

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Budapest CSCE Summit. (4 pages)	11/28/1994	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: President Nazarbayev Letter to the President. (5 pages)	11/28/1994	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: Budapest CSCE Summit: NPT, START and Security. (4 pages)	11/29/1994	P1/b(1)
004. cable	re: Budapest CSCE Summit...planning continues. (3 pages)	11/29/1994	P1/b(1)
005. cable	re: Budapest CSCE Summit...planning continues. (5 pages)	11/30/1995	P1/b(1)
006. cable	re: Latest Kazakhstani Views. (2 pages)	11/30/1994	P1/b(1)
007. cable	re: Kazakhstani Views. (3 pages)	12/01/1994	P1/b(1)
008. cable	re: Kazakhstan Delivers Diplomatic Note. (2 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)
009. cable	re: Kazakhstan Accepts Revised Budapest Scenario. (2 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)
010. cable	re: HEU Transfer. (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1)
011. cable	re: European Security. (10 pages)	12/15/1994	P1/b(1)
012. cable	re: Ambassador's Meeting with President Nazarbayev, December 15. (5 pages)	12/15/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1993-Dec 1994 ([Budapest CSCE Kazakhstan Summit])
OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/26/1994-12/15/1994]

2014-0846-F

vz3315

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
LINE1: OAAUZYUW RUEHCAA7214 3302046-UUUU--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE3: O 262046Z NOV 94
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 262046Z NOV 94
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 5196
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY IMMEDIATE 1978
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV IMMEDIATE 4674
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2852
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK IMMEDIATE 4108
INFO: RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 6079
SUBJ: PREPARATION OF DOCUMENTS FOR START CEREMONY

TEXT:

UNCLAS STATE 317214

BUDAPEST ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KTIA, PARM

SUBJECT: PREPARATION OF DOCUMENTS FOR START CEREMONY

1. ADDRESSEES SHOULD INFORM HOST STATES ASAP OF U.S. CONCEPTS FOR PREPARING THE DOCUMENTS FOR THE CEREMONY ON DECEMBER 5 IN BUDAPEST.

2. TEXTS OF THE MEMORANDUM ON SECURITY ASSURANCES FOR UKRAINE SHOULD BE PREPARED ON TREATY PAPER IN FOUR ORIGINALS FOLLOWING THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ALTERNAT. THIS MEANS THAT UKRAINE AND RUSSIA SHOULD EACH PROVIDE IN BUDAPEST FOUR ORIGINALS OF THE MEMORANDUM ON SECURITY ASSURANCES FOR UKRAINE, IN UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN RESPECTIVELY, FOLLOWING THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ALTERNAT. (FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE DOCUMENTS PREPARED FOR THE U.S. WHEN COUNTRIES ARE LISTED THE UNITED STATES WOULD COME FIRST FOLLOWED BY THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER, AND THE SAME PRINCIPLE WOULD BE FOLLOWED FOR THE DOCUMENTS PREPARED FOR THE OTHER COUNTRIES.) THE PARTIES WILL EXCHANGE TEXTS FOR BINDING ON DECEMBER 4 IN BUDAPEST (SEE PARA 6 BELOW). IN ADDITION TO THE TEXTS (WHICH WILL NOT BE INDIVIDUALLY SIGNED) COMMON TITLE AND SIGNATURE PAGES WILL BE PREPARED IN EACH LANGUAGE. EACH

COUNTRY'S BINDER WILL CONCLUDE WITH A COMMON SIGNATURE PAGE. EACH LEADER WILL SIGN EACH SIGNATURE PAGE AT THE DECEMBER 5 CEREMONY. DEPARTMENT WILL FAX AN ENGLISH TITLE AND SIGNATURE PAGE TO POSTS ON MONDAY. FOR

LONDON: WE WILL CONTACT THE FCO MONDAY CONCERNING PREPARATION OF ENGLISH TEXT.

3. TEXTS OF MEMORANDA ON SECURITY ASSURANCES FOR BELARUS AND KAZAKHSTAN WILL BE PREPARED AND ASSEMBLED IN THE SAME MANNER. BELARUS AND KAZAKHSTAN SHOULD EACH BRING TO BUDAPEST FOUR ORIGINALS OF THE MEMORANDA ON SECURITY ASSURANCES, IN THEIR LANGUAGES, FOLLOWING THE PRINCIPLE OF THE ALTERNAT. RUSSIA SHOULD BRING FOUR ORIGINALS OF THE MEMORANDUM FOR BELARUS AND FOUR ORIGINALS OF THE MEMORANDUM FOR KAZAKHSTAN. ON DECEMBER 4 THE BINDERS WILL BE ASSEMBLED WITH TITLE AND SIGNATURE PAGES.

4. TEXTS OF THE JOINT DECLARATION ON EUROPEAN SECURITY SHOULD BE PREPARED ON NON-TREATY PAPER. SINCE THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE ISSUED RATHER THAN SIGNED, THERE IS NO NEED TO APPLY THE ALTERNAT PRINCIPLE OR TO BIND THE TEXTS IN A COMMON DOCUMENT.

5. BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN, RUSSIA, AND UKRAINE SHOULD EACH BRING FOUR ORIGINALS OF ITS INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION OF THE START I TREATY. IT DOES NOT MATTER WHAT PAPER IS USED FOR THESE INSTRUMENTS. IN ADDITION, A TEXT OF A PROTOCOL OF EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION SHOULD BE PREPARED ON TREATY PAPER. EACH COUNTRY WILL PLACE THE TEXT OF THE PROTOCOL OF EXCHANGE IN ITS LANGUAGE IN A BINDER. ALL FIVE PRESIDENTS WILL SIGN EACH PROTOCOL OF EXCHANGE. THE TEXT OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL OF EXCHANGE WILL BE FAXED TO POSTS ON MONDAY.

6. THE U.S. PROPOSES THAT TECHNICAL EXPERTS MEET IN BUDAPEST IN THE MORNING OF DECEMBER 4 TO ARRANGE FOR ASSEMBLY OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION AND THEIR DISPLAY AT THE SIGNING OF THE PROTOCOL OF EXCHANGE. THIS WILL AVOID CONFUSION THAT WOULD ENSUE FROM EACH OF THE PRESIDENTS HANDING HIS INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION TO THE OTHER FOUR PRESIDENTS AT THE CEREMONY, AND LEAD TO A MORE DIGNIFIED CEREMONY. THE U.S. TECHNICAL EXPERTS WILL BE ROBERT DALTON NAD MARSHALL BROWN.

7. FINALLY, POSTS SHOULD REPEAT THE U.S. REQUEST FOR A COPY ASAP OF EACH COUNTRY'S INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION OF START, AND OF THE MEMORANDUM ON SECURITY ASSURANCES IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE HOST COUNTRY. FROM UKRAINE AND RUSSIA WE ALSO NEED ASAP THE JOINT DECLARATION ON

EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE HOST COUNTRY. THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEXTS OF THE MEMORANDA ON SECURITY ASSURANCES AND THE JOINT DECLARATION ON EUROPEAN SECURITY WERE PROVIDED IN STATE 312291. EMBASSIES SHOULD ENDEAVOR TO SECURE THESE DOCUMENTS FROM HOST COUNTRIES AND FAX THEM TO THE DEPARTMENT ASAP. KIEV SHOULD ALSO CONTINUE TO SEEK A COPY OF UKRAINE'S INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION TO THE NPT.

