

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

January 1-20, 1993 (Chron) [9]

Staff Office-Individual:

Defense Policy-Bell, Robert

Original OA/ID Number:

43

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
31	3	1	2	V

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0152

January 29, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR NANCY SODERBERG

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *has seen*

FROM: KEITH HAHN *YH*

SUBJECT: Military Roles and Missions Review - Qs & As

The attached questions and answers are provided in anticipation of Press interest in the Washington Post article on a reported Powell-Nunn agreement on the Military Roles and Missions study being prepared by JCS.

Concurrence by: *DD for PC*
Paul Clarke

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward these questions and answers to the White House Press Office for the Friday, January 29, 1993 press briefing.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Proposed Questions and Answers

MILITARY ROLES AND MISSIONS REVIEW

Q: Was there a secret Nunn-Powell deal on how to orchestrate the review of Military Roles and Missions due to be released soon?

A: I don't know. You'll have to ask Senator Nunn or General Powell.

Q: What is your position on the most recent draft of the Roles and Missions Report?

A: I haven't seen a copy of the report. We will wait for General Powell to submit his formal report.

Q: Do you think more streamlining of the armed forces is needed?

A: During the campaign, the President endorsed the idea of a "no holds barred, top-to-bottom" review such as Senator Nunn called for in a speech last July. As the defense budget declines, we will find it increasingly important to reduce redundancies in our armed forces in order to maintain critical military capabilities and force structure.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0077

January 28, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH:

ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM:

KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT:

Invitation to Speak to the Veterans of Foreign Wars

You have been invited to speak to the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Veterans of Foreign Wars on February 28 here in Washington. In the past, this meeting has resulted in considerable attention, regardless of stated publicity and press intentions. In addition, you can expect some pointed questions about current issues of interests to veterans groups, such as policies regarding POW/MIAs, the defense budget, and homosexuals in the armed forces. Although your calendar is currently clear on this date, you may want to forego this invitation until these and other issues have been fully vetted by the Administration.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I extending your regrets at this time.

Attachments

Tab I Letter for Signature

Tab II Invitation from John M. Carney

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Carney:

Thank you very much for the kind invitation to speak to your National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee. President Clinton and the rest of his national security team are indeed deeply immersed in the tremendous tasks that you correctly alluded to in your letter.

Today, we are faced with the challenge of articulating or reaffirming U.S. policy on a wide range of national security issues. My schedule, unfortunately, reflects the pressures of this challenge and will preclude my speaking to your committee on February 28. However, please keep me in mind for any future opportunities to address your outstanding organization.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security
Affairs

Mr. John M. Carney
Commander-in-Chief
Veterans of Foreign Wars
VFW Memorial Building
200 Maryland Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES



THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

January 21, 1993

Mr. Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. Lake:

First let me congratulate you on being appointed Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. It is well deserved and the President and the country will be well served by this appointment.

Second, I want to invite you to address the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States on Sunday, February 28, at the Sheraton Washington Hotel here in Washington.

This Committee, which is drawn from throughout the United States, represents our 2.2 million members on national security and foreign affairs issues. In light of the tremendous tasks before our new President, we would like to gain your perspective on these tasks and our goals in accomplishing them.

You may expect an audience of approximately 300, including our National Officers. Your desires on publicity and press attendance will govern. We would like for you to address the Committee beginning at 10:00 A.M. with suggested remarks of approximately 35-40 minutes and 15-20 minutes for questions and answers.


Please advise Mr. Kenneth A. Steadman, Director of National Security and Foreign Affairs if you can accept our invitation. His address and phone number are:

VFW Memorial Building
200 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002
202/543-2239

-2-

I sincerely hope you will join us for this important meeting and look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,


JOHN M. CARNEY
Commander-in-Chief

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0106

January 30, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*
FROM: KEITH HAHN *kh*
SUBJECT: Letter from H. Lee Halterman RE: Military Legal
Issues

At Tab II H. Lee Halterman, District Director and General Council for the Committee on the District of Columbia, forwards a letter from attorney John Vaisey "for your disposition as would be helpful." Mr. Vaisey's letter to the President provides advice on a wide range of issues -- from his experiences in the field of military law to the Savings and Loan crisis.

