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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING  
BY  
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

December 5, 1994

Aboard Air Force One  
En Route Washington, D.C. From Budapest, Hungary

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There were brief meetings with Kohl and then a trilateral with Izetbegovic and Tudjman, and that's what I'm going to tell you about.

The meeting with Kohl lasted about 20, 25 minutes and it focused first on Bosnia; Kohl expressing general frustration which the President shared about the situation and the problems in using NATO air power, but they didn't arrive at any new conclusions; stressed the importance of pushing really hard on the diplomatic track trying to get a cease-fire and a settlement as we've been saying.

They also talked about the problem with the Russians over NATO in light of today's statements and expressed, again, certain -- both concern and a state of perplexity about what the Russians were up to; hoped that we could clear up their misconceptions about what NATO is doing, that this is a process, that we're not setting a timetable for the actual expansion of the alliance; and that we need to work -- you know, talk to the Russians further to clear up the misconceptions in their mind.

Kohl stressed -- and the President agreed -- that there is a great sense of -- we have to have a sense of obligation in trying to bring stability to Central and Eastern Europe. Kohl stressed that the European Union has a major role to play in this regard in the political and economic areas, as important as NATO, and that we can't allow what the Russians have done to cause a loss of confidence on the part of the Central Europeans as to our commitment to their integration. This is something which the President agreed with fully. So those are the main points in the Kohl discussion.

In the meeting with the Bosnian and the Croatian presidents, the President started by stressing that there had been no change in the basics of our policy, that we stand by the Contact Group proposal -- (inaudible) -- Izetbegovic, he said that we are not in favor of a confederation between Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs; said we would like to continue to use NATO air power, stand by our commitments, ready to use it to the extent that the U.N. will permit; and then asked them to spell out their concerns.

Izetbegovic said that the Bosnians were prepared for a three-month countrywide cease-fire, but this had to be premised on both a cease-fire in Bihac immediately and withdrawal of the Croatian-Serb forces -- things that we are demanding as well. He expressed his concern about UNPROFOR putting the brakes on the use of NATO air power, urging that UNPROFOR be strengthened rather than withdrawn so that NATO air power can be used more assertively.

Tudjman, for his part, expressed concern about the continued occupation of the Krajina by the Krajina Serbs plus their new involvement in Bihac. He noted that they had recently signed

this economic agreement with the Krajina Serbs; expressed certain skepticism on its being implemented effectively; and, once again, raised the question of whether Croatia would renew UNPROFOR's mandate in the new year if the Krajina Serbs didn't follow through on this agreement. So, that was about all they had time for.

Q How long did that meeting last?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: About 10 -- 10 or 15 minutes.

Q Why were the meetings added to the schedule?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the meeting with Kohl had kind of been provisionally penciled in. He expressed a strong interest in just a brief conversation with the President. And the Bosnians and the Croats requested the meeting in the last couple of days -- over the weekend -- in light of the deteriorating situation. And the President felt, in light of the circumstances, he wanted to, in particular, give a chance for them to convey their views directly.

Q Why a meeting with Kohl to talk about Bosnia when the problems in the last weeks have been with the Brits and the French?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, because he saw John Major on the margins of the ceremony, and Mitterrand was a late arrival; and he spoke with Mitterrand on the phone last week, as you all know. And he has a strong relationship with Kohl.

The Germans are, of course, in the Contact Group, the presidency of the EU. Kohl, of course, I think, expressed a particular interest in seeing him to talk about the NATO expansion issues as well. So consistent with their long-standing partnership, the President was quite glad to agree to the request.

Q Did Yeltsin ask for a meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeltsin did not ask for a meeting, no. There was none scheduled. They spoke very briefly after the START NPT ceremony, but basically just to exchange greetings and say that they would be in contact with each other. But we didn't plan a meeting and didn't have one.

The President did meet with two other leaders today -- President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and President Lukashenko of Belarus. They were both -- the Lukashenko meeting was four or five minutes. It was really just a -- photo-op. The Nazarbayev meeting was about 10 minutes. If you are interested, I can tell you about them, but they mainly -- both of them dealt with economic reform and with some nuclear issues pertaining to the treaty that was signed.

I did want to tell you about something good that happened with the Russians today. After two years of effort, we made some progress on Nagorno-Karabakh, and that was directly related to the CSCE Conference itself.

For two years, the Russians have been trying to impose a unilateral military solution. The CSCE has been saying, no, it should be an international solution. And today the Russians agreed to language for the final communique that would have the leaders call upon the CSCE to field the multinational peacekeeping force. This is a significant step forward. We don't have complete CSCE agreement yet. This is a U.S.-Russian agreement in language which now must be agreed to by all.

It's significant because this is in Russia's backyard. It's a place where Russia has clear national interest, where Russia had wanted a unilateral solution. But Secretary Christopher did some hard negotiating over the weekend -- Friday and yesterday -- with Minister Kozyrev, and President Clinton sent a letter to President Yeltsin on Friday on this issue. And the Russians have agreed to join forces with us.

It's very important because this war has gone on for six years and it's been as bloody as Bosnia -- it just hasn't gotten print. And it's got to come to an end. And the only way it's going to come to an end is if Russia and the United States, Germany, Sweden, other CSCE members come together. And that's what we agreed upon today.

So we're hopeful -- and in the next couple of months we might be able to organize this force.

Q Is there a sense of perplexity about what Yeltsin was up to on NATO?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: On NATO? I would say a couple of things. Obviously, there are domestic forces at work here. Yeltsin has a parliament that is legitimate and powerful and has its own views, and those views are not pro-NATO expansion.

I think it's -- you know looking at the Kozyrev action on Thursday and Yeltsin's speech today, it's also fair to say that some in the Russian leadership probably want to know more from us about where this process is going. They clearly misread what the NAC did on Thursday.

And so what we have pledged to do with them is to have very close discussions over the next couple of weeks to explain in great detail what it is that NATO is doing and what NATO is not doing. And we're comfortable that after these discussions take place, the Russians will sign those PFP documents.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would just add on that the Russians, in Thursday and in today's statement, are trying to draw some kind of dichotomy between partnership and expansion of the alliance. From the very start, going back to the NATO Summit, these have been two interrelated parts of our policy which we've explained to them from that point.

PFP is both the mechanism of preparing countries for potential NATO membership, as well as what we see as a long-term program for engaging all the countries that have joined, and others that we hope to join, in an enduring relationship with NATO.

