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Folder Title:

OSCE [Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe] Budapest Summit 1994 [7]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Potential Areas of Conflict in the Balkans. (3 pages)	10/14/1994	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Copy. Russian Draft for CSCE Summit. (2 pages)	10/14/1994	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: Copy. Preserving CFE Into the Future. (5 pages)	10/17/1994	P1/b(1)
004. memo	Copy. For Mitchel Wallerstein and Ms. Burdick from Jim Hinds. Subject: Draft Paper for Bornholm. (3 pages)	08/26/1993	P1/b(1)
005. paper	Moving Toward NATO Expansion. (5 pages)	10/12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Anne Witkowsky)
OA/Box Number: 734

FOLDER TITLE:

OSCE [Oragnization for Security Cooperation in Europe] [7]

2014-0846-F

vz3334

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE**B**

S/S #

'94 OCT 18 P1:55

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION Confidential No. Pages 25FROM: _____
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Package of info we discussed.

TO: (Agency)

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NSCANNE Witkowski456-9191DE-03375FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐REMARKS: Per our conversationUNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTSInitials: VZ Date: 3/6/2015

2014-0846-E

S/S Officer: (Signature)




United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 17, 1994

UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM

TO: FSC Backstopping Group

FROM: EUR/RPM/D - David Hess 

SUBJECT: Backstopper's Meeting on October 19

We have scheduled an FSC Backstopping Meeting on Wednesday, October 19, at 11:00 AM in room 4915 (Central American Affairs conference Room #3) to discuss the interagency papers for Budapest provided to date (faxed to agencies). Agencies should come prepared to provide line-in, line-out comments, so that we can get them out to the Del as soon as possible. For those papers not yet provided, agencies should give an indication when these will be ready for interagency review.

We would also like to address Code of Conduct. There remains a fundamental difference of approach with regard to the Code: the Hungarians have not given up on a comprehensive treatment of security and the U.S. has not committed to including in a Code anything beyond a treatment of democratic control of armed forces and use of armed forces. The approach in the coordinator's desperation text represents a middle position. Washington needs to let the Del know what outcome we prefer and what we can live with.

If you will need pre-clearance into the building, please contact Deirdre Hawkins at 647-1135 by COB Tuesday, October 18.

UNCLASSIFIEDA handwritten circled number 1.

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7 October, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL FSC DELEGATIONS
WORKING GROUP B

CODE OF CONDUCT

Attached is a draft of Sections I, II, III and IV, using the 22 July draft's numbering system. Each section reflects a different stage in our work. At our next meeting, I intend to use this paper as the basis for a quick review and refinement of our drafting before going on with the next sections.


Section I. This section is essentially in the form of my desperation paper of 14 September. The Hungarian delegation's proposals are also included here, though, as noted, that delegation would place these elements elsewhere in the document.

I will for the time being treat the elements under 'A. CSCE's Comprehensive Concept of Security,' as genuinely floating paragraphs to see whether we can agree to compress and consolidate the coordinator's text and the text proposed by the Hungarian delegation. (I have already done so for a few obviously duplicated passages.)

Language under B and C is more familiar, having been around for some time. I will expect concrete drafting suggestions and quick agreement on most of that text.

Section II. Delegations have my perception of 29 September covering this section. You will recall that there were many differences over wording and contradictions over the linkage between various parts of this section. Considering the complicated nature of our discussions, I have made my best guess of what might be acceptable (and have to be accepted) for this section. I will continue to treat these parts as floating text and will expect agreement to most of the language of my suggestion.

Sections III and IV. These are reproductions of my suggestions distributed on 4 October, 1994. They are included to show the appropriate placement of language from the Hungarian delegation's view of its proposed text.


Jim E. Hinds
Coordinator

7 October, 1994

I. CONCEPTS GUIDING SECURITY RELATIONS

[A.] CSCE's Comprehensive Concept of Security

The participating States confirm the continuing validity of their comprehensive concept of security, as initiated in the Final Act, which relates the maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It links economic and environmental solidarity and co-operation with peaceful inter-State relations.

