

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Pat Battenfield to Cathy Millison and M. Kay Joshi. Subject: Africa Book -- Pullaside with Moi. (7 pages)	03/13/1998	P1/b(1)
002. email	Pat Battenfield to Cathy Millison and M. Kay Joshi. Subject: Africa Book -- Pullaside with Kabila. (7 pages)	03/13/1998	P1/b(1)
003. email	Joseph Wilson to Matthew Gobush. Subject: Overview: Influentials Meeting. (8 pages)	03/18/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Special Envoy])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[03/13/1998-03/18/1998]

2014-0927-F

vz5296

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 3/14/98 5:32:40 PM
FROM Barks-Ruggles, Erica
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT more [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Kinser-Kidane, Brenda J.

CARBON_COPY Barks-Ruggles, Erica
Battenfield, Pat A.
Hendricks, Lori A.
Hill, Roseanne M.
Prendergast, John P.
Sanders, Robin R.
Williams, Mary C.
Wilson, Joseph C.

TEXT_BODY

- Erica

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

SAfamily.doc
SOUTH AFRICA: FAMILY PLANNING AND CHILDREN

According to a 1997 census, the population of South Africa is about 38 million.

The South African government is in the process of developing a National Population Policy, a comprehensive effort to reduce past inequities while enhancing the quality of life of all South Africans.

Although the apartheid era government's support for family planning was based on deplorable, racially motivated concerns, it gave the black majority as well as the white elite better means to plan the number and spacing of their children.

Consequently, South Africa's fertility and population growth rates have been declining for years and are among the lowest in sub-Saharan Africa. Infant and

maternal mortality remain unacceptably high, especially among blacks and rural inhabitants, but are markedly lower than most elsewhere in the region. Although 35% of the population is under the age of 15, South Africa also has Africa's highest percentage of people over 60.

The quality and effectiveness of reproductive health services are poorest for South Africa's historically disadvantaged population. At least 30% of women in rural areas give birth at home, and a significant proportion of these births are unassisted by trained persons. Evidence indicates that illegal abortions are a significant contributor to high maternal mortality rates. Also, two of the main contributors to morbidity and mortality among adolescents are pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases, yet there are few health programs targeting youth.

Contraceptive prevalence is high. It is generally accepted that contraceptive usage among married women is at least 60%. While women in South Africa bear an average of 4.3 children, surveys show that this figure is far higher than women's preferred family size. This is likely due to an unmet need for contraceptive services and the necessity for the government to develop maternal and child health care and women's services, and to provide for more accessible family planning services.

South Africa's Constitution contains an extensive list of children's rights and freedoms, but while the government has made some progress in delivering the required services, the demand far outstrips the available resources. Many South African children live in poverty. In 1995, more than 9 million children lived in households whose income fell below the poverty line. About 96% of these were African. Of the 8.7 million African children living in poverty, more than 75% lived in rural areas.

Although acute malnutrition among school children is not a major problem, a 1994 government study found that over one million students were either underweight or stunted in growth. Social programs known as "Presidential Initiatives," which were included in the former Reconstruction and Development Program, continue to receive government support. They offer free health care to pregnant women and to children under 6 years of age and provide meals for primary school children. The Primary School Nutrition Project reaches about 5.5 million children in 15,800 schools. The 1996 Schools Bill aims to achieve greater educational opportunities for black children. It mandates compulsory education from ages 7 to 15, a single syllabus, and more equitable funding.

Violence against children is widespread. Reported cases increased 65% between 1993 and 1995. This increase in repeated cases +-is attributable to the creation of special units to deal with these crimes, growing emphasis on children's rights, and increased attention by the public and the media. However, a lack of coordinated and comprehensive strategies to deal with such crimes continues to impede the delivery of services to victims. Moreover, the South African Law Commission reported in August 1997 that few abusers are convicted and that laws dealing with child abuse are largely ineffective.

USAID programs addressing children's issues include supporting primary health care and helping to establish the National Youth Commission.

PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Background:

USG/DROC relations are nascent but on balance constructive, despite frustrations on both sides. The Kabila Government's record to date is mixed at best, and recent developments have been more negative than positive. There has been progress in preparing for constitutional reform and restructuring the economy. But the continued ban on political party activities, increased harassment of opposition figures and journalists, and Kabila's erratic behavior are worrying. Specific issues of particular concern are the relegation to internal exile of prominent opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi and the use of military courts to try civilians.

The GDROC has been frustrated by what it perceives to be an over-emphasis by us and other donors on the UN human rights investigation, which is now beginning to show progress after months of delay. Many in the human rights community believe that the U.S. should condition any assistance to the Government of the Congo on full cooperation with the investigation, and Congressional legislation (the Faircloth Amendment) codifies this requirement. Other legislation (the Brooke Amendment) precludes assistance to Governments, like the Congo, which are in arrears in repayment of U.S. debts, even though most of these debts were amassed by the Mobutu Government.

U.S. policy remains one of cautious engagement towards the Congo to avert a failed transition that could lead to renewed cross-border conflict, refugee flows, and other humanitarian disasters requiring costly international

response.

During her visit to Kinshasa in December, the Secretary announced that we would work with Congress to provide a total of approximately \$45-50 million to the Congo. While most funds would be channeled through NGOs, UN agencies, and the World Bank Trust Fund, we also propose a modest and carefully targeted program of assistance to the Government to promote democratic reforms, sound economic management, and improved public health.

What is US policy towards the Congo?

* US policy is to engage the Government and people of the Congo to promote democratic and economic reforms and respect for human rights. We are concerned by recent developments, especially the detention of prominent opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi.

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* We strongly support successful completion of the UN human rights investigation into reported massacres during the 1996-1997 rebellion which ultimately toppled Mobutu.

* Above all, we want to avoid a failed post-Mobutu transition that leads to renewed conflict, refugee flows, and other humanitarian disasters that could destabilize the region and require costly international response.

What is the USG's assessment of the Congolese government?

* The new government has been in power approximately ten months. Its record to date has been mixed at best.

* President Kabila has set a calendar for democratic reform leading to elections and has formed a relatively broad-based cabinet.

* However, the government has banned political party activity and harassed some opposition figures and journalists. Security forces continue to commit abuses, including extra-judicial killing and arbitrary arrest and detention.

* We are particularly concerned by the detention and internal exile of prominent opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, which we have publicly condemned.

* I intend to raise these issues personally in my contacts with President Kabila.

What is your reaction to President Kabila's decision not to meet with your Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa, Jesse Jackson?

* The purpose of Rev. Jackson's visit was to emphasize that government, other political groups, and the civil society all have important and constructive roles to play in the Congo's recovery. He succeeded in conveying that message.

* Rev. Jackson met with a cross-section of political leaders and civil society groups.

* We were disappointed that President Kabila and Foreign Minister Karaha declined to meet with Jackson.

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What is the status of the U.N Human Rights team?

* We are pleased that the team's field deployment has resumed. This appears due to improved cooperation on the Congolese side and a more pragmatic approach on the part of the team.

* The Government of the DROC has agreed to the UN's request to extend the

deadline for completion of the investigation to May 31, as requested by Secretary General Annan.

* We continue to monitor progress of the team closely. We are concerned over recent reports that security forces briefly detained two local citizens who had spoken with the team.

* We remain strongly committed to seeing full cooperation by the Congolese government with this investigation.

In light of recent developments, does the U.S. still plan to provide direct assistance to the Government of the DROC?

* In December, Secretary Albright announced our intention to work with Congress to provide \$35-40 million in bilateral aid and to contribute \$10 million to the World Bank Trust Fund for the Congo. That remains our intention.

* Any bilateral assistance would be channeled principally through NGOs, although we would also plan to provide modest and carefully targeted aid directly to the central government for technical assistance to key ministries (Justice, Health, Finance), to promote democratic reform and the rule of law, and to improve public health.

* We will not provide direct budget support or aid to the security forces. This is carefully targeted assistance in areas intended to help the people of the Congo advance their political and economic transition.

* (if raised) We are well aware of Congressional restrictions on providing certain types of assistance to the Congo. We intend to discuss thoroughly with Congress all available options for proceeding with an assistance program, including possible legislation or exercise of waiver authorities.

- 4 -

What is the U.S. doing to freeze Mobutu's assets?

