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Folder Title: Chron File - February 1993 #1 [2]				
Staff Office-Individual: Defense Policy-Bell, Robert				
Original OA/ID Number: 43				
Row: 31	Section: 3	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB). (1 page)	12/07/1992	P1/b(1)
001b. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB). (1 page)	12/29/1992	P1/b(1)
001c. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB). (1 page)	12/23/1992	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For Anthony Lake from Robert Bell. Subject: Byond the Numbers Game: A Forces/Capabilities Assessment.... Record ID: 9300365. (6 pages)	02/06/1993	P1/b(1)
003a. cable	Duplicate of 001a. [with non-substantive marginalia] (1 page)	12/07/1992	P1/b(1)
003b. cable	Duplicate of 001b. (1 page)	12/29/1992	P1/b(1)
003c. cable	Duplicate of 001c. (1 page)	12/23/1992	P1/b(1)
004. cable	Duplicate of vz4351_002. (1 page)	01/08/1993	P1/b(1)
005a. letter	[Personally Identifiable Information] [partial] (1 page)	12/21/1992	b(6)
005b. letter	[Personally Identifiable Information] [partial] (1 page)	02/03/1993	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4352

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

February 4, 1993


ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: DANIEL B. PONEMAN 
FROM: RICHARD C. BARTH 
SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Loring Mills

Loring Mills, Vice President of the Edison Electric Institute, wrote you about disposition of the fissile materials extracted from nuclear weapons dismantled in Russia. He urges these materials be rendered useless for nuclear weapon purposes by rapidly diluting the 500 metric tons of highly-enriched uranium and by blending weapon-grade with reactor-grade plutonium. Mills concludes that President Clinton should establish a commission to address this issue.

The proposed response (Tab I) assures Mr. Mills that his suggestions will be taken into account in developing U.S. nonproliferation policy. Accordingly, we will circulate Mills' suggestions to the IWG on nonproliferation and export controls.

Concurrence by: Robert Bell 

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Mr. Mills at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Proposed Response to Loring Mills
Tab II Incoming Letter

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Mills:


Thank you for your letter of January 22, 1993, and for sharing your ideas on the peaceful disposition of weapon-grade nuclear materials.

As you know, President Clinton is strongly committed to thwarting nuclear proliferation. We welcome your suggestions on the subject and will ensure that they are taken into account as we develop our policies toward this critical national security challenge.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security
Affairs

Mr. Loring E. Mills
Vice President, Nuclear Activities
Edison Electric Institute
701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-2696



**EDISON ELECTRIC
INSTITUTE**

LORING E. MILLS
Vice President, Nuclear Activities

January 22, 1993

Mr. Anthony Lake
The Office of the National Security Advisor
Executive Office of the President
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Lake:


The Administration of President Clinton and Vice President Gore has the opportunity to make an early, tangible impact on world peace. Enclosed is a copy of my recent presentation to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs. It addresses the very serious and significant issue of how to "render unusable" large stockpiles of weapons grade fissile material presently in the possession of several nations. Russia and other FSU nations have expressed a willingness to dispose of such material. The United States should engage a more forceful effort to achieve this important goal and, ultimately, follow suit with U.S. weapons-grade material. The challenge before the world community is to define an effective way to address this issue during this historic window of opportunity. The thoughts in this presentation are my personal views as a concerned citizen and not those of the Edison Electric Institute.

The rather bold personal recommendation that a Presidential Commission be established quickly to address this vital international issue received favorable reaction from the audience. Such a Commission would provide thoughtful guidance for both near-term and long-term approaches to rid Planet Earth of nuclear weapons grade fissile material. This issue is so critical to the future of the world, and so important, that it must not be left to the normal slow course of international and domestic bureaucratic discourse.

Also, enclosed is a copy of a presentation I made on the Option For Commercial Use Of Highly Enriched Uranium at a conference on March 24, 1992.

I would be pleased to discuss this in greater detail at your convenience.

Sincerely,



Loring E. Mills

LEM/mlf
Enclosures

NUCLEAR WEAPONS: FROM WAR TO PEACE

Loring E. Mills
Vice President

Edison Electric Institute
January 21, 1993

Good afternoon Ladies and Gentlemen:

Let me start by asking you to close your eyes and visualize your most vivid experience during the summer period between your Junior year and your Senior Year in High School. What were you doing and what impressed you the most? Was it a trip, an experience or some event? During the summer between my Junior and Senior Year in High School I was working on the family farm in the Finger Lake Region of New York State. As a teenager I was helping the war effort every way possible: feeding livestock, harvesting crops, collecting old tin cans for scrap metal and silk weed pods for parachute material. In August of 1945, that summer, the United States dropped two Atomic Bombs on Japan - one of uranium and one of plutonium fissile material -- terrible devastation and loss of life -- but it did bring a quick end to World War II. We were joyous at the time. We had succeeded in punching back against the dastardly deed of December 7, 1941 "*The Day that will Live In Infamy*".

Soon after the war ended, the reports contained horror stories of tens of thousands of lives lost and several square miles of devastation as a result of the atomic bombs. How could man reek such terrible devastation on fellow human beings? Nuclear weapons must never be used in anger again -- ever!! They must be outlawed world wide. That was 1945 and 1946.

But instead a very expensive race was joined by several powerful nations as they continued to develop the capability of building atomic and hydrogen bombs. Many feared that if they did not have the nuclear ability, those who did would conquer and rule. No reasoned end was in sight for that race of destruction. Bigger, better, more perfection, more and more weapons, above surface testing and then underground testing continued for decades. Nuclear deterrence was the byword for the super powers.

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¹ (A disclaimer: the thoughts conveyed in this presentation are my own as a concerned citizen and not those of the Edison Electric Institute. Most of the thoughts are not original but are a compilation from discussion with many persons and from a wide span of reference documents. While I have worked on nuclear fuel programs over several decades, I have no experience or knowledge on nuclear weapons.)

Yes, as we now know, nuclear deterrence has worked for over forty years. No nuclear device has been used in anger since 1945. As one looks forward, for many more decades, some nuclear weapons capability for deterrence purposes will probably be retained by several nations. But how much and by whom? What is reasonable and practical. Certainly the tens of thousands of weapons that were accumulated by the super powers is unjust, unwarranted and just plain silly. Reductions have been initiated under the START I Treaty and the recently signed START II Treaty, both head in the right direction. Hopefully, within 100 years the impracticability of nuclear weapons deterrence will be recognized and future generations will eliminate such devices from the earth.

Three questions are before us: 1) can nuclear weapons be safely dismantled and the nuclear fissile material safely stored? 2) is there a way that the nuclear fissile material can be rendered unusable? and 3) can the material be used effectively for peaceful purposes? The answer to all three questions is yes. Now, how do we make sure it gets done and proliferation is prevented?

Today we have a wonderful opportunity to do just that. Disassembly and storage is a noble and vital first step, but not enough. The nuclear material in storage could be assembled again into new weapons within a relatively short period of time. A special effort must be applied to make the nuclear material unusable as weapons -- ever again. This can be done and it should be done as a focused and dedicated international goal.

Can we use nuclear weapons fissile material in a peaceful way? Absolutely yes. The fissioning of atoms liberates energy that can be collected as heat and converted into electricity within the existing four hundred plus commercial nuclear energy plants that are now in use around the world. Both the uranium and plutonium fissile material from the weapons can be diluted with non-fissile uranium or used in a graphite matrix to make nuclear fuel for commercial plants.

Those of us in the commercial nuclear energy business have always tried to convince ourselves, and the public, that there is no relationship between nuclear weapons and commercial nuclear energy. A commercial nuclear plant can not blow up like a nuclear bomb, but Three Mile Island and Chernobyl showed the world that major accidents could happen. In fact, public opinion polls have shown that over fifty percent of the public believe a commercial nuclear plant could become a mushroom cloud.

Commercial nuclear energy is obtained from the fissioning of uranium and plutonium atoms in a slow and controlled manner. In contrast, nuclear weapons use the same fissioning atoms in a much more pure and concentrated form to provide a nearly instantaneous release of energy. Uranium isotope 235 is the initial fissioning material in commercial nuclear fuel with a concentration of about 3.5 percent. Some nuclear weapons use this same fissile material with a concentration of over 90 percent. The commercial fuel is called low enriched uranium (LEU), and the weapons material is called high enriched uranium (HEU).

