

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

Defense Policy-Bell, Robert

Original OA/ID Number:

43

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
31	3	1	2	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For Anthony Lake from Daniel Poneman. Subject: Purchase of Highly-Enriched Uranium from Russia. Record ID: 9300159. (2 pages)	02/01/1993	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB) - Balance Iroquois 93. (1 page)	08/01/1993	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	For William Itoh from Anne Witkowsky. Subject: [Inspection]. Record ID: 9300111. (1 page)	02/04/1993	P1/b(1)
003b. memo	For Marc Grossman et al. Subject: [Inspection] Record ID: 9300111. (1 page)	02/04/1993	P1/b(1)
003c. report	Duplicate of vz4349_004c. (5 pages)	01/11/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [1]

2016-0152-F

vz4351

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9300142
RECEIVED: 28 JAN 93 16

TO: DAVID, JACK

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 08 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: DEFENSE POLICY
MP

NATO
UN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: THANK YOU LTR TO DAVID FOR HIS INSIGHT INTO INTERNATIONAL MATTERS

ACTION: LAKE SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 01 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
HAHN
NSC CHRON

OK

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY: NSASK

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. David:

Thank you very much for providing me your insights on several important issues facing the U.S. The questions of what role we should play in establishing international order, how much military presence we should maintain abroad, and the future political structure of Europe are timely and significant. These issues are among the many we have begun to review in an effort to clearly define our goals and objectives for this Administration. Your contributions to these discussions are greatly appreciated.

I hope your unique qualifications are recognized in the near future as the Departments of State and Defense continue to fill important security arrangement positions.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security
Affairs

Mr. Jack David
747 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0142

January 30, 1993

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Letter from Mr. Jack David RE: Foreign Policy and
National Security Issues

At Tab II Mr. Jack David has provided -- at your request -- three short papers on foreign policy and national security issues. The first paper, entitled "Needed - A Police Force for a New World Order," advocates the U.S. take a leading role in developing an international peacekeeping and peace-enforcing force to replace the U.S. as world policeman. The second, "Prudence in Reducing U.S. Forces Abroad," warns against precipitous reductions in U.S. military presence abroad in an effort to realize immediate economic savings. The last paper is a memorandum on Mr. David's observations from his experience as a member of the U.S. 1992 NATO delegation and provides his views on future relationships among Europeans and their impact on the U.S.

At Tab I is a letter to Jack David thanking him for responding to your request.

Concurrences by: Barry *BM* Lowenkron and Eric *ES* Schwartz

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Mr. Jack David
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

C1412

Staff

JACK DAVID
747 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017
212-421-2233

January 20, 1993

Mr. Anthony Lake
National Security Advisor
to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Lake:

You may recall the enclosed letter you wrote to me. Thereafter, you scheduled a March 13, 1992 meeting with me, but it aborted and never was rescheduled. Although I drafted a foreign policy speech for the campaign at Lionel Johnson's request, I had no further contact with you.

Nevertheless, at your invitation (see attached), enclosed please find three recent short essays/memoranda I prepared on foreign policy/national security issues. I hope you find them useful. I have applied (and been recommended by David Aaron and Senator Biden) for positions in State and Defense involving security arrangement issues, but no luck so far. I would like to contribute in this area.

Sincerely,

Jack David

Jack David

JD:sre
enclosures
cc: Mr. Anthony Lake
Kinne Brook Farm
Worthington, MA 01098

Anthony Lake
Kinn Brook Farm
Worthington, MA 01098



Dear Mr. David:

George Stephanopoulos has passed along to me (I'm coordinating foreign policy positions) your letter + piece on collective security in Europe, which I enjoyed reading. You may have noted that Governor Clinton took the same position on NATO in his Georgetown Univ. lecture on foreign/defense policy last December.

Sent

I see in your "appendix" references to "The Constitutionality of a Mandatory Non-Military National Service Obligation" and NSDD 84. If you had copies handy, I'd be most interested — as I would also in further thoughts on the evolution of European security arrangements over the next decade.

Sincerely,
Tony Lake

Needed - A Police Force for a New World Order

by Jack David

January 7, 1993

Page 1 of 4

The debate concerning whether, when and to what extent the United States should project force abroad -- when it should be policeman for the world -- is one of great importance. It implicates questions of vital concern, not the least of which is when American lives should be put at risk in foreign conflicts and when our somewhat depleted economic resources should be expended for objectives the achievement of which will yield results perceived by many of our citizens as obscure or not sufficiently beneficial to us for what they cost us. Yet, as important as this debate is, it distracts our focus from a topic that may be equally important to our interests in the short run and more important in the long run.

The topic is whether we should construct an alternative to the United States as the "policeman of the world" and, if so, how it can be done. Recent events show that the time is ripe for fruitful discussion of creating a structure for international forces to undertake the kinds of actions the United States recently has undertaken and considered undertaking -- as envisioned in one form by Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's June 17, 1992 Agenda for Peace. Although the United States would participate in such a force structure, particularly if it came into being in the near term, while the United States remains the only country having the airlift, sea lift, oversight and other logistical capability to project forces afar, it would

not necessarily bear the largest military, economic, political or leadership burden in every instance.

With the fall of Communist totalitarian regimes and the large number of states joining those who long have espoused humanitarian values, democratic principles and rights of individuals to participate in market economies, there is a larger consensus than the world has ever known that certain values are so basic that they are absolutes and should be protected by action of the international community. The value of the sanctity of the life and welfare of each human being is now sufficiently absolute that "ethnic cleansing," indiscriminate murder of political opponents, the commission of war crimes and widespread starvation caused by internal conflict or by across-border war are unacceptable and now command an active response from the international community. Significantly, the strength of this political consensus is reflected in the strength of the approved responses in instances where community values are flagrantly and dramatically assaulted; force may be used, if necessary.

The most important fact to be gleaned from the more activist role played by the United Nations in peacekeeping and the more aggressive role played by the United States and other countries in addressing problems of unprincipled violence by means of the principled use of force is that the emerging international consensus has supported the use of force in these cases, if necessary. One can discuss Desert Storm, humanitarian

assistance and possibly more aggressive action in Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO-supported over-flights of northern Iraq to protect Kurds from Saddam Hussein, and U.S. intervention in Somalia and compare legal justifications for each, but the main feature of all is that there is a broad international consensus for action and that consensus derives from the fact that conduct of political and military leaders in each instance unacceptably derogates from values that those in the consensus want to protect and preserve. The fact that the international community, including the five members of the United Nations Security Council, European countries and much of the rest of the world, can agree that such strong action can be taken signifies a consensus not only that action is warranted in these cases but that doing sufficiently egregious harm to internationally respected values now and in the future will warrant support of the international community for enforcement action, even if such action entails violating the sovereignty of a state. On the international level, however, there are inadequate enforcement mechanisms for dealing with bad people in political leadership positions who do such violence and for relieving the victims of such violence from the reign of terror to which they are subject.

Although the United States has a unique role to play in peacekeeping and peace-making at this time, discussion of the "new world order" would seem to assume the readiness of the "world" to further elaborate the means suggested by the United

Nations Charter for assuring peace and the observance of civilized standards of behavior not only between countries but by governments with respect to their own people. One of the most critical sets of issues the Clinton Administration will need to study and resolve is how can an international police force or forces be structured to replace the United States as a sole actor, by what standards or rules should it operate and how should it be financed so that the international community -- the "world" -- bears the burden of and assumes responsibility for assuring the "new world order."

The consensus reflected in the approval of recent peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations may not be sufficiently great to cause prompt agreement on the architecture of an international police force, on the rules for the operation and use of such an institution and on methods by which its activities can be financed. Nevertheless, the United States should make the nourishment and development of a consensus on these matters a central feature of its foreign policy by taking the leading role in devising an acceptable architecture for an international force to supplement and soon replace the "policeman" role the United States now is playing and in developing rules for the use and international financing of such a force.

"Prudence in Reducing U.S. Forces Abroad"
For Opinion Page of New York Times

by Jack David
November 19, 1992

The Clinton administration is expected to make very substantial cuts in military and related expenditures for America's involvement in and commitments to security arrangements abroad, both in Europe and in Asia. But some proponents would have us reduce our expenditures for overseas military to zero and make all of the savings available for urgently attending to domestic needs. While President-elect Clinton sees that we need to marshal scarce economic resources to deal with urgent domestic economic and social needs and that an economically strong America must be the top priority, even for national and international security, he will be wise to resist the counsel of those who urge cutting expenses to the point of eliminating our effective presence in overseas security arrangements.

Cuts that would reduce our effective military presence overseas will free up money for domestic use, but they will have additional consequences as well. Any material withdrawal of foreign-based U.S. forces itself will change the world, and also will change America's political and economic influence in the world. If we withdraw to such an extent that we seriously impair our operational capability on foreign soil, as some would have the President-elect do, our withdrawal will have at least the following consequences:

1. Those who have relied on us for security will strengthen themselves militarily and politically, perhaps in ways that are not completely to our liking;
2. The ambitions of tyrants and would-be tyrants will not suffer the restraining influence of credible potent United States opposition;
3. For the foreseeable future, the world will be without any generally acceptable leader in military and security matters; and
4. Future commitments of the United States on security matters will not be considered as dependable as have our commitments in the past.

If we impair our operational capability on foreign soil today to a degree that brings about these consequences and in the future decide that we again want to play a more prominent role in security outside North America, others may not be as accepting of our leadership as they are today -- and certainly will ask more as a condition of giving support to initiatives the U.S. may then wish to take. It also is likely that the world will be a more dangerous place at that time.

The end of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe unleashed strong destabilizing forces of nationalism, religious intolerance and ethnic enmities that the Soviets had contained for many years, albeit by repression. These consequences of Soviet

withdrawal from Eastern Europe entail perils to security and stability in Europe and Asia whose full extent we do not yet know. Rendering the U.S. incapable of operational effectiveness to meet our international commitments abroad would have similarly great consequences from an "effect on security" point of view, as the presence of a credible and potent U.S. capability meaningfully contributes to stability; withdrawal of that presence and capability may well set the stage for instability.