You take that; you take the efforts to strengthen CSCE; bilateral links between Russia and other countries, on the one hand, and NATO on the other; other things that are going on, like the Contact Group, the G-7 plus one; we think we have a comprehensive approach. And this is what we've been laying out for the Russians, particularly since the Clinton-Yeltsin summit in September.

So we are a little perplexed that, despite all this explanation, they seem to, for whatever reasons, be interpreting it in their own fashion.

Q Are you concerned that Yeltsin took it so public today? I mean, he went further than Kozyrev and made it a big issue?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it was predictable after Kozyrev's actions on Thursday. There have been some communications, letters between President Clinton and President

Yeltsin where they have voiced some questions about this process. So it wasn't a terrible surprise.

And I think I'd like to put the emphasis on we're going to go forward from here. We are committed to a very close relationship with the Russians. We have a good relationship. We agree on more things than we disagree on. But clearly, we have some disagreements. So what you do is, you try to narrow those differences and you go forward.

And I'm confident that we'll be able to work out their active participation in the PFP which is what our goal is right now. You know, we're not talking about timetable for NATO expansion. We're not going to enter into negotiations with prospective members.

But we are talking about getting PFP going. That means getting the Russian military training with NATO, NATO forces in Western Europe. And right now -- as of Thursday, the Russians were saying, well, we're going to wait a little bit; we want to be assured about where you're going.

I'm confident that after we have this next round of discussions, they'll decide to join PFP actively. They've already joined, but to actually put their forces into training with ours.

Q What about the veto on Friday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, well, we were disappointed because the substance of that resolution related to one of the key problems in the recent problem in Bihac, namely the involvement of the Krajina Serbs. And this was an effort to cut supplies to the Krajina Serbs that can benefit their war machine directly and back fill-in to the Bosnian Serbs.

Q (Inaudible).

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think they're -- as we understand their concern, they saw it as something to be perceived as tightening of sanctions on Milosevic at a time when we're trying to encourage him through the carrot of sanctions relief to take further steps to isolate the Bosnian Serbs.

It's a difference of view as to what this would have done. We feel this would have helped isolate the Bosnian Serbs and could have earned Milosevic some points if he complied with it. But we'll continue to pursue that issue. This is a -- we don't see this as a crisis.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can I just add to that because I'd just like to add to the kind of questions -- speak to the kind of questions you're asking.

Clearly, we're going through a rougher patch in our relations with Russia than we had, say, in '92 or '93. But just as we have some disagreements, perhaps, on aspects of the NATO question, at this summit the President was able to agree with Yeltsin on two very important issues: START I NPT and the fact that both of them are going to push START II for ratification in 1995; and Nagorno-Karabakh -- an issue that is emotionally very close to the Russian heart and very close to their core national interests.

So this relationship is an even relationship; it's balanced. And I think at this summit you heard today some disagreements on NATO, but you saw today two major agreements that President Clinton and President Yeltsin worked out -- Nagorno-Karabakh and START NPT. And I would like to emphasize the good that's happening.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me add something. Let me add something on the Central European perspective in all of this. We've also come along -- my colleagues have talked about the developments in our thinking and the balance policy we've put together. This has been paralleled, in a way, by a development of the Central Europeans' thinking.

A couple of years ago and then after the Russian parliamentary elections, the Central Europeans spoke in terms of NATO expansion as something that was necessary to protect them against Russia. So it had a kind of a zero-sum game quality to it. And that's not at all our view. And we've talked to them a lot and urged them to think -- over the past year -- and urged them to think in terms of everybody's longer term interest and to get away from zero-sum game in the way they look at regional politics, just as they've gotten away from zero-sum game in their own domestic politics as democracies deepen.

And it's interesting and it's rather heartening that when the Central Europeans, the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians and others, start talking about the way they see the future of Europe and their place in it, they are at pains to talk about the need to strengthen their relations with Russia, strengthen the CSCE, and to understand NATO expansion in that context.

Now, you can come back and say, well, they don't really mean it; this is just talk and smoke. I think they've genuinely developed their thinking. They don't want a NATO expansion to leave them in the eastern edge of some hostile frontier. They know they're going to have to be living with Russia either as a neighbor or in the region forever. And it's good to see that they are thinking in terms of a productive relationship, of an integrated Europe in which NATO expansion will play a part.

And I refer you to the recent statements by the Polish Foreign Minister and you can check with the Czechs, they will say much the same thing. So this is a welcome development.

The only other thing that I could add is that the President also saw the Hungarian President and Prime Minister. This was a discussion which touched on European security, architecture in the way we've been describing.

Also, we impressed on them the need to continue their economic reforms. They confirmed that they would do so and that they recognize they have a short-term rough patch.

And finally, the President did offer to put a regional law enforcement academy, which he announced in September in his -- speech, in Budapest. This is a training academy. The FBI will have a leading role in putting it together. It will be open to law enforcement people from throughout Central Europe and the NIS, and the focus will be on things like money laundering, narcotics trafficking, trafficking nuclear weapons, organized crime, all the kinds of trans-border crimes, criminal activity we have seen on the increase since '89. So that was one thing that happened in this bilateral.

Q What happens next with Russia? Will the President call him, write him? How does he get over this hump with NATO?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think the Vice President will be in Moscow next week for three days. He has meetings with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. In his relationship with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, they talk about everything. I would think --

Q -- appropriate place to do that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think this issue would definitely come up during the Vice President's visit. He's going to see Chernomyrdin; he'll see President Yeltsin. President Clinton and President Yeltsin are in touch by letter or phone frequently, and I think, given the events of the last week, both the NAC meeting and now today's meeting, I think it's likely that they'll be in touch on this issue. Yes. Probably by letter I would imagine.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING  
BY  
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

December 5, 1994

The Briefing Room

2:05 P.M. EST

Good afternoon. Today we're going to provide you a BACKGROUND BRIEFING on the trilateral denuclearization agreement that was signed today at Budapest. The agreement was indeed a very important one, very historic, and is distinct from the CSCE plenary and meetings that went on. So we thought it would be useful and effective to have some administration officials here today to explain to you exactly what the meaning of the trilateral agreement will be for nuclear weapons reductions now and in the future.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. I'm going to be very brief because I know you want to get to questions. Let me just say at the outset, this is a really good deal. It was a good deal when it was made and it's really a more important deal now that it's been ratified and come into effect. And what I'd like to do is just hit three areas, sort of the background, historical context, briefly the accomplishments of the treaty, and then move on to next steps.