The second fissioning material that is used in nuclear weapons is plutonium of nearly pure isotope 239, at a concentration of over 90 percent. We know that a small amount of plutonium is produced in commercial nuclear reactors through neutron absorption of the fertile uranium isotope 238. In fact, at the end of usable life of nuclear fuel, three or four years in a nuclear plant, the energy produced is approximately one half from the fissioning of uranium and one half from the fissioning of plutonium, although the plutonium concentration is less than one percent.

However, there are major differences in the isotopic mix of both the uranium and the plutonium in commercial nuclear plants, compared to weapons material.

It is impossible to make even a poor nuclear weapon directly from commercial nuclear fuel. The uranium fissile isotope 235 is contained as a 3.5 percent mix in a 96.5 percent matrix of uranium of isotope 238 which will not fission. These isotopes cannot be separated chemically. Separation can be performed by mechanical means in a few highly classified facilities in the world, processes that few have mastered. Just visualize the task, separating chemically identical atoms that have a weight difference of only 3 units in 235 units. A diffusion process is used by France and the United States and a centrifuge process is used by Great Britain, Netherlands, Germany and Russia. A third process, laser excitation, has been under research for 15 years but the process entails very difficult high technology and no production plant is in sight.

Plutonium generated in commercial nuclear plants is lousy material for nuclear weapons. The inherent characteristics of commercial fuel and high burn-up results in a very impure plutonium consisting of four primary isotopes 239, 240, 241 and 242 and the concentration is less than one percent. These plutonium isotopes cannot be separated chemically to get the desired mix for a predictable plutonium weapon. One of the myths that is continually promoted by anti-nuclear persons is that plutonium recovered from commercial nuclear fuel is good bomb making material. Such a task, if possible, is extremely difficult and unpredictable. Now, I know there will be someone in the audience who will want to take issue with me on this point and I have been beaten up at times by the anti-nuclear forces on this, but believe me, no one in their right mind or wrong mind would seek to use the impure mix of plutonium from commercial nuclear energy plants to make a weapon. While it may be theoretically possible, the task is very, very difficult, very hazardous to the persons trying to make the weapon and very unstable and unpredictable in its use. In vivid contrast, special production reactors are used by the defense people to generate the high purity plutonium needed for predictable nuclear weapons. This pure weapons grade plutonium is referred to as clean plutonium, as distinguished from dirty plutonium from commercial plants.

The concept of using plutonium from reprocessed commercial fuel for nuclear weapons is one of the two primary "unwarranted fear-media hype" myths that is fostered by the "anti-nukes". The second such myth is that plutonium is the most dangerous and toxic material on earth. Not so! Has anyone ever heard of or seen documented a case where a person has died from plutonium intake? I know of none and I have asked many others about this and have found none. Yes, there have been deaths due to radiation, three at the military SL-1 reactor accident, 31 at the Chernobyl accident and recently released data has indicated that several deaths have occurred from excess radiation in medical treatments. But none are attributed to plutonium ingestion. We have always know that plutonium has the potential for delayed adverse health effects if ingested and very careful and rigidly controlled techniques have been used to prevent such access. Plutonium is hazardous, but it is not dangerous, when handled and transported properly.

The uranium from nuclear weapons is much easier to use for commercial fuel and the economic advantage can be billions of dollars. Plutonium on the other hand is more difficult to use as commercial fuel and it may cost more to produce such fuel than the energy value received. However, if the goal is to make the fissile material unusable for nuclear weapons, now and forever more, the absolute best way, is to convert it into commercial nuclear fuel and use it to produce electricity. In this process it gets impregnated with highly radioactive waste products that makes it highly radioactive for centuries and such use will convert clean plutonium to dirty plutonium.

My first assignment in the nuclear business was in 1958, eight years after I had received my engineering degree. General Electric transferred me from the Research Laboratory at Electric Park in Syracuse, New York to the Hanford Laboratory in Richland, Washington to work on a unique and special project called the Plutonium Recycle Program. I joined a research team and worked with them for five years in the development of technology for the use of plutonium as fuel in future commercial nuclear energy plants. The project, funded by the Federal Government, had two primary purposes: 1) define the means to use effectively plutonium recovered from commercial plant spent fuel, and; 2) define a means for consuming the plutonium from nuclear weapons when we decide to dismantle them. Here we are, thirty five year later, and we are now ready to dismantle the weapons. The basic technology has been waiting on the shelf for a long time seeking this opportunity.

Let's explore the path for the two fissile materials separately: first uranium and then plutonium.

Uranium

As mentioned earlier, commercial nuclear fuel contains about 3.5 percent of the fissile isotope uranium 235 (LEU) and weapons material is over 90 percent of that fissile isotope (HEU). Both originate from the same basic mineral content of uranium ore bodies. The naturally occurring uranium mineral contains a precise mix of fissile and non-fissile isotopes: 0.711 percent fissile uranium 235 and 99.289 percent non-fissile uranium 238. As discussed

earlier, the two uranium isotopes in natural uranium, U235, and U238, cannot be separated chemically, only mechanically and in highly classified facilities. This very diluted mix of fissile to non-fissile uranium is the way mother nature has delivered it to us in all uranium forms throughout the world, except one spot in Niger where a natural chain reaction occurred in a fairly rich ore body over a several million year period -- a long, long time ago. This natural uranium with the very low fissile content can be used in certain nuclear plant designs such as the CANDU plants designed and built in Canada. However, the plants in the United States and most of those in Europe and Asia, require a fissile content of about 3.5 percent to achieve the desired characteristics.

Today, commercial nuclear fuel is obtained by taking six pounds of natural uranium and through the classified process called enrichment, separating the isotopes to produce one pound of fuel quality material and five pounds of unusable material called tails. In contrast, to achieve weapons grade uranium with 95 percent fissile isotope uranium 235, it requires about two hundred pounds of natural uranium, and an awfully lot of enrichment work, to provide one pound of weapons material. The other one hundred and ninety-nine pounds is thrown away. This enrichment process is reversible, you can take one pound of weapon grade uranium (HEU) and mix it with about thirty-three pounds of natural uranium to produce the desired commercial fuel (LEU). This is precisely the plan that has been discussed between the United States and Russia for making the material useless as weapons material and useful for energy production. The U.S./Russia arrangement was first announced on August 31, 1992 and a major second step was discussed in detailed negotiations last week. It was very pleasing to see the favorable stories about the concept in the Washington Post on September 1, 1992 and a very favorable editorial on September 2, 1992. This is truly a win-win-win situation: 1) Russia receives badly needed funding for its economy by selling the material to the U.S. 2) a large quantity of nuclear weapons material is rendered unusable forever and, 3) energy is produced in the form of electricity from the material. This can be accomplished with only modest investment in new facilities. A private group of Allied Signal and NFS, Inc. have been working with the Governments of both the U.S. and Russia to provide the technology and this group signed its second protocol with Russia last November.

During the first five years the plan calls for about ten tons of weapons uranium to be used this way each year. I understand this quantity may be adjusted upward. After five years the quantity is expected to increase to thirty tons of weapons grade uranium each year. This may not sound like a great amount, but it is significant. Thirty tons of weapons grade uranium when blended with natural uranium will provide about one-half of the new fuel needs for all 110 commercial nuclear plants in the United States. Let me repeat that, nearly one half of all new fuel needed in the U.S. could be provided each year from thirty tons of HEU blended with natural uranium. Since there is at least 500 tons of such uranium weapons grade material in the FSU nations, at thirty tons a year it will take seventeen years to use it up. And of course, there is about the same amount, if not more, of HEU in the United States defense stockpile.

From a proliferation standpoint I am concerned about this large quantity of HEU that will be around for decades. Uranium weapons material (HEU) is the easiest material to use in making a nuclear weapon. It has a potential of being diverted to others who desire to achieve their own form of nuclear deterrence. Thus, HEU represents the major world threat of nuclear proliferation, greater than that of plutonium. It is the larger quantity of defense stockpiles, 500 tons in both FSU and U.S., is less hazardous than plutonium to use and can make a major destructive device, as demonstrated in public in 1945. A special effort appears desirable within the next few years to quickly convert all of the HEU to an enrichment level of less than twenty percent uranium isotope 235 and to store this lower enrichment level material until it can be further diluted and fabricated into commercial fuel. This early dilution step would render it unusable for nuclear weapons material, and make it much less attractive for diversion. To assure that the arms merchants of the world do not have access to the HEU, such material should always be retained under Federal ownership. Although, it does appear advantageous to contract with private companies for the processing steps. It is just scary to consider allowing private companies to own large quantities of HEU.

Plutonium

There is a significant but smaller quantity of plutonium in both the FSU and U.S. weapons stockpile, about 100 tons in each. How much is 100 tons of plutonium? One railroad car carries about 100 tons of coal and the density of coal is about one tenth that of plutonium,. Thus, the physical volume of 100 tons of plutonium is about the volume of one tenth of a railroad car that carries coal. This physical volume is manageable.