CHRISTOPHER
BT
#7214

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 7214

TOR: 941126155049 M1382327

DIST:

SIT: ANDREASEN BELL FRIED GARDNER NSC SCHIFTER VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY

□

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Budapest CSCE Summit. (4 pages)	11/28/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1993-Dec 1994 ([Budapest CSCE Kazakhstan Summit])
OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/26/1994-12/15/1994]

2014-0846-F

vz3315

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHTAA6566 3351251-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 011251Z DEC 94
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY
OSRI: RUEHTA
DTG: 011251Z DEC 94
ORIG: AMEMBASSY ALMATY
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2557
INFO: RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0909
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0040
RUEHKS/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0977
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 1006
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1435
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0833
SUBJ: EXCHANGE OF DIPLOMATIC NOTES ON START I TREATY
OBLIGATIONS

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ALMATY 006566

GENEVA FOR MARSHALL BROWN

BUDAPEST ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, START, CSCE, KZ
SUBJECT: EXCHANGE OF DIPLOMATIC NOTES ON START I TREATY
OBLIGATIONS

REF: STATE 318946

1. ON DECEMBER 1, DCM DELIVERED DIPLOMATIC NOTE ON START I TREATY OBLIGATIONS (REFTEL, PARA 2) TO KAZAKHSTANI DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER NURGALIYEV. NURGALIYEV SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF KAZAKHSTAN HAD NO PROBLEM CLARIFYING THESE OBLIGATIONS AND WOULD DO ITS BEST TO HAVE A DIPLOMATIC NOTE STATING THE OBLIGATIONS TO THE EMBASSY ON DECEMBER 2.
COURTNEY
BT
#6566

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 3/6/2015
2014-0846-F

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 6566

TOR: 941201084512 M1390368

DIST:

SIT: NSC

□

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHTAA6567 3351333-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 011333Z DEC 94
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY
OSRI: RUEHTA
DTG: 011333Z DEC 94
ORIG: AMEMBASSY ALMATY
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2558
INFO: RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0910
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0041
RUEHKS/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0978
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 1007
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1436
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0834
SUBJ: BUDAPEST DOCUMENTS

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ALMATY 006567

GENEVA FOR MARSHALL BROWN

BUDAPEST ALSO FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, CSCE, START, KZ

SUBJECT: BUDAPEST DOCUMENTS

REF: (A) STATE 320149
(B) ALMATY 6512
(C) STATE 318025
(D) ALMATY 6483
(E) BUDAPEST 11822
(F) STATE 318946

1. FOLLOWING IS A STATUS REPORT ON KAZAKHSTANI DOCUMENTS FOR BUDAPEST. SEPTELS REPORT ON KAZAKHSTAN'S RESPONSE TO THE LATEST SCENARIO PROPOSALS AND ON DIPLOMATIC NOTES REGARDING START I TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

2. DESPITE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE KAZAKHSTANI REPRESENTATIVE IN BUDAPEST (REF E), THE MFA HAS RECONFIRMED TO US TODAY THAT IT WILL/WILL USE KAZAKH-LANGUAGE DOCUMENTS.

3. THE FOLLOWING KAZAKH-LANGUAGE DOCUMENTS WERE FAXED BY THE EMBASSY TO S/NIS - STEVE PIFER ON DECEMBER 1:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 3/6/2015

294-0846 F

-- THE INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION OF THE START I TREATY;

-- THE PROTOCOL OF EXCHANGE OF START I INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION; AND

-- THE MEMORANDUM ON SECURITY ASSURANCES, WITH TITLE AND SIGNATURE PAGES. (THE TEXT, WITHOUT TITLE OR SIGNATURE PAGES, WAS FAXED TO S/NIS - PIFER EARLIER.) NOTE THAT THESE TITLE AND SIGNATURE PAGES WERE BASED ON THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TEXTS GIVEN TO THE KAZAKHSTANIS ON NOVEMBER 30 IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS IN REF C. THOSE INSTRUCTIONS WERE SUPERCEDED BY REF F, AND REVISED VERSIONS OF THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TITLE AND SIGNATURE PAGES WERE GIVEN TO NURGALIYEV ON DECEMBER 1. WE WILL FOLLOW UP WITH THE KAZAKHSTANIS ON DECEMBER 2 TO SEE IF THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO REVISE THEIR TEXTS.

4. WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO NOTE THAT WHILE IT IS NO LONGER AN ISSUE FOR KAZAKHSTAN, THE KAZAKHSTANIS TOLD US (REF D, PARA 7) THAT THE RUSSIAN-VANGUAGE VERSION OF THE MEMORANDUM ON SECURITY ASSURANCES, OBTAINED FROM MOSCOW, WAS IN PLACES INCONSISTENT WITH THE ENGLISH TEXT. THE RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE MEMORANDUM WAS FAXED ON NOVEMBER 30 TO EUR/ISCA - FORD HART, WITH NOTATIONS OF PLACES IN WHICH THE KAZAKHSTANIS HAD NOTED DISCREPANCIES.

COURTNEY

BT

#6567

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 6567

TOR: 941201084615 M1390370

DIST:

SIT: AOKI BURNS FORSYTHE GOTTEMOELLER NSC PONEMAN

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. cable	re: Kazakhstani Views. (3 pages)	12/01/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1993-Dec 1994 ([Budapest CSCE Kazakhstan Summit])
OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/26/1994-12/15/1994]

2014-0846-F
vz3315

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. cable	re: Kazakhstan Delivers Diplomatic Note. (2 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1993-Dec 1994 ([Budapest CSCE Kazakhstan Summit])
OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/26/1994-12/15/1994]

2014-0846-F
vz3315

RESTRICTION CODES

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Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
LINE1: PAAUZYUW RUEHTAA6594 3361159-UUUU--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE3: P 021159Z DEC 94
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY ALMATY
OSRI: RUEHTA
DTG: 021159Z DEC 94
ORIG: AMEMBASSY ALMATY
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2584
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0044
INFO: ////
SUBJ: KAZAKHSTAN: U.S. APPROACH TO EUROPEAN SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE

TEXT:
UNCLAS ALMATY 006594

BUDAPEST FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, NATO, CSCE, KZ
SUBJECT: KAZAKHSTAN: U.S. APPROACH TO EUROPEAN SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE

REF: STATE 313233

POLOFF DELIVERED REFTEL DEMARCHE TO MFA CHIEF FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL ZHANBATYROV ON
DECEMBER 2. ZHANBATYROV THANKED POLOFF FOR THE
INFORMATION BUT MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT. COURTNEY
BT
#6594

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 6594
TOR: 941202084118 M1393016
DIST:
PRT: ITOH REED SENS SIT
SIT: BELL BURNS FORSYTHE FRIED GARDNER NSC SCHIFTER SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW
WITKOWSKY
□

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. cable	re: Kazakhstan Accepts Revised Budapest Scenario. (2 pages)	12/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1993-Dec 1994 ([Budapest CSCE Kazakhstan Summit])
OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/26/1994-12/15/1994]

2014-0846-F
vz3315

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. cable	re: HEU Transfer. (2 pages)	12/03/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1993-Dec 1994 ([Budapest CSCE Kazakhstan Summit])
OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/26/1994-12/15/1994]

2014-0846-F
vz3315

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
LINE1: PAAUZYUW RUEHUPA1932 3391906-UUUU--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE3: P 051906Z DEC 94
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
OSRI: RUEHUP
DTG: 051906Z DEC 94
ORIG: AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4301
INFO: RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0274
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 0439
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 0446
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0247
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0257
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 0318
RUEHDB/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0258
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0260
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0258
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 0324
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0534
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 0247
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0300
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 0409
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 0286
RUEHSC/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0352
RUEHSQ/USLO SKOPJE 0168
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 3592
SUBJ: CSCE SUMMIT -- ADDRESSES BY PRESIDENTS CLINTON,
YELTSIN, AND IZETBEGOVIC, DECEMBER 5 -- MORNING
TEXT:
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 BUDAPEST 011932