This began in 1982 in the Reagan administration, following the Carter efforts to get the SALT II treaty, which I negotiated, through. Reagan wanted deeper cuts, and so SALT became START -- strategic arms Reduction talks. It's gone on now for 12 years -- three presidencies, signed by President Bush, and in effect, could have been ratified shortly after that signature, except a funny thing happened on the way to ratification. The Soviet Union fell apart, and the result was that we had four new identities holding nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. And since then, for two years plus, there has -- rather almost two years, there has been intensive work by this administration at the presidential level and just about every other level of the government you can imagine to solve the problems that were created by that collapse of the Soviet Union. As I said, there were four new nuclear weapons states, including Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus. They all had to be made party to the treaty, and there were long negotiations about successor states' status and so forth.

Having gotten them to agree to be party to the treaty, we then, in Lisbon -- Secretary Baker worked a deal whereby they agreed that they would join the treaty as nonnuclear weapon states, members of the Nonproliferation Treaty, an absolutely vital consideration because, otherwise, we would have had, in effect, a proliferation of nuclear weapon states.

So after all this negotiation, the toughest nut was Ukraine, as I think you all know. It was only in the last couple of weeks that the Rata overwhelmingly approved accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty. And so the conditions were met. The Russians had said that they would not let the treaty go into effect until and unless all three of the other states had joined the NPT, and indeed they did. I can't emphasize enough the difficulty of the negotiations that were involved here and the intense work that was

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done by this administration, in addition to the intense work that had been done by the previous administration.

What does the treaty do? It reduces by almost 40 percent the strategic weapons on each side to a number around 6,000 deployed warheads. Back in '91 when the treaty was signed, each side had about 10,000. It's legally binding. It's verifiable. It's irreversible. And as far as I can determine, it's durable. It has the most comprehensive inspection and monitoring regime ever agreed upon in any arms control treaty. That's it. It's several pounds of, most of which is the verification and inspection.

It also provides, as I'll get into, a very valuable basis for the START II Treaty, which is somewhat thinner because it derives from the START I Treaty considerably.

So no new nuclear weapon state will emerge as a result of this. And I think the accomplishments are just extraordinary. And having, as I said, been in this business in the SALT II Treaty, I can tell you that I congratulate all the negotiators who worked on this treaty.

So where do we go from here? As I mentioned -- I mentioned START II -- it means the ratification of START I and the entry into effect of START I means that we can now go forward with the ratification of START II, which is before the Senate now.

That treaty, when entered into effect, will reduce the weapons on each side to no more than 3,500, possibly as low as 3,000. It will eliminate all of the most dangerous weapons, what were the Soviet, now the Russian, SS-18s, and will be another major step toward strategic stability.

An indirect effect which is vital at this time is the effect it will have on the extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty. That treaty comes up for review and extension in April of '95, and it now has 168 parties to it and many of them over the years have complained that the major nuclear powers have been insufficient in their efforts to reduce their own arsenals. Certainly the entry into force of START I and the perspective entry into force of START II is of significance.

And finally, at the summit last September the two Presidents agreed that once START II comes into effect we could have additional discussions on the possibility of further reductions of remaining nuclear forces. So this is a treaty which meets our strategic arms control desires and it certainly assists in maintaining the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Questions.

Q What's the status of Ukraine moving its arms to Russia?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As far as I know, all of the tactical weapons have been out of Ukraine for some time, and the process is in order -- I'm not sure -- it's begun, the strategic weapons. It's not complete.

Q It was ahead of schedule. So what's the status -- a couple of months ago it was ahead of schedule. What's the status right now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, basically, we started via a side agreement to begin moving those weapons to Russia earlier this year. That will continue, and in fact now, some of the other weapons that were not included in that previous agreement will begin moving towards Russia for dismantlement. In the interim, all

of the weapons are being deactivated, which is less than complete dismantlement. It is, in effect, removing the warheads from the launchers so that they cannot be used while awaiting transport to Russia for dismantlement. That will continue, and the entire process will be completed as soon as we can get it completed.

Q Can't you be any more specific in terms of the numbers, though, what Ukraine had? Is it 176 or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I've got some of those numbers here. Have you got them? Ukraine, we had 700 warheads that are no longer deployed, 360 have been returned to Russia. Forty of the missiles have been removed from launchers thus far.

Q Could you say something about the security agreements that were made in connection especially with the Ukrainian decision to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The same security assurances were given each of them by Russia and the United States, and essentially, it's that we will not use nuclear weapons except when they make an attack in alliance with a nuclear state. We also commit ourselves to going to the U.N. Security Council for supporting if they are attacked. There are a couple of others that slip my mind. Respect the states' independence and sovereignty, refrain from the threat or use of force against them, refrain from economic coercion, consult with the Security Council if they're threatened by nuclear aggression, and consult if a question arises concerning fulfillment of these commitments.

Q So Ukraine got nothing extra?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q What's the timetable for the removal of all of the weapons now that are outside of Russia, to Russia for dismantling? When will they all be in Russia or gone from any possible operation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: According to the treaty, by the seven years, starting from today, which the treaty -- during which time the treaty will be implemented. If it can be done more rapidly, it will be done more rapidly. But the commitment is to finish it within the seven years -- seven-year period.

Q Why should it take that long for Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't imagine it will. In fact, some of them it will be much, much shorter. You asked by when, and they will certainly be done by then. All of the reductions under START I -- U.S., Russian and the other three smaller states will all be completed within seven years. Some of them, Kazakhstan, I imagine can be done much, much more rapidly. Also, Ukraine, Belarus, for all practical purposes, is down to a de minimus number, and will probably be completed much earlier.

Q But Belarus and Kazakhstan still do have arsenals on their territory?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Some of the strategic weapons are still there. All of the tactical nuclear weapons were removed quite a while ago.

Q And so how many are there? I thought that Belarus was totally devoid of any strategic weapons now.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's very close to it.  
De minimus.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: First, on warheads that have been taken off deployment status and returned to Russia, my colleague gave the numbers for Ukraine. For Kazakhstan, it is 810 no longer deployed. Approximately 500 have been returned to Russia. For Belarus, which only has the single-warhead SS-25 deployed on its soil, 45 warheads no longer deployed, 45 warheads returned to Russia. That means a couple -- tens of SS-25s still remain to be moved from Belarus.

If I could just follow on, on a question of removal, the four states directly involved -- Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus -- have a series of agreements on schedule for what is obviously a fairly complex action of taking the warheads off deployment status and moving them safely and securely in the schedule that's well within the START reduction period for the three streets.