[CSCE's Human Dimension]

(Note: One delegation proposes that this part be included in a new section, as indicated at the appropriate place, under the general heading, "Commitments in the various dimensions of security," along with the existing Section IV.)

() The participating States emphasize that [issues concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms, including those of persons belonging to national minorities, as well as compliance with] the commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating States and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned. The protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the strengthening of democratic institutions continue to be a vital basis for their comprehensive security. [The participating States reconfirm that full respect for and protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including those of persons belonging to national minorities, and the development of societies based on pluralistic democracy and the rule of law represent a fundamental basis for security and stability within and among them.]

() Recognizing that respect for human rights in all its aspects constitutes a fundamental basis for security within and among all participating States, the participating States are determined to promote, respect and protect human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law and to promote tolerance and peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with international law and existing CSCE commitments.

() [Violations of commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension, in particular] [They recognize that] manifestations of aggressive nationalism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, [and] racism [and other violations of human rights] endanger [the maintenance of peace,] security and democracy [, and they will guard against such activities] [and thus require increased attention and efforts by the CSCE

6.

community]. To that end, they will protect the rights of all people on their territory, including persons belonging to national minorities, who can exercise and enjoy their rights individually as well as in community with other members of their group. [They will in this regard substantially enhance the international monitoring of compliance with CSCE principles and commitments.]

() [The participating States, determined to expand and strengthen friendly relations and co-operation among their peoples and strengthen stability and security, will protect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities and create conditions for the promotion of that identity, free of any attempts at assimilation against their will. They will promote and protect the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, who can exercise and enjoy their rights individually as well as in community with other members of their group, including their right to express, preserve and develop their identity, and where appropriate to enjoy local or other forms of autonomy.]

(Note: In addition, one delegation proposes the following paragraph related to the material above, which it would include in Section II, as indicated there.)

() [The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including those relating to persons belonging to national minorities, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the fostering of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States.]

...

[Economic and Environmental Cooperation]

(Note: One delegation proposes that this part be included in a new section, as indicated at the appropriate place, under the general heading, "Commitments in the various dimensions of security," along with the existing Section IV and the part on human dimension, above.)

() The participating States are convinced that increased economic co-operation among them plays a crucial role in strengthening security and stability in the CSCE area. Accumulating economic difficulties and economic decline generate social tension, entailing the threat of conflicts within and between States. [Bearing in mind the close relationship between economic development, economic welfare and democracy, stability (etc) they will intensify their economic co-operation. They will in particular multiply their efforts to help consolidate economies in transition through, inter alia, increased market access. In

order to avoid the emergence of new divisions they will equally promote the integration of the economies in transition into the international economic and financial system.]

() Economic development carries with it the need for responsible environmental policies and co-operation between participating States. [The participating States, conscious of the impact the environmental protection and their environmental policy have on their security and friendly and good-neighbourly relations, will conduct responsible environmental policies and will closely co-operate in order that practices that may cause irreversible damage to the environment be prevented or discontinued.]

...

[Regional and Transfrontier Cooperation]

() The participating States recognize that the various regional cooperation activities among participating States contribute positively to the promotion of CSCE principles and objectives as well as the implementation and development of CSCE commitments. They consider such forms of co-operation, based on sovereign equality and mutual interests of States and being in full conformity with the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter and the CSCE, as integral and important components of the evolving cooperative European security framework.

...

[B.] Indivisibility of Security

() The participating States [are convinced] [will act on their conviction] that security is indivisible and that the security of each of them is inseparably linked to the security of all others.

() They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other States, but will pursue their own security interests [as part of] [in conformity with] the common effort to strengthen security and stability [in the CSCE area].

...

[C.] Co-operative Security

() The participating States will base their security relations upon a co-operative and common approach to security. They emphasize in that regard the CSCE's central role.

() [They will continue to develop systems of interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions and arrangements, including European and transatlantic organizations and institutions, multilateral and bilateral undertakings and various forms of regional and subregional co-operation, which are integral components of cooperative security.] - or - [Consistent with this approach and its aims, they will continue to develop their bilateral and multilateral relationships, as well as various forms of regional and sub-regional co-operations and undertakings, thus promoting mutual reinforcement of their institutions in the Euro-Asian and transatlantic area as integral components of a co-operative security framework.]

