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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: CSCE Summit: Message from President Clinton. (4 pages)	11/27/1994	P1/b(1)
002. briefing paper	European Security and the CSCE. (22 pages)	11/24/1994	P1/b(1)
003. paper	CSCE (10 pages)	10/31/1994	P1/b(1)
004. cable	re: Budapest Reivew Conference: Initial Allied Response. (8 pages)	11/10/1994	P1/b(1)
005. cable	re: Guidance for Introducing U.S. Concept. (5 pages)	11/07/1994	P1/b(1)
006. cable	re: Supplementary Guidance and Background Information. (4 pages)	11/07/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Anne Witkowsky)
OA/Box Number: 2427

FOLDER TITLE:

CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Budapest Summit for
Forum for Cooperation [Binder] [2]

2014-0846-F
vz3327

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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** To be added
as annex to
Vienna Doc 94.*

The participating States, acting in accordance with paragraph 4 of the Programme for Immediate Action set out in the Helsinki Document 1992, have adopted the following measure:

GLOBAL EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION

(1) GENERAL PROVISIONS

The participating States of the CSCE will exchange annually information on major weapon and equipment systems and personnel in their conventional armed forces, on their territory as well as worldwide, as specified below. The global exchange of military information will be separate from other information exchange regimes and will not be subject to limitations, constraints or verification. This information will be provided not later than 30 April of each year and it will reflect the situation as of 1 January of that year.

(2) INFORMATION ON COMMAND STRUCTURE AND PERSONNEL

(2.1) Information will be provided for general or equivalent staff with regard to:

(2.1.1) location;

(2.1.2) peacetime authorized personnel strength.

(2.2) Information on the command organization of the forces referred to in paragraph (1) will be provided according to the provisions of paragraph (4.1), specifying for each formation:

(2.2.1) designation;

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(2.2.2) first level of subordination;

(2.2.3) normal peacetime location of headquarters, specifying the exact geographic terms and/or co-ordinates.

(2.3) Information on personnel will be provided with regard to:

(2.3.1) peacetime authorized personnel strength for each formation or service according to the provisions of paragraph (4) of this document;

(2.3.2) total authorized conscripts and total authorized professional officers/enlisted;

(2.3.3) total officers/enlisted on active duty by rank;

(2.3.4) total personnel in reserve status who have completed their initial military service or training and who have been called up or have reported voluntarily for military service or training since the last exchange of information;

(2.3.5) total military personnel serving under the command of the United Nations or under a mandate of the CSCE.

(3) **INFORMATION ON HOLDINGS OF MAJOR WEAPON AND EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS**

Information on major weapon and equipment systems will be provided in the categories listed in paragraphs (3.1) to (3.9) with regard to total holdings and holdings according to the provisions of paragraph (4). This information excludes those major weapon and equipment systems undergoing testing or evaluation, provided that they have not yet entered into service.

(3.1) Battle tanks

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(3.2) Armoured combat vehicles:

(3.2.1) armoured personnel carriers;

(3.2.2) armoured infantry fighting vehicles;

(3.2.3) heavy armament combat vehicles.

(3.3) Armoured vehicle launched bridges

(3.4) Anti-tank guided missile launchers permanently/integrally mounted on armoured vehicles

(3.5) Self-propelled and towed artillery:

(3.5.1) guns, howitzers and artillery pieces combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers, 100 mm calibre or larger;

(3.5.2) mortars, 100 mm calibre or larger;

(3.5.3) multiple launch rocket systems, 100 mm calibre or larger.

(3.6) Aircraft:

(3.6.1) combat aircraft, specifying total number of aircraft capable of operating from aircraft carriers;

(3.6.2) military transport aircraft;

(3.6.3) primary trainer aircraft.

(3.7) Helicopters:

(3.7.1) attack helicopters;

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(3.7.2) combat support helicopters;

(3.7.3) military transport helicopters.

