

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 9/28/99 4:28:29 PM

FROM Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT africa speech [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Fallin, James (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (PRESS)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Huff, Lindsey E. (PRESS)
Leavy, David C. (PRESS)
Schaefer, Christopher S. (ADMIN/INTERN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
Battenfield, Pat A. (AF)
Byrne, Catherine E. (AF)
Dempsey, Nora B. (AF)
Frazer, Jendayi E. (AF)
Smith, Gayle E. (AF)

CARBON_COPY Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
Crocker, Bathsheba N. (NSA)
Dejban, Donna D. (NSA)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN)
Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Moretz, Sheila K. (NSA)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
Sargeant, Stephen T. (EXSEC)
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L. (NSA)
Storey, Sharon V. (NSA)
Sutphen, Mona K. (NSA)

TEXT_BODY This is the final as prepared for delivery draft.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT africare big.doc
Address by Samuel R. Berger
Africare Dinner
Washington, DC
September 27, 1999

Let me begin by thanking C. Payne Lucas for bringing us together tonight and for all Africare does to help African communities stand on their feet. Africare's approach - listening to local needs, responding to local initiatives, complementing, rather than preempting local efforts, has become America's approach to Africa in the last several years - but you've been at it for almost 30 years. Rev. Tutu, Mrs. Machel [ma-SHELL], Secretary Herman, Brady Anderson, Ambassador Young, Ambassador McHenry, Al Freeman, members of the diplomatic community, members of Congress:

A year and a half ago, during his trip to Africa, the President went to a school outside of Kampala. Surrounded by African children and teachers and community leaders - he said it was time for America to see Africa with new eyes . . . to build a relationship based on mutual respect and mutual interest. I would like to take this opportunity, surrounded by African friends and friends of Africa, to speak about what we are doing to give life to those words.

Let me begin by talking about where we've been. As the President also said in Uganda last year, America has not, throughout history, always done right by Africa.

Let's look just at this century. During the Cold War, America's choice of friends in Africa was too often determined almost exclusively by the strength of their opposition to communism, and not by their commitment to democracy and development. Much of Africa became a battleground -- between tyrants pretending to be anti-communists to receive our aid and tyrants pretending to be Marxists to receive Soviet aid. We did far too little to help develop the potential of Africa's people and Africa's economies.

You could argue that we really didn't have an Africa policy then. We had a global policy of containing communism that saw the entire continent

through
East-West eyes, not through U.S.-African eyes. It did little to advance
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This President has set out to change the lens through which we see
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Our interests are clear. As the bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi
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The same
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It was to advance these interests that the President traveled last year to
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You may have heard recently that some members of Congress have
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If the complaint is that our Administration made Africa more than just
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This is a moment when our engagement with Africa can make a
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More Africans than ever have the opportunity to improve their lives,
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Africa's new democracies still face enormous obstacles, many
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has worked with the Congress to urge passage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act.

Will trade and investment alone eliminate poverty in Africa? Of course not. But without it, Africans will never have what the people of virtually every other region in the world increasingly depend upon: a chance to market the products of their labor and creativity beyond their borders. That is what Africans have told us they want and need. By passing the Growth and Opportunity Act, this Congress can make clear that, just like with the rest of the world, America wants and needs a deeper trade relationship with Africa.

A second obstacle to Africa's progress is the burden of debt. That's why we and our G-7 partners have adopted a plan to reduce by up to 70 percent the outstanding debt of the world's poorest countries in a way that will free resources for education and health. Enough pledges have already been made to allow the first group of nations to start seizing the benefits of this program now.

A third obstacle is the lack of access to education and to the technology that unlocks the door to the information economy. That's why we have launched an Education Initiative, to support primary schools in Africa, to improve the prospects of women and girls, to link African and American educational institutions, and to improve access to the Internet.

A fourth obstacle to development is chronic disease. Over the next 10 years in Africa, AIDS is expected to kill more people than all the wars of the 20th century, combined. Each year, diseases like malaria, tuberculosis, and pneumonia leave millions of children without parents and millions of parents without children. Yet today, only 2% of all global biomedical research is devoted to the

major killers of the developing world. This is both an injustice and an economic calamity for Africa, for no nation can defeat poverty if it is overwhelmed by the needs of the ill.

That's why we have asked the Congress for an additional \$100 million to fight, with Africa, the epidemic of AIDS. And in his address to the UN last Tuesday, the President committed the United States to a concerted effort to accelerate the development and delivery of vaccines for diseases like malaria, AIDS, and TB, working with the private sector to create incentives for medical research that will save lives, and liberate nations from this crippling burden.

But the greatest obstacle to Africa's progress may well be the persistence of conflict, including in Sierra Leone, the Congo, Sudan, Angola and between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

These wars have different causes, but common features. They have brought into stark relief the need for stronger institutions in Africa to ensure that disputes are resolved by peaceful means. Unregulated borders are vulnerable to the spread of small arms and illegal trade; judicial institutions are often too weak to settle grievances and satisfy claims for justice; the regional organizations necessary to guarantee collective security are only now coming into their own.

But something new and promising has also begun to emerge from the horror of these conflicts. In each case, African nations have taken the lead to work for peace. And their leadership has allowed us to address these conflicts in partnership with African leaders and institutions. Instead of facing a choice between abdicating America's responsibility and imposing America's solutions, we have a golden opportunity to support African efforts to stop wars and save lives.

In seizing that opportunity, our first step has been to work with Africans to help strengthen their capacity to unite for peace. For example, we have launched the African Crisis Response Initiative, which has already trained over 4000 African peacekeepers, some of whom have been deployed to Sierra Leone. And we have launched the Great Lakes Justice Initiative, to help strengthen legal institutions and to counter the culture of impunity that has plagued that region.

We have also tried to play an active supporting role when African nations have taken responsibility to end conflicts on their continent.

In Sierra Leone, for example, West African nations took the lead when their peacekeeping organization, ECOMOG, intervened and its leaders finally forged a peace agreement. But I am proud that throughout the process, the United States played a helpful role. Over the last decade, we have provided over \$100 million to ECOMOG. Our Special Envoy for Africa Rev. Jesse Jackson, with Ambassador Howard Jeter, facilitated the signing of a cease fire without preconditions, paving the way for the agreement the regional countries forged in July.

In the Congo, the parties to the conflict forged a cease fire, under the leadership of President Chiluba of Zambia, and with the involvement of Presidents Mbeki of South Africa, Mkapa of Tanzania and Chissano of Mozambique. But here too, I am pleased with the role we played.

For the last year, former Congressman and now Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Howard Wolpe, has flown more than 20 missions in the region, trying to keep the nations talking about common interests, even as they fought over their differences. For the last several months, quietly and behind the scenes, we have facilitated a dialogue between opponents in this tragic war.

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The OAU has taken the lead to resolve the deadly conflict between
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In each of these cases, our role has been to help Africans find African
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I know many of you are asking if, in the wake of Kosovo and East
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First of all, I do not believe that the international community's actions in Kosovo and East Timor shift our attention from Africa's conflicts. On the contrary. They have focused the whole world's attention on the need to strengthen our collective capacity to respond to death and suffering on a massive scale - wherever it may happen. This was the main subject of debate at the UN General Assembly last week. And everyone engaged in that debate understands one of the main challenges we face lies in Africa.

Let's be clear about what that challenge is. Africans are not asking us to respond to conflicts such as those in Sierra Leone, or the Congo, or Ethiopia-Eritrea, with NATO bombing, or by doing the job for them.

Africans are asking us to recognize that their crises are not merely African problems -- any more than Kosovo was purely a European problem or East Timor was purely an Asian problem. Africans are asking the international community to lend tangible support when they take appropriate action to address these crises, or keep the peace. Africans are asking for help in building the institutional capacity to sustain the leadership they are willing to provide. And they are asking the United States in particular whether we are prepared to provide a share of the resources needed to back up the peace we help broker.

The President is deeply committed to meeting this challenge. In his speech last week to the UN, he made clear that neither America nor any other country can do everything, or be everywhere. But he also said: "Simply because we have different interests in different parts of the world does not mean we can be indifferent to the destruction of innocents in any part of the world." He said that "when we are faced with deliberate, organized campaigns to murder whole peoples, or expel them from their land, the care of victims is important, but not enough. We should work to end the violence."

That's why we supported the deployment of additional observers to Sierra Leone in July. It is why we are actively engaged in shaping a peacekeeping mission in that country, a mission that must include ECOMOG, the African force that took the lead when it was time to intervene, and the United Nations, which can mobilize the support of the whole world.

It's why we supported UN Secretary-General Annan in July when he swiftly deployed military liaison officers to the Congo. We will work with the region to consolidate the Congo agreement, which provides not only a cease fire but a blueprint for the region's long-term collective security.

When we reach an agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia - and we must, because the consequences of another round of war would be tragic and devastating -- the United States will directly support the planned OAU mission to keep the peace.

We can and must do more to meet these challenges, and to do that we must pose a challenge to ourselves.

First, we need leadership. I can assure you that President Clinton's commitment to a new relationship between the United States and Africa is strong and deep-rooted.

Second, our Congress must recognize that it is in our national interest to invest in Africa's future, and to provide the resources necessary to keep the peace and prevent the wars.

Congress has been willing to fund aid to the victims of conflict and famine in Africa. Right now, our spending on humanitarian assistance for a handful of African crises is twice as high as our spending on development for the entire continent. It is more than 10 times as high as our spending on peacekeeping.

And this year's spending bill for foreign operations cuts our request for development assistance to Africa by more than 40 percent. We will fight that, because we'd save money as well as lives if we invested more in prevention.

Third, we need the continuing commitment of the American people to their own partnership with the people of Africa. The friends of Africa gathered here tonight, as individuals and as participants in the National Summit on Africa, the Constituency for Africa, and the untiring campaign of C. Payne Lucas and Africare, are key to our collective success.

I've described to you our efforts to make good on the promise of a new partnership with Africa. We are headed in the right direction on a long road. I ask for your continuing support and leadership in keeping us moving down that road.

History provides no guarantees, but neither does it place artificial barriers on what we can achieve. The last decade of this century has seen so many hard earned miracles, from the end of the Cold War, to the spread of democracy to more than half the world's people, to the birth of freedom in South Africa and Nigeria. Surely, if all this is possible, Africa can overcome its difficulties and find its way into the global mainstream -- with peace and rising prosperity for all its people.

We are united here today not just by our hope, but by our belief that this will happen if we seize the opportunities before us. And we are united by our conviction that working with Africans to reach that goal is not only right, but right for us.

Thank you.

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 9/28/99 5:58:46 PM

FROM Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT September 27 Remarks by Samuel R. Berger at Africare Dinner,
Washington, DC
[UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Fallin, James (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (PRESS)
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Orzulak, Paul K. (SPCHW)
Widmer, Edward L. (Ted) (SPCHW)
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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT SRB Remarks at Africare Dinner 9-27-99.doc
THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release
September 28, 1999

As Prepared for Delivery

REMARKS BY SAMUEL R. BERGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS

AFRICARE DINNER
WASHINGTON, DC

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Let me begin by thanking C. Payne Lucas for bringing us together tonight and for all Africare does to help African communities stand on their feet. Africare's approach - listening to local needs, responding to local initiatives, complementing, rather than preempting local efforts, has become America's approach to Africa in the last several years - but you've been at it for almost 30 years. Rev. Tutu, Mrs. Machel, Secretary Herman, Brady Anderson, Ambassador Young, Ambassador McHenry, Al Freeman, members of the diplomatic community, members of Congress:

A year and a half ago, during his trip to Africa, the President went to a school outside of Kampala. Surrounded by African children and teachers and community leaders - he said it was time for America to see Africa with new eyes . . . to build a relationship based on mutual respect and mutual interest. I would like to take this opportunity, surrounded by African friends and friends of Africa, to speak about what we are doing to give life to those words.

Let me begin by talking about where we've been. As the President also said in Uganda last year, America has not, throughout history, always done right by Africa.

Let's look just at this century. During the Cold War, America's choice of friends in Africa was too often determined almost exclusively by the strength of their opposition to communism, and not by their commitment to

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You could argue that we really didn't have an Africa policy then. We had a global policy of containing communism that saw the entire continent through East-West eyes, not through U.S.-African eyes. It did little to advance our interests in Africa or the interests of Africans.

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Our interests are clear. As the bombings in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi made clear, the battle against terrorism must be waged in and with Africa. The same is true for the fight against proliferation -- both Sudan and Libya have tried to obtain weapons of mass destruction - and for the struggle to protect the global environment. Few Americans are aware that we now obtain between 12 and 14 percent of our oil from Africa, and that this could increase to 20 percent over the next decade. Africa is also home to over 700 million producers and consumers -- we have been missing out on their contributions for too long and should seize every opportunity to bring them into the global mainstream. Finally, let's remember that our country is trusted to lead in the world in part

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These wars have different causes, but common features. They have brought into stark relief the need for stronger institutions in Africa to ensure that disputes are resolved by peaceful means. Unregulated borders are vulnerable to the spread of small arms and illegal trade; judicial institutions are often too weak to settle grievances and satisfy claims for justice; the regional organizations necessary to guarantee collective security are only now coming into their own.

