

**Background Information on FTA's Current Reverse-Commute
Demonstration Projects:**

In its 1993 appropriation, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) received \$1.5 million to implement a national JOBLINKS employment transportation initiative. This initiative will develop and demonstrate model projects designed to promote innovative approaches to improving employment-related transportation services and overcoming critical mobility barriers to employment for residents of urban and rural areas. Thirteen demonstration sites were recently announced, including: Los Angeles, California; Fresno County, California; Detroit, Michigan; a five-county Chippewa Indian area in Michigan; Southwest Arkansas; Mississippi County, Arkansas; Louisville, Kentucky; Kentucky Public Transit Association; Raleigh, North Carolina; Cabarrus County, North Carolina; Cleveland and Rutherford Counties, North Carolina; Glendale, Oregon; and Portland, Oregon.

All of these demonstration sites will combine job training with reverse-commute services. Not much data collection is planned. No grants have been awarded yet because FTA is waiting for 13(c) labor certifications from the Department of Labor.

Dept. of Transportation 1993 Appropriations

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Project ACTION.—The Committee has approved the budget estimate of \$2,000,000 to continue Project ACTION (Accessible Community Transportation in our Nation) administered by the National Easter Seal Society through a cooperative agreement with FTA. Through research, demonstration projects, technical assistance, and information dissemination, Project ACTION has improved relations between the transit and disability communities and highlighted new cooperative tools and techniques to improve transportation services for people with disabilities. Areas where Project ACTION has helped make major improvements range from development of a new securement device to pioneering new training techniques for transit users with disabilities and transit providers. In the coming fiscal year the project will add new demonstration projects with an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) focus, enhance its clearing-house function for wide distribution of information on the project and ADA, and continue its research, training and public education functions. The Committee believes that this project is making a unique and positive contribution in helping meet the challenge of ADA implementation.

Fuel cell bus.—The amount recommended includes \$2,000,000 for the continuation of phase II of the phosphoric acid fuel cell bus technology development program to be administered by the university which had oversight over the feasibility study and coordinated the activities of the advisory committee. The Secretary shall enter into agreements with the Department of Energy to coordinate the research activities on the phosphoric acid fuel cell.

Team Transit.—The Committee directs that \$300,000 be provided to the Minnesota Metropolitan Transit Commission for its team transit program. These funds will be used to implement solutions to mass transportation mobility and congestion problems in the urban and suburban areas in and around Minneapolis-St. Paul. The Committee recognizes the importance of this program and believes it can provide a national model to help meet the diverse transportation needs of other urban/suburban areas across the country.

Joblinks Employment Transportation Initiative.—The Committee recognizes that the lack of transportation alternatives can limit access by lower income and unemployed persons to employment and job training opportunities, especially for residents of inner-city and rural areas. Accordingly, the Committee has included \$1,500,000 for a national JOBLINKS employment transportation initiative. This initiative will include the development and demonstration of model projects in four to six states designed to promote innovative approaches to improving employment-related transportation services and overcoming critical mobility barriers to employment for residents of urban and rural areas. The JOBLINKS demonstration should be designed and implemented by a national non-profit organization with demonstrated capacity in the rural and community transportation field. The Committee directs FTA to report on the project by February 1, 1993.

Florida International University and University of South Florida.—The Committee recommendation includes \$3,000,000 for a grant to Florida International University and the University of South Florida to conduct a joint multi-year, interdisciplinary re-



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Editorial

Access to Jobs — The Missing Link

Earlier this spring, Vickie Shaffer testified on behalf of CTAA before a congressional committee that was considering next year's transit appropriations. In addition to calling for full and more adequate funding for transit, Shaffer, who manages the Tri-State Transit Authority in Huntington, W.V., urged committee members to do something about the problems that a growing number of low income and unemployed people have in getting to jobs and job-training opportunities.


It looks like the CTAA proposal is getting a receptive hearing. At the urging of Congressman David Price (D-NC), the Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee has recommended that \$1.5 million be set aside for a national JOBLINKS employment transportation demonstration program, designed to assist people in inner city and rural areas. The proposed JOBLINKS program acknowledges the important linkage between adequate transportation and access to jobs and improved employment opportunities, particularly in rural and urban communities

that traditionally have been underserved,

CTAA members have long been concerned about the lack of public transit options available to the poor, advocating that community transportation systems can play an important role in solving this problem. For example, 40 percent of rural Americans live in counties currently unserved by conventional transit. Where rural transit exists, funding is so scarce that local agencies are often forced to restrict their services to targeted populations such as the elderly or persons with disabilities, or to limit trips to essential medical or nutrition purposes.

The potential role of community transportation in expanding employment opportunities and contributing to economic development must not be overlooked. This applies to the residents of Eastern Tennessee as well as South Central Los Angeles. We need to make sure that mobility and access are not viewed as solely social services but as vehicles to economic freedom and independence as well. Implementation of the JOBLINKS proposal would be a good start.

TRANSIT-LOK — The Complete Passenger Wheelchair Tie-Down System.




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a jumpseat. Simply flip up the seat and lock in the wheelchair to the hooks and track supplied. Transit-Lok comes complete with all mounting hardware and passive seatbelt restraints.

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- Employment Suburbanization in Large Metropolitan Areas (MAs)
39 MAs with One Million or more residents
Half of the total U.S. population resides in these large MAs
- 43 percent of 1980s job growth in all large MAs was located outside the central county of the MA
 - Central counties: gained 31 percent, or 7.5 million jobs
 - Suburban counties: gained 48 percent, or 5.7 million jobs
- 60 percent of 1980s job growth in large MAs in the Northeast and Midwest was located outside the central county of the MA
 - Central counties: gained 10 percent, or 1.5 million jobs
 - Suburban counties: gained 34 percent, or 2.3 million jobs

- 75 percent or more of 1980s job growth was located outside the central county in the following MAs:

– *Chicago IL-IN-WI CMSA	100%
– *Detroit MI CMSA	100%
– Milwaukee WI CMSA	100%
– *Philadelphia PA-NJ-DE-MD CMSA	100%
– St.Louis MO-IL CMSA	100%
– Denver CO CMSA	93%
– Baltimore MD MSA	92%
– *Washington DC-MD-VA MSA	85%
– Kansas City MO-KS MSA	80%
– *SanFrancisco-Oakland CA CMSA	79%
– *NewYork NY-NJ-CT CMSA	66%
– *LosAngeles CA CMSA	50%
– *Dallas-FtWorth TX CMSA	20%

* = eight largest MAs

- **We need data that allow us to:**
 - Identify the central cities, not just central counties, of the MA
 - Distinguish types of jobs at various locations
 - Compare changes in job location with changes in residential location
- **We employ the Economic Censuses of 1977 and 1987**
 - Manufacturing, Retail Trade, and Services
 - These sectors represented about two-thirds of the labor market in 1987

CHANGING NUMBER OF JOBS PER CITY RESIDENT (as a measure of job prospects within a MA)

- MANUFACTURING PRODUCTION

- 10 of 12 largest cities had a falling ratio of manufacturing jobs to city residents
- In Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Milwaukee, there were 3 fewer production jobs per 100 residents in 1987 than in 1977

- RETAIL TRADE

- 9 of 12 largest cities had a rising ratio of retail jobs to city residents (though 95% of new retail jobs were in the suburbs of most regions)
- 7 of 12 largest cities were in their MA's lowest (red) category of retail job prospects

- SERVICES

- 12 of 12 largest cities had a rising ratio of service jobs to city residents (though 75% of new service jobs were in the suburbs of most regions)
- 8 of 12 largest cities were not in their MA's highest (blue) category of service job prospects

CHANGING NUMBER OF JOBS PER SUBURBAN RESIDENT (as a measure of job prospects within a MA)

- In every MA, at least one (often two or three) suburban counties had the same number of manufacturing production jobs per county resident in 1987 as in 1977. This despite the fact that the populations of these suburban counties grew rapidly in the 1980s.
- Two suburban counties (DuPage outside of Chicago, and Waukesha outside of Milwaukee) were in their MA's highest (blue) category of job growth in all three industrial sectors. This represents a diversity that once characterized only central cities.
- Eight other suburban counties were in the highest category of both growing sectors, retail and services. They were:
 - Montgomery outside Washington
 - Howard outside Baltimore
 - Marin and San Mateo outside San Francisco
 - Montgomery and New Castle outside Philadelphia
 - Oakland and Washtenaw outside Detroit
- All but one of these job-rich suburban counties are adjacent to the central county of their metropolitan area.

- The suburbs are the engines of job growth in these metro areas.
- This fact, coupled with the continuing concentration of poverty, unemployment, and ethnic minorities within central cities, sets the basic parameters of urban antipoverty strategy.
- Urban antipoverty strategy, especially as it relates to work, has become a largely geographical exercise:
 - Dispersal (e.g., Gautreaux) seeks to move inner-city residents to suburban jobs (and other things).
 - Development (e.g., Zones) seeks to move jobs that would otherwise locate elsewhere to inner-city residents.
 - Mobility seeks to help inner-city residents access suburban jobs by lowering institutional barriers (e.g., SDA geography) and transportation barriers (e.g., transit system routes). It complements both dispersal (by providing a “beachhead” in the suburbs) and development (by importing income that might support inner-city businesses).
- But all three, at least implicitly, recognize the virtual necessity of the suburban labor market in providing work for the inner-city poor.

Reverse

13 Demos

National system - edly

^{- from}
Dan Birnie
FTA/DOT

Rich Steinman
FTA

8 cities for 3 yrs = 30 million
20 mil from state/local

3-4 mo to finish design project
6 months to work w/ cities

why are we supporting reverse commuting
↳ move people to suburbs?
↳ NOT feels its a failure

Given Job Creation stats, why
isn't this happening?
Institutional Barriers

- Politics have -- Private providers vs.
Public Agencies
- not Doesn't like



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

July 9, 1993

URBAN POLICY SEMINAR

Topic: Enhancing the Mobility of the Urban Poor

Speaker: Dr. Sandra Rosenbloom, Director
Roy P. Drachman Institute for
Land and Regional Development Studies
The University of Arizona

Time: Tuesday, July 20, 2:30 - 4:00 P.M.

Place: The Secretary's Conference Room, Room 3327, Main Treasury Building

Urban policies ranging from traditional renewal to enterprise zones assume that improving the places where poor people live will ultimately help poor people. Some observers of the urban scene argue that such strategies are misguided. They note that powerful economic forces have created cities where job growth and economic opportunities are concentrated in nodes located throughout a metropolitan area, often far removed from concentrations of low income households. Rather than attempting to run against the economic tide, urban policy should adopt mobility enhancing strategies that can connect the poor, inner-city residents with economic opportunities scattered throughout a metropolitan area.

Dr. Sandra Rosenbloom will discuss the problems of and prospects for enhancing the mobility of the poor. Her perspective is particularly interesting in that she has focused on linkages between mobility with job training and other support service. Also attending are several Department of Transportation officials who can assess Federal support for such efforts. Attached is a copy of report by Dr. Rosenbloom on reverse commuting and a recent *Wall Street Journal* article on mass transit.

Attachments (2):
See Distribution:

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

21-Jul-1993 09:55am

TO: Christopher F. Edley, Jr
FROM: Harry G. Meyers
Office of Mgmt and Budget, EGSS
CC: Roger S. Adkins
CC: Francis S. Redburn
SUBJECT: Reverse Commuting Seminar at Treasury

A seminar on reverse commuting was held at Treasury yesterday, in keeping with Roger Altman's direction for more positive "pro-active" policy development by the agency. Alicia Munnell, Bo Cutter, and Joe Stiglitz were the three principals, with numerous staff in attendance. Dr. Sandra Rosenbloom, of the University of Arizona was the principal speaker, along with Walter Kulyk and Douglas Bernie, of the Department of Transportation, as commentators.

The conclusion was that reverse commuting did not work when it was first tried in the early 1970's, and that it did not work when the experiment was repeated in the 1980's. It appears to work best as part of a package of social services to stimulate job search, but is inferior to automobile travel once people have gotten jobs. It does not appear in any way to be a silver bullet -- a simple solution to a complicated process.

Part of the limitation is that commuting with public transportation is just plain slow and inefficient. In modern times, the burden on low income individuals is increased by the fact that the jobs do not pay much, (typically maids in suburban hotels or day labor), and that the need for day care increases the costs of the commute far beyond the farebox.


This is exacerbated by inefficient route structures of public transit, which generally continue to maintain central city hub structures despite evidence of commuting patterns in which 40% of the population live and work outside the central city. In addition, concentrations of ridership in low income, densely populated areas are underserved, while suburban buses frequently run at low capacities.



U.S. Department
of Transportation

Reverse Commute Transportation: Emerging Provider Roles

March 1992



Reverse Commute Transportation: Emerging Provider Roles

**Final Report
March 1992**

Prepared by

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The study team would like to thank **Stewart McKeown** and **Marina Drancsak** of the Federal Transit Administration for their support, guidance, and patience--they helped us immensely in too many ways to count.

The study would not have been possible without the backing of **Dr. Terry Kahn** and his staff of the Graduate Program in Community and Regional Planning at the University of Texas at Austin.

Chris Mann, a research associate at the Drachman Institute, was responsible for most of the case study research and her contribution cannot be overestimated. We are grateful to **Julie Jamarta** who organized the bibliography.

We cannot overemphasize our appreciation to the planners and administrators and managers at the many agencies and programs whose experiences are described in these pages--we are very grateful for their willingness to speak with us, often for significant periods of time. Grateful as we are, we absolve them of any responsibility for our errors of fact or judgement.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study reports the findings of a small Federal Transit Administration funded study designed to identify and briefly evaluate both historical and modern reverse commute experiments and projects. In particular the Study was devised to meet three objectives:

- 1) to identify the socio-economic and geographic conditions which create markets for reverse commute services in local communities;
- 2) to describe and compare methods of providing home-to-work services for inner city residents employed, or seeking employment, in suburban areas, with special emphasis on new roles for private operators, and,
- 3) to evaluate the conditions under which various models of reverse commute services, and alternative providers, do or could have long term viability or develop into part of comprehensive transportation systems.

Historically, the first real policy concern with reverse commuters came with the ghetto riots of the late 1960's. In response, a series of Federal and State programs funded reverse commute experiments from 1966-1971 designed to get people from the ghettos of our major cities to the vast sea of suitable unfilled suburban jobs. The 60's projects were largely failures in both getting jobs for unemployed people and in establishing permanent transportation services.

In the late 1980's the Federal government, as well as some state and local governments, began once again initiating and funding more reverse commute experiments. These newer projects can be partially differentiated from earlier experiments in that they aimed at increasing the involvement of private entrepreneurs (whether for- or not-for-profit), a focus conspicuously missing in the earlier experiments.

Unfortunately most of the most recent projects have met with the same fate as their predecessors of three decades past and it is important to understand the reasons why reverse commute experiments have either succeeded or failed. Overall the study found little evidence that providing transportation cures or even addresses the inner city unemployment problem. Most of the assumptions underlying this "solution" were simply untrue or far more complex than originally thought--there weren't many suburban vacancies matching inner city skill levels, there weren't many inner city residents who wanted to travel long distances and give up social benefits for entry level jobs, and there was a great deal of prejudice and poor communication on the part of suburban employers.

The study also focused on different provider roles in reverse commute service provision and came to four major policy conclusions:

● non-transit agencies (public or private) appear to provide the most successful reverse commute transportation services for new job seekers, but only when the agencies provide a range of supportive services.