* We do not believe that Mobutu's family or close associates hold any significant assets in the United States.

* An interagency group has examined the legal requirements to implement an asset freeze. They are complex.

* We're studying our options but have not taken any decision.

* Freezing assets would not in any event give us the authority to turn them over to the Congolese Government or anyone else, absent a judicial determination of claims to title.

* We have consulted with other governments regarding the possibility of coordinated action. Our differing legal authorities however, make coordination extremely difficult.

What has the U.S. done about the three American students kidnapped in 1974? Have we raised this issue with Kabila?

* We have the deepest sympathy for the terrible experience suffered by these Americans, kidnapped twenty-four years ago and held for several months.

* The kidnap victims have met with senior Administration officials at the National Security Council, in the State Department's Bureaus of Human Rights and African Affairs, and with our Ambassador to the Congo, Dan Simpson.

* Since Kabila's re-emergence on the political scene in October 1996, we have

been fully aware of his role in the 1974 kidnapping.

* We have repeatedly made clear to President Kabila that we are taking into account both his current and his historical performance on human rights in determining the nature of our relationship with his new Government.

Drafted: AF/C:JSwan 3/11/98

Cleared: AF/C:MBaas
P:LBassett
S/P:Smorrison
PA:CGoux

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 3/18/98 9:33:25 AM
FROM Barks-Ruggles, Erica
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT question packages [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Leavy, David C.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY David -
Here is what we have so far - as I said it is a bit
of a jumble and not in the shape it needs to be in. Also stuck on
the sheets about the initiatives.

- Erica

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

FSpartnership.doc
FACT SHEET

**PRESIDENT'S PARTANERSHIP FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND OPPORTUNITY AND AFRICAN GROWTH
AND OPPORTUNITY ACT**

President Clinton called for expeditious passage of the African
Growth and
Opportunity Act during the State of the Union Address. The Act
complements the
President's Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in
Africa.

All 42 African countries eligible for the U.S. Generalized System of
Preferences
program (GSP) can participate in some of the Partnership's programs
(Level 1).
Special programs (Level 2) provide substantial additional economic
incentives to
countries that are pursuing aggressive, growth-oriented economic
reforms. The
goals of the Partnership and Act are to help African countries spur

economic
growth, move away from dependence on foreign assistance, and
establish new
business ties with U.S. companies.

Level 1 programs include:

--Renewal of the GSP law that provides greater market access to least
developed
countries, which include 29 African countries;

--Establishment of two large investment funds -- \$150 million and
\$500 million --
that are guaranteed by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation;

--Appointment of an Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Africa
and a senior
adviser for African programs at the Export-Import Bank; and

--USAID programs to strengthen U.S. and African business
organizations and assist
regional economic integration in Southern Africa.

Level 2 Partnership programs include:

--Annual Cabinet-level economic cooperation forums;

--Extinction of concessional bilateral debt for the poorest Level 2
countries;

--USAID programs for bilateral technical assistance, economic policy
reform, and
agricultural market liberalization; and

--If doing so will not harm U.S. industries, the Act allows duty-free,
quota-free
entry under the GSP program of textile and other products currently
excluded from
the program.

Under the Act and Partnership, free trade agreements may also be
considered for
countries that have met the rigorous requirements for negotiations.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT educationinitiative.doc

EDUCATION FOR DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE

The Education for Development and Democracy Initiative aims to accelerate Africa's progress as the 21st century approaches. The quality of African education has declined over twenty years of rapid population growth amid diminishing resources. Over twenty African countries are pursuing educational reforms, but they face the difficult challenge of providing basic education for the fifty percent of Africa's population which is below the age of 15. African governments also need to provide skills to post-secondary students that will enable them to participate in the global community, and to strengthen policy and professional skills in order to empower citizens politically and economically.

The Education for Development and Democracy Initiative seeks to boost African integration into the global community of free market democracies by improving the quality of, and technology for, education in Africa. U.S. experience, resources and skills will be leveraged with African and other efforts already underway in areas where the U.S. has a comparative advantage and can provide value-added, catalytic investments based upon field-proven methods.

Primary and Secondary Education

At the primary and secondary level, building on a workable Peace Corps model, pilot schools will be selected to serve as community resource centers. The resource centers will provide educational materials and serve as a base for implementing improvements in local teacher preparation and training for out of school youth. The resource centers will also provide computers with access to the internet, CD-ROM resources and Desktop Publishing capability.

Hand Crank

Radio Learning equipment and training may also be provided, based on a successful USAID South Africa program. The possibility of gaining local private sector fee-for-service support is being explored.

School-to-school partnerships between the United States and Africa and among African schools will be promoted through access to computer technology and exchanges. Education Initiative efforts will be coordinated with Leland, Globe, Worldwide schools and other U.S. efforts in this area.

Improving girls' education is a key component of the initiative as well. Girls' development will be pursued through several avenues, including leadership identification and possibly scholarships, raising community awareness and support for educating girls, school feeding programs, and mentoring by older girls and women, all of which had been carried out successfully by various U.S. agencies.

Higher Education

At the University level, the initiative will build U.S.-African linkages in the following ways: depending upon need and Africa buy-in, the U.S. will assist with curriculum development aimed at practical, labor-market oriented training using the community college or vo tech model, as well as training in the fields of business, health, science, math, technology and engineering. The initiative will also offer assistance with teacher training, and with linking the university to its community, including fee-for-service activities and community service. Technology linkages will be established or expanded via the internet, and references provided via CD-ROM.

Professional Training and Civil Education

The initiative focus on professional training and civil education will strengthen

U.S. efforts to promote partnerships between the U.S. and African government institutions and civil society, as well among African government institutions and civil societies. Exchanges and visits will be supplemented by in-country training project to enhance policy and operational skills and promote networking across political as well as government/civil society divisions.

Access to technology and internet linkages for policymakers and civil society leaders will be provided through USIA information resource centers, which will also supply computer training modules and other training and reference materials. Finally, Africa civil education efforts aimed at under reached populations and schools will be supported and expanded in order to assist with establishing a democratic culture.

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

greatlakesjus.doc
GREAT LAKES JUSTICE INITIATIVE

With its history of recurrent genocide, armed rebellions, protracted internal conflicts, and mass population displacement, the Great Lakes region of Africa is one of the world's most crisis prone. In Rwanda, for example, up to one million persons were massacred in less than four months in 1994. This genocide was followed by the largest single-day refugee outflow in history: in one day, over 250,000 Rwandans crossed the border into Tanzania. The absence of justice - both political and socio/economic - has been a key contributing factor to the region's crises.

The legacy of genocide and the continuing violence and absence of rule of law are the region's overarching challenges. Without justice, the prospects for

sustainable peace, economic development, and inclusive governance are bleak.

However, the Great Lakes region also possesses tremendous promise.

New leaders

and vibrant civil societies are committed to the search for pragmatic, and

collaborative solutions to the region's ills. Through the Great Lakes Justice

Initiative (GLJI) we will work together as partners with both the people and the

governments of the region to build judicial systems which are impartial,

credible, effective, and ethnically inclusive. GLJI will be pursued in conjunction with other U.S. efforts to address ongoing political, economic, and

security challenges in the region.

Secretary Albright announced our intent to launch a GLJI when she traveled to

Africa in December 1997. The Administration's FY 99 budget request included \$30

million for implementation of the GLJI. The countries currently slated to

participate are Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi.

Partnership is the hallmark of this initiative. We therefore plan to define

further the vision and to develop the specific operational goals in concert with

African leaders, civil society, international and indigenous NGOs, and the donor

community.

Likely activities include: 1) Training for local lawyers, judges, police, and

others essential to the judicial process at the national and local level;

2)

Public outreach and education to foster greater societal cooperation and

reconciliation; 3) Support for conflict prevention and alternative dispute

resolution; 4) Support for international mechanisms of accountability, such as

the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR); 5) Support for military

justice mechanisms.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

greatlakesjustice.doc

GREAT LAKES JUSTICE INITIATIVE

The Great Lakes Justice Initiative is a Presidential Initiative to help

end the culture of violence, vengeance and impunity that has devastated this region for generations. The initiative will focus on supporting African efforts in the Great Lakes region to transform the justice sector into an instrument of peace and prosperity. The President is pledging \$30 million for an expanded U.S. commitment to help the public and private sectors of Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo develop justice systems that are impartial, credible, inclusive and effective.