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Within days of the clashes last month between Ugandan and Rwandan forces in the Congo, a US team worked with those countries to reach a cease fire and an agreement on securing rebel signatures to the Congo-wide peace agreement. And that agreement reflects the dialogue we've had with the region since last fall about the need for a new regional security arrangement in Central Africa, and for greater citizen participation in shaping Congo's future.

The OAU has taken the lead to resolve the deadly conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and thanks to their efforts peace is closer today than at any time in the last fifteen months. My predecessor Tony Lake has made a half dozen trips to the region on our behalf to support this process. The President has actively engaged President Isaías and Prime Minister Meles.

On Thursday, we will be holding the first session of the US-Angolan Consultative Commission, which will address among other things that country's continuing conflict. We are working with the UN to strengthen enforcement of multilateral sanctions against UNITA, and to find ways to cut off the illegal trade in diamonds that has fueled this and other African wars.

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Second, our Congress must recognize that it is in our national interest to invest

in Africa's future, and to provide the resources necessary to keep the peace and prevent the wars.

Congress has been willing to fund aid to the victims of conflict and famine in Africa. Right now, our spending on humanitarian assistance for a handful of African crises is twice as high as our spending on development for the entire continent. It is more than 10 times as high as our spending on peacekeeping. And this year's spending bill for foreign operations cuts our request for development assistance to Africa by more than 40 percent. We will fight that, because we'd save money as well as lives if we invested more in prevention.

Third, we need the continuing commitment of the American people to their own partnership with the people of Africa. The friends of Africa gathered here tonight, as individuals and as participants in the National Summit on Africa, the Constituency for Africa, and the untiring campaign of C. Payne Lucas and Africare, are key to our collective success.

I've described to you our efforts to make good on the promise of a new partnership with Africa. We are headed in the right direction on a long road. I ask for your continuing support and leadership in keeping us moving down that road.

History provides no guarantees, but neither does it place artificial barriers on what we can achieve. The last decade of this century has seen so many hard earned miracles, from the end of the Cold War, to the spread of democracy to more than half the world's people, to the birth of freedom in South Africa and Nigeria. Surely, if all this is possible, Africa can overcome its difficulties and find its way into the global mainstream -- with peace and rising prosperity for all its people.

We are united here today not just by our hope, but by our belief that this will happen if we seize the opportunities before us. And we are united by our conviction that working with Africans to reach that goal is not only right, but right for us.

Thank you.

#

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/4/99 6:02:42 PM
FROM Frazer, Jendayi E. (AF)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT TZ Delegation Recommendations [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Smith, Gayle E. (AF)

CARBON_COPY Battenfield, Pat A. (AF)
Byrne, Catherine E. (AF)
Dempsey, Nora B. (AF)
Frazer, Jendayi E. (AF)
Smith, Gayle E. (AF)

TEXT_BODY Gayle, spoke to Steve Sargeant. He said if Carter leads the delegation we are likely to have a larger plane that departs from US. I've recommended up to twenty names. Waiting to hear from one other source on academics that were close to Nyerere. Steve also said that if no members of congress on our list no need to vet through @legis. WH Personnel will vet Congressional delegates list.

Process:
State Exec.Sec will send a list to NSC ExecSec. Our lists will be forwarded to WH Personnel and Chief of Staff Office for further vetting. Not sure if we (NSC/AF) will get a final chop on the list but I've coordinated with State/AF and OPL to ensure at least half are common recommendations.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

TZDel.doc
TO: Gayle Smith

FROM: Jendayi Frazer

RE: Recommended Delegation to Tanzania

Below is a recommended list to honor Pres. Nyerere based on inputs from State Department, OPL, and others that knew him from the early days of Tanzania's independence. (see Tab A)

USG:

1. Jimmy Carter, head of delegation
2. Thomas Pickering (USG, close to Nyerere/TZ)
3. Rev. Jesse Jackson (USG, request by TZ, Pres. Special Envoy)
4. Brady Anderson, (USG, close to Nyerere)
5. Susan E. Rice (USG, State point on Africa)
6. Gayle E. Smith (USG, Pres. Asst. on Africa)
7. Howard Wolpe (USG, Great Lakes Sp. Envoy)

Business:

8. AMB Andrew Young (State, OPL lists)
GoodWorks International
9. AMB David Miller (State list)
Corporate Council on Africa
10. Cortland Cox (OPL, NSC list; close to Nyerere & Ron Brown)
Minority Business Development Agency
11. Ernest Green (OPL list)
African Development Foundation

NGO's:

12. Gay McDougall (OPL list)
International Human Rights Law Group
13. Mora McLean (OPL list)
African-American Institute
14. William Lucy (OPL list)
Coalition of Black Trade Unionists
15. Ronald Dellums (OPL list)
Constituency for Africa

Academia: (may change somewhat; waiting for other suggestions)

16. Ernest Wilson
Univ. of Maryland
17. Henry Benien
President, Northwestern Univ.
18. Willard Johnson
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
19. Sylvia Hill
Univ. of District Columbia

TAB A: Delegate Lists

State/AF (not in priority order)

1. VP Gore or Jimmy Carter, head of delegation
2. Thomas Pickering
3. Susan E. Rice
4. Brady Anderson
5. Jessie Jackson

6. Andrew Young
7. Kwesi Mfume
8. AMB. David Miller (CCA)
9. Morris Templesman (CCA/NY)
10. Carl Ware, Coca Cola
11. Karl McCall, Comptroller State of NY; Board of SA Dev. Fund

WH Office of Public Liaison (not in priority order)

1. Cortland Cox
2. AMB Andrew Young
3. Ernest Green
4. C. Payne Lucas
5. Gay McDougall
6. William Lucy
7. Ronald Dellums
8. Leonard Robinson
9. Mora McLean
10. Rev. Leon Sullivan

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/8/99 10:47:16 AM
FROM Sargeant, Stephen T. (EXSEC)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: TZ Delegation Recommendations [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Matthews, Sonyia (ADMIN)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)

CARBON_COPY**TEXT_BODY**

Sensitive information

Mara,
Do you want to discuss this with
Sandy today? DoS will not send over any official request for
delegation/list
of potential delegates until a HOS actually expires. However, Gayle
is concerned that Nyerere's condition is worsening and the opportunity

to have Former President Carter head the delegation may elude us
if he is not "informally" asked soon. Jendayi is serving as Gayle's
point person if you have more questions.

Steve

-----Original Message-----

From: Frazer,
Jendayi E. (AF)
Sent: Friday, October 08, 1999 10:38 AM
To: Shapiro,
Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Cc: @AFRICA - African Affairs; Sargeant, Stephen
T. (EXSEC)
Subject: FW: TZ Delegation Recommendations [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

VERY
CLOSE HOLD:

Dan, Former President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania
is critically ill and expected to die soon (perhaps within 48 hours;
he is on life support and dialysis). I've attached a preliminary
list of delegates based on input from OPL and State/AF. Can you
recommend a few members of congress to add to the delegation (2 or

3)? We are trying to keep the list to twenty. This is very close hold for obvious protocol reasons but we need to plan for the inevitable.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

TZDel2.doc

TO: Gayle Smith

FROM: Jendayi Frazer

RE: Recommended Delegation to Tanzania

Below is a recommended list to honor Pres. Nyerere based on inputs from State

Department, OPL, and others that knew him from the early days of Tanzania's independence. (see Tab A)

USG:

1. Jimmy Carter, head of delegation
2. Thomas Pickering (USG, close to Nyerere/TZ)
3. Rev. Jesse Jackson (USG, request by TZ, Pres. Special Envoy)
4. Brady Anderson, (USG, close to Nyerere)
5. Susan E. Rice (USG, State point on Africa)
6. Gayle E. Smith (USG, Pres. Asst. on Africa)
7. Howard Wolpe (USG, Great Lakes Sp.Envoy)

US Congress:

- 8.
- 9.
- 10.

Business:

11. AMB Andrew Young (State, OPL lists)
GoodWorks International
12. AMB David Miller (State list)
Corporate Council on Africa
13. Cortland Cox (OPL, NSC list; close to Nyerere & Ron Brown)
Minority Business Development Agency
14. Ernest Green (OPL list)
African Development Foundation

NGO's:

15. Gay McDougall (OPL list)
International Human Rights Law Group

16. Mora McLean (OPL list)
African-American Institute
17. William Lucy (OPL list)
Coalition of Black Trade Unionists
18. Ronald Dellums (OPL list)
Constituency for Africa

Academia: (may change somewhat; waiting for other suggestions)

19. Ernest Wilson
Univ. of Maryland
 20. Henry Benien
President, Northwestern Univ.
- TAB A: Delegate Lists

State/AF Preliminary (not in priority order)

1. VP Gore or Jimmy Carter or Bill Richardson, head of delegation
2. Thomas Pickering (may not be on final list)
3. Susan E. Rice
4. Brady Anderson
5. Jessie Jackson
6. Andrew Young
7. Kwesi Mfume
8. AMB. David Miller (CCA)
9. Morris Templesman (CCA/NY)
10. Carl Ware, Coca Cola
11. Karl McCall, Comptroller State of NY; Board of SA Dev. Fund

WH Office of Public Liaison (not in priority order)

1. Cortland Cox
2. AMB Andrew Young
3. Ernest Green
4. C. Payne Lucas
5. Gay McDougall
6. William Lucy
7. Ronald Dellums
8. Leonard Robinson
9. Mora McLean
10. Rev. Leon Sullivan

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/8/99 11:58:07 AM
FROM Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: TZ Delegation Recommendations [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN)

CARBON_COPY Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Matthews, Sonyia (ADMIN)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
Sargeant, Stephen T. (EXSEC)

TEXT_BODY UNCLASS but SENSITIVE

Tracey,

DoS will not send over any official request for delegation/list of potential delegates until a HOS actually expires. However, Gayle is concerned that Nyerere's condition is worsening and the opportunity to have Former President Carter head the delegation may elude us if he is not "informally" asked soon. (Jendayi is serving as Gayle's point person if you have more questions.)

Can you find a moment to raise with Sandy and/or put paper in front of him on this issue. I think question (though you should check with Jendayi) is whether we can very informally start moving on putting this delegation together (including most importantly calling Carter to make request that he heads) before Nyerere actually has died.

-----Original
Message-----

From: Frazer, Jendayi E. (AF)
Sent: Friday, October
08, 1999 10:38 AM
To: Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Cc: @AFRICA -
African Affairs; Sargeant, Stephen T. (EXSEC)
Subject: FW: TZ Delegation
Recommendations [UNCLASSIFIED]
Importance: High

VERY CLOSE HOLD:

Dan,

Former President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania is critically ill and expected to die soon (perhaps within 48 hours; he is on life support and dialysis). I've attached a preliminary list of delegates based on input from OPL and State/AF. Can you recommend a few members of congress to add to the delegation (2 or 3)? We are trying to keep the list to twenty. This is very close hold for obvious protocol reasons but we need to plan for the inevitable.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT TZDel2.doc
TO: Gayle Smith

FROM: Jendayi Frazer

RE: Recommended Delegation to Tanzania

Below is a recommended list to honor Pres. Nyerere based on inputs from State Department, OPL, and others that knew him from the early days of Tanzania's independence. (see Tab A)

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1. Jimmy Carter, head of delegation
2. Thomas Pickering (USG, close to Nyerere/TZ)
3. Rev. Jesse Jackson (USG, request by TZ, Pres. Special Envoy)
4. Brady Anderson, (USG, close to Nyerere)
5. Susan E. Rice (USG, State point on Africa)
6. Gayle E. Smith (USG, Pres. Asst. on Africa)
7. Howard Wolpe (USG, Great Lakes Sp.Envoy)

US Congress:

- 8.
- 9.
- 10.

Business:

11. AMB Andrew Young (State, OPL lists)
GoodWorks International
12. AMB David Miller (State list)
Corporate Council on Africa

13. Cortland Cox (OPL, NSC list; close to Nyerere & Ron Brown)
Minority Business Development Agency
14. Ernest Green (OPL list)
African Development Foundation

NGO's:

15. Gay McDougall (OPL list)
International Human Rights Law Group
16. Mora McLean (OPL list)
African-American Institute
17. William Lucy (OPL list)
Coalition of Black Trade Unionists
18. Ronald Dellums (OPL list)
Constituency for Africa

Academia: (may change somewhat; waiting for other suggestions)

19. Ernest Wilson
Univ. of Maryland
 20. Henry Benien
President, Northwestern Univ.
- TAB A: Delegate Lists

State/AF Preliminary (not in priority order)

1. VP Gore or Jimmy Carter or Bill Richardson, head of delegation
2. Thomas Pickering (may not be on final list)
3. Susan E. Rice
4. Brady Anderson
5. Jessie Jackson
6. Andrew Young
7. Kwesi Mfume
8. AMB. David Miller (CCA)
9. Morris Templesman (CCA/NY)
10. Carl Ware, Coca Cola
11. Karl McCall, Comptroller State of NY; Board of SA Dev. Fund

WH Office of Public Liaison (not in priority order)

1. Cortland Cox
2. AMB Andrew Young
3. Ernest Green
4. C. Payne Lucas
5. Gay McDougall
6. William Lucy
7. Ronald Dellums
8. Leonard Robinson
9. Mora McLean

10. Rev. Leon Sullivan

2

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/8/99 9:59:57 PM
FROM Frazer, Jendayi E. (AF)
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 10/08/1999
DECLASSIFYON 10/08/2000
SUBJECT TZ Delegates list ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TO Sargeant, Stephen T. (EXSEC)

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526 5/16/2017
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By VR NARA, Date 1/8/2018
 2014-0927-F

CARBON_COPY Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)
 Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
 Dejbani, Donna D. (NSA)
 Gire, Cynthia L. (EXSEC)
 Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
 Hilliard, Brenda I. (EXSEC)
 Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN)
 Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
 Matthews, Sonyia (ADMIN)
 Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
 Powell, Elliott (WHSR/EXSEC)
 Sargeant, Stephen T. (EXSEC)
 Wasserman, Elaine P. (EXSEC)
 Battenfield, Pat A. (AF)
 Byrne, Catherine E. (AF)
 Dempsey, Nora B. (AF)
 Frazer, Jendayi E. (AF)
 Smith, Gayle E. (AF)

TEXT_BODY

Steve, the memo will come through the system but wanted you to have now.