() The participating States will co-operate in ensuring that all such security arrangements are in harmony with CSCE principles. [The evolution of such arrangements should lead to a comprehensive security framework reflecting the participating States' co-operative approach.]

...

II. RIGHTS AND COMMITMENTS IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY

(Note: In this section, most material that is not bracketed or underlined represents the coordinator's best guess as to what may gain consensus.)

Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity

() The participating States reaffirm their respect for each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence.

...

Respect for Frontiers

() The Participating States reaffirm the principle of inviolability of frontiers as embodied in the Helsinki Final Act. They will not attempt to occupy or acquire territory by any means in contravention of the Charter of the United Nations or CSCE principles. They will not recognize such occupation or acquisition as legal. They will not attempt, advocate, or recognize the forceful change of frontiers in violation of international law.

() The participating States equally recognize that frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement, as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. Such changes in frontiers must be accompanied by appropriate provisions to safeguard the rights under international law and the Helsinki Final Act of persons affected by such changes.

9.

[Peaceful Evolution of States]

() The participating States reaffirm that they will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and relevant international law related to territorial integrity of States. All peoples have the right, in full freedom and without external interference, to pursue by peaceful means their political, economic, social and cultural development.

U.S. not keep on this.....

() The participating States will respect and encourage peaceful evolution of their constitutions according to the wishes of the people as expressed through democratic processes, so long as changes made conform to international law and CSCE principles.

Hungary, Sweden, etc....

Refraining From the Threat or Use of Force

() The participating States recall their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States contained in the Helsinki Final Act. The participating States will not provide assistance or support to States that use or threaten the use of force in violation of this commitment.

[Peaceful Settlement of Disputes]

(Note: One delegation supports placing the following text at this point in the code. Others believe that it belongs in the next section.)

() Consistent with their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force, the participating States confirm that disputes among them will be settled exclusively by peaceful means. To this end they will continue to develop available dispute settlement mechanisms and procedures and to make extensive use of them should disputes arise.

(Note: One delegation proposes to include at this place, text under the heading, "Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." The language would be as shown above under "CSCE's Human Dimension."

Right to Self-defence

() The participating States reaffirm the inherent right, as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, of individual and collective self-defence, *[in the event of an attack]*

() Any participating State has the right to seek assistance in realizing its individual or collective self-defence. The participating States, in the spirit of solidarity and in conformity with their CSCE responsibilities and procedures, will consult promptly with a participating State seeking such assistance. They will consider jointly the nature of the threat and actions that may be required in defence of their common values.

*Consult
check
w/ legal.*

...

Security Arrangements

() Each participating State, bearing in mind the legitimate security concerns of other States, is free to determine its security interests itself on the basis of full equality, in accordance with international law, and has the right freely to choose its own security arrangements, ensuring that they are compatible with its obligations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with its commitments to CSCE principles and objectives.

() The participating States each have the sovereign right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, and to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties, including treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality. Each has the right to change its status in this respect, subject to relevant procedures.

...

Sufficiency

() Each participating State reaffirms its commitment to maintain only such military capabilities as are commensurate with common or individual legitimate security needs both within and outside the CSCE area. A participating State will refrain from attempts to achieve military capabilities with the intent of imposing its domination in the CSCE area as a whole or in sub-regions.

(11)

() The participating States will maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war, fulfil their commitments with regard to the United Nations or the CSCE, manage crises and provide for effective individual and collective self-defence, including in implementation of defence or alliance treaties and for legitimate internal security requirements.

() Each participating State determines those capabilities on the basis of national democratic procedures, in accordance with international law, bearing in mind the legitimate security concerns of other States as well as the need to contribute to the strengthening of security and stability.

Stationing of Forces

() A participating State will not station its armed forces on the territory of another participating State without that State's free consent. Armed forces of a participating State may be stationed on the territory of another participating State only in accordance with international law and as freely agreed between them. Stationed forces will be withdrawn in accordance with such agreements if the host State later withdraws its consent.