The legacy of the recent genocide, the continuing cycle of violence and the absence of rule of law are clearly overarching regional challenges. Respect for the rule of law, and legal institutions which are perceived as fair and impartial by the people, are also critical elements for social peace, democracy and good governance, and equitable economic growth. When bolstered by concurrent efforts to link political rights to economic rights at all levels, for all peoples, changes in the justice system can act as an important catalyst for peace.

The primary partners for this endeavor are governmental and key non-governmental actors in Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The initiative will engage them in a public-private partnership to achieve its goals. Other African countries might also play important roles. The cooperation and commitment of other donors to coordinating their efforts within an African-driven plan is critical to this undertaking. The overall effort will also benefit from the participation of U.S. based and international (including African) private sector organizations which have an interest and resources to contribute.

The hallmarks of this initiative are partnership, inclusivity and consultation with key counterparts in each country. The initiative will build a strategically

focused and coordinated effort to strengthen institutions at all levels simultaneously. It will help to develop or strengthen institutions that improve coordination and forge linkages between these levels; support elements of integrated national reform programs which might include capacity building within key sectoral institutions (courts, prosecution, police, bar associations, law schools); support initiatives that foster community development, reconciliation and peaceful coexistence, and community based dispute resolution and prevention mechanisms. Partnerships will be encouraged between local communities and national institutions that enhance a sense of ownership, inclusivity and participation. Activities may range from support to the International Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) at the international level, to support for national justice sector institutions or military court procedures, to support for civil society organizations and efforts at the local level. Activities implemented will build upon and enhance the considerable efforts already underway in the region.

At the forthcoming regional summit the President will engage regional leaders, soliciting their ideas on how to address the political, economic and security challenges of the Great Lakes area. The President will emphasize that partnership will be the guiding principle of the Great Lakes Justice Initiative. These themes elaborate those introduced by the Secretary of State during her recent visit to Africa.

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* We remain strongly committed to seeing full cooperation by the Congolese government with this investigation.

In light of recent developments, does the U.S. still plan to provide direct assistance to the Government of the DROC?

* In December, Secretary Albright announced our intention to work with Congress to provide \$35-40 million in bilateral aid and to contribute \$10 million to the World Bank Trust Fund for the Congo. That remains our intention.

* Any bilateral assistance would be channeled principally through NGOs, although we would also plan to provide modest and carefully targeted aid directly to the central government for technical assistance to key ministries (Justice, Health, Finance), to promote democratic reform and the rule of law, and to improve public health.

* We will not provide direct budget support or aid to the security forces. This is carefully targeted assistance in areas intended to help the people of the Congo advance their political and economic transition.

* (if raised) We are well aware of Congressional restrictions on providing certain types of assistance to the Congo. We intend to discuss thoroughly with Congress all available options for proceeding with an assistance program, including possible legislation or exercise of waiver authorities.

- 4 -

What is the U.S. doing to freeze Mobutu's assets?

- * We do not believe that Mobutu's family or close associates hold any significant assets in the United States.

- * An interagency group has examined the legal requirements to implement an asset freeze. They are complex.

- * We're studying our options but have not taken any decision.

- * Freezing assets would not in any event give us the authority to turn them over to the Congolese Government or anyone else, absent a judicial determination of claims to title.

- * We have consulted with other governments regarding the possibility of coordinated action. Our differing legal authorities however, make coordination extremely difficult.

What has the U.S. done about the three American students kidnapped in 1974? Have we raised this issue with Kabila?

- * We have the deepest sympathy for the terrible experience suffered by these Americans, kidnapped twenty-four years ago and held for several months.

- * The kidnap victims have met with senior Administration officials at the National Security Council, in the State Department's Bureaus of Human Rights and African Affairs, and with our Ambassador to the Congo, Dan Simpson.

- * Since Kabila's re-emergence on the political scene in October 1996, we have been fully aware of his role in the 1974 kidnapping.

- * We have repeatedly made clear to President Kabila that we are

taking into
account both his current and his historical performance on human
rights in
determining the nature of our relationship with his new Government.

Drafted: AF/C:JSwan 3/11/98

Cleared: AF/C:MBaas
P:LBassett
S/P:Smorrison
PA:CGoux

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

QsAsburundi.doc
BURUNDI: PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Background

Burundi suffers from a bitter internecine struggle between a Tutsi minority, which controls the government and military, and a disfranchised Hutu majority. At present the Government of Burundi (GOB) is in a civil war with several Hutu rebel groups. An attempted coup in 1993 resulted in the assassination of the country's first democratically elected President. Approximately 200,000 Burundians perished in subsequent ethnic killings and army reprisals. In July 1996 Tutsi military leaders overthrew the Hutu President and established an interim government under former President Buyoya.

Regional states imposed an economic embargo in lieu of a regional military response to the coup. While the embargo has been modified to allow humanitarian goods into Burundi, the regional states maintain that the sanctions are necessary to pressure the GOB to negotiate a political settlement to the conflict.

Regional all-party peace talks are currently suspended. At a February 21 summit, regional leaders reaffirmed certain conditions for the GOB to meet before resuming negotiations.

U.S.-Burundi relations have worsened because of the 1996 coup. We continue to engage the GOB, stressing the importance of a negotiated settlement to the conflict and a return to democracy. USG development assistance was suspended in response to the coup, but a modest humanitarian assistance program continues.

Why is Burundi not being invited to the Kampala regional summit?

* The GOB was not invited because the regime which took power in 1996 overthrew a democratically elected president and government and is subject to regional sanctions.

* USG diplomats will continue to engage GOB officials at all levels in an effort to promote a negotiated political settlement to the civil war.

What is the U.S. doing to help stem the violence in Burundi?

* The level of violence remains troubling. With negotiations stalled, frustrated rebel groups may intensify their military efforts. It is imperative that an inclusive negotiating framework be re-established as soon as possible.

* USG diplomats, including Special Envoy Howard Wolpe, are working closely with the regional states, the Burundian Government, and the international community to reinvigorate the regional peace process.

* We continue to stress the futility of a military solution to the conflict, emphasizing that only a negotiated political settlement will further lasting peace in Burundi.

Why did the regional states impose a blockade on Burundi?

* The regional states imposed an embargo on Burundi in lieu of a regional military response to the July 1996 coup. The region modified the sanctions in April 1997 to allow for the flow of humanitarian goods.

* The regional states have refused to lift the sanctions, arguing that the sanctions are a necessary diplomatic tool to pressure the military government to negotiate a return to democracy.

* The USG supports the regional embargo as a means to force the military regime to negotiate a political settlement.

What is the state of U.S. bilateral relations with Burundi?

* The 1996 coup, which overthrew the democratically elected President, negatively impacted US-Burundian relations. While we do not recognize the current regime as legitimate, we continue to work with the GOB at all levels in an effort to further a negotiated political settlement that culminates in a restoration of democracy.

* Our policy priorities in Burundi are humanitarian in focus. USG diplomacy concentrates on preventing a return to large scale ethnic killings, ending the cycle of violence and impunity, and promoting a return to democratic government.

What is the level of U.S. aid to Burundi?

* The USG was legally obligated to suspend all development assistance to Burundi because of the 1996 coup in which a democratically elected President

was
overthrown by the military.

* USG humanitarian assistance to Burundi totaled \$10.8 million in fiscal year 1997. Assistance is channeled through UN agencies and USG-vetted Non-governmental agencies (NGOs). In addition, USAID's Food for Peace distributed \$65 million in food assistance throughout the Great Lakes region in 1997.

* USAID provided \$4.2 million in grants to US-based NGOs for reconciliation promotion projects during 1997.

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

QsAselephant.doc
PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Elephants/Ivory Trade

Does the United States support Botswana's policies on elephants and the resumption of trade in elephant ivory?

* The U.S. accepts the decision last year of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). The Convention of Parties approved a proposal that would enable Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe eventually to resume limited trade in elephant products, including ivory.

* We have pledged to work with the governments of Botswana and other countries to ensure that the CITES criteria and controls for trade in ivory are properly implemented.

* Botswana's thriving elephant population is testimony to the government's

commitment to protect the species.

* Does the U.S. support the killing of elephants for profit?

* No, the United States does not support killing elephants for profit.