I've attached the consolidated list of names from State, OPL, NSC/AF and NSC/Legis. NSC/Leg. modified the congressional delegates on State's list. The recommendations are in priority order taking into account those who went to the South African and Nigerian inaugurals. OPL may want to rerank the private citizens.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7485.doc

October 8, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. BRADTKE

THROUGH: GAYLE E. SMITH

FROM: JENDAYI E. FRAZER

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION TO FUNERAL OF
FORMER PRESIDENT JULIUS NYERERE,
TANZANIA

Recommended Delegates in priority order:

Head of Delegation:

1. Former President Jimmy Carter, (head of delegation)
2. Rev. Jesse Jackson, (First alternate head of delegation.
Should be invited as delegate if President Carter leads).
3. Bill Richardson, (Second alternate delegation head)

Congressional Delegates:

4. James Clyburn or CBC Representative (of his designation)
5. Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick (Foreign Ops)
6. Ed Royce (Africa Subcommittee Chair)

USG Delegates:

7. Thomas Pickering, Undersecretary of State for Political
Affairs
8. Brady Anderson, USAID Administrator
9. Susan E. Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs
10. Gayle E. Smith, Special Assistant to President for African
Affairs
11. Howard Wolpe, Special Envoy for Great Lakes issues

Private Delegates:

12. AMB Andrew Young, GoodWorks International
13. Ronald Dellums, Constituency for Africa
14. Gay McDougall, International Human Rights Law Group

15. AMB. David Miller, Corporate Council on Africa
16. Carl Ware, Director of International Operations, Coca-Cola Corporation
17. Kwesi Mfume, President of the NAACP
18. Randall Robinson, TransAfrica
19. Cortland Cox, Director Minority Business Development Agency
20. Ernest Green, Chairman, African Development Foundation
21. William Lucy, Coalition of Black Trade Unionist
22. Carl McCall, Comptroller of the State of New York
23. Mora McLean, President, African-American Institute
24. Reverend Leon Sullivan, Founder & CEO IFESH/African-African

American Summit

25. C. Payne Lucas, President, Africare
26. Henry Benien, President, Northwestern University
27. Ernest Wilson, Director Conflict Management Center, Univ. of Maryland
28. Leonard Robinson, President, National Summit on Africa

2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 7485

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by: Frazer, Jendayi

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 11/8/99

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/14/99 10:40:52 AM
FROM Frazer, Jendayi E. (AF)
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATIONREASON 1.5(d)
DATECLASSIFIEDON 10/08/1999
DECLASSIFYON 10/08/2000
SUBJECT FW: TZ Delegates list [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
TO Sargeant, Stephen T. (EXSEC)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 5/16/2017
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 1/8/2012
2014-0927-5

CARBON_COPY Smith, Gayle E. (AF)
Battenfield, Pat A. (AF)
Byrne, Catherine E. (AF)
Dempsey, Nora B. (AF)
Frazer, Jendayi E. (AF)
Smith, Gayle E. (AF)

TEXT_BODY Steve, expect this list to come from State/Protocol. It was approved by State/AF, NSC/AF and NSC/Legis. State/AF has recommended that Albright lead the delegation. Her office will make the decision. We expect WH to reduce the delegation to appropriate size.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT 7485.doc

October 14, 1999

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. BRADTKE

THROUGH: GAYLE E. SMITH

FROM: JENDAYI E. FRAZER

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION TO FUNERAL OF
FORMER PRESIDENT JULIUS NYERERE,
TANZANIA

Recommended Delegates in priority order:

Head of Delegation:

1. Madeleine K. Albright (head of delegation)
or Former President Jimmy Carter, (alternate)

Congressional Delegates:

2. James Clyburn or CBC Representative (of his designation)
3. Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick (Foreign Ops)
4. Ed Royce (Africa Subcommittee Chair)
5. Bill Frist (Africa Subcommittee)

USG Delegates:

6. Rev. Jesse Jackson, Special Envoy
7. Brady Anderson, USAID Administrator
8. Susan E. Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
9. Howard Wolpe, Special Envoy for Great Lakes issues
10. Jendayi Frazer, Director, African Affairs, NSC

Private Delegates:

11. AMB Andrew Young, GoodWorks International
12. Ronald Dellums, Constituency for Africa
13. Gay McDougall, International Human Rights Law Group
14. AMB. David Miller, Corporate Council on Africa
15. Carl Ware, Director of International Operations, Coca-Cola Corporation
16. Kwesi Mfume, President of the NAACP
17. Randall Robinson, TransAfrica
18. Cortland Cox, Director Minority Business Development Agency
19. Ernest Green, Chairman, African Development Foundation
20. William Lucy, Coalition of Black Trade Unionist
21. Carl McCall, Comptroller of the State of New York
22. Mora McLean, President, African-American Institute
23. Reverend Leon Sullivan, Founder & CEO IFESH/African-American

American Summit

24. C. Payne Lucas, President, Africare
25. Henry Benien, President, Northwestern University
26. Ernest Wilson, Director Conflict Management Center, Univ. of Maryland
27. Leonard Robinson, President, National Summit on Africa

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 7485

CONFIDENTIAL

Classified by: Frazer, Jendayi

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify On: 11/8/99

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/18/99 11:33:31 AM
FROM Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT October 18 Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Fallin, James (PRESS)
Gobush, Matthew N. (PRESS)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Huff, Lindsey E. (PRESS)
Leavy, David C. (PRESS)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
Aragoncillo, Leandro A. (VP)
Babbitt, James F. (VP)
Black, Steven K. (VP)
Bolan, Christopher J. (VP)
Brody, Richard J. (VP)
Davidson, Leslie K. (VP)
Dennett, Todd H.
Fuerth, Leon S. (VP)
Orfini, Michael H. (VP)
Osius, Theodore G. (VP)
Roberts, Michael W. (VP)
Saunders, Richard M. (VP)
Woolston, Ann E. (VP)

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

oct18gui.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

October 18, 1999

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA

Pakistan (new)

EUROPE / RUSSIA

Russia - NMD Cooperation (new)

Observer Article (new)

Chechnya (new)

MULTILATERAL

Sierra Leone (new)

INTERAM

Panama - Moscoso Visit (new)

LEGISLAT

Foreign Ops

DEFENSE

Rand Study

PAKISTAN

October 18, 1999

How do you view the situation in Pakistan?

* I welcome General Musharraf's stated commitment to return Pakistan to democracy and civilian rule.

* I am disappointed, however, that he did not specify a quick timetable. We will continue to strongly urge him to restore a constitutional, civilian and democratic government.

So are you ready to deal with General Musharraf regime?

* Until there is a return to democracy we cannot have business as usual and we have made this very clear.

* We have implement sanctions under Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and are considering other measures.

Are you concerned about Pakistan's nukes?

* There has been no change in Pakistan's nuclear holding. General Musarraff's statement on nuclear and missile restraint is encouraging.

* It is also important that Musharraf said he is committed to dialogue with India, which is in the best interest of both parties.

* We will be looking to see that his actions reflect his pledge to return Pakistan to democracy and respect for civil liberties, press freedom and human rights.

What about Sharif?

* I am concerned about the treatment of Sharif and other politicians in upcoming

accountability campaign, in particular reports that Sharif would be tried for treason and attempted murder.

RUSSIA and NMD
October 18, 1999

Are the NY Times and Washington Post stories true that you are willing to help Russia complete construction of one of early warning radars?

* When I met in Cologne with President Yeltsin, I made clear that we want to work cooperatively on the issue of missile defense and the ABM Treaty to take into account the common threat posed by rogue states.

* Believe a cooperative approach will enhance both countries security. Each face threats from rogue states.

* In recent discussions regarding our NMD program and its implications for the ABM Treaty, we have put forward a number of ideas for discussion relating to cooperation in the area of missile defense and the ABM Treaty.

* Discussions on this issue continue; will consider next steps as this process unfolds but let me stress that our common interests would be enhanced by increased cooperation similar to early warning system that we announced in Moscow last year to deal with increased proliferation of ballistic missiles.

Are you prepared to deploy a NMD system even without Russian concurrence?

* Let me be clear that U.S. is committed to the development of a limited NMD system. The system is designed primarily to counter the threat posed by emerging rogue state missile threats.

* No decision has been taken on whether to proceed with deployment. I will consider whether to deploy a limited NMD next year.

* The ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability. We are committed to work with Russia to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty required for possible deployment of a limited NMD.

What is the Russian reaction at this point to U.S. proposals to modify the Treaty? to cooperate on missile defense?

* We are in the very early phases of discussing these issues with Russia.

* Expect it will be some time before the U.S. puts concrete proposals on the table regarding changes to the ABM Treaty and receives a considered Russian response to these proposals, as well as our ideas for cooperation.

* In the meantime, we will continue what has been a serious and constructive set of discussions on these issues.

Aren't you placing American security at risk by not simply scrapping the ABM Treaty and proceeding with NMD?

* The approach the Administration is taking with respect to NMD and the ABM Treaty will give us the kind of protection we will need for the immediate missile threat.

* This approach will enhance our overall security, and takes into account the diverse nature of potential threats to our security, including the emerging ballistic missile threat from rogue states.

* U.S. also has an interest in preserving strategic stability with Russia; ABM Treaty remains an important agreement in this area. In our interest to try to work cooperatively with Russia on changes to the Treaty, as well as missile defense.

How much money will it cost to go forward with the kind of cooperation discussed in the Washington Post and New York Times?

* At this stage, we have simply put forward ideas for discussion relating to cooperation on missile defense and the ABM Treaty. Premature to give any cost estimates, given we are still awaiting feedback from Russia and have not made concrete proposals.

OBSERVER ARTICLE ON CHINESE EMBASSY BOMBING

October 18, 1999

* The allegations in the article are completely false.

* We conducted a full and thorough investigation. It was a tragic accident and we view this matter closed.

RUSSIA/CHECHNYA

October 18, 1999

Background: Fighting in Chechnya has continued, with the Russian government setting conditions for talks which Chechen leaders cannot meet. Russian troops over the weekend continued to draw closer to the Chechen capital of Grozny.

What have you done in reaction to the Russian attacks on Chechnya, and their refusal to negotiate with Chechen leaders?

(. Urge a constructive dialogue with all legitimate leaders in the North Caucasus. Convinced that this is the only way the Russians will be able to achieve long-lasting stability and security in the region. Also important for Russia to avoid steps that make effective dialogue more difficult.

(. Especially concerned about the possibility of further escalation. Any resumption of general hostilities in Chechnya could threaten stability in the entire North Caucasus region. Have delivered this message quite clearly to the Russian government.

(. Have also stressed the danger to innocent civilians from recent escalation and deeply regret the loss of innocent life. Important for all concerned to avoid

indiscriminate use of force, respect human rights and, for Russian government, avoid policies that discriminate against people from the Caucasus region on racial or ethnic grounds.

* Concerned about reports that some people fleeing fighting in Chechnya are being prevented from entering neighboring Russian republic of North Ossetia. Urge Russians to ensure that freedom of movement is protected, especially for those at greatest risk.

*

SIERRA LEONE PEACE AGREEMENT October 18, 1999

CONTEXT: A peace agreement was signed July 7 in Lome, Togo by the President of Sierra Leone and the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), ending a nearly eight-year long conflict which began in 1991. Its main elements include a cessation of violence, RUF participation in an expanded Cabinet, a mechanism to control strategic natural resources (diamonds), and a full pardon for RUF leader Foday Sankoh coupled with amnesty for the RUF. The agreement also provides for extensive demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of combatants. Several commissions, including a truth and reconciliation commission, will be established to help in national reconciliation and reconstruction. Two previous peace agreements - the latest in 1996 - have failed.

The U.S., UK and Netherlands have provided logistical support for the regional peacekeepers (ECOMOG) that defended (and in March 1998 restored to power after an attempted coup) the democratically elected government of President Kabbah. In April of this year, the Sierra Leone Government allowed Foday Sankoh, imprisoned and sentenced to death on eight counts of treason, to travel to Lome, Togo to consult with senior RUF commanders for the first time in more than two years. This internal RUF dialogue developed an agenda for negotiations with the government and helped to clarify the RUF lines of authority. On May 18th, Rev. Jackson and President Eyadema of Togo brokered a meeting between Sankoh and President Kabbah that reached agreement on a cease-fire and the beginning of

peace talks.

POLICY:

* Our objectives in Sierra Leone have been to promote a regional peace that will end the conflict, relieve the suffering of the people of Sierra Leone, and foster peace and national reconciliation. We are hopeful that this agreement will succeed, and we are prepared to provide appropriate support for its implementation.