Q You mentioned earlier the U.S. Senate has START II and is beginning to try to go through the ratification process. Is Russia also going through it, or what is the progress of that and what is the next step for START II?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The treaty, as I understand it, is at the Duma. I'm not sure of exactly the procedures that are used there -- whether they have an executive calendar as we do or not. But the treaties have been sitting there because, by its own terms, it needs START I entry into effect to move forward. So it only happened this morning, so let's see what happens this afternoon, or next week, or whatever.

Q And what happens -- after ratification -- it's been signed by both heads of state. So are you just waiting for another ceremony like the one today for it to go into effect?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, it has to be approved by the --

Q Both legislatures, right.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. Well, by the Senate here and the --

Q What's the outlook in the new Republican Senate?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, bear in mind, as I said at the outset, I don't think the outlook is bad at all. I think this treaty was negotiated by and signed by Republican presidents, and the START I Treaty was overwhelmingly approved by a bipartisan group, well over 90 votes in the Senate, and I don't see why it shouldn't be the same case with the START II Treaty.

Q Let me give you a scenario. Let us suppose that other issues concerning Russia come before current -- the new Senate, like aid, for example -- funds and other things --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They might invade Afghanistan?

Q -- and does not get good treatment. What then would be the outlook in the Duma for the ratification of START II, and, therefore, what effect might that have on the ratification of START --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that's kind of hypothetical speculation as to what scenario might transpire.

Q Is it not the kind of speculation, though, that you have to deal with?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't deal with speculation. I think that's a big mistake.

Q But, I mean, the administration would have to deal with it, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me say that there has been bipartisan support, also, for that assistance, and therefore, our expectation is that the assistance program, as voted by the Congress and as we expect will be voted in the coming sessions, should continue and if the bipartisan support continues, as we expect it will, that should not be a major problem.

Q Have you talked to the Senate about this yet? And I realize today was really the day of effectuation of this treaty. But have you talked to the Senate about moving on START II? Do you have any sense of how quickly they would be prepared to move on it? How quickly would you want them to move on it? Is this something you want done in 1995 before the election season really makes people crazy?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, obviously, they've been talked to and briefed, and they're well aware of what the content of the treaty is. But it's been held up pending this entry into effect.

When would I like to see it? As far as I'm concerned, the sooner the better. It's a good treaty, it benefits certainly the United States' security interest. Why hold it up?

Q Is the administration, as a matter of policy, though, seeking to have this treaty acted on in six months, in a year?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, as soon as possible. Thank you for reminding us.

Q Does START I require destruction of launchers, or is that START II?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's both. START I does as well.

Q Will they be done under the eyes of American inspectors, or after the fact -- what is the verification regime? When does that start?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's already started. We've got sitting over here Ambassador Stephen Steiner, who is our representative on the JCIC, which is the commission in Geneva which monitors. And I think Steve's already initialed or signed close to 50 sub-agreements with the other parties to the treaty regarding inspection and --

Q But have we actually done any on-site inspections? The so-called intrusive inspections?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We haven't done it, no.

Q Do we know when those will start?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No inspections until the treaty is actually in operation, which only begins today.

Q When will they start then?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The continuous monitoring, which we can do at one site in Russia and one site in Ukraine, can begin 30 days from today. And the baselines are scheduled to begin 45 days from today. That's where you go to all the sites and confirm what's there, what's declared under the treaty.

The date is supposed to be provided by all the parties 30 days from today.

Q And is the nuclear movement center now operational?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, yes. It has been for years. And it will be very involved in all of the notifications.

Q And do not notification provisions now kick in as of today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: A whole bunch already gone out.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have been -- both we and our START partners have been engaged in beginning the implementation of the treaty-required reductions even before entry into force. For example, this is something we first encouraged the Soviet Union and Russia particularly to do very shortly after the treaty was signed.

The United States has now removed 100 percent of the warheads from ballistic missiles whose launchers are to be eliminated under START. And we have eliminated, using START rules, 34 percent of the ballistic missile launchers that must be destroyed under the treaty. All of the heavy bombers that must be eliminated under the treaty are at our elimination facility at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. Russia has eliminated approximately 50 percent of the ballistic missile launchers which it must destroy under START. So we're well on our way to the full implementation of the treaty reductions.

Q When you said 100 percent of the warheads for ballistic missiles, what are we talking -- five or 1,500?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The total number of ballistic missile warheads that have been removed from missiles is 3,906.

Q You don't have on paper all that, do you?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We can probably get one for you fairly easily.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Can I, in closing, just reemphasize what my colleague did in his opening statement, and that is the nonproliferation benefits of this treaty. When the treaty was signed, of course, it was the Soviet Union. It's now a collection of independent states, the newly-independent states. All of those states, with the exception of Russia, are now either denuclearized or in the process of being denuclearized, and will in the end be nonnuclear weapon states. And therefore, the benefits in nonproliferation terms is really quite extraordinary and something that's important, although unforeseen back at the time the treaty was being negotiated; nonetheless, extremely important here in 1995 as we head into a Nonproliferation Treaty review and extension conference.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

2:25 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary  
(Budapest, Hungary)

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING  
BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

The Helia Hotel  
Budapest, Hungary

December 5, 1994

12:15 P.M. (L)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As you know, the President came to the Budapest summit because of the commitment that he has displayed to building a more secure and integrated Europe. And as he said in his statement today, CSCE has a major role to play in this regard, and his presence here was meant to signify continued U.S. engagement in this effort.

Strengthening the CSCE is part of a broader agenda for European security that we've been setting forth over the past year, beginning with the NATO Summit and extending up to this event. It involves a range of institutions as well as the deepening of our bilateral ties with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

As the President said in his statement, he remains committed to adapting NATO as one of the number one priorities in this overall effort. NATO is not only adapting in terms of its own missions, but seeking to project stability eastward through the Partnership for Peace and through its eventual expansion. And, of course, the decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council last week -- very much part of the push forward that this summit here is intended to continue.

I would say that Partnership for Peace and expansion of the alliance are two sides of the same coin, part of NATO's effort to help promote stability and cooperation. And as the President said, to erase old lines without creating new ones.

In terms of the CSCE, we see it as particularly important in developing more effective means for preventing conflicts, for preventing future Bosnias. And in that regard, we've seen a lot of positive accomplishments coming out of the summit. My colleague will talk in more detail about the specifics of the summit results.

Clearly the biggest threat to European security today is ethnic conflict, regional conflict and making the CSCE more effective, more proactive in dealing with conflicts at an early stage is going to be critical for the future security of Europe.

One of the most important accomplishments that we are quite hopeful about, as the President said, we are on the verge of achieving what will be a very significant decision to establish a CSCE peacekeeping force in the Nagorno-Karabakh. This is key to establishing the rules of the road for peacekeeping operations in the future in Europe, and particularly in the Newly Independent States.