Cattle Fences

Does the U.S. support Botswana's use of cattle fences that may impede wildlife migratory patterns?

* As a landlocked, beef-exporting country committed to wildlife conservation, Botswana faces unique challenges in preventing the spread of bovine disease across open borders. We understand the need to strike a balance among the competing interests of the wildlife conservation, the livestock industry and the wildlife tourism industry.

* The government is studying alternatives to veterinary cordon fences that were erected against the spread of highly contagious bovine disease that inadvertently disrupt wildlife migratory patterns.

* We support the government's efforts to work with interested groups to address the converging concerns of preventing the spread of disease in livestock with minimal interference in the movements of wildlife.

* We are encouraged by the helpful role SADC has played in this process and urge it to remain engaged and active.

Border Dispute with Namibia

What is the U.S. Government's view of the current border dispute between Botswana and Namibia?

* We support the diplomatic and legal approaches that both governments have undertaken to date, including referral of concerns to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the case at the International Court of Justice.

Background:

The Government of Namibia (GON) is claiming as its own an often-submerged bank of the Linyanti River between Botswana and Namibia. Botswana maintains that this area is within its own borders. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) recently endorsed the establishment of a joint Namibia-Botswana technical commission to resolve the border question. A dispute over ownership of Sedudu (Botswana)/Kasikili(Namibia) island in the Chobe River has been referred to the International Court of Justice in The Hague for adjudication.

U.S. Military Assistance to Botswana

Is the U.S. supplying military equipment to the Government of Botswana? How does this impact the dispute with Namibia?

* The U.S. has excellent relations with both Botswana and Namibia, including productive security assistance relationships with both governments. We have supplied military training and equipment to Namibia and Botswana under the International Military Education and Training (IMET), biodiversity, and excess defense articles (EDA) programs.

* Our assistance is based, in part, on both countries' positive records as practitioners of democracy. Our security assistance relationship with Botswana is older, given Namibia's more recent independence. We are not aware of any specific impact that U.S. security assistance to either country would have on the border dispute with Namibia.

Democratic Transition

Is President Masire's retirement truly an example of a democratic transition, or is this actually the smooth hand-off of a one-party state from one leader to another?

* While the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has been in power since independence, Botswana is a multi-party democracy with no restrictions on political activity. Seven elections have been held since independence. In the 1994 elections, contested by 9 parties, the opposition Botswana National Front (BNF) captured 13 out of 40 parliamentary seats.

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT QsAskenya.doc

KENYA: PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Background

Kenya and the United States have enjoyed consistently close relations. We have a longstanding partnership for development, dating back before independence. We have worked together closely in response to regional humanitarian crises and security threats. In recent years, however, U.S. pressure for democratization, economic reform, and improved governance has generated friction.

After both domestic and U.S.-led international pressure led the Government to abandon one-party rule in 1991, Kenya has made halting but discernable progress towards democracy. Presidential and parliamentary elections held December 29-30, 1997, while not free and fair, were in many ways better than those held in 1992. President Moi, in power since 1978, won the election with 40% of the vote, defeating an ethnically divided opposition. The ruling party, KANU, obtained only a four-seat majority in Parliament.

Police used force to break up pro-reform demonstrations on several occasions in 1997. Reforms introduced by the government in October defused much of the tension and did permit the opposition relative freedom to organize, meet and campaign. A variety of shortcomings in the electoral climate remained, however, and the logistically flawed elections left many dissatisfied. We are urging the government to make the planned process of constitutional review a broadly inclusive one. Ethnic violence reappeared in the Rift Valley in January. The U.S. Embassy joined 21 other missions in criticizing the GOK's slow response to the fighting, and Special Envoy Jesse Jackson visited clash areas in early February. He delivered a strong message on the government's duty to protect all citizens and urged reconciliation. Government-linked ethnic groups appear to have initiated the attacks on opposition-leaning Kikuyu communities, but many victims ultimately came from both sides of the ethnic divide. Over one hundred people died in the clashes.

Why has President Moi been invited to the Kampala Regional Summit?

* Kenya is a traditional partner in East Africa and we cooperate closely on regional issues. The size of its economy and its transportation links make it a linchpin of the region. The Governments of Uganda and the United States considered Kenya's importance in extending the invitation.

* We consult with President Moi on a range of regional issues. He is the chair of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-sponsored peace talks on Sudan. Kenya has also played a constructive role in the past on talks aimed at resolving conflicts in Somalia and the Great Lakes.

* President Clinton looks forward to the opportunity to hear President Moi's

ideas on important regional issues and to express our own concerns about questions of economic reform and good governance in the region.

What is the state of our bilateral relationship with Kenya?

* Kenya and the United States enjoy close and cooperative relations. We have a longstanding partnership for development before independence. We have worked together closely in response to regional humanitarian crises and security threats.

* As a friend, we take an abiding interest in Kenya's progress towards more effective democracy. Our government has played an active role in encouraging the development of Kenya's civil society. We are encouraged by the commitment of the Kenyan people to democracy, evident in the increased turnout on election day. An impressive 68% of registered voters cast a ballot. Our goal is to help Kenya establish a democratic system that will honor this emerging democratic culture.

What is the level of U.S. assistance to Kenya?

* USAID's annual development assistance to Kenya averages about \$20 million. This money is concentrated in population and health programs, including child survival and efforts to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS. In addition, we are working to promote small enterprise, supporting Kenya's environmental conservation efforts, and promoting democratization.

* Virtually all of our development assistance is channeled through non-governmental organizations.

* In addition to development assistance, we have provided substantial food and disaster assistance in recent years in response to cycles of drought and flooding. In FY 1997, our food and disaster assistance amounted to almost \$5 million.

* Peace Corps has over 100 volunteers in Kenya.

* The Department of Defense and the Centers for Disease Control have both worked to combat infectious diseases in Kenya. DOD has provided logistical support for humanitarian response efforts as well.

What are the prospects for peaceful democratic reform in Kenya?

* Kenya faces substantial challenges in its evolution to a free and fair democracy, but there are also grounds for hope.

* Among the challenges are the country's fiscal and economic difficulties. They have created a difficult environment for many Kenyans. Ethnic tensions, often manipulated by political or community leaders, complicate efforts by those pursuing inclusive dialogue on political reform.

* The challenges can be overcome if the government asserts a constructive leadership role. President Moi, his Ministers and the ruling-party should welcome the apparent interest of so many Kenyans in questions of democracy and economic policy. The growth of Kenya's robust civil society, its relatively open public dialogue about reform, and its millions of experienced voters give us grounds for hope.

Why is President Clinton not visiting Kenya?

* President Clinton gave full consideration to a stop in Kenya during his visit. Unfortunately, he was able to schedule only a handful of countries during this visit and was not able to add Kenya.

* Kenya is an important U.S. partner in Africa and a key to growth and stability in East Africa. For this reason, once it became certain that he would not be able to go to Kenya on this trip, the President was interested in holding direct talks with President Moi in Uganda. We are pleased he will have that opportunity.

Does the United States hold the Kenyan Government responsible for recent ethnic violence in Kenya, as Special Envoy Jackson stated? If so, why is President Clinton meeting with President Moi?

* Special Envoy Jesse Jackson made clear our belief that the Government of Kenya has a unique and natural responsibility to see to the protection of all of its citizens, regardless of their ethnic identity or political persuasion. He conveyed that view directly to the Government, and we are pleased that the violence has abated.

* Rev. Jackson did not assign blame, to the government or any other political group, for starting or sustaining the conflict. We encourage more effective action to bring the perpetrators to justice, but we discourage a singular focus on pointing fingers. Kenyans need to find ways to overcome the divisions that have fed the sort of tragic violence we witnessed in January and February.

* President Clinton's decision to meet with President Moi in Uganda does not imply agreement with the Government of Kenya on all matters. One of the most important purposes of such meetings can be to explore areas of disagreement and to ensure that our concerns, whether they be about democracy, ethnic reconciliation, or economic reform, are clearly conveyed.

Will the U.S. support the renewal of Kenya's IMF programs to help it repair the damage caused by El Nino flooding?

* We are sympathetic to the suffering of Kenyans caused by flooding. We are pleased to have provided substantial amounts of food aid and logistical support for its distribution. In addition, we have provided technical experts to combat outbreaks of infectious diseases.