Opposition to Terrorism

() The participating States will not support terrorist acts in any way and will take resolute measures to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms. They will not sponsor or provide support on or outside their territories for terrorists engaged, inter alia, in illegal activities against legitimate governments or citizens of other States.

() The participating States will co-operate fully in combating the threat of terrorist activities, including those involving illicit arms transfers and drug trafficking, through implementation of effective international instruments in this respect. They will, in particular, fulfil the requirements of international agreements by which they are bound to prosecute or extradite terrorists.

() They will take appropriate legal and administrative measures in this regard, with a view to denying political, financial and material support to persons or organizations that use terrorism to achieve their ends.

...

[Fulfillment in Good Faith of Obligations]

(Note: One delegation proposes including the following text, under this heading, at this point. Others believe it applies more appropriately to the entire code and should be reflected in the preamble, or perhaps in the concluding Section.)

(() The participating States reaffirm their commitment enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act to fulfil in good faith all their obligations and commitments they entered into. They commit themselves, in particular, to implement all the provisions contained in the various CSCE documents. They will ensure that their internal laws and regulations are in conformity with their CSCE commitments.]

...

III. CONFLICT PREVENTION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

() The participating States, obliged to refrain from the unlawful threat or use of force, will settle disputes among them exclusively by peaceful means. To this end they will further develop dispute settlement mechanisms and procedures and make extensive use of them should a dispute arise between them. They emphasize the importance of early warning of tension and the necessity to act promptly. They will consult and co-operate in situations of potential conflict and will use fully the relevant CSCE fora, procedures and mechanisms as well as other relevant means.

() They stress that CSCE commitments remain valid at all times, including during periods of crisis, taking into account relevant principles of international law. In the event of armed conflict, the participating States, in the appropriate forum, will seek to facilitate the effective cessation of hostilities and to create conditions favorable to a political process of reconciliation and the building of a stable peace. They will co-operate in support of humanitarian actions to alleviate suffering among civilian populations, providing for the free movement of personnel and resources dedicated to such tasks. The participating States are determined to act in solidarity if CSCE norms and commitments are violated and to facilitate concerted responses to security challenges that they may face as a result.

() The participating States will support and co-operate fully with missions, peacekeeping operations and other efforts undertaken on the basis of CSCE mechanisms established for those purposes, especially when acting as hosts on their territory. They will consider on a case-by-case basis the provision of

personnel, material and financial assistance to such efforts in accordance with CSCE decisions and procedures.

() The participating States will co-operate closely with any United Nations peacekeeping operation or other activity authorized by the Security Council for the CSCE area. Recognizing the United Nations Security Council's responsibilities in matters regarding the maintenance and restoration of peace and security, they reaffirm CSCE's availability and readiness to work with the United Nations in this regard.

() The participating States will develop their close co-operation with European and transatlantic institutions capable of providing appropriate resources for conflict prevention, crisis management and peacekeeping activities.

...

(Note: At this point, one delegation proposes a new section heading "Commitments in the various dimensions of security." It would contain: A. Human Dimension, B. Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence- and Security-Building (i.e., this Section) , and C. Economic and Environmental Co-operation; with text for A and C as indicated above.)

IV. ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING

() The participating States regard the implementation [in all circumstances] of each of their arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building treaties, agreements and other commitments as an indispensable element of their indivisible security. They will implement in full all [such agreements and] [their CSCE] commitments [even in crisis situations] [, in conformity with international law,] and will keep their implementation under review in the [appropriate] [Forum for Security Cooperation and other relevant] CSCE body[ies], with the objective of enhancing and promoting security dialogue, cooperation, confidence and stability.

() They will regard breaches of CSCE commitments and arms control Treaties and related obligations [, particularly those which may be a threat to security,] as a source of concern for all. [They will undertake appropriate measures in such cases and will, in particular, . . . , making use as appropriate of CSCE fora or specialized bodies established by the relevant documents for such purposes.]

14.

() The participating States reaffirm their commitment to pursue further arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building measures, with a view to enhancing security and stability in the CSCE area as a whole and in specific regions [. . .].

