arms Control PCC shall resolve all differences on matters of substance.

Legislative Strategy Group (LSG)

- o Chaired and directed by the Department of State (H), the LSG is composed of representatives from the following agencies and organizations: Chair - DOS/H, NSC, OSD, ACDA, JCS, IC, other relevant agencies as appropriate, and Treaty Working Group (TWG) Chairmen (arms control chief negotiators are members of the LSG and will be invited to attend LSG meetings when their agreement is on the agenda). The LSG will:

-2-

- provide legislative policy guidance to and approve decisions and activities of the staff-level Legislative Working Group; and coordinate all arms control legislative activities related to ratification or the approval of executive agreements, at the senior levels within the Executive Branch;
- approve all requests for participation in relevant Congressional hearings and briefings and composition of interagency representation;
- receive guidance from the arms control PCC on all substantive issues.

Legislative Working Group (LWG)

- o Chaired and directed by the Department of State (H), the LWG is composed of representatives from the following agencies and organizations: Chair - DOS/H, NSC, ACDA, OSD, JCS, IC, and other relevant agencies as appropriate, and TWG Chairmen.
- o This group will meet regularly (with the TWGs and as a separate group) to:
 - provide staff-level support to the LSG;
 - develop legislative strategies for the presentation of arms control proposals and initiatives to the Congress;
 - serve as the primary point of contact with Congressional staff;
 - task and coordinate for presentation to the Hill all testimony (prior to submission to OMB), briefing and background material, Qs and As, talking points, transmittal letters, responses to correspondence and written questions, etc., consistent with PCC guidance;
 - process requests for Administration testimony and briefings before Congressional committees and staff;
 - identify and coordinate organization of briefing teams composed of representatives from relevant agencies (at both the policy and technical levels), and identify key Members and staff for briefing purposes;
 - coordinate the maintenance of "logs" for all actions taken, committee and Members briefed/hearing testimony, and provide recommendations

-3-

Treaty Working Groups (TWG)

- o Chaired and directed by the Chief Negotiators for each arms control agreement (who are also members of the LSG), or their designees, the TWGs (interagency groups consisting of former delegation members and representatives of the existing PCC arms control backstopping and working groups) will draw upon existing substantive expertise to support the ratification effort directed by the LSG. This will include:
 - preparing and coordinating testimony, briefing and background material, Qs and As, talking points, transmittal letters, responses to correspondence and written questions, etc., consistent with PCC guidance;
 - providing briefings for Members of Congress and their staffs as tasked and coordinated by the LWG;
 - and maintaining computer-based files of cleared briefing materials, Qs and As, correspondence, and a log as explained above, etc.
- o The TWG will report through the Arms Control PCC Subcommittee to the Arms Control PCC on all substantive issues. It is envisioned that each individual TWG will be located in the State Department and retain sufficient staff-level support to carry out its duties.
- A CFE TWG will be established immediately to coordinate the ratification effort for this treaty. A START TWG will also be established in anticipation of an agreement by early next year. The START TWG will be chaired by ACDA, pending return to Washington of the delegation. Other TWGs will be established as necessary at the direction of the LSG and will include representatives from all relevant agencies and organizations.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 17, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY SODERBERG

FROM:

BOB BELL *RB*

SUBJECT:

Overview of Defense Budget

Per your request, attached is suggested
Press Guidance on the President's
FY 94-97 defense budget proposal.

Attachment as stated

PRESS GUIDANCE

OVERVIEW OF DEFENSE BUDGET

Question

Is the President's FY 1994-1997 defense budget consistent with the position on military spending he took during the campaign?

Answer

Yes. The President's proposals for military spending envisions defense program reductions from the revised \$1.12 trillion Bush/Cheney FY 94-97 baseline of \$60 billion -- the same amount he pledged to trim during the campaign.

Question

Aren't there other reductions in his defense budget that take the total reduction to \$87 billion -- over 40% more than he suggested during the campaign?

Answer

In addition to the \$60 billion in program cuts, the President's military spending plan for FY 1994-97 includes roughly \$17 billion in pay and benefits adjustments. I would emphasize, though, that military and DOD civilian workers are not having their pay cut, nor are they being singled out for special treatment. Rather, they will not be receiving the same level of pay increases as had been projected by the last administration. Moreover, the order to increase salaries at below-COLA rates is being levied government-wide as part of the President's austerity program.

There is also a \$10 billion debit in the spending plan which is associated with the underpricing of the Bush/Cheney defense plan. At the time President Clinton made his \$60 billion reduction pledge, he assumed that the Bush/Cheney defense spending plan for FY 1994-1997 would reflect honest budget assumptions. Serious questions have since been raised as to whether the Bush/Cheney plan is significantly underfunded due to overestimation of potential management reform savings and underpricing of weapons acquisition programs.

We do not know if the program is underfunded or, if so, the extent of the underfunding. Secretary Aspin has, however, established a special task force (the Odeen panel) to get to the bottom of this. We hope the Odeen panel will report that there is no shortfall. But as a prudent hedge against the possibility that there is a substantial shortfall, we have revised upward our

estimate of the cost of the FY 94-97 Bush/Cheney baseline by \$10 billion and projected a possible requirement to offset this through additional reductions of the same amount.

We have made no decisions how this \$10 billion reduction would be achieved if it turns out that a shortfall of this magnitude is confirmed by the Odeen panel. If we do have to identify another \$10 billion in reductions, we would consider many options, including finding additional efficiencies in defense overhead or operations or achieving greater savings through increased streamlining of Armed Forces roles and missions.