Those who urge President-elect Clinton to leave security in Europe and in Asia to the Europeans and the Asians owe it to their audience and to the integrity of their own analysis to identify and quantify the costs of their proposals in terms of security and stability. Calculating the strategic and political cost of each proposal for reducing America's military and political commitments abroad is as worthwhile an exercise as evaluating how the economic savings can be spent domestically.

Mr. Clinton is thankfully making domestic economic and social concerns our number one priority and is right to include cuts in expenditures for foreign-based military capability among the methods of marshaling resources to address them. In evaluating any money-saving proposal to withdraw forces stationed abroad to deal with regional security problems (those entailing the largest commitments of force), the President-elect needs to be able to assess the irreversible impacts alternative cuts are

likely to have on the actions of others in the region and to portray the security status of a region after we withdraw and others respond to the withdrawal. Accordingly, advice to significantly reduce America's military and security capability abroad for immediate economic savings must be accompanied by an assessment of this kind so as to be sure that the reduction proposed will not bring about unintended or unacceptable consequences.

JACK DAVID
747 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017
(212) 421-2233

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Council on Foreign Relations

RE: 1992 NATO Delegation

FROM: Jack David

DATE: October 9, 1992

This memorandum contains impressions and conclusions of participants in the 1992 NATO delegation after the meetings they had with NATO, EC, SHAPE, USAFE, government officials, local politicians and others in Belgium and Germany during the last week in May 1992. The memorandum started out as a summary of my own impressions and conclusions, which I shared with all members of the delegation in a July 22, 1992 memorandum. I edited the original memorandum to reflect corrections, comments, suggestions and additions provided to me by most of the other members of the delegation and recirculated the revised memorandum on September 21, 1992, asking for responses by October 9, 1992. No substantive changes to the text were suggested. Accordingly, our impressions and conclusions are that:

1. The historic binding force of NATO members, that all members will go to war upon an attack on one member, has little practical or political relevance at this time as it is predicated on the existence of a single, powerful aggressor whose attack on one would be a threat to all and no such powerful aggressor exists; on the other hand, Eastern European countries find this central feature of NATO membership attractive, as they fear that the bear may come out of the woods again one day. NATO's development of the NACC may be a bridge between its past and its future. Another bridge may be its underfunded exchanges with military personnel of former Warsaw Pact countries, exchanges which serve the valuable purpose of building trust. Still, NATO's unique ability is that it can take and carry out security decisions because of its infrastructure, including personnel from different countries accustomed to dealing with each other in performing precisely this function. The use of NATO's abilities would be essential to any "out of area" military operation.

2. NATO and the U.S., as part of it, are vigorously attempting to identify and convince others of new goals to

justify politically and economically keeping NATO and the U.S. military in Europe; the new goals, toward which consensus seems to be developing, are providing humanitarian assistance, peace keeping and even enforcing peace.

3. The absence of a single, powerful, potential aggressor eliminates a risk that was an impediment to the use of collective action to address lesser threats to stability, but collective action to address such threats, especially the use of force, nevertheless requires a political consensus which is difficult to build even without the threat of a powerful adversary who might use force to oppose such action. The events in Yugoslavia have underlined the difficulty in garnering political support for collective action to address the conflicts that have emerged in the wake of the Cold War's end.

4. The European members of NATO and of the CSCE are more ambivalent about collective action involving the use of force than is the United States but they share our concerns about human rights abuses and acts of aggression even beyond the borders of Europe; they feel as they do particularly because refugee problems resulting from aggression and human rights abuses threaten stability and security in Europe. In the short term, advocating the collective use of force to reduce refugee problems will be more persuasive to European countries than other rationales.

5. Notwithstanding the much publicized Franco/German force of 35,000 troops, neither France nor Germany nor any other European state has the ability or will have the ability over the next ten years to project and maintain military forces in the areas where they may be deployed (e.g., Iraq, all of former Yugoslavia -- including Kosovo, the western parts of the former Soviet Union); whether such European forces operate under a CSCE flag, a UN flag or otherwise, their deployment will be possible only with support of the NATO infrastructure and U.S. military assets and related U.S. military support in Europe (particularly for airlift, aerial refueling, intelligence from overhead technical systems and sea lift). Our continued support of an adequate NATO infrastructure and of an effective U.S. military presence on European soil are vital to protect our short term interests (at least ten years) in maintaining stability in Europe and nearby areas, including the Persian Gulf; it is in our interest and Europe's interest to find ways to finance this.

6. Germany agreeing to participate in the Franco/German force was born of a variety of motivating factors; among these none is any more clear than Germany's general policy of improving its relations with France. Other motivating factors probably derived from political considerations having to do with the European Community and concern about a reduced U.S. military presence in Europe. Some of us detected a suggestion that another motivating factor may have been some Germans' perception

(not shared by the U.S.) of not being sufficiently consulted in NATO, with a specific illustration being the U.S. and the U.K. forming and staffing the Rapid Deployment Force after the Gulf War with perceived (by some Germans) inadequate consultation.

7. The relative influence of Germany in NATO will increase over the next ten years and France also will come to play a more influential role in European security decision making, including making decisions about collective action by European countries (although at least one of our delegation feels that France's negativism about the U.S. is incurable and that France is unlikely to be a "team player" on a team whose captain is the U.S.); this means that U.S. dominance of decision making in NATO must end, although we will continue to be an influential partner. A stronger European security identity -- whether within NATO or through the strengthening of the WEU and/or the EC -- likely will continue to emerge regardless of the fate of Maastricht, but surely will emerge more rapidly if Maastricht or something like it is approved. Yet, ironically, the only country that most Europeans will accept as "the leader" for the foreseeable future is the U.S., European military and political leaders generally being uncomfortable accepting either French or German leadership in these matters, and many German leaders not trusting their own country's military leadership, particularly insofar as Germany replacing U.S. leadership in European security matters might well lead to Germany coming to possess nuclear weapons. For the benefit of the long term, we should utilize our close relationship with Germany to help nourish the German/French relationship and thereby help shape the more influential roles that Europeans will play in NATO and in European security in the years to come.

Jack David

JD:sre

February 2, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*
FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*
SUBJECT: Base Closure Commission Membership

In order for the Base Closure Commission to meet the tight schedule set forth by legislation, a decision must be made this week whether to: (a) retain the eight members nominated by President Bush on January 6 (and subsequently appointed on January 8 during the pre-Inauguration recess); (b) nominate new members to replace one or more of the eight appointed by President Bush; or (c) keep the current eight members but designate a different individual as Chairman. The President has full authority to choose any of these options.

Senator Mitchell does not want to replace any of the current members. However, he would like to replace Jim Courter as Commission Chairman with Harry McPherson. Courter headed the last Commission and received generally favorable reviews for his efforts. However, Mitchell is upset that Loring AFB was included on the last base closure list, even though Courter voted to keep Loring.

In addition, several Senators have raised concerns about the appointment of Rebecca Cox, who is strongly supported by Senator Dole and was formerly Senator Steven's Chief of Staff. Ms. Cox recently married a California congressman from a district with a large military presence. While she is listed as a D.C. resident and apparently has not lived in California, there is a perceived conflict of interest in her membership on the Commission. At the same time, though, her presence on the Commission could be defended as an appropriate response to representations from California -- the state with the largest exposure to defense cuts -- that it be represented on the Commission.

The current membership has the strong support of Secretary Aspin and Senator Nunn and reflects a balance of Congressional representation. The members were sponsored as follows:

- Senate Majority Leader: Peter Bowman and Harry McPherson
- Senate Minority Leader: Rebecca Cox

- Speaker of the House: H.T. Johnson and Arthur Levitt
- House Minority Leader: Jim Courter (Chairman)
- White House: Bev Byron and Robert Stuart

While strongly supportive of the current membership, Congressional staffers have expressed a procedural concern about the Bush recess appointment of the Commission. As a rule, they don't like recess appointments. In this case, however, the urgency to name members to meet Commission timelines ameliorated their concerns. Congress plans to move quickly to confirm Commission members as soon as they reconvene following the Washington/Lincoln birthday recess period the week after next.

The deliberations of this Commission will be politically sensitive and every effort should be made to minimize politicization of the process. Given the support that the current Commission membership has from Secretary Aspin and Senator Nunn, there should be a compelling reason -- which Senator Mitchell has not yet provided -- to replace either individual members or the chairman. It should be noted that since Senator Mitchell was successful in placing Peter Bowman (Chairman of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard) on the Commission, the State of Maine's equities in this next go-around would appear to be fully protected.

RECOMMENDATION

That you retain the current Base Closure Commission membership.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9300077
RECEIVED: 26 JAN 93 13

TO: CARNEY, JOHN M

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 02 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ANSA

MP

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REPLY TO INVITATION TO SPEAK AT NATL SECURITY & FORN AFFAIRS COM 28
FEB

ACTION: LAKE SGD LTR / REGRET

DUE DATE: 29 JAN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BELL
EMERY
HAHN
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJSL

CLOSED BY: NSMEM

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 2, 1993

Dear Mr. Carney:

Thank you very much for the kind invitation to speak to your National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee. President Clinton and the rest of his national security team are indeed deeply immersed in the tremendous tasks that you mentioned in your letter.

My schedule, unfortunately, reflects the pressures of this agenda and will preclude my speaking to your committee on February 28. I have had to turn down all speaking engagements during this period. I wish this were not so, for I am very aware of how important the VFW is, and the opportunity you have offered me.

Sincerely,



Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security
Affairs

Mr. John M. Carney
Commander-in-Chief
Veterans of Foreign Wars
VFW Memorial Building
200 Maryland Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0077

January 28, 1993

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*
FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*
SUBJECT: Invitation to Speak to the Veterans of Foreign Wars

You have been invited to speak to the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Veterans of Foreign Wars on February 28 here in Washington. In the past, this meeting has resulted in considerable attention, regardless of stated publicity and press intentions. In addition, you can expect some pointed questions about current issues of interests to veterans groups, such as policies regarding POW/MIAs, the defense budget, and homosexuals in the armed forces. Although your calendar is currently clear on this date, you may want to forego this invitation until these and other issues have been fully vetted by the Administration.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I extending your regrets at this time.

Attachments

Tab I Letter for Signature
Tab II Invitation from John M. Carney

VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES



THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

January 21, 1993

Mr. Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. Lake:

First let me congratulate you on being appointed Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It is well deserved and the President and the country will be well served by this appointment.