Can you comment on the amnesty provision for the rebels in the peace agreement reached in Lome?

* We are eager to help regional efforts to establish peace and security and address the humanitarian needs of the Sierra Leonean people. This is a peace agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. It provides for amnesty only within the borders of Sierra Leone, it does not preclude potential prosecution of war crimes by an international body. However, no such tribunal exists at present. The United States is not a signatory and is not bound by the agreement, although we do support the conclusion of the peace agreement.

What recourse will be available for victims of atrocities?

* The peace agreement provides for a truth and reconciliation commission, as well as a human rights commission that will deal with these issues on a case-by-case basis. The peace agreement also provides for humanitarian assistance to reach populations in rural areas and for the demobilization and reintegration into society of child combatants.

Did the U.S. pressure President Kabbah to make undue concessions to the RUF?

* No. The United States, along with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the UN, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the UK and

others, acted as a facilitator for the peace talks. This agreement is strictly between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF.

What kind of role has the United States played in "facilitating" the agreement?

* From the start, the United States worked with the government, RUF representatives, ECOWAS and the UN to initiate talks and reach a lasting settlement.

* On May 18th, Reverend Jesse Jackson, the President and Secretary of State's Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa, working in close collaboration with ECOWAS Chairman President Eyadema of Togo and the UN, was able to secure the agreement of President Kabbah and RUF leader Sankoh to a cease fire that commenced on May 24th. This led to the negotiation of the agreement that was signed in July.

* This was part of a team effort that extended over months to encourage dialogue between the parties. Reverend Jackson's efforts built on the work of our Special Envoy for Liberia, Ambassador Howard Jeter, and our Ambassador to Sierra Leone, Joseph Melrose.

When will the UN peacekeeping start?

* The UN has a small observer mission in place now. This Friday (October 22) the Security Council is scheduled to vote for an expanded UN operation (up to 6,000 troops) to help in the demilitarization and demobilization of the combatants.

Will the U.S. military participate in the UN mission?

* No.

What is the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone?

* It is dire. This January, the RUF/AFRC rebels invaded the capital, Freetown. In a period of several weeks, 6,000 people were killed and large portions of the city were destroyed, leaving about 150,000 people homeless. More than 3,000

children (two-thirds of them girls) are registered as missing since January.

* Sierra Leone is a small country with a population of only 4.6 million. Violence and terror have forced more than one-third of the population to flee their homes. More than 400,000 are refugees - primarily in neighboring Guinea and Liberia - and another 700,000-1,000,000 are believed to be internally displaced. The agreement to allow unhindered access by humanitarian organizations to many areas of the country that have been isolated for more than a year will allow the international community to start meeting the needs of an estimate 2.6 million people in need of assistance.

What is the United States doing to alleviate the suffering in Sierra Leone?

* We have provided more than \$55 million in emergency humanitarian relief to Sierra Leone in FY98, and so far in FY99, we have provided an additional \$41 million in humanitarian assistance.

* We are also providing non-lethal logistical support to ECOMOG in its role implementing the peace agreement. This support has amounted to \$10 million since May 1998, and we are providing an additional \$5.8 million now. In addition, we hope to provide a further \$3 million in draw down of non-lethal defense articles.

VISIT BY PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT MIREYA MOSCOSO
October 18, 1999

CONTEXT: Panamanian President Moscoso will meet with the President on October 19, 1999. This will be her first encounter with the President since her September 1 inauguration.

What will be discussed during the meeting?

The topics of conversation will cover the broad range of our excellent bilateral relationship. These will include, among other things, the upcoming transfer of the canal to the Republic of Panama, our security assistance relationship, counter-drug cooperation, and trade and investment issues.

Why is the United States government turning over property and real estate worth billions of dollars to Panama?

After years of negotiations, and with the advice and consent of the Senate, in 1977 the Government of the United States concluded a treaty with the Government of Panama calling for the gradual transfer of full authority and control over the Panama Canal to the Government of Panama. That process, begun in 1979, culminates in the final transfer of the Canal to Panama at noon on December 31, 1999. At this time, more than 95% of the Canal workforce is Panamanian and the current director of the Panama Canal Commission is a Panamanian. In the 20 years since the Treaty went into effect, in spite of bilateral differences, administrations from opposing parties in both Panama and the United States have worked to adhere to the terms of the Treaty and related agreements. We made a binding treaty commitment in 1977 to transfer the Canal to Panama in operating condition, and also to transfer to Panama certain property contained in what was known as the Canal Zone. We are on schedule to fulfill that commitment.

UXO/RANGE ISSUE

Why is the United States government refusing to clean up unexploded ordnance on firing ranges in Panama as required by the Treaty?

The Canal Treaty requires us to "take all measures to ensure insofar as may be "practicable," that hazards to human life, health and safety are removed." In the case of the former firing ranges, we have fulfilled that requirement. All areas of the former ranges that are accessible were cleared to the extent practicable. Some areas, representing about 3% of the total area transferred, will continue to have unexploded ordnance present because rough terrain and thick forest make clearance impracticable. These areas are located in the environmentally sensitive canal watershed and would suffer possibly irreparable damage if cleared and graded in order to find unexploded ordnance. We provided information on the management of such areas, gained from similar experience in the United States, and equipment to the Government of Panama to help it to manage these areas. We will remain in contact with the Government of Panama on this issue in the future.

What about unexploded chemical weapons left in Panama?

We have no evidence that unexploded chemical weapons or their components exist in areas of Panama covered by the Panama Canal Treaty.

COUNTERNARCOTICS CENTER/FOLS

Why didn't the United States government negotiate an agreement with the government of Panama to establish a counter-narcotics center that would have allowed us to continue to use the valuable facilities at Howard AFB?

The Government of the United States negotiated with the Government of Panama for almost two years on an agreement that would have allowed U.S. Forces to remain in Panama and to carry out counter-narcotics activities. The MCC negotiations did not fail for lack of will or effort. Ultimately, however, the two countries were unable to agree on acceptable terms. In the final analysis, our need for a cost effective counter-drug facility could not be reconciled with the political and financial requirements of the Panamanian government.

How do you intend to make up for the loss of U.S. bases for counter-drug activities in Panama?

We have entered into agreements with the governments of Ecuador and the Netherlands to use existing facilities in Ecuador and the Netherlands Antilles (Aruba and Curacao) as Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) for counter-drug missions. Operations from these facilities have begun already. We are also exploring with other countries the possibility of establishing a third FOL. Once fully functional, we expect that the FOLS will provide better operational counter-drug capability, particularly in the critical source zone areas, at less cost than our former bases in Panama.

Panama will continue to play an important role in our counter-drug effort, and this issue will be a central part of our bilateral relationship.

Is the United States government pursuing an FOL in Panama too?

No, we are not looking at Panama as a sight for a future FOL at this time.

U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

Does the government of the United States plan to begin talks with the new government of Panama regarding a U.S. military presence after 1999?

The Government of the United States has no current plans to discuss a post-1999 military presence with the Government of Panama. We are working with the Government of Panama to insure the security of the Canal.

How do you propose to protect the Canal from Colombian guerrillas who already operate with impunity in the eastern Panamanian province of Darien?

Upon final transfer of the Canal to Panama the task of protecting it on a routine basis devolves upon the Government of Panama. We are consulting with the Government of Panama regarding possible threats to the Canal from all sources. Both sides believe in this framework of cooperation. We stand ready to work with the Government of Panama, now and in the future, on any plan it might devise for protection of the Canal.

PANAMA CANAL CAPITAL FUND

Is the U.S. Government giving away \$160 million to the government of Panama in addition to transferring the Canal?

In 1996, the Panama Canal Commission (PCC) established a long-range capital assets improvement program to enhance the capacity and safety of the Panama Canal. The program is underway but is not scheduled to be completed until 2005.

The program includes such projects as widening the Gaillard cut to permit two-way traffic of large vessels; procurement of additional tugboats, launches, and locks towing locomotives to handle increased levels of traffic; rehabilitation of 53,000 feet of locomotive towtrack; replacement of the original locks machinery with modern hydraulics systems; and enhancement of the Canal's vessel traffic management system by incorporating a Global Positioning System (GPS).

These important capital projects are funded out of a capital "revolving" fund. Importantly, this capital fund consists of toll receipts, and does not include any U.S. taxpayer monies. Canal tolls were increased substantially approximately two years ago to pay for these projects through a process that included notification to the affected industry and to the congressional committees exercising oversight of canal matters.

After careful consideration of the legal and policy issues, relevant USG agencies agreed that transferring the fund to the PCA (the Panama Canal Authority, the successor to the Panama Canal Commission) would be proper and consistent with U.S. law. Moreover, such transfer would be consistent with the USG obligation in the Panama Canal Treaty to turn over the Canal "in operating condition and free of liens and debts."

Panama Canal Chinese interest
October 18, 1999

CHINESE THREAT TO THE CANAL

Why did the government of the United States stand by and allow the Chinese to take over the ports on either side of the Canal?

* The Government of Panama granted a commercial concession to operate port facilities in Balboa and Cristobal, on the Pacific and Atlantic sides of the Canal respectively, to the Hong Kong company Hutchison-Whampoa in 1996. Under the terms of the contract, Hutchison-Whampoa does not own the port facilities, but rather operates them, together with other private contractors, on behalf of the Government of Panama. There is no evidence that the commercial concession granted to Hutchison-Whampoa represents a threat to the Canal. The neutrality of the Canal and its operations are guaranteed by the Neutrality Treaty signed and

ratified by the governments of the United States and Panama, and also by that Treaty's protocol, to which 36 other countries are states party.

Panama Canal Authority Controls the Canal

- * The Panama Canal Authority maintains full authority over the canal.
- * The Authority - and no private contractor or investor -- controls the movement of vessels through the canal.
- * Panama has invited private companies worldwide to assist in the development of the canal.

Hutchison Whampoa's Commercial Interest in the Canal

- * Hutchison Whampoa (HW), a privately-held Hong Kong company with international investors, won the contract to develop Panama's ports of Cristobal (Atlantic side) and Balboa (Pacific Coast) for \$22 million plus 10 percent of gross port revenues. The bid was more than twice as much as the next competitor. Such discrepancies in bidding are not uncommon in international practice and HW's bidding process was not inconsistent with other bidders' practices in Panama.
- * HW activities in Cristobal and Balboa are limited to unloading and loading containers and storing cargo.
- * HW is but one of many port operators in Panama, including Stevedoring Services of America (SSA) and Evergreen, a Taiwan company.
- * In 1998, HW moved just 9 percent of all containers through Panama's ports, in comparison to SSA's 66 percent and Evergreen's 24 percent.
- * HW does not operate or control pilotage of ships through the canal. To enter the port of Panama, a vessel must be piloted by an official designated by the Panama Canal Authority.
- * HW has the right to "own and operate, under a separate concession from the Port Authority, towage, work boats, vessel repair services and pilotage services"

(i.e. piloting into HW's port facilities, not through the Canal itself).

Hutchison Whampoa is a Global Commercial Operation

- * HW services 17 international ports, including the United Kingdom, the Bahamas and Hong Kong, and handles around 12 percent of all international container traffic.
- * HW recently was asked to look into assisting the modernization of the port of Rotterdam, the world's largest container port.
- * HW's origins can be traced back to the 1820's as a British firm; with \$36 billion, it is a publicly held company and the second largest company on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in terms of market capitalization. HW's investment of \$150 million in Panama represents a small fraction of its overall holdings.
- * 49.9 percent of HW's shares are held by Cheung Kong (CK) Holdings; 34.9 percent of CK is held by Li Ka-shing, the world's 10th wealthiest person, according to Fortune Magazine, and a migrant from China in 1941.
- * Both HW and CK are involved in more than ports; their businesses include real estate and telecommunications.
- * No mainland Chinese or members of the PRC Government are directors of HW or CK.
- * Of CK's total holdings, no more than ten percent is invested in China. Li Ka-shing himself did not invest in China until 1979.
- * Li Ka-shing is on the board of CITIC, a leading Chinese investment company. Former Secretary of State Shultz and AIG Chairman Greenberg have sat on the Board.
- * HW has joint venture (JV) arrangements with a number of U.S. companies including Motorola and Procter & Gamble.

HW also has JVs with Chinese public entities. Its only JV with the PLA is a contract to provide commercial telecom services to China Great Wall. To date, no material services have been rendered.

Vetoing Foreign Ops bill
October 18, 1999

10/15/99 2:19 pm

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Today I am returning without approval H.R. 2606, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, FY 2000.

The central lesson we have learned in this century is that we cannot protect American interests at home without active engagement abroad. Common sense tells us, and hard experience has confirmed, that we must lead in the world, working with other nations to defuse crises, repel dangers, promote more open economic and political systems, and strengthen the rule of law. These have been the guiding principles of American foreign policy for generations. They have served the American people well, and greatly helped to advance the cause of peace and freedom around the world.

This bill rejects all of those principles. It is a frontal attack on America's 50-year tradition of leadership for a safer, more prosperous and democratic world. It is an abandonment of hope in our nation's capacity to shape that kind of world. It implies that we are too small and insecure to meet our share of international responsibilities, too shortsighted to see that doing so is in our national interest. It is the budget document of a new isolationism that would have America bury its head in the sand at the height of our power and prosperity.