CSCE has also been working on principles for peacekeeping and conflict prevention which will provide a more general road map for the future. Important progress has been made on that and my colleague will give you the latest state of play.

So, again, the President's engagement here on the CSCE half of the agenda was to continue the development of the broader security regime that we hope will provide for increased security and integration in post-Cold War Europe.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just to comment on the CSCE meeting itself. As my colleague said, the most important fact in understanding and detailing the results of this meeting is to see it in the context of what we have been doing in other places and to see it in the context of what we're starting to call the outlines of a security architecture in Europe.

And this security architecture, as the President has set forth also in his remarks this morning, is meant to establish a basis of cooperation, both among countries and among institutions so that the things that each institution best can be related to each other and hopefully extend a sense of security throughout Europe and especially to the parts of Central and Eastern Europe which feel that they are without a security framework at the moment.

The CSCE's role in this is severalfold. And it is in particular to be the place, the broad framework which has the methods and the means to start to do basic democratic development and to look at conflicts when they come early on.

Now, our goal here at this meeting was first to give the CSCE what we believe is its deserved political profile and its deserved political credibility. This is important because however useful the tools are that the CSCE has developed -- and actually many have been developed over the past few years -- it is still a different kind of undertaking. It is still something which works very slowly, very much at the grass roots of problems. And, as

most of you I think would agree, describing even what it is and how it works for someone who has to write about it is a very difficult thing to do.

So on the basis of an American initiative, we first did a very simple thing, and that is propose that its name be changed from conference to organization. That's a symbolic change, but it is now also expected to behave like an organization -- to be operational, to be focused, and to have the credibility than an organization does.

Secondly, you will see later in the documents when they're approved, the CSCE has a clear now mandate. Several tasks, which are clearly defined and which the heads of government states as a political commitment that they will see the CSCE as their primary tool, their primary institution for dealing with this mandate. And the mandate is of the areas that we've been talking about -- human rights, democratic development, conflict prevention, but also arms control. Conventional arms control remains a very important subject, and the CSCE is the framework for conventional arms control in Europe.

And two very important decisions on conventional arms control, or on conventional armaments have come out of this. The first one is a framework proposed by the United States for future conventional arms control negotiations, which relate them to the goals of the CSCE. And secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, is the so-called code of conduct of military relations, which stresses in particular a point which is also important in NATO -- that is civilian control of the armed forces. And in these newly emerging democracies, civilian control of the armed forces is not a foregone conclusion. And to have a common code agreed among the CSCE countries, which prescribes and people commit themselves to civilian control of the armed forces is really quite important.

There are a number of other decisions which have been taken and which we can talk about if you wish. But I think -- I'll just say one more time -- the most important point is to see this in the context of what is in fact now a growing set of interrelationships which will hopefully give those countries in Europe, and there are unfortunately a large number of them, who feel right now that they are living under insecure circumstances -- who whatever we think about the overall situation feel that they are living in threatened circumstances, that the CSCE will take an important step in helping to increase their sense of security, and in developing tools which will avoid conflicts before they break out.

Q Do you have a full, detailed agreement now with Russia on dealing with Nagorno-Karabakh?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as the President

said in his remarks this morning, we have a basic agreement with Russia. And we hope that this basic agreement can be turned into an agreement of all CSCE countries. But Nagorno-Karabakh, as you know, is a very complicated issue. And so it has to be worked now with all the countries in the CSCE, and that's going to take us during this day to make sure we can confirm that agreement.

Q You said the others, and I'm asking you about the U.S. and Russia.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The U.S. and Russia --

Q I'm asking you details, and you're saying you have a basic agreement.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, we have. We have a

--

Q So let me rephrase the question. Are you still in disagreement with Russia --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q -- on exactly what to in Nagorno-Karabakh, like what percentage of the troops will be Russian?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're not necessarily in disagreement, but we haven't reached agreement. In other words, we have agreed here to have an agreement on the basic principle of doing it with the understanding that the details would be worked out.

Q Would you give us a readout of Christopher's meeting with Kozyrev last night, because we never got a full readout yet? And also, given what Yeltsin said this morning, was there any consideration given to a meeting between Clinton and Yeltsin so that you could figure out exactly what he was trying to say?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as my colleague can answer the second part of it, Christopher's meeting with Kozyrev last night, which I attended, was arranged to work out a number of final details. It was a very positive session and a very businesslike session. And it spent most of its time, and my colleague can talk about this later, working on the question -- the remaining detail questions of the signing ceremony today. But we also discussed several detailed issues of the CSCE, including Nagorno-Karabakh, and including some of the other documents. And it was really very much a working session, which was a very successful one. And many of the things that we're going to be able to agree today were set in motion in that meeting.

Q What about Yeltsin's remarks today -- any consideration that maybe they were sufficiently worrisome that you would want to clarify them at the highest levels?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we're clearly going to continue the dialogue with the Russians. This began, of course, during Yeltsin's visit to the U.S. at the end of September. We laid out the agenda that was adopted pretty much as presented to Yeltsin back in September, adopted by the NAC on Friday.

Clearly, the Russians don't have full understanding of exactly what was decided. But we will continue to work this. There may not be time for a serious conversation here, but we have plenty channels of communication between the President and Yeltsin so that we don't see any opportunity missed here.

Q So he's not going to meet with Yeltsin here?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To be honest, it's possible that a very brief conversation might be arranged, but it will happen in the next hour or it won't happen at all, given that the President has a very tight schedule and is going to be leaving.

Q And you don't expect any results, obviously -- you don't expect any breakthrough?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, first of all, I don't know if a meeting's going to take place. But, as I said, I think that the Russians have understood where NATO was going, that NATO will expand. But this is going to be a process that is going to be taken step by step. It'll be transparent. We will continue to discuss all aspects with Russia and other members of the Partnership for Peace. The basic outlines of the NATO decision that was taken last week were well understood by the Russians beforehand. Clearly there are some aspects that have caused the more alarmist statements we've heard from Mr. Yeltsin today. But we don't see any insurmountable difficulties.

Q Can you tell us a little bit more about the -- (inaudible) -- worked out last night?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My colleague is going to do that. That's the next chapter of this briefing.

Q But we will get it, right?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, they're waiting in the wings.