Second, I want to invite you to address the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States on Sunday, February 28, at the Sheraton Washington Hotel here in Washington.

This Committee, which is drawn from throughout the United States, represents our 2.2 million members on national security and foreign affairs issues. In light of the tremendous tasks before our new President, we would like to gain your perspective on these tasks and our goals in accomplishing them.

You may expect an audience of approximately 300, including our National Officers. Your desires on publicity and press attendance will govern. We would like for you to address the Committee beginning at 10:00 A.M. with suggested remarks of approximately 35-40 minutes and 15-20 minutes for questions and answers.

Please advise Mr. Kenneth A. Steadman, Director of National Security and Foreign Affairs if you can accept our invitation. His address and phone number are:

VFW Memorial Building
200 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002
202/543-2239

-2-

I sincerely hope you will join us for this important meeting and look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,


JOHN M. CARNEY
Commander-in-Chief

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [1]

2016-0152-F

vz4351

RESTRICTION CODES

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Agreement Between
the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the Russian Federation
Concerning the Disposition of
Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Desiring to arrange the safe and prompt disposition for peaceful purposes of highly enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons resulting from the reduction of nuclear weapons bearing in mind existing agreements in the area of arms control and disarmament,

Reaffirming their commitment to ensure that the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are carried out under arrangements that will further the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968,

Affirming their commitment to ensure that the nuclear material transferred for peaceful purposes pursuant to this Agreement will comply with all applicable non-proliferation, material accounting and control, physical protection, and environmental requirements,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

PURPOSE

The Parties shall cooperate in order to achieve the following objectives:

(A) The conversion as soon as practicable of highly enriched uranium (HEU) extracted from nuclear weapons resulting from the reduction of nuclear weapons pursuant to arms control agreements and other commitments of the parties which is currently estimated at approximately 500 metric tons in Russia, having an average assay of 90 percent or greater of the uranium isotope 235 into low enriched uranium (LEU) for use as fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. For purposes of this Agreement, LEU shall mean uranium enriched to less than 20 percent in the isotope 235; and

(B) The technology developed for conversion of HEU resulting from the reduction of nuclear weapons in the Russian Federation may be used for conversion of HEU [resulting from the reduction of nuclear weapons ²] in the United States of America; and

- 2 -

(C) The establishment of appropriate measures to fulfill the non-proliferation, physical security, material accounting and control, and environmental requirements of the Parties with respect to HEU and LEU subject to this Agreement.

ARTICLE II

IMPLEMENTATION CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS

1. The Parties, through their executive agents, shall within 6 months from entry into force of this Agreement seek to enter into an initial implementing contract to accomplish the objectives set forth in Article I of this Agreement. The Parties may conclude additional implementing contracts or agreements pursuant to this Agreement, as required. For any purchase, the executive agents shall negotiate terms (including price), which shall be subject to approval by the Parties.

2. It is the intent of the Parties that the initial implementing contract shall provide for, inter alia:

(A) The purchase by the United States Executive Agent of LEU converted from HEU at facilities in Russia and sale of such LEU for commercial purposes;

(B) Initial delivery of LEU converted from HEU extracted from nuclear weapons resulting from the reduction of nuclear weapons pursuant to arms control agreements and other commitments of the Parties by October 1993, if possible;

(C) Conversion of no less than 10 metric tons having an average assay of 90 percent or greater of the uranium isotope 235 in each of the first five years, and, in each year thereafter, conversion of no less than 30 metric tons of HEU having an average assay of 90 percent or greater of the uranium isotope 235; however, specific amounts will be stipulated in the first and subsequent implementing contracts;

(D) The participation of the United States private sector and of Russian enterprises;

(E) The allocation among the United States of America, private sector firms of the United States of America, the Russian Federation, and Russian enterprises of any proceeds or costs arising out of activities undertaken pursuant to any implementing contracts;

- 3 -

(F) The use by the Russian Federation of a portion of the proceeds from the sale of LEU converted from HEU for the conversion of defense enterprises, enhancing the safety of nuclear power plants, environmental clean-up of polluted areas and the construction and operation of facilities in the Russian Federation for the conversion of HEU to LEU;

(G) By agreement of the parties an equivalent amount of HEU can substitute for the corresponding amount of LEU planned for purchase by the U.S. Executive Agent.

ARTICLE III

EXECUTIVE AGENTS

Each Party shall designate an executive agent to implement this Agreement. For the United States of America, the Executive Agent shall be the Department of Energy. For the Russian Federation, the Executive Agent shall be the Ministry of the Russian Federation of Atomic Energy. After consultation with the other Party, either Party has the right to change its executive agent upon 30 days written notice to the other Party. If a Governmental corporation is established under United States law to manage the uranium enrichment enterprise of the Department of Energy, it is the intention of the United States Government to designate that corporation as the Executive Agent for the United States of America.

ARTICLE IV

PRIORITY OF AGREEMENT

In case of any inconsistency between this Agreement and any implementing contracts or agreements, the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.

ARTICLE V

ADDITIONAL MEASURES

1. The Russian Federation shall ensure that the quality of LEU derived from HEU subject to this Agreement is such that it is convertible to LEU usable in commercial reactors. Specifications shall be agreed upon in the process of negotiating the initial and subsequent implementing contracts.

2. The conversion of HEU subject to this Agreement shall commence as soon as possible after the entry into force of the initial implementing contract.

3. The Parties shall, to the extent practicable, seek to arrange for more rapid conversion of HEU to LEU than that provided for in Article II(2) (C).

- 4 -

4. The United States of America shall use LEU acquired pursuant to this Agreement and its implementing contracts and agreements, when subject to United States jurisdiction and control, for peaceful purposes only.

5. LEU acquired by the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement shall be subject to safeguards in accordance with the November 18, 1977, Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968.

6. The Parties shall maintain physical protection of HEU and LEU subject to this Agreement. Such protection shall, at a minimum, provide protection comparable to the recommendation set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/REV.2 concerning the physical protection of nuclear material.

7. If the Parties enter into an agreement for cooperation concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear material acquired by the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and its implementing contracts and agreements when subject to United States jurisdiction or control, shall be subject to the terms and conditions of that Agreement for cooperation.

8. The activities of the United States of America under this Agreement, or any implementing contract or agreement shall be subject to the availability of funds.

9. In the event the United States Government does not have funds available for implementation of this Agreement, the Russian Federation reserves the option to obtain funding for implementation of this Agreement from any private United States company.

10. Prior to the conclusion of any implementing contract, the Parties shall establish transparency measures to ensure that the objectives of this Agreement are met, including provisions for material accounting and control and access, from the time that HEU is made available for conversion until it is converted into LEU. Specific transparency measures shall be established in the same time frame as the negotiation of the initial implementing contract.

11. Prior to the conclusion of any implementing contract, the Parties shall agree on appropriate governing provisions for entry and exit, liability, and status of personnel, exemptions for taxes and other duties, and applicable law.

PROTOCOL

The Parties to this Protocol will be guided by the following provisions to be included in a contract by the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for the sale of Russian low-enriched uranium (LEU) derived from highly enriched uranium (HEU) extracted from nuclear weapons resulting from the reduction of nuclear weapons.

1. The contract will provide for the purchase of LEU derived from HEU, and/or the purchase of HEU, in amounts that will total approximately 500 metric tons (MT) of HEU resulting from the extraction of HEU from nuclear weapons in the Russian Federation over the contract period from FY 1994 through FY 2012.
2. BUYER: The buyer of this material will be DOE or its successor, the United States Enrichment Corporation.
3. SELLER: The seller will be the Russian State trading organization Technobexport, acting on behalf of MINATOM.
4. MATERIAL: Material purchased as LEU derived from HEU will contain an average product assay of 3.6 percent U-235, unless otherwise agreed, and will meet American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) specifications. If material is delivered as HEU by Technobexport, acting on instructions from MINATOM, to DOE, then the HEU must be of sufficient quality to be converted to LEU that meets ASTM specifications.
5. DELIVERIES: Material purchased under the contract will be provided by MINATOM to DOE in amounts equivalent to at least 10 MT, 10 MT, 20 MT, 20 MT, and 30 MT of HEU for fiscal years 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998, respectively. From FY 1999 through the life of the contract, amounts representing at least 30 MT of HEU will be provided each year until the total of approximately 500 MT of HEU has been purchased by DOE. It is the intent of both DOE and MINATOM that these proposed annual delivery amounts will be increased to the maximum extent achievable by both Parties.

- 2 -

6. DELIVERY LOCATION: Material delivered by Techsnabexport, acting of behalf of MINATOM, to DOE shall be made F.O.B., Port, St. Petersburg, or other port in the Russian Federation, as mutually agreed. DOE has the right to sample and test material for compliance with ASTM specifications prior to shipment.

7. ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTRACT VALUE:

The total net value for purchases of 500 MT of HEU under this contract from FY 1994 through FY 2012 is estimated at about \$7.8 billion. All values are expressed in 1993 United States dollars and they will be adjusted according to appropriate escalation provisions. The assumptions used to arrive at this estimate are:

- a. HEU has an enrichment of 90 percent U-235.
- b. Tails assay of 0.3 percent U-235.
- e. The basis for calculation of the value of this contract is \$75 per SWU and \$24 per kilogram of natural uranium expressed in 1993 constant dollars.
- d. 500 MT of HEU contains about 70,000,000 SWUs and 109,000,000 kilograms of natural uranium.
- e. The amount of natural uranium used as a blendstock is about 15,000,000 kilograms.

The United States offers to provide natural uranium as blendstock to Russia. The Russian side indicated that this approach would be reviewed.

8. At the next meeting the sides will discuss a possible mechanism for a periodic review of the value of uranium delivered, percentage of enrichment, tails assay, price, payment and other related issues.
9. SHIPPING CONTAINERS: The issue of the provision of shipping containers will be resolved at a future meeting.

- 3 -


10. **TRANSPARENCY MEASURES:** The Parties agree jointly to implement such transparency and access measures as required to provide confidence that the resulting LEU was derived from HEU extracted from nuclear weapons. These transparency and access measures should be based on a materials control and accounting (MC&A) system.

Prior to any implementation contract, the Parties shall reach agreement on specific transparency measures in a separate document.