In the short term, it utterly fails to address critical national security needs. It suggests we can afford to underfund our efforts to keep deadly weapons from falling into dangerous hands and walk away without peril from our essential work toward peace in places of conflict. Just as seriously, it fails to address

America's long-term interests. It reduces assistance to nations struggling to build democratic societies and open markets, and backs away from our commitment to help people trapped in poverty to stand on their feet. This, too, threatens our security, because future threats will come from regions and nations where instability and misery prevail and future opportunities will come from nations on the road to freedom and growth.

By denying America a decent investment in diplomacy, this bill suggests that we should meet threats to our security with our military might alone. That is a dangerous proposition. For if we underfund our diplomacy, we will end up overusing our military. Problems we might have been able to resolve peacefully will turn into crises we can only resolve at a cost of life and treasure. Shortchanging our arsenal of peace is as risky as shortchanging our arsenal of war.

The overall funding provided by the bill is woefully inadequate. This version of the bill is \$2.2 billion, or 14 percent, below the level that I requested of \$14.9 billion, and is also a reduction from the level of funding for the current fiscal year. The specific shortfalls are numerous and unacceptable.

For example, it is shocking that Congress has failed to fulfill our obligations to Israel and its neighbors as they take risks and difficult decisions to advance the Middle East peace process. My Administration, like all its predecessors, has fought hard to promote peace in the Middle East. The bill would provide neither the \$800 million requested this year as a supplemental appropriation nor the \$500 million requested in FY 2000 funding to support the Wye River Agreement. Just when Prime Minister Barak has helped give the peace process a jump start, this sends the worst possible message to Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians about America's commitment to the peace process. We should instead seize this opportunity to support them.

[Additional resources are required to respond to the costs of building peace in Kosovo and the rest of the Balkans, and I intend to work with Congress to provide assistance above what is in this bill.] Other life-saving peace efforts, such as those in Sierra Leone, East Timor and Eritrea-Ethiopia, are imperiled by the bill's inadequate funding of the Voluntary Peacekeeping Account.

My Administration has sought to protect Americans from the threat posed by the potential danger of weapons proliferation from Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union. But Congress has failed to finance the Enhanced Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI), which is designed to prevent weapons of mass destruction and weapons technologies from falling into the wrong hands and weapons scientists from offering their talents to countries, or even terrorists, seeking these weapons. The bill also curtails ETRI programs that help Russia and other New Independent States strengthen export controls to avoid illicit trafficking in sensitive materials through their borders and airports. ETRI will also help facilitate withdrawal of Russian forces and equipment from countries such as Georgia and Moldova. And it will create peaceful research opportunities for thousands of former Soviet weapons scientists.

Some members of Congress might be willing to fund these nonproliferation efforts if we took the money from programs that support democracy and small scale enterprises in Russia, but these are the very kinds of initiatives needed to complete Russia's transformation away from communism and authoritarianism. A generation from now, no one is going to say we did too much to help the nations of the Soviet Union safeguard their nuclear technology and expertise. If the funding cuts in this bill were to become law, future generations would certainly say we did too little, and that we imperiled our future in the process.

The Administration has also sought to promote economic progress and political change in developing countries, because America benefits when these countries become our partners in security and trade. At the Cologne Summit, we led a historic effort to enable the world's poorest and most heavily indebted countries to finance health, education and opportunity programs. Congress fails to fund the U.S. contribution. The bill also severely underfunds Multilateral Development Bank financing and other programs that will promote development in Latin America, Asia and especially Africa. The cuts to the Multilateral Development Banks will virtually double US arrears to these institutions.

Across the board, the Administration requested minimum levels of funding to assure American leadership on matters vital to the interests and values of our citizens. In area after area, from fighting terrorism and international crime to promoting nuclear stability on the Korean peninsula, from helping refugees and disaster victims to meeting its own goals of a 10,000-member Peace Corps,

Congress has failed to fund adequately even the most modest requests.

Several policy matters addressed in the bill are also problematic. One provision would hamper the Export-Import Bank's ability to be responsive to American exporters by requiring that Congress be notified of dozens of additional kinds of transactions before the Bank can offer financing. Another provision could be read to prevent the United States from engaging in diplomatic efforts to promote a cost-effective, global solution to climate change. A third provision places restrictions on assistance to Indonesia that could harm our ability to influence the objectives we share with Congress: ensuring that Indonesia honors the referendum in East Timor and that security is restored there, while encouraging democracy and economic reform in Indonesia. A fourth provision would jeopardize our ability to fulfill commitments to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization under the Agreed Framework, and would damage our nonproliferation policy on the Korean peninsula. Finally, this bill contains several sections that, if treated as mandatory, would encroach on the President's sole constitutional authority to conduct diplomatic negotiations.

In sum, this appropriations bill undermines important American interests, and ignores the lessons that have been at the core of our bipartisan foreign policy for the last half century. Like the Senate's recent vote to defeat the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, this bill reflects an inexcusable and potentially dangerous complacency about the opportunities and risks America faces in the world today. I therefore will not sign it.

I look forward to working with Congress to craft an appropriations bill that I can support, properly addressing our shared goal of an America that is strong at home and strong abroad, respected not only for our leadership, but for the vision and commitment that real leadership entails. The American people deserve a foreign policy worthy of our great country, and I will fight to ensure that they continue to have one.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release August 16, 1999

FACT SHEET

The President's International Affairs Budget: Investments in Peace

During his address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars today, President Clinton will repeat his call to Congress for full funding of his international affairs budget. The President's investments in peace serve U.S. national security interests and minimize the need for military intervention abroad. The President will highlight the following initiatives:

Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative - During his 1999 State of the Union Address, President Clinton called for expanded cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, and other New Independent States (NIS) to safeguard weapons of mass destruction (WMD) materials and technology so that they never fall into the wrong hands. In the aftermath of the Russian financial crisis in August 1998, President Clinton directed a two-thirds increase for threat reduction programs over five years (\$4.5 billion total). The Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) proposed in the President's balanced budget promotes increased funding for State Department non-proliferation and safety programs from \$53 million last year to \$251 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2000. It also increased combined funding in FY2000 for the successful Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction program (also known as Nunn-Lugar) and the nuclear materials safety program at the Department of Energy to \$750 million. We are actively working with our allies and other nations to encourage additional contributions to this effort. The Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative would:

- * Deactivate and store warheads, secure fissile materials and dispose of 50 tons of plutonium;
- * Tighten exports controls to prevent countries such as Iran from acquiring dangerous technologies;
- * Complete work on a chemical weapons destruction facility and eliminate former

chemical and biological weapons facilities;

- * Support civilian research opportunities for up to 40,000 former Soviet weapons scientists; and

- * Help Georgia and Moldova facilitate Russian troop withdrawals from their territory and strengthen their sovereignty.

In its FY2000 foreign operations appropriations bills, the Congress slashed the President's request for overall NIS assistance programs (which includes the ETRI funds for State) by \$252-307 million, but did not specify how to apply the cuts. These cuts would force the Administration to make unacceptable tradeoffs between support for NIS reforms and threat reduction activities.

Middle East Peace - In reaching the agreement at Wye River last year, President Clinton committed to helping Israelis minimize the risks of peace and to lifting the lives of the Palestinians so that hopes for peace do not founder in poverty and despair.

For this reason, the President requested a three-year, \$1.9 billion assistance package designed to help sustain the Middle East peace process. It includes funds to bolster Israel's security and to promote the safety and well-being of the Palestinian and Jordanian people.

In its FY2000 foreign operations appropriations bills, the Congress provided only the funds requested for Jordan. It has yet to fund the Israeli or Palestinian components of Wye, for either FY1999 or FY2000.

Conflict Resolution in Africa - Recent cease-fire agreements in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone, as well as the restoration of democracy in Nigeria, offer new opportunities for peace, prosperity and democracy in those regions. Supporting this trend through conflict resolution, democratization, and trade and investment is in the U.S. national interest. In his FY2000 budget request, the President proposed \$818 million in development assistance and economic support funds to Africa.

In its fiscal year 2000 foreign operations appropriations bills, the Congress has

cut significantly the President's request.

United Nations Arrears - Paying the U.S. dues to the United Nations is a legal and moral responsibility. But it is not only an obligation, it is an opportunity. The UN helps mobilize support of other nations for goals important to U.S. interests, from keeping the peace, to immunizing children, to caring for refugees, to combating the spread of deadly weapons.

The Senate has passed legislation that provides authorization for appropriations of the bulk of U.S. payment of UN arrears. Fiscal year Commerce, State, Justice appropriations bills, however, continue to underfund significantly UN arrears payments.

RAND STUDY October 18, 1999

Background: On Tuesday, 19 October, the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses (OSAGWI) at the Department of Defense will release a RAND study on the medical effects of the drug Pyridostigmine Bromide (PB). PB is an investigational new drug (IND) given to service personnel during the Gulf War as a pretreatment to prevent death in the event of an attack by the nerve agent soman. Because PB is an IND, it was given to service personnel under special rules of the FDA. Release of this report will be controversial because the author concludes that PB cannot be ruled out as a cause of long-term health problems. This is the first report that OSAGWI has published that could be interpreted as finding a cause for some Gulf War illnesses. In reality, the report only concludes that more research is needed on the effects of PB because the current body of information is inadequate.

Does the RAND report on PB released by DOD indicate that a cause has finally been found for Gulf War illnesses?

* This Administration has worked hard to "leave no stone unturned" in trying to find out why some of our Gulf War veterans are suffering from unexplained illnesses.

* DOD commissioned RAND to study available scientific literature to determine if some specific exposures could explain illnesses suffered by some of our Gulf War veterans.

* The RAND PB report does not conclude that PB is a cause of Gulf War illnesses. It does state that PB cannot be ruled out as a possible cause for some illnesses and calls for additional research on the health affects of PB.

Will there be more research done on PB as a result of this study?

* We currently have over \$20 million invested in completed or ongoing research on the health effects of PB.

* We will use the recommendations in the RAND report to consider funding additional research projects on PB.

* VA has contracted with the Institute of Medicine to conduct a thorough review of PB that is expected to be completed within one year.

If we weren't certain of the health effects of PB, why was it given to our troops?

* I refer you to the Department of Defense for a history of PB use.

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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/18/99 2:15:30 PM

FROM Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)

CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT October 18 Guidance [UNCLASSIFIED]

TO Abercrombie-Winstanley, Gina K. (NESA)
Ahmed, Sarah (RECORDS)
Akers, Dale W. (STP)
Allen, Charles A. (LEGAL)
Andreasen, Steven P. (DEFENSE)
Armstrong, Fulton T. (INTERAM)
Avery, Dale R. (INTERAM)
Baker, James E. (LEGAL)
Barnett, Cheryl E. (RUE)
Bartlett, L. June (EXSEC)
Bartsch, Bryan W. (STP)
Battenfield, Pat A. (AF)
Baum, Russell A. (ADMIN)
Bayley, Douglas C. (WHSR)
Bellamy, Ralph C. (RECORDS)
Benjamin, Daniel (TNT)
Bernard, Kenneth W. (HEALTH)
Binnendijk, Johannes A. (Hans) (DEFENSE)
Blackburn, John (WHSR)
Blinken, Antony J. (EUR)
Bolinski, Charlene C. (RECORDS)
Bouchard, Joseph F. (DEFENSE)
Bowles, Ian A. (ENV)
Brackman, Stella S. (DEFENSE)
Bradtke, Robert A. (EXSEC)
Bresnahan, Gary E. (WHSR/STP)

Broadwick, Bonnie . (WHSR)
Bryan, Dave L. (STP)
Burrell, Christina L. (LEGIS)
Busby, Scott W. (MULTI)
Byrne, Catherine E. (AF)
Camp, Donald A. (NESA)
Carteret, Charles L. (STP)
Carty, John J. (STP)
Cheramie, Don E. (WHSR)
Clark, Bronya (ADMIN)
Clarke, Richard A. (TNT)
Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)
Cressey, Roger W. (TNT)
Crocker, Bathsheba N. (NSA)
Crowder, Stevan D. (WHSR)
Curts, Brenda E. (INTEL)
Dames, Victoria J. (RECORDS)
Dejban, Donna D. (NSA)
Dempsey, Nora B. (AF)
Depaepe, Michael B. (STP)
DeRosa, Mary B. (LEGAL)
Dimel, Marsha L. (ADMIN)
Duncan, John D. (INTECON/DOS)
Dunn, John A. (RUE/INTERN)
Dupuy, Shawn L. (STP)
Edwards, Joan K. (NONPRO)
Ehrendreich, Joel (WHSR)
Elkind, Jonathan H. (RUE)
Epstein, Gerald L. (OSTP)
Erdahl, Douglas M. (WHSR)
Fallin, James (PRESS)
Feldman, Daniel F. (MULTI)
Ficklin, John W. (RECORDS)
Figueredo, Orlando (STP)
Ford, Robert G. (WHSR)
Frazer, Jendayi E. (AF)
Fuchs, Joachim D. (WHSR)