However, because of the safety precautions necessary for handling plutonium due to its potential toxicity, the task at hand is mammoth. To make it available for commercial fuel, it could be blended with natural uranium at a mix of thirty-three parts uranium with one part of plutonium. However, this expands the handling difficult from 100 tons to a total of 3400 tons with plutonium that must be handled very carefully. While the technology is known for doing so, the facilities do not exist and a very large new investment would be required to make such a quantity of commercial fuel with plutonium fissile material. Also, no electric utility in the United States wants to take on the burden of using mixed plutonium/uranium fuel for its nuclear energy plants in the near term. Using such fuel would require more rigid handling and substantial changes in the control system. Thus, the overall cost of producing and using plutonium containing fuel in commercial nuclear energy plants will result in a cost penalty. Unless it becomes a major national goal to dispose of plutonium in this manner, and it is subsidized, it is doubtful that commercial energy plants in the U.S. will used plutonium fuel, although it is being used today in other countries.

An alternative is to build special nuclear plants that can more effectively use plutonium fuel and render it unusable for weapons. The Department of Energy has initiated a series of studies to determine the available paths for doing so. High Temperature Gas, Light Water,

Heavy Water and Liquid Metal cooled nuclear plants will be studied in this regard. The basic purpose of every study is to find a way to render plutonium unusable as a nuclear weapons material. The result after use in such a power plant will be a mix of plutonium isotopes that is undesirable for nuclear weapons.

Other means of getting rid of plutonium include shooting it off to the sun, burying it at the bottom of the ocean, mixing it with highly radioactive wastes, diluting it in a glass matrix and disposing of it in a waste repository.

One alternative that may be done quickly and at reasonable cost, is to mix the clean weapons grade plutonium with the dirty plutonium isotope mix that is recovered through the reprocessing of commercial spent fuel. Reprocessing is not performed in the United States because it is not economical for us to do so. However, France, Russia and Great Britain have operating reprocessing facilities for commercial fuel. While those who abhor nuclear energy find this path an unacceptable one, because it tends to justify the reprocessing step for commercial fuel, with the existing facilities this approach is the lowest cost, quickest and easiest way to transfer weapons grade plutonium into a dirty, lousy mix of plutonium isotopes and for all practical purposes render it much much less attractive for use as weapons material.

Associated Cost

How much will all of this cost? Who will pay for it, and will the taxpayer get hit in the pocketbook again for this activity? Properly done, the taxpayer will pay nothing, and in fact will gain value from the excess revenues from the use of HEU and use this excess revenue to perform cleanup functions that otherwise would be paid for by the taxpayer. There is a very high energy value in the weapons material, both uranium and plutonium, with a net value of several billions of dollars. An overall financial approach could be to use the value in the HEU stockpile of the U.S. as the collateral needed to carry out the activity of rendering unusable nuclear weapons material worldwide. Also, since it will require a long time to use up the HEU in commercial fuel, it appears to be an excellent candidate for zero coupon bond financing for the purchase of Russian HEU now, with a plan for it to be used later. To achieve maximum cooperation from the FSU, it appears desirable to pay top dollar for their HEU, rather than the low ball value proposed by DOE. Somehow we should be able to find a way to use the U.S. HEU as basic business collateral to allow a higher value to be paid for the HEU from the FSU.

Also, the net value from the use of HEU could be allocated to several related activities, subsidizing the program to get rid of the plutonium, stabilization of mill tailings generated from producing the uranium in the first place, and the decommissioning decontamination and of the uranium enrichment facilities. The program can indeed be a win-win-win-win proposition.

I would now like to draw some general conclusions and make a few specific recommendations. Remember, the vivid image in my mind comes from being a teenager exposed in August of 1945, to our unacceptable use of nuclear weapons in anger. Such uses must not be allowed again and our long range goal should be to eliminate all nuclear weapons usable fissile material from the surface of the earth.

Such a common goal appears to be in the interest of U.S. Federal Government, FSU Republics, other nuclear weapons nations, the nuclear industry, environmentalists, and anti-nuclear folks. All should be able to support the basic concept that most of the weapons grade fissile material should be rendered unusable forever as weapons material and this should be done as soon as possible.

It is a mammoth task, lets get on with it now.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We must proceed expeditiously with the task of rendering unusable, weapons grade fissile material, both HEU and Plutonium, so that no one will be able to use the material as a weapon any time in the future -- ever. Secure storage as now being pursued is essential but it is not good enough. The modest approach of using HEU as commercial fuel that is in the works is laudable, but insufficient. This "render unusable" effort must receive high priority because of the unique window of opportunity that exists now and it should proceed at a responsible rate toward the ultimate goal of no nuclear weapons grade fissile material on planet earth.

The HEU should be blended down with natural or depleted uranium to less than twenty percent uranium 235 as soon as practical, within the next 10 years. In parallel, and over a longer period of time, the uranium should be blended down further for use as commercial nuclear fuel to produce electricity. The clean weapons grade plutonium should be mixed with dirty plutonium recovered from the reprocessing of commercial fuel to quickly render it isotopically unattractive as weapons material. This issue is so critical to the future of the world and so important that it must not be left to the normal slow course of international diplomatic policy actions.

President Clinton should be urged to immediately convene a Presidential Commission of twelve distinguished citizens as a major early task of the new Administration. The effort could be placed under the tutelage of Vice President Gore and charged with listening to the views of all parties and to recommend the best means to proceed with the control and rendering unusable nuclear weapons material. A time limit of six months should be set for the Commission activity. An excellent candidate for Chairmanship of the Commission is Ambassador Kennedy or someone of his vast experience and for Executive Director, William Dircks. This Commission is needed because of the international importance, the urgency, the immediate window of opportunity and the difficulty of the present bureaucratic maze of DOS, DOD, DOE, ACDA, and others trying to deal with this very important issue for the future of mankind.

Questions directed to this Commission should include:

1. Can weapons grade fissile material be rendered unusable for weapons?
2. What alternative approaches are most practical to do so?
3. Can the tasks be effectively accomplished within the existing multi-cabinet bureaucratic maze and malaise?
4. Should a separate entity be established within the Executive Branch with the sole purpose of possession, control, render unusable and disposition of weapons grade fissile material?

5. Should this function be assigned in total to the newly established Uranium Enrichment Corporation?
6. What role and international coordination already exists within the United Nations for this set of very important world stabilizing tasks?
7. Should a new international coordination role be defined?
8. What amount of weapons grade fissile material can be made available from the U.S. stockpile for rendering unusable?
9. To encourage international cooperation, should the U.S. offer to render unusable quantities of material equivalent to that from the FSU and other nuclear weapons countries?
10. Should the U.S. offer to purchase, possess and render unusable, all weapons grade fissile material that other weapons nations are willing to release?
11. What legislative action is required to foster the overall approach for the task of rendering unusable the nuclear weapons grade fissile material worldwide?

Thank you for allowing me to discuss this vital issue with you and for your kind attention. May I count on you to encourage President Clinton to set up this important Commission?

OPTIONS FOR COMMERCIAL USE OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM

Presented by
Loring E. Mills

Session: Arms Reduction and the Commercial Nuclear Fuel Market

Fuel Cycle'92 Conference
USCEA

Charleston, South Carolina
March 24, 1992

Immobilization of weapons grade fissile material to prevent its future use in a destructive way is a humanitarian goal that ranks high in the annals of a major world improvement. Storage of these materials may permit future access and total elimination may not really be achievable, while immobilization removes the material from the possibility of adversarial diversion. Arguments will continue over whether nuclear deterrence as a national policy for the last few decades was appropriate or necessary. However, the result is clear, no one has used a nuclear weapon in anger since 1945. While many still believe in the security advantage of possessing nuclear weapons, the primary deterrence policy of the past few decades, with massive numbers of nuclear devices, has run its course and is no longer applicable. National security interests will dictate the amount and rate permitted for immobilizing the fissile material, but the need to do so is vividly apparent.

A fond aspiration of everyone contributing to nuclear weapons capability is that it would never be used. And, that someday the world powers would find a way to convert all nuclear destructive potential to peaceful uses. That time is now and the production of electricity is the only significant means of achieving an economic benefit from fissile material.