(3.8) Surface warships, greater than 400 tons fully loaded displacement

(3.9) Submarines greater than 50 tons submerged

(4) **LEVELS OF DISAGGREGATION**

(4.1) For the command organization, information in paragraph (2.2) will be provided according to the following levels of disaggregation:

- for land forces down to division or equivalent or, if no such equivalent exists, the next higher level of command;
- for other forces down to the level of army or equivalent or, if no such equivalent exists, down to the next lower level of command.

(4.2) For all land forces stationed within the territory of the reporting State, the information in paragraphs (2.3.1) and (3) will be provided from the highest level down to and including the level of army or equivalent or, if no such equivalent exists, down to the next lower level of command.

(4.3) For all other forces stationed within the territory of the reporting State, the information in paragraphs (2.3.1) and (3) will be disaggregated down to the level of service.

(4.4) For all forces stationed beyond the territory of the reporting State, the information in paragraphs (2.3.1) and (3) will be disaggregated down to the level of service, specifying the numbers for each respective region in which such forces are stationed.

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(5) **TECHNICAL DATA AND PHOTOGRAPHS**

Each participating State will also provide the following information on each type or class of major weapon and equipment systems in the inventory of its armed forces for each category listed in paragraph (3):

- (5.1) Type;
- (5.2) National nomenclature/Name;
- (5.3) General descriptions of characteristics and capabilities.

This information will be provided together with relevant photographs.

If this information has not previously been reported to all other participating States, it will be exchanged once and amended as required in the next information exchange if new types or classes enter into service.

(6) **WEAPON AND EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS NEWLY ENTERED INTO SERVICE**

Each participating State will provide to all other participating States the following information concerning its major weapon and equipment systems as specified in paragraph (3):

- (6.1) Total number of equipments by category entered into service in the previous calendar year through national production;
- (6.2) Total number of equipments by category entered into service in the previous calendar year through imports.

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(7) **CLARIFICATION**

(7.1) In addition to clarifications obtained at the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM), each participating State may ask for clarification from any other participating State concerning the application of this measure. Communications in this context will, if appropriate, be transmitted to all other participating States.

(7.2) Each participating State, on the basis of its national practice, will make available a glossary of terms, acronyms and abbreviations used in the implementation of this measure, and any other explanation it deems necessary for the better understanding of the information provided.

(8) **COMMUNICATIONS**

(8.1) The information will be provided in an agreed format.

(8.2) Communications will be made in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IX of the Vienna Document 1994 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures.

(8.3) If information required under this measure has already been provided in another CSCE context, participating States may refer to the information under the respective format.

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The participating States have decided that the aforementioned measure is politically binding and will come into force on 1 January 1995.

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*Agreed in 1993.

STABILIZING MEASURES FOR LOCALIZED CRISIS SITUATIONS

In view of the CSCB's developing responsibilities for conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes, specific militarily significant stabilizing measures may be required for application in localized crisis situations to supplement and enhance the capabilities outlined in Chapter III of the Helsinki Document 1992. Such measures, drawing on the experience gained by the CSCB, would support the political process of crisis resolution by supplementing other CSCB arrangements for risk reduction, conflict prevention and crisis management.

Therefore, acting on the basis of Chapter V of the Helsinki Document 1992, the participating States have adopted the following catalogue of stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations.

I. CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES OF APPLICATION

1. The catalogue of stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations is intended to facilitate decision-making in the appropriate CSCE bodies and the search for specific measures for temporary application in support of the political process.
2. The catalogue is neither comprehensive nor exhaustive and does not exclude any further specific measures which may be elaborated in particular cases.
3. The catalogue does not commit any participating State to agree to the adoption of any of the measures contained therein in a given situation. It does not imply automatic application, or any priority in the selection of possible measures. However, it does indicate the readiness of participating States to explore in good faith the applicability of these measures in a specific situation.
4. These stabilizing measures may be applied individually or in various combinations, depending on circumstances. Their implementation will require co-ordination with peacekeeping and other relevant activities. Many of these measures would benefit from the participation of observers and/or monitors for verification purposes.
5. These stabilizing measures will be applied in accordance with the specific requirements of a given situation. Modalities will have to take account of the basic defence requirements and of the capabilities of participating States and, if applicable, of other parties involved.
6. The selection of measures to be applied in each case will be based on the decision of the appropriate CSCE body seized with a given crisis, in accordance with the rule of consensus. Their application will require the prior consent and active support of the parties involved in a particular crisis situation.
7. Measures of a military nature will, as a rule, be applicable to the armed forces involved in a particular crisis situation and belonging to all the respective parties involved in such a