George, Christopher L. (RECORDS)
Gire, Cynthia L. (EXSEC)
Gladura, Timothy L. (INTEL)
Gobush, Matthew N. (PRESS)
Good, Travis C. (RECORDS)
Gordon, Philip H. (EUR)
Gordon-Hagerty, Lisa E. (TNT)
Gray, Wendy E. (NSA)
Green, Charles A. (TNT)
Guarnieri, Valerie N. (MULTI)
Hale, John E. (STP)
Halperin, David E. (SPCHW)
Hammer, Michael A. (PRESS)
Hammonds, D. Holly (INTECON)
Hane, Gerald J. (OSTP)
Harris, Elisa D. (NONPRO)
Hendricks, Lori A. (INTECON)
Hill, Christopher R. (SEE)
Hill, Roseanne M. (MULTI)
Hilliard, Brenda I. (EXSEC)
Hillman, Thomas W. (STP)
Holtzapple, Richard A.
Howerton, Barbara E. (INTEL)
Huff, Lindsey E. (PRESS)
Hunerwadel, Joan S. (LEGAL)
Hunker, Jeffrey A. (TNT)
Huso, Ravic R. (ASIA)
Jacobson, Tracey A. (ADMIN)
Jansen, Christian P. (WHSR)
Jarosinski, Frank J. (WHSR)
Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Jordan, Kristine A. (STP)
Joshi, M. Kay (EXSEC)
Kaidanow, Tina S. (SEE)
Kale, Dora A. (MULTI)
Kalka, Jean-Francois (JF) (STP)
Kaplan, Dean M. (RECORDS)

Kass, Nicholas S. (EUR)
Kaufman, Stuart J. (RUE)
Keenan, Josefina (Chris) (HEALTH)
Keith, James R. (ASIA)
Kelly, Sandra L. (DEFENSE)
Knepper, Charlotte (INTEL)
Konrad, Elizabeth M. (RECORDS)
Krass, Caroline D. (LEGAL)
Lackey, Miles M. (LEGIS)
Laskowski, Gregory J. (WHSR)
Leary, William H. (RECORDS)
Leavy, David C. (PRESS)
Lee, Malcolm R. (NEC)
Liberatore, Joseph W. (TNT/INTERN)
Lieberson, Donna P. (TNT)
Lieberthal, Kenneth G. (ASIA)
Locke, Dwayne L. (STP)
Loring, Pamela (RUE)
Lowden, Michael R. (STP)
MacDonald, Bruce W. (OSTP)
Malinowski, Tomasz P. (SPCHW)
Malley, Robert (NESA)
Manning, Michael T. (WHSR)
Marsh, Thomas S (RECORDS)
Matthews, Sonyia (ADMIN)
Maxfield, Nancy H. (EUR)
McCarthy, Mary O. (INTEL)
McGee, Jenny A. (WHSR)
McIlhany, Jesika A. (ADMIN)
McIntyre, Stuart H. (RECORDS)
Merchant, Brian T. (RECORDS/INTEL)
Millison, Cathy L. (EXSEC)
Mitchell, Donald A. (INTEL)
Mitchell, Rebecca (Julie) J. (DEFENSE)
Mitsler, Elaine M. (INTECON)
Miyaoaka, Lester H. (STP)
Montgomery, Mark C. (TNT)

Moretz, Sheila K. (NSA)
Muir, Morgan C. (SEE)
Murphy, Allison M. (ADMIN)
Naplan, Steven J. (MULTI)
Norland, Richard B. (EUR)
Noss, Heather L. (TNT/INTERN)
Orzulak, Paul K. (SPCHW)
Pascual, Carlos E. (RUE)
Payne, Raymond H. (WHSR/STP)
Peterman, David (Brian) (DEFENSE)
Pimentel, Betsy J. (DEFENSE)
Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
Porter, Pete (RECORDS)
Porterfield Patrick C. (WHSR)
Powell, Elliott (WHSR/EXSEC)
Prise, Edith M. (RECORDS)
Pritchard, Charles (Jack) L. (ASIA)
Quinn, Mary E. (EUR)
Rickard, Robin S. (WHSR)
Riedel, Bruce O. (NESA)
Rinaldi, Steven M. (OSTP)
Roach, Darren S. (STP)
Robinson, Jack A. (TNT)
Rogers, Elizabeth B. (WHSR)
Rosa, Frederick M. (TNT)
Roundtree, Beverly (TNT)
Rudman, Mara E. (NSA)
Russ, Judith P. (SEE)
Salvetti, Lisa M. (RECORDS)
Samans, Richard (NEC)
Samore, Gary S. (NONPRO)
Sanborn, Daniel R. K. (Records)
Sandalow, David B. (ENV)
Sapiro, Miriam E. (SEE)
Sargeant, Stephen T. (EXSEC)
Saunders, Richard M. (VP)
Schaefer, Christopher S. (ADMIN/INTERN)

Schaefer, Matthew P. (INTECON)
Schrader, Joel M. (WHSR)
Schwartz, Eric P. (MULTI)
Scott-Perez, Marilyn L. (NSA)
Segal, Jack D. (NONPRO)
Shah, Sonal R.
Shannon, Thomas A. (INTERAM)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Sibley, Matthew W. (WHSR)
Sigler, Ralph H. (WHSR)
Silva, Mary Ann T. (RUE)
Simon, Steven N. (TNT)
Simons, James R. (STP)
Smith, Gayle E. (AF)
Smith, James A. (WHSR)
Smith, Michael P. (RECORDS)
Snowden, Deniz (INTERAM)
Snyder, Julie A. (STP)
Soubers, Richard R. (RECORDS)
Starks, Tali T. (RECORDS)
Storey, Sharon V. (NSA)
Stromseth, Jane E. (MULTI)
Sutliff, Deana R. (WHSR)
Sutphen, Mona K. (NSA)
Swarm, Amy L. (WHSR)
Tarver, J. Sean (WHSR)
Tavlarides, Mark J. (LEGIS)
Tedstrom, John E. (RUE)
Tucker, Maureen E. (NONPRO)
Vaccaro, Jonathan M. (Matt) (MULTI)
Valenzuela, Arturo A. (INTERAM)
vonLipsey, Roderick K. (SEE)
Ward, JoAnn (OSTP)
Wasserman, Elaine P. (EXSEC)
Weber, Anthony D. (STP)
Wechsler, William F. (TNT)
Weiss, Andrew S. (RUE)

Widmer, Edward L. (Ted) (SPCHW)
Williams, Mary C. (ADMIN)
Williams, Robert S. (WHSR)
Witkowsky, Anne A. (DEFENSE)
Wozniak, Natalie S. (PRESS)
Yee, Hoyt B. (EUR)
Aragoncillo, Leandro A. (VP)
Babbitt, James F. (VP)
Black, Steven K. (VP)
Bolan, Christopher J. (VP)
Brody, Richard J. (VP)
Davidson, Leslie K. (VP)
Dennett, Todd H.
Fuerth, Leon S. (VP)
Orfini, Michael H. (VP)
Osius, Theodore G. (VP)
Roberts, Michael W. (VP)
Saunders, Richard M. (VP)
Woolston, Ann E. (VP)

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TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

NSC GUIDANCE October 18.doc
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GUIDANCE

October 18, 1999

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA

Pakistan (new)

EUROPE / RUSSIA

Russia - NMD Cooperation (new)

Observer Article (new)

Chechnya (new)

MULTILATERAL

Sierra Leone (new)

INTERAM

Panama - Moscoso Visit (new)

LEGISLAT

Foreign Ops

DEFENSE

Rand Study (new)

Vieques (new)

AFRICA

LA Times rebuttal

PAKISTAN

October 18, 1999

How do you view the situation in Pakistan?

* I welcome General Musharraf's stated commitment to return Pakistan to democracy and civilian rule.

* I am disappointed, however, that he did not specify a quick timetable. We will continue to strongly urge him to restore a constitutional, civilian and democratic government.

So are you ready to deal with General Musharraf' regime?

* Until there is a return to democracy we cannot have business as usual and we have made this very clear.

* We have implement sanctions under Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and are considering other measures.

Are you concerned about Pakistan's nukes?

* There has been no change in Pakistan's nuclear holding. General Musarraff's statement on nuclear and missile restraint is encouraging.

* It is also important that Musharraf said he is committed to dialogue with India, which is in the best interest of both parties.

* We will be looking to see that his actions reflect his pledge to return Pakistan to democracy and respect for civil liberties, press freedom and human rights.

What about Sharif?

* I am concerned about the treatment of Sharif and other politicians in upcoming accountability campaign, in particular reports that Sharif would be tried for treason and attempted murder.

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE ABM TREATY

October 18, 1999

CONTEXT: The New York Times and Washington Post reported on October 17 that the United States is seeking to renegotiate the ABM Treaty and offering to help Russia complete a large early warning radar as part of a campaign to gain Russian agreement to ABM Treaty changes.

POLICY

- * U.S. is committed to the development of a limited NMD system. The system is designed primarily to counter the threat posed by emerging rogue state missile threats.
- * No decision has been taken on whether to proceed with deployment: a decision on whether to deploy a limited NMD will not be made until the year 2000 or later.
- * The ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability. The U.S. is committed to work with Russia to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty required for possible deployment of a limited NMD and to make progress on further strategic arms reductions.

Core Press Points

- * It is clear there is an emerging ballistic missile threat from rogue states.
- * We are moving forward as quickly as we can with our NMD research and development program; the President will make a decision on NMD deployment next summer consistent with considerations of feasibility, threat, cost and arms control.
- * We have made clear to Russia that we want to work cooperatively on the issue of missile defense and the ABM Treaty, which would need to be modified to accommodate deployment of a limited NMD. We have also made clear our continued interest in pursuing discussions relating to further reductions in strategic

arms.

* Believe a cooperative approach on NMD and ABM will provide tangible benefits to both U.S. and Russian security. Each face threats from rogue states.

* In recent discussions regarding our NMD program and its implications for the ABM Treaty, we have put forward a number of ideas for discussion relating to practical U.S.-Russian cooperation in the area of missile defense and the ABM Treaty.

* Discussions on this issue continue; will consider next steps as this process unfolds.

Q: What is the Russian reaction at this point to U.S. proposals to modify the Treaty? to cooperate on missile defense?

* We are in the very early phases of discussing these issues with Russia.

* Expect it will be some time before the U.S. puts concrete proposals on the table regarding changes to the ABM Treaty and receives a considered Russian response to these proposals, as well as our ideas for cooperation.

* In the meantime, we will continue what has been a serious and constructive set of discussions on these issues.

Q: Are you offering to complete construction of a Russian radar in Siberia or to share data from U.S. radars.

* Not going to comment on any of the specific ideas for discussion we have put forward, other than to say there are some new and creative ideas.

* Again, we are in the very early phases of discussing this with Russia.

* The ideas we have put forward for discussion make clear we are serious about a cooperative approach that will enhance both countries' security.

Q: Aren't you placing American security at risk by not simply scrapping the ABM Treaty and proceeding with NMD?

* The approach the Administration is taking with respect to NMD and the ABM Treaty will give us the kind of protection we will need for the immediate missile threat.

* This approach will enhance our overall security, and takes into account the diverse nature of potential threats to our security, including the emerging ballistic missile threat from rogue states.

* U.S. also has important interest in preserving strategic stability and pursuing further strategic arms reductions with Russia; ABM Treaty remains an important agreement in this area. In our interest to try to work cooperatively with Russia on changes to the Treaty, national missile defense, and arms control.

Q: How much money will it cost to go forward with the kind of cooperation discussed in the Washington Post and New York Times?

* At this stage, we have simply put forward ideas for discussion relating to cooperation on missile defense and the ABM Treaty. Premature to give any cost estimates, given we are still awaiting feedback from Russia and have not made concrete proposals.

Is it true you are looking at paying for an upgrade or joint U.S.-Russian presence at Russian radar in Azerbaijan?

* No, we have not put forward this idea for discussion with Russia. Very sensitive to Azerbaijan's concerns about Russian presence on its territory.

RUSSIA/CHECHNYA

October 18, 1999

Background: Fighting in Chechnya has continued, with the Russian government setting conditions for talks which Chechen leaders cannot meet. Russian troops over the weekend continued to draw closer to the Chechen capital of Grozny.

What have you done in reaction to the Russian attacks on Chechnya, and their refusal to negotiate with Chechen leaders?

(. Urge a constructive dialogue with all legitimate leaders in the North Caucasus. Convinced that this is the only way the Russians will be able to achieve long-lasting stability and security in the region. Also important for Russia to avoid steps that make effective dialogue more difficult.

(. Especially concerned about the possibility of further escalation. Any resumption of general hostilities in Chechnya could threaten stability in the entire North Caucasus region. Have delivered this message quite clearly to the Russian government.

(. Have also stressed the danger to innocent civilians from recent escalation and deeply regret the loss of innocent life. Important for all concerned to avoid indiscriminate use of force, respect human rights and, for Russian government, avoid policies that discriminate against people from the Caucasus region on racial or ethnic grounds.

* Concerned about reports that some people fleeing fighting in Chechnya are being prevented from entering neighboring Russian republic of North Ossetia. Urge Russians to ensure that freedom of movement is protected, especially for those at greatest risk.

SIERRA LEONE PEACE AGREEMENT

October 18, 1999

CONTEXT: A peace agreement was signed July 7 in Lome, Togo by the President of Sierra Leone and the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), ending a nearly eight-year long conflict which began in 1991. Its main elements include a cessation of violence, RUF participation in an expanded Cabinet, a mechanism to control strategic natural resources (diamonds), and a full pardon for RUF leader Foday Sankoh coupled with amnesty for the RUF. The agreement also provides for extensive demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of combatants. Several commissions, including a truth and reconciliation commission, will be established to help in national reconciliation and reconstruction. Two previous peace agreements - the latest in 1996 - have failed.