The new focus on dismantlement and safe storage of the fissile material is uppermost on the mind of world leaders. This was brought into a sharp focus with the dissolution of the USSR into independent republics. One of the most refreshing aspects of this new era is the openness and seriousness with which representatives from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) address the need for this effort. The CIS representatives appear to be more open and more willing to cooperate than our own federal establishment. Most of the public discussions are focused on the fissile material in the hands of the CIS because of fear associated with instability in that area. However, to be creditable, the immobilization¹

¹ Thoughts in this paper are a compilation of a range of considerations obtained through discussions with many persons and information in the reference documents. This presentation is attributable to the author and not the adopted position of EEI or the utility industry.

A Few considerations for control of fissile material include:

- Storing the material under rigid international safeguards for an unlimited period is doable. But such an approach does not eliminate the potential of someone, somehow, under some circumstances, finding a way into that storage bin and using the material in anger.
- Sending the material to the sun or outer space with rockets, or dropping it in a deep ocean trench are achievable -- at considerable added cost to society -- ignoring the reality of a potential value to society in extracting energy from the material. The potential hazard of a failed rocket launch must be recognized.
- Transmutation to non-radioactive elements is supported by various researchers with theoretical concepts that, if achievable, will consume valued societal resources and take decades to develop.
- Mixing the material with other highly radioactive defense wastes or extensive dilution in a glass matrix and disposing of it in a geologic repository may be achievable if the energy values are foregone-- at a considerable added cost to society.
- Converting the material to commercial nuclear energy fuel and extracting a portion of its energy value while making it too radiologically hot to handle through in-situ generation of highly radioactive fission products is doable with very little additional research. The recovered energy values appear to be great -- providing a positive economic societal benefit in addition to immobilization. Final immobilization can be achieved by following the current national program with the highly radioactive spent fuel disposed of within a geologic repository. The amount of spent fuel requiring permanent disposal will be exactly the same whether or not the commercial fuel is made from weapons material or non-weapons material.

PUBLIC VIEW

The nuclear industry has worked for decades to convince the public that nuclear weapons and commercial nuclear energy are quite different and not directly related. Does the dilution, and use of fissile material from nuclear weapons as commercial fuel fly in the face of this separation concept? Perhaps it does, but if so, the concept of separation was not achieved in the first place. More likely, the immobilization of nuclear weapons material in commercial reactors will be viewed as a favorable activity for commercial nuclear energy. A "white hat" position: nuclear weapons destroyed but not made with commercial nuclear energy.

USE AS COMMERCIAL FUEL

The only peaceful societal benefit to extract energy from the material is through the production of electricity. Since the existing 109 nuclear energy plants in the U.S. are light-water-reactors (LWR) fueled with uranium, the use of HEU may be directed down that path with minimal changes to the present overall system. However, such a path will have a measurable impact on the uranium supply, conversion and enrichment suppliers.

No changes are needed to the commercial reactors or the planned disposal of spent fuel from the reactor operation to accommodate the use of diluted HEU in LWR's. Although the modular high-temperature-gas cooled reactor (MHTGR) technology has not achieved commercialization, it may be possible to achieve a greater energy recovery value from the HEU through its use as fuel for HTGR's where the enrichment level is just under 20 percent U235 instead of the 3-4 percent U235 for LWR's. Also, HEU can be used as fuel for liquid metal reactors (LMR's). However, major capital investments for both MHTGR and LMR reactors and corresponding fuel fabrication facilities would be required for these systems to be used for the immobilization step.

Using plutonium, on the other hand, in commercial nuclear energy LWR plants, raises a number of issues that have not been resolved in the U.S. for the operation, regulation and safeguards arenas, including possible modifications of the plants to achieve the control necessary for the different neutronic characteristics of plutonium fuels. Early planning on commercial nuclear energy programs did include an overall plan for the development and use of recycled Pu in LWR's as mixed U-Pu oxide fuel and this should be considered for immobilization of Pu and pursued if it is economically attractive. Using mixed oxide fuels in LWR's may turn out to be the most effective way to immobilize Pu by producing a mix of Pu isotopes that preclude adversarial use, even though not economical from a commercial standpoint. Alternatively, a greater energy value from Pu may be achieved by using it as fuel for liquid-metal reactors (LMR) as either metal or mixed oxide fuel forms. A major investment in both future LMR plants and fuel processing facilities would be required to effectively immobilize the Pu.

HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM (HEU)

The HEU in the national defense stockpile exists in several forms; fabricated metallic uranium shapes, metal for weapons production and pure uranium hexafluoride (UF₆). The uranium in this stockpile was produced mostly from ore bodies within the U.S. and it was enriched within the three plants operated by the Atomic Energy Commission in the late 1940's, 1950's, and early 1960's. Very little of these materials would be needed for strategic purposes in a world devoid of nuclear weapons, although a small portion is needed to power the nuclear Navy.

While the primary concern, from a diversion use standpoint, is with the HEU, any policy that addresses the immobilization of HEU should also consider the disposition of all excess

uranium from the national strategic stockpile. In addition to HEU, the defense stockpile includes large quantities of natural and low-enriched uranium. Any sale of this material into the commercial market will have an impact on the current uranium suppliers, converters and enrichers. Thus, the rate of sale must be controlled to limit and minimize the impact on the existing market.

The production and processing of natural and low enriched uranium is a flourishing and very competitive commercial industry. The only unique steps required to use the HEU are the reduction of metal forms and purification followed by blending of the HEU with other uranium to produce the low enriched uranium employed in the nations commercial reactors. Although not performed at this time, the processes are well know and the capital investment necessary is relatively small. There are NRC licensed private facilities in operation today for processing HEU that may be viewed as an existing base for this activity.

The "de-enrichment" of HEU can be achieved by blended it with depleted, natural or other low enriched uranium as the matrix material. This blending can be done as liquid UF_6 or a solid UO_2 powder. The choice of the matrix material to use for blending and the chemical form for blending will be made as an economic decision based on the relative cost of natural uranium and the cost of the specific processing functions.

For that quantity of HEU currently in the form of UF_6 , the preferred process is to blend it with matrix UF_6 , as a heated liquid. A UF_6 cylinder of HEU and a UF_6 cylinder of matrix UF_6 may each be heated to liquify the UF_6 and the UF_6 metered from each cylinder, in the proper proportion, into an evacuated third product cylinder to achieve the desired enrichment. The third cylinder may be heated to receive the blend as a liquid or chilled to cause the UF_6 to precipitate as a solid.

This UF_6 blending may be performed in one step or several steps. After the product cylinder is filled, it can be rotated in a heated chamber for a period of time to achieve complete homogeneity. The product then would be analyzed and further blending performed if needed to achieve the precise enrichment desired. Blending of UF_6 to achieve the specific isotopic content desired has been a standard practice at the enrichment plants for decades. The unique aspect with regard to using HEU is the very wide difference in isotopic content of the U^{235} and U^{238} in the two components being blended. Special controls are necessary to assure that the HEU does not segregated in the low enriched product cylinder, resulting in a critical mass configuration.

Where uranium metal shapes and alloys are the staring point, they could be melted into shapeless buttons with adder material included to disguise all classified security aspects associated with the use as weapons material. The metal uranium could be dissolved in nitric acid and purified through solvent extraction, converted to UO_3 and subsequently reduced to UO_2 . The HEU in pure UO_2 power form may be an acceptable product that could be supplied to the commercial fuel fabricators to blend with the conventionally produced UO_2 powder just prior to the fabrication of fuel pellets. This would require the fabricator to

perform an added processing step of powder blending. A complication that may be experienced with this approach is that the "black art" of producing the desired ceramic quality of UO_2 powder would not be under the control of the fabricator for the HEU. However, because the quantity of HEU added to the matrix UO_2 would be small, less than three percent of the material in most cases, this may not be a significant problem.

An alternative of providing all of the HEU uranium to the fabricator as low-enriched UF_6 can be achieved after producing UO_2 with subsequent steps of hydrofluorination of the UO_2 powder to UF_4 and fluorination to form pure UF_6 for blending with matrix UF_6 . An alternate dry processing approach could be used that eliminates the solvent extraction purification step prior to forming the UO_2 powder. This would produce impure UF_6 and a fractional distillation step would be performed as the last step to obtain pure UF_6 .

From the fuel fabricator and customer standpoint, converting the HEU to UF_6 and subsequent blending to the desired low enrichment before delivery of the UF_6 to the fabricator would provide the material in the form now received and no change would be included in the operation of the fabricator. Providing UO_2 powder to the fabricator as HEU would require the addition of the powder blending step and it would raise new criticality and safeguards material control issues at the fuel fabricator plant and require a plant license modification. While these conditions appear manageable, they do add to the cost of fuel fabrication.