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situation. In general, their effective implementation presupposes either that an armed conflict has not yet broken out or that a cease-fire has been established.

8. While considering the application of any of the measures for temporary application in support of the political process in those parts of the territories of the participating States involved in a localized crisis, the appropriate CSCE body will also identify the parties involved and, as necessary, any third parties, as well as the geographical scope of application, the time-frame and conditions for their application, the role of CSCE institutions and structures, and other modalities of application and implementation.

9. The parties involved in a particular crisis situation will be identified in each case in accordance with the relevant norms of international law and CSCE provisions. When such parties are not States, their identification and subsequent participation in a crisis prevention, management and/or settlement process does not affect their status.

10. The implementation of some of the measures may require the good offices or the mediating function of a third party, trusted by all the parties involved in a particular crisis situation. The role of the third party may be undertaken by the CSCE, by a State or group of States, or by organization(s) not involved in the conflict, acting under the terms of a CSCE mandate in accordance with relevant provisions of Chapter III of the Helsinki Document 1992.

11. The meaning of specific notions or terms in the catalogue (e.g. "military units" or "military activities") does not necessarily correspond to the meaning embodied in the Vienna 1992 Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and may be adapted by the appropriate CSCE body depending on the requirements of a particular situation.

II. CATALOGUE

A. Measures of Transparency

The following measures involve submission of different information exchanges and/or notifications, whenever possible in writing. Depending on the circumstances, the help of CSCE authorities and/or third parties may be needed to implement them.

The application of these measures is likely to be most effective at the prevention or settlement stages of a particular crisis situation.

All modalities of these measures, including their area of application and actual scope, will be decided by the appropriate CSCE body, taking into account, *inter alia*, requirements of a particular crisis situation and the impact the measures may have on the military situation.

1. Extraordinary Information Exchange

- Provision and/or update of relevant data submitted in the context of the Vienna Document 1992 by the participating States involved in a particular crisis situation and/or provision of such data by parties involved other than States;
- as appropriate, provision of other information specific to a particular crisis situation by the parties involved.

The scope of the exchange of disaggregated information specific to a particular crisis situation might be different over different phases of a crisis and might include:

- numbers of militarily significant formations and units and their locations, relevant weapon and equipment systems and personnel strengths;
- detailed information on command structure, broken down to the lowest possible sensible level;
- appropriate consideration of 'irregular' forces, if they exist.

2. Notification of Certain Military Activities

- Notification by the parties involved of certain military activities in the crisis area:
 - the content of such notifications could be patterned on the relevant provisions of the Vienna Document 1992, and their modalities should address timing of the actual provision of notification, thresholds and types of activity to be notified.

3. Notification of Plans for Acquisition and Deployment of Major Weapon and Equipment Systems

- Notification of types and numbers of major weapon and equipment systems, as well as the source of procurement and the planned period of delivery, destination and deployment of these systems, including designation of receiving unit(s).

A complementary measure might be:

- possible additional information on the supply of major weapon and equipment systems to parties involved in crisis situations.

B. Measures of Constraint

Any application of the following measures presupposes political will on the part of all parties involved to seek a peaceful settlement.

The application of these measures is likely to be most effective at the prevention or settlement stages of a particular crisis situation.

In each case of possible application, the relationship between these measures and legitimate needs to protect State borders must be considered.