◇ These agencies do less well at providing daily repetitive commuter transportation for the people for whom they've gained jobs.

● transit operators can provide successful reverse commute services for those already employed in three ways: they can,

◇ rationalize and streamline existing bus services so that already employed workers don't face two and three transfers, commuting hours daily on trips that would take minutes by car,

◇ they can provide feeder bus services from regional rail or bus stations to major suburban employment complexes, synchronizing travel and work schedules, and,

◇ they can work with suburban employers or employment complexes to establish new bus services that provide fairly direct service from inner city neighborhoods.

● there is an important role for private entrepreneurs in reverse commuting, largely as contractors to public agencies and to transit operators, because most work services cannot be self-sufficient without subsidy; private operators, whether for-profit or not-for-profit can:

◇ contract with public agencies to provide inner-city-to-suburban bus/van services;

◇ contract with public agencies to run feeder services.

● opportunities for genuine free-market provision of profitable reverse commute services are very limited, given restrictive transit franchising, the low income of potential riders, and the high costs of service delivery, but they do exist; private operators can:

◇ profitably provide services as part of a family of transportation services to inner city neighborhoods, (spreading costs more evenly over the entire day), and,

◇ profitably provide services under contracts from private firms.

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INTRODUCTION

REVERSE COMMUTE AS A POLICY ISSUE

The transportation pattern called reverse commute has probably been with us since the development of the earliest suburbs. The term describes the work trip of a resident of the traditional core of the city who is forced to commute "outward" to a job, that is, away from the destination toward which most people are travelling, the downtown. Of course, for decades many local transit companies routinely ran bus routes to take domestics to jobs in homes in the suburbs (and some still do) but reverse commuting did not become a policy concern until it 1) was indicted as part of the ghetto unemployment problem, and 2) more recently, became such an important and growing part of urban traffic flows.

Historically, the first real policy concern with reverse commuters came with the ghetto riots of the late 1960's. In response, a series of Federal and State programs funded reverse commute experiments from 1966-1971 designed to get people from the ghettos of our major cities to the vast sea of suitable unfilled suburban jobs. The 60's projects were largely failures in both getting jobs for unemployed people and in establishing permanent transportation services.

The projects themselves, and their lessons, seem to have faded from our collective consciousness or have been summarily ignored; a 1989 NACO report dismissed these multi-million dollar ghetto transportation projects--and by implication their results--as mere "short-lived pilot...projects"--without analyzing the reasons for their short lives¹. A 1989 report for the National League of Cities vaguely acknowledged these projects but asserted that conditions had changed markedly; the report concluded,

Evidence...suggests that conditions will be far more amenable to transportation solutions in the 1990's than in the 1960's...the wholesale decentralization of regions has resulted in outer cities plagued by a growth-choking congestion and inner cities stricken with an isolated deprivation. This stress is most clearly seen in the regional labor markets of our larger metropolises; suburban employers unable to fill jobs and impacted ghetto residents unable to find them.

In the late 1980's the Federal government, as well as some state and local governments, began once again initiating and funding more reverse commute experiments. These newer projects can be partially differentiated from earlier experiments in that they aimed at increasing the involvement of private entrepreneurs (whether for- or not-for-profit), a focus conspicuously missing in the earlier experiments.

Unfortunately most of the most recent projects have met with the same fate as their predecessors of three decades past and it is important to understand the reasons why

reverse commute experiments have either succeeded or failed. It is also important to remember that both historical and current projects have set different goals for themselves and that project personnel have come to evaluate success in terms of their own particular goals.

Specifically, reverse commute can be an issue in four different, albeit somewhat related, policy arenas and thus have any one of four goals:

a) ghetto or underclass unemployment

- the belief that inexpensive transportation must be provided from the inner city to the suburbs to address growing and persistent unemployment among urban minorities, particularly those styled "the underclass."

b) suburban travel patterns and congestion

- the expressed need to provide viable transportation options for many different markets in the suburban areas where most of the new jobs have gone in the last thirty years.

c) expanding the number and role of transportation providers

- the belief that private for-profit entrepreneurs should be encouraged to find new and different "market niches" for commuter services, some of which would be inner city residents working (or seeking work) in the suburbs because entrepreneurs will either be cheaper or more efficient or more responsive to the local community; and,

d) empowering minority communities to address their own transportation needs

- the belief that encouraging private, generally not-for-profit neighborhood based organizations to provide needed transportation services to their people or clients will help empower the community.

We must recognize that it is difficult to generalize about the success or failure of any reverse commute project because that outcome is based in large part on how well any agency did at meeting its own specific goal or goals from among these four.

The transferability of the results of any given reverse commute project is always open to debate because the objectives of individual projects can be so different, ranging from

getting unemployed people jobs to gaining long-term transit riders to creating self-sufficient community transportation providers. Clearly transit agencies would only be interested in implementing programs which created long term transit riders, social agencies in programs which empowered the community, employment projects in programs which created long term job gains.

However, even with that disclaimer, it is clear that most of the historic and current reverse commute projects were not very successful at meeting any of these four goals and this report attempts to describe the underlying myths and assumptions--some quoted above--that helped create their problems.

STUDY BACKGROUND AND FINDINGS

This reports presents the findings of a small Federal Transit Administration funded study designed to identify and briefly evaluate both historical and modern reverse commute experiments and projects designed to address any or all of the four goals raised above. In particular the Study was designed to meet three objectives:

- 1) to identify the socio-economic and geographic conditions which create markets for reverse commute services in local communities;
- 2) to describe and compare methods of providing home-to-work services for inner city residents employed, or seeking employment, in suburban areas, with special emphasis on new roles for private operators, and,
- 3) to evaluate the conditions under which various models of reverse commute services, and alternative providers, do or could have long term viability or develop into part of comprehensive transportation systems.

Because resources were very limited, the study simply identified and described on-going or recently completed reverse commute operations--generally based on system-reported data and open-ended telephone interviews with project staff.

Overall the study found little evidence that providing transportation cures or even addresses the inner city unemployment problem. Most of the assumptions underlying this "solution" were simply untrue or far more complex than originally thought--there weren't many suburban vacancies matching inner city skill levels, there weren't many inner city residents who wanted to travel long distances and give up social benefits for entry level jobs, and there was a great deal of prejudice and poor communication on the part of suburban employers.

In addition, the study found that many community based transportation systems were initiated with misguided assumptions about the resources needed to develop and implement transportation services that could be viable and competitive over the long run.

Many of the projects were so heavily subsidized that they can hardly be used to test the potential role of the private entrepreneur.

The study also found that transit operators weren't any more willing to become active reverse commute providers than they were 25 years ago when the first Federal programs addressed this problem. Moreover, when they were willing to provide new or requested services, they 1) did so in ways that met their rather than the riders' needs and 2) they expected almost all their costs to be paid by fares or employer subsidies--although other riders (and destinations) in their system were far more heavily subsidized. While it is easy to sympathize with the financial burden under which most systems operate, it is still important to ask the simple question: is it fair to ask reverse commute riders, who are often poorer and more disadvantaged, to pay a greater share of the cost of transit service--when that service is so much more important to them?

This report has four major sections. The first briefly describes the changes in demographic and employment patterns which have fueled new concern over reverse commuters; the second describes the ways in which historical reverse commute services were provided. The third section describes current services provided by four different types of providers: *private for-profit*, *private not-for-profit*, *public non-transit agency*, and *public transit operators*. The last section summarizes and considers the policy and planning implications of these findings.

SUBURBAN GROWTH AND INCREASED REVERSE COMMUTE

INTRODUCTION

Nationally reverse commute trips increased almost 9% between 1970 and 1980. However, these are aggregate metropolitan figures: 25% of those living in the inner city were making reverse commute trips in 1980. Moreover these numbers are not corrected to account for annexation and growth in central city boundaries in the ten year period so they clearly understate the true dimensions of the reverse commute phenomenon--one created or enhanced by the rapid suburbanization of the nation's jobs and homes.

Some individual metropolitan areas experienced even greater changes in traditional commute patterns. A 1991 study in the Washington Metropolitan area found that reverse commuting from the core increased 45% between 1980-1988, to account for one in five trips in the region in 1988². A 1985 study found that in the two decades between 1960 and 1980 reverse commute travel increased 66% in the Baltimore region³.

Reverse commuting grows from the inability (or perhaps unwillingness⁴) of certain workers to move their homes to the suburbs to follow the jobs ^{5 6 7 8 9}. At the same time that the bulk of employment growth has gone to suburban areas, the kind of jobs remaining in the central cities have become increasingly mismatched to the skill levels of

central city residents^{10 11 12 13}. Thus many inner city workers seek the suburban jobs still matched to their skills and are forced to become reverse commuters¹⁴; in so doing they generally incur more expensive and longer commutes in both time and distance with fewer and poorer transit options^{15 16 17 18}.

In addition, patterns within the central city have also created sometimes "hidden" (or ignored) transportation problems for even those inner city residents with central city jobs. Since there has also been dispersion of employment within central cities as well, traditional transit services operating along radial corridors originating in the CBD may provide less than optimal services for those inner city workers with central city jobs. Below these trends are discussed in greater depth.

SUBURBAN TRENDS

The majority of population growth in the last three decades has been in the suburbs¹⁹. The dimensions of this suburban population growth are staggering: while U.S. population rose 56.1% in the forty years since WWII and metropolitan areas grew 76.1%, central cities only grew 49.9%. In contrast the suburban population grew almost 200% in the same years! In short most of the increase in metropolitan population was actually in the suburbs; 86% of total US population growth since 1970 has gone to suburban areas²⁰.

More importantly most new jobs in the last thirty years have also gone to suburban areas in all parts of the country²¹. Between 1960 and 1980 83% of all metropolitan job growth was in the suburbs--which now have over 60% of all U.S. jobs. These patterns are uniform; even in slow-growth parts of the country with declining population (such as Philadelphia, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Buffalo) suburban employment growth far outstripped total employment growth--these areas experienced suburban job growth even when total job change was negative²². For example between 1979 and 1987 the City of Milwaukee lost almost 30,000 jobs but the Milwaukee suburbs gained over 36,000 jobs during the same time period²³. As a result of the tremendous increase in suburban population and jobs, the majority of work-trip growth, roughly 70%, was in the suburb-to-suburb trip pattern.

Between 1960 and 1980, the reverse commute, from central city to suburb, grew as much as did the central city to central city commute--8.5%--to constitute 8% of all commuter travel but over one fourth of the trips of central city workers. In 1980 roughly five million American workers were travelling from the central city to the suburbs for work, more than double the 1960 number. Strikingly, 5.6% of all those workers used transit for their work trip (compared to 1.6% of workers living and working in the suburbs), in spite of the real disadvantages involved.

Of course many central cities did experience absolute job growth in the last twenty years and remain viable work places. But central city employment growth has been

overwhelmed by employment growth in the suburban rings. A crucial fact is that while the number of jobs in the City centers may have either stayed constant (although the percentage of total regional jobs was declining) or even grown those central city jobs are very different from those traditionally found in the CBD--there are few manufacturing or production jobs and many high skill information processing and professional jobs^{24 25}.

The proportion of manufacturing jobs across the country fell from a third after World War II to under a fourth by 1982. Some areas felt the loss even more profoundly; in New Jersey manufacturing dropped from a third of all jobs in 1970 to less than one in five jobs in 1986²⁶. Thus low skilled inner-city workers may be disadvantaged as much by the nature of the jobs left in (or coming to) the central city as they are by the movement of other jobs to the suburbs.

The problem is probably far greater than the data given above suggest. Since many Southern and Western cities have grown in area (through annexation) over the same time they have grown in population, it seems clear that the true extent of reverse commute has been underestimated. For example, a worker who was considered a reverse commuter in 1970 would not be so considered in 1980 if the city in which s/he lives annexed the area where s/he works--even if the direction and travel distance were exactly the same over the ten year period.

CENTRAL CITY TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS

Most workers, regardless of their place of residence, have responded to the suburbanization of employment by turning to the private car--less than 2% of all suburb-to-suburb commutes were made by transit in 1980. However, quite apart from the external costs imposed on society by increasing auto use, and the impact on transit systems facing ever-declining markets, many inner city residents either do not have cars or spend a considerable and disproportionate part of their incomes to maintain a car.

Noted sociologist and demographer John Kasarda has commented,

An additional...impediment faced by inner-city minorities is their increased distance from current sources of blue-collar and other entry-level jobs. As industries providing these jobs have dispersed to the suburbs, exurbs, and nonmetropolitan periphery, racial discrimination and inadequate income have prevented inner-city minorities from moving with their traditional sources of employment. Moreover the dispersed nature of job growth sites make public transportation from inner city neighborhoods impractical, requiring the vast majority of city residents who work in peripheral area to commute by private vehicles.²⁷

The impact of the disparity between home and available jobs can be seen in a variety of ways. Recent work focusing on single mothers in the paid labor force has found that

such workers commute far longer distances than comparable married women or male workers, although traditional theories predict short commutes for those with low income. Studies in cities as disparate as Toronto and Houston, Rochester, NY and Dallas has found that single mothers living in the inner city have been severely disadvantaged by the suburbanization of jobs.

Kostyniuk and Kitamura found that, except for the very poorest women who did not drive, single parents in Rochester, NY made more trips and travelled further for all purposes than comparable married workers²⁸. Johnston-Anumonowo found that although single women with children in Worcester, Massachusetts were less likely to own cars, they were more likely to make their work trips in cars; she also found that single mothers had longer work trips than comparable married women²⁹.

Rutherford and Wekerle studied single and married workers in a Toronto suburb and concluded that single mothers spent more time travelling to work and that they were less likely to work in the suburb in which they lived than comparable married women³⁰. Rosenbloom found that single mother in Houston and Dallas had very different travel patterns than comparable married women, generally travelling further and using a car more often than either married worker at all but income levels below \$5,000 a year³¹.

Inner city residents, particularly the single women who were often the focus of the reverse commute projects described in this report, have been put at serious risk as they try to combine employment and household responsibilities in the face of the need to reverse commute. One scholar has noted,

With the continued increase in service jobs throughout the economy and the continuing suburbanization of jobs in general...single mothers will be adversely affected by having to endure longer commutes. Coupled with their relative deprivation of private automobiles, single mothers in poor carless households...are likely to be most affected and may even be forced to drop out of the labor force³².

Kostyniuk and Kitamura concluded,

One of the forces that have been at work against transit-dependent workers is employer relocation. As part of the continuing suburbanization process, employers are relocating from central cities into the suburbs, where provision of viable transit services is known to be costly and ineffective³³.

Central city residents may also be disadvantaged in a different way. It has often been assumed that those living in the center city have adequate transportation resources to obtain central city jobs, that they only have problems with regard to suburban employment. However, what constitutes the central city is far larger than traditional core area neighborhoods--the travel trends described above may understate the number of

inner city residents who are both travelling some distance to work, and, travelling out from the core of the city.

The Bureau of the Census definition of "central city" coincides with the legal boundaries of a city, and is not limited to the CBD of that city. In many cities, particularly those in the South and the West, this definition would include low density residential areas 20 to 40 miles away from the traditional city core, areas that commonly would be considered "suburban." In Houston, Texas, for example, an inner city resident could be making a 30 mile one-way work trip away from the central city and not be considered as a reverse commuter! In Jacksonville, Florida an inner city resident could cross three county lines to go to work and still not be classified as a reverse commuter.