() Recognizing the danger to their security of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as of sensitive materials and other goods, technologies and expertise related to the production and possession of weapons of mass destruction, the participating States will cooperate in supporting and strengthening nonproliferation agreements and other multilateral practices aimed at preventing the proliferation of such weapons.

(() They will become parties to and comply with [existing multilateral non-proliferation agreements, in particular] the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention as well as the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Non-use of Poisonous Gases and Bacteriological Weapons; they will co-operate in strengthening these agreements, in particular their verification procedures, as appropriate.]

() The participating States [commit themselves] [will make every effort] to prevent illegal arms transfers. Thus, they will exercise and promote due restraint in conventional arms transfers and the transfer of related technology and sensitive military know-how, recalling the principles guiding the transfer of conventional arms adopted by the Forum for Security Cooperation on November 25, 1993.

October 11, 1994

Subject: Review of implementation of Rome Council Decision 1.7 and FSC's contribution to regional security through arms control, disarmament and csbm's

Status of implementation:

The single major effort to implement the decision contained in paragraph 1.7 took place during an informal open-ended meeting hosted by Austria on March 24, 1994. Although well-attended, the discussion covered a wide range of views, from those anxious for an early focus on specific measures to those who insisted that nothing specific could be done without the participation of Serbia. The only consensus of the meeting was that the discussions should continue in an informal format, focusing on basic concepts and keeping in mind the need for the eventual participation of all States in the region.

The next step was achieved on October 5, 1994, when the FSC reached consensus on a Chairman's Statement which moves discussion of Southeast European security to Working Group 2 of the Budapest Review Conference.

Statement of U.S. goals:

The U.S. has noted consistently that there is a delicate relationship between arms control proposals and the overall settlement; any arms control discussion which must include a broader range of members than found in the ICFY process must be complementary to -- and not competitive with -- the political negotiations for a settlement.

To this end, the U.S. has argued for early discussion on the process to be pursued, rather than on specific results. We would expect Working Group 2 to resume the discussion begun in March following that same premise.

The NATO paper on "A possible arms control approach to security in the Balkans" provides the best framework for discussions on this subject in Budapest. Recent events have not changed much of the points made in the paper. We believe this paper would make a valuable starting point for these discussions in Budapest. If there is no consensus to table this paper by the 16 in Budapest, we support using it as a basis for discussion by USDel members.

46.

Chairman's statement from October 5, 1994:

"Pursuant to paragraph 1.7 of the Rome Decisions of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation has started to examine how the CSCE could contribute to regional security in Southeastern Europe through arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building. Upon the invitation of a group of Participating States an informal open-ended meeting was held on the subject in Vienna on 24 March 1994, hosted by Permanent Representative of Austria to the CSCE, Ambassador Martin Vukovich.

In view of decision No. CSCE/27-CSO/Dec.1 of 15 June 1994 by the Committee of Senior Officials on the "Agenda, organizational framework, timetable and other modalities of the Budapest Review Conference," the work on the subject will be continued in Working Group 2 of that Conference."

(17)

October 13, 1994

SUBJECT: Vienna Document Implementation

In general terms, compliance with the Vienna Document (1990 and 1992) has been good. Amid the continuing trend by CSCE militaries to reduce the size and frequency of large-scale military activities, those activities which are conducted are subject to an impressive degree of transparency and openness. The provisions for air base visits have encouraged extensive opportunities for contacts among military personnel. In addition, the unprecedented sharing of information about military structures and activities called for in the Vienna Document has played a major role in ensuring stability in Europe as states transition from Cold War structures. Finally, the importance of the CSCE Communications Network for CSBM implementation (and other uses) cannot be understated. Efforts to ensure connectivity to certain Central Asian States can be seen by those states as a demonstration of interest by other States in their ability to successfully implement CSBMs.

Specific review of Vienna Document implementation has taken place during a series of Annual Implementation Assessment Meetings (AIAMs) (as specified in Chapter X of the Vienna Document). To date, the four AIAMs (November 1991, November 1992, May 1993, April 1994) have provided a dedicated forum in which technical experts from participating States gather to share experiences concerning CSBM implementation. Some suggestions made during the AIAMs have been put forward as proposals for FSC efforts to (further) develop the Vienna Document 1992.