* It is important, in our view, that Kenya make the fundamental governance and policy reforms outlined by the IMF before its Enhanced Structural

Adjustment
Facility is resumed.

* Basic reforms are needed to give confidence to private investors and to ensure that multilateral credits are well used. Our interest is in seeing Kenya create the fiscal and policy environment needed to promote rapid economic growth and meet the needs of its people.

2

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

QsAsRwanda.doc
PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

RWANDA

Background:

The current Government of Rwanda (GOR) took power following the genocide in 1994 that claimed up to one million lives and prompted massive refugee flows. The GOR continues to face an insurgency campaign mounted by ex-Rwandan Army (FAR) and Interahamwe militia, mainly in the northwest. There are credible reports of human rights violations by the Rwandan Army, but particularly by the insurgent forces. We have urged both the rebel and government forces to respect the lives of non-combatants. We have been strong supporters of the UN sponsored International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). Through our new Great Lakes Justice Initiative we will assist in improving Rwanda's domestic judicial system. Over 120,000 persons are in prison in Rwanda on genocide-related charges. The vast majority of the Rwandan refugees who fled the country in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide have returned home and been successfully and safely reintegrated into society.

Credible reports of human rights abuses committed by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) have led to vociferous criticism of our military assistance program to Rwanda. In fact, our modest military assistance is aimed at preventing those very types of abuses. Training has focused primarily on humanitarian/civic themes such as demining, military justice, rule of law, and human rights. We also conducted marksmanship training in summer 1996, for one-half day for thirty students as part of a routine training package.

Why is President Clinton visiting Rwanda?

* The President is going to Rwanda to affirm genocide is unacceptable wherever it occurs. He is going to Rwanda to remind the world of the unspeakable horror which visited Rwanda and which continues to haunt the Great Lakes region of Africa. The President will also acknowledge that the international community shares with Africans, some responsibility for failing to respond adequately to the 1994 genocide.

* President Clinton applauds the efforts of the Rwandese people to live together and to rebuild a united nation. Americans stand with Rwanda as it seeks to build national institutions accountable to all its citizens. The President's discussion will focus on ways to avert future tragedies and promote human rights, justice, economic development, democratization, and regional stability.

How do you assess the fighting in Rwanda today? Is the situation deteriorating?

* Fighting in Rwanda intensified with the return of the former Rwandan army known as the ex-FAR and the genocidal militias known as the Interahamwe from eastern Zaire late 1996 and early 1997. These were the soldiers who originally launched the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 which claimed up to one million lives.

* Most of the fighting is localized in the northwest area of the country.

Although GOR troops continue to win every head-to-head battle with the insurgents, the rebels persist in their terrorist attacks.

* The insurgents have no visible command and control structure and no articulated political platform. We cannot predict how long the insurgency will last.

* We deplore the violence in the northwest and are especially concerned by the number of civilians who have died as a result. We urge both rebel and government forces to respect the lives of non-combatants.

Why is the U.S. not more vocal in condemning human rights abuses by the Government during counterinsurgency operations in the northwest?

* We have been vocal and we will continue to stand firm on the necessity of protecting civilians, in all cases, including during counterinsurgency operations. We have repeatedly communicated this view to the Rwandan government publicly and privately, most recently by Secretary Albright. When President Clinton meets with President Bizimungu and Vice President Kagame he too will emphasize the importance which the US attaches to this issue.

* Recently there has been a decline in the number of abuses attributable to the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). The GOR has also shown an increasing willingness to court-martial those soldiers accused of human rights abuses. These are positive developments which we will continue to monitor closely.

What is the US view regarding accusations that Rwanda committed massacres in Zaire in 1996-97?

* We view these accusations seriously. We have consistently called for an investigation into reports of refugee massacres in Zaire, and due process and accountability for those found responsible for atrocities.

* We support the efforts of the UN Human Rights Investigation in Congo. The UN team is currently in the interior carrying out its mission.

* The Government of Rwanda has informed us that they also view accusations of Rwandan involvement in massacres seriously, and will hold accountable any Rwandan soldiers involved in any atrocities.

What is the United States doing to counter the reemergence of destabilizing hate radio messages?

* On December 11, 1997, there was a broadcast from Bukavu in Eastern Congo which encouraged the expulsion and/or extermination of ethnic Tutsis. This broadcast coincided with the movement of extremist Hutu militiamen from eastern Congo to Rwanda. We have detected no transmissions since December 11. Although this may have been an isolated event, we are well aware of the previous devastating impact of hate radio in the region and are therefore preparing strategies to counter this threat.

* Our strategy focuses on augmenting messages of ethnic cooperation, healing, and reconciliation. Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts in local languages in the region and enjoys a wide audience. We are examining how we might better utilize VOA programming to promote peace and inclusiveness. We have also sent a team to the region to assess how we might further advance reconciliation through grassroots activities such as village plays and radio dramas.

Do we know who is responsible for supporting the rebels responsible for the continued violence, and can we do anything to shut off that support?

* We do not know precisely who is responsible for supporting the rebels. We continue to examine this issue and work to obtain the most definitive possible information.

* In an effort to gain more information and to eventually help thwart rebel supply lines, we are asking the United Nations to reinstate the UN Arms Flow Investigative Commission. We have canvassed our Security Council partners and there is broad support for this initiative. The task is to identify adequate financial support.

What does the US think of the re-education camps run by the Rwandan government?

* Following the massive return of refugees in late 1996, the GOR determined there was a need for a program to counter the message of hate/genocide with which many refugees were bombarded in the camps of Eastern Zaire. It instituted "Reeducation camps" which are month-long programs for adults comprised mostly of lectures/discussions which focus on the importance of forging a national identity.

* Most reeducation camps were closed at the end of 1997. However the GOR does plan to continue the program in some form. Participation in a reeducation program is a condition for civil service employment. This program has had no effect on the majority of the returned refugees since over 80% of that population are small agricultural farmers.

* We believe that reeducation seminars are a potentially useful method to facilitate ethnic unity and counteract extremist propaganda. However, we do not agree that participation should be a prerequisite for employment; rather, we believe that the programs should be more widely and frequently available.

Can you comment on USG military assistance to Rwanda? Why has the USG trained an army accused of severe human rights abuses in both eastern Zaire and northwestern Rwanda?

* One of the primary goals of our military training in Rwanda is to help prevent human rights abuses. Following the genocide of 1994 in which up to one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed, the United States committed itself to help rebuild Rwandan society. Part of this rebuilding effort is assistance to the Rwandan military. Our assistance focuses on professionalizing the RPA and training its officers to work in a multi-ethnic, pluralistic environment. We have provided training in humanitarian demining, rule of law, human rights and public information, and in support for refugee repatriation.

* We provided a half day of marksmanship training to 30 students in 1996 as part of our standard package of professional soldier training for the military. Through this assistance program, we aim to promote the protection of human rights and to help Rwanda to develop a disciplined, professional, apolitical military.

* We have protested military excess and indiscriminate use of force to the highest levels of Rwanda government. In recent months, there has been a decline in the number of abuses attributable to the RPA. This is a positive development, which of course bears close monitoring.

* We note that a military prosecutor who has been instrumental in court-martialing Rwandan soldiers accused of human rights abuses was trained under the U.S. military assistance program.

Over 100,000 persons are in prison in Rwanda in absolutely horrid conditions. Many of the prisoners have not even been advised of the charges against them. What is the US doing about this issue?

* This is a very complex, tough issue. Clearly the victims of genocide deserve justice. The guilty must be held accountable for their actions. The culture of impunity has been a big contributor to the cycles of violence which have plagued

the Great Lakes region of Africa.

* Equally important is ensuring due process for the accused. It is clear that the GOR will not be able to process all of the current cases through normal judicial means. It will remain politically difficult, however, for the GOR to consider "alternative mechanisms" until the masterminds of the genocide are convicted.

* We are encouraged by the progress which the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has made within the past year. Both indictments and surrenders to the Tribunal are up. We are hopeful that the tribunal will soon complete its first trials.

* Our new Great Lakes Justice Initiative (GLJI) will help further develop Rwanda's domestic justice system. Through GLJI we hope to help develop judicial systems which are impartial, credible, and effective throughout the region.

It is now public knowledge that Rwandan troops played a key role in the overthrow of the Mobutu government. Are Rwandan troops still in Congo? What is our policy on this issue?