Eno Foundation data show that an overwhelming percentage of work trips destined for the central city are, in fact, destined for areas outside the traditional core. Five times the number of work trips originating in both the suburbs and the central cities of metropolitan areas were destined for outside the central city. Fewer than one trip in seven considered to have a central city destination was actually intended for the CBD

These data raise another issue--given the fact that many Southern and Western cities have grown in area (through annexation) over the same time they have grown in population, it seems clear that the true extent of reverse commute has been underestimated. For example, a worker who was considered a reverse commuter in 1970 would not be so considered in 1980 if the city in which s/he lives annexed the area where s/he works--even if the direction and travel distance were exactly the same.

Clearly there are a large number of central city residents who also work in what the Census defines as the Central City have problems which have not been explicitly recognized or measured. The extent of the real reverse commute problem--where that is defined as a central city worker travelling some distance out from core--is not really known but has been clearly underestimated by researchers using census data to a) define suburbs and b) count the number of reverse commuters.

HISTORICAL ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE REVERSE COMMUTE SERVICES

This study had four parts; in the first the Research Team conducted an overview of state-of-the-art of reverse commute projects with a three part data collection Phase. This section describes the results of an intensive literature search designed to identify historical reverse commute projects reported on in the scholarly or professional (report) literature. The subsequent major section describes current or recently completed reverse commute projects, focusing specifically on the large number of different providers who today operate such services.

THE 1960'S TRANSPORTATION EMPLOYMENT PROJECTS

National Experiences

In the 1960's, when reverse commute travel accounted for roughly 7% of all trips, the Federal government developed a series of demonstration projects designed to establish long term viable public transit links between the inner city and growing suburban employment concentrations. The initial projects were admittedly spurred by the 1965 inner city riots in Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, and other large cities; the widely quoted McCone Commission report on the causes of the Watts (Los Angeles) riots, commented,

Our investigation has brought into clear focus the fact the inadequate and costly public transportation currently existing throughout the Los Angeles area seriously restricts the residents of the disadvantaged areas such as south central Los Angeles. The lack of adequate transportation handicaps them in seeking and holding jobs, shopping, and fulfilling other needs³⁵.

The federally funded projects were first called the "poverty transportation program" and then re-named Service Demonstration Grants. Between 1966 and 1970 the Federal government paid for 14 demonstration projects in 14 cities, attempting to establish 50 different services or routes; the funds went almost entirely to community groups and actors. The total cost to the Federal government for these specific projects was approximately \$7.0 million in 1965 dollars; with state and local contributions, and adjusted for inflation, the total in 1992 dollars would be close to \$35.0 million. In addition, through the mid-1970's the Federal government also paid for several reverse commute demonstration projects, including the Shirley Highway Express Bus Demonstration, where the grantee was always a transit operator.

John Crain, then of SRI, is the most quoted chronicler of the history of the first set of more community-based projects although his work was published prior to the completion of most projects. Crain suggests that these projects had three phases; in the first, 1966-67, there was a rush to throw money at the unemployment problem by funding community groups to provide needed transportation services to suburban locations. In Phase II, 1968-69, the concept was streamlined and there was a focus on cost cutting; moreover there was a greater emphasis on developing conventional bus routes where needed to coordinate with manpower programs. He styled the third phase, in which he was operating, as "controlled research."³⁶

The more-polished focus that appeared in the second phase stressed the fact that there were high development costs relative to uncertain profitability in starting reverse commute transit lines. The Federal grants therefore were designed to support the development of reverse commute links to the point where they would be taken over by the existing public transit operator. The emphasis on ending ghetto unemployment

through transit was considerably softened.

By the time the second and third phases rolled around (the early 1970's), the success of reverse commute projects was being defined and assessed differently by different actors. Most federal officials, and Crain himself, stressed the long-term viability of reverse commute services provided by traditional transit operators. Most local and state actors and local grant recipients continued to stress the original purpose: finding employment for inner city residents.

In 1970 when Crain's evaluation was published, it appeared that 8 of the 14 projects could conceivably be seen as a success using the Federal definition: projects that resulted in, or would be likely to result in, permanent transit route development. Success was not defined at all in terms of employment goals because, as Crain observed, *the successful routes were those which serviced more than one user group including tourists and people already employed at the site.*

For example, in Chicago, one of the projects which Crain considered a success, an express bus route from the end of a rapid transit line to O'Hare Airport was used by a significant number of inner city residents to access jobs at the airport. However, the bus line itself was a "success" only because it was widely used by air travellers from downtown hotels and businesses; in fact, less than 30% of the riders on the line were workers. In addition, although studies found that 40% of those who were workers were new hires, and two thirds of the new hires said that they depended on the new transit line for their jobs, more than half of the workers had stopped riding the bus a year after the survey on which Crain based his assessment³⁷.

In fact, Crain estimated that *only one of three riders in all fourteen projects obtained a job because of the service provided and most of those had already been employed elsewhere*--less than 3% (on average) of all new hires in the 14 projects had been on welfare prior to the initiation of the transportation service (in half of the project none of the new rider/employees had been on welfare). In the Chicago project, for example, only one in four new hires came from a family living below poverty level. He concluded, "...the impact on welfare is small...most welfare recipients are not in a position to accept employment whether transportation exists or not."³⁸

The Boston project exemplified services that were clearly unsuccessful from the onset. A series of routes were established to take inner city residents to massive and growing employment concentrations on the Route 128 ring road; the service was offered for six months but ridership was small and the operating deficit per passenger trip would approach \$11 in 1992 dollars. Although ridership patterns were not well documented, it appears that fewer than 30% of the riders attributed their jobs to the service or felt that they would have to seek others jobs if service were discontinued³⁹.

Another one of the aspects which the historic reverse commute projects share with more

recent projects is *a tendency to claim success for projects without much firm evidence*; in the early projects success was almost always stated in terms of jobs gained for unemployed inner city residents. However a U.S. General Accounting Study found that almost all the claims were unsubstantiated, exaggerated, or based on very early results. Projects that did make some attempts to monitor employment gains often asked if the rider could get to one specific job without the subsidized transportation; they did not ask if the rider had other equivalent job opportunities.

Moreover few projects followed new hires over any time period to see if they were still employed or riding. In addition projects tended to aggregate all job hires to report as successes, although later ones only got their jobs in the place of the earlier "successes" who had quit or been fired.

Although Crain felt that more than half of the routes supported by the program had been or were likely to be taken over by the local transit operator, he also concluded that *reverse commute transit was not potentially profitable for most public transit operators* and this explained their lack of interest in the concept. Writing in 1970, Crain suggested that,

- The major reason for the marginal developability of the reverse commute route is the sprawling automobile orientation of suburban industry. The organization of work locations, shift times, and overtime requirements is designed with the auto in mind. It is exceedingly difficult to serve such employment sites well with conventional busing.⁴⁰

He also noted, however, that direct Federal aid to community groups to develop conventional routes had made transit agency interest and support even less likely. In fact he felt that the lack of involvement by the mass transit industry had "...undermined the program and made testing of innovative operation rather meaningless."

In 1982 Alan Altshuler and his colleagues, in analyzing the experiences of these projects, concluded,

...these demonstrations...produced only meager benefits. They may have helped several thousand people obtain jobs, but it was uncertain that the beneficiaries would have been unable to find jobs in the absence of the projects. A typical pattern, moreover, was that riders who used the special transit services to obtain jobs used some of their first earnings to purchase cars⁴¹.

In fact Meyer and Gomez-Ibanez report that a special 1970 census of employment of low income residents found that less than 1% (5 out of 1,000) of those not in the labor force who wanted or were looking for a job said that transportation was the principal reason they couldn't find work or weren't looking for work⁴².

TEP in Watts and East Los Angeles

The Principal Investigator of this study was a young researcher in one of the 14 reverse commute projects analyzed by Crain; from January 1969 to September of 1971--when the project was canceled--Dr. Rosenbloom was the on-site representative of consultants hired by the State of California to monitor the Transportation Employment Project (TEP) (a name it retained) in Watts (South Central Los Angeles) and East Los Angeles. She was involved in the process both locally and nationally long enough to follow all 14 of the projects described by Crain--and to see all but three fail by Crain's standards. That is, only three of the 14 projects ultimately developed routes that were taken over by the local transit operator.

The Crain and other findings described above complement those of Dr. Rosenbloom and her colleagues who, between 1969-1971, chronicled the experiences of the South and East Los Angeles project, often comparing it to the other projects, in a series of working papers and a final report to UMTA; these findings are summarized here^{43 44 45}. The Watts project was one of Crain's successes in that a cross town route which it developed (on Century Boulevard to the airport) was taken over by the Southern California Regional Transit Authority. But in most other ways, the Los Angeles TEP was a failure on a number of fronts (other than putting this researcher through school) and a classic illustration of the problem of tying ghetto unemployment to transportation services.

Although by 1970 the Federal government had backed away from its earliest goals of attacking ghetto unemployment by providing transportation, most Los Angeles grant recipients (and the state and local agencies also providing funding) still *clearly believed that there was an important link between reverse commute services and suburban employment*. For these local actors, the overall goal of the service provided was to get people off of welfare by taking them to suburban jobs.

Moreover several labor economists associated with the Watts project felt that a serious ghetto employment problem was the nature of *the job search and information dissemination process*; that is, most people hear about job vacancies from people already employed at a firm. So if few inner city residents (with or without transportation) work a suburban plant, few of their neighbors will hear about potential jobs. Getting more people to suburban jobs might ultimately mean getting more appropriate information into the neighborhoods about suburban employment opportunities.

But *there was little evidence in Watts or elsewhere that reverse commute services got people jobs or even better jobs*; more than half of all riders carried on most of the TEP routes were people who were already employed at the suburban location. In one service, the TEP made it possible for a large garment manufacturer to move farther out from the Los Angeles central city (to a lower taxing suburban jurisdiction) by providing subsidized transportation to all his Chicana workers from East Los Angeles. While all

these jobs were considered "successes" by the project staff, they might give outsiders pause (and the situation certainly did not please the City of Los Angeles).

Although the TEP project did not make a strong effort to track all workers and riders, it appeared that *there were high turnover rates in employment*, for reasons ranging from workers being fired to quitting because of unwillingness to continue the long commutes involved. Although Crain estimated average attrition among the 14 projects at 7% he was writing fairly early in the life of most of the projects. Most of the TEP routes had far higher turn-over rates with rates well above 40% within 6 months.

As a consequence of high job turn-over rates and car-buying by the few successful workers *maintaining ridership was very difficult*. TEP staff quickly began to solicit ridership among those already employed at the suburban locations to which the vans travelled. We heard a number of illuminating (if possibly apocryphal) stories--one involved the worker who left his Thunderbird at home every day because he became a TEP rider. Another story involved the project driver who turned in far more money daily than appropriate for the number of riders on his roster; at first he claimed he was picking up casual riders (a practice allowed by TEP). Ultimately it appeared that he was worried about his job in the face of rapidly falling ridership; he thought it worth the investment to put his own money into the fare box to give the illusion of higher ridership!

One ridership attrition example raises several important issues. A route that ran from Watts to a defense plant at the airport had fairly high ridership, with all riders being new job hires--at least initially. The defense contractor employer worked with TEP project staff and was able to offer night time maintenance jobs at salaries significantly above minimum wage. But over three to four months the TEP staff noticed significant drops in ridership and began to investigate. It appears that most of the inner city residents had been hired pending security clearances; since many had minor or even major arrest records, their requests for security clearances were rejected by the relevant government agencies in the months following their hiring and they were gradually fired.

Clearly *many genuinely cooperative employers made relatively naive assumptions about the work force which they were being offered*. Moreover, *the vacancies that did exist were not well matched to the skill levels and training of unemployed inner city residents*. Many suburban employers assumed that the real cause of ghetto unemployment problem was transportation so they simply didn't recognize that there might be different work experiences, cultural assumptions and expectations, and training needs among potential inner city workers--let alone possible arrest records. Many firms were simply unwilling or unable to deal with the additional training and other needs of previously unemployed inner city residents, particularly young people.

In addition, it is hard to separate out the last conclusion from the clear--if undocumentable--finding that *many suburban firms discriminated against minority*

workers because they were prejudiced or had stereotypes about inner city residents. TEP project staff often worked months with apparently cooperative suburban employers who never seemed to get to the stage of hiring any workers. Other projects noted the same problem; one staff person commented, "Some employers were using the transportation barrier as a convenient excuse for not hiring for other reasons⁴⁶."

Another major finding that the TEP Project shared with others was that *the assumption of major job vacancies in the suburbs were largely unsubstantiated*. Then, as now, many suburban employers complained about their inability to find and keep workers but they weren't willing to raise wages, pay for training or recruitment, or subsidize transportation services--which meant that job vacancies couldn't have been too serious a problem for them.

It's important to note that the major difference between the jobs sought in Watts (and most of the other UMTA SDG projects) and those sought in today's reverse commute services is that--poverty employment projects in the 60's sought much better, higher paying production jobs. No project would have thought of focusing on service sector or minimum wage jobs. Ironically, therefore, it was far more realistic for these earlier projects to expect that employers would be willing to subsidize some element of the training or transportation of workers. Unfortunately, that was rarely the case.

As suggested by Crain and the other analysts cited, *TEP transportation services were very expensive per rider served and even more expensive per worker placed*; one study found that they were triple the average cost for transit service at that time⁴⁷. Clearly part of the expense was paying full time paid drivers who were rarely used for more than half the day but who could not be hired part-time, often for political reasons. (Most drivers were originally hired full time before anyone really thought through the operational details; therefore the project would have to demote full time drivers to part-time, which is considerably more difficult than hiring part-time drivers to begin with.)

In an effort to better use underutilized vehicles and drivers, the TEP project staff and grantees began the development of mid-day travel services. Several two-to-three times per week shopping services were inaugurated with great fanfare from major housing projects. TEP staff selected large, clean grocery stores at some distance from the housing projects in order to avoid all the obvious problems of ghetto stores: high prices, small sizes, poor selection, and inferior maintenance⁴⁸. Unfortunately *most of the mid-day services were not successful because they failed to respond to the real needs of inner city shoppers*.

Housing project residents rarely have checking accounts and often shop in small local stores which cash their assistance checks, take food stamps, and give credit. In many cases, residents already owed most of their check to local store keepers by the time it came and had little disposable cash to shop elsewhere. In addition, while project staff thought that shoppers would much rather buy larger sizes of a product, incurring

substantially lower unit costs, many shoppers simply could not afford to buy the larger sizes. Moreover, in the late 1960's not all non-ghetto stores took food stamps or they made an embarrassing process of doing so.

Another major problem was children--many women could leave their children under the watchful eye of a neighbor for the few minutes it took to shop locally, or they could take their children with them to a neighborhood store. If they took the TEP van, they generally had to bring several small children and this created both a serious capacity problem for the TEP staff and a financial problem for the rider if the children were charged a fare. (In an effort to address the capacity problem at one housing project, staff insisted on charging children the full, albeit small, fare. Not surprisingly, many women stopping riding altogether.)

TEP project analysis also focused on two additional very significant findings, not mentioned by Crain or other analysts. First, the *TEP projects drove out of business existing neighborhood transportation entrepreneurs*. Although the McCone Commission commented on the lack of transportation in the inner city--they were simply wrong. By almost any measure, Watts and East Los Angeles had the best public transit network in the region in the 1960's--admitting the inherent failings of public transit in a sprawling city like Los Angeles.