11. **CONVERSION OF HEU INTO LEU:** Before the implementing contract is finalized, the Russian Executive Agent shall demonstrate to the U.S. Executive Agent the capability and capacity to support the contract delivery schedule.


The United States side repeated its well-known position that the United States will not sign this contract until it is assured that the Russian Federation has reached an agreement on the appropriate sharing of proceeds from this contract with Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:



William F. Burns

FOR THE MINISTRY OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION FOR ATOMIC ENERGY:



Nikolai N. Egorov

January 16, 1993
Washington, D.C.

TAB III

PROTOCOL


The Parties to this Protocol will be guided by the following provisions in preparing the purchase contract by representatives of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy (MINATOM) for low enriched uranium (LEU) equivalent to 4.1 million pounds U_3O_8 .

1. Purchase will consist of 154,313 kilograms of LEU having an assay of 4.5 percent in the isotope 235.
2. The entire amount will be delivered in several shipments on or about June 30, 1993, unless otherwise agreed.
3. The Department of Energy will pay USD 115 million under this contract.
4. The Parties agree that the point of delivery of the LEU, under this contract, shall be F.O.B. destination, Portsmouth, Ohio, U.S.A. DOE will provide appropriate containers at Portsmouth at no cost to MINATOM for the shipment under this contract.
5. The Parties agree that MINATOM will use the service of the Russian State trading organization Technabexport and other entities, to assist in the technical aspects of providing the LEU. Such services could include transportation, insurance, and related matters.
6. The Parties agree in principle with the DOE draft purchase contract and will review the draft to determine if any changes are needed in order to be consistent with the Protocol in the purchase contract.

The United States side stated that the United States can commit only USD 64 million toward the purchase of the quantity of LEU referred to in paragraph 1 until a contract for the sale of Russian LEU derived from highly enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons resulting from the reduction of nuclear weapons has been signed.


The Parties further agree to meet the week of January 25, 1993 in Geneva, Switzerland in order to finalize the contract and sign it if all appropriate conditions are observed.

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:



William F. Burns

FOR THE MINISTRY OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION FOR ATOMIC ENERGY:



Nikolai N. Egorov

January 16, 1993
Washington, D.C.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9300043
RECEIVED: 23 JAN 93 13

TO: ARISON, H LINDSEY

FROM: BELL

DOC DATE: 01 FEB 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: STOCKPILES

ANSA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: THANK YOU LTR TO ARISON RE PROPOSAL FOR NATL DEFENSE STOCKPILE

ACTION: BELL SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 27 JAN 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BELL
HAHN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY ✓ DATE 2/1 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSWTL

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9300043
RECEIVED: 23 JAN 93 13

TO: LAKE

FROM: ARISON, H LINDSEY

DOC DATE: 23 JAN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: STOCKPILES

ANSA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO LAKE FM ARISON IDENTIFYING & OFFERING SOLUTION OF NATL
DEFENSE STOCKPILE PROBLEM & REQUEST FOR MTG TO DISCUSS PROPOSAL

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 27 JAN 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: HAHN

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
HAHN

FOR CONCURRENCE
BELL

FOR INFO
DARRAGH
HALL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0043

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT BELL

FROM: KEITH HAHN 

SUBJECT: Letter from H. Lindsey Arison RE National Defense
Stockpile

At Tab II H. Lindsey Arison III has written to Mr. Lake to propose a National Critical Materials Council to be located "in the NSC." He is basically opposed to OSD oversight of the disposition of critical materials as directed in Section 3306 of the Defense Authorization Act (at Tab III).

For background, Mr. Arison is a financial analyst in the office of the Secretary of the Air Force -- Financial Management Budget Execution Branch (FMBEB) specializing in "special programs." I disagree with Mr. Arison's basic premise -- that the U.S. is dangerously dependent on foreign sources of critical and strategic materials -- and his solution -- the formation of another single-issue bureaucracy.

The letter at Tab I thanks him for his proposal and points out that the 93 Defense Authorization Act -- arrived at after a full discussion of the issues -- provides for broad governmental and commercial coordination in the operation and modernization of the National Defense Stockpile.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Letter for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence
Tab III H.R. 5006 Title XXXIII

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


February 1, 1993

Dear Mr. Arison:

On behalf of Anthony Lake, thank you for your insights on the National Defense Stockpile oversight issue. As you know, the 102nd Congress devoted a significant amount of attention to determining the best way to manage and modernize our strategic and critical materials stockpile. The advisory committee established to make recommendations to the President on this issue is composed of representatives from all of the appropriate government agencies, as well as concerned industries and consumers.

I can assure you that the recommendations of this committee concerning the disposition of obsolete materials and the modernization of National Defense Stockpile will receive our careful consideration.

Sincerely,



Robert G. Bell
Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director
for Defense Policy and Arms
Control

H. Lindsey Arison III
13498 Lake Shore Drive
Herndon, VA 22071

0043

Staff

22 January 1993

TO:

The Honorable Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
202-456-2255
202-395-3380 (FAX)

FROM:

H. Lindsey Arlson III
Department of the Air Force
SAF/FMBMB, Room 5C132, Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330
703-614-1283
703-695-8406 (FAX)

Page 1 of 6 pages

H. LINDSEY ARISON III
13498 Lake Shore Drive
Herndon, VA 22071

22 January 1993

The Honorable Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Lake,

I am writing to identify a critical problem concerning oversight of the National Defense Stockpile and offer a solution.

David Price (Professional Staff Member, HASC), frustrated and exasperated over the fact that so many years have passed and so little has been done, drafted the current legislation concerning the stockpile. Accordingly, Congress has directed DoD to establish an advisory committee to oversee the stockpile's operation no later than 15 March, 1993.

In disagreement with the strategy of Section 3306 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1993 (H.R. 5006), I contend that allowing OASD (Production & Logistics) to have oversight responsibility for the stockpile is like "fixing a fight". An organization outside and above DoD needs to oversee the operation.


Please read my proposal and let me know what you think. Perhaps appointing an Executive Director of the National Critical Materials Council in the NSC would be the best idea.

Bringing the strategic and critical materials problem (to include oil and natural gas) under control would be a significant credit to the Clinton Administration, early-on.

I am personally committed to the success of the National Critical Materials Council and have already identified a three-member team to complete the tasks of centralizing control and providing a cost savings to the Government within one year.

Can we meet to discuss this proposal? I look forward to speaking with you soon.

Respectfully,



703-614-1283 (office) 703-713-0777 (home)

**THE IMMEDIATE SOLUTION TO THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC
AND CRITICAL MATERIALS VULNERABILITY PROBLEM**

by

H. Lindsey Arison III

27 October 1992

The statement "the United States is too dependent on foreign sources for its strategic minerals" is irrefutable. Since the early 1950s, the United States has become increasingly dependent on foreign sources for strategic and critical materials/minerals (S&CM) essential to its defense and economic well-being. How reliant have we become? Based on 1990 data, the following is a list of just those minerals for which we are 90-100% import dependent.

<u>Mineral</u>	<u>% Imported</u>	<u>Major Sources (1986-89)</u>	<u>Major Uses</u>
Columbite	100%	Brazil, Canada, Thailand, Germany	Steelmaking/aerospace alloys
Graphite	100%	Mexico, China, Brazil, Madagascar	Metallurgical processes
Manganese	100%	Gabon	Steelmaking
Nica (sheet)	100%	India, Belgium, France, Brazil	Electronic equipment
Strontium	100%	Mexico, Spain, Germany	TV tubes, pyrotechnics
Bauxite & Alumina	98%	Australia, Guinea, Jamaica, Suriname	Aluminum production
Diamonds (industrial)	92%	S. Africa, Britain, Ireland, Saire	Grinding/cutting machinery
Fluorspar	90%	Mexico, S. Africa	Metallurgical & chemical

The United States must also import platinum, cobalt, tantalum, nickel, chromium, tin, tungsten, barite, and potash to meet 68-88% of its needs. What has been done in the last 40 years to reduce our strategic minerals vulnerability? We have created a National Defense Stockpile (NDS) which currently has \$6.93 billion dollars worth of excess materials and \$1.22 billion in deficits (based on 30 Sep 91 inventories and 31 Jan 91 prices). And, we have chartered a non-functioning, displaced National Critical Materials Council (NCMC) which now consists of only three part-time members and one full-time Technical Director. There is no Executive Director and the Council neither convenes nor advises the President. Is it any wonder the U.S. is in such a potentially perilous situation? No one is centrally managing the process. We need to have a champion and advocate for strategic and critical materials in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) to centrally oversee the S&CM community on a full-time basis and regularly advise the President. Having now a greater appreciation for the gravity of the problem which besets us, here is my diagnosis and what I propose as the immediate solution.

Outdated planning assumptions communicated to the National Defense Stockpile Center by the Joint Staff have caused a serious discrepancy between what we need and what we have. Despite the fact that the total inventory is worth \$9.012 billion dollars, much of it consists of materials that were acquired during the 1950s and 1960s and that have little worth in the event of a national emergency today. Instead of basing our needs on the assumption that the United States will be involved in a conventional war of at least three years duration, involving total mobilization of the economy, the Joint Staff needs to continually reassess the Nation's stockpile requirements in light of the dynamic new world order.

Here is my three-step solution:

1. Appoint an Executive Director to revive the NCMC. It was established in 1984; since then it has gradually become ineffectual. The Executive Director will ensure the Joint Staff develops S&CM planning criteria consistent with the present world situation and current national defense strategies, that the NDS inventory is adequate, that all agencies concerned with strategic and critical materials are "partners in the process", and that the President is regularly advised.

2. Move the Council's office to the Old Executive Office Building from where it is currently displaced in the Bureau of Mines to give it more prestige and critical access to other agencies of the Executive Office of the President.

3. Establish a National Critical Materials Committee chaired by the Council's Executive Director to facilitate inter-agency communication and coordination.