The U.S., UK and Netherlands have provided logistical support for the regional peacekeepers (ECOMOG) that defended (and in March 1998 restored to power after an attempted coup) the democratically elected government of President Kabbah. In April of this year, the Sierra Leone Government allowed Foday Sankoh, imprisoned and sentenced to death on eight counts of treason, to travel to Lome, Togo to consult with senior RUF commanders for the first time in more than two years. This internal RUF dialogue developed an agenda for negotiations with the government and helped to clarify the RUF lines of authority. On May 18th, Rev. Jackson and President Eyadema of Togo brokered a meeting between Sankoh and President Kabbah that reached agreement on a cease-fire and the beginning of peace talks.

POLICY:

* Our objectives in Sierra Leone have been to promote a regional peace that will end the conflict, relieve the suffering of the people of Sierra Leone, and foster peace and national reconciliation. We are hopeful that this agreement will succeed, and we are prepared to provide appropriate support for its implementation.

Can you comment on the amnesty provision for the rebels in the peace agreement reached in Lome?

* We are eager to help regional efforts to establish peace and security and address the humanitarian needs of the Sierra Leonean people. This is a peace agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. It provides for amnesty only within the borders of Sierra Leone, it does not preclude potential prosecution of war crimes by an international body. However, no such tribunal exists at present. The United States is not a signatory and is not bound by the agreement, although we do support the conclusion of the peace agreement.

What recourse will be available for victims of atrocities?

* The peace agreement provides for a truth and reconciliation commission, as well as a human rights commission that will deal with these issues on a case-by-case basis. The peace agreement also provides for humanitarian assistance to reach populations in rural areas and for the demobilization and reintegration into society of child combatants.

Did the U.S. pressure President Kabbah to make undue concessions to the RUF?

* No. The United States, along with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the UN, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the UK and others, acted as a facilitator for the peace talks. This agreement is strictly between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF.

What kind of role has the United States played in "facilitating" the agreement?

* From the start, the United States worked with the government, RUF representatives, ECOWAS and the UN to initiate talks and reach a lasting settlement.

* On May 18th, Reverend Jesse Jackson, the President and Secretary of State's Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa, working in close collaboration with ECOWAS Chairman President Eyadema of Togo and the UN, was able to secure the agreement of President Kabbah and RUF leader Sankoh to a cease fire

that commenced on May 24th. This lead to the negotiation of the agreement that was signed in July.

* This was part of a team effort that extended over months to encourage dialogue between the parties. Reverend Jackson's efforts built on the work of our Special Envoy for Liberia, Ambassador Howard Jeter, and our Ambassador to Sierra Leone, Joseph Melrose.

When will the UN peacekeeping start?

* The UN has a small observer mission in place now. This Friday (October 22) the Security Council is scheduled to vote for an expanded UN operation (up to 6,000 troops)to help in the demilitarization and demobilization of the combatants.

Will the U.S. military participate in the UN mission?

* No.

What is the humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone?

* It is dire. This January, the RUF/AFRC rebels invaded the capital, Freetown. In a period of several weeks, 6,000 people were killed and large portions of the city were destroyed, leaving about 150,000 people homeless. More than 3,000 children (two-thirds of them girls) are registered as missing since January.

* Sierra Leone is a small country with a population of only 4.6 million. Violence and terror have forced more than one-third of the population to flee their homes. More than 400,000 are refugees - primarily in neighboring Guinea and Liberia - and another 700,000-1,000,000 are believed to be internally displaced. The agreement to allow unhindered access by humanitarian organizations to many areas of the country that have been isolated for more than a year will allow the international community to start meeting the needs of an estimate 2.6 million people in need of assistance.

What is the United States doing to alleviate the suffering in Sierra Leone?

* We have provided more than \$55 million in emergency humanitarian relief to Sierra Leone in FY98, and so far in FY99, we have provided an additional \$41 million in humanitarian assistance.

* We are also providing non-lethal logistical support to ECOMOG in its role implementing the peace agreement. This support has amounted to \$10 million since May 1998, and we are providing an additional \$5.8 million now. In addition, we hope to provide a further \$3 million in draw down of non-lethal defense articles.

VISIT BY PANAMANIAN PRESIDENT MIREYA MOSCOSO October 18, 1999

CONTEXT: Panamanian President Moscoso will meet with the President on October 19, 1999. This will be her first encounter with the President since her September 1 inauguration.

What will be discussed during the meeting?

The topics of conversation will cover the broad range of our excellent bilateral relationship. These will include, among other things, the upcoming transfer of the canal to the Republic of Panama, our security assistance relationship, counter-drug cooperation, and trade and investment issues.

Why is the United States government turning over property and real estate worth billions of dollars to Panama?

After years of negotiations, and with the advice and consent of the Senate, in 1977 the Government of the United States concluded a treaty with the Government of Panama calling for the gradual transfer of full authority and control over the Panama Canal to the Government of Panama. That process, begun in 1979, culminates in the final transfer of the Canal to Panama at noon on December 31, 1999. At this time, more than 95% of the Canal workforce is Panamanian and the current director of the Panama Canal Commission is a Panamanian. In the 20 years since the Treaty went into effect, in spite of bilateral differences, administrations from opposing parties in both Panama and the United States have

worked to adhere to the terms of the Treaty and related agreements. We made a binding treaty commitment in 1977 to transfer the Canal to Panama in operating condition, and also to transfer to Panama certain property contained in what was known as the Canal Zone. We are on schedule to fulfill that commitment.

UXO/RANGE ISSUE

Why is the United States government refusing to clean up unexploded ordnance on firing ranges in Panama as required by the Treaty?

The Canal Treaty requires us to "take all measures to ensure insofar as may be "practicable," that hazards to human life, health and safety are removed." In the case of the former firing ranges, we have fulfilled that requirement. All areas of the former ranges that are accessible were cleared to the extent practicable. Some areas, representing about 3% of the total area transferred, will continue to have unexploded ordnance present because rough terrain and thick forest make clearance impracticable. These areas are located in the environmentally sensitive canal watershed and would suffer possibly irreparable damage if cleared and graded in order to find unexploded ordnance. We provided information on the management of such areas, gained from similar experience in the United States, and equipment to the Government of Panama to help it to manage these areas. We will remain in contact with the Government of Panama on this issue in the future.

What about unexploded chemical weapons left in Panama?

We have no evidence that unexploded chemical weapons or their components exist in areas of Panama covered by the Panama Canal Treaty.

COUNTERNARCOTICS CENTER/FOLS

Why didn't the United States government negotiate an agreement with the government of Panama to establish a counter-narcotics center that would have allowed us to continue to use the valuable facilities at Howard AFB?

The Government of the United States negotiated with the Government of Panama for almost two years on an agreement that would have allowed U.S. Forces to remain in Panama and to carry out counter-narcotics activities. The MCC negotiations did not fail for lack of will or effort. Ultimately, however, the two countries were unable to agree on acceptable terms. In the final analysis, our need for a cost effective counter-drug facility could not be reconciled with the political and financial requirements of the Panamanian government.

How do you intend to make up for the loss of U.S. bases for counter-drug activities in Panama?

We have entered into agreements with the governments of Ecuador and the Netherlands to use existing facilities in Ecuador and the Netherlands Antilles (Aruba and Curacao) as Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) for counter-drug missions. Operations from these facilities have begun already. We are also exploring with other countries the possibility of establishing a third FOL. Once fully functional, we expect that the FOLS will provide better operational counter-drug capability, particularly in the critical source zone areas, at less cost than our former bases in Panama.

Panama will continue to play an important role in our counter-drug effort, and this issue will be a central part of our bilateral relationship.

Is the United States government pursuing an FOL in Panama too?

No, we are not looking at Panama as a sight for a future FOL at this time.

U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

Does the government of the United States plan to begin talks with the new government of Panama regarding a U.S. military presence after 1999?

The Government of the United States has no current plans to discuss a post-1999 military presence with the Government of Panama. We are working with the Government of Panama to insure the security of the Canal.

How do you propose to protect the Canal from Colombian guerrillas who already operate with impunity in the eastern Panamanian province of Darien?

Upon final transfer of the Canal to Panama the task of protecting it on a routine basis devolves upon the Government of Panama. We are consulting with the Government of Panama regarding possible threats to the Canal from all sources. Both sides believe in this framework of cooperation. We stand ready to work with the Government of Panama, now and in the future, on any plan it might devise for protection of the Canal.

PANAMA CANAL CAPITAL FUND

Is the U.S. Government giving away \$160 million to the government of Panama in addition to transferring the Canal?

In 1996, the Panama Canal Commission (PCC) established a long-range capital assets improvement program to enhance the capacity and safety of the Panama Canal. The program is underway but is not scheduled to be completed until 2005. The program includes such projects as widening the Gaillard cut to permit two-way traffic of large vessels; procurement of additional tugboats, launches, and locks towing locomotives to handle increased levels of traffic; rehabilitation of 53,000 feet of locomotive towtrack; replacement of the original locks machinery with modern hydraulics systems; and enhancement of the Canal's vessel traffic management system by incorporating a Global Positioning System (GPS).

These important capital projects are funded out of a capital "revolving" fund. Importantly, this capital fund consists of toll receipts, and does not include any U.S. taxpayer monies. Canal tolls were increased substantially approximately two years ago to pay for these projects through a process that included notification to the affected industry and to the congressional committees exercising oversight of canal matters.

After careful consideration of the legal and policy issues, relevant USG agencies agreed that transferring the fund to the PCA (the Panama Canal Authority, the successor to the Panama Canal Commission) would be proper and consistent with U.S. law. Moreover, such transfer would be consistent with the USG obligation in the Panama Canal Treaty to turn over the Canal "in operating condition and free of liens and debts."

Panama Canal Chinese interest
October 18, 1999

CHINESE THREAT TO THE CANAL

Why did the government of the United States stand by and allow the Chinese to take over the ports on either side of the Canal?

* The Government of Panama granted a commercial concession to operate port facilities in Balboa and Cristobal, on the Pacific and Atlantic sides of the Canal respectively, to the Hong Kong company Hutchison-Whampoa in 1996. Under the terms of the contract, Hutchison-Whampoa does not own the port facilities, but rather operates them, together with other private contractors, on behalf of the Government of Panama. There is no evidence that the commercial concession granted to Hutchison-Whampoa represents a threat to the Canal. The neutrality of the Canal and its operations are guaranteed by the Neutrality Treaty signed and ratified by the governments of the United States and Panama, and also by that Treaty's protocol, to which 36 other countries are states party.

Panama Canal Authority Controls the Canal

- * The Panama Canal Authority maintains full authority over the canal.
- * The Authority - and no private contractor or investor -- controls the movement of vessels through the canal.
- * Panama has invited private companies worldwide to assist in the development of the canal.

Hutchison Whampoa's Commercial Interest in the Canal

* Hutchison Whampoa (HW), a privately-held Hong Kong company with international investors, won the contract to develop Panama's ports of Cristobal (Atlantic side) and Balboa (Pacific Coast) for \$22 million plus 10 percent of gross port revenues. The bid was more than twice as much as the next competitor. Such discrepancies in bidding are not uncommon in international practice and HW's bidding process was not inconsistent with other bidders' practices in Panama.

* HW activities in Cristobal and Balboa are limited to unloading and loading containers and storing cargo.

* HW is but one of many port operators in Panama, including Stevedoring Services of America (SSA) and Evergreen, a Taiwan company.

* In 1998, HW moved just 9 percent of all containers through Panama's ports, in comparison to SSA's 66 percent and Evergreen's 24 percent.

* HW does not operate or control pilotage of ships through the canal. To enter the port of Panama, a vessel must be piloted by an official designated by the Panama Canal Authority.

* HW has the right to "own and operate, under a separate concession from the Port Authority, towage, work boats, vessel repair services and pilotage services" (i.e. piloting into HW's port facilities, not through the Canal itself).

Hutchison Whampoa is a Global Commercial Operation

* HW services 17 international ports, including the United Kingdom, the Bahamas and Hong Kong, and handles around 12 percent of all international container traffic.

* HW recently was asked to look into assisting the modernization of the port of Rotterdam, the world's largest container port.

* HW's origins can be traced back to the 1820's as a British firm; with \$36

billion, it is a publicly held company and the second largest company on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in terms of market capitalization. HW's investment of \$150 million in Panama represents a small fraction of its overall holdings.

* 49.9 percent of HW's shares are held by Cheung Kong (CK) Holdings; 34.9 percent of CK is held by Li Ka-shing, the world's 10th wealthiest person, according to Fortune Magazine, and a migrant from China in 1941.

* Both HW and CK are involved in more than ports; their businesses include real estate and telecommunications.

* No mainland Chinese or members of the PRC Government are directors of HW or CK.

* Of CK's total holdings, no more than ten percent is invested in China. Li Ka-shing himself did not invest in China until 1979.

* Li Ka-shing is on the board of CITIC, a leading Chinese investment company. Former Secretary of State Shultz and AIG Chairman Greenberg have sat on the Board.

* HW has joint venture (JV) arrangements with a number of U.S. companies including Motorola and Procter & Gamble.