Q Would you give us a little bit more sense of what you have resolved in Nagorno-Karabakh, because you've had elements of understanding -- (inaudible) -- it hasn't -- (inaudible) -- to

the summit, it's one of the -- (inaudible) --didn't work it out then. It sounds like -- (inaudible) --agreement to agree but get an agreement. On the details --(inaudible) -- all along.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, since I know you've been following this, you know how difficult and complex this issue is. I, myself, have been working on this for three years. And I can't tell you how many times we've thought we were within one minute of signing something and then there was a military offensive by one or the other side or an insulting statement by one or the other side. I mean, it really is one of these issues which is deep, deep down in emotion and history.

And I think the first thing, which ought to be mentioned here, is in fact the perseverance. And not just the perseverance of the United States, but also of Italy, which was the chairman of the Minsk Group for a long time, of Sweden, which was the Chairman of the Minsk Group. I mean, yes, but working through these issues like pulling apart a thread. And what we have achieved now -- what we think we have achieved, I can tell you very directly, is agreement by the Russians, and hopefully by everybody else, that the CSCE, working with the Russians, should be the central focus of the peace process; that we should move now from the cease-fire, which has been in place for some months, to a formal cease-fire, which is a negotiated document. And once that negotiated document is agreed, that there should planning to provide -- and that word will be in the text, hopefully -- to provide a peacekeeping force. And that peacekeeping force will be the basis, hopefully, of convening the Minsk Conference, which will be the formal peace conference, hopefully, to come up with a true negotiated settlement.

So it is not -- but again, to expect that we should sit down here at this meeting and work out the numbers, the command arrangements, that was something that was a little bit much to expect. What we do have is the basic agreement to do this.

Q Specifically on the makeup of the peacekeeping force -- as a matter of fact, Christopher said the Russian -- (inaudible) -- would be under 50 percent. Do you have a Russian agreement on that point? And who would basically lead --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's not part of the agreement. I mean, that is -- what we have is an agreement to set up the force. And it will be weeks or months of discussion over the questions of how many troops and who commands them and things like that.

Q So you're still sidestepping that.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we're not sidestepping it. We're doing what you do in such processes. A summit meeting,

such as this, is not the place where you get into those details.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: But this will be a CSCE peacekeeping force. That's the important accomplishment here.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

12:32 P.M. (L)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary  
(Budapest, Hungary)

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING  
BY  
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

December 5, 1994

The Helia Hotel  
Budapest, Hungary

12:33 P.M. (L)

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You should all, by now, have a fact sheet that lays out for you the various documents that were signed today by the Presidents and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Essentially, all the various pieces came together this morning -- the signing of security assurances by the U.S., the U.K. and Russia. Ukraine gave us their instrument of accession to the nonproliferation treaty, and by that step and the previous steps by Kazakhstan and Belarus to become nonnuclear parties to the NPT, that provided the basis to bring START I into effect on the part of the United States and Russia.

And as you heard President Clinton say in his remarks, President Clinton and President Yeltsin, in September, had committed to now move very quickly to ratify in each of their countries the START II treaty and be prepared by the time of their next summit meeting in the spring of 1995, to exchange the instruments of ratification for START II.

So these involved a series multiple negotiations that concluded fairly early this morning. And these sets of negotiations go back to the signing of the START I treaty in 1991 and then putting in place the Lisbon Protocols in the spring of 1992.

But over the last few days, we have been working to ensure that the depositories of Ukraine's instrument of accession -- that is, the United States, the U.K. and Russia -- were comfortable with the ways that Ukraine was now becoming an adherent, a nonnuclear party to the nonproliferation treaty. Because as most of you know, Ukraine's Parliament in agreeing to Ukraine taking this step, had included a number of statements and interpretations. And so it became a legal matter as to the relationship between Ukraine's domestic law and how Ukraine would then adhere to becoming a nonnuclear party to the NPT.

And so we've worked through the interpretations among the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, as the countries which receives these instruments of ratification, and then with Ukraine, so that there was absolutely no doubt that they would be committed to carrying out all the obligations as a nonnuclear party to the nonproliferation treaty.

This required, late last evening, a discussion between Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister Kozyrev to ensure that we had the right understandings and the right sets of documents as a basis of moving forward this morning. And on the basis of their discussions, we were able, in the very early hours this morning, to put all the pieces of paper together that you saw variously signed at various times in the signing ceremony.

I think this demonstrates, once again, as has been the case all along since the Lisbon Protocols in the spring of 1992, through the trilateral statement that was made between the U.S., U.K. --

I'm sorry -- the United States, Russia and Ukraine last January, the very important role that the United States plays in both leading and facilitating these very important steps taken today in the ways of moving towards the significant reductions in nuclear weapons and adherence by these three countries to the nonproliferation treaty.

So let me end my opening remarks and let my colleagues follow up with some of the more specific details.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I wanted to give you a little bit of historical perspective. When the Soviet Union fell apart in -- at Christmastime really, in 1991, we didn't know where we were going to be with regard to nuclear weapons, because there were nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. And the breakup of the Soviet Union might have really stopped, dead in its tracks, the process of strategic arms reduction that had moved so -- with such pain, through so many years, from the very early stages of strategic arms limitation in the late '60s through the 70s, to a natural process of beginning to reduce the nuclear arsenals -- to destroy some of the missiles and their launch systems. So it was with great uncertainty that we looked at what was happening in the former Soviet Union at that time.

Just to give you a sense of the magnitude of the problem, at the point of the Soviet break-up, on Ukrainian territory there were 1,840 strategic nuclear warheads. Of those, 460 were on SS-24 missiles, very modern missiles, and 780 were on SS-19 missiles. There were another just about 600 on air-launched cruise missiles, so quite a few in Ukraine.

Kazakhstan had 1,410 strategic nuclear warheads, of which about 440 were on the largest intercontinental ballistic missiles,

the SS-18s, that were such a tremendous source of worry to the United States and our allies over the years because of their ability to really strike and kill very hardened targets. There were also about 370 bomber weapons in Kazakhstan at that time.

Belarus had about 81 SS-25, single warhead missiles at the time of the Soviet break-up. So it was quite a worrying problem, and one that President Bush took very seriously, and President Clinton, when he came into office, recognizing that we had to move forward from the Lisbon Protocol that was signed in May 1992, and really provided the means to get these countries moving towards nonnuclear status. It set them on the path toward becoming nonnuclear weapons states under the nonproliferation treaty and also made all these countries parties to the strategic arms reduction treaty that was brought into force today -- so that there was a mechanism in place to effect these warheads moving out of these countries.