ALLOCATION OF RECOVERED URANIUM VALUE

Even though a portion of the separative work unit economic value in the HEU would be lost in the process of blending it down to a low enrichment, the resulting economic value is significant -- several billion of dollars for the total HEU stockpile. Allocation of these recovered values to specific purposes appears to be in order. While government economists may view the value of the HEU as a national resource to be paid to the Treasury without strings, there are liabilities on the books today of private industry and the federal government that are the direct result of producing the HEU. There is a strong rationale for allocating the recovered value of HEU to a few specific tasks: 1) stabilization of uranium mill tailings in the U.S, 2) decontamination and decommissioning of the uranium enrichment facilities, 3) subsidizing the immobilization of Pu and 4) providing financial support for international safeguards efforts of such sensitive materials by the NRC and IAEA. Allocation of the recovered values to many other nuclear programs may not be justifiable such as: development of MHTGR and LMR technology or subsidizing an inefficient uranium enrichment enterprise.

SUPPLY INDUSTRY IMPACT

The quantity of fissile material in the U.S. and CIS defense stockpiles is substantial and if released quickly for commercial use, would have a major impact on the international nuclear fuel supply industry. Availability of the material at any rate will displace the equivalent need

for newly mined uranium, for conversion of uranium concentrates into UF_6 and for the enrichment function. Thus, the potential impact to these sectors of the industry must be addressed and steps taken to minimize or overcome the adverse effects. The first two activities, mining and conversion are performed by private companies in several countries. The third activity, enrichment, is performed by the federal government in the U.S., France and Russia, plus by a consortium in three other countries England, Netherlands and Germany. Japan is planning to build enrichment capability for a portion of the commercial needs in that country. Also, a new private enrichment venture, Louisiana Energy Services, is in the plant design and licensing stage with expectation to build a new plant and start production in 1996 in competition with both the U.S. federal government and foreign suppliers.

There is simply no way to sidestep the fact that an impact will occur once a decision is made to immobilize the fissile material by using it as commercial nuclear fuel. Specific controls could be established to minimize the impact, such as limiting the available quantity to no more than 20 to 30 percent of the annual demand and require that the price for the material be at least equal to the average fair market price for new source material. Alternatively, a fair market price could be established and published for a specific limited quantity to be released each year along with a requirement that every nuclear plant use a specified amount of the fissile material each year at the established price until the available material is consumed. This arbitrary pricing and use approach would force the material to be consumed and that portion of supply insulated from the majority of the material that would be purchased on the open competitive market.

The cost of stabilizing the existing mill tailings from prior mining and milling of uranium ores is a significant liability of the current and past domestic uranium producers. Since much of this mill tailing material resulted from the production of the uranium that is now held in the defense stockpile as HEU, it appears appropriate for a portion of the revenues received from the sale of HEU to be allocated to pay for the stabilization of mill tailings. Such a step may be very helpful to the financial health of the domestic uranium producers.

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT

Existing institutions within the Federal Government, DOE and DOD, now have responsibility for the fissile material and some may argue they constitute the preferred institutional arrangement for immobilization of fissile material along with help from the national laboratories. Others may argue that the cumbersome governance structure of these organizations will not permit them to perform the tasks efficiently or effectively because of the inherent strictures and embedded culture of DOE and DOD and the provincial research driven approaches of the national laboratories.

Because of the national and international importance of the need to immobilize these fissile materials in a reasonable period of time, it may be preferable for Congress to establish a dedicated not-for-profit Federal Corporation with the sole purpose to receive and

immobilize the fissile material while maximizing the recovered economic societal values. Such an arrangement would permit a focused effort, that is separate, distinct and not affected by interest in many other tasks and commitments. With the single purpose responsibility it could openly be held accountable for completing the task on a timely basis in an orderly way.

Other institutional options include a newly chartered combined federal and private organization such as COMSAT, a dedicated non-for-profit private corporation or allow competitive private industry to perform the task. The later may be the truly democratic way. However, the sensitivity of the task and the importance of proper controls may dictate that the control be provided through a more structured arrangement.

Also, to encourage similar efforts and international safeguards control in all nations with nuclear weapons, it appears desirable to include IAEA participation and an international umbrella coordination body. Having a separate, sole purpose Federal Corporation in the US would provide a responsible model that may be appropriate in the other nations.

PLUTONIUM

While plutonium represents a smaller portion of the weapons grade fissile materials, it receives most of the notoriety. Carefully controlled glove box and remote processing steps and elaborate safeguard controls that are required for the handling of PU results in a much different economic picture for its use as fuel for the production of electricity compared to using HEU. Also, because the U.S. decided in the 1970's, for a combination of political, proliferation risk and economic reasons, to forego the recovery and recycle of plutonium in commercial nuclear energy programs, a basic infrastructure is not in place within the U.S. upon which to build a plutonium processing capability. Three commercial plutonium processing plants were built, licensed and operated in the U.S. However, they have ceased operation and have been dismantled. Plutonium processing plants are operating in France and Germany and pilot operations in Japan for the production of mixed U-Pu oxide commercial fuel. The planned capacity for each plant is about 100 metric ton per year and they have produced mixed U-Pu oxide fuel assemblies which have been used in commercial LWR's.

The original research for fabricating Pu containing fuels was performed by the Federal Government under the Plutonium Recycle Program in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Operational characteristics of Pu fuel was demonstrated in the Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor at the Hanford Laboratories. Also a few mixed oxide fuel assembled were produced and used in several commercial plants in the U.S. in the 1970's, including a full reload in the Ginna Nuclear Station in Central New York. The processing steps are known but the safety regulations and safeguard requirements are not developed for large scale use of Pu in commercial nuclear energy plants. The overall economics of using Pu fuels in LWR's is yet to be defined. Because of both the need to make large capital investments to process the material and the unpredictable regulatory constraints, it appears that the added

cost associated with Pu would exceed the economic value of Pu as fuel for LWR's at this time. Improved overall Pu fuel economics may be achieved in the future with LMR systems. However, the capital investment required for such fully developed systems is very high.

Thus, if immobilization of Pu is desired in the near term, at the lowest practical cost it may be desirable to select a direct disposal option for this material -- mixing with defense high level waste or as diluted material in a large glass matrix -- and disposal of the material in a deep underground repository. While this appears heretical from an energy conservation standpoint, if the cost of direct disposal is less than the net cost of fabrication, use and disposal, then immobilization by direct disposal may be the proper alternative to achieve early immobilization. However, to achieve effective immobilization of the Pu through irradiation and isotopic change along with disposal in a repository as spent fuel, the added cost of using Pu as commercial fuel may be justified.

CONCLUSION

Immobilization of the HEU and Pu made available from within the defense stockpile can be achieved by processing the material into commercial nuclear energy plant fuel and disposing of the spent fuel in a deep underground repository. The energy values that could be recovered from the material are very large and the economic value of producing electricity appears large for HEU and only marginal or negative for Pu. Separate paths may be appropriate with the HEU used in commercial plants and the Pu in federal plants. However, to achieve effective immobilization of the Pu, it may be appropriate to subsidize its use as fuel for commercial plants.

Capital investments for converting HEU for use as fuel in LWR plants appears to be quite small and the material can be processed at locations that currently have NRC licenses. Large capital investments would be required to use the HEU in MHTGR and LMR plants and for all aspects of using and processing Pu. An additional complication with the use of Pu as commercial fuel is the need to develop a new detailed regulatory basis including very rigid safeguard procedures.

Allocation of the recovered values for HEU to pay for existing liabilities that occurred as a result of producing the HEU in the first place appears to be appropriate; including mill tailings stabilization and D&D of enrichment facilities.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0200

February 2, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*
FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*
SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise - MPA BILATERAL
TRAINING 1-93

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, approving military exercise MPA BILATERAL TRAINING 1-93. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

This exercise is part of a professional exchange program with Turkey in maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) operations. It includes classroom training in maintenance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) techniques and the cross-decking of personnel with Turkish counterparts for training and ASW operations. It is scheduled to take place February 15-19, with one U.S. P-3 aircraft deploying and operating from Topel Air Base, Turkey. Although small in scope, this exercise is being reviewed as a significant military exercise because it will take place in a designated politically sensitive area - the Sea of Marmara.

The critical cancellation date is February 8, 1993.

Concurrence by: Jane Holt *JH*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the exercise and have Will Itoh sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II OSD Executive Secretary Memorandum, February 1, 1993

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VR* NARA, Date *8/23/2016*
2016-0752-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0200

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise MPA BILATERAL
TRAINING 1-93

Military exercise MPA BILATERAL TRAINING 1-93 is approved.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

0200



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

01 FEB 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise -
MPA BILATERAL TRAINING 1-93

The Department of Defense recommends NSC approval of the attached Significant Military Exercise Brief, Exercise MPA BILATERAL TRAINING 1-93. The Department of State concurs with this recommendation.