HW also has JVs with Chinese public entities. Its only JV with the PLA is a contract to provide commercial telecom services to China Great Wall. To date, no material services have been rendered.

Vetoing Foreign Ops bill
October 18, 1999

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Today I am returning without approval H.R. 2606, the Foreign Operations, Export

Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, FY 2000.

The central lesson we have learned in this century is that we cannot protect American interests at home without active engagement abroad. Common sense tells us, and hard experience has confirmed, that we must lead in the world, working with other nations to defuse crises, repel dangers, promote more open economic and political systems, and strengthen the rule of law. These have been the guiding principles of American foreign policy for generations. They have served the American people well, and greatly helped to advance the cause of peace and freedom around the world.

This bill rejects all of those principles. It is a frontal attack on America's 50-year tradition of leadership for a safer, more prosperous and democratic world. It is an abandonment of hope in our nation's capacity to shape that kind of world. It implies that we are too small and insecure to meet our share of international responsibilities, too shortsighted to see that doing so is in our national interest. It is the budget document of a new isolationism that would have America bury its head in the sand at the height of our power and prosperity.

In the short term, it utterly fails to address critical national security needs. It suggests we can afford to underfund our efforts to keep deadly weapons from falling into dangerous hands and walk away without peril from our essential work toward peace in places of conflict. Just as seriously, it fails to address America's long-term interests. It reduces assistance to nations struggling to build democratic societies and open markets, and backs away from our commitment to help people trapped in poverty to stand on their feet. This, too, threatens our security, because future threats will come from regions and nations where instability and misery prevail and future opportunities will come from nations on the road to freedom and growth.

By denying America a decent investment in diplomacy, this bill suggests that we should meet threats to our security with our military might alone. That is a dangerous proposition. For if we underfund our diplomacy, we will end up overusing our military. Problems we might have been able to resolve peacefully will turn into crises we can only resolve at a cost of life and treasure. Shortchanging our arsenal of peace is as risky as shortchanging our arsenal of

war.

The overall funding provided by the bill is woefully inadequate. This version of the bill is \$2.2 billion, or 14 percent, below the level that I requested of \$14.9 billion, and is also a reduction from the level of funding for the current fiscal year. The specific shortfalls are numerous and unacceptable.

For example, it is shocking that Congress has failed to fulfill our obligations to Israel and its neighbors as they take risks and difficult decisions to advance the Middle East peace process. My Administration, like all its predecessors, has fought hard to promote peace in the Middle East. The bill would provide neither the \$800 million requested this year as a supplemental appropriation nor the \$500 million requested in FY 2000 funding to support the Wye River Agreement. Just when Prime Minister Barak has helped give the peace process a jump start, this sends the worst possible message to Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians about America's commitment to the peace process. We should instead seize this opportunity to support them.

[Additional resources are required to respond to the costs of building peace in Kosovo and the rest of the Balkans, and I intend to work with Congress to provide assistance above what is in this bill.] Other life-saving peace efforts, such as those in Sierra Leone, East Timor and Eritrea-Ethiopia, are imperiled by the bill's inadequate funding of the Voluntary Peacekeeping Account.

My Administration has sought to protect Americans from the threat posed by the potential danger of weapons proliferation from Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union. But Congress has failed to finance the Enhanced Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI), which is designed to prevent weapons of mass destruction and weapons technologies from falling into the wrong hands and weapons scientists from offering their talents to countries, or even terrorists, seeking these weapons. The bill also curtails ETRI programs that help Russia and other New Independent States strengthen export controls to avoid illicit trafficking in sensitive materials through their borders and airports. ETRI will also help facilitate withdrawal of Russian forces and equipment from countries such as Georgia and Moldova. And it will create peaceful research opportunities for thousands of former Soviet weapons scientists.

Some members of Congress might be willing to fund these nonproliferation efforts if we took the money from programs that support democracy and small scale enterprises in Russia, but these are the very kinds of initiatives needed to complete Russia's transformation away from communism and authoritarianism. A generation from now, no one is going to say we did too much to help the nations of the Soviet Union safeguard their nuclear technology and expertise. If the funding cuts in this bill were to become law, future generations would certainly say we did too little, and that we imperiled our future in the process.

The Administration has also sought to promote economic progress and political change in developing countries, because America benefits when these countries become our partners in security and trade. At the Cologne Summit, we led a historic effort to enable the world's poorest and most heavily indebted countries to finance health, education and opportunity programs. Congress fails to fund the U.S. contribution. The bill also severely underfunds Multilateral Development Bank financing and other programs that will promote development in Latin America, Asia and especially Africa. The cuts to the Multilateral Development Banks will virtually double US arrears to these institutions.

Across the board, the Administration requested minimum levels of funding to assure American leadership on matters vital to the interests and values of our citizens. In area after area, from fighting terrorism and international crime to promoting nuclear stability on the Korean peninsula, from helping refugees and disaster victims to meeting its own goals of a 10,000-member Peace Corps, Congress has failed to fund adequately even the most modest requests.

Several policy matters addressed in the bill are also problematic. One provision would hamper the Export-Import Bank's ability to be responsive to American exporters by requiring that Congress be notified of dozens of additional kinds of transactions before the Bank can offer financing. Another provision could be read to prevent the United States from engaging in diplomatic efforts to promote a cost-effective, global solution to climate change. A third provision places restrictions on assistance to Indonesia that could harm our ability to influence the objectives we share with Congress: ensuring that Indonesia honors the referendum in East Timor and that security is restored there, while encouraging democracy and economic reform in Indonesia. A fourth provision would jeopardize our ability to fulfill commitments to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development

Organization under the Agreed Framework, and would damage our nonproliferation policy on the Korean peninsula. Finally, this bill contains several sections that, if treated as mandatory, would encroach on the President's sole constitutional authority to conduct diplomatic negotiations.

In sum, this appropriations bill undermines important American interests, and ignores the lessons that have been at the core of our bipartisan foreign policy for the last half century. Like the Senate's recent vote to defeat the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, this bill reflects an inexcusable and potentially dangerous complacency about the opportunities and risks America faces in the world today. I therefore will not sign it.

I look forward to working with Congress to craft an appropriations bill that I can support, properly addressing our shared goal of an America that is strong at home and strong abroad, respected not only for our leadership, but for the vision and commitment that real leadership entails. The American people deserve a foreign policy worthy of our great country, and I will fight to ensure that they continue to have one.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release August 16, 1999

FACT SHEET

The President's International Affairs Budget:
Investments in Peace

During his address to the Veterans of Foreign Wars today, President Clinton will repeat his call to Congress for full funding of his international affairs budget. The President's investments in peace serve U.S. national security interests and minimize the need for military intervention abroad. The President will highlight the following initiatives:

Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative - During his 1999 State of the Union Address, President Clinton called for expanded cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, and other New Independent States (NIS) to safeguard weapons of mass destruction (WMD) materials and technology so that they never fall into the wrong hands. In the aftermath of the Russian financial crisis in August 1998, President Clinton directed a two-thirds increase for threat reduction programs over five years (\$4.5 billion total). The Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) proposed in the President's balanced budget promotes increased funding for State Department non-proliferation and safety programs from \$53 million last year to \$251 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2000. It also increased combined funding in FY2000 for the successful Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction program (also known as Nunn-Lugar) and the nuclear materials safety program at the Department of Energy to \$750 million. We are actively working with our allies and other nations to encourage additional contributions to this effort. The Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative would:

- * Deactivate and store warheads, secure fissile materials and dispose of 50 tons of plutonium;
- * Tighten exports controls to prevent countries such as Iran from acquiring dangerous technologies;
- * Complete work on a chemical weapons destruction facility and eliminate former chemical and biological weapons facilities;
- * Support civilian research opportunities for up to 40,000 former Soviet weapons scientists; and
- * Help Georgia and Moldova facilitate Russian troop withdrawals from their territory and strengthen their sovereignty.

In its FY2000 foreign operations appropriations bills, the Congress slashed the President's request for overall NIS assistance programs (which includes the ETRI funds for State) by \$252-307 million, but did not specify how to apply the cuts. These cuts would force the Administration to make unacceptable tradeoffs between support for NIS reforms and threat reduction activities.

Middle East Peace - In reaching the agreement at Wye River last year, President Clinton committed to helping Israelis minimize the risks of peace and to lifting the lives of the Palestinians so that hopes for peace do not founder in poverty and despair.

For this reason, the President requested a three-year, \$1.9 billion assistance package designed to help sustain the Middle East peace process. It includes funds to bolster Israel's security and to promote the safety and well-being of the Palestinian and Jordanian people.

In its FY2000 foreign operations appropriations bills, the Congress provided only the funds requested for Jordan. It has yet to fund the Israeli or Palestinian components of Wye, for either FY1999 or FY2000.

Conflict Resolution in Africa - Recent cease-fire agreements in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone, as well as the restoration of democracy in Nigeria, offer new opportunities for peace, prosperity and democracy in those regions. Supporting this trend through conflict resolution, democratization, and trade and investment is in the U.S. national interest. In his FY2000 budget request, the President proposed \$818 million in development assistance and economic support funds to Africa.

In its fiscal year 2000 foreign operations appropriations bills, the Congress has cut significantly the President's request.

United Nations Arrears - Paying the U.S. dues to the United Nations is a legal and moral responsibility. But it is not only an obligation, it is an opportunity. The UN helps mobilize support of other nations for goals important to U.S. interests, from keeping the peace, to immunizing children, to caring for refugees, to combating the spread of deadly weapons.

The Senate has passed legislation that provides authorization for appropriations of the bulk of U.S. payment of UN arrears. Fiscal year Commerce, State, Justice appropriations bills, however, continue to underfund significantly UN arrears payments.

RAND STUDY
October 18, 1999

Background: On Tuesday, 19 October, the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses (OSAGWI) at the Department of Defense will release a RAND study on the medical effects of the drug Pyridostigmine Bromide (PB). PB is an investigational new drug (IND) given to service personnel during the Gulf War as a pretreatment to prevent death in the event of an attack by the nerve agent soman. Because PB is an IND, it was given to service personnel under special rules of the FDA. Release of this report will be controversial because the author concludes that PB cannot be ruled out as a cause of long-term health problems. This is the first report that OSAGWI has published that could be interpreted as finding a cause for some Gulf War illnesses. In reality, the report only concludes that more research is needed on the effects of PB because the current body of information is inadequate.

Does the RAND report on PB released by DOD indicate that a cause has finally been found for Gulf War illnesses?

* This Administration has worked hard to "leave no stone unturned" in trying to find out why some of our Gulf War veterans are suffering from unexplained illnesses.

* DOD commissioned RAND to study available scientific literature to determine if some specific exposures could explain illnesses suffered by some of our Gulf War veterans.

* The RAND PB report does not conclude that PB is a cause of Gulf War illnesses. It does state that PB cannot be ruled out as a possible cause for some illnesses and calls for additional research on the health affects of PB.

Will there be more research done on PB as a result of this study?

* We currently have over \$20 million invested in completed or ongoing research on the health effects of PB.

* We will use the recommendations in the RAND report to consider funding additional research projects on PB.

* VA has contracted with the Institute of Medicine to conduct a thorough review of PB that is expected to be completed within one year.

If we weren't certain of the health effects of PB, why was it given to our troops?

* I refer you to the Department of Defense for a history of PB use.

Press Guidance - LA Times

"Clinton's Africa Policy Gets Mixed Results"

* This President has arguably done more to include Africa into the core of U.S. foreign policy than any previous president.

The charge that the President's Africa policy has failed to focus on institutions is simply incorrect.

Obviously, we - like our partners in Africa - are troubled by the increase in conflict over the past year. But we are encouraged by recent progress achieved with the peace agreement in Sierra Leone and ceasefire agreement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Our efforts to help broker peaceful solutions have all been rooted in our working with African institutions and strengthening them - we are working with the OAU on the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict, with ECOWAS on Sierra Leone, and with SADC on the Congo.

The U.S. has provided over \$100 million to support ECOMOG, the peacekeeping arm of ECOWAS, over the last decade, including to support their efforts in Sierra

Leone.

The President's policy has not focused on individual leaders, but on building the foundation for deeper and comprehensive relations with Africa:

- * The President has requested an increase in foreign assistance to Africa, the bulk of which goes towards building public and private institutions and increasing African capacity;
- * President Clinton's Africa Crisis Response Initiative has trained over 4000 African peacekeepers in six countries;
- * This administration is leading the international community in efforts to address Africa's crippling debt, both through the Cologne Initiative and the bilateral measures President Clinton announced at the IMF;
- * President Clinton has launched a new AIDS Initiative, requesting an additional \$100 million from Congress, which designed to support African efforts to tackle this dangerous epidemic;
- * As he said in his press conference last week, the President fully supports the passage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, as a vehicle for building a strong trade relationship between the U.S. and Africa;
- * Under President Clinton's leadership, the United States has initiated a comprehensive approach to working with African partners to counter terrorism, the international drug trade, crime and other transnational threats.

(Professor Bill) Zartman is right about Nigeria and the promise of Obasanjo's leadership. President Clinton has invited Obasanjo for an official working visit here in Washington on October 28th. But because we are focused on institutions, and not just individual leaders, the visit will include extensive meetings between U.S. government agencies and their Nigerian counterparts on building a stronger institutional capacity to fight transnational threats and promote

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