Membership should include at least the following:

Congress	Professional Staff Member, Senate Armed Services Committee Professional Staff Member, House Armed Services Committee
EOP	Asst Director for Energy, Materials, and Intl Security, Office of Technology Assessment Director, Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council Deputy Associate Director for National Security, Office of Management and Budget Asst Director for National Security Affairs, Office of Science and Technology Policy Special Asst to the President for Energy, Environment, and Natural Resources Associate Director for Natural Resources, Council on Environmental Quality
DoD	Administrator, National Defense Stockpile Center, Defense Logistics Agency Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production Resources), OASD (Production & Logistics) Deputy Director for Plans, Analysis, and Resources, Joint Staff (J-4)
Energy	Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs
FEHA	Associate Director for National Preparedness

The problem and solution are clear. The United States is dangerously dependent on foreign sources for its strategic minerals and outdated planning assumptions have rendered the stockpile inadequate. Reviving the NCMC by appointing an Executive Director, relocating the Council's office, and establishing a National Critical Materials Committee will be the first great steps toward reducing our Nation's strategic minerals vulnerability.

0043

staff

22 January 1993

TO:

**The Honorable Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
202-458-2255
202-395-3380 (FAX)**

FROM:

**H. Lindsey Arlson III
Department of the Air Force
SAF/FMBMB, Room 5C132, Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330
703-614-1283
703-695-8405 (FAX)**

Page 1 of 6 pages

(2) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking out "such acquisition" and inserting in lieu thereof "such acquisition, maintenance, and disposal".

(b) **REHABILITATION OF FACILITIES AND DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS.**—Paragraph (2) of such section is further amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:

"(H) Improvement or rehabilitation of facilities, structures, and infrastructure needed to maintain the integrity of stockpile materials.

"(I) Disposal of hazardous materials that are stored in the stockpile and authorized for disposal by law."

(c) **PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR EMPLOYEE SALARIES AND EXPENSES.**—Such section is further amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(4) Notwithstanding paragraph (2), moneys in the fund may not be used to pay salaries and expenses of stockpile employees."

SEC. 3314. MARKET IMPACT COMMITTEE.

Section 10 of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(c)(1) The President shall appoint a Market Impact Committee composed of representatives from the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Interior, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and such other persons as the President considers appropriate. The representatives from the Department of Commerce and the Department of State shall be Cochairmen of the Committee.

"(2) The Committee shall advise the National Defense Stockpile Manager on the projected domestic and foreign economic effects of all acquisitions and disposals of materials from the stockpile that are proposed to be included in the annual materials plan submitted to Congress under section 11(b), or in any revision of such plan, and shall submit to the manager the Committee's recommendations regarding those acquisitions and disposals.

"(3) The annual materials plan or the revision of such plan, as the case may be, shall contain—

"(A) the views of the Committee on the projected domestic and foreign economic effects of all acquisitions and disposals of materials from the stockpile;

"(B) the recommendations submitted by the Committee under paragraph (2); and

"(C) for each acquisition or disposal provided for in the plan or revision that is inconsistent with a recommendation of the Committee, a justification for the acquisition or disposal.

"(4) In developing recommendations for the National Defense Stockpile Manager under paragraph (2), the Committee shall consult from time to time with representatives of producers, processors, and consumers of the types of materials stored in the stockpile."

SEC. 3315. CLARIFICATION OF THE STOCKPILE STATUS OF CERTAIN MATERIALS.

All materials purchased under section 303 of the Defense Production Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2093) and held in the Defense Production Act inventory as of June 30, 1992, are hereby transferred to the National Defense Stockpile and shall be managed, controlled,

President.

50 USC 98c note.

and subject to disposal by the National Defense Stockpile Manager as provided in the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98a et seq.).

TITLE XXXIV—CIVIL DEFENSE

SEC. 3401. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is hereby authorized to be appropriated \$142,565,000 for fiscal year 1993 for the purpose of carrying out the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2251 et seq.).

TITLE XXXV—PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION

SEC. 3501. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the "Panama Canal Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993".

Subtitle A—Annual Authorization

SEC. 3511. AUTHORIZATION OF EXPENDITURES.

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—For fiscal year 1993, the Panama Canal Commission (subject to subsection (b)) may make such expenditures and, without regard to fiscal year limitations, may enter into such contracts and commitments, within the limits of funds and borrowing authority available to it in accordance with law, as may be necessary under the Panama Canal Act of 1979 (22 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.) for the operation, maintenance, and improvement of the Panama Canal for fiscal year 1993.

(b) **LIMITATION ON ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.**—For fiscal year 1993, the Panama Canal Commission may expend from funds in the Panama Canal Revolving Fund not more than \$51,156,000 for administrative expenses, of which not more than—

(1) \$12,000 may be used for official reception and representation expenses of the Supervisory Board of the Commission;

(2) \$6,000 may be used for official reception and representation expenses of the Secretary of the Commission; and

(3) \$34,000 may be used for official reception and representation expenses of the Administrator of the Commission.

(c) **PURCHASE OF PASSENGER VEHICLES.**—Funds available to the Panama Canal Commission may be used for the purchase of passenger motor vehicles (including large heavy-duty vehicles) to be used to transport Commission personnel across the Isthmus of Panama. A passenger motor vehicle may be purchased with such funds only as necessary to replace another passenger motor vehicle of the Commission. No passenger motor vehicle may be purchased with such funds for a price in excess of \$18,000.

SEC. 3512. HEALTH CARE.

Section 1321(e)(1) of the Panama Canal Act of 1979 (22 U.S.C. 3731) is amended by inserting after "health care services" the following: "provided by medical facilities licensed and approved by the Republic of Panama (and not operated by the United States)".

SEC. 3513. VESSEL TONNAGE MEASUREMENT.

Section 1602(a) of the Panama Canal Act of 1979 (22 U.S.C. 3792) is amended in the first sentence by inserting "or its equivalent", or its equivalent

Panama Canal
Commission
Authorization
Act for Fiscal
Year 1993.

Site, Nevada; the Pinnellas Plant, Florida; and the Pantex facility, Texas);

(D) an atomic weapons research facility that is under the control or jurisdiction of the Secretary (including the Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories); or

(E) any facility described in paragraphs (1) through (4) that—

(i) is no longer in operation;

(ii) was under the control or jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, or the Energy Research and Development Administration; and

(iii) was operated for national security purposes.

(2) The term "Department of Energy employee" means any employee of the Department of Energy employed at a Department of Energy defense nuclear facility, including any employee of a contractor or subcontractor of the Department of Energy employed at such a facility.

TITLE XXXII—NUCLEAR SAFETY

SEC. 3201. AUTHORIZATION FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR SAFETY BOARD.

There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1993, \$13,000,000 for the operation of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board under chapter 21 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2286 et seq.).

SEC. 3202. NUCLEAR SAFETY IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.

(a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident on April 26, 1986, has resulted in \$283 to \$352 billion worth of damage, with more than 4,000,000 people still living on land contaminated with radiation;

(2) there are 16 Chernobyl-type RBMK reactors now operating in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, all of which have faulty designs, poor construction, and dangerously lax and outdated operating procedures;

(3) there are dozens of Soviet-designed reactors now operating in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union with poor construction and lax and outdated operating procedures;

(4) a serious nuclear reactor accident in one of the newly freed states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union would seriously exacerbate these states' difficult progress towards economic recovery and could lead to political instability;

(5) retrofitting the RBMK reactors with modern Western safety equipment will result in only marginal safety improvements at great expense; and

(6) alternative power sources, such as natural gas turbines, and modern energy efficiency measures and technologies could displace the need for much of the power which these reactors provide.

(b) UNITED STATES POLICY.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should undertake bilateral and multilateral initiatives, including trade initiatives, to—

(1) assist in bringing on line enough replacement power and modern energy efficiency measures and technologies in the states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union so that the RBMK reactors may be shut down as soon as possible and placed in stable condition to prevent radiological contamination;

(2) assist the states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in upgrading their other nuclear reactors to Western standards of safety and in ensuring that all of their nuclear reactors receive routine maintenance and repairs;

(3) encourage and provide technical assistance to Russia and Ukraine to enact domestic legislation governing nuclear reactor safety;

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(5) identify nuclear safety research as a principal focus of the soon-to-be created nuclear science centers in Ukraine and Russia; and

(6) make greater resources available to the International Atomic Energy Agency to promote programs of nuclear safety in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

(c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report with a systematic assessment of the nuclear reactor safety situation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, with a description of specific bilateral and multilateral initiatives the Administration is taking and plans to take to address these nuclear safety issues.

Pres L.

TITLE XXXIII—NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE

Subtitle A—Modernization Program

SEC. 3301. DEFINITIONS.

50 USC 98d

For purposes of this subtitle:

(1) The terms "National Defense Stockpile" and "stockpile" mean the stockpile provided for in section 4 of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98c).

(2) The term "National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund" means the fund in the Treasury of the United States established under section 9(a) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h(a)).

SEC. 3302. DISPOSAL OF OBSOLETE AND EXCESS MATERIALS CONTAINED IN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE.

50 USC 98d

(a) DISPOSAL AUTHORIZED.—Subject to the conditions specified in subsection (b), the President may dispose of obsolete and excess materials currently contained in the National Defense Stockpile in order to modernize the stockpile. The materials subject to disposal under this subsection and the quantity of each material authorized to be disposed of by the President are set forth in the following table:

Authorized Stockpile Disposals

Material for disposal	Quantity
Aluminum Oxide, Abrasive Grain	51,022 short tons

Authorized Stockpile Disposals—Continued

Material for disposal	Quantity
Aluminum Oxide, Fused Crude	249,867 short tons
Antimony	2,007 short tons
Asbestos, Chrysotile	3,004 short tons
Bauxite, Metal Grade, Jamaican	12,457,740 long tons
Bauxite, Metal Grade, Surinam	5,299,597 long tons
Bauxite, Refractory	207,067 long tons
Beryl Ore	17,729 short tons
Bismuth	1,825,955 pounds
Cadmium	6,328,570 pounds
Chromite, Chemical Grade Ore	208,414 short dry tons
Chromite, Metallurgical Grade Ore	1,511,356 short dry tons
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Fluorspar, Acid Grade	892,856 short dry tons
Fluorspar, Metallurgical Grade	410,822 short dry tons
Germanium	713 kilograms
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Graphite, Natural, Other than Ceylon & Malagasy	2,803 short tons
Iodine	5,835,022 pounds
Jewel bearings	51,778,337 pieces
Lead	610,053 short tons
Manganese, Ferro	938,285 short tons
Manganese Ore, Metallurgical Grade	1,627,425 short dry tons
Manganese, Battery Grade, Natural Ore	68,226 short dry tons
Manganese, Battery Grade, Synthetic Dioxide	3,011 short dry tons
Mercury	128,026 flasks (76 pounds)
Mica, Phlogopite Splittings	963,251 pounds
Nickel	37,214 short tons
Quartz Crystals, Natural	800,000 pounds
Rutile	39,200 short tons
Sapphire & Ruby	16,305,502 carats
Sebacic Acid	5,009,697 pounds
Silicon Carbide	28,774 short tons
Silver	83,951,492 troy ounces
Tin	141,278 metric tons
Vegetable Tannin, Chestnut	4,976 long tons
Vegetable Tannin, Quebracho	28,832 long tons
Vegetable Tannin, Wattle	15,000 long tons
Zinc	378,768 short tons

(b) **CONDITIONS ON DISPOSAL.**—The authority of the President under subsection (a) to dispose of materials stored in the stockpile may not be used unless and until the President submits to Congress a revised annual materials plan under section 11(b) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-2(b)) that—

(1) complies with the requirements of section 10(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1), as added by section 3314; and

(2) contains the certification of the Secretary of Defense that the disposal of such materials will not adversely affect the capability of the National Defense Stockpile to supply the strategic and critical materials necessary to meet the needs of the United States during a period of national emergency that requires a significant level of mobilization of the economy of the United States, including any reconstitution of the military and industrial capabilities necessary to meet the planning assumptions used by the Secretary of Defense under section 14(b) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-5(b)).