Please note the critical cancellation date is
8 February 1993.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Michael B. Sherfield", is positioned above the printed name.

Michael B. Sherfield
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated

THIS DOCUMENT IS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ITS ATTACHMENT.

~~SECRET~~

X6 0816
U.S. DEF. SEC. TR. No.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB). (1 page)	12/07/1992	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F
vz4352

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB). (1 page)	12/29/1992	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F
vz4352

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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001c. cable	re: Part I Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB). (1 page)	12/23/1992	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F
vz4352

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9300082
RECEIVED: 26 JAN 93 16

TO: LAKE

FROM: HAHN
BELL

DOC DATE: 02 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MILITARY BASES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BASE CLOSURE COMMIS

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE

DUE DATE: 29 JAN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
HAHN
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJSL

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 2 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 5, 1993

TO BRUCE LINDSEY,

PLEASE TAKE NOTE OF DOCUMENT. WHEN
FINISHED PLEASE RETURN ORIGINAL TO THE
NSC.

FROM,
TONY LAKE

February 2, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL

FROM: KEITH HAHN

SUBJECT: Base Closure Commission Membership

*Bruce Lindsey
asked for this
memo after our
conversation.
PZ*

In order for the Base Closure Commission to meet the tight schedule set forth by legislation, a decision must be made this week whether to: (a) retain the eight members nominated by President Bush on January 6 (and subsequently appointed on January 8 during the pre-Inauguration recess); (b) nominate new members to replace one or more of the eight appointed by President Bush; or (c) keep the current eight members but designate a different individual as Chairman. The President has full authority to choose any of these options.

Senator Mitchell does not want to replace any of the current members. However, he would like to replace Jim Courter as Commission Chairman with Harry McPherson. Courter headed the last Commission and received generally favorable reviews for his efforts. However, Mitchell is upset that Loring AFB was included on the last base closure list, even though Courter voted to keep Loring.

In addition, several Senators have raised concerns about the appointment of Rebecca Cox, who is strongly supported by Senator Dole and was formerly Senator Stevens' Chief of Staff. Ms. Cox recently married a California congressman from a district with a large military presence. While she is listed as a D.C. resident and apparently has not lived in California, there is a perceived conflict of interest in her membership on the Commission. At the same time, though, her presence on the Commission could be defended as an appropriate response to representations from California -- the state with the largest exposure to defense cuts -- that it be represented on the Commission.

The current membership has the strong support of Secretary Aspin and Senator Nunn and reflects a balance of Congressional representation. The members were sponsored as follows:

- Senate Majority Leader: Peter Bowman and Harry McPherson
- Senate Minority Leader: Rebecca Cox

- Speaker of the House: H.T. Johnson and Arthur Levitt
- House Minority Leader: Jim Courter (Chairman)
- White House: Bev Byron and Robert Stuart

While strongly supportive of the current membership, Congressional staffers have expressed a procedural concern about the Bush recess appointment of the Commission. As a rule, they don't like recess appointments. In this case, however, the urgency to name members to meet Commission timelines ameliorated their concerns. Congress plans to move quickly to confirm Commission members as soon as they reconvene following the Washington/Lincoln birthday recess period the week after next.

The deliberations of this Commission will be politically sensitive and every effort should be made to minimize politicization of the process. Given the support that the current Commission membership has from Secretary Aspin* and Senator Nunn, there should be a compelling reason -- which Senator Mitchell has not yet provided -- to replace either individual members or the chairman. It should be noted that since Senator Mitchell was successful in placing Peter Bowman (Chairman of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard) on the Commission, the State of Maine's equities in this next go-around would appear to be fully protected.

RECOMMENDATION

That you retain the current Base Closure Commission membership.

** He believes Courter should take the heat for politically unpopular decisions.*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0304

February 4, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ROBERT BELL *RB*

SUBJECT: Designation of Liaison to Senate Arms Control
Observer Group

The five co-chairmen of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group (SACOG) have written the President requesting that he designate a liaison to meet with and brief the Group periodically on arms control matters (Tab B). This function was ably performed by Special Adviser Nitze during the Reagan Administration and ACDA Director Lehman during the Bush Administration.

Once the Administration makes final decisions on ACDA and gets its ACDA and State arms control teams confirmed, you can decide who should be assigned this liaison responsibility on a permanent basis. In the interim, it would seem logical for either you or me to serve as point man to the Group. I am happy to volunteer, as I know the Senators well and served on the Group's staff since its inception in 1985 until coming here. If you agree, the letter for President Clinton's signature at Tab A would inform the Group of this interim designation.

Concurrences: Don Gross *DG*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I, forwarding to him for his signature letters to the Group designating me as an interim liaison.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Proposed Letter to the SACOG
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

0304

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Designation of Liaison to Senate Arms Control
Observer Group

Background

The five co-chairmen of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group (SACOG) have written to request that you designate a liaison to meet with and brief the Group periodically on developments in the arms control field. Since its inception in 1985, this Group has played a crucial role in the successful negotiation and ratification of the INF, CFE, and START treaties. As a SACOG charter member, the Vice President can attest to the value of this consultative body.

Once final decisions are made on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and senior State and ACDA arms control officials are confirmed by the Senate, we can decide who should be assigned this liaison responsibility on a permanent basis. In the interim, the NSC Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, Robert G. Bell, can function in this capacity.

Recommendation

That you sign the letters to the five co-chairmen at Tab A making this designation.

Attachments

Tab A Proposed Letters to SACOG Co-Chairmen
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Stevens:

Thank you for your letter of January 7, advising me of the mandate and responsibilities of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group. As you note, Vice President Gore was a charter member of the Group, and he has attested to the crucial role it has played in the successful negotiation and ratification of the INF, CFE, and START treaties.

I agree that the Group can and should continue to serve as an indispensable consultative link between the Senate and the Executive Branch on pressing arms control issues and hope the Group's charter will be extended for the duration of the 103rd Congress.

As you know, my Administration is currently endeavoring to secure Senate confirmation of key sub-cabinet nominees, including several in the arms control area. Pending identification of a permanent liaison to the Group, I will ask my Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, Robert G. Bell, to meet with and brief the Group as you deem appropriate.

Again, I appreciate your willingness to work closely with me in forging an effective partnership in the field of arms control.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Co-Chairman
Arms Control Observer Group
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Pell:

Thank you for your letter of January 7, advising me of the mandate and responsibilities of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group. As you note, Vice President Gore was a charter member of the Group, and he has attested to the crucial role it has played in the successful negotiation and ratification of the INF, CFE, and START treaties.

I agree that the Group can and should continue to serve as an indispensable consultative link between the Senate and the Executive Branch on pressing arms control issues and hope the Group's charter will be extended for the duration of the 103rd Congress.

As you know, my Administration is currently endeavoring to secure Senate confirmation of key sub-cabinet nominees, including several in the arms control area. Pending identification of a permanent liaison to the Group, I will ask my Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, Robert G. Bell, to meet with and brief the Group as you deem appropriate.

Again, I appreciate your willingness to work closely with me in forging an effective partnership in the field of arms control.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Co-Chairman
Arms Control Observer Group
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Byrd:

Thank you for your letter of January 7, advising me of the mandate and responsibilities of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group. As you note, Vice President Gore was a charter member of the Group, and he has attested to the crucial role it has played in the successful negotiation and ratification of the INF, CFE, and START treaties.

I agree that the Group can and should continue to serve as an indispensable consultative link between the Senate and the Executive Branch on pressing arms control issues and hope the Group's charter will be extended for the duration of the 103rd Congress.

As you know, my Administration is currently endeavoring to secure Senate confirmation of key sub-cabinet nominees, including several in the arms control area. Pending identification of a permanent liaison to the Group, I will ask my Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, Robert G. Bell, to meet with and brief the Group as you deem appropriate.

Again, I appreciate your willingness to work closely with me in forging an effective partnership in the field of arms control.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Co-Chairman
Arms Control Observer Group
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Nunn:

Thank you for your letter of January 7, advising me of the mandate and responsibilities of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group. As you note, Vice President Gore was a charter member of the Group, and he has attested to the crucial role it has played in the successful negotiation and ratification of the INF, CFE, and START treaties.

I agree that the Group can and should continue to serve as an indispensable consultative link between the Senate and the Executive Branch on pressing arms control issues and hope the Group's charter will be extended for the duration of the 103rd Congress.