The AIAM provides an opportunity to address in detail issues associated with implementation of the Vienna Document. (These issues may also be addressed at any time within the FSC, outside the context of the AIAM.) We believe, however, that implementation review during the Budapest Review Conference should focus on the overall role of the AIAM within the European security environment and the utility of the AIAM as it is currently structured (i.e., does the AIAM accomplish the goals we have set for it?).

We are pleased to note that the evolution of AIAM modalities since 1991 (most of it due to USDel efforts) has resulted in a more comprehensive review of implementation issues. The latest AIAM, with both formal and informal discussion sessions, allowed for a greater degree of informal interaction among experts than previous AIAMs. This opportunity for experts to discuss specific implementation concerns and problems in an informal "brainstroming" environment was judged by participants to be conducive to improvements in compliance and providing opportunities to learn from each other.

(18)

One area left unresolved is the question of what should happen after the AIAM. Many States supported efforts following the April 1994 AIAM to have AIAM conclusions presented to the FSC for follow-up action. A problem arose, however, since the AIAM is not a negotiating body, and several participating States felt that preparation of any "conclusions" from the AIAM required negotiation -- which would change the status of the meeting. They also pointed out that many AIAM participants had neither the time nor the experience to engage in such negotiations. As a compromise, the last two AIAMs have charged the CPC (Conflict Prevention Center) to prepare a written summary of informal status. Current work on development of the AIAM chapter in the Vienna Document contains a similar reference.

- We are pleased with efforts to include reference to some report from the AIAM (a "survey of proposals" compiled by the CPC) in the enhanced Vienna Document. We believe, however, that it would not be unreasonable to charge the Chairman of the AIAM with compiling a brief written report of the meeting. A report by the chairman is not something which requires negotiation, but it would serve to accentuate the importance of the meeting. This has routinely been done for CSCE seminars; there is no reason why it should not be done for the AIAM. (In the case of multiple chairmen because the AIAM continues over more than one day, the chairmen could combine efforts to produce one report.) DURING IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW AT BUDAPEST, USDEL SHOULD PURSUE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CHAIRMAN PREPARING A REPORT TO BE PRESENTED TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE AIAM.

- There is no question that the FSC should be charged with reviewing the AIAM results and determining if any follow-up is required. We would see this as ranging from an acknowledgement in the Special Committee that implementation is proceeding smoothly, to steps such as the one taken in May, in which letters were sent to those participating States which had not provided information on their military forces. Special Committee action with regard to the results of the AIAM would, in effect, complete the AIAM. The Special Committee decides the dates, agenda and modalities as the first phase of the AIAM; the conduct of the AIAM is the second phase; review of the "results" (in the form of a chairman's report or otherwise) and appropriate follow-up action would be the last phase in the process. DURING IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW AT BUDAPEST, USDEL SHOULD PURSUE THE GOAL OF ESTABLISHING SPECIAL COMMITTEE REVIEW OF AIAM RESULTS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE AIAM PROCESS.

If either or both of these can be agreed in principle during Budapest, there would be two possibilities for "capturing" them: including the point(s) in the AIAM chapter of the enhanced Vienna Document, or noting the decision in a Chairman's Statement during a Special Committee meeting. With the agreement captured in one of these methods, it would be simple to ensure it was repeated when the time came to write the modalities for the AIAM.

19.

POSITION PAPER

Subject: Global Exchange of Military Information

1. Purpose. To update the position and goals of the on-going negotiations of the Global Exchange of Military Information.

2. Key Points

-The US goal remains to increase transparency through this measure without constraining US operational capability.

-US position remains as articulated in the NATO proposal, particularly with regard to levels of disaggregation.

-The global exchange of military information, if any, will not involve limitations, constraints or verification. As such, if this measure is emplaced in Vienna Document, appropriate caveats clearly delineating the distinctiveness of this measure from other CSBMs should be made.