Do not bother to read Mr. Vaisey's letter. The reply at Tab I is provided as an acknowledgement and a courtesy to Mr. Halterman.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Letter for Signature
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Halterman:

On behalf of the President, thank you for forwarding Mr. John Vaisey's letter. It provides an interesting perspective on a wide range of issues that the President will have to address in the near term.

Please pass my regards to Mr Vaisey.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security
Affairs

Mr. H. Lee Halterman
District Director
and General Counsel
Committee on the District
of Columbia
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

RONALD V. DELLUMS
8TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

CHAIRPERSON,
COMMITTEE ON THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

CHAIRPERSON,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE



Congress of the United States House of Representatives

January 21, 1993

Mr. Anthony Lake
National Security Advisor
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Lake:

Please find enclosed a letter from attorney John Vaisey, who has had a long practice in the field of military law, including representation of gay men who faced discharge from the service. Because we have worked for more than two decades with Mr. Vaisey on these matter, he sent this to our office and asked that we forward it to the President during the transition. We felt it would be better sent once things had settled and the administration were in placed. Therefore, I forward it now to your attention for your disposition as would be helpful.

With best wishes for future, I remain

Sincerely,

H. Lee Halterman
District Director & General Counsel

HLH:dbl

0104
ANY REPLY TO THIS LETTER
SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO
OFFICE CHECKED:

CARLOTTIA SCOTT
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

ROBERT BRAUER
SPECIAL COUNSEL

☐ 2136 RAYBURN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-2661

DONALD R. HOPKINS
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR

☒ H. LEE HALTERMAN
DISTRICT COUNSEL
☐ 201 13TH STREET, SUITE 105
OAKLAND, CA 94612
(510) 763-0370

☐ 1720 OREGON STREET
BERKELEY CA 94703
(510) 548-7767

☐ 3732 MT. DIABLO BLVD., SUITE 160
LAFAYETTE, CA 94549
(510) 283-8125

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0142

January 30, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH:

ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM:

KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT:

Letter from Mr. Jack David RE: Foreign Policy and
National Security Issues

At Tab II Mr. Jack David has provided -- at your request -- three short papers on foreign policy and national security issues. The first paper, entitled "Needed - A Police Force for a New World Order," advocates the U.S. take a leading role in developing an international peacekeeping and peace-enforcing force to replace the U.S. as world policeman. The second, "Prudence in Reducing U.S. Forces Abroad," warns against precipitous reductions in U.S. military presence abroad in an effort to realize immediate economic savings. The last paper is a memorandum on Mr. David's observations from his experience as a member of the U.S. 1992 NATO delegation and provides his views on future relationships among Europeans and their impact on the U.S.

At Tab I is a letter to Jack David thanking him for responding to your request.

Concurrences by:

Barry *BM* Lowenkron and Eric *ES* Schwartz

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Mr. Jack David
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. David:

Thank you very much for providing me your insights on several important issues facing the United States. The questions of what role we should play in establishing international order, how much military presence we should maintain abroad, and the future political structure of Europe are timely and significant.

These issues are among the many we have begun to review in an effort to clearly define our goals and objectives for this Administration. Your contribution to the discussion is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security
Affairs

Mr. Jack David
747 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10017

C-1412

Staff

JACK DAVID
747 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017
212-421-2233

January 20, 1993

Mr. Anthony Lake
National Security Advisor
to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Lake:

You may recall the enclosed letter you wrote to me. Thereafter, you scheduled a March 13, 1992 meeting with me, but it aborted and never was rescheduled. Although I drafted a foreign policy speech for the campaign at Lionel Johnson's request, I had no further contact with you.

Nevertheless, at your invitation (see attached), enclosed please find three recent short essays/memoranda I prepared on foreign policy/national security issues. I hope you find them useful. I have applied (and been recommended by David Aaron and Senator Biden) for positions in State and Defense involving security arrangement issues, but no luck so far. I would like to contribute in this area.