As you know, my Administration is currently endeavoring to secure Senate confirmation of key sub-cabinet nominees, including several in the arms control area. Pending identification of a permanent liaison to the Group, I will ask my Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, Robert G. Bell, to meet with and brief the Group as you deem appropriate.

Again, I appreciate your willingness to work closely with me in forging an effective partnership in the field of arms control.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Sam Nunn
Co-Chairman
Arms Control Observer Group
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Lugar:

Thank you for your letter of January 7, advising me of the mandate and responsibilities of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group. As you note, Vice President Gore was a charter member of the Group, and he has attested to the crucial role it has played in the successful negotiation and ratification of the INF, CFE, and START treaties.

I agree that the Group can and should continue to serve as an indispensable consultative link between the Senate and the Executive Branch on pressing arms control issues and hope the Group's charter will be extended for the duration of the 103rd Congress.

As you know, my Administration is currently endeavoring to secure Senate confirmation of key sub-cabinet nominees, including several in the arms control area. Pending identification of a permanent liaison to the Group, I will ask my Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, Robert G. Bell, to meet with and brief the Group as you deem appropriate.

Again, I appreciate your willingness to work closely with me in forging an effective partnership in the field of arms control.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
Co-Chairman
Arms Control Observer Group
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA
CLAUDBORNE PELL, RHODE ISLAND
SAM N. IN. GEORGIA
CO-CHAIRMEN

GEORGE MITCHELL, MAINE
TED KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, NEW YORK
ALBERT GORE, JR., TENNESSEE
PAUL SARBAMES, MARYLAND
DALE BUMPERS, ARKANSAS
CARL LEVIN, MICHIGAN

TED STEVENS, ALASKA
RICHARD G. LUGAR, INDIANA
CO-CHAIRMEN

ROBERT DOLE, KANSAS
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JOHN WARNER, VIRGINIA
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JAKE GARN, UTAH
JOHN CHAFEE, RHODE ISLAND
WARREN RUOMAN, NEW HAMPSHIRE
TRENT LOTT, MISSISSIPPI

000689

United States Senate

ARMS CONTROL OBSERVER GROUP

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

January 7, 1993

Honorable William J. Clinton
President-Elect
Clinton-Gore Transition Office
P.O. Box 8086
Little Rock, Arkansas 72203

Dear President-Elect Clinton:

We, the co-chairmen of the bipartisan United States Senate Arms Control Observer Group, are writing to share our thoughts regarding the crucial need for continuity in our arms control and nonproliferation efforts as your Administration takes office.

The Senate Arms Control Observer Group was created in 1985 by the Senate with three main goals in mind:

- o to fulfill more adequately the Senate's constitutional role in the treaty-making process;
- o to coordinate between Senate committees with regard to oversight in the area of arms control;
- o and to create a mechanism for improving timely consultation and coordination between the Senate and the Administration in order to end an unsatisfactory history wherein, over a decade, none of the arms control treaties signed by Presidents of both parties with the Soviet Union (SALT II and two nuclear testing treaties) succeeded in attaining the approval of the full Senate.

The creation of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group was welcomed by the Reagan Administration in an enthusiastic and positive manner. Secretary Shultz designated Ambassador Paul Nitze to meet with the Group on a regular basis and update it on the status of negotiations. Likewise, during the Bush Administration, Ambassador Ron Lehman was designated to carry on the responsibilities of Ambassador Nitze.

The Senate Arms Control Observer Group is a bipartisan group of 20 Senators, with a designated core staff. The Group's efforts are designed to complement rather than duplicate the work of the committee of jurisdiction, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the committees concerned with military and intelligence aspects, the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The Group does not engage at all in negotiations, but consults with and advises our negotiating teams in order to report to the Senate and the concerned committees on the progress and development of the talks, and to ensure the most informed and thorough

consideration possible when the agreements are submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent. Vice President-Elect Gore has been a member of the Group since its creation and an active participant throughout its existence.


Since its creation, the activities of the Group have grown in their importance to the Senate. The Group has developed a genuine nonpartisan spirit and a productive relationship of trust and confidentiality with the Executive Branch, often acting as a key sounding board for our negotiators as proposals were developed and modified in connection with the numerous negotiations, including: the INF Treaty; the two nuclear testing protocols; the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty; and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitations on Strategic Offensive Arms (START II). During the existence of this Group, the Senate has approved six significant arms control treaties which have strengthened our national security, enhanced nuclear stability and reduced the risk of nuclear war. The willingness of the leadership in the republics of the former Soviet Union to work with us in addressing some of the problems of the nuclear era presents opportunities for further strong and comprehensive agreements which must not be lost.

We believe the future value of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group is readily apparent as negotiations begin on a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) Treaty and as discussions continue with the republics of the former Soviet Union and other countries on implementation of START, adjustments to treaty terms that may be necessary because of changed circumstances, nonproliferation issues and a wide variety of nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons issues.


In view of the crucial need for continuity in the United States arms control policy, we respectfully urge you to identify as soon as possible a member or members of your administration who could serve in the same capacity as did Ambassadors Nitze and Lehman, to act as your liaison to the Group, and meet with and brief the Group on a regular basis on ongoing negotiations and discussions on arms control and nonproliferation agreements.

We stand ready to work closely with you in helping to ensure that there is an effective partnership and cooperation between the Senate and your administration in the field of arms control.


Sincerely,



Ted Stevens
Co-Chairman




Robert C. Byrd
Co-Chairman



Claiborne Pell
Co-Chairman



Sam Nunn
Co-Chairman



Richard G. Lugar
Co-Chairman

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9300352
RECEIVED: 05 FEB 93 15

TO: ITOH

FROM: SHERFIELD, M

DOC DATE: 05 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY

CM

PERSONS: LOCHER, J

SUBJECT: ABSENCE OF SECDEF

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 09 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
BERGER
CLARKE
DARRAGH
~~FRY~~
HAHN
ITOH
LAKE
LINHARES
SODERBERG

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

5 FEB 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Absence of the Secretary of Defense


The Secretary of Defense will depart for an overseas trip at 1800, Friday, 5 February, and will return to Washington, D.C. at 1430, Sunday, 7 February.

Accordingly, during the following period of time, the official indicated will be the Acting Secretary of Defense:

Date/TimesActing Secretary of Defense

1800, Friday, 5 February
through
1430, Sunday, 7 February

Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations &
Low-Intensity Conflict)
Honorable James R. Locher, III


Michael B. Sherfield
Executive Secretary

cc: SecDef
DepSecDef
SecArmy
SecNavy
SecAF
DoD GC
Dir, WHMO
CJCS
NMCC
OSD Cables

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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002. memo	For Anthony Lake from Robert Bell. Subject: Byond the Numbers Game: A Forces/Capabilities Assessment.... Record ID: 9300365. (6 pages)	02/06/1993	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F
vz4352

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

TO: SHERFIELD, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 08 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MILITARY EXERCISES

TURKEY

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISE MPA BILATERAL TRAINING 1 - 93 APPROVAL

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 04 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
DEFENSE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BELL
HAHN
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 8/23/2006
726-052-F

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY ✓ DATE ✓ 2/8/93 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSASK

DOC 3 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0200

February 8, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise MPA BILATERAL
TRAINING 1-93

Military exercise MPA BILATERAL TRAINING 1-93 is approved.



William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0200

February 2, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*
FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*
SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise - MPA BILATERAL
TRAINING 1-93

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, approving military exercise MPA BILATERAL TRAINING 1-93. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

This exercise is part of a professional exchange program with Turkey in maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) operations. It includes classroom training in maintenance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) techniques and the cross-decking of personnel with Turkish counterparts for training and ASW operations. It is scheduled to take place February 15-19, with one U.S. P-3 aircraft deploying and operating from Topel Air Base, Turkey. Although small in scope, this exercise is being reviewed as a significant military exercise because it will take place in a designated politically sensitive area - the Sea of Marmara.

The critical cancellation date is February 8, 1993.

Concurrence by: Jane Horn *JH*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the exercise and have Will Itoh sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve *W* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature
Tab II OSD Executive Secretary Memorandum, February 1, 1993

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *W* NARA, Date *8/28/2011*
276-01514

~~SECRET~~

0200



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

01 FEB 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise -
MPA BILATERAL TRAINING 1-93

The Department of Defense recommends NSC approval of the attached Significant Military Exercise Brief, Exercise MPA BILATERAL TRAINING 1-93. The Department of State concurs with this recommendation.

Please note the critical cancellation date is
8 February 1993.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Michael B. Sherfield", is positioned above the printed name.