-On the question of inclusion of certain categories of equipment in this information exchange, preference remains to abide by the NATO proposal. Sub-categories within the agreed categories should not be further broken out except as indicated in the NATO proposal (e.g., Military transport aircraft).

POSITION PAPER

Subject: Military Contacts and Cooperation

1. Purpose. To update the status of implementation of the FSC measure "Programme of Military Contacts and Cooperation".

2. Key Points

-The United States remains actively engaged in the field of military to military contacts at all levels of the rank structure. Our goal is to retain leadership in this area and continue an extensive program of military cooperation.

-Examples of military to military contacts over the past year:

--Conduct of a joint battalion-size peacekeeping exercise with Russian forces in Totskoye in September.

--Inclusion of foreign officers in US staff and war colleges, as well as at special-to-arms training institutes.

--US European Command operates the Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany as a locus for multinational discussions on democratic control of the armed forces.

--Bilateral Joint Staff talks are routinely conducted with a number of CSCE partners.

--US European Command conducts a broad-based military contact program, sending joint military contact teams of experts on virtually aspect of military affairs to interface with CSCE partners.

--The US has not yet arranged a visit to a military facility other than an air base. It is our intention to host either a military facility or air base visit alternatively every two and a half years. Planning is underway.

--The exchange of information on agreements on military contacts and cooperation is planned for November.

Working Group 2
U.S. Delegation Intervention
October 14: Meeting 1

Mr. Chairman,

In the opening Plenary Sessions, we have heard many delegations call for CSCE to enhance its credibility. We agree that this is one of the vital tasks of this review conference. For that reason, implementation is high on our agenda. CSCE's credibility is linked to its determination to assess its past performance with an eye to improving its future performance. We cannot expect to be entrusted with greater responsibilities if we do not satisfactorily fulfill existing ones. Also central to CSCE's credibility is its ability to convey to both heads of state and the average citizen its commitment to implementation and compliance.

The implementation review portion of our agenda presents us with an excellent opportunity to see where we have been, to determine how well implementation review has served us, and to identify ways to improve both compliance and its review in the future.

Looking back over the last several years of CSCE military security developments, we have adopted an ever-increasing number of measures to enhance confidence, security, and stability. From Stockholm 1988, to Vienna 1990, 1992, and Rome 1993, we have deepened the transparency of our military structures and activities, and augmented our military contacts on a scale unprecedented in the CSCE area. The elaboration of these measures is a welcome development. However, CSBM implementation has been uneven. If, as we believe, the effectiveness of CSBMs is proportional to their use, we need occasionally to remind ourselves of how they have been utilized, not only over the months since the last AIAM, but in historical context.

For example, while the number of evaluation visits and inspections have generally increased over time, the use of risk reduction provisions has lagged behind. To what extent does this indicate a reticence to use such provisions versus a questioning of their true value? If measures are not used, there is no avoiding the question of why they have not been used. Here we return to the value of implementation review as a means to enhance the CSCE's credibility.

Similarly, we have heard a number of delegations call for greater examination of compliance as a regular part of Special Committee business. These considerations lead to two broad implementation review questions:

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-- First, which measures require better implementation? and

-- Second, how can we better link implementation review to concrete improvements of the CSCE military security regime?

Under the first question, we would expect to look at compliance with CSBMs since the last AIAM. For example, what have been the replies to the letters sent by the FSC to participating states that did not adequately comply with the information exchange requirements of VD '92. Do these replies suggest next steps? Have the CSCE Seminars held in Central Asian participating states in May and September of this year been valuable? Should we consider new seminars, and if so, what might be the topics and timing? We need to look at our initial compliance with the measures adopted at the Rome Council. While it is early in the life of these measures, we may gather valuable conclusions for the future of implementation.

With insights gathered, we can address our second question. This is the future-oriented heart of implementation review.

Here, we need to ask ourselves if the AIAM has served us well. It was established to provide expert-level review of implementation of CSBMs. Here, we need to ask if there is sufficient connection between this expert-level analysis and political accompaniment and action. We need to look more closely at follow-up to the experts' recommendations. Similarly, we should discuss how best to link the yearly AIAM's activities with those of the biannual review conference.