Sincerely,

Jack David

Jack David

JD:sre
enclosures
cc: Mr. Anthony Lake
Kinne Brook Farm
Worthington, MA 01098

Anthony Lake
Kinnis Brook Farm
Worthington, MA 01098



Dear Mr. David:

George Stephanopoulos has passed along to me (I'm coordinating foreign policy positions) your letter + piece on collective security in Europe, which I enjoyed reading. You may have noted that Governor Clinton took the same position on NATO in his Georgetown Univ. lecture on foreign/defense policy last December.

Sent | I see in your "appendix" references to "The Constitutionality of a Mandatory Non-military National Service Obligation" and NSDD 84. If you had copies handy, I'd be most interested - as I would also in further thoughts on the evolution of European security arrangements over the next decade.

Sincerely,
Tony Lake

Needed - A Police Force for a New World Order

by Jack David

January 7, 1993

Page 1 of 4

The debate concerning whether, when and to what extent the United States should project force abroad -- when it should be policeman for the world -- is one of great importance. It implicates questions of vital concern, not the least of which is when American lives should be put at risk in foreign conflicts and when our somewhat depleted economic resources should be expended for objectives the achievement of which will yield results perceived by many of our citizens as obscure or not sufficiently beneficial to us for what they cost us. Yet, as important as this debate is, it distracts our focus from a topic that may be equally important to our interests in the short run and more important in the long run.

The topic is whether we should construct an alternative to the United States as the "policeman of the world" and, if so, how it can be done. Recent events show that the time is ripe for fruitful discussion of creating a structure for international forces to undertake the kinds of actions the United States recently has undertaken and considered undertaking -- as envisioned in one form by Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's June 17, 1992 Agenda for Peace. Although the United States would participate in such a force structure, particularly if it came into being in the near term, while the United States remains the only country having the airlift, sea lift, oversight and other logistical capability to project forces afar, it would

not necessarily bear the largest military, economic, political or leadership burden in every instance.

With the fall of Communist totalitarian regimes and the large number of states joining those who long have espoused humanitarian values, democratic principles and rights of individuals to participate in market economies, there is a larger consensus than the world has ever known that certain values are so basic that they are absolutes and should be protected by action of the international community. The value of the sanctity of the life and welfare of each human being is now sufficiently absolute that "ethnic cleansing," indiscriminate murder of political opponents, the commission of war crimes and widespread starvation caused by internal conflict or by across-border war are unacceptable and now command an active response from the international community. Significantly, the strength of this political consensus is reflected in the strength of the approved responses in instances where community values are flagrantly and dramatically assaulted; force may be used, if necessary.

The most important fact to be gleaned from the more activist role played by the United Nations in peacekeeping and the more aggressive role played by the United States and other countries in addressing problems of unprincipled violence by means of the principled use of force is that the emerging international consensus has supported the use of force in these cases, if necessary. One can discuss Desert Storm, humanitarian

assistance and possibly more aggressive action in Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO-supported over-flights of northern Iraq to protect Kurds from Saddam Hussein, and U.S. intervention in Somalia and compare legal justifications for each, but the main feature of all is that there is a broad international consensus for action and that consensus derives from the fact that conduct of political and military leaders in each instance unacceptably derogates from values that those in the consensus want to protect and preserve. The fact that the international community, including the five members of the United Nations Security Council, European countries and much of the rest of the world, can agree that such strong action can be taken signifies a consensus not only that action is warranted in these cases but that doing sufficiently egregious harm to internationally respected values now and in the future will warrant support of the international community for enforcement action, even if such action entails violating the sovereignty of a state. On the international level, however, there are inadequate enforcement mechanisms for dealing with bad people in political leadership positions who do such violence and for relieving the victims of such violence from the reign of terror to which they are subject.

Although the United States has a unique role to play in peacekeeping and peace-making at this time, discussion of the "new world order" would seem to assume the readiness of the "world" to further elaborate the means suggested by the United

Nations Charter for assuring peace and the observance of civilized standards of behavior not only between countries but by governments with respect to their own people. One of the most critical sets of issues the Clinton Administration will need to study and resolve is how can an international police force or forces be structured to replace the United States as a sole actor, by what standards or rules should it operate and how should it be financed so that the international community -- the "world" -- bears the burden of and assumes responsibility for assuring the "new world order."