In 1967 Watts was served by three municipal bus operators in addition to the SCRTD; it was also served by a small three route black private bus operator and three minority owned taxi operators. All were gone in 1972. Admittedly most had been marginal operations at best, and other forces were at work (for example, the SCRTD took over some of the municipal operator lines), but it didn't help that the TEP project established new operations to compete with their shaky businesses. A look at the reports of several other UMTA SDG poverty projects suggests similar impacts.

Second, TEP project economists were able to show that in 1970 *there were more entry-level and low skill production jobs within the central city than there were low skilled workers*. In short, no one had focused at all at jobs much closer to inner city residents because of the emphasis on growing suburban employment opportunities. Clearly the belief that unemployment was caused by lack of transportation obscured the abundance of job opportunities available within more reasonable commuting distance with current transit options. It might have made far more sense to train and deliver potential workers to these employers.

It is hard to dispute Myer and Gomez-Ibanez' evaluation of the transportation employment link as played out in the early transportation employment projects,

The results of these demonstration projects were disappointing...Most of the new routes suffered from low patronage...and there was little evidence that many jobs were found because of the new bus service, so that the cost of providing this

service per job attachment was probably extraordinarily high. When compared with racial discrimination or lack of skills and education, employment decentralization and inadequate or expensive public transportation appeared to be relatively minor causes of unemployment (or underemployment) among low-income central-city residents⁴⁹. (emphasis added)

REVERSE COMMUTE PEAK HOUR BUS SERVICE

In the mid-1970's UMTA funded two different kinds of reverse commute projects which had only a tangential employment focus: a Baltimore project and the Shirley Highway reverse commute demonstration. Both involved grants to existing transit operators. The first was an acknowledged failure, the other was considered to be a success. Robert Wakesman studied both projects for the National Bureau of Standards in 1974 and concluded that four variables lead to successful reverse commute services provided by traditional transit operators:

- 1) the route had to serve a very concentrated employment area (at least 2,500 employees) with no shift work (ie a maximum start-time variation of 90 minutes);
- 2) the route had to be geared to those already employed at the site and not just to targeted inner city residents;
- 3) the route had to fit easily into the existing with-flow commuter bus schedules; and,
- 4) the route should, if at all possible, be paired with an existing successful peak period with-flow route.

As an illustration of the importance of the last two factors, Wakesman pointed out that the Baltimore project was a failure carrying 27 passengers because the operator needed 63 passengers to meet marginal costs. On the other hand, the Shirley Highway reverse commute project was a success carrying 19 passengers because that's all the operator needed to meet marginal costs⁵⁰.

Note that there are really three major differences between these 1970's projects and the 1960's poverty-transportation projects. First, and most obviously, the funds went to a transit operator and not a community group--deliberately, as a matter of Federal policy. Second, the needs of reverse commuters were only accommodated if they meshed with the needs of traditional commuters and only if they paid all of the marginal costs of operation (something it is unlikely that traditional peak period commuters came close to doing). Third, there was little discussion of the role of transportation services in addressing ghetto unemployment. In short, no special efforts were considered for

reverse commuters, there was no explicit transportation-employment link, and reverse commuters were not subsidized in any real way.

SUMMARY

The earliest reverse commute projects were generally failures whether measured by jobs gained or new transportation services created and sustained. The only possible "successes" were those that did little more than effectively use underutilized outbound capacity on traditional peak hour bus service.

The next section describes a cross section of the reverse commute experiments which have been funded by the Federal or other governments in the last few years, contrasting their experiences with the generally forgotten lessons of the 1960's projects. Although the newer projects focus on two elements largely missing in the earliest projects--a meaningful role for the private sector operator, and, using transportation services as part of a package of community empowerment tools, it is hard to miss how many of the sad lessons about the transportation-employment link are exactly the same.

MODERN REVERSE COMMUTE PROVIDER ROLES

INTRODUCTION

This study had four parts; the first was designed to conduct an overview of state-of-the-art of reverse commute projects with a three part data collection Phase; first an intensive literature search was conducted to identify current and historical reverse commute projects reported on in the scholarly or professional (report) literature; the historical examples are described above.

Second, the study Team asked key FTA, state, and professional organizations and agencies to identify additional projects and contact people and/or reports. Finally the Study Team used computer data bases to identify and print the full text of newspaper articles in 20 major urban newspapers which dealt with some aspect of the reverse commute problem--these articles often identified additional projects or additional information about projects previously identified.

Once a wide variety of projects were identified they were divided, in the second Phase of the Study, into four main categories of reverse commute providers: *private for-profit*, *private not-for profit*, *public non-transit agencies*, and *traditional public transit providers*. Then the Study Team analyzed the operations, impact, and implications of each identified project. When there was recent published information on a project the Team used that material, although the Team occasionally called project personnel for

updates*. The Team directly called all of the other identified projects over a six month period, sharing the written account prepared on each project (which appear in the appendix of the full report) with the informants, asking them for corrections and suggestions.

Table One shows the four main categories of providers and the kind of services which they are or could be providing. Each of these four provider types is discussed below.

PRIVATE FOR-PROFIT PROVIDERS

There are two major types of private entrepreneurs: those that provide reverse commute services as an ordinary business and those that provide reverse commute service under contract to public agencies or private firms. The former can make a profit without any public subsidization, the latter cannot (at least for the subsidized service in question.) Obviously one operator can provide both types of services.

While the literature has lately been full of examples of private operators providing commuter service without subsidy^{31 32}, it is less clear that many private operators provide reverse commute service. Although there are anecdotal stories, there are few firm data because a) the services are often illegal (or to use the fashionable term "extra-legal") in that they violate state or city transportation ordinances or franchises and b) they are often very small scale, hard to find, and even less likely to have the time to talk to interviewers^{33 34}.

Farkas and his colleagues report, for example, that there are six small firms in the Baltimore area which operate regular commuter services during peak hours between suburban activity centers and the City of Baltimore, serving "very specific market niches that have not been served by....MTA [the regional transit operator]." These firms, although apparently legal, have not been able to expand because they are small and relatively unsophisticated; moreover they have to compete with both private firms which are subsidized indirectly through public agency contracting and with private not-for-profit providers (such as those discussed in the following sections) which are very heavily subsidized³⁴.

* This turned out to be a valuable practice because several recent reports on these projects turned out to be more hopeful than useful. That is, several oft-cited reports described the birth but not the death of a number of highly publicized projects.

** In 1986 while conducting a transportation survey in Texarkana (Texas and Arkansas) I went with a research team to a location in the "ghetto" where a private operator daily took workers 40 miles out of the city to a large Army arms depot. The morning we showed up no vehicles were seen; the operator, who was probably operating illegally, had apparently been "warned" of our pending visit, and misunderstood our purpose.


Basic Providers and Provider-Roles in Reverse Commute

Private For-Profit Providers

- entrepreneurs (profit w/o subsidy)
- contractors to private firms and public agencies (subsidized profit)

Private Non-Profit Providers

- social agencies
- tenant management associations
- transportation management associations



with grants/contracts from
public agencies or private firms

Public Non-Transit Agencies

- contracting with private or public operators

Public Transit Operators

- traditional operations
 - feeders to rail service
 - re-routing and re-scheduling traditional routes
- less traditional operations
 - contracting with private providers
- non-traditional operations
 - vanpooling
 - brokering

In addition, Farkas et al describe the extensive "hack" industry in Baltimore--unregulated private cars providing group ride taxi-like service in inner-city neighborhoods (these hack services are similar to illegal services found in other cities and described by Rosenbloom^{55 56 57} and others⁵⁸). Unfortunately the Baltimore researchers have no evidence that these operators currently provide any significant reverse commute service, although they clearly have the potential to do so.

Other than the Baltimore data, the Study Team was unable to both identify and interview any operators who were providing reverse commute services entirely on their own, that is, who were making a profit without government intervention or subsidy of any kind. There are more examples of private operators serving as contractors and these are addressed in the sections below, which describe the kinds of agencies and organizations which contract with private operators to provide reverse commute services.

PRIVATE NON-PROFIT PROVIDERS

The Team identified three classes of non-profit providers involved in some way in providing reverse commute : social and human service agencies whose major mission was something other than transportation, tenant management associations whose goal was generally to help public housing project residents get and maintain jobs, and transportation management associations (TMAs) which usually work with suburban employers and employment complexes to deal with a range of transportation issues.

Social and Human Service Agencies

There are undoubtedly hundreds, if not thousands, of human service agencies across the United States attempting to take inner city residents to expanding suburban employment concentrations. Below we highlight just two that have appeared in the literature or have been brought to our attention.

Project Libertad in Washington, DC began in 1985 as a pilot project organized by one man, Paul Leach, who was associated with a homeless shelter serving Cubans, Salvadorans, and other Hispanics. In 1990 the project received a \$20,000 UMTA Section 8 grant, administered by the Washington Council of Governments. From its inception the Project was designed to use transportation to link suburban construction jobs to inner city workers, particularly the homeless. The project began by taking homeless men living in shelters to landscaping jobs at suburban construction sites. The project started operation with a van lent by the Red Cross and later used a donated bus driven by Paul Leach himself; the project asked riders and employers for donations.

Today Project Libertad has shifted away from its focus on the homeless and serves neighborhood residents, providing a more reliable workforce with a better reputation. The Project currently charges riders \$2 and employers \$1-2 per trip. The Project uses school buses because they are cheap and easy to get so the driver is the main expense.

A serious continuing problem has been that the construction landscape jobs on which the Project concentrates are seasonal jobs in the best of times; since the construction industry is very cyclical it has not been the best of time for several years. So workers are being recruited for short term temporary jobs with no hope of advancement, training, or stability in the workforce. Conversely, most of the workers to whom transportation is provided have serious problems entering the labor force: they often can't drive, don't speak English, and are untrained. Given the seasonal nature of the jobs and high employee turnover, Leach has found keeping the Project going to be very demanding work. In fact, he informed us that he will be leaving to take a job at a rehabilitation center for alcoholics⁵⁹.

Community Family Life Services (CFLS) in Washington, DC. a non-profit organization founded in 1969 and associated with the First Trinity Lutheran Church, began the Employment Transportation Assistance (ETA) program in September 1985 to assist poor homeless and unemployed DC residents to take advantage of suburban job opportunities⁶⁰. The ETS program combines employment screening and training programs with van service to suburban jobs.

The ETA program was very successful from the beginning. In the first six months, using a donated van and volunteer labor, CFLS was able to bring the Marriot Corporation at Dulles airport eight unemployed city residents, a number that soon grew to 30 and then to 200. Other companies signed up and by March of 1986 CFLS was simply unable to handle the demand for its service. They began contracting with a private operator for daily service with 14 vans and eight drivers to transport roughly 150 people.

The ETA program allows new employees to ride free for two weeks (until they receive their first pay check); initially riders were charged \$3.50 per day or \$18 per week. The program handled a non-payment problem by asking employers to withhold the fare from employee paychecks. Although the program began with donations in late 1986 they sought and received an \$80,000 UMTA Section 6 grant to help with operations. Today clients pay \$3.50 per day and companies pay \$15 a shift for transportation.

Although everyone involved with the project considers it a success--the project having obtained jobs for over 950 DC residents since 1986--there have been fairly serious problems. The "official" employee attrition rate is between 30-40% and companies have complained about unreliable employees. An internal CFLS study conducted in April 1988 found that only 46 of 255 people hired between June of 1987 and January of 1988 were still employed--that is, at the end of an eleven month period only 18% of those who got jobs through the program still had those jobs. (Of those that left, only 8% reported leaving to take other jobs.)

The recent downturn in the economy has substantially reduced the number of suburban jobs available; starting in 1987 major suburban employers (largely hotels and nursing

homes) began dropping out of the program, citing problems from an unwillingness to subsidize employee transportation, to an unwillingness to hire District residents. Currently the program transports about 60 people. One final note: most of the locations to which the ETA program transports people are served by conventional public transit but either the time or the fare is seen as prohibitive.

Tenant Management Associations

The Federal Transportation Administration's Entrepreneurial Services Program (ESP) is designed to encourage the private sector, especially minorities, to enter the transportation industry and create efficient, market-responsive transportation services. Under its Challenge grant program, the ESP program has directly funded several reverse commute operations centered at public housing projects.

In addition, the ESP program has funded the National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise (NCNE), a privately funded organization which sponsors projects aimed at enabling unemployed groups to become self supporting and to participate in economic activities, to assist nine public housing tenant management associations in establishing transportation services. The NCNE grant was specifically designed to promote reverse commute service by Tenant Management Corporations, organizations formed by the residents of publicly-subsidized housing projects. The experiences of several projects in both types of tenant management programs are described below.

ESP Challenge Grants

This section describes two non-NCNE reverse commute projects funded under the ESP program: *Accessible Services, Inc (ASI)* (Philadelphia) and *Lakeview Transportation Service*, (Cleveland, Ohio).

Accessible Services, Inc (ASI) is a private reverse commute service operating in and around Philadelphia; it began with one of the first ESP Challenge grants in 1988. Strikingly the original project actually completely failed⁶¹ but a reorganized version is now operating; its current operational patterns are described by Farkas, et al.

It is interesting to analyze the initial failure*. A series of articles in the Philadelphia inquiry in mid-1989 reported that one year after the award of the \$82,500 grant almost all of the grant money had been spent, without one single trip having been made. An official of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce reported that the project had failed because employers did not need low skilled labor, and weren't interested in hiring and

* Although press reports make it clear that the project was totally stopped and all concerned admitted its failure, none of the (previously) published reports make clear how significant and clear cut a failure the first project was.

training workers, particularly black workers--because of racial prejudice and stereotyping⁶². Mark Welsh, the operator of the original and the current operation, was quoted as saying that his problems occurred because few of the public agencies or private firms subsidizing the transportation paid on time. Moreover many of the employers would not hire individual employees unless and until they had been certified for state and federal tax credits.

A study by the National Council of Regional Government offered some explanations for the initial failure of the project, its subsequent reorganization as a broker, and continuing problems, themes which echo with those expressed above (and discussed briefly by Farkas et al.) The NARC report noted that many employers were concerned about ASI's lack of experience and so refused to participate; in addition, the agency acting as the employment broker, the Urban Affairs Partnership, moved slowly and was unable to deal with the constant employment turnover. The employment turnover (between 10-15%) was the result of firings for drug use and attitudinal problems and high quit rates.

The job turnover, coupled with the tendency of successful applicants to get cars, was a problem for ASI. The NARC report concluded that ASI's major problem was getting enough reasonably qualified workers to take the jobs; to retain a ridership of 200 workers, ASI needed to find between 15-30 new workers weekly⁶³.

Currently ASI acts as a broker for the Job Relay System, contracting with various carriers, including a social service transportation system also run by Welch which uses FTA 16(b)2 vehicles, to provide required reverse commute services. ASI, as broker, pays \$25 per vehicle hour and can, therefore break even with five passengers paying \$5 per one way trip. Therefore ASI charges employers \$6 and employees \$4.00 for a roundtrip.

ASI is carrying approximately 150 riders per week although the number fluctuates; the transportation service is packaged with an employee recruitment service. After contacts with more formal training organizations did not work out, ASI developed its own network of community based groups and institutions which generate sufficient low skilled but appropriate unemployed individuals. Currently ASI's biggest clients are hotels and industrial employers in suburban business parks⁶⁴.