(c) **REQUIRED USE OF PREVIOUS DISPOSAL AUTHORITIES.**—(1) The President shall complete the disposal of all quantities of materials in the National Defense Stockpile that—

Pres

(A) have been previously authorized for disposal by law; and

(B) have not been disposed of before the date of the enactment of this Act.

(2) The disposal of materials required by this subsection shall be completed before the end of the five-year period beginning on October 1, 1992, unless the President notifies Congress that the Market Impact Committee established under section 10(c) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1(c)), as added by section 3314, determines that completion of the disposal of such materials during such period would result in the undue disruption of the usual markets of such materials. The notification shall also indicate the date on which the disposal of such materials will be completed.

(d) **SPECIAL LIMITATION REGARDING SILVER.**—(1) The disposal of silver under this section may only occur in the form of coins or, subject to paragraph (2), as material furnished by the Federal Government to a contractor for the use of the contractor in the performance of a Federal Government contract.

(2) A contractor receiving silver as Government furnished material shall pay the Federal Government the amount equal to the fair market value of the silver, as determined by the National Defense Stockpile Manager. The amount paid by the contractor for the silver shall be deposited in the National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund.

(e) **SPECIAL LIMITATION REGARDING CHROMITE AND MANGANESE ORES.**—During fiscal year 1993, the disposal of chromite and manganese ores of metallurgical grade under subsection (a) may be made only for processing within the United States and the territories and possessions of the United States.

(f) **SPECIAL LIMITATION REGARDING CHROMIUM AND MANGANESE FERRO.**—The disposal of chromium ferro and manganese ferro under subsection (a) may not commence before October 1, 1993.

(g) **RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER DISPOSAL AUTHORITY.**—The disposal authority provided in subsection (a) is in addition to any other disposal authority provided by law.

SEC. 3303. USE OF BARTER ARRANGEMENTS IN MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

50 USC 98d n

The President may enter into barter arrangements to dispose of materials under section 3302 in order to acquire strategic and

critical materials for, or upgrade strategic and critical materials in, the National Defense Stockpile.

SEC. 3304. DEPOSIT OF PROCEEDS FROM DISPOSALS IN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE FUND.

All moneys received from the sale of materials under section 3302 shall be deposited in the National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund.

SEC. 3305. AUTHORIZED USES OF STOCKPILE FUNDS.

(a) **USE FOR ACQUISITIONS AND OTHER PURPOSES.**—During fiscal year 1993, the National Defense Stockpile Manager may obligate up to \$66,000,000 of the funds in the National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund (subject to such limitations as may be provided in appropriations Acts) for the authorized uses of such funds under section 9(b)(2) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h(b)(2)).

(b) **RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.**—Of the amount specified in subsection (a), \$25,000,000 may be obligated for materials development and research under subparagraph (G) of such section.

SEC. 3306. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REGARDING OPERATION AND MODERNIZATION OF THE STOCKPILE.

(a) **APPOINTMENT.**—Not later than March 15, 1993, the President shall appoint an advisory committee under section 10(a) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1(a)) to make recommendations to the President concerning the operation and modernization of the National Defense Stockpile.

(b) **MEMBERSHIP.**—The committee shall consist of members who have expertise regarding strategic and critical materials, including—

(1) employees of Federal agencies (including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of the Interior, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency);

(2) representatives of mining, processing, and fabricating industries and consumers that would be affected by the acquisition of materials for the stockpile or the disposal of materials from the stockpile; and

(3) other interested persons or representatives of interested organizations.

SEC. 3307. SPECIAL RULE FOR 1993 REPORT ON STOCKPILE REQUIREMENTS.

In the report on stockpile requirements required to be submitted to Congress by January 15, 1993, pursuant to section 14 of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-5), the Secretary of Defense shall include, in addition to the Secretary's recommendations with respect to stockpile requirements based upon the planning assumptions developed under subsection (b) of such section, the following information:

(1) A list of recommendations with respect to stockpile requirements that is based upon and consistent with the planning assumptions and scenarios that support—

(A) the defense capabilities and programs of the Armed Forces specified in the budget submitted to Congress under

section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year 1994; and

(B) the future-years defense program submitted under section 221 of title 10, United States Code, with respect to that budget.

(2) An explanation of the reasons for any deviation between the Secretary's recommendations with respect to stockpile requirements prepared under section 14(a) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-5(a)) and the list of recommendations with respect to stockpile requirements required by paragraph (1).

SEC. 3308. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

Part A of title XXXIII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190; 105 Stat. 1583) is amended—

(1) in sections 3301(a), 3301(d), and 3302(a), by striking out “fiscal years 1992 and 1993” and inserting in lieu thereof “fiscal year 1992”; and

(2) in sections 3301(a), 3301(d), and 3302(b), by striking out “each of such fiscal years” and inserting in lieu thereof “such fiscal year”.

Subtitle B—Programmatic Changes

SEC. 3311. PROCEDURES FOR CHANGING OBJECTIVES FOR STOCKPILE QUANTITIES ESTABLISHED AS OF THE END OF FISCAL YEAR 1987.

Section 3(c) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98b(c)) is amended by striking out paragraphs (2) through (5) and inserting in lieu thereof the following new paragraph:

“(2) The President shall notify Congress in writing of any change proposed to be made in the quantity of any material to be stockpiled. The President may make the change effective on or after the 30th legislative day following the date of the notification. The President shall include a full explanation and justification for the proposed change with the notification. For purposes of this paragraph, a legislative day is a day on which both Houses of Congress are in session.”.

SEC. 3312. REPEAL OF LIMITATION ON EXCESS BALANCE IN FUND.

Section 5(b) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98d(b)) is amended—

(1) by striking out “(1)”; and

(2) by striking out “, or (2)” and all that follows through “\$100,000,000.” and inserting in lieu thereof a period.

SEC. 3313. AUTHORIZED PURPOSES FOR EXPENDITURES FROM THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE TRANSACTION FUND.

(a) **MAINTENANCE AND DISPOSAL OF MATERIALS.**—Section 9(b) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h(b)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2)(A)—

(A) by inserting “, maintenance, and disposal” after “acquisition”; and

(B) by striking out “section 6(a)(1)” and inserting in lieu thereof “section 6(a)”; and

50 USC 98h-1
note.

President.

50 USC 98d note.

President.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

0043

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2/1/93

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT BELL

FROM:

KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT:

Letter from H. Lindsey Arison RE National Defense Stockpile

At Tab II H. Lindsey Arison III has written to Mr. Lake to propose a National Critical Materials Council to be located "in the NSC." He is basically opposed to OSD oversight of the disposition of critical materials as directed in Section 3306 of the Defense Authorization Act (at Tab III).

For background, Mr. Arison is a financial analyst in the office of the Secretary of the Air Force -- Financial Management Budget Execution Branch (FMBEB) specializing in "special programs." I disagree with Mr. Arison's basic premise -- that the U.S. is dangerously dependent on foreign sources of critical and strategic materials -- and his solution -- the formation of another single-issue bureaucracy.

The letter at Tab I thanks him for his proposal and points out that the 93 Defense Authorization Act -- arrived at after a full discussion of the issues -- provides for broad governmental and commercial coordination in the operation and modernization of the National Defense Stockpile.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Letter for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence
Tab III H.R. 5006 Title XXXIII

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


February 1, 1993

Dear Mr. Arison:

On behalf of Anthony Lake, thank you for your insights on the National Defense Stockpile oversight issue. As you know, the 102nd Congress devoted a significant amount of attention to determining the best way to manage and modernize our strategic and critical materials stockpile. The advisory committee established to make recommendations to the President on this issue is composed of representatives from all of the appropriate government agencies, as well as concerned industries and consumers.

I can assure you that the recommendations of this committee concerning the disposition of obsolete materials and the modernization of National Defense Stockpile will receive our careful consideration.

Sincerely,



Robert G. Bell
Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director
for Defense Policy and Arms
Control

H. Lindsey Arison III
13498 Lake Shore Drive
Herndon, VA 22071

H. LINDSEY ARISON III
13498 Lake Shore Drive
Herndon, VA 22071

0043

22 January 1993

The Honorable Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Lake,

I am writing to identify a critical problem concerning oversight of the National Defense Stockpile and offer a solution.

David Price (Professional Staff Member, HASC), frustrated and exasperated over the fact that so many years have passed and so little has been done, drafted the current legislation concerning the stockpile. Accordingly, Congress has directed DoD to establish an advisory committee to oversee the stockpile's operation no later than 15 March, 1993.

In disagreement with the strategy of Section 3306 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1993 (H.R. 5006), I contend that allowing OASD (Production & Logistics) to have oversight responsibility for the stockpile is like "fixing a fight". An organization outside and above DoD needs to oversee the operation.


Please read my proposal and let me know what you think. Perhaps appointing an Executive Director of the National Critical Materials Council in the NSC would be the best idea.