The consensus reflected in the approval of recent peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations may not be sufficiently great to cause prompt agreement on the architecture of an international police force, on the rules for the operation and use of such an institution and on methods by which its activities can be financed. Nevertheless, the United States should make the nourishment and development of a consensus on these matters a central feature of its foreign policy by taking the leading role in devising an acceptable architecture for an international force to supplement and soon replace the "policeman" role the United States now is playing and in developing rules for the use and international financing of such a force.

"Prudence in Reducing U.S. Forces Abroad"
For Opinion Page of New York Times

by Jack David
November 19, 1992

The Clinton administration is expected to make very substantial cuts in military and related expenditures for America's involvement in and commitments to security arrangements abroad, both in Europe and in Asia. But some proponents would have us reduce our expenditures for overseas military to zero and make all of the savings available for urgently attending to domestic needs. While President-elect Clinton sees that we need to marshal scarce economic resources to deal with urgent domestic economic and social needs and that an economically strong America must be the top priority, even for national and international security, he will be wise to resist the counsel of those who urge cutting expenses to the point of eliminating our effective presence in overseas security arrangements.

Cuts that would reduce our effective military presence overseas will free up money for domestic use, but they will have additional consequences as well. Any material withdrawal of foreign-based U.S. forces itself will change the world, and also will change America's political and economic influence in the world. If we withdraw to such an extent that we seriously impair our operational capability on foreign soil, as some would have the President-elect do, our withdrawal will have at least the following consequences:

1. Those who have relied on us for security will strengthen themselves militarily and politically, perhaps in ways that are not completely to our liking;
2. The ambitions of tyrants and would-be tyrants will not suffer the restraining influence of credible potent United States opposition;
3. For the foreseeable future, the world will be without any generally acceptable leader in military and security matters; and
4. Future commitments of the United States on security matters will not be considered as dependable as have our commitments in the past.

If we impair our operational capability on foreign soil today to a degree that brings about these consequences and in the future decide that we again want to play a more prominent role in security outside North America, others may not be as accepting of our leadership as they are today -- and certainly will ask more as a condition of giving support to initiatives the U.S. may then wish to take. It also is likely that the world will be a more dangerous place at that time.

The end of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe unleashed strong destabilizing forces of nationalism, religious intolerance and ethnic enmities that the Soviets had contained for many years, albeit by repression. These consequences of Soviet

withdrawal from Eastern Europe entail perils to security and stability in Europe and Asia whose full extent we do not yet know. Rendering the U.S. incapable of operational effectiveness to meet our international commitments abroad would have similarly great consequences from an "effect on security" point of view, as the presence of a credible and potent U.S. capability meaningfully contributes to stability; withdrawal of that presence and capability may well set the stage for instability.

Those who urge President-elect Clinton to leave security in Europe and in Asia to the Europeans and the Asians owe it to their audience and to the integrity of their own analysis to identify and quantify the costs of their proposals in terms of security and stability. Calculating the strategic and political cost of each proposal for reducing America's military and political commitments abroad is as worthwhile an exercise as evaluating how the economic savings can be spent domestically.

Mr. Clinton is thankfully making domestic economic and social concerns our number one priority and is right to include cuts in expenditures for foreign-based military capability among the methods of marshaling resources to address them. In evaluating any money-saving proposal to withdraw forces stationed abroad to deal with regional security problems (those entailing the largest commitments of force), the President-elect needs to be able to assess the irreversible impacts alternative cuts are

"Prudence in Reducing U.S. Forces Abroad"

by Jack David

November 19, 1992

Page 4 of 4

likely to have on the actions of others in the region and to portray the security status of a region after we withdraw and others respond to the withdrawal. Accordingly, advice to significantly reduce America's military and security capability abroad for immediate economic savings must be accompanied by an assessment of this kind so as to be sure that the reduction proposed will not bring about unintended or unacceptable consequences.