So it was a very serious problem and one that President Clinton has been devoted very intensely to working over the last couple of years. And through our diplomacy, through the trilateral deal that we signed with Ukraine and Russia on January 14th this year, through working with Belarus and Kazakhstan, through our diplomacy involving the Nunn-Lugar program, which is an assistance program named for Senators Nunn and Lugar, who first thought it up several years ago. That had brought a lot of funds into these countries, not only to help them with the elimination process, to get rid of these nuclear systems, but also to help them with housing and defense conversion, some of the issues that are of really tremendous concern to them.

So the President has worked hard at this, and it's been a tremendous success for him. And I think it's been a service to us all because it's really brought us to a level of security that many of us feared we'd never see at the time of the Soviet break-up. So it's quite an accomplishment today.

But let me say further, and I'll close on this -- that this set of agreements is really, really about the future. It's really about radical reductions in strategic arms that go beyond START I, that go to START II, and even beyond START II to further radical reductions.

My colleague will want to talk in detail about the structure, both of START I and then how we plan to proceed from here. But it's also about the long-term interest of the United States in these countries -- in their security for the long haul; independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of some of these countries -- of these countries, is of tremendous importance to the United States. And it means working closely with them over many years to develop their health, in terms of their economic development -- also their political relationships. And I think

this CSCE Summit is an important forum for those kinds of relationships to develop.

And finally, security ties that go well beyond the nuclear issue, to working closely with the armed forces in these countries on military to military contacts, defense cooperation of all kinds -- really expanding the defense cooperation ties well beyond the nuclear issue. So we really welcome this day as a day when are leaving the nuclear issue behind us with regard to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. And it gives us a chance now to expand our relationships in many directions with these countries, and we really are looking to a long-term future with them, where, I think that we'll see an expansive U.S. relationship, but also one that is very deep and well developed in many areas, and not focused, as it has been in the last couple years -- very much -- on the whole nuclear question.

So let me turn over to my colleague, who can talk to you in detail about START.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. I'll focus my remarks on the significance of the START I treaty in three areas: the first, the journey it had to travel to get here today; second, its significance in its own right; and third, its significance in terms of the door that's being unlocked to the way ahead.

In terms of the history of this treaty, it's important to remember that it spans four administrations and five presidential terms. START I's story really began in the final year of the Carter administration.

The START II treaty had failed to secure -- excuse me, the SALT II treaty had failed to secure a two-thirds vote in the Senate, and then-Governor Ronald Reagan in his campaign for the presidency was criticizing SALT II for not providing deep enough cuts. That's why when START II began in 1982 -- excuse me, when the START I negotiations began in 1982, the word "R" in START stood for reductions.

With Reagan's election, the United States chose to observe the SALT II agreement informally, while it negotiated these deeper cuts in START I. But the opening U.S. position in this negotiation in 1982 was essentially nonnegotiable and provoked a reaction in two different areas. First, it gave impetus to the nuclear freeze movement, which carried through most of the 1980s. And second, it provoked a reaction in Congress.

And many of you that have covered this story over the years will remember in 1983, when a number of congressmen took the MX missile hostage and traded their votes for the MX for a more negotiable and flexible U.S. negotiating position.

Even with these changes, though, the sheer complexity of the START I treaty meant that it took until 1991 before President Bush was able to conclude the negotiations. These negotiations spanned five separate chief U.S. negotiators: General Rowney, Ambassador Campelman, Senator Tower, Ambassador Burt, and Ambassador Brooks.

By the time START I was signed in 1991, as my colleague emphasized, the Soviet Union was disintegrating. And even as the ink was drying on the treaty, it appeared to be in jeopardy. But through six months of hard work, culminating in the Lisbon Protocol in May of 1992, the START I treaty was transformed from a bilateral U.S.-Soviet agreement into a multi-party, five-nation treaty.

When President Clinton took office in January 1993, his first substantive policy presidential decision directive, or PDD, was on the subject of getting START I and START II into force. It then took, as my colleague emphasized, two years of determined diplomacy to reach the point that we arrived at today.

Second, in terms of the importance of the treaty in its own right, as President Clinton said at the signing ceremony this morning, START I is the first arms control agreement actually to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals.

The treaty requires the elimination of bombers, ICBM silos and launchers, and ballistic missile submarine launch tubes that carried over 9,000 of the 21,000 total warheads the United States and the former Soviet Union declared when they signed the treaty in 1991. And that then is a reduction of over 40 percent of the warheads from the active inventories of the former two superpowers.

In the areas of the most destabilizing weapon systems, such as the SS-18 ICBM, START I requires a 50 percent reduction. START I also requires, through the Lisbon Protocol, the removal of all nuclear weapons and all strategic offensive arms from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

Although the United States and Russia have been deactivating strategic systems and removing ICBM missiles and warheads unilaterally, as a matter of national policy since START I was signed, and although Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have been removing nuclear weapons from their soil over the last number of months, the entry into force of START I will lock in these reductions by requiring the launchers -- that is, the bombers, the ICBM silos, and the ballistic missile submarines -- to be physically destroyed.

In addition, entry into force of START I will be quickly followed by the implementation of an elaborate notification and verification system, with 12 different types of inspections that will greatly improve transparency and help build mutual confidence.

Finally, START I is a bridge to START II and beyond. At their September Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that once START I had entered into force, they would promptly press their legislatures for ratification of the pending START II treaty, with a goal of entering this even more far-reaching treaty into force at their next summit, next spring.

Under START II, the two sides will remove an additional 5,000 strategic nuclear warheads, leaving each side with between 3,000 and 3,500, which is a two-thirds reduction from the Cold War peak.

The two Presidents also agreed in September that once START II is ratified, both sides will immediately deactivate, or otherwise remove from combat status, those systems whose elimination will be required by that treaty, rather than waiting for the treaty to run its course through the year 2003.

And finally, START II ratification will open the door to the next round of START, in which we will decide what further reductions in, and limitations on, remaining U.S. and Russian nuclear forces should be carried out.

I would suggest now that you direct your questions to any of the three of us.

Q Has the rise of the Republican right complicated the promise that the President and Yeltsin made on START II? Does this make easy ratification with Jesse Helms now a -- (inaudible)  
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SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well Senator Helms of course, will have to announce his position on this treaty himself. I would simply note that the START II treaty is a treaty signed by a Republican president. There have been hearings on the START II treaty in the three committees of jurisdiction and interest in arms control -- the Foreign Relations Committee, the Armed Services Committee, and the Intelligence Committee. One of those three committees in 1992 issued a report on the START II treaty -- the Armed Services Committee -- in which the Republicans and the Democrats on that committee, by an overwhelming bipartisan vote, recommended ratification of the START II treaty.