Bringing the strategic and critical materials problem (to include oil and natural gas) under control would be a significant credit to the Clinton Administration, early-on.

I am personally committed to the success of the National Critical Materials Council and have already identified a three-member team to complete the tasks of centralizing control and providing a cost savings to the Government within one year.

Can we meet to discuss this proposal? I look forward to speaking with you soon.

Respectfully,



**THE IMMEDIATE SOLUTION TO THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGIC
AND CRITICAL MATERIALS VULNERABILITY PROBLEM**

by

H. Lindsey Arison III

27 October 1992

The statement "the United States is too dependant on foreign sources for its strategic minerals" is irrefutable. Since the early 1950s, the United States has become increasingly dependent on foreign sources for strategic and critical materials/minerals (S&CM) essential to its defense and economic well-being. How reliant have we become? Based on 1990 data, the following is a list of just those minerals for which we are 90-100% import dependent.

<u>Mineral</u>	<u>% Imported</u>	<u>Major Sources (1986-89)</u>	<u>Major Uses</u>
Columbium	100%	Brazil, Canada, Thailand, Germany	Steelmaking/aerospace alloys
Graphite	100%	Mexico, China, Brazil, Madagascar	Metallurgical processes
Manganese	100%	Gabon	Steelmaking
Nica (sheet)	100%	India, Belgium, France, Brazil	Electronic equipment
Strontium	100%	Mexico, Spain, Germany	TV tubes, pyrotechnics
Bauxite & Alumina	98%	Australia, Guinea, Jamaica, Suriname	Aluminum production
Diamonds (industrial)	92%	S. Africa, Britain, Ireland, Saire	Grinding/cutting machinery
Fluorspar	90%	Mexico, S. Africa	Metallurgical & chemical

The United States must also import platinum, cobalt, tantalum, nickel, chromium, tin, tungsten, barite, and potash to meet 68-88% of its needs. What has been done in the last 40 years to reduce our strategic minerals vulnerability? We have created a National Defense Stockpile (NDS) which currently has \$6.93 billion dollars worth of excess materials and \$1.22 billion in deficits (based on 30 Sep 91 inventories and 31 Jan 91 prices). And, we have chartered a non-functioning, displaced National Critical Materials Council (NCMC) which now consists of only three part-time members and one full-time Technical Director. There is no Executive Director and the Council neither convenes nor advises the President. Is it any wonder the U.S. is in such a potentially perilous situation? No one is centrally managing the process. We need to have a champion and advocate for strategic and critical materials in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) to centrally oversee the S&CM community on a full-time basis and regularly advise the President. Having now a greater appreciation for the gravity of the problem which besets us, here is my diagnosis and what I propose as the immediate solution.

Outdated planning assumptions communicated to the National Defense Stockpile Center by the Joint Staff have caused a serious discrepancy between what we need and what we have. Despite the fact that the total inventory is worth \$9.012 billion dollars, much of it consists of materials that were acquired during the 1950s and 1960s and that have little worth in the event of a national emergency today. Instead of basing our needs on the assumption that the United States will be involved in a conventional war of at least three years duration, involving total mobilization of the economy, the Joint Staff needs to continually reassess the Nation's stockpile requirements in light of the dynamic new world order.

Here is my three-step solution:

1. Appoint an Executive Director to revive the NCMC. It was established in 1984; since then it has gradually become ineffectual. The Executive Director will ensure the Joint Staff develops S&CM planning criteria consistent with the present world situation and current national defense strategies, that the NDS inventory is adequate, that all agencies concerned with strategic and critical materials are "partners in the process", and that the President is regularly advised.

2. Move the Council's office to the Old Executive Office Building from where it is currently displaced in the Bureau of Mines to give it more prestige and critical access to other agencies of the Executive Office of the President.

3. Establish a National Critical Materials Committee chaired by the Council's Executive Director to facilitate inter-agency communication and coordination.

Membership should include at least the following:

Congress	Professional Staff Member, Senate Armed Services Committee
	Professional Staff Member, House Armed Services Committee
DOE	Asst Director for Energy, Materials, and Intl Security, Office of Technology Assessment
	Director, Defense Policy and Arms Control, National Security Council
	Deputy Associate Director for National Security, Office of Management and Budget
	Asst Director for National Security Affairs, Office of Science and Technology Policy
	Special Asst to the President for Energy, Environment, and Natural Resources
	Associate Director for Natural Resources, Council on Environmental Quality
DoD	Administrator, National Defense Stockpile Center, Defense Logistics Agency
	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production Resources), OASD (Production & Logistics)
	Deputy Director for Plans, Analysis, and Resources, Joint Staff (J-4)
Energy	Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs
FEHA	Associate Director for National Preparedness

The problem and solution are clear: The United States is dangerously dependent on foreign sources for its strategic minerals and outdated planning assumptions have rendered the stockpile inadequate. Reviving the NCMC by appointing an Executive Director, relocating the Council's office, and establishing a National Critical Materials Committee will be the first great steps toward reducing our Nation's strategic minerals vulnerability.

Site, Nevada; the Pinnellas Plant, Florida; and the Pantex facility, Texas);

(D) an atomic weapons research facility that is under the control or jurisdiction of the Secretary (including the Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories); or

(E) any facility described in paragraphs (1) through (4) that—

(i) is no longer in operation;

(ii) was under the control or jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, or the Energy Research and Development Administration; and

(iii) was operated for national security purposes.

(2) The term "Department of Energy employee" means any employee of the Department of Energy employed at a Department of Energy defense nuclear facility, including any employee of a contractor or subcontractor of the Department of Energy employed at such a facility.

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(1) the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident on April 26, 1986, has resulted in \$283 to \$352 billion worth of damage, with more than 4,000,000 people still living on land contaminated with radiation;

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(4) a serious nuclear reactor accident in one of the newly freed states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union would seriously exacerbate these states' difficult progress towards economic recovery and could lead to political instability;

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(6) alternative power sources, such as natural gas turbines, and modern energy efficiency measures and technologies could displace the need for much of the power which these reactors provide.

(b) UNITED STATES POLICY.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should undertake bilateral and multilateral initiatives, including trade initiatives, to—

(1) assist in bringing on line enough replacement power and modern energy efficiency measures and technologies in the states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union so that the RBMK reactors may be shut down as soon as possible and placed in stable condition to prevent radiological contamination;

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(c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report with a systematic assessment of the nuclear reactor safety situation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, with a description of specific bilateral and multilateral initiatives the Administration is taking and plans to take to address these nuclear safety issues.

President.

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Subtitle A—Modernization Program

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Mercury	128,026 flasks (76-pounds)
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Nickel	37,214 short tons
Quartz Crystals, Natural	800,000 pounds
Rutile	39,200 short tons
Sapphire & Ruby	16,305,502 carats
Sebacic Acid	5,009,697 pounds
Silicon Carbide	28,774 short tons
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Vegetable Tannin, Wattle	15,000 long tons
Zinc	378,768 short tons

(b) CONDITIONS ON DISPOSAL.—The authority of the President under subsection (a) to dispose of materials stored in the stockpile may not be used unless and until the President submits to Congress a revised annual materials plan under section 11(b) of the Strategic Critical Materials Stockpiling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-2(b)) that—

(1) complies with the requirements of section 10(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1), as added by section 3314; and

(2) contains the certification of the Secretary of Defense that the disposal of such materials will not adversely affect the capability of the National Defense Stockpile to supply the strategic and critical materials necessary to meet the needs of the United States during a period of national emergency that requires a significant level of mobilization of the economy of the United States, including any reconstitution of the military and industrial capabilities necessary to meet the planning assumptions used by the Secretary of Defense under section 14(b) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-6(b)).

(c) REQUIRED USE OF PREVIOUS DISPOSAL AUTHORITIES.—(1) The President shall complete the disposal of all quantities of materials in the National Defense Stockpile that—

President.

- (A) have been previously authorized for disposal by law; and
- (B) have not been disposed of before the date of the enactment of this Act.
- (2) The disposal of materials required by this subsection shall be completed before the end of the five-year period beginning on October 1, 1992, unless the President notifies Congress that the Market Impact Committee established under section 10(c) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1(c)), as added by section 3314, determines that completion of the disposal of such materials during such period would result in the undue disruption of the usual markets of such materials. The notification shall also indicate the date on which the disposal of such materials will be completed.
- (d) SPECIAL LIMITATION REGARDING SILVER.—(1) The disposal of silver under this section may only occur in the form of coins or, subject to paragraph (2), as material furnished by the Federal Government to a contractor for the use of the contractor in the performance of a Federal Government contract.
- (2) A contractor receiving silver as Government furnished material shall pay the Federal Government the amount equal to the fair market value of the silver, as determined by the National Defense Stockpile Manager. The amount paid by the contractor for the silver shall be deposited in the National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund.
- (e) SPECIAL LIMITATION REGARDING CHROMITE AND MANGANESE ORES.—During fiscal year 1993, the disposal of chromite and manganese ores of metallurgical grade under subsection (a) may be made only for processing within the United States and the territories and possessions of the United States.
- (f) SPECIAL LIMITATION REGARDING CHROMIUM AND MANGANESE FERRO.—The disposal of chromium ferro and manganese ferro under subsection (a) may not commence before October 1, 1993.
- (g) RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER DISPOSAL AUTHORITY.—The disposal authority provided in subsection (a) is in addition to any other disposal authority provided by law.

SEC. 3303. USE OF BARTER ARRANGEMENTS IN MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

50 USC 98d note.

The President may enter into barter arrangements to dispose of materials under section 3302 in order to acquire strategic and

critical materials for, or upgrade strategic and critical materials in, the National Defense Stockpile.

SEC. 3304. DEPOSIT OF PROCEEDS FROM DISPOSALS IN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE FUND.

All moneys received from the sale of materials under section 3302 shall be deposited in the National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund.

SEC. 3305. AUTHORIZED USES OF STOCKPILE FUNDS.

(a) **USE FOR ACQUISITIONS AND OTHER PURPOSES.**—During fiscal year 1993, the National Defense Stockpile Manager may obligate up to \$66,000,000 of the funds in the National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund (subject to such limitations as may be provided in appropriations Acts) for the authorized uses of such funds under section 9(b)(2) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h(b)(2)).