The assistance of third parties may facilitate implementation and, in particular, monitoring of the following measures.

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- The term "irregular forces" refers to forces not under the command of the regular forces' command.

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1. Introduction and Support of a Cease-fire

- Elaboration of technical terms of the cease-fire;
- disengagement of forces;
- measures to ensure implementation of the cease-fire provisions.

2. Establishment of Demilitarized Zones

- Restraints on the presence or deployment of militarily significant forces within areas agreed upon by the parties involved;
- withdrawal of military forces from demilitarized zones;
- prohibition of the presence and deployment of any such forces within demilitarized zones.

In the above cases:

- exceptions for forces carrying out peacekeeping, humanitarian or other tasks mandated by the United Nations or the CSCE.

Complementary measures might include:

- agreement not to deploy heavy weapons within range of demilitarized zones or other areas agreed by the parties involved;
- withdrawal of certain forces and weapon and equipment systems of the parties involved to positions at agreed distances from demilitarized zones or other areas agreed by parties involved.

In the above cases the ranges of weapons involved might provide criteria for determining such distances.

Other measures to be sought might include:

- restrictions (including, where applicable, freezes) on deployments, within agreed larger distances of these areas and zones, of all forces of the parties involved;
- withdrawal of armed forces to defined areas in the rear;
- withdrawal of armed forces to normal peacetime locations, as defined in Chapter I of the Vienna Document 1992 or in an extraordinary information exchange, if applicable.

3. Cessation of Military Flights

- Cessation of flights by armed aircraft of the parties involved over specified areas or border zones;

- cessation of flights by all military aircraft of the parties involved, according to the situation on the ground.

In the above cases:

- exceptions for aircraft carrying out peacekeeping, humanitarian or other peaceful tasks mandated by the United Nations or CSCE or agreed upon by all parties involved in a conflict;
- monitoring of air traffic control by CSCE observers in order to ensure cessation of flights by all military aircraft and the safe passage of aircraft for peacekeeping, humanitarian or other peaceful purposes. As for military air traffic control, access of CSCE observers would be dependent on the consent of the relevant party or parties involved.

4. Deactivation of Certain Weapon Systems

- Withdrawal from active service in specified areas of certain weapon systems, particularly heavy weapons:
 - as a complementary measure, storage and/or corralling in specified areas under the control of the CSCE and/or third party observers.

5. Treatment of Irregular Forces

- Commitment by the participating States and/or parties involved in a particular crisis situation to undertake suitable and relevant efforts aimed at the subordination of irregular forces operating in the crisis area to the regular forces' command of parties involved, and/or disarmament and disbandment of such forces, preferably in conformity with agreed calendars.

6. Constraints on Certain Military Activities

- Restraints and/or prohibition of certain military activities by the parties involved, relevant to the crisis area:
 - types and parameters of constraints, as well as their area of application, will depend on the nature and requirements of a crisis;
 - consideration should be given to parameters such as number of troops participating in a given activity, and/or number - total or by category - of weapon and equipment systems involved in such activity.

C. Measures to Reinforce Confidence

Possible involvement by the CSCE and/or third parties with the parties involved in a particular crisis situation in order to draw the latter gradually into the process of implementation of these measures as the level of confidence increases.

1. Public Statements on Matters Relevant to a Particular Crisis Situation

- Public statements by the parties involved that they will facilitate the work of, for example, officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, accredited diplomats, designated monitors, observers, rapporteurs, peacekeeping forces, organizations for humanitarian assistance and media representatives, and afford them all possible protection in accordance with the character of their specific duties;
- public statements by the parties involved on humanitarian matters, such as information on prisoners of war (including the numbers and exchanges of prisoners of war);
- agreement by the parties involved to avoid public statements which could escalate the conflict.

2. Observation of Certain Military Activities

- Invitation of observers by the parties involved to certain military activities in the crisis area.