We have adopted, or are in the process of adopting, several measures which do not lend themselves to the traditional implementation review by experts. How do colleagues envisage conducting compliance review of principles addressing non-proliferation and conventional arms transfers, the use of crisis stabilizing measures, and the code of conduct.

Mr. Chairman,

This is how the U.S. Delegation sees conducting this portion of our work. We expect to address these questions, and provide our own suggestions for the future. There is much room for improvement in compliance with CSCE military security measures. Similarly, with a little imagination, we can not only improve compliance, but ensure that the implementation review procedure itself serves to enhance the credibility of CSCE.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. Delegation
14 October 1994

WORKING GROUP 2

FOOD FOR THOUGHT WORK PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW

1. Review of outstanding issues.
 - A. Review of any unresolved Vienna Document implementation issues.
 - B. Review of new measures not addressed during AIAM.
 - Further Enhancement of Stability and Confidence; Military Co-operation and Contacts; Defense Planning; and, Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers.
 - C. Study of the results of various security seminars.
 - Central Asian seminars of May and September 1994.
 - Other relevant seminars (Defense Planning, etc.).
2. Identifying Areas of Weakness in Existing Review Process.
 - A. Problems raised in past AIAMs that were not subsequently addressed at the political level.
 - Failure of several participating states to exchange information on military forces (including negative reports); possible problems with submissions.
 - Questions arising from disparate interpretations of VD-92 compliance and verification regime.
 - B. Items not adequately covered, or not likely to be adequately covered, by existing review process (i.e., by the AIAM).
 - Review of new agreements that may differ from traditional CSBMs and therefore may require a broader process. These might include CAT Principles, Code of Conduct, regional measures, etc.

3. Improving the future review process.

A. Addressing problems identified through the existing review process.

-- Should new links be established between technical experts and the political level in order to ensure that problems that have been identified are adequately addressed?

-- How can CSCE political bodies better address problems identified in the review process? What is the appropriate role of FSC?

B. Possible Enhancement of the review process.

-- Should the mandate of the AIAM be broadened to encompass additional items?

-- Should separate review processes be established in addition to the AIAM?

-- Should seminars continue to be utilized to assist newly admitted states in achieving full implementation of existing and future security commitments?

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	Copy. Russian Draft for CSCE Summit. (2 pages)	10/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Anne Witkowsky)
OA/Box Number: 734

FOLDER TITLE:

OSCE [Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe] [7]

2014-0846-F
vz3334

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. cable	re: Copy. Preserving CFE Into the Future. (5 pages)	10/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Anne Witkowsky)
OA/Box Number: 734

FOLDER TITLE:

OSCE [Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe] [7]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	Copy. For Mitchel Wallerstein and Ms. Burdick from Jim Hinds. Subject: Draft Paper for Bornholm. (3 pages)	08/26/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Anne Witkowsky)
OA/Box Number: 734

FOLDER TITLE:

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8299

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20506

October 13, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS, ^{NB} RICHARD SCHIFTER, ^{RL}
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW ^{DF}

FROM: DANIEL FRIED ^{DF}

SUBJECT: Circulating the NATO Expansion Paper

You told Sandy Vershbow that you wanted to circulate under your signature our staff paper on NATO Expansion. A cover memo to your principal counterparts is attached for your signature at Tab I; the paper is attached at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to your principal counterparts at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to Principal Counterparts
Tab A NSC Staff Paper on NATO Expansion

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 3/6/2015
704 -0846-2

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U.S.
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: NSC Staff Paper on NATO Expansion

I recommend that you review and circulate to selected senior persons on your staffs the paper on NATO Expansion prepared by NSC staff and attached at Tab A. The paper was prepared to contribute to interagency deliberation and consultations with our Allies and others on this matter in coming weeks.

Anthony Lake
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment
Tab A NSC Staff Paper on NATO Expansion

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 3/6/2015
2014-0846-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. paper	Moving Toward NATO Expansion. (5 pages)	10/12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Anne Witkowsky)
OA/Box Number: 734

FOLDER TITLE:

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2014-0846-F

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