The *Lakeview Transportation Service (LTS)* project centered at Lakeview Terrace in Cleveland, Ohio received its \$100,000 ESP Challenge grant in December of 1988 to provide transportation services for public housing and inner city residents to obtain suburban jobs. The Tenant Management Firm was assisted in developing its business, management, and operational plans by three FTA contractors. With an additional \$150,000 raised from private sources, LTS purchased a van, bought insurance, and hired drivers and a manager.

LTS has been plagued by problems since its inception. The consultant reports expected

substantial fare box recovery from passengers and even more substantial employer subsidy. In addition, the operational plan assumed significant fare-paying mid-day shopping and recreational travel. None of these things happened. The manager has had continuing difficulty in developing job opportunities within a reasonable commuting distance which will provide any transportation subsidies and he cannot obtain sufficient revenues from the fares that his riders can pay from jobs in the \$4-5/hour range.

Moreover, the manager has been unable to induce many residents to take jobs; he believes that this is partially because of the trip distances involved and partially because of the structure of public benefit programs. Residents who take jobs face rent increases (since HUD guidelines call for rent payments equal to 30% of income) and the loss of medical and other benefits when they get off public assistance. In his words, "People who receive AFCD and other public assistance are not interested in getting up at 5-6 AM to work for \$4.00 an hour."⁶⁵

Currently, LTS carries 14 people to work and has a contract with the City of Cleveland to transport JPTA clients to training and job interviews for \$2.50 a roundtrip (carrying 8-10 clients per week on this contract). The City Contracting Officer has told us that the City JPTA administrative office contracts with LTS in order to allow any local social agency to help its clients get jobs or training; if an agency calls LTS for a job or training related trip for a client the City will pay LTS to carry the rider. Unfortunately few agencies have taken advantage of this offer⁶⁶.

The manager would like to develop other, non-work related, transportation services but reports that he is limited to providing work related transportation only. He is also unwilling to drive excessive distances (over 35 miles one way) because of wear and tear on the vehicle and the additional (unsubsidized) expenses.

NCNE Assisted Reverse Commute Projects

NCNE used the FTA funds to enable selected tenants' associations to address reverse commute problems by initiating their own transportation services. At each of the nine sites, grants from \$50 -100,000 were used to pay for initial planning, business plan development, and hiring a manager knowledgeable in marketing and transportation. Additional funds had to be raised to pay for vehicle purchases (although recipients could apply for FTA Title III funds, the restrictions involved in obtaining such grants--such as labor approval and prohibitions on charter operations--discouraged most associations.)

NCNE felt that investing in reverse commute operations in public housing communities had several important benefits: first the reverse commute would create jobs (in its operation) and increase access to many more suburban jobs. Increased employment would lead to improvements in the standard of living in public housing developments while the revenues gained would be used by neighborhood groups to expand existing businesses and to develop new businesses. Ultimately successful reverse commute

services would take the pressure off of expensive public transportation programs⁶⁷.

Initial reports on these projects were highly optimistic; a 1989 study reported, "...most planned or operating reverse commute project administrators are enthusiastic about the numerous benefits of the services to employers and inner city workers."⁶⁸ A 1990 study for Urban Mobility Corporation reported, "...reverse commute van programs can be successful where there is high unemployment in certain parts of the metropolitan area and high labor shortages in another part of the region are within reasonable commuting distances...the transportation program can bridge the gap."⁶⁹

Unfortunately, although there are notable successes in the program, many of the projects described in these studies either never got started, have been canceled, or are limping along. In the fall of 1991, four of the nine were not operating at all and one had become a social service contractor. The unsuccessful projects seem to have fallen victim to the same easy assumptions about the link between transportation and jobs that plagued their predecessors in the 1960's.

This section evaluates three of the projects which have been described in the literature and/or which the Study Team contacted during its research: *Cochran Gardens Tenant Management Corporation* (St. Louis, MO)⁷⁰, the *Bromley-Heath Resident Management Corporation* (Boston, MA)⁷¹, the *LeClaire Courts Service Corporation's Accel Transportation* (Chicago)⁷².

In St. Louis, the *Cochran Gardens Tenant Management Corporation* began services in that public housing development in February 1989. The program was beset with problems from its inception, but many had to do with the difficulty of placing residents in jobs. First there was a skills-job mismatch between residents and suburban employers; second, the length of the work trip was so long (60-90 minutes one-way) that many residents were unwilling to make the commute. Finally the program was able to begin service with two vehicles to hotels in a suburban area 20 miles from the housing project, with employees paying \$4.00 per round trip⁷³. The program has not been able to get employers to pay any of the employee travel costs. In 1990 the projects had gained jobs for a total of 30 workers although attrition was extremely high.

Discussions in late 1991 with project staff show that the Cochran Transportation Services work with employers to gain them Targeted Jobs Tax Credit, which allow firms to save up to 40% of the first \$6,000 of wages paid to economically disadvantaged people, to a maximum of \$2,400 per employee. In short, many riders are gaining jobs which are substantially subsidized to begin with, for at least the first year.

In Boston, the *Bromley-Heath Resident Management Corporation* planned to provide a reverse commute service for its residents and other inner city residents to the expanding job market along the Route 128 corridors where there were widely believed to be many entry level job vacancies. Unfortunately just at the time that the Corporation was ready

to begin services, the employers who had been willing to help subsidize it ran into rough economic times. The Corporation did not believe that the employees could themselves afford the \$4.00 round trip cost so they did not begin these services.

Currently the Bromley-Heath Management Corp. has a private subsidiary, the *Connector*, which contracts with job training agencies to provide transportation to training and to jobs using one 15 passenger van. The Connector operates strictly as a for-profit charter or contract provider, with costs paid entirely by job training services; that is, the Connector charges no fares to riders since any employee payment is handled by the training agency. Staff report that employers seem unwilling to pay anything. When the ridership volume is sufficient for fares to cover costs (a minimum of 6), the Connector provides services to the prisons so residents could visit relatives⁷⁴.

Staff report that there is significant turn-over in ridership both because job retention is not high, and, because successful employees ride only long enough to save sufficient funds for a car. The high turn-over has not posed a serious financial or operational problem because the training agency pays the costs and because only a few firms are involved.

In Chicago, the *LeClaire Courts Service Corporation* organized a for-profit subsidiary, *Accel Transportation* which operates reverse commute services under contract to (largely) suburban employers. Accel is considered to be the most successful NCNE projects; NCNE reported that Accel is breaking even after only 18 months in operation⁷⁵. Actually Accel is not running at a deficit only because, in addition to the ESP Program, they have also received a three year grant from the Regional Transportation Authority and a grant from a local non-profit organization, the Darrow Center. Accel is committed to covering a larger share of operating costs from employers and riders and less from RTA over a three year period.

By establishing a relationship with the Chicago Institute for Economic Development to pre-screen job seekers Accel was able to convince employers that it could reduce employee recruitment and training costs. Currently, Accel has contracts with nine employers, carrying 129 riders daily in three vans to job clusters in suburban DuPage County. The thirty mile ride takes roughly 45 minutes and costs \$5.50 per round trip. Riders use tickets which can be bought at Le Claire or from employers (for those employers which subsidize the service).

Project staff have had many of the problems common to both current and historical reverse commute projects tied to employment programs. Staff report that it has been difficult to find employers willing to hire black inner city residents, that the length of the work trip has discouraged many potential workers among LeClaire residents, and that it has been difficult to find natural job groupings in the suburbs (ie one firm, or several adjacent firms, willing to hire a number of workers)⁷⁶.

Farkas and his colleagues in their analysis of this project noted several key features of the Accel project which bear repeating. First, marketing studies contributed to the project weren't very realistic; the major problem was that employment projections did not consider that growth would not equally affect all segments of the market--in short that there would not be equal job growth in entry-level and service sector jobs in the nearby suburbs. Second, the interest of LeClaire Court residents in taking advantage of the transportation was strongly reinforced by the day care and after-school programs which Le Claire provided.

Our own analysis shows that the heavy subsidization of the project is a both a policy and an operational problem. On an operational level, the subsidies provided by employers are a positive feature but they also have created problems because employers require daily service even when the employee level at any given firm has dropped too low to financially justify the stop. The major grants from the private foundation and the regional transit authority are also problematic. In our interviews, project staff reported that the service might not continue when grant funding expires⁷⁷. On a policy level, private operators with substantial public subsidies (not even contracts) are hardly a positive example of the role the private sector can play in reverse commuting.

Transportation Management Associations (TMAs) and Private Employers

TMAs are generally now-profit membership organizations designed to address traffic congestion and transportation problems in specific employment concentrations, often, although not necessarily, at suburban locations. A TMA representing a group of employers has been responsible for a successful reverse commute project in the Princeton, NJ area. In addition, there are two known examples of successful reverse commute projects organized originally by individual employers. All three projects allow employees to commute out from the center city on existing rail lines, providing them with coordinated shuttle services from the closest rail stop to the suburban employment center; all three projects operate in the New Jersey suburbs of New York City and Philadelphia and are discussed in this section of the report*.

The *Greater Princeton TMA (GPTMA)* was formed in 1984 as a non-profit, membership corporation whose goal was to initiate traffic reduction programs in the growing Princeton employment concentrations. Within a few years several major firms re-located from Manhattan who wanted to keep their Manhattan employees; in 1987 Merrill Lynch initiated and paid for a shuttle to transport employees 5-7 miles from the rail station on the New York and Philadelphia line. When First Boston and American

* Both Transportation Management Corporations and individual employers operating transportation services are covered in this section, *Private Not-for-Profit Providers*, because although we assume that the individual and member firms are designed to make a profit, the transportation services are not.

Reinsurance relocated from Manhattan they too tried to start their own shuttle services; the developer of the employment complex, the Forrestal Center, in which they were located suggesting developing one shuttle service for all three firms.

GPTMA was asked to administer and broker the service; it received an Entrepreneurial Service Grant for planning expenses. Once the service was planned, GPTMA requested proposals for service and awarded the contract to a local limousine company. (Staff report that, because of proximity to Atlantic City, many private carriers in the area have excess capacity.) The local public transit operator, New Jersey Transit did not bid on the service because smaller, non-diesel vehicles were specified and because union requirements kept its operating costs higher.

The current service has been operating successfully since October of 1990, with an average daily ridership of 75. The shuttle meets trains during morning and evening peak periods (7-9:30 AM, 4-6:30 PM); the employee pays nothing while each business pays \$104,000/year in operational expenses plus 10% administrative fees (GPTMA member firms pay 8%). GPTMA is responsible for scheduling and coordinating buses with train service (which changes twice a year) and for providing ridership and marketing information.

GPTMA staff attribute the success of the shuttle to several factors: the long history of shuttle service by Merrill Lynch before the coordinated service was begun, the willingness of employers to pay all associated costs in order to keep high level white collar and executive employees, and the developer's use of the service as a marketing tool in attracting other employers to the area⁷⁸.

Another shuttle service in a suburban center close to the Princeton Forrestal Center has also been successful. The *Route 1 "Carnegie" corridor in Mercer County* is an employment concentration located near but not at a commuter rail station along a hi-speed line serving New York, Newark, and Philadelphia. The area has both residential and campus style residential office parks, which are part of the rapid office growth in Princeton; it is located 1.4 miles from the Princeton Junction commuter rail station.

The area's developer began a shuttle service in 1988, the Carnegie Haul, to enhance the attractiveness of the Carnegie Center in West Windsor Township; the developer originally paid all of the costs and the service was free to employers.

The shuttle currently runs from 6 to 10 AM and from 3 to 8 PM on a 25 minute headway, meeting all outbound trains. Employees ride free but local residents pay. A clustered campus style office park, the Center consists of 20 buildings with an average of six bus stops per run with no more than 1/5 mile between stops. The Carnegie Center also includes 550 medium density residential units which generate traditional suburban-to-center city commuter rail ridership to New York and Philadelphia; residential ridership accounts for nearly 60% of the total daily ridership on the Carnegie Haul. The

residential ridership has a 6:30 - 7:30 peak while the reverse commute feeder has a 7:45 - 8:45 peak; the divergence allows the same bus to service both residential and office locations.

A 1991 study by Marchwinski and Fittante⁷⁹ found that about one fifth of the Carnegie Haul riders came from New York City, another one-fifth from Newark, a little over 7% from Philadelphia, and an equal number from Princeton; in total roughly 75% of riders were reverse commuters travelling an average of 28.5 miles. When asked how they would make the trip if the shuttle were discontinued, almost 40% said they would come to work in a car (as a driver or passenger) and another 19% said they would take a train or taxi. No one said that they would not make the trip without the shuttle service.

Another shuttle service was organized in the Middletown/Homdel area of Monmouth County, New Jersey to serve four three separate AT & T facilities located in a rural suburban area, the furthest of which is 7.5 miles from the North Jersey Coast Line, a 66.7 mile rail route with direct service to New York City. The *AT & T shuttle* connects to the Middletown rail station, approximately 40 miles from New York City. However, Marchwinski and Fittante found that over 80% of the AT & T shuttle came from further south of the work site and not from New York; the average trip was 14.4 miles. When asked what mode they would use if the shuttle were discontinued 10% said that they would no longer make the trip while over 40% said that they would drive.

In a 1989 report for the National League of Cities, Mark Alan Hughes noted the existence of two additional TMA's that were then providing some kind of reverse commute service: in Boston the Route 128 TMA group picked up employees at the ends of Boston T-lines and transported them to Wellesley Office Park and Cummings Office Park. In Newark a TMA provided Meadowlinks Ride Sharing, a transportation service from Newark to the Meadowlands where there are employment opportunities for low skilled workers⁸⁰. He also noted the plans of several TMAs in De Kalb and Fulton Counties (outside Atlanta) to provide comparable services but we have been unable to locate them.

Hughes also noted that other individual suburban employers were providing service from the inner city to their suburban employment concentrations: in Birmingham Wendy's fastfood restaurant chain has initiated a system of driving workers to suburban locations in a company car. BP America, a large suburban employer in Cleveland announced its willingness to subsidize private groups to set up reverse commute services. A private seasonal employer in Kansas City sends its own private buses to the inner city to pick up workers during its busy months. Hughes also reported on the difficulties faced by the Burger King franchises in Rochester which began reverse commute services to suburban operations from the inner city; within a year lack of interest by inner city workers and on-site conflicts ended the service⁸¹.

In summary, the services described here are generally different from those described in

previous sections in two ways: first, they are feeder services to line haul facilities and thus require a transfer while the services described above were all fairly direct city to suburb transport with no transfer, and second, in spite of the direct service provided by the first set of services, the second were remarkably more successful.

What characterizes most of the successes analyzed here from the more problematic projects described in previous sections is a) the willingness of employers to subsidize substantial transportation costs, b) the provision of a fairly high quality service, and c) indirectly, the skill level of employees. That is, high skill individuals had choices, both of other jobs and other transportation options and had to be treated well by their employers or they would seek alternative employment.

With the exception of the few Burger King and seasonal examples described by Hughes, these operations contrast markedly with the way employers viewed public housing residents or inner city workers--in general, employers were not willing to cover much or any of their transportation costs, they had to be persuaded to hire the employees in the first place (sometimes only doing so when the worker was additionally subsidized by tax cuts or training programs), and the employees themselves had few alternative choices of either jobs or transportation.

PUBLIC NON-TRANSIT AGENCIES

This section provides three examples of agencies involved in encouraging or operating transportation services to inner city residents commuting to suburban jobs; the *City of Hartford Employment Transportation Services*, the *Regional Employment Program (REP)*, (District of Columbia), and *Wisconsin Department of Transportation JOB-RIDE Program*. The first two are services provided by agencies of large city governments and the third is a program funded by a state DOT and Energy Bureau but limited to one large city. In many ways their experiences are remarkably similar to those of the tenant management associations and social service agencies described above.