3. Liaison Teams

- Exchange of standing liaison teams, having direct communication capabilities, between local operational headquarters:
 - possibility for multinational liaison teams (inclusion of CSCB and/or third parties).

4. Establishment of Direct Lines of Communication

- Establishment of direct lines of communication ("hotlines") between the respective capitals and/or operational headquarters of the parties involved. The operation use of such hotlines on a 24-hour basis should be encouraged, particularly at the local

5. Joint Expert Teams in Support of Crisis Management

- Establishment of joint teams tasked with the clarification of ambiguous and/or controversial situations in order to facilitate their settlement.

6. Joint Co-ordination Commissions or Teams

- Establishment of joint co-ordination commissions or teams to facilitate the resolution of technical military issues and other technical issues arising from the implementation of agreed measures.

D. Measures for Monitoring of Compliance and Evaluation

Particular attention should be given to monitoring or to the evaluation of compliance with agreed stabilizing measures, to clarify ambiguous situations, build confidence, avoid misperceptions and provide each party involved with assurances of the others' peaceful intentions.

In view of the potential for mistrust between the parties involved, the possible monitoring of compliance or evaluation by CSCE and/or third party representatives could be considered, particularly with regard to the initial stages of a crisis. Possible participation by the parties directly involved in the crisis needs early consideration in order to achieve regular contacts and to build confidence. Local or regional co-ordination bodies, on which third parties would also be represented, could be established to contribute to the effective implementation of agreed measures.

All detailed modalities of these measures, including their specific areas of application, are to be tailored to the requirements of a specific crisis situation.

1. Evaluation of Data Provided under Extraordinary Information Exchange

- Possibility of periodic evaluation visits designed to check validity of data provided under Extraordinary Information Exchange.

2. Inspections

- In order to check compliance with agreed stabilizing measures, inspections of specific activities, objects and/or installations, patterned on, but - depending on circumstances and specific agreements of parties involved - possibly more intrusive than, the verification regime of the Vienna Document 1992.

3. Observation of Compliance with Demilitarized Zones

- Stationing of permanent observers (of the CSCE and/or third parties) along borders or along and/or within the limits of demilitarized zones.

4. Verification of Heavy Weapons

- Verification of agreed stabilizing measures regarding certain weapon systems, particularly heavy weapons, including monitoring and/or inspections of their deactivation, redeployment or withdrawal from storage.

5. Challenge Inspections

- Challenge inspections, with regard to specified areas, as the most stringent and intrusive means of verification, in order to clarify, and thus to contribute to the resolution of, any question which has given rise to doubts about compliance with agreed measures;

The regime of challenge inspections is to include:

- provisions on the right of refusal and protection of sensitive installations;
- possibility of conducting challenge inspections by the CSCE and/or third parties;
- detailed modalities commensurate with the requirements of a specific crisis situation.

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6. Aerial Observation Regime

- Conduct by a third party of overflights, with possible participation of representatives of the parties involved, aimed at checking compliance with agreed stabilizing measures and building confidence (augmented by CSCE-arranged flights);
- possibility of using procedures and measures agreed within the framework of Open Skies regime.

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	re: Budapest Reivew Conference: Initial Allied Response. (8 pages)	11/10/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Anne Witkowsky)
OA/Box Number: 2427

FOLDER TITLE:

CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Budapest Summit for
Forum for Cooperation [Binder] [2]

2014-0846-F
vz3327

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial
information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. cable	re: Guidance for Introducing U.S. Concept. (5 pages)	11/07/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Anne Witkowski)
OA/Box Number: 2427

FOLDER TITLE:

CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Budapest Summit for
Forum for Cooperation [Binder] [2]

2014-0846-F
vz3327

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	re: Supplementary Guidance and Background Information. (4 pages)	11/07/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy and Arms Control (Anne Witkowski)
OA/Box Number: 2427

FOLDER TITLE:

CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Budapest Summit for
Forum for Cooperation [Binder] [2]

2014-0846-F
vz3327

RESTRICTION CODES

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