(b) **RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.**—Of the amount specified in subsection (a), \$25,000,000 may be obligated for materials development and research under subparagraph (G) of such section.

SEC. 3306. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REGARDING OPERATION AND MODERNIZATION OF THE STOCKPILE.

(a) **APPOINTMENT.**—Not later than March 15, 1993, the President shall appoint an advisory committee under section 10(a) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1(a)) to make recommendations to the President concerning the operation and modernization of the National Defense Stockpile.

(b) **MEMBERSHIP.**—The committee shall consist of members who have expertise regarding strategic and critical materials, including—

(1) employees of Federal agencies (including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of the Interior, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency);

(2) representatives of mining, processing, and fabricating industries and consumers that would be affected by the acquisition of materials for the stockpile or the disposal of materials from the stockpile; and

(3) other interested persons or representatives of interested organizations.

SEC. 3307. SPECIAL RULE FOR 1993 REPORT ON STOCKPILE REQUIREMENTS.

In the report on stockpile requirements required to be submitted to Congress by January 15, 1993, pursuant to section 14 of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-5), the Secretary of Defense shall include, in addition to the Secretary's recommendations with respect to stockpile requirements based upon the planning assumptions developed under subsection (b) of such section, the following information:

(1) A list of recommendations with respect to stockpile requirements that is based upon and consistent with the planning assumptions and scenarios that support—

(A) the defense capabilities and programs of the Armed Forces specified in the budget submitted to Congress under

section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, for fiscal year 1994; and

(B) the future-years defense program submitted under section 221 of title 10, United States Code, with respect to that budget.

(2) An explanation of the reasons for any deviation between the Secretary's recommendations with respect to stockpile requirements prepared under section 14(a) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-5(a)) and the list of recommendations with respect to stockpile requirements required by paragraph (1).

SEC. 3308. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

Part A of title XXXIII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190; 105 Stat. 1583) is amended—

(1) in sections 3301(a), 3301(d), and 3302(a), by striking out "fiscal years 1992 and 1993" and inserting in lieu thereof "fiscal year 1992"; and

(2) in sections 3301(a), 3301(d), and 3302(b), by striking out "each of such fiscal years" and inserting in lieu thereof "such fiscal year".

Subtitle B—Programmatic Changes

SEC. 3311. PROCEDURES FOR CHANGING OBJECTIVES FOR STOCKPILE QUANTITIES ESTABLISHED AS OF THE END OF FISCAL YEAR 1987.

Section 3(c) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98b(c)) is amended by striking out paragraphs (2) through (5) and inserting in lieu thereof the following new paragraph:

"(2) The President shall notify Congress in writing of any change proposed to be made in the quantity of any material to be stockpiled. The President may make the change effective on or after the 30th legislative day following the date of the notification. The President shall include a full explanation and justification for the proposed change with the notification. For purposes of this paragraph, a legislative day is a day on which both Houses of Congress are in session."

President.

SEC. 3312. REPEAL OF LIMITATION ON EXCESS BALANCE IN FUND.

Section 5(b) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98d(b)) is amended—

(1) by striking out "(1)"; and

(2) by striking out ", or (2)" and all that follows through "\$100,000,000." and inserting in lieu thereof a period.

SEC. 3313. AUTHORIZED PURPOSES FOR EXPENDITURES FROM THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE TRANSACTION FUND.

(a) **MAINTENANCE AND DISPOSAL OF MATERIALS.**—Section 9(b) of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h(b)) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2)(A)—

(A) by inserting ", maintenance, and disposal" after "acquisition"; and

(B) by striking out "section 6(a)(1)" and inserting in lieu thereof "section 6(a)"; and

0 USC 98h-1
ote.

'resident.

(2) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking out "such acquisition" and inserting in lieu thereof "such acquisition, maintenance, and disposal".

(b) REHABILITATION OF FACILITIES AND DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS.—Paragraph (2) of such section is further amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:

"(H) Improvement or rehabilitation of facilities, structures, and infrastructure needed to maintain the integrity of stockpile materials.

"(I) Disposal of hazardous materials that are stored in the stockpile and authorized for disposal by law."

(c) PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR EMPLOYEE SALARIES AND EXPENSES.—Such section is further amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(4) Notwithstanding paragraph (2), moneys in the fund may not be used to pay salaries and expenses of stockpile employees."

SEC. 3314. MARKET IMPACT COMMITTEE.

Section 10 of the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98h-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(c)(1) The President shall appoint a Market Impact Committee composed of representatives from the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Interior, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and such other persons as the President considers appropriate. The representatives from the Department of Commerce and the Department of State shall be Cochairmen of the Committee.

"(2) The Committee shall advise the National Defense Stockpile Manager on the projected domestic and foreign economic effects of all acquisitions and disposals of materials from the stockpile that are proposed to be included in the annual materials plan submitted to Congress under section 11(b), or in any revision of such plan, and shall submit to the manager the Committee's recommendations regarding those acquisitions and disposals.

"(3) The annual materials plan or the revision of such plan, as the case may be, shall contain—

"(A) the views of the Committee on the projected domestic and foreign economic effects of all acquisitions and disposals of materials from the stockpile;

"(B) the recommendations submitted by the Committee under paragraph (2); and

"(C) for each acquisition or disposal provided for in the plan or revision that is inconsistent with a recommendation of the Committee, a justification for the acquisition or disposal.

"(4) In developing recommendations for the National Defense Stockpile Manager under paragraph (2), the Committee shall consult from time to time with representatives of producers, processors, and consumers of the types of materials stored in the stockpile."

SEC. 3315. CLARIFICATION OF THE STOCKPILE STATUS OF CERTAIN MATERIALS.

All materials purchased under section 303 of the Defense Production Act (50 U.S.C. App. 2093) and held in the Defense Production Act inventory as of June 30, 1992, are hereby transferred to the National Defense Stockpile and shall be managed, controlled,

and subject to disposal by the National Defense Stockpile Manager as provided in the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act (50 U.S.C. 98a et seq.).

TITLE XXXIV—CIVIL DEFENSE

SEC. 3401. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There is hereby authorized to be appropriated \$142,565,000 for fiscal year 1993 for the purpose of carrying out the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2251 et seq.).

TITLE XXXV—PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION

SEC. 3501. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the "Panama Canal Commission Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993".

Subtitle A—Annual Authorization

SEC. 3511. AUTHORIZATION OF EXPENDITURES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—For fiscal year 1993, the Panama Canal Commission (subject to subsection (b)) may make such expenditures and, without regard to fiscal year limitations, may enter into such contracts and commitments, within the limits of funds and borrowing authority available to it in accordance with law, as may be necessary under the Panama Canal Act of 1979 (22 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.) for the operation, maintenance, and improvement of the Panama Canal for fiscal year 1993.

(b) LIMITATION ON ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.—For fiscal year 1993, the Panama Canal Commission may expend from funds in the Panama Canal Revolving Fund not more than \$51,156,000 for administrative expenses, of which not more than—

(1) \$12,000 may be used for official reception and representation expenses of the Supervisory Board of the Commission;

(2) \$6,000 may be used for official reception and representation expenses of the Secretary of the Commission; and

(3) \$34,000 may be used for official reception and representation expenses of the Administrator of the Commission.

(c) PURCHASE OF PASSENGER VEHICLES.—Funds available to the Panama Canal Commission may be used for the purchase of passenger motor vehicles (including large heavy-duty vehicles) to be used to transport Commission personnel across the Isthmus of Panama. A passenger motor vehicle may be purchased with such funds only as necessary to replace another passenger motor vehicle of the Commission. No passenger motor vehicle may be purchased with such funds for a price in excess of \$18,000.

SEC. 3512. HEALTH CARE.

Section 1321(e)(1) of the Panama Canal Act of 1979 (22 U.S.C. 3731) is amended by inserting after "health care services" the following: "provided by medical facilities licensed and approved by the Republic of Panama (and not operated by the United States)".

SEC. 3513. VESSEL TONNAGE MEASUREMENT.

Section 1602(a) of the Panama Canal Act of 1979 (22 U.S.C. 3792) is amended in the first sentence by inserting "or its equivalent", or its equivalent

Panama Canal
Commission
Authorization
Act for Fiscal
Year 1993.

President.

50 USC 98c note.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0201

February 2, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise BALANCE IROQUOIS 93

Attached at Tab I is a proposed memorandum to the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, approving military exercise BALANCE IROQUOIS 93. At Tab II Defense recommends approval and State concurs.

BALANCE IROQUOIS 93 is a combined exercise with the Indian armed forces, consisting primarily of free fall parachute training and operations. It is a follow-on to an earlier airborne exercise and will take place March 15-30 in the vicinity of Agras, India. Approximately 60 U.S. and 84 Indian personnel will be involved.

The critical cancellation date is February 15, 1993.

Concurrences by: Martin *ML* and Bruce *BR* Riedel

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the exercise and have Will Itoh sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Signature

Tab II OSD Executive Secretary Memorandum, January 29, 1993

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *12* NARA, Date *8/23/16*

7016-01 52

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0201

MEMORANDUM FOR COL. MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise BALANCE IROQUOIS 93

Military exercise BALANCE IROQUOIS 93 is approved.

William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary



ADMINISTRATION
AND MANAGEMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1950



02
29 JAN 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT: Significant Military Exercise - BALANCE IROQUOIS 93

The Department of Defense recommends NSC approval of the attached Significant Military Exercise Brief, Exercise BALANCE IROQUOIS 93. The Department of State concurs with this recommendation.

Please note the critical cancellation date is
15 February 1993.


Michael B. Sherfield
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated

This memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED without enclosure.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	re: Significant Military Exercise Brief (SMEB) - Balance Iroquois 93. (1 page)	08/01/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [1]

2016-0152-F

vz4351

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	For William Itoh from Anne Witkowsky. Subject: [Inspection]. Record ID: 9300111. (1 page)	02/04/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [1]

2016-0152-F
vz4351

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	For Marc Grossman et al. Subject: [Inspection] Record ID: 9300111. (1 page)	02/04/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [1]

2016-0152-F
vz4351

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. report	Duplicate of vz4349_004c. (5 pages)	01/11/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Robert Bell)
OA/Box Number: 43

FOLDER TITLE:

Chron File - February 1993 #1 [1]

2016-0152-F

vz4351

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