Probably one of the oldest programs is a set of projects originally implemented in Hartford Connecticut as the result of a 1977 law suit which the City brought against the State; in an out of court settlement, the Connecticut Department of Transportation (ConnDOT) agreed that its fixed route mass transit routes were inequitable because they provided abundant service to the city from the suburbs but minimal reverse commute services.

ConnDot itself began the provision of reverse commute services from the inner city to large suburban employment centers and industrial parks. At the same time, ConnDOT funded the *City of Hartford* to begin paratransit services for job interviews and training and employment programs. The City established the *Employment Transportation Services*, an agency responsible for planning these services; ETS contracted for shared-ride taxis to take inner city residents to job interviews, physical exams, and other social

services and for temporary vanpools as a transition to fixed route subsidized ride sharing.

Over the years ETS has initiated transportation services to fill a variety of reverse commute gaps--summer employment, after-work training at Bradley airport, etc. Project staff believe that Hartford is one of the first cities with a strategic approach to the issue of unemployment, recognizing that transportation is only part of the overall problem. For example, social agencies have been encouraged to meet regularly in a program of Collective Resource Management to assess how welfare recipients could become self-sufficient, including linking job training, day care, and GED preparation to transportation (although day care has recently been eliminated due to budget cuts).

ETS continues to provide both initial job search and transitional transportation; service can be initiated by either a non-profit employment agency or an employer and will be provided within a 25 mile radius of the City in areas in which neither Connecticut Transit or the Greater Hartford Transit District provide service. Individuals are given free rides to suburban job interviews or training; once employed (or accepted into a long term training program) a newly employed worker may be provided with vanpool service for up to six months--provided there are at least four riders going to the same site.

(ETS may opt to provide service for less than four passengers but only for six weeks; the required 4 person ridership must then be made up of either those already employed at the site or additional new hires from the inner city). Once service has begun, ETS works with the employer and the employment agency to arrange permanent transportation services. In 1989-90, ETS was providing vanpool service to 11 suburban employers.

In 1989 ETS made 24,000 one way trips, providing service to almost 900 people. Many of the riders had been unemployed for long periods, one third having been without a job for over a year. Of those provided transportation services, almost 90% are racial minorities and slightly over one half are women. ETS also offers car-pool matching services for inner city residents and provides a van purchasing and leasing programs which several employers have utilized. Currently ETS has six separate programs all provided under a private contract with The Connecticut Company. The private contractor provides drivers, operations staff, and vehicle storage while City staff are responsible for administration, project development and supervision, and performance monitoring.

Under Hartford's BREAC program (Barriers Removed Employment Assistance Collaborative), implemented in 1988, the City targeted AFDC mothers who had never been salaried and who were living in public housing. The goal was to identify the package of salary and benefits that would be more attractive than public assistance as well as the support services (including transportation and childcare) needed to prepare

clients for and retain them in paid employment. These services were then provided to selected jobs.

Initially the BREAC program was very successful; the first 25 participants experienced an 88% retention rate after six months of employment. However, the recent recession has caused most to lose their jobs or to be offered a salary and benefit package effectively worth less than collecting welfare. (In 1989, Tom Phillips, ETS Director told a CTR reporter that a mother of one child would have to earn \$7 per hour, plus full medical benefits for herself and her child, to just match her AFDC benefits were she to be unemployed⁸²).

Tom Phillips told us that these programs have been successful because agencies have learned the importance of self-sufficiency in job retention. They recognize that a large investment must be made initially in daycare, counseling, financial guidance, and other personal problem solving skills; transportation can only be one element in this package. He feels that, even after recent lay-offs, Hartford has experienced a long term change in attitudes among both workers and employers--stereotypes have been removed on both sides. He is optimistic about the program once business picks up⁸³.

In 1985 the District of Columbia initiated the *Regional Employment Program (REP)*, a joint effort of the District's Department of Employment Services (DOES) and suburban jurisdictions designed to assist in matching suburban employers who are having difficulties in recruiting employees with unemployed DC residents. REP provided a computerized Central Job Bank and preliminary screening of applicants; in addition, the program provided federal Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) assistance to employers for those new employees who qualified. The REP also maintained a transportation information center and distributed limited transportation subsidies to job-seeking applicants.

The Program also established a van leasing program by participating in agreements with suburban employers in which it subsidized up to half the cost of leasing vans to transport DC residents to their employment locations. Between 1986 and 1991 the Program served over 3,000 people placing many in jobs that paid between \$6-7. Unfortunately the Program was phased out in November of 1991 because of lack of money; currently no one at the Department of Employment Services has responsibility for reverse commute services⁸⁴.

The State of Wisconsin Department of Transportation developed a *JOB-RIDE Program* to subsidize access to suburban jobs for inner city and minority residents in an attempt to reduce welfare dependency and to alleviate suburban employee shortages in Milwaukee. JOB-RIDE attempts to bring together business and private organizations serving the unemployed to produce innovative transportation solutions linking urban job seekers to suburban jobs by initially funding private, non-profit organizations which provide job development, training, and placement services to obtain/provide transportation

alternatives where conventional public transit would be inefficient.

In 1989 total program costs were \$259,00 with a mixture of revenue sources (including over 20% from grantee match and a \$90,000 grant from the State's Department of Health and Social Services). In 1990 and 1991 the primary source of financing was the stripper well oil overcharge funds which allowed the program to grow to \$440,000. In the first two years of operation (1/89 - 12/90) JOB-RIDE filled 1,440 permanent and 598 temporary jobs.

A number of changes were made in the program starting in 1990: 1) the program was limited to permanent or probationary jobs, 2) businesses and local government agencies were also allowed to participate as transportation providers, 3) the one-way fare was limited to \$2 per trip and, if a fare were charged, employers were required to pay 50% of that fare, and jobs were required to pay a minimum of \$4 per hour. During 1990 five private, nonprofit organizations received funding to provide reverse commute services; most operated 1 or two vans although the Milwaukee Careers Cooperative operated up to 6 vans.

In 1990 (the last year for which comprehensive data were made available) the Wisconsin Energy Bureau reported that the program served 2,021 people, providing a total of 51,870 one-way trips. The program placed 733 people in full time permanent jobs with an average hourly wage of \$5.38. The cost per one-way passenger trip was \$8.46, the average productivity was 3.06 passengers per hour, and the total cost for each permanent job⁸⁵ placement was \$590. The report noted that while placements had increased over 1989 totals (685), the 1990 target had not been reached and that costs per placement were substantially higher (\$590 vs. \$371 in 1989) and productivity lower than in previous years.

JOB-RIDE services are provided primarily with vans carrying from 3 - 8 riders per one way trip. Most participants lease vehicles but the State apparently allows grantees the option of buying vehicles with the state keeping the lien^{*}.

Although the Program has generally been hailed as a success, the legislatively mandated changes seen in 1990 hint at some problems: lack of employer support, the inexperience of some of the non-profits in transportation provision, and the tendency to subsidize transportation for temporary or very low paying jobs. In its report on the program in 1990 the Wisconsin Energy Bureau listed other problems reported by the grantees themselves:

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- * The Wisconsin Department of Energy 1990 final report on this program reports that, because the cost of leasing vans was so high, grantees were allowed to purchase vehicles. This was denied by an official of the Wisconsin Bureau of Transit but affirmed by one of the grantees.

- 1) low wage levels and the need for health benefits discourage may welfare recipients from accepting or continuing in a job, (even if some benefits continue),
- 2) the need for childcare (and having both the money to pay for it and the time to find it) can discourage welfare recipients,
- 3) inner city residents are not able to compete for the better suburban service jobs, in part because the companies with the best pay have the strictest job performance standards (including mandatory drug testing which has proved to be a problem for their riders),
- 4) appropriate available jobs require substantial commutes which increases provider costs while lowering employee interest, and,
- 5) employers are not very interested in participating (they must pay 50% of any fare charged) and would require additional incentives to participate (which the grantees recommended)⁶⁶.

Interestingly several grantees listed regular riders as a problem since this program's success criterion involved placing people in jobs, not providing long term transportation services. In addition, several grantees faced problems similar to those experienced by Accel in Chicago; to gain employer support the operator had to agree to provide daily transportation services to each employer even if the number of inner-city workers at that firm fell below the level that made such service cost-effective.

The Bureau of Energy also made some evaluative comments of its own, noting that program sponsors may have to lower their expectations regarding job placements and cost-effectiveness given these realities and the downturn in the economy. Moreover the Bureau noted that a summer intern found that record keeping by grantees was fair at best and that few efforts were made to follow the progress of people placed in jobs. Thus, although grantees suggested that the benefits to society of long term employment successes are considerable in both reduced welfare payments and increased tax payments, there are no data whatsoever to show that the placements were former welfare recipients or to indicate how long any of them stayed in the job. The most telling point made by all our sources: there is no guaranteed funding for the program after the oil surcharge money disappears in 1993 and the program may be dropped.

SYNTHESIZING THE EXPERIENCES OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT AND PUBLIC NON-TRANSIT AGENCIES

This study defined four categories of reverse commute provider: *the private for profit, the private not-for-profit, the public non-transit agency, and the transit operator*. This report has already described representative examples of each of the first three types of

providers. Because the second and third share an overriding concern with two major non-transportation objectives: using transportation to increase employment, and using transportation to empower community based groups, and because these objectives are so different from those motivating the last group of reverse commute provider, it is useful at this time to compare and synthesize their common experiences.

It is important to reiterate the fact that reverse commute projects can and did have different goals and that success must be measured in terms of the goals the projects had for themselves. Clearly most of the projects described above aimed at increasing employment among inner city residents by providing reverse commute services temporarily or permanently. In this goal most were not successful. In addition, some of the projects also aimed at developing permanent transportation links to suburban employment centers for inner city workers; even fewer had success at this goal.

The Source of Common Problems

It is clear that many of the projects operated by not-for-profits or public agencies were less than overwhelmingly successful in the goals that they set for themselves. The problem for those that sought to address high joblessness seems clear in retrospect (and when examining historical reverse commute experiments): inner city unemployment is neither caused by the lack of transportation services nor cured by the provision of transportation services. Transportation services may be part of the solution to the unemployment problem but the experiences just described suggest that it may, in fact, be only a minor or temporary part of a useful program.

Several common patterns emerge in the less than successful projects;

■ Project organizers/sponsors made unrealistic assumptions about:

- the availability of jobs matched to resident/worker skills,
- the willingness of firms to hire unskilled workers new to the work force, and,
- the willingness of employers to subsidize the transportation of entry-level employees.

•Project organizers/sponsors made unrealistic assumptions about:

- the willingness of residents to travel long distances to accept entry-level wages,
- the ability of residents to take jobs far from home without continuing additional support or programs (ie childcare), and,

- the ability of low skilled or untrained resident workers to compete successfully for unsubsidized jobs.

•Project funders made unrealistic assumptions about:

- the difficulty of providing reliable and efficient transportation services in the face of high and continuous turn-over rates, and,

- the ability of an inexperienced and untrained staff--no matter how enthusiastic or motivated--to successfully develop, market, and operate transportation services while also running an employment agency.

Other major concerns surfaced indirectly. Several project staff spoke discouragingly of the *unwillingness of public housing residents to work at all* when project expectations of work-seeking behavior had been so high. But those expectations were completely out of line with some stark economic realities; to gain low paid or entry level employment, most inner city residents would lose medical and other social benefits and face rent increases. They would also have to find and pay for childcare. In short, their total after-tax revenue might be significantly less employed than unemployed.

Other project personnel and researchers spoke of their surprise at the *unwillingness of suburban employers to hire minority group members* and the prejudice and stereotyping which they found among those employers. It is easy, and not very fair at a distance, to label these views as naive, but it is worth noting that these are exactly the same discrimination problems which the reverse commute programs of the 1960's and 1970's experienced.

Some projects which focused on raising employment rates also assumed that permanent transportation services would be required while others initially or ultimately came to seen transportation as a transitional service. For the agencies which assumed the need for a continuing service, a major source of trouble was the *difficulty in maintaining a consistent ridership base*. The trouble was two pronged: residents who were successful at getting and keeping a job often bought a car, and residents who do not get or maintain a job dropped out. While several projects glossed over their drop-out rates, turn-over rates were very high and, when adequate data existed, appeared to be substantially above averages for all low skilled workers (in spite of unsupported claims to the contrary).

So agencies spent a great deal of time trying to both fill their vehicles with fare paying customers and find jobs for the unemployed. Not surprising several systems ended up advertising for already employed workers who wanted rides, sometimes taking them right off the transit system.

In addition even those agencies which did not want to offer continuing transport had trouble in providing demand responsive services daily for a variety of riders going to a

variety of jobs. Several programs overcame these problems by only dealing with specific employers or with employment services dealing with specific employers at certain times. ASI in Philadelphia and Accel in Chicago found it easier to supply a steady stream of employable workers than to provide a flexible responsive transportation service. Other providers (like Bromley Heath) were far better at operating contract charter-type service where separate agencies provided and paid for employee recruitment and training and supplied all riders, already guaranteed employment at a few sites. (The next section discusses the more operational issues raised by these services.)

Two additional concerns raised by staff or other researchers are worth comment. First many staff noted that *their efforts were neutralized or rendered unsuccessful by the massive downturn in the economy*. Unfortunately this assertion begs the question by ignoring key issues: if lack of transportation is the reason why inner city people can't get entry-level suburban jobs then the economy should effect everyone equally. That is, if transporting people to job openings doesn't get many inner city residents long term employment while others still have jobs, then we have to question why inner city residents feel the downturn so much and so much earlier than suburban workers.

A second additional problem mentioned by some staff and researchers is the *overwhelming dependance our society has on the car*, several researchers have commented that if cars paid the true cost they impose on society (ie congestion, pollution, energy loss, valuable land lost to streets and parking, etc) we would have more support for mass transit and ultimately for denser land use patterns. Somehow this is seen as helping the inner city poor.

This comment again raises the question of whether transportation is the real problem facing inner city residents; the lack of support for mass transit is a direct function of the suburbanization of society and the inability of conventional transit to compete with cars in low density land patterns^{87 88 89}. The more acute problems seem to be a) the inability of central cities to maintain high density traditional cores because of the shift of jobs to the suburbs and b) the inability of inner city residents to move to the suburbs.

However, even if lack of support for mass transit is treated as a transportation barrier for inner city workers, it does not follow that more support for mass transit will translate into meaningful aid for inner city residents. It is not clear that additional suburban transit or subsidized vanpools would provide more than marginal assistance to the inner city worker who cannot or will not move to the suburbs (even assuming a sort of trickle down transit theory).

Moreover these comments ignore the time travel constraint seen by so many of the projects described above; using transit within our current land use patterns imposes very significant time costs^{90 91}. Even if subsidized, the reverse commute would still be too expensive in time for many inner city workers (who might also incur additional monetary costs for childcare, etc.).

Moreover it seems unrealistic to expect both a massive and speedy restructuring of land use patterns which have been at least 80 years in the making; inner city residents waiting for the return of 1912 Chicago or Boston or even Los Angeles in order to get a job will be waiting a long time.