DEPT FOR EUR/RPM (COHEN), S/NIS, ISCA, EUR/EE
DEPT ALSO FOR DRL (ELY-RAPHEL)
DEPT PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
FROM CSCE BUDAPEST REVIEW CONFERENCE 203
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CSCE, PREL
SUBJECT: CSCE SUMMIT -- ADDRESSES BY PRESIDENTS CLINTON,
YELTSIN, AND IZETBEGOVIC, DECEMBER 5 -- MORNING
1. SUMMARY: A RECURRING THEME IN THE FIRST ROUND OF
BUDAPEST SUMMIT INTERVENTIONS WAS HOW BOTH TO RESOLVE AND
PREVENT FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE. PRESIDENT CLINTON
HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR A STRONG SECURITY FRAMEWORK THAT
WOULD HELP NEWLY-FREE NATIONS COMPLETE THEIR
TRANSFORMATION. THIS, HE STATED, WOULD REQUIRE CLOSE
COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO, THE CSCE, THE UN, AND OTHER

ORGANIZATIONS. PRESIDENT YELTSIN RESPONDED, AND SPECIFICALLY QUESTIONED NATO EXPANSION WITH HIS OWN WARNING AGAINST CREATING "NEW ZONES OF DEMARCATION" IN EUROPE. DOING SO, HE CLAIMED, WOULD BE THE DEATH KNEEL FOR DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA. YELTSIN'S DIRECTNESS WAS SURPASSED BY BOSNIAN PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC, WHO CHARGED THE GATHERED LEADERS WITH ABANDONING ONE OF CSCE'S PARTICIPATING STATES. HE VOWED THAT, DESPITE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S DESIRE TO GET BEYOND THE BOSNIAN CRISIS, HIS COUNTRYMEN WOULD CONTINUE TO FIGHT ON. (OTHER OPENING DAY STATEMENTS REPORTED SEPTTEL.) END SUMMARY.

CLINTON STATEMENT HIGHLIGHTS NEW ROLE FOR CSCE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

2. AS THE FIRST PLENARY SPEAKER, PRESIDENT CLINTON NOTED THAT WHILE THE COLD WAR HAD ENDED, NEITHER PEACE NOR DEMOCRACY WERE ASSURED. FOR THAT REASON, A NEW SECURITY FRAMEWORK WAS NEEDED FOR THE ERA AHEAD. THE NEW DEMOCRACIES MUST NOT BE CONSIDERED TO A GRAY ZONE; THE IRON CURTAIN SHOULD NOT BE REPLACED BY A VEIL OF INDIFFERENCE.

3. THE PRESIDENT POINTED OUT THAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE ON ISSUES WHICH MATTERED FOR THE FUTURE. SIGNATURE BY FIVE OF CSCE'S MEMBER STATES -- UKRAINE, BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES -- WOULD BRING THE START I TREATY INTO FORCE THAT DAY; IT WOULD OPEN THE DOOR TO PROMPT RATIFICATION OF START II. THESE ACTIONS, THE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED, WOULD CUT THE ARSENALS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION MORE THAN 60 PERCENT FROM THEIR COLD WAR PEAK.

4. AT THE SAME TIME, PRESIDENT CLINTON STRESSED, THE TERRIBLE CONFLICT IN BOSNIA RAGED. THE GOVERNMENT OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA HAD MADE THE RIGHT CHOICE BY ACCEPTING THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE PLAN AND AGREEING TO CALLS FOR A CEASE-FIRE. HE CALLED ON THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO END THE AGGRESSION, AGREE TO THE CEASE-FIRE AND RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE CONTACT GROUP PLAN.

5. IN ORDER TO PREVENT FUTURE BOSNIAS, THE PRESIDENT STATED, STRUCTURES TO ASSIST NEWLY-FREE NATIONS IN THEIR TRANSFORMATION WERE NEEDED. NATO REMAINED THE BEDROCK OF SECURITY IN EUROPE, BUT ITS ROLE WAS CHANGING AS THE CONTINENT CHANGED. LAST JANUARY, THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE HAD BEEN LAUNCHED; LAST WEEK, FURTHER STEPS TO PREPARE FOR EXPANSION HAD BEEN TAKEN. NATO WOULD NOT AUTOMATICALLY EXCLUDE ANY NATION FROM JOINING; AT THE SAME TIME, NO COUNTRY OUTSIDE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO VETO EXPANSION.

6. AS NATO CONTINUED ITS MISSION, PRESIDENT CLINTON EMPHASIZED, OTHER INSTITUTIONS COULD ALSO SHARE THE SECURITY BURDEN AND TAKE ON SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES. A STRONG AND VIBRANT CSCE WAS VITAL. ONCE A FOCAL POINT FOR

CONFRONTING TYRANNY, THE CSCE COULD NOW HELP TO BUILD A NEW, INTEGRATED CONTINENT. CSCE WAS THE ONLY REGIONAL FORUM TO WHICH NEARLY EVERY NATION IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA BELONGED. IT HAD PIONEERED WAYS TO PEACEFULLY UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 05 BUDAPEST 011932

DEPT FOR EUR/RPM (COHEN), S/NIS, ISCA, EUR/EE

DEPT ALSO FOR DRL (ELY-RAPHEL)

DEPT PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY

VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

FROM CSCE BUDAPEST REVIEW CONFERENCE 203

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: CSCE, PREL

SUBJECT: CSCE SUMMIT -- ADDRESSES BY PRESIDENTS CLINTON, YELTSIN, AND IZETBEGOVIC, DECEMBER 5 -- MORNING

1. SUMMARY: A RECURRING THEME IN THE FIRST ROUND OF BUDAPEST SUMMIT INTERVENTIONS WAS HOW BOTH TO RESOLVE AND PREVENT FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE. PRESIDENT CLINTON HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR A STRONG SECURITY FRAMEWORK THAT WOULD HELP NEWLY-FREE NATIONS COMPLETE THEIR TRANSFORMATION. THIS, HE STATED, WOULD REQUIRE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO, THE CSCE, THE UN, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS. PRESIDENT YELTSIN RESPONDED, AND SPECIFICALLY QUESTIONED NATO EXPANSION WITH HIS OWN WARNING AGAINST CREATING "NEW ZONES OF DEMARCATION" IN EUROPE. DOING SO, HE CLAIMED, WOULD BE THE DEATH KNEEL FOR DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA. YELTSIN'S DIRECTNESS WAS SURPASSED BY BOSNIAN PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC, WHO CHARGED THE GATHERED LEADERS WITH ABANDONING ONE OF CSCE'S PARTICIPATING STATES. HE VOWED THAT, DESPITE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S DESIRE TO GET BEYOND THE BOSNIAN CRISIS, HIS COUNTRYMEN WOULD CONTINUE TO FIGHT ON. (OTHER OPENING DAY STATEMENTS REPORTED SEPTTEL.) END SUMMARY.

RESOLVE CONFLICTS. ITS PROPOSED NEW NAME, THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, SYMBOLIZED THE NEW AND IMPORTANT MISSION IT SHOULD UNDERTAKE -- AS THE FIRST FLEXIBLE LINE OF DEFENSE AGAINST ETHNIC AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS. CSCE COULD HELP GUARD AGAINST SPHERES OF INFLUENCE, AND HELP NATIONS COME TOGETHER TO BUILD PROSPERITY.

7. PRESIDENT CLINTON UNDERScoreD THAT THE RESULTS OF THE SUMMIT WOULD HELP PREVENT FUTURE CONFLICTS -- BY STRENGTHENING THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR NATIONAL MINORITIES, ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT TO PROVIDE FOR DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY REINFORCING PRINCIPLES TO HALT THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND PREPARING TO SEND CSCE MONITORS AND PEACEKEEPERS TO POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS OUTSIDE BOSNIA. PRESIDENT CLINTON EXPRESSED HIS SATISFACTION THAT WITH THE SUPPORT AND INVOLVEMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, THE CSCE WAS ON THE VERGE OF AN AGREEMENT THAT CSCE WOULD LEAD A MULTINATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH. FINALLY, PRESIDENT CLINTON HIGHLIGHTED THE IMPORTANT ROLE CSCE HAD TO PLAY IN PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH WHILE PROTECTING EUROPE'S RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT.