JACK DAVID
747 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10017
(212) 421-2233

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Council on Foreign Relations

RE: 1992 NATO Delegation

FROM: Jack David

DATE: October 9, 1992

This memorandum contains impressions and conclusions of participants in the 1992 NATO delegation after the meetings they had with NATO, EC, SHAPE, USAFE, government officials, local politicians and others in Belgium and Germany during the last week in May 1992. The memorandum started out as a summary of my own impressions and conclusions, which I shared with all members of the delegation in a July 22, 1992 memorandum. I edited the original memorandum to reflect corrections, comments, suggestions and additions provided to me by most of the other members of the delegation and recirculated the revised memorandum on September 21, 1992, asking for responses by October 9, 1992. No substantive changes to the text were suggested. Accordingly, our impressions and conclusions are that:

1. The historic binding force of NATO members, that all members will go to war upon an attack on one member, has little practical or political relevance at this time as it is predicated on the existence of a single, powerful aggressor whose attack on one would be a threat to all and no such powerful aggressor exists; on the other hand, Eastern European countries find this central feature of NATO membership attractive, as they fear that the bear may come out of the woods again one day. NATO's development of the NACC may be a bridge between its past and its future. Another bridge may be its underfunded exchanges with military personnel of former Warsaw Pact countries, exchanges which serve the valuable purpose of building trust. Still, NATO's unique ability is that it can take and carry out security decisions because of its infrastructure, including personnel from different countries accustomed to dealing with each other in performing precisely this function. The use of NATO's abilities would be essential to any "out of area" military operation.

2. NATO and the U.S., as part of it, are vigorously attempting to identify and convince others of new goals to

1

justify politically and economically keeping NATO and the U.S. military in Europe; the new goals, toward which consensus seems to be developing, are providing humanitarian assistance, peace keeping and even enforcing peace.

3. The absence of a single, powerful, potential aggressor eliminates a risk that was an impediment to the use of collective action to address lesser threats to stability, but collective action to address such threats, especially the use of force, nevertheless requires a political consensus which is difficult to build even without the threat of a powerful adversary who might use force to oppose such action. The events in Yugoslavia have underlined the difficulty in garnering political support for collective action to address the conflicts that have emerged in the wake of the Cold War's end.

4. The European members of NATO and of the CSCE are more ambivalent about collective action involving the use of force than is the United States but they share our concerns about human rights abuses and acts of aggression even beyond the borders of Europe; they feel as they do particularly because refugee problems resulting from aggression and human rights abuses threaten stability and security in Europe. In the short term, advocating the collective use of force to reduce refugee problems will be more persuasive to European countries than other rationales.

5. Notwithstanding the much publicized Franco/German force of 35,000 troops, neither France nor Germany nor any other European state has the ability or will have the ability over the next ten years to project and maintain military forces in the areas where they may be deployed (e.g., Iraq, all of former Yugoslavia -- including Kosovo, the western parts of the former Soviet Union); whether such European forces operate under a CSCE flag, a UN flag or otherwise, their deployment will be possible only with support of the NATO infrastructure and U.S. military assets and related U.S. military support in Europe (particularly for airlift, aerial refueling, intelligence from overhead technical systems and sea lift). Our continued support of an adequate NATO infrastructure and of an effective U.S. military presence on European soil are vital to protect our short term interests (at least ten years) in maintaining stability in Europe and nearby areas, including the Persian Gulf; it is in our interest and Europe's interest to find ways to finance this.

6. Germany agreeing to participate in the Franco/German force was born of a variety of motivating factors; among these none is any more clear than Germany's general policy of improving its relations with France. Other motivating factors probably derived from political considerations having to do with the European Community and concern about a reduced U.S. military presence in Europe. Some of us detected a suggestion that another motivating factor may have been some Germans' perception

(not shared by the U.S.) of not being sufficiently consulted in NATO, with a specific illustration being the U.S. and the U.K. forming and staffing the Rapid Deployment Force after the Gulf War with perceived (by some Germans) inadequate consultation.