Last, this kind of thinking ignores how important the private car currently is for the inner city resident trying to keep suburban employment; increasing the price of driving and/or parking (in order to discourage the use of the car) will clearly impact low income people long before it hits the middle class--and long before alternative transit services can be made available to fill the gap.

Overall these experiences strongly suggest that projects providing transportation alone will not increase inner city employment unless they also 1) provide intensive training and skills enhancement, 2) offer a range of continuing support services, 3) ensure wages that more than compensate for both the loss of benefits and increased rent and employment expenses, 4) work with employers to overcome prejudice and stereotyping, 5) guarantee the worker meaningful on-the-job training and a real career ladder, and 6) keep travel times and distances reasonable (and in line with wage rates). There is some evidence, however, that with these resources inner city residents don't need any transportation services at all to secure employment--although they may use them at least temporarily if provided.

The importance of so many other societal variables--lack of education and training, racism, the growing scarcity of decently paid production and industrial jobs, the incredible costs to the welfare recipient of taking suburban work, etc--had only been marginally recognized by project staff before services were initiated. The primary importance of these crucial elements was minimized in the rush to get a transportation service started; while it is hard to fault local project staff, some funding agencies should have had a clearer idea of the enormity of the problem before raising so many hopes.

Certainly a number of recent studies and analysts have recognized that transportation must be part of a package of services for inner city workers but they 1) have not made these observations very forcefully and 2) have at the same time pushed for the development of reverse commute services as a cure for unemployment--sending at best a mixed message.

The Lessons of the Successful Projects

Ironically the single most successful set of projects were those with very different goals; that is, the successful projects started with employed people and provided them transportation, and not the other way around. The clear successes--again in the terms which they set for themselves--were those systems in and around Princeton New Jersey where large employers were willing to pay substantial sums to transport high skilled high income employees from a train station to the work site. Note that there is no indication

that anyone gained a job from these services or that any jobs that would have been lost in the absence of service would not have been easily replaced by comparable ones closer to the central city locations of the commuters involved.

For all other reverse commute projects, those that defined success in terms of employment gained, two substantive factors seem associated with success, factors that were the obverse of the failures described above:

■ transportation is provided as part of a package of services, which includes rider screening, interviewing, and skills training, the development of on-going relationships with major employers, and the long term provision of multiple support services like childcare, and,

■ transportation is provided on a temporary or transitional basis--that is, the measure against which success is measured is *people placed in jobs*, (and less often than it should be considered, *retained in jobs*) and not total or continued ridership.

The organizational structure within which these services was provided varies and also seems to affect success.

• transportation provision is directly and integrally linked but to other agencies providing the full range of employment agency services--screening, training, interviewing skills, etc.

That is, the most successful projects were those which did not themselves provide all these services but had meaningful links to agencies which did. The least successful were those projects which had to "do it all" juggling a number of tasks: finding potential employees and employers, getting the potential worker to an employable condition, making the initial connection between employers and employees, maintaining employer contact, convincing the employer to pay part of the cost of transporting workers, and--then, finally--providing transportation to anyone who actually got hired.

It is also clear that many of the more successful projects did provide service in or near areas where conventional *transit was already operating*, like ASI, ACCEL, and Bromley-Heath as well as Washington's Community Life Services. What these projects provided was more direct and generally far cheaper transportation service than that provided by existing traditional transit providers.

An important note; few projects keep data sufficiently detailed to really determine if they were indeed successful. We spoke with many project staff who believed or maintained that their projects were successful but who were unable to provide any data to substantiate their claims--whether success was measured by job placements or the number of riders or high cost-recovery ratios (or some combination). Few data were

available on actual turn-over rates. Many projects were either unable or unwilling to provide data beyond 1989 or 1990 although they were still operating at the end of 1991. Several projects claimed to be financially successful--which turned out to mean only that they weren't spending more than the subsidies given them, not that they were "making it on their own."

Certainly all of the projects described above had some successful elements. Even among those with the most discouraging results several factors helped:

- having strong leadership and an entrepreneurial spirit
- creating community and large employer support
- establishing a stable on-going organization with community and agency visibility.

The successful projects also had other elements in common which are a little more troubling considering the recent policy emphasis on the role of private entrepreneurs and the self-empowerment of community actors. First, the most successful projects were those where workers and/or those employing them were subsidized by multiple programs, including employment tax credits, JPTA training and employment programs, and local employment subsidies. This suggests again how complex the unemployment problem is since simply providing transportation was not enough to induce many employers to hire inner city workers--unless those workers were given special training at little or no employer cost and their wages were already substantially discounted in some way.

Second, the most successful projects were those which had multiple sources of subsidy and which were not forced to rely simply on rider fares or direct employer subsidization of employee fares or contract revenues. For example, the NCNE projects which have received the most attention are those which have three to five major public and private sources of operating assistance as well as vehicle grants. ASI in Philadelphia contracts with a social service provider which gets most of its vehicles through the FTA 16(b)2 program; Accel in Chicago is funded by the Regional Transit Authority, a private foundation, and an FTA grant. In short they were not really acting like private businesses and the extent of community self-empowerment that realistically results from continual subsidies is unclear.

Certainly some of the projects described became potentially viable once they entered into contract relationships with either employers or public agencies--from the Greater Princeton TMA to Bromley Heath. Contracting can be differentiated from subsidies--since many private transportation providers, including most taxis in the U.S.⁹², stay in business only because they have long term contracts with public or private agencies. Therefore projects which can meet their costs by providing genuine contract services

(which are not disguised subsidies) can be considered successful in our view (although there are differing opinions).

However, it is important to note that some of the projects engaged in contracting were not playing on a level playing field--since many of their start up and vehicle expenses had been subsidized. To be successful entrepreneurs, or to really empower a community over the long run, these projects must maintain a competitive position. This generally means providing an array of services in order not to be too dependant on any one contract. It also implies having the ability to move beyond social service contracting since these kind of funds are in such short supply and may be easily cut.

Above all, examining the more successful projects once again calls into serious question the easy assumptions about the jobs-transportation link; clearly creating employment opportunities takes much more than providing transportation. And running a profitable transportation service takes more than grants which pay start up costs.

Underlying Operational and Service Assumptions

The previous section directly or indirectly focused on experiences in linking inner city people to jobs using transportation. This section focuses on the underlying operational rationale of many of these projects and suggests the problems which reverse commute providers have in developing and maintaining a competitive position--independent of their goals about increasing inner city employment.

Many of these projects tacitly made three major and strongly interrelated operational assumptions which proved to be untrue: 1) that a transportation system could be entirely or largely self-supporting from providing work trips, 2) that private provision of reverse commute work trip transportation would be so much cheaper than public provision that reasonable fares could be charged, and, 3) that there was a need for a long-term transportation service.

First, many systems concentrated all their energy on developing work trip routes either ignoring the need to also provide mid-day trip-making or assuming that such non-work trips would be easy to capture once work trip schedules were established. In fact, the nature of mid-day travel made it extremely difficult to serve because a) it was for neighborhood based shopping and recreation for which there was generally satisfactory and cheap public transit, b) medical and other kinds of mid-travel not well served by transit were not routinized and required real time dispatching and scheduling expertise, and c) the window of time vehicles were actually available for non-work travel was very limited, given the lengthy suburban work trips.

On the other hand, even if a project were able to offer substantial mid-day service, productivity would not be high (few systems who kept records achieved more than 3 passengers per hour) and the fares charged would have to be fairly low. It is

conceivable that the marginal operating costs of mid-service (driver time, gas, oil, wear and tear) could be higher than the revenues.

Second, few providers seriously analyzed the cost parameters involved in providing work trip services with paid drivers. This fact was made painfully clear to the systems, like Project Libertad or Community Life Services in Washington, where the driver was initially either a volunteer or someone paid from another budget, when the system became so large that paid drivers were needed. The reality is that the costs of running services are fairly high, and even higher if all expenses are really counted (including, for example, vehicle depreciation or capital recovery costs for donated vehicles). Apportioning these costs to a limited ridership necessarily creates astronomical fares.

Table Two attempts to show the generic situation facing systems providing only work trips if they attempt to recover all costs from fares (even if those fares are subsidized by employers or other agencies). If the full costs of service (driver plus vehicle depreciation plus operating expenses plus insurance) were \$100 a day (a very reasonable figure) a large 14 passenger van would have to operate at 100% occupancy to generate a fare of \$7! If vehicle expenses were half again as high, the full cost-recovery fare would be over \$10! Only if an operator could provide two round trips per day and those trips were completely full would fares fall below \$4.00 a day per rider. Note that few of the projects had average ridership (ie productivity) any where near these ranges.

The kind of analyses shown in Table Two were only rarely undertaken by project staff. In our discussions it seemed clear that many did not originally understand that they were often dealing with daily costs in excess of \$100. Many providers talked of per vehicle hour expenses in the \$20 -30 range, without quite realizing that such a figure was only realistic if applied over an 8 hour plus day. (That is, it is not generally possible to buy or produce any given hour of service for that figure since many expenses can't be purchased in small discrete units--it isn't possible to buy two hours per day of insurance even if a project can hire a driver for only two hours per day.) To a large extent, most systems should have figured their costs in the way shown on Table Two and not on an hourly basis.

In addition, many operators did not give a value to volunteer time or staff salaried on other accounts or donated parking or office space; more seriously they didn't include any way to pay for new vehicles once donated ones were gone*. In computing costs in

Government accounting regulations forbid grantees from depreciating vehicles received from federal grants because a) the grantee did not pay for the vehicle and therefore should not seek reimbursement for the yearly loss in vehicle value, and b) depreciation is a private sector concept where the costs of doing business are subtracted from profit (see Rosenbloom, Cost-Analysis for Social Service Agency Transportation Providers)--in general federal grantees are not profit making entities. Obviously, many of these projects did not receive their vehicles through federal grants (and so could either depreciate them or establish a capital recovery account) and they are attempting to act like profit making entrepreneurs whose prices/fares should include all costs of doing business.

**Daily Roundtrip Fare or Subsidy Required
for Reverse Commute Entrepreneurial Service Under Different Cost and
Ridership Assumptions**

	Cost Per Day	
	\$100/service day	\$150/service day
<u>One-Vehicle Trip Daily (2-ways)</u>		
50% occupancy (7 people RT)	\$14.29	\$21.43
79% occupancy (11 people RT)	\$9.09	\$13.64
100% occupancy (14 people RT)	\$7.14	\$10.71
<u>Two-Vehicle Trips Daily (2-ways)</u>		
50% occupancy (14 people RT)	\$7.14	\$10.71
100% occupancy (28 people RT)	\$3.57	\$ 5.36

the \$20 - 30 range many providers were really calculating the subsidized and not the full costs that would be incurred by a private profit-making entrepreneur. Thus while many of the systems sought to be self-sufficient their accounting methods actually worked against that goal.

Figure I is a graphic concept of the justification for subsidy which underlay most of the reverse commute projects analyzed. Most of the projects assumed:

- that private entrepreneurs would require fewer subsidies than public operators to provide the very same reverse commute trip,
- that employers could be persuaded to contribute a substantial percentage of the cost, a share that would decrease as rider income increased, and,
- that as the income of riders increased the amount of public subsidy would be decreased by the growing ability of the rider to pay higher fares.


In actual operation many of these assumptions either did not hold or the thresholds could not be reached within the cost parameters shown in Table One. First, while it is extremely likely that private entrepreneurs can provide transportation services for subsidies far below those required by public transit operators, the projects analyzed here provide little direct evidence of the cost advantages offered by the private sector since most were highly subsidized in one way or another.

Moreover, the assumptions about employer behavior were often wrong. Ironically employers appeared to be more willing to subsidize travel as worker income went up--as in the three Princeton area projects. Therefore Figure I shows that at certain fairly high incomes the rider paid nothing while the employer paid all! In addition many projects were unable to get any employer subsidy at all--which left them with the choice of charging \$5 -10 per day in fares to minimum wage workers (and those fares arrived at by undercounting actual expenses) or not providing services at all. Many projects were only able to achieve employer cost-sharing for new or recently hired employees--that is the employer cost sharing was viewed as a time-limited subsidy.

In addition, the actual cost of an unsubsidized fare is probably fairly high--meaning that if the worker could easily pay the full fare in question s/he also could--and probably would--buy a car.

A third major assumption made by some of the projects was that there was a need for a long-term transportation service. However because of the very high rates of turn-over, and the fact that the few successful applicants got cars, many agencies complained of the lack of continuing riders. This made it necessary to do real time re-routing weekly (and even daily) and even to encourage local residents already employed at the site to ride. (Ironically others, like the Milwaukee providers, complained about having too many

Understanding Dynamics of Subsidizing Reverse Commute



continuing riders, taking up space needed for new hires).

In sum, the cost assumptions underlying many of the non-transit agency projects analyzed above were weak at best.

PUBLIC TRANSIT OPERATORS

Public transit operators are providing a range of reverse commute services generally in significantly different ways than the first three major kinds of reverse commute providers. First, an increasing number of transit operators have "stumbled onto" growing reverse commute patterns, suddenly finding that the two way flows on some lines have started to even out (or are even disproportionately reverse commute). Sometimes, but not always, they have responded by changing schedules and stops to accommodate the reverse commuter.

Second, some transit agencies have begun to provide feeder or shuttle services from suburban rail facilities to nearby employment concentrations; sometimes the shuttle service is provided by the rail operator and sometimes by a suburban operator. Some transit agencies have begun to work with employers to develop special transit routes or vanpools for suburban employment concentrations.

And third, at least one transit agency, the Baltimore MTA is acting as a broker, providing funding for a variety of local private operators to serve small reverse commute niches (acting similar to many of the projects described above but with the difference that the service is provided under contract to the transit agency).

An analysis of the role of the transit operator in providing reverse commute transportation raises several disturbing questions. As suggested previously, it is not clear that transit operators are providing adequate service to employment concentrations within the central city, let alone to the growing (and far distant) suburban concentrations. Moreover, the way in which transit operators have responded to reverse commuters are problematic; the responses tend to meet the needs of the transit system far better than they meet the need of the rider.

For example, providing feeder service from a suburban rail station to a suburban employment concentration may be a helpful option for inner city residents but providing direct bus service from the inner city to the same concentration would be far better--it would cost the worker less in time, inconvenience, and probably expense. It wouldn't however increase rail ridership--the major goal of most transit systems with rail operations.

A larger question is also raised by the transit agency practice of providing new services only if the marginal (or average) costs will be covered by fares or employer subsidy or both. Obviously few transit systems in the United States cover more than 30-40% of

their operating expenses from fares; any system is likely to have suburban routes falling considerably below that level. Ironically the routes which tend to show the highest revenue to cost ratio are those in the inner city! In short, transit operators expecting cost recovery from new routes are expecting more from reverse commuters than they are of current riders and generally more from low income inner city workers than from suburban middle income riders.

The sections that follow describe several examples of the four ways in which transit operators are directly or indirectly involved in reverse commute services.

Discovering and Accommodating New Niches

Many of the earlier reverse commute projects were aimed at encouraging transit operators to see something right under their noses for the first time--a revenue producing way to use excess capacity on the outbound trip. But Crain's 1970 assertion that transit operators are not very interested in addressing reverse commute needs has proved remarkably durable.

This sub-section describes two transit services which have become reverse commute providers by fate or accident and two which have made some conscious efforts to meet the needs of that market: the *Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority (MSBA)* (Nassau County, NY), *CalTrain*, (between San Jose and San Francisco), *NJ Transit* and, *Tucson*.