8. SINCE THE CSCE WAS FOUNDED IN 1975, PRESIDENT CLINTON EMPHASIZED, MORE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE THAN EVEN DREAMERS MIGHT HAVE HOPED. NOW, THE CHALLENGE WAS TO HELP THE FREEDOMS WHICH HAD BEEN SECURED SPREAD AND ENDURE.

YELTSIN STRIKES A CAUTIONARY NOTE

9. RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN, WHO SPOKE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING PRESIDENT CLINTON, CHOSE TO HIGHLIGHT THE WORRYING TRENDS MOSCOW SEES IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY INSTITUTIONS. HISTORY SHOWS, HE DECLARED NEAR THE BEGINNING OF HIS SPEECH, THAT IT IS DANGEROUS TO ATTEMPT TO OPERATE AS IF THE FATE OF CONTINENTS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE, WAS "GOVERNED FROM ANY ONE CAPITAL." HE SAID THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A EUROPEAN-WIDE SYSTEM OF SECURITY IS NECESSARY. HE HOPED THAT CSCE LEADERS WOULD BE ABLE TO DISCUSS AND ADOPT A "SECURITY MODEL" FOR THE FUTURE OF EUROPE AT THE LISBON SUMMIT IN 1996. RUSSIA SEES AN INTERLOCKING WEB OF SECURITY GUARANTEES AS THE BASIS FOR EUROPEAN-WIDE SYSTEM OF SECURITY. THE RUSSIA FEDERATION IS READY, HE EMPHASIZED, TO DISCUSS BOTH BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL SECURITY (##)

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 05 BUDAPEST 011932

DEPT FOR EUR/RPM (COHEN), S/NIS, ISCA, EUR/EE

DEPT ALSO FOR DRL (ELY-RAPHEL)

DEPT PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY

VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

FROM CSCE BUDAPEST REVIEW CONFERENCE 203

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: CSCE, PREL

SUBJECT: CSCE SUMMIT -- ADDRESSES BY PRESIDENTS CLINTON, YELTSIN, AND IZETBEGOVIC, DECEMBER 5 -- MORNING

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10. YELTSIN STATED THAT IN HIS COUNTRY THE QUESTION IS BEING ASKED -- HOW WILL CHANGES IN CSCE RELATE TO THE TRANSFORMATION OF CURRENT STRUCTURES OF SECURITY? RUSSIA, HE SAID, IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE CHANGES OCCURRING IN NATO, WHICH WAS CREATED IN THE COLD WAR AND IS SEARCHING, NOT WITHOUT DIFFICULTY, FOR ITS PLACE IN THE NEW EUROPE. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NATO'S SEARCH NOT CREATE NEW ZONES OF DEMARCATION IN EUROPE. BUT, YELTSIN ARGUED, PLANS FOR NATO'S EXPANSION CONTRADICTED THAT LOGIC. EXPLANATIONS ARE HEARD THAT THIS IS SIMPLY AN "EXPANSION OF STABILITY" IN CASE OF AN UNWELCOME DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS IN RUSSIA. IF, BASED ON THIS THINKING, ONE WANTS TO EXPAND NATO UP TO THE BORDERS OF RUSSIA, THEN, YELTSIN EMPHASIZED, I CAN TELL YOU ONE THING: "IT IS TOO SOON TO BURY DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA." IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO REPEAT THE MISTAKES OF THE PAST, HE SAID. NO STRONG COUNTRY WILL LIVE BY THE LAWS OF ISOLATION.

11. SHIFTING GEARS, THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT CLAIMED THAT THE RIGHTS OF RUSSIANS IN OTHER CIS COUNTRIES AND THE BALTIC STATES WERE BEING INFRINGED. HE CHARGED THE BALTIC STATES, ESPECIALLY ESTONIA, WITH ORGANIZED REPRESSION OF THE ORTHODOX IS NECESSARY THAT CSCE PARTICIPATING STATES HONOR THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS DECLARATIONS AND OF THE DECLARATION OF THIS CSCE

SUMMIT ON AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM, RACISM, CHAUVINISM, XENOPHOBIA, AND ANTI-SEMITISM.

12. YELTSIN STATED THAT THE CSCE NEEDS AN EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING POTENTIAL. RUSSIA IS MORE AWARE OF THIS NEED THAN PERHAPS ANY OTHER CSCE COUNTRY. HE SAID THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT IS INTERESTED IN SHARING WITH ITS PARTNERS IN THE UN AND THE CSCE THE POLITICAL AND MATERIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF PEACEKEEPING. THIS COULD BE IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH, TAJIKISTAN, GEORGIA OR MOLDOVA, BUT, OF COURSE, NOT TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE OPERATIONS.

13. YELTSIN LABELLED AS UNACCEPTABLE ATTEMPTS TO REVISE THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN EURO. CSCE SHOULD ADD ITS VOICE IN PROTEST AGAINST SUCH ATTEMPTS.

14. THE RUSSIAN LEADER SAID THAT THE HOPES FOR THE CSCE WILL DEPEND UPON THE COOPERATION BETWEEN EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS, SUCH AS THE CIS, NATO, THE WEST EUROPEAN UNION, THE EU AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE. HE ASSURED HIS COUNTERPARTS THAT THE CIS WAS NOT AN ATTEMPT TO CREATE NEW BLOCS IN EUROPE AND THAT IT IS BEING BUILT UPON THE BASIS OF THE HELSINKI PRINCIPLES.

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 BUDAPEST 011932

DEPT FOR EUR/RPM (COHEN), S/NIS, ISCA, EUR/EE
DEPT ALSO FOR DRL (ELY-RAPHEL)
DEPT PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
FROM CSCE BUDAPEST REVIEW CONFERENCE 203
E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: CSCE, PREL

SUBJECT: CSCE SUMMIT -- ADDRESQ, AND IZETBEGOVIC,
DECEMBER 5 -- MORNING

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15. YELTSIN CONCLUDED BY POINTING TO THE APPROACHING 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF WORLD WAR II. HE SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO MORE ENEMIES IN EUROPE, NO MORE VICTORS AND VANQUISHED. HE WELCOMED "ALL OF YOU" ON MAY 9, 1995 TO COMMEMORATE THE VICTORY OVER FASCISM. (COMMENT: PRESUMABLY HE MEANT IN MOSCOW. THIS APPARENT INVITATION WAS NOT IN THE RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE TEXT OF YELTSIN'S SPEECH DISTRIBUTED BY THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION. END COMMENT.)

IZETBEGOVIC'S CRITICISM OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

16. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, IN A SOLEMN AS WELL AS ANGRY TONE, REMINDED THE GATHERED LEADERS OF EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA OF THEIR COLLECTIVE FAILURE IN ONE OF CSCE'S PARTICIPATING STATES. HE SAID THAT IT WAS MORE THAN IRONIC THAT IN FRONT OF THIS FORUM DEDICATED TO SECURITY AND COOPERATION, HE HAD TO SPEAK ABOUT INSECURITY AND NON-COOPERATION. THE TRAGEDY IN BIHAC, HE STATED, IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. HE STATED THAT AN ATTACK IS BEING CONDUCTED FROM ONE UN PROTECTED AREA (IN CROATIA) AGAINST ANOTHER UN "SAFE AREA"; THE ENTIRE WORLD COMMUNITY CANNOT EVEN PROTECT ONE CITY.

17. IZETBEGOVIC HAD SHARP WORDS FOR UN SECRETARY GENERAL BOUTROS-GALI, WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY NAMING HIM. THE BOSNIAN LEADER SAID THAT THE PROGNOSIS OF BOUTROS-GALI'S PEOPLE IN THE REGION HAVE CONSISTENTLY BEEN WRONG. HE HAD EVEN SHARPER WORDS FOR FRANCE, UK AND RUSSIA. PARIS AND LONDON, HE CLAIMED, HAVE FROM THE OUTSET BEEN ACTING AS PROTECTORS OF THE SERBS, WHILE THE RUSSIANS HAVE PREVENTED FOOD AND OTHER SUPPLIES FROM REACHING BIHAC AND HAVE BEEN THE SOURCE FOR MUCH OF THE BOSNIAN SERBS' MODERN WEAPONRY.

18. PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC NOTED THAT HIS COUNTRYMEN HAVE

NOT SURRENDERED, AS MANY HAD PREDICTED AS EARLY AS TWO YEARS AGO. TO THE SURPRISE OF MANY, BOSNIA HAS CREATED A 150,000 MAN ARMY OUT OF SMALL BANDS OF ARMED CITIZENS. AS BOSNIA'S DEFENSES GROW STRONGER, HOWEVER, OTHERS' WILLINGNESS TO HELP IT WEAKENS, HE CHARGED. HE SAID HE WANTED TO REMIND HIS COLLEAGUES THAT NO "WAR OF LIBERATION" HAD BEEN LOST IN THE LAST 50 YEARS. BOSNIA'S CURRENT WAR OF LIBERATION WILL NOT BE EITHER, HE DECLARED.

19. THE BOSNIAN LEADER CLOSED BY SAYING THAT HE WAS SORRY IF HIS COLLEAGUES TOOK OFFENSE AT WHAT HE SAID. HE EXPECTED THAT THE FRIENDS OF BOSNIA WITHIN THE HALL WOULD UNDERSTAND -- AND AS FOR THE OTHERS, HE DID NOT CARE.

UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 BUDAPEST 011932

DEPT FOR EUR/RPM (COHEN), S/NIS, ISCA, EUR/EE

DEPT ALSO FOR DRL (ELY-RAPHEL)

DEPT PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY

VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

FROM CSCE BUDAPEST REVIEW CONFERENCE 203

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: CSCE, PREL

SUBJECT: CSCE SUMMIT -- ADDRESSES BY PRESIDENTS CLINTON, YELTSIN, AND IZETBEGOVIC, DECEMBER 5 -- MORNING

1. SUMMARY: A RECURRING THEME IN THE FIRST ROUND OF BUDAPEST SUMMIT INTERVENTIONS WAS HOW BOTH TO RESOLVE AND PREVENT FUTURE OUTBREAKS OF VIOLENCE. PRESIDENT CLINTON HIGHLIGHTED THE NEED FOR A STRONG SECURITY FRAMEWORK THAT WOULD HELP NEWLY-FREE NATIONS COMPLETE THEIR TRANSFORMATION. THIS, HE STATED, WOULD REQUIRE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO, THE CSCE, THE UN, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS. PRESIDENT YELTSIN RESPONDED, AND SPECIFICALLY QUESTIONED NATO EXPANSION WITH HIS OWN WARNING AGAINST CREATING "NEW ZONES OF DEMARCATION" IN EUROPE. DOING SO, HE CLAIMED, WOULD BE THE DEATH KNEEL FOR DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA. YELTSIN'S DIRECTNESS WAS SURPASSED BY BOSNIAN PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC, WHO CHARGED THE GATHERED LEADERS WITH ABANDONING ONE OF CSCE'S PARTICIPATING STATES. HE VOWED THAT, DESPITE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S DESIRE TO GET BEYOND THE BOSNIAN CRISIS, HIS COUNTRYMEN WOULD CONTINUE TO FIGHT ON. (OTHER OPENING DAY STATEMENTS REPORTED SEPTEL.) END SUMMARY.

BROWN

BT

#1932

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05

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SSN: 1932

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DIST:

SIT: BEYRLE BURNS CLARKER FORSYTHE GOTTEMOELLER KERRICK NSC RICE
SAUNDERS STERN VERSHBOW

□

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED

LINE1: PAAUZYUW RUEHUPA1965 3401718-UUUU--RHEHAAX.

LINE2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH

LINE3: P 061718Z DEC 94

LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

OSRI: RUEHUP

DTG: 061718Z DEC 94

ORIG: AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4323

INFO: RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 3598

RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0252

RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 0252

RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 0444

RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 0323

RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0279

RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 0291

RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 0451

RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 0414

RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0358

RUEHSQ/USLO SKOPJE 0174

RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV 0539

RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 0330

RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0306

RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT 0265

RUEHDB/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 0263

RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 0263

RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 0262

SUBJ: CSCE SUMMIT -- PLENARY STATEMENTS,
DECEMBER 6

TEXT:

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BUDAPEST 011965

DEPT FOR EUR/RPM (COHEN), S/NIS, ISCA, EUR/EE

DEPT ALSO FOR DRL (ELY-RAPHEL)

DEPT PASS TO PRESIDENT'S AND SECRETARY'S PARTY

VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

FROM CSCE BUDAPEST REVIEW CONFERENCE 207

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: CSCE, PREL

SUBJECT: CSCE SUMMIT -- PLENARY STATEMENTS,
DECEMBER 6

1. SUMMARY: DURING PLENARY STATEMENTS AT THE SECOND DAY
(DECEMBER 6) OF THE CSCE SUMMIT IN BUDAPEST, MANY
DELEGATIONS URGED CSCE TO BE MORE ACTIVE. TOUCHING ON
THEIR NATIONAL CONCERNS, REPRESENTATIVES OF GEORGIA,
GREECE, MOLDOVA, AZERBAIJAN, AND OTHERS ADDRESSED THE
PLENARY. END SUMMARY.

2. GEORGIA. PRESIDENT SHEVARDNADZE CRITICIZED THE WORLD COMMUNITY IN GENERAL AND THE CSCE IN PARTICULAR FOR ITS LACK OF COURAGE IN USING EUPHEMISMS FOR THE "GENOCIDE" AND "CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY" IN ABKHAZIA. HE SAID THAT, TO MANY IN THE CIS, THE PEACE FOLLOWING THE COLD WAR WAS FRIGHTENING, WHICH WAS FRUSTRATING FOR HIM TO ADMIT, PARTICULARLY SINCE HE HAD PARTICIPATED DIRECTLY IN BRINGING DOWN THE BERLIN WALL. HE CRITICIZED UN AND CSCE PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS FOR GIVING POWER TO THOSE WHO "HAVE NO MORAL RIGHT TO RULE"; GEORGIANS HAD NO CONFIDENCE IN THE PARIS AND HELSINKI DECISIONS WHILE UN PEACEKEEPING LOOKED "MORE AND MORE LIKE APPEASEMENT". SHEVARDNADZE ALSO CALLED FOR MORE ATTENTION TO THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY, SAYING THAT A FAILURE TO DEVELOP ECONOMIES WOULD LEAD PEOPLE TO FOLLOW DICTATORS. HE CLOSED HIS PLENARY STATEMENT BY PROPOSING A CSCE CONFERENCE IN 1995 ON CREATING A NEW DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM IN GEORGIA.

3. GREECE. MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS KAROLOS PAPOULIAS FOCUSED ON EVENTS IN THE SOUTHERN EUROPE REGION. HE COMMENDED THE CSCE MISSION IN SKOPJE, THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR NATIONAL MINORITIES (HCNM) AND OFFICE OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (ODIHR) FOR THEIR ROLES IN PREVENTING SPILLOVER OF CONFLICT. PAPOULIAS STATED THAT ATHENS' POLICY IN THE BALKANS IS BASED ON NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES. IN A PROVOCATIVE MANNER, PAPOULIAS CONTINUED THAT "GOOD RELATIONS ARE NOT A ONE-WAY STREET" AND CRITICIZED ALBANIA FOR NOT RESPECTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND IMPLEMENTING THE HCNM SUGGESTIONS. FINALLY, THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER--ALMOST CERTAINLY TO THE FRUSTRATION OF THE FYROM DELEGATION--SUPPORTED GREATER CSCE PARTICIPATION BY THE NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES.

4. MOLDOVA. MOLDOVAN PRESIDENT MIRCEA SNEGUR URGED CSCE TO EMPHASIZE THE HAZARDS OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION WHEN IT LEADS TO SEPARATISM AND OFFERED TO ORGANIZE A CONFERENCE OR SEMINAR TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE. SNEGUR COMMENDED THE CSCE MISSION IN MOLDOVA, PARTICULARLY ITS ROLE IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE RUSSIAN 14TH ARMY FROM MOLDOVA.