* Ex-FAR and Interahamwe soldiers used the refugee camps in former eastern Zaire to launch cross-border attacks on Rwanda. This posed a national security threat for Rwanda which eventually led to their participation in the overthrow of the Mobutu government. Nevertheless, throughout the crisis in Zaire, the U.S. worked energetically to achieve a negotiated solution to the conflict and condemned all cross-border military activity.

* Most Rwandan troops have now been withdrawn from Congo. It is up to sovereign governments to determine the nature of their military alliances and cooperation. We do believe, however, that the withdrawal of all foreign forces from

the
Democratic Republic of Congo could have a stabilizing influence on
the region.

Rwandan VP Kagame is one member of a new generation of African
activist leaders.

How much activism does the USG endorse, at least tacitly, by
allowing governments
such as Rwanda to shape events outside their own countries?

* Regional alliances based on economic and political concerns are a
logical
outcome of increased regional and global interdependence. Regional
economic
cooperation could help increase Africa's participation in the global
economy with
one possible benefit being a reduced need for aid from the west. We
will
continue to encourage regional cooperation in Africa provided it falls
within the
bounds of internationally accepted norms and laws.

What can you tell us about genocide suspect Elizaphan Ntakirutimana
who is
currently imprisoned in Texas? Why haven't we surrendered him to
the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda?

* Mr. Nkatirutimana has been indicted by the International Criminal
Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) on genocide and other serious violations of
international
humanitarian law. He was arrested and jailed in Texas in 1996 with a
view to his
surrender to the Tribunal. In December 1997, an U.S. magistrate
ordered his
release finding the relevant U.S. statute unconstitutional and that there
was a
lack of probable cause. Subsequently the ICTR submitted additional
information
to the court and Mr. Ntakirutimana was re-arrested last month.

* We strongly believe that there is a proper legal and factual basis for
surrender of the indictee to the Tribunal and that it is up to the
Tribunal to
determine this individual's guilt or innocence.

* We cannot speculate as to when the indictee might be surrendered
but hope that

it will be soon.

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT QsAsSA.doc

PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Background:

South Africa and the United States have close bilateral relations based on our diverse and open societies, an attachment to democratic principles and human rights, and a shared vision of a peaceful and prospering international community.

Since apartheid ended with the election of Nelson Mandela as President in 1994, government, business, and personal links between the two countries have expanded rapidly. The U.S.-South Africa Binational Commission, created in 1994 during Mandela's state visit to Washington, has helped to revitalize a relationship that had been stunted during the final decades of apartheid. The Commission, co-chaired by Vice President Gore and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, has promoted bilateral cooperation in such areas as trade and investment, agriculture, human resources development and education, conservation and the environment, energy, science and technology, and defense.

South Africa, richly endowed with natural resources, is undertaking the daunting task of transforming its government, economy, and society to expunge the damage of apartheid. The ruling African National Congress (ANC) has instituted policies to extend essential social services to the historically disadvantaged

majority of
South Africa's 38 million people and to stimulate economic growth
and jobs.
Mandela will retire when his term ends in April 1999, and Mbeki,
now president of
the ANC, is the current favorite to succeed him.

Why is President Clinton visiting South Africa?

* The United States was pleased to host President Mandela's State
Visit in 1994.

President Clinton was honored to accept President Mandela's
invitation to pay a
State Visit to South Africa in connection with his current tour of
Africa.

* The exchange of State Visits symbolizes the warm and friendly
relations between
the U.S. and South Africa.

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* South Africa's struggle to end apartheid and its successful transition
to
democracy are history-making events that captured the attention and
the
admiration of the world.

* Since the establishment of constitutional, non-racial democracy with
the
elections of April 1994, South Africa has been a beacon of hope for
Africa and
the world, and it has quickly become a leading member of the
community of
nations.

* The United States and the new South Africa share a deep attachment
to peace,
democracy, and human rights. Our open and diverse societies have
much in common,
and our government, business, and personal links are growing rapidly.

* The United States highly values its close relations with South Africa
and seeks
to improve our ties further.

* First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton visited South Africa last March.

What will the President's visit to South Africa accomplish?

- * First and foremost, it will underscore the friendship between our two countries and the determination of the United States to improve our ties even further.

- * The President will meet with President Mandela to review developments in our relations and to exchange views on issues of mutual concern. Among other topics, President Clinton will emphasize the commitment of the United States to an enduring and cooperative friendship and our determination to continue helping South Africa -- in line with the government's priorities -- to achieve its goals.

- * The President will take advantage of the opportunity to explain to President Mandela the nature of the United States' new engagement in Africa.

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- * The President will also highlight rapidly growing U.S. investment in South Africa and the southern African region.

- * The visit will allow the President to witness first hand South Africa's transition to democracy.

What is the state of our bilateral relations with South Africa?

- * Our bilateral relations are excellent.

- * U.S.-South African relations had been distant and strained, particularly during the final years of apartheid. The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 imposed wide-ranging sanctions, and many U.S. businesses had withdrawn from South Africa.

- * This estrangement began to change in the early 1990s as South

Africans negotiated the end of apartheid. Following the 1994 elections, which resulted in the election of Nelson Mandela as President and the establishment of non-racial, constitutional democracy, U.S.-South African relations warmed rapidly.

* During Mandela's October 1994 State Visit to the U.S., Presidents Clinton and Mandela agreed to establish a Binational Commission (BNC) to reinvigorate bilateral cooperation in areas ranging from trade and investment to conservation and the environment.

* The Commission, co-chaired by Vice President Gore and Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, has succeeded in broadening cooperation and contacts in many areas. We regret that the Iraq crisis required the U.S. to postpone the February meeting of the Commission in Pretoria, but we remain committed to the BNC process.

* In the past four years we have concluded a Bilateral Tax Treaty, a Civil Aviation Agreement, and numerous other measures that have set the stage for increased trade and commerce.

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* We are particularly pleased that on February 27, Vice President Gore and Deputy President Mbeki announced the lifting of U.S. prohibitions against doing business with South African government defense firms, thereby normalizing our defense trade relations.

* These are all examples of increasing U.S.-South African cooperation to strengthen our bilateral relations.

What is the level of U.S. bilateral assistance to South Africa?

* In 1994, to help support the goals of the new South African

government,
President Clinton announced a three-year assistance package of nearly \$600 million. We then announced in 1996 the current ten-year, \$435 million program.

* There are 68 Peace Corps Volunteers in South Africa.

Lifting of Armscor Debarment

What does the lifting of debarment mean for U.S./South African defense trade?

* On February 27, Vice President Gore and Deputy President Mbeki announced suspension of debarment of Armscor, Denel (and its divisions, including Kentron) and Fuchs Electronics.

* The decision to lift debarment will pave the way for enhanced bilateral defense trade relations and cooperation, and will strengthen our overall national security relationship. We are pleased that our mutual efforts to bring this matter to closure have succeeded, and I extend our thanks to the South African side for its commitment and perseverance.

-5-

Does this give a green light for South Africa to buy U.S.-origin defense articles such as aircraft?

* The lifting of debarment means that defense trade requests involving these and other South African defense entities will be reviewed by the U.S. Government under the same standards and controls that are applied universally. These standards include consistency with U.S. foreign policy and national

security
interests, and furtherance of world peace.

* These South African firms will now be on the same footing as all other firms for license applications. The suspension of debarment removes the presumption that license applications for trade with these firms would be denied.

How will the U.S. control U.S. technology once sold to the South Africans?

* An essential condition for the suspension of debarment was the establishment by South Africa of programs to monitor and control the use of U.S.-origin products and technology. We are satisfied that South Africa has established the required programs ("compliance programs"), and we will continue to work closely with South Africa to ensure that the programs operate effectively.

Background:

With the lifting of debarment, several U.S. defense firms have expressed interest in sales to South Africa. None has yet submitted requests for licenses to market their products in South Africa. The Swedish government has asked us how the lifting of debarment will affect the previously-denied request from a Swedish/British consortium to market SAAB's Gripen fighter (which contains U.S. components, including the engine) in South Africa. We anticipate the Department of State will receive a renewed marketing license request for the Gripen shortly.

-6-

What about other illicit transfers of U.S.-origin defense articles under the previous regime?