Michael B. Sherfield
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated

THIS DOCUMENT IS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM ITS ATTACHMENT.

~~SECRET~~

020 DEF SECRET No. X6 08 16

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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003a. cable	Duplicate of 001a. [with non-substantive marginalia] (1 page)	12/07/1992	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4352

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. cable	Duplicate of 001b. (1 page)	12/29/1992	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4352

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. cable	Duplicate of 001c. (1 page)	12/23/1992	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4352

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

UNCLASSIFIED			
MESSAGE NO.	CLASSIFICATION	PAGES 1	
FROM	WILLIAM H. ITOH <i>W.H.</i>	# 456-2585	
	(NAME)	(PHONE NUMBER)	(ROOM NO.)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION	SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISE		
	0200		
TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
REMARKS:			

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9300201
RECEIVED: 01 FEB 93 16

TO: SHERFIELD, M

FROM: ITOH

DOC DATE: 05 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MILITARY EXERCISES INDIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SIGNIFICANT MILITARY EXERCISE BALANCE IROQUOIS IN INDIA

ACTION: ITOH SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 04 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
EXECSEC
HAHN
NSC CHRON
RAGLE

COMMENTS: _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/23/2006
2016-0152-F

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 3 OF 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 6, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise BALANCE IROQUOIS 93

Military exercise BALANCE IROQUOIS 93 is approved.



William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0201

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

February 2, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise BALANCE IROQUOIS 93

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, approving military exercise BALANCE IROQUOIS 93. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

BALANCE IROQUOIS 93 is a combined exercise with the Indian armed forces, consisting primarily of free fall parachute training and operations. It is a follow-on to an earlier airborne exercise and will take place March 15-30 in the vicinity of Agras, India. Approximately 60 U.S. and 84 Indian personnel will be involved.

The critical cancellation date is February 15, 1993.

Concurrences by: Martin *ML* and Bruce *BR* Riedel

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the exercise and have Will Itoh sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve *R* Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab II OSD Executive Secretary Memorandum, January 29, 1993

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

Department of State Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *8/22/2006*

206-0152-7



ADMINISTRATION
AND MANAGEMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950




20 JAN 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise - BALANCE IROQUOIS 93

The Department of Defense recommends NSC approval of the attached Significant Military Exercise Brief, Exercise BALANCE IROQUOIS 93. The Department of State concurs with this recommendation.

Please note the critical cancellation date is
15 February 1993.


Michael B. Sherfield
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated

This memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED without enclosure.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

X6-0812

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	Duplicate of vz4351_002. (1 page)	01/08/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F
vz4352

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9300340
RECEIVED: 05 FEB 93 10

TO: LAKE

FROM: PODESTA, J

DOC DATE: 05 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: MILITARY NOMINATIONS
WH REFERRAL

NAVIGATIONAL FREEDOM

PERSONS: KELLER, RICHARD F

SUBJECT: MILITARY NOMINATIONS OF KELLER / 4 OFFICERS FOR APPT TO GRADE OF
BRIGADIER GEN RESERVE OF MARINE CORPS OF US

ACTION: LAKE APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 09 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LAKE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL

NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 2/5/93 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 2/10/93

MILITARY NOMINATIONS: MAJ GEN RICHARD F. KELLER, USA

SUBJECT: 4 OFFICERS FOR APPT TO THE GRADE OF
BRIGADIER GENERAL, RESERVE OF THE
MARINE CORPS OF THE UNITED STATES

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	PASTER	☐	☐
McLARTY		☐	RASCO	☐	☐
GEARAN	☐	☐	RUBIN	☐	☐
PANETTA	☐	☐	SEGAL	☐	☐
EMANUEL	☐	☐	STEPHANOPOULOS	☐	☐
GIBBONS	☐	☐	VARNEY	☐	☐
HALE	☐	☐	WATKINS	☐	☐
HERMAN	☐	☐	WILLIAMS	☐	☐
LAKE	☒	☐	CLERK	☐	☒
LINDSEY	☐	☐		☐	☐
MONTOYA	☐	☐		☐	☐
NUSSBAUM	☐	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

Do you have any objections?

Check also with Rell.

RESPONSE:

No.

February 6, 1993

Anthony Lake
Anthony Lake

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 3, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Forwarded for your approval and signature is the nomination of Major General Richard F. Keller, United States Army, for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general and a recommendation for his assignment as Chief of Staff, United States European Command.

As required by title 10, United States Code, section 601 (2) (d) (1), the Secretary of Defense has attached an evaluation of General Keller's performance in joint duty assignments from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This nomination has been staffed by the Secretary of the Army and was approved by the Secretary of Defense.

Recommend you approve and sign the attached.



JOHN A. GAUGHAN

Director

White House Military Office

Attachment



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

22 JAN 1993


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Army General Officer Nomination

I recommend the assignment of Major General Richard F. Keller, United States Army, as Chief of Staff, United States European Command, an authorized lieutenant general position, and his nomination for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general. General Keller, who is 54 years of age, is currently serving as Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized). He will succeed Lieutenant General Robert D. Chelberg, United States Army, who is retiring.

In order to carry out the duties and responsibilities of the proposed assignment, an officer must have demonstrated highly effective performance in senior leadership positions. He must possess a thorough understanding of the requirements of the European theater of operations, including war plans and the political environment. He must have the ability to work well with senior officials from other Services and other nations. General Keller meets these requirements.

This action will not result in the Army's exceeding the number of officers authorized to be serving in the grade of lieutenant general. As required by title 10, United States Code, section 601(d)(1), I have attached an evaluation of General Keller's performance in a joint duty assignment from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



Secretary of Defense

Attachments



CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0001

CN-388-92

21 December 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Through: Deputy Secretary of Defense

Subject: General Officer Nomination

1. In accordance with the provisions of title 10, United States Code, and DOD Instruction 1320.4, the Secretary of the Army has recommended Major General Richard F. Keller for assignment as Chief of Staff, United States European Command, and appointment to the grade of lieutenant general.
2. I have reviewed Major General Keller's performance in one joint assignment as Commander, Battalion Combat Advisory Team, 25th Infantry Division (Republic of Vietnam), United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. In this assignment, he demonstrated broad knowledge of national military strategy, United States-allied relations, and military force structure. He worked well with senior officials from other nations and successfully worked with other Services in the integrated employment of military forces. Loyal and tireless, he handled every assignment with skill, imagination, and exceptional judgment. I am confident he is well qualified for this assignment and advancement.
3. After consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I concur in the Secretary of the Army's nomination of Major General Keller for this assignment and appointment to the grade of lieutenant general. Accordingly, I recommend you forward the enclosed nomination to the President approving these actions.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "C. L. Powell", is positioned above the typed name.

COLIN L. POWELL
Chairman
of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosure

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. letter	[Personally Identifiable Information] [partial] (1 page)	12/21/1992	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4352

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

The White House

Washington

To the Senate of the United States:

I nominate:

The following named officer for appointment to the grade of lieutenant general while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under Title 10, United States Code, Section 601(a):

To be Lieutenant General

Major General Richard F. Keller, (b)(6) United States Army [005a]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 3, 1993

100-100000-10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Forwarded for your approval and signature is a nomination containing the names of four officers for appointment to the grade of brigadier general in the Reserve of the Marine Corps of the United States.

This nomination is based on the results of a selection board approved by the Secretary of Navy and Secretary of Defense.

Recommend you approve and sign the attached.



JOHN A. GAUGHAN

Director

White House Military Office

Attachment



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

1 FEB 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Marine Corps General Officer Nomination

I recommend you nominate the officers whose names are on the attached list for appointment to the grade of brigadier general in the Reserve of the Marine Corps of the United States.

This recommendation is based on the results of a selection board approved by the Secretary of the Navy. This nomination will not result in the Marine Corps exceeding the authorized strength of general officers in an active status in the Reserve of the Marine Corps of the United States.

Attachments

A handwritten signature, likely of J. Edgar Hoover, is located in the bottom right area of the page. The signature is written in a cursive, stylized script.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. letter	[Personally Identifiable Information] [partial] (1 page)	02/03/1993	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [2]

2016-0152-F

vz4352

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

The White House

Washington

To the Senate of the United States:

I nominate:

The following named officers for appointment in the Reserve of the United States Marine Corps under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 5912:

To be Brigadier General

Colonel Jerry E. Ward,

(b)(6)

Colonel John W. Hill,

[005b]

Colonel Dennis M. McCarthy,

(b)(6)

Colonel Frederick R. Lopez,