5. AZERBAIJAN. AZERBAIJAN PRESIDENT HEYDAR ALIYEV CONDEMNED THE ARMENIAN OCCUPATION OF SIX AZERBAIJANI PROVINCES AND WELCOMED THE EFFORTS OF THE MINSK GROUP AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION AT NEGOTIATING A SETTLEMENT. HE STRESSED THAT THE CEASE-FIRE FOR THE LAST SIX MONTHS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PEACE AND OFFERED TO PROVIDE A SECURITY GUARANTEE TO THE ARMENIANS IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND AGREED TO A CSCE FORCE IN THE REGION. ALIYEV DEMANDED, HOWEVER TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, THE INVIOABILITY OF AZERBAIJANI BORDERS, THE WITHDRAWAL OF ARMED FORCES, AND THE RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THEIR HOMES. FINALLY, ALIYEV STATED THAT THE AZERBAIJAN GOVERNMENT PLAYED NO ROLE IN THE RECENT DESTRUCTION OF THE BRIDGE BETWEEN GEORGIA AND ARMENIA, AS ALLEGED BY TERP PETRIASSIAN THE DAY BEFORE.

6. KAZAKHSTAN. PRESIDENT NAZERBAYEV CALLED FOR A GREATER LINKAGE BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND ASIAN SECURITY THROUGH THE CSCE AND AGAIN CALLED FOR SUPPORT OF HIS PROPOSAL TO FORM UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 BUDAPEST 011965

DEPT FOR EUR/RPM (COHEN), S/NIS, ISCA, EUR/EE
DEPT ALSO FOR DRL (ELY-RAPHEL)
DEPT PASS TO PRESIDENT'S AND SECRETARY'S PARTY
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
FROM CSCE BUDAPEST REVIEW CONFERENCE 207
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CSCE, PREL
SUBJECT: CSCE SUMMIT -- PLENARY STATEMENTS,
DECEMBER 6

1. SUMMARY: DURING PLENARY STATEMENTS AT THE SECOND DAY (DECEMBER 6) OF THE CSCE SUMMIT IN BUDAPEST, MANY DELEGATIONS URGED CSCE TO BE MORE ACTIVE. TOUCHING ON THEIR NATIONAL CONCERNS, REPRESENTATIVES OF GEORGIA, GREECE, MOLDOVA, AZERBAIJAN, AND OTHERS ADDRESSED THE PLENARY. END SUMMARY.

A CONFERENCE ON COOPERATION AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING IN ASIA. HE SAID ASIA WAS DRAWING ON CSCE EXPERIENCE INCLUDING ITS REACHING OUT TO NON-MEMBER MEDITERRANEAN STATES IN THE BELIEF THAT SECURITY DEPENDED NOT JUST ON DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE REGION BUT ALSO ON ITS PERIPHERY. NAZERBAYEV ALSO STRESSED THE ECONOMIC ROLE FOR CSCE -- HOLDING UP AS A MODEL FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION KAZAKHSTAN'S COMMON ECONOMIC SPACE WITH UZBEKISTAN AND KYRGYSTAN -- AND THE HUMAN DIMENSION SPECIFICALLY STRESSING THE ROLE OF CSCE IN ENSURING INTER-ETHNIC HARMONY.

7. LATVIA. PRESIDENT ULMANIS DELIVERED A THINLY VEILED ATTACK ON RUSSIAN BEHAVIOR AND PROPOSALS, THANKING "FRIENDS AND ALLIES" FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE IN HELPING TO NEGOTIATE THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA, REJECTING THE PROPOSITION THAT CSCE SHOULD BE EUROPE'S LEADING SECURITY ORGANIZATION, AND OPPOSING ANY ATTEMPTS TO KEEP STATES FROM CHOOSING THEIR SECURITY PARTNERS. HE STRESSED THAT CSCE'S VALUE LAY IN ITS PRINCIPLE OF CONSENSUS DECISION-MAKING BUT NOTED CSCE HAD NOT FULLY TAPPED ITS POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION CALLING FOR MORE ENFORCEMENT OF CSCE OBLIGATIONS. ULMANIS SAID THAT WHAT CSCE WAS MISSING WAS THE ABILITY TO MAKE LEGALLY BINDING RESOLUTIONS.

8. BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA. THE BOSNIAN AMBASSADOR TO CSCE (HADZIAHMETOVIC) PASSIONATELY ADDRESSED THE PLENARY, COMPLAINING THAT HIS COUNTRY HAD BEEN DEPRIVED THE RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF AND CSCE PRINCIPLES HAD BEEN COMPROMISED. HE PLEADED FOR A STRONG SUMMIT STATEMENT ON THE FIGHTING IN BOSNIA AND CRITICIZED "ONE COUNTRY" (RUSSIAN FEDERATION) FOR BLOCKING THE STATEMENT.

9. FYROM. THE LAST SPEAKER OF THE PLENARY WAS FORMER

YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA PRESIDENT GLIGOROV. HE DEMANDED IMMEDIATE MEMBERSHIP IN CSCE, SAYING IT WAS UNFAIR FOR ONE COUNTRY TO BLOCK MACEDONIAN MEMBERSHIP. HE SAID HE ALSO WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE FAILURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN BOSNIA, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE ECONOMIC DAMAGE THAT INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO HAVE INFLICTED ON HIS COUNTRY. HE BLAMED CSCE FOR TOLERATING THE EXTERNAL PRESSURES EXERTED ON HIS COUNTRY--PARTICULARLY ATHEN'S UNILATERAL EMBARGO--AND ASKED FOR THE CSCE TO ENHANCE ITS ROLE IN THE BALKANS.

10. OTHER THEMES. THE TURKMENISTAN REP STRESSED HIS GOVERNMENT'S POTENTIAL TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES THROUGH THE CSCE AND URGED CSCE TO TAKE ON A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE AND INCREASE ITS EFFORTS IN THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION. THE LUXEMBOURG REP HIGHLIGHTED CSCE'S POTENTIAL FOR IMPROVING GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS THROUGH THE STABILITY PACT. THE TAJIK REP SUGGESTED CSCE STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMIC FORUM AND COOPERATION WITH OTHER REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND PROVIDE THE RESOURCES TO IMPLEMENT ARMS CONTROL DECISIONS. THE PRESIDENTS OF THE CZECH AND SLOVAK REPUBLICS UNDERScoreD THEIR GOVERNMENTS' DESIRE TO BECOME INTEGRATED INTO EUROPE AND THE UNIQUE ROLE CSCE COULD PLAY. THEY URGED THE CSCE TO PLAY A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN PEACEKEEPING AND ACCENTUATE ITS PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY MISSIONS.M

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 03 BUDAPEST 011965

DEPT FOR EUR/RPM (COHEN), S/NIS, ISCA, EUR/EE
DEPT ALSO FOR DRL (ELY-RAPHEL)
DEPT PASS TO PRESIDENT'S AND SECRETARY'S PARTY
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
FROM CSCE BUDAPEST REVIEW CONFERENCE 207
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CSCE, PREL
SUBJECT: CSCE SUMMIT -- PLENARY STATEMENTS,
DECEMBER 6

1. SUMMARY: DURING PLENARY STATEMENTS AT THE SECOND DAY (DECEMBER 6) OF THE CSCE SUMMIT IN BUDAPEST, MANY DELEGATIONS URGED CSCE TO BE MORE ACTIVE. TOUCHING ON THEIR NATIONAL CONCERNS, REPRESENTATIVES OF GEORGIA, GREECE, MOLDOVA, AZERBAIJAN, AND OTHERS ADDRESSED THE PLENARY. END SUMMARY.

11. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF KYRGYSTAN SPOKE IN SUPPORT OF THE ROLE OF THE MINSK GROUP IN DEVELOPING A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE IN THE CSCE. SHE THANKED THE CSCE FOR ITS ASSISTANCE WITH HER COUNTRY'S FIRST FREE ELECTIONS AND ASKED FOR MORE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO HELP DEVELOP KYRGYSTAN'S ECONOMIC BASE. THE PRIME MINISTER OF ICELAND STRUCK A SIMILAR NOTE IN STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING CSCE'S ECONOMIC DIMENSION. REPRESENTATIVES OF LIECHTENSTEIN, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWITZERLAND AND THE HOLY SEE ALSO SPOKE.

BROWN

BT
#1965

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
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SSN: 1965
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TOR: 941206122946 M1399607
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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED

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LINE2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZEX

LINE3: O P 100239Z DEC 94

LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC

OSRI: RUEHC

DTG: 100239Z DEC 94

ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS IMMEDIATE 0739

RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA IMMEDIATE 1803

RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 0095

RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA IMMEDIATE 4842

RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE 3781

RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2869

RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 5302

RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 4383

INFO: RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY 2101

RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC PRIORITY 3856

RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY 0307

RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY 2513

SUBJ: DOCUMENTS FROM THE SECURITY ASSURANCES AND START
I CEREMONIES AT THE CSCE BUDAPEST SUMMIT

TEXT:

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 328787

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: MNUC, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: DOCUMENTS FROM THE SECURITY ASSURANCES AND START
I CEREMONIES AT THE CSCE BUDAPEST SUMMIT

1. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE, PARAGRAPH 3.

2. ON DECEMBER 5, ON THE MARGINS OF THE CSCE BUDAPEST SUMMIT, UKRAINE DEPOSITED ITS INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION TO THE NPT AS A NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE, SECURITY ASSURANCES WERE PROVIDED BY THE U.S., UK, AND RUSSIA TO UKRAINE KAZAKHSTAN, AND BELARUS, A EUROPEAN SECURITY DECLARATION WAS ISSUED, AND THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION FOR THE START I TREATY WERE EXCHANGED FORMALLY BRINGING THE START I TREATY INTO FORCE. THESE DOCUMENTS ARE CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 4-6 BELOW.

3. ACTION: POSTS MAY PROVIDE THE DOCUMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 4-6, AS APPROPRIATE. WE HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED A NUMBER OF REQUESTS FROM EMBASSIES IN WASHINGTON FOR THIS INFORMATION, BUT HAVE NOT YET CIRCULATED THESE DOCUMENTS.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY DECLARATION

BEGIN TEXT OF JOINT DECLARATION:

JOINT DECLARATION OF THE LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, UKRAINE, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

THE LEADERS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, UKRAINE' AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND MET DURING THE SUMMIT MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE.

THE LEADERS DISCUSSED THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE. THEY UNDERScoreD THEIR DETERMINATION TO SUPPORT THE INCREASINGLY STRONG TENDENCIES TOWARD THE FORMATION OF SECURITY BASED ON POLITICAL PARTNERSHIP, AND TO COOPERATE IN THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF A SECURITY SYSTEM WHICH EMBRACES ALL THE CSCE STATES. THIS WILL INVOLVE THE EVOLUTION -- GIVEN THE NEW REALITIES -- OF TRANSATLANTIC AND REGIONAL MECHANISMS OF SECURITY IN A MANNER THAT ENHANCES THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF ALL CSCE STATES.

THEY ARE COMMITTED TO CONTINUING THE PROCESS OF BUILDING POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC SECURITY IN AN UNDIVIDED EUROPE' IN WHICH INTEGRATION, OPENNESS FOR PARTICIPATION, AND TRANSPARENCY ARE CHARACTERISTIC.

THE LEADERS CONFIRMED THAT CSCE COMMITMENTS IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ECONOMICS, AND SECURITY REPRESENT THE CORNERSTONE OF THE COMMON EUROPEAN SECURITY SPACE, AND THAT THEY HELP ENSURE THAT COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES IN THIS SPACE ARE NOT SUBJECTED FURTHER TO THE THREAT OF MILITARY FORCE OR OTHER UNDESIRABLE CONSEQUENCES OF AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM AND CHAUVINISM.

THEY NOTED THAT THE HISTORICAL CHANGES IN THE WORLD. INCLUDING THE END OF THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN BLOCS OF THE "COLD WAR", CREATE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR THE FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY AND STABILITY ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT AND FOR DEEP REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES.

IN THIS REGARD, THE LEADERS DISCUSSED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRILATERAL STATEMENT OF JANUARY 14, 1994. THEY NOTED PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS STATEMENT.

THE LEADERS ALSO CONFIRMED THAT AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE BROADER PROCESS OF STRENGTHENING SECURITY AND STABILITY IS ALSO MADE BY SUCH AGREEMENTS AS THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, THE OPEN SKIES TREATY AND CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES.

END TEXT OF JOINT DECLARATION

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 05 STATE 328787

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: MNUC, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: DOCUMENTS FROM THE SECURITY ASSURANCES AND START
I CEREMONIES AT THE CSCE BUDAPEST SUMMIT

5. TEXT OF SECURITY ASSURANCES

BEGIN TEXT OF MEMORANDUM ON SECURITY ASSURANCES FOR
UKRAINE:

MEMORANDUM ON SECURITY ASSURANCES IN CONNECTION WITH
UKRAINE'S ACCESSION TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
UKRAINE, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND,

WELCOMING THE ACCESSION OF UKRAINE TO THE TREATY ON THE
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A
NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE,

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE COMMITMENT OF UKRAINE TO ELIMINATE
ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM ITS TERRITORY WITHIN A SPECIFIED
PERIOD OF TIME,

NOTING THE CHANGES IN THE WORLD-WIDE SECURITY SITUATION,
INCLUDING THE END OF THE COLD WAR, WHICH HAVE BROUGHT
ABOUT CONDITIONS FOR DEEP REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES,

CONFIRM THE FOLLOWING:

1. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO UKRAINE, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CSCE FINAL ACT, TO
RESPECT THE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EXISTING
BORDERS OF UKRAINE.

2. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND REAFFIRM THEIR OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE, AND THAT NONE OF
THEIR WEAPONS WILL EVER BE USED AGAINST UKRAINE EXCEPT IN
SELF-DEFENSE OR OTHERWISE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER
OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

3. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO UKRAINE, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CSCE FINAL ACT, TO
REFRAIN FROM ECONOMIC COERCION DESIGNED TO SUBORDINATE TO
THEIR OWN INTEREST THE EXERCISE BY UKRAINE OF THE RIGHTS

INHERENT IN ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND THUS TO SECURE ADVANTAGES OF ANY KIND.

4. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO SEEK IMMEDIATE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE, AS A NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IF UKRAINE SHOULD BECOME A VICTIM OF AN ACT OF AGGRESSION OR AN OBJECT OF A THREAT OF AGGRESSION IN WHICH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE USED.

5. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND REAFFIRM, IN THE CASE OF UKRAINE, THEIR COMMITMENT NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST ANY NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF AN ATTACK ON THEMSELVES, THEIR TERRITORIES OR DEPENDENT TERRITORIES, THEIR ARMED FORCES, OR THEIR ALLIES, BY SUCH A STATE IN ASSOCIATION OR ALLIANCE WITH A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE.

6. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, UKRAINE, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND WILL CONSULT IN THE EVENT A SITUATION ARISES WHICH RAISES A QUESTION CONCERNING THESE COMMITMENTS.

UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 05 STATE 328787

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: MNUC, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: DOCUMENTS FROM THE SECURITY ASSURANCES AND START I CEREMONIES AT THE CSCE BUDAPEST SUMMIT

THIS MEMORANDUM WILL BECOME APPLICABLE UPON SIGNATURE.

SIGNED IN FOUR COPIES HAVING EQUAL VALIDITY IN THE ENGLISH, RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN LANGUAGES.