* We are working closely with the South African government to resolve this matter, and we are pleased with the progress being made.

Pharmaceuticals/Intellectual Property Rights

Do you have any comment on South Africa's "Medicine's Law," which the U.S. believes infringes on the patent rights of the U.S. pharmaceuticals industry?

* First, we support the South African government's intent to provide safe and affordable health care to all.

* At the same time, we are very concerned about the implications of the law for the patent rights of U.S. pharmaceuticals firms.

What actions will the U.S. take?

* I understand that we continue to discuss our concerns with representatives of the South African government. We hope to be able to develop an approach that will allow South Africa to have more affordable health care without sacrificing internationally accepted intellectual property rights.

* The U.S. pharmaceutical industry has recommended applying U.S. trade legislation ("section 301"), and we will be studying the industry's petition in the coming weeks.

Will the U.S. take South Africa to the WTO?

* We are keeping all our options open. I would like to emphasize, however, our desire to work amicably with South Africa on this matter. At the same time, we will work hard to protect the rights and interests of U.S. pharmaceutical firms.

-7-

Dow Chemicals Subsidiary/Exports to Cuba

How can the U.S. justify hurting South African industry and workers by denying shipments of chemical fertilizers to Cuba under a longstanding

contract?

* We understand your concerns about the impact of U.S. legislation restricting trade with Cuba. Our purpose remains to promote democracy, human rights, and freedom for Cuba's long-suffering people.

* U.S. legislation, specifically the Cuba Democracy Act of 1992, prohibits the shipment of chemicals to Cuba by the South African subsidiary of the U.S. firm Dow Chemical.

* We regret any negative impact on the South African government, your industry, or South African workers.

* We realize South Africa and the U.S. have different policies toward Cuba. Other friends of the U.S. have voiced their strong concerns about U.S.

legislation. Nevertheless, our overriding consideration will continue to be promoting freedom for Cuba, and we will continue to use the means at our disposal to encourage Castro government to permit that freedom.

Carbon Steel Exports to the U.S.

In addition to limiting our trade with Cuba, the U.S. has also placed South Africa at a disadvantage in the area of carbon steel exports to the U.S. Does this mean the U.S. accords South Africa lower priority than other countries, such as Russia and the Ukraine?

* No. Again, we understand the concerns of your government and industry.

* As this is a highly complex subject, let me simply say that the agreement negotiated between the U.S. government and South Africa's steel industry was freely concluded by both parties.

U.S.-South Africa Trade Relations

Why are the U.S. and South Africa engaged in these trade disputes?

* Disagreements between trading partners in today's interdependent and increasingly competitive global marketplace are inevitable. Each government seeks to defend the interests of its industry and people according to established international practice and under operative international agreements.

* We seek to resolve amicably with South Africa disputes of the kind that have arisen lately. Our goal is to increase our trade for the benefit of both countries.

Africa Growth and Opportunity Act

Does the South African government oppose the African trade bill? If so, why?

* I understand South Africa has expressed concern about the linkage the Bill establishes between the economic policies of African nations and their eligibility to benefit under the proposed provisions.

* Nevertheless, I also understand South Africa has expressed its support for the Bill, which we intend as a sign of support for steps being taken by Africans themselves. Many have already expressed their appreciation for this clear signal of support from the United States.

* The Bill enhances trade benefits and political contact at high levels for African countries that are engaged in pursuing reform policies in the areas of trade, investment, economic policy management, and human resources development.

* The philosophy of the Bill is simple: America stands ready to help those African countries that help themselves. Our purpose is to establish a framework

consistent with U.S. trade legislation that will permit African countries to increase their trade with the U.S.

U.S.- South African Friction

Sometimes, the U.S. and South Africa appear to have a "love-hate" relationship.

What accounts for the occasional friction that arises?

* My discussions with President Mandela leave no doubt that our relations are excellent, and I am convinced that both sides are committed to improving our ties even further.

* It is important to remember that we are still in the relatively early stages of building relations across a broad range of areas -- diplomatic, legal, commercial, defense, and others. The Binational Commission has lent valuable momentum to this effort. As we work together to arrive at mutual understandings that protect the interests of both nations, differences are inevitable, but we have already proven our ability to work through complex issues. A prime example of this is the recent lifting of debarment in the Armscor case.

* The U.S. is committed to dialogue on the basis of the complete equality of sovereign states to resolve the problems we encounter and solidify our friendship. We think this process is proceeding very well.

What about allegations that the U.S. tries to dictate policies to South Africa?

* It is a normal practice of diplomacy to make our partners, including South Africa, aware of our positions, and to solicit their cooperation on issues of mutual interest. This is true in all areas -- political, economic/commercial, and security.

* We enjoy excellent communications with the South African government and will

continue to work to build understanding and all areas of our bilateral relationship.

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The Binational Commission

Does the recent U.S. decision to postpone the February meeting the Binational Commission signal decreasing U.S. interest? What will happen to the Commission when Deputy President Mbeki and Vice President Gore are no longer co-chairs?

* It was with extreme reluctance that I asked Vice President Gore to remain in the U.S. to assist me during the crisis with Iraq. This in no way signals a lessening of the U.S. commitment to the Binational Commission.

* As to the future of the Commission, I first want to note the outstanding leadership of Deputy President Mbeki and Vice President Gore, and the lasting and valuable contributions of Ministers, Secretaries, and everyone associated with the Commission and its committees.

* Clearly, much work remains to be done, and we will continue to work hard to enhance our cooperation in the many areas in which the Commission is working.

What has the Commission actually accomplished?

* When President Mandela and I agreed to establish the Commission in 1994, we envisaged it as a mechanism to "jump start" our relations across a broad spectrum of issues. Clearly, it has accomplished that goal, as we have established increasingly productive contacts and programs in many areas: human resources development, education, the environment, sustainable energy use, defense, agriculture, and trade and investment.

* The involvement of the Vice President and Deputy President has provided

critical impetus to various bilateral undertakings, including the Tax Treaty we have signed, the resolution of the Armscor case, signing a Memorandum of Understanding on anti-crime cooperation, and establishing a Defense Committee to enhance our cooperation in this area.

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South African Criticism of USAID

What is the U.S. doing in response to President Mandela's criticism of USAID's South Africa programs?

* I would first like to note that we are proud to be able to assist the South African government and the people of South Africa to achieve their goals. We are committed to working closely with the government on our assistance programs. We are pleased to be helping in the critical areas of education, health care, housing, and urban development. Our programs are also helping to promote economic growth and the consolidation of South Africa's democratic transition.

* The concerns raised have given us an opportunity to sit down once again with the South African government to review our programs.

* Much has happened since South Africa's transition, and the U.S. will make every effort to ensure that our assistance supports the government's objectives.

* I understand that very constructive high level discussions are taking place, and we look forward to continuing to assist South Africa's transformation.

Anti-Crime Assistance

What is the U.S. doing to help South Africa combat its serious crime problem?

* The United States has experienced first hand the destructive effects of crime on society.

* Further, as the world grows more interdependent, crime has become a transnational problem requiring increasing international cooperation.

* For both these reasons, we have been ready to assist South Africa in coping with its crime problem.

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* In July 1996, Vice President Gore and Deputy President Mbeki signed a declaration on Mutual Anti-Crime Cooperation outlining ways our countries can work together to reduce organized crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, and international terrorism.

* Steps we have already taken in cooperation with South Africa include opening offices of our Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and U.S. Customs Service to maintain liaison with South African law enforcement authorities.

* We are working with South African ministries to provide assistance in the areas of investigative training for police and improving coordination between police and prosecutors. In addition, through a USAID program we are helping to increase access by the people to the justice system, for example, through training of lawyers.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

What are U.S. views on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission?

* I would not like to comment in great detail on an internal matter, but

I will
observe that experience in other countries has shown that good faith
national
efforts to come to grips with past conflicts do help to heal wounds and
promote
reconciliation.

* We believe the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, under the
very able
leadership of Archbishop Desmond Tutu (whom we hold in the
highest regard) has
played an important and very constructive role in South Africa's
transition and
is making a real contribution to national reconciliation.

* As a measure of our support, we have provided funds through our
USAID program
to assist the Commission's operations.

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South African Ties to Libya and Cuba

Do you have any comment on South Africa's friendly relations with
Libya and Cuba?