7. The relative influence of Germany in NATO will increase over the next ten years and France also will come to play a more influential role in European security decision making, including making decisions about collective action by European countries (although at least one of our delegation feels that France's negativism about the U.S. is incurable and that France is unlikely to be a "team player" on a team whose captain is the U.S.); this means that U.S. dominance of decision making in NATO must end, although we will continue to be an influential partner. A stronger European security identity -- whether within NATO or through the strengthening of the WEU and/or the EC -- likely will continue to emerge regardless of the fate of Maastricht, but surely will emerge more rapidly if Maastricht or something like it is approved. Yet, ironically, the only country that most Europeans will accept as "the leader" for the foreseeable future is the U.S., European military and political leaders generally being uncomfortable accepting either French or German leadership in these matters, and many German leaders not trusting their own country's military leadership, particularly insofar as Germany replacing U.S. leadership in European security matters might well lead to Germany coming to possess nuclear weapons. For the benefit of the long term, we should utilize our close relationship with Germany to help nourish the German/French relationship and thereby help shape the more influential roles that Europeans will play in NATO and in European security in the years to come.

Jack David

JD:sre

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9300252
RECEIVED: 02 FEB 93 17

TO: LAKE

FROM: DAVIS, JACQUELYN K

DOC DATE: 29 JAN 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
ARMS CONTROL
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES
ECONOMICS
ANSA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: INVITATION LAKE ADDRESS WORKSHOP OF INSTITUTE FOR FORN POLICY
ANALYSIS / US / FSU RELATIONS & INDUSTRIAL DEMILITARIZATION ON 9 FEB

ACTION: REGRETTED BY PHONE

DUE DATE: 05 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BARTH
BELL
BURNS
DARRAGH
ITOH
PONEMAN
PROCTOR
SODERBERG
WALKER
WILSON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA

CLOSED BY: NSWEA

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.

In association with The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
President

Jacquelyn K. Davis
Executive Vice President

Charles M. Perry
Director of Studies

Mr. Tony Lake
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Old Executive Office Building
17th & Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20506

Dear Mr. Lake:

Congratulations on your new job in the Clinton Administration. We at the Institute wish you all the best in your future endeavors as you work to help shape U.S. policy in the coming months and years.

With respect to your new duties, I would like to bring to your attention a workshop that the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis will host on February 9th, entitled *U.S.-FSU Relations and Industrial Demilitarization: Issues and Priorities for the New Administration*. Participating in this workshop will be some of the top experts in the U.S. on issues pertaining to the Former Soviet Union. Each session will have a 10 to 15 minute overview, with each discussion point introduced (3 to 5 minutes) by a noted expert in that area. A 20 minute roundtable discussion is planned for each agenda point. In addition, Mr. Robert Gates, Former Director of Central Intelligence, will speak and answer questions at a working luncheon (see attached agenda).

While I know you are very busy, and may be reluctant to speak in public until the Administration's policies are fully developed, I believe the workshop would provide you with a unique opportunity to have a high-quality overview of the current situation and likely issues that you will have to deal with in the coming months. In addition, it should provide you with an opportunity to interact with the community of experts following this issue. Therefore, I would like to invite you to attend all or any portion of this workshop that you can fit into your schedule.

The workshop will be held from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. on Tuesday, February 9, 1993, at the Sheraton Carlton Hotel, 923 16th Street, NW. The Carlton is located just 1.5 blocks from either the McPherson Square or Farragut North metro stops.

Should you have any questions, please call me or David Tanks in our Washington Office at (202) 463-7942. I hope to hear from you soon. And, once again, I wish you all the best in your new career.

Sincerely,

Jacquelyn K. Davis
Jacquelyn K. Davis



Washington Office
1725 DeSales Street, N.W., Suite 402
Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone: (202) 463 7942
FAX: (202) 785-2785
January 29, 1993

Draft Agenda

U.S.-FSU Relations and Industrial Demilitarization: Issues and Priorities for the New Administration

Organized and Hosted By:

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

The Sheraton Carlton Hotel

February 9, 1993

8:15 am - 3:30 pm

8:15 am Coffee and Pastries

8:30 am Welcoming Remarks

8:35 am *Session I A Status Report: The Current Situation in the Former Soviet Union (FSU)*

Overview: Dr. John P. Hardt
 Associate Director for Research Coordination
 Congressional Research Service

Roundtable Discussion:

Points of Tension: Ethnic, Political, and Economic

.. Dr. Peter Reddaway
 George Washington University
 Invited

Economic Reforms and Industrial Demilitarization

.. Dr. John Williamson
 Institute for International Economics
 Invited

.. Mr. Cliff Kupchan
 House Foreign Affairs Committee

Armament and Advanced Technology Transfers

.. Mr. David Markov
 Institute for Defense Analyses

Arms Control Compliance and the Military Dimension

.. Dr. Joseph Nye
 Center for Science and International Affairs

.. Mr. Michael Krepon
Henry L. Stimson Center

10:15 am Coffee Break

10:30 am Session II *Russia's Emerging Security Objectives and Goals*

Overview: Ambassador Arthur Hartman
APCO Associates

Roundtable Discussion:

· Inferred Impact of Reform Objectives

.. Mr. Mark Zlotnik
Assistant NIO for Russia and Eurasia

· Intentions Signalled By Russia's New Military Doctrine

.. Ms. Mary FitzGerald
Hudson Institute

· Implications for Industrial Demilitarization Priorities

.. Dr. Hans Binnendijk
Georgetown University

12:15 pm Luncheon

**Mr. Robert Gates
Former Director of Central Intelligence**

1:30 pm Session III *What, If Anything, Should the U.S. Do to Influence Military and Industrial Policies in the FSU, and How Could It Be Accomplished?*

Overview: Mr. Ron Bartek
Professional Staff Member
House Armed Services Committee

Roundtable Discussion:

· Macro-Economic/Sectoral Restructuring and Monetary Stabilization

.. Mr. Russell Cheetham
World Bank

· Initiatives Regarding the Food and Energy Chains

.. Mr. Alan Mustard
Department of Agriculture

.. Dr. Daniel Fine
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

.. Mr. Erik Jones
Department of State

Industrial Demilitarization Assistance Priorities

.. Mr. Richard Shriver
International Executive Service Corps

.. Mr. William Taylor
Department of State

Assistance Possibilities for Controlling Arms Transfers

.. Dr. Geoffrey Kemp
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

.. Mr. Mark Lowenthal
Congressional Research Service

Ideas for Limiting Proliferation

.. Mr. Victor Alessi
Department of Energy

Potential U.S.-FSU Cooperative Ventures in the Defense Industrial Realm

.. Ms. Kathryn Wittneben
Enterprise Development Information Center

3:30 pm Close

January 29, 1993



INSTITUTE FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

***U.S.-F.S.U. Relations and Industrial Demilitarization:
Issues and Priorities for the New Administration***

Sheraton Carlton Hotel
8:15 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.
February 9, 1993

Session I

A Status Report: The Current Situation in the Former Soviet Union (FSU)

☐ I will attend

☐ I will not attend

Session II

Russia's Emerging Security Objectives and Goals

☐ I will attend

☐ I will not attend

Luncheon

Mr. Robert Gates, Former Director of Central Intelligence

☐ I will attend

☐ I will not attend

**** Legal restrictions require us to collect \$10 per person for
Executive Branch employees to defray luncheon costs.***

Session III

***What, If Anything, Should the U.S. Do to Influence Military and Industrial
Policies in the FSU, and How Could It Be Accomplished?***

☐ I will attend

☐ I will not attend

Name: _____

Title: _____

Company: _____

Address: _____

City: _____ State: _____ Zip: _____

Phone: _____

Fax: _____

Please fill out and return by fax to Renée Lajoie
Fax: 202-785-2785 Phone: 202-463-7942

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 7, 1993

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

JOHN GORDON *G*

FROM:

KEITH HAHN *KH*

SUBJECT:

Visit by General Shalikashvili, Monday,
January 11, 1993

You are scheduled to meet with General John Shalikashvili, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in your office at 2:00 p.m. on Monday, January 11, 1993. The purpose of the call is to discuss policies and operations related to the countries of the former Yugoslavia. He will also review the status of U.S. and NATO military-to-military outreach programs with countries of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. No formal or informal documents have been prepared by the SACEUR staff for this visit.

The call is scheduled to last approximately 20 minutes, after which General Shalikashvili will make a brief courtesy call on Bob Zoellick before returning to the Pentagon.

Concurrences by:

indraft *indraft*
Jeff Jones and Barry Lowenkron