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

FOR UKRAINE

FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BUDAPEST, DECEMBER 5, 1994

END TEXT FOR UKRAINE

BEGIN TEXT OF MEMORANDUM ON SECURITY ASSURANCES FOR KAZAKHSTAN:

MEMORANDUM ON SECURITY ASSURANCES IN CONNECTION WITH THE

REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN'S ACCESSION TO THE TREATY ON THE
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN,
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND,

WELCOMING THE ACCESSION OF REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN TO THE
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A
NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE,

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE COMMITMENT OF REPUBLIC OF
KAZAKHSTAN TO ELIMINATE ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM ITS
TERRITORY WITHIN A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME,

NOTING THE CHANGES IN THE WORLD-WIDE SECURITY SITUATION,
INCLUDING THE END OF THE COLD WAR, WHICH HAVE BROUGHT
ABOUT CONDITIONS FOR DEEP REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES,

CONFIRM THE FOLLOWING:

1. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE REPUBLIC OF
KAZAKHSTAN, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CSCE
FINAL ACT, TO RESPECT THE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY AND
THE EXISTING BORDERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN.

2. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND REAFFIRM THEIR OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN
AND THAT NONE OF THEIR WEAPONS WILL EVER BE USED AGAINST
THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENSE OR
OTHERWISE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS.

3. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE REPUBLIC OF
KAZAKHSTAN, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CSCE
FINAL ACT, TO REFRAIN FROM ECONOMIC COERCION DESIGNED TO
SUBORDINATE TO THEIR OWN INTEREST THE EXERCISE BY THE
REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN OF THE RIGHTS INHERENT IN ITS
SOVEREIGNTY AND THUS TO SECURE ADVANTAGES OF ANY KIND.

4. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO SEEK IMMEDIATE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO
THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN, AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE
PARTY TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, IF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN SHOULD BECOME A
VICTIM OF AN ACT OF AGGRESSION OR AN OBJECT OF A THREAT OF
AGGRESSION IN WHICH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE USED.

5. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 05 STATE 328787

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: MNUC, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: DOCUMENTS FROM THE SECURITY ASSURANCES AND START
I CEREMONIES AT THE CSCE BUDAPEST SUMMIT

AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND REAFFIRM, IN THE CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
KAZAKHSTAN, THEIR COMMITMENT NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AGAINST ANY NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY TO THE TREATY
ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EXCEPT IN THE
CASE OF AN ATTACK ON THEMSELVES. THEIR TERRITORIES OR
DEPENDENT TERRITORIES, THEIR ARMED FORCES, OR THEIR
ALLIES, BY SUCH A STATE IN ASSOCIATION OR ALLIANCE WITH A
NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE.

6. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE REPUBLIC OF
KAZAKHSTAN, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND WILL CONSULT IN THE
EVENT A SITUATION ARISES WHICH RAISES A QUESTION
CONCERNING THESE COMMITMENTS.

THIS MEMORANDUM WILL BECOME APPLICABLE UPON SIGNATURE.

SIGNED IN FOUR COPIES IN THE ENGLISH, KAZAKH, AND RUSSIAN
LANGUAGES, THE ENGLISH AND RUSSIAN TEXTS HAVING EQUAL
VALIDITY. THE KAZAKH-LANGUAGE TEXT SHALL BE DEEMED TO BE
OF EQUAL VALIDITY WHEN ITS CONFORMITY WITH THE
ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TEXT IS ESTABLISHED.

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BUDAPEST, DECEMBER 5, 1994

END TEXT FOR KAZAKHSTAN

BEGIN TEXT OF MEMORANDUM ON SECURITY ASSURANCES FOR
BELARUS:

MEMORANDUM ON SECURITY ASSURANCES IN CONNECTION WITH THE
REPUBLIC OF BELARUS' ACCESSION TO THE TREATY ON THE
NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDE2ATION, THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, AND
THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS,

WELCOMING THE ACCESSIOF OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS TO THE
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A

NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE,

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE COMMITMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
BELARUS TO ELIMINATE ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM ITS
TERRITORY WITHIN A SPECIFIED PERIOD OF TIME,

NOTING THE CHANGES IN THE WORLD-WIDE SECURITY SITUATION,
INCLUDING THE END OF THE COLD WAR, WHICH HAVE BROUGHT
ABOUT CONDITIONS FOR DEEP REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES,

CONFIRM THE FOLLOWING:

1. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE REPUBLIC OF
BELARUS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CSCE
FINAL ACT, TO RESPECT THE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY AND
THE EXISTING BORDERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS.

2. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND REAFFIRM THEIR OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN FROM THE
THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS AND
THAT NONE OF THEIR WEAPONS WILL EVER BE USED AGAINST THE
REPUBLIC OF BELARUS EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENSE OR OTHERWISE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

3. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 05 STATE 328787

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: MNUC, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: DOCUMENTS FROM THE SECURITY ASSURANCES AND START
I CEREMONIES AT THE CSCE BUDAPEST SUMMIT

AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE REPUBLIC OF
BELARUS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CSCE
FINAL ACT, TO REFRAIN FROM ECONOMIC COERCION DESIGNED TO
SUBORDINATE TO THEIR OWN INTEREST THE EXERCISE BY THE
REPUBLIC OF BELARUS OF THE RIGHTS INHERENT IN ITS
SOVEREIGNTY AND THUS TO SECURE ADVANTAGES OF ANY KIND.

4. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO SEEK IMMEDIATE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO
THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS, AS A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE
PARTY TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR

WEAPONS, IF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS SHOULD BECOME A VICTIM
OF AN ACT OF AGGRESSION OR AN OBJECT OF A THREAT OF
AGGRESSION IN WHICH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE USED.

5. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION,
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND REAFFIRM, IN THE CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS,

THEIR COMMITMENT NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST ANY NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE PARTY TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF AN ATTACK ON THEMSELVES, THEIR TERRITORIES OR DEPENDENT TERRITORIES, THEIR ARMED FORCES, OR THEIR ALLIES, BY SUCH A STATE IN ASSOCIATION OR ALLIANCE WITH A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE.

6. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND WILL CONSULT IN THE EVENT A SITUATION ARISES WHICH RAISES A QUESTION CONCERNING THESE COMMITMENTS.

THIS MEMORANDUM WILL BECOME APPLICABLE UPON SIGNATURE.

SIGNED IN FOUR COPIES HAVING EQUAL VALIDITY IN THE ENGLISH, BELARUSIAN, AND RUSSIAN LANGUAGES.

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BUDAPEST, DECEMBER 5, 1994

END TEXT FOR BELARUS

6. BEGIN START I PROTOCOL

PROTOCOL OF EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION

THE UNDERSIGNED, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ALYAKSANDR G. LUKASHENKA' PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS; NURSULTAN A. NAZARBAYEV, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN; BORIS N. YELTSIN, PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION; AND LEONID D. KUCHMA, PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE, ON DECEMBER 5, 1994, MET TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, SIGNED AT MOSCOW ON JULY 31, 1991, AND THE PROTOCOL TO THAT TREATY, SIGNED AT LISBON ON MAY 23, 1992.

THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION HAVING BEEN FOUND TO BE IN GOOD ORDER AND DUE FORM, THE PRESIDENTS PROCEEDED WITH THE EXCHANGE.

BUDAPEST, DECEMBER 5, 1994

END TEXT OF START PROTOCOL. TALBOTT

BT
#8787

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 05
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. cable	re: European Security. (10 pages)	12/15/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1993-Dec 1994 ([Budapest CSCE Kazakhstan Summit])
OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/26/1994-12/15/1994]

2014-0846-F

vz3315

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. cable	re: Ambassador's Meeting with President Nazarbayev, December 15. (5 pages)	12/15/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1993-Dec 1994 ([Budapest CSCE Kazakhstan Summit])
OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:

[11/26/1994-12/15/1994]

2014-0846-F

vz3315

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]