* South Africa is a good friend of the United States. We agree on
many things
and disagree on a few.

* We are committed to managing our differences in this area and
strengthening the
excellent relations we enjoy.

* At the same time, we will continue to advance and defend our own
policies, and
we will continue urging all countries to press countries such as Libya
to cease
their support of international terrorism, stop their abuse of human
rights, and
halt their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

* We will continue to insist that Libya comply in full with all UN
Security
Council Resolutions, including surrendering the Pan Am 103 bombing
suspects for
trial in the U.S. or U.K.

* We believe that South Africa's historic transition to democracy is an example states like Libya and Cuba should follow.

* The time is long overdue for the Cuban government to join its neighbors in the western hemisphere in establishing democratic government, freely elected by the Cuban people, and based on the rule of law and respect for fundamental freedoms.

* The promotion of a peaceful democratic transition and respect for human rights in Cuba is the goal of our policy. We will continue to urge all countries to use their influence to press the Cuban government for a peaceful democratic transition and to respect the human rights of the Cuban people.

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African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)

Are the U.S. and South Africa cooperating on the ACRI?

* The United States remains committed to enhancing the peacekeeping and humanitarian relief capacities of African states.

* We are working closely with African nations, the UN, the OAU, the United Kingdom, France, and other partners to help develop this capacity.

* South Africa and the U.S. have discussed the ACRI initiative on many occasions, and we stand ready to continue consultations.

* We are pleased that our cooperation on defense matters is deepening over time -- as evidenced by the establishment of the Binational Commission Defense Committee -- and we look forward to productive consultations with South Africa on the ACRI and other defense and security matters of mutual interest.

PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Drafted: AF/S:DGatto
3/5/98; x79838

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ARA/CCA:VVockerodt
PM/SRP:PVanSon
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SC/ACRI:JChristensen

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

QsAsSENEGAL.DOC
SENEGAL: PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Is the purpose of the President's stop in Senegal to demonstrate that

the
U.S. is not anti-Islam? How does this stop relate to the overall U.S.
policy to
the Muslim world?

A. The purpose of the President's stop in Senegal is to recognize the
strong
historical and cultural ties between our countries. We have a close
bilateral
relationship dating back to Senegal's independence in 1960.

Senegal plays an active role in the Islamic world. President Diouf is a
previous president of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. He
was
recently honored in Saudi Arabia with the International Prize of the
Faysal
Foundation for Service to Islam.

Senegal is considered a moderate in the Muslim world. It supports the
Middle
East Peace process, has full diplomatic relations with Israel, and is not
sympathetic to pariah states like Libya and Iran.

We greatly valued Senegal's support in the Gulf War.

Like the United States, Senegal is also noted for its religious
tolerance.
People of all religions and denominations are free to practice their
faith.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT QsAsUGANDA.DOC

UGANDA: PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

What is the USG's view of Museveni's human rights record?

* Uganda has made substantial progress on human rights since
President Museveni
came to power. Rule of law has been restored in most of the country.
There
continue to be a handful of extrajudicial killings by security forces

every year,
about which we expressed concerns to the government, but they are a
fraction of
what accompanied the regimes of Idi Amin and Milton Obote.

* Uganda elected a Constituent Assembly, adopted a Constitution, and
held
national elections in 1996. Although those elections were flawed by
restrictions
on political party activity, they marked a step forward for democracy
in Uganda.
The Parliament, though dominated by "Movement" supporters of
President Museveni,
is demonstrating an assertiveness in challenging policies and the
conduct of
government officials.

* We have many areas of concern. Pre-trial detention in Uganda is
excessive, and
prison conditions are harsh. Security forces do beat and on occasion
kill
criminal suspects. The GOU has from time to time detained a critical
journalist
on suspect charges. And we believe that Uganda's current "no-party"
system is
not in the long-term interest of the country.

* Trends are important in assessing Museveni's human rights
performance. Not
only has he brought substantial progress to Uganda over the regimes
that preceded
him, he continues to proactively seek ways to ameliorate ethnic and
religious
divisions in the country. The Government takes steps to punish abuses
against
citizens by security forces, and there is a sense that it is actively
working to
address shortcomings in its justice and prison systems. While the
greater
pluralism is necessary in politics, his efforts to include traditionally
marginalized groups such as women are important.

What does the U.S. think of the Ugandan Government's penchant for
crossing
borders for military purposes as it has in the former Zaire and Sudan?

* The United States Government has expressed concerns to the
Government of Uganda
in the past about reports of cross-border activities. We did so in early
1997 in

response to reports about possible Ugandan involvement in the then Zaire.

* We recognize that Uganda has had legitimate security concerns about the inability or unwillingness of neighboring states to prevent incursions by armed bands from their territories into Uganda. In the case of the former Zaire, certainly, the government of President Mobutu failed to restrain attacks from Zaire's territory against Uganda and its neighbors. In the case of Sudan, the government is in complicity with a brutal insurgency, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which is attacking Uganda.

* Uganda has repeatedly expressed its support for regional efforts to prevent conflict within and between states of the region. We intend to continue working with Uganda on these efforts.

Why is the U.S. such a strong proponent of multi-partyism in some countries like Kenya but has cozied up to Museveni, who has banned political parties from contesting elections?

* The United States has encouraged the expansion of political pluralism throughout Africa. We have advocated political inclusion both privately and publicly in Uganda, and both the Secretary of State and the First Lady did so in 1997.

* We believe that we must approach the goal of expanding political pluralism with a clear knowledge of local realities. We promote core beliefs, like political pluralism, in our approach to both Kenya and Uganda, but we also work within the historical, social and political context of both countries.

* In the case of Uganda, we believe that we can give credit for some unique and positive political developments while emphasizing the need for improvement in other areas.

* We welcome Uganda's efforts to bring women and other traditionally marginalized groups into government, and we look with enthusiasm at its plan to devolve power to local elected bodies. On the question of multipartyism, we have every expectation that the Government of Uganda will search for a means of giving greater space to organized political competition and that it can do so without increasing the danger of ethnic identification or sectarian violence.

What is the U.S. doing about corruption in Uganda?

* The United States has joined other donors in expressing concern that there is a need for greater transparency in the government's regulatory and economic role. The misappropriation of military resources has also been cited as a concern, both by President Museveni himself and by international donors.

* The World Bank has included improved economic governance in its country strategy for Uganda, an emphasis that we support. Bank funding is supporting work by the respected NGO Transparency International, which is working with the business community in Uganda to target areas for Government reform.

* While corruption is a problem in Uganda, the Government has in several cases shown the will to combat it. The recent censure by the Parliament of a ranking Government Minister, the Minister of State for Education, may also demonstrate the emergence of checks and balances on this issue.

CONTEXT

The joint press conference with President Mandela will probably take place at Tuynhuis, the President's office. The bilateral meeting between the two Presidents will have taken place beforehand.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Acknowledge the members of the South African and U.S. press.

ISSUES

- * Discuss bilateral meeting with President Mandela.
- * Underline U.S. commitment to South Africa.
- * Stress desire to strengthen friendship.
- * Discuss U.S. engagement in Africa, as evidenced by your trip and new initiatives.

CONTENTS

- * Very pleased to be in South Africa; Hillary, who visited in March 1997, came away extremely impressed; happy I now have the opportunity to see for myself the extraordinary developments occurring in this remarkable country.
- * President Mandela and I have had very friendly and productive talks about a range of bilateral and international issues.
- * I underscored the commitment of the United States to continue assisting South Africa's government and people to achieve your goals as you seek to transform your country.
- * I also assured President Mandela of our support for South Africa's growing international role and our desire to work with South Africa to meet the

international challenges we face.

* I am pleased that relations between our two countries are excellent.

* The United States wants to strengthen our bilateral relationship. In this regard, we are pleased to have been able to announce last month the lifting of the debarment that had been imposed upon Armscor and other firms. This will open the way for normal defense trade relations between our two countries.

* I am confident that through regular consultations -- such as the Binational Commission -- our mutual understanding on a range of bilateral issues will continue to grow.

* I would also like to note briefly some of our initiatives that demonstrate the commitment of the United States to increase its engagement in Africa. These include the Partnership for Growth and Opportunity and the Africa Education Initiative.

* I would be pleased at this point to take your questions.

3

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT SENQ&A.doc
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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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