The *Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority (MSBA)* serving Nassau County outside New York City (and providing commuter service to Queens, Long Island, and Suffolk County) is a subsidiary of the New York MTA operated by Nassau County. The system was originally established to provide feeder services to the subways going to Queens, but during the 1980's staff noticed that these same routes were filling up in the reverse direction as light industrial and service jobs developed on Long Island. Staff explain that reverse commute ridership has not been actively developed but has simply increased with new Nassau County employment opportunities; by 1988 the number of morning peak passengers travelling east (away from the subway connection to Queens) had exceeded the CBD-bound number.

Currently reverse commute passengers are estimated to comprise 60% of all MSBA ridership⁹³. The MBSA strategic business plan noted,

[The] reverse commutation pattern has grown steadily...consequently buses no longer "deadhead" back from Queens to the depots. Buses carry capacity loads to points in Nassau and remain in peak service for longer intervals

Other than extending peak service slightly the MBSA has made little effort to streamline existing services for reverse commuters. However at the time we spoke staff were

considering a demonstration feeder service from one or more stations on the Long Island Railroad and the Route 110 (Long Island) employment centers to serve rail reverse commuters.

Caltrains and the Southern Pacific Company, with financial support from San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa Clara Counties, operate *CalTrain*, a 47 mile heavy rail line between San Jose and San Francisco. They operate 52 weekday and 46 (total) weekend trains. Like many operators CalTrain found that it had a growing number of reverse commuters; unlike many operators, CalTrain undertook a detailed study of reverse commute rider characteristics. The 1989 survey found significant differences between the traditional and reverse commuter: reverse commuters were younger, more likely to be male, not "quite so well off financially" and considerably less likely to have a car⁹⁴. Reverse commuters starting in San Francisco were also more like to rate CalTrain as slower, more expensive, and less dependable than did traditional commuters⁹⁵.

NJ Transit, a statewide organization has provided a number of reverse commute services. They began reverse commute operations in the early 1980's when Hartz Mountain Industries asked them to provide service to its new shopping mall and office complex, *Harmon Meadow*, which was located near the North Bergen Park-n-ride serving New York City. Reverse peak trips on the park-n-ride service were re-routed to serve Harmon Meadow, with Hartz paying the operating subsidy. The service continues today without any subsidy since fares cover the operating cost⁹⁶. The following paragraphs describe a sample of the 13 reverse (or sometimes cross-) commute "prototype" projects which NJ Transit implemented prior to 1989.

In 1985 NJ Transit began a link between the inner city of Trenton and the *US Highway One Development Corridor* (Mercer and Middlesex counties) using two separate routes. Although marketing was extensive and headways frequent, ridership was relatively low (below 200 per day compared with routes linking Trenton with Route One shopping malls which carried 2,500 - 3,500 daily). In mid-1987 NJ Transit cut this service back to one route and increased headways. The service has continued in operation, slowly but steadily increasing in ridership; in 1988 ridership had climbed over 400--largely due to an increase in shoppers.

Staff has not seen a significant increase in ridership to the office locations along the corridor, despite frequent marketing efforts made to attract this market...The relative failure to attract significant numbers of office commuters may be attributable to...continued dominance of the private auto, a variety of privately operated shuttle vehicles connecting US 1 locations with the Princeton Junction railroad station...the presence of free on-site parking for all employees located at these offices...⁹⁷

In 1987 NJ Transit was asked to re-route an existing route (No. 1 in Newark) to stop at the *River Terminal Development Corporation*; the transit system agreed to do so if the

the expected subsidy and asks the employer to subsidize the difference between the fare box and the costs of operation. The employer can guarantee service by buying monthly passes for employees.

When we asked project staff if they thought it fair for these employers to pay full costs when other systems users paid (on average) less than 70% of the cost of service, the reply was that "if they wanted transit service they should have located near existing transit facilities." Moreover the economic status of the potential user is not their concern when establishing routes.

In *Tucson*, with a grant from DOT designed to promote alternatives to the private car, the city transit system, Sun Tran, began one reverse commute route and one suburban extension of an existing route to serve a large aerospace firm, a major mall and several resort hotels. Service was provided seven days per week, on half hour headways during morning peak periods and 15 minute headways during the PM peak. Although designed to accommodate workers the route did not provide express bus service; it took roughly 68 minutes to make an 11 mile trip.

While the extended route (the 105 Express) has exceeded its goals, its ridership has turned out to be suburban residents riding to suburban destinations. Route 16, the genuine reverse commute route, did not do well at all; although ridership projections were in excess of 200 people daily the route actually had only 33 at the time it was canceled in the spring of 1992 (when the grant ran out). Staff attribute its failure to downturns in the economy, the need for shorter headways, and public perception that transit is not reliable; they also questioned whether transit and work schedules coincided and whether the trip was simply too long⁹⁸.

It is hard not to be struck by the fact that the City operated the service very much like "ordinary" routes, making no concession to the particular scheduling needs or time constraints facing inner city residents going to work. In fact, to access two of the largest resorts at the end of the route, inner city workers (who had already faced an hour long bus tour of the city) had to transfer to a hotel van at the bus stop to finish their worktrip commute.

The National League of Cities study reported in 1989 that six cities' transit operators were considering implementing, evaluating, or studying reverse commute services (Chicago's PACE, Cincinnati's Queen's Metro, the Denver RTD, Detroit's DOT, Louisville's Transportation Authority, and the New York Port Authority). In 1991 we could find no explicit reverse commute services in these areas--although such services may, in fact, exist.

Feeder Services from Suburban Rail Stations

This section describes two different types of feeder services to regional rail stations

River Terminal would pay approximately \$9,000 a year in additional operating costs. After just a few months in operation the daily ridership (46) exceeded the break-even point (42) and the system continued the service without subsidy.

In the same year NJ Transit was asked by *United Parcel Service* in the Newark area to provide them with public transportation services; UPS had difficulty in recruiting semi-skilled workers for a 12 noon to 4:00 PM shift and felt that the absence of direct bus service was the cause. In fact UPS projected that between 45 and 75 people would use a direct bus service if the 29 route, which intersected virtually all lines in the greater Newark area, were extended to UPS. NJ Transit modified the service as requested, adding 4.9 hours to daily service, requiring an annual subsidy of almost \$38,000 which UPS agreed to pay. Unfortunately, the service averaged only 3 riders per trip and UPS refused to continue to subsidize it after three months of operation--when NJ Transit discontinued service.

In 1988 NJ Transit began service to a regional mall, *Bridgewater Commons*, from older Route 1 communities with potential service sector workers. By making minor adjustments in existing routes, the system was able to provide service at almost no cost. Unfortunately they got almost no riders either; after 7 months of operation ridership was about 25 people per day with about 40% probably being employees. In late 1989 ridership had grown to 50 people per day.

In analyzing all of their prototype non-traditional commute services, NJ Transit noted that the commitment of the employer and the total travel time facing the employee were significant success factors. They concluded that costs could often be kept low enough to maintain service if unused capacity was activated and route deviations requiring little additional operation time were used. Specific examples included the high level of service they were able to provide to New Jersey work locations drawing New York employees because they had so much excess capacity in the reverse direction (given the extensive NJ Transit service to New York). They were also able to cheaply provide service to an employer if his/her location was close to an existing route and the shift times matched existing bus schedules. In fact they calculated that any employer more than 5 miles from an existing bus service (or those with unusual shift times) required an extra driver for the new service.

Problems which lead to low ridership included the physical layout of most suburban office park developments which required substantial time for a bus to circumnavigate and which often dictated different pick-up and drop-off points, forcing riders to walk long distance to access their buildings.

NJT officials are actively involved with the Business-Transit Alliance which has used the information from the 13 prototypical projects to assist businesses in meeting their employee transportation needs. NJ Transit has a policy similar to SEPTA's described below; if an employer requests additional or different transit services, NJT calculates

interested parties pay for that service on a quarterly basis; the cost structure guarantees that SEPTA will break even on incremental expenses. The average cost to each employer is about \$15,000, which reflects a "credit" for the train fare paid by employees using the bus on the grounds that they wouldn't have used the train unless the 200 bus existed.

Most of the 200-series routes run in peak periods only, although some offer hourly service during the off-peak. Most routes carry 2/3 of their riders in the morning peak so that a significant number of riders travel only one way with the feeder bus. One route serving AARP and the Prudential Insurance Complex operates during non-peak hours for shift workers and for job interviewees. Routes carry from 10 to 20 passengers per daily trip.

Costs to some employers originally included vehicle lease expenses. Between April 1989 and early 1991 employers were required to pay one half of the vehicle lease cost or \$12,650 per bus used regardless of fare revenues; the first two routes (which had not been charged this expense) were "grandfathered". Controversy and confusion eventually caused SEPTA to rescind that policy.

By fall of 1991, when we interviewed project staff, SEPTA had six operating 200 series routes, all serving suburban rail stations, and most significantly subsidized by private employers. Three of the routes were in serious danger of being canceled at the time we spoke because they were not sufficiently subsidized and their ridership totals were not high enough to cover costs¹⁰¹. On several routes, employers reported that the downturn in the economy made it easier for them to get sufficient employees without paying transportation subsidies.

The SEPTA Board has actually adopted a formal policy that the 200-series operate contingent on receipt of employer or other subsidies sufficient to meet expected deficits. The Board will only approve a 200-series route in the following case:

Prior to the end of the first year of operations, SEPTA staff will evaluate the overall performance of the routes. A second year estimate of costs, revenues, and deficits will be prepared and first year contributors and possible new subscribers so notified...If second year and subsequent years' funding is not forthcoming [from employers, etc.] steps will be taken to modify service structure and service levels or to discontinue the routes.

Route 201, the first route, was still doing well in the fall of 1991; carrying 250 passengers per day, its operating ratio was 117% and it required no additional subsidies. The newest route, 203, provides service from the Pennbrook station to Merck and Ford Electronics; prior to service initiation staff had estimated a daily ridership of 90 passengers with the two firms agreeing to fund the \$12,650 deficit. Unfortunately the route has only 23 daily passengers and will be discontinued if substantial subsidies are not agreed to.

carrying workers out from the central city: *Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority's "200-Series"* (Philadelphia), and, *Cobb Community Transit (CCT)* (suburban Atlanta).

The best known system of suburban reverse commute feeder services is the series of six *"200-Series" routes* operated by the *Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority* (Philadelphia) or SEPTA. Hughes has chronicled the initiation of the SEPTA 200 series. In September of 1986 the developer of a group of suburban business campuses approached SEPTA and asked for a new bus service to link the employers located there to the nearest suburban rail station. SEPTA's original analysis showed that the route would only can carry 60% of the ridership needed to recover the cost of operations strictly through fares.

The developer and the major tenants agreed to subsidize the difference. The Route, 201, was heavily marketed by SEPTA and began service in March of 1988 but by June had 186 riders--more than enough to cover operating costs. By September the route was carrying 237 passengers and using the "profits" to subsidize the rail system itself⁹⁹.

As a result of the success of Route 201 SEPTA began planning more than a dozen 200 routes between suburban rail stations and employment areas. The 200 series routes are implemented in special ways¹⁰⁰:

- 1) Bus and rail schedules are coordinated to "guarantee" connections.

This requires the bus to arrive at the rail station five minutes before train departure and to depart the station about three minutes after train arrival.

If trains are late, buses are held.

- 2) Special fares have been established.

Holders of certain rail passengers ride free; other train users pay a 50c transfer fee.

- 3) The private sector is the primary source of funding for operating deficits.

Fund raising and coordination is handled by TMA's, individual employers, or business park managers.

- 4) The 200 series schedules also include connecting regional rail information.

In general 200-series routes are only established when employers call and request them. SEPTA staff then develop a cost proposal for the requested service and require that

passengers were transferring from the rail service and that actual deficits were almost \$33,400. The Bucks Bounty IDC did make quarterly payments on the expected \$12,600 deficit but cannot cover an amount nearly three times higher; the County itself has also refused to provide additional subsidy. Therefore in October of 1991 SEPTA recommended discontinuation of the 211 route which is carrying 96 passengers daily.

It is hard not to be struck by the impact of SEPTA's particular definition of service success; neither (relatively) high ridership nor fairly substantial financial contributions from local business or government is enough to constitute a successful service. For SEPTA to continue to operate these feeder services, almost all the riders must be contributing to regional rail revenue and ridership and somebody must pick up almost all the expenses involved. It's unlikely that SEPTA applies these criteria to most of the other bus or rail routes in its vast system.

Using SEPTA's definition it appears that most of the feeder services were less than successful as transportation services, although public relations staff report that the routes have demonstrated their effectiveness in providing a link between employers and employees which is good for business. In the words of the SEPTA marketing director, "these services give substance to SEPTA's new slogan, 'Public Transit Means Business in Pennsylvania'."

There are no data on the numbers of riders who got or kept their jobs as a result of these augmented services and no data on the socio-economic status of those riders. There is anecdotal evidence that some are low skilled workers, and the willingness of some employers to subsidize service suggests that there is definitely a need for feeder connections to suburban rail services, although the primary beneficiaries are unknown. It is conceivable that some of these riders resemble those in the Princeton Area (ie higher income, higher skill levels) rather than being poor, unemployed inner city residents commuting out on rail lines.

Cobb Community Transit (CCT) provides feeder services to and from MARTA stations in Atlanta and DeKalb county; originally designed to take suburban residents to five suburban MARTA stations (since MARTA does not reach Cobb County), the system found itself with growing reverse commute ridership as people learned how to use the system. CCT has an agreement with MARTA which allows it to only service rapid rail stations and which permits free transfers between the two carriers. However, an examination of their route structure makes it clear that CCT actually provides significant service in downtown Atlanta which facilitates reverse commute activities.

CCT Route 10, which has the highest volume of reverse commute ridership (almost 3,400 trips weekly) stops at four major MARTA stations in the city (Five Points, the Peachtree Center, the Civic Center, and the Art Center) before travelling to suburban Cobb County in closed door operation. In Cobb County, Route 10 makes four stops including a large hotel and a major regional shopping mall. Another Cobb County route

Route 205 which connects the King of Prussia Plaza with the Wayne Regional Rail Station, serving three colleges and concentrations of office, hotel, and light industry, was funded in 1989 by private employers as part of a package of new week-day and week-end transit services in the area. Unfortunately, although other (non-feeder, non-reverse commute) routes put into service at the same time were doing better than anticipated by 1990, Route 205 was doing very poorly. SEPTA agreed to continue the service for a second year but only with serious service cuts. In the fall of 1991 the route was averaging 57 passengers daily (although the average Saturday non-work ridership was 130 passengers). In an October 1991 report SEPTA staff recommended discontinuation of all but Saturday service on Route 205.


Route 206 is one of the more successful routes. Converted from an existing route into 200 series service in May, 1988, the route connects the Paoli Regional Rail Station with the Great Valley Corporate Center in Chester County. Originally funded jointly by Chester County and the Rouse Corporation, Rouse eventually picked up the whole deficit. The route operates weekdays only with eight morning peak trips and three afternoon peak trips. There has been a slow but steady increase in ridership, with most transferring from the regional rail system (there are currently 125 daily passengers, higher than originally anticipated) but the deficit had also increased because a second bus was required for the larger ridership. The total 1992 subsidy was \$14,500. However SEPTA staff expect a smaller deficit in the future because ridership is expected to decrease after a local highway construction project is completed, allowing the service to revert to a one-vehicle operation¹⁰².

Route 210 has also had higher than anticipated ridership but a higher