Q Signing documents with the Russians has always put a suspenseful. Can you just be clearer about what documents you needed to line up, what understandings you needed to clarify? Did the Russians backtrack a little last week, or were we just putting the final details together?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The only detail left after the Ukrainian Parliament had approved Ukraine becoming a nonnuclear

party to the nonproliferation treaty -- and by the way, that's the only way one can become a party to the nonproliferation treaty, as a nonnuclear power -- it was then necessary to draft the instrument of accession to that treaty. And, as I suggested, the Rada had gone on to suggest some interpretations in making their approval. And so it was just necessary to clarify legally, the relationship between what the Rada had done as domestic law in Ukraine and the instrument of accession that was being provided by Ukraine to the depositories. And so the lawyers in each country were making sure that there were no doubts whatsoever that this commitment was to carry out the full obligations as a nonnuclear power to the nonproliferation treaty. And so it was not a document beyond that document, but it was to make sure that those commitments were clear.

Q Was that related to the ownership?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That was related to the one point in what the Rada had said with respect to the ownership of weapons -- the nuclear warheads that existed and are being removed from Ukraine.

Q Just taking the question about the for -- (inaudible) -- of START I -- did it go today? I mean, as of today --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They had all signed each of the documents that came into force at that time.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You might have been interested to see that each President had in front of him a stack of documents, actually. And those were the formal entry into force documents for START. And essentially what they signed today was a protocol so that the Presidents would not have to end up signing so many documents, the whole stack before each of them. They each signed a protocol that essentially covered all of those documents, and then they were able to exchange them very easily. So that was the kind of mechanics of how we did it today to try to make what were already many signatures, several fewer.

Q Last fall the Pentagon released its nuclear cost review, which recommended a number of different alternatives, mostly at numbers that exist in START II. You're saying now that you will open discussions going beyond START II. Do you have some end number in mind? Was this just an initial exploration of the possibilities of the going beyond the numbers that START II contains and the Pentagon has decided is the appropriate number to have?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The mandate that was given the Department of Defense with the Nuclear Posture Review was to determine the United States START II force posture. And that is

what the NPR -- the Nuclear Posture Review -- produced in terms of a recommendation and that the President approved. So from the NPR you have the U.S. START II posture.

The next question is, what types of further reductions or limitations should the U.S. consider in the next round of START? And as I said, the two Presidents have directed their experts to intensify their discussions between the two countries on those basic concepts. And we are working hard in terms of an inter-agency review to come to the U.S. position that we will take to those discussions.

Q You don't have a date for -- I mean, you don't have a date for -- how should I put it -- I mean, the high level negotiation to begin with real numbers in line for START III, or IIA, or whatever it's going to be called?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We don't have a projected opening date, Barry, but we do have the instruction from the two Presidents to be in a position to hit the ground running once START II is ratified. That's why they directed us at the expert level -

Q START II?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Once START II is ratified. That's why they directed us at the expert level to intensify our discussion. So the start date, if you will, for the next round of START is a function of the speed by which the United States Senate and the Russian Duma can complete their ratification proceedings on the START II treaty. But the two Presidents have set a target date of being able to exchange the instruments of ratification of START II and enter that treaty into force at their next summit, late next spring -- and that's only four months, five months out.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could I just follow up on that. But in the interim one of the other priorities that we have is to begin discussions with the Russians on what we call transparency and irreversibility with respect to the nuclear materials that now will be coming out of these numbers of weapons that are called for in terms of START I and over time, START II reductions. And indeed, the next priority in arms control will also be now to get transparency -- that means an understanding on both sides as to the amounts of these materials to make sure that they are safely stored and that over time they can be reduced. So arms control is going to take an additional, you know, sort of direct with respect to controls of nuclear materials as the vast numbers come out of these stockpiles.

Q Measures not already in these -- you know, monumental verification --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That right. These are, as you recall, that START itself doesn't deal with the weapons, per se, or the materials in those weapons. But President Clinton and President Yeltsin agreed at the summit as well to begin discussions in early 1995 on ways in which we can bring controls on the nuclear materials that are coming out of these weapons now being reduced.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

12:56 P.M. (L)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING  
BY  
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

December 4, 1994

Aboard Air Force One En Route to Budapest, Hungary

6:50 P.M. EST

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think three -- well, four major topics for the few days, including the Christopher meetings, and the first obviously is then, chronologically, was Bosnia and Christopher's work on that on the Contact Group. And I think you're up to date on that.

For the President, I think there are three major deals. One is the CSCE summit itself. There, the main aspects are, first of all, to reaffirm NATO as the linchpin of our security ties to Europe, but also to promote the reforms and strengthening of CSCE so that it can serve two purposes. One is to provide the overarching security framework for Europe that will allow us to tie in the Russians more so that as NATO expands, the Russians are also a part, very clearly a part, of the -- I'm trying not to use the word architecture -- of the security framework in Europe. And secondly, on its merits, to strengthen CSCE so that it could help to prevent and head off future Bosnias through such things as enhanced peacekeeping capabilities, looking after minorities, et cetera.

The second deal is the signing of the accession of Ukraine to the NPT, where Kazakhstan and Belarus will also be present. And you all know the history of our two years of efforts to bring this off. It's been a major, major goal that the President has been working on. And what this means is, and this wasn't in the briefing, I think, is that we believe that by the end of 1996 Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine will finally be nuclear-free.

And the third major part of this is -- and as I was saying earlier, I think this has been understated in its importance -- is the START I signing -- or ratification. What this means is, one, that is on its own merits, as you know, now we will go down to about 6,000 warheads. And this is the -- probably the best verification scheme that we've ever put into a strategic arms control agreement. But equally important, it means that now we move on to the ratification of START II, which we have said that

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we would try to do by the summit meeting with Yeltsin next spring. This is going to require some work now with the Congress and the Foreign Relations Committee. And START II gets us down to 3,000 to 3,500 warheads.

It struck me -- and this is the culmination of well over a decade of negotiations and hard work spanning three, or I would argue even four, administrations. But more than the culmination of a lot of work, and I would note that at the end the work took place while a revolution, a democratic revolution, was going on in Russia, which was not easy. It just struck me up there that if there was still a Cold War that this would be a huge deal. Yet the nuclear weapons are the same nuclear weapons, and I think that we have understated the significance of the START I piece of this.

And I would hope you all have a nice supper. And if you want any experts, I can drown you in facts. Then I'll come back and offer more opinions if you need those, too.

Thank you very much. Have a nice supper.

END

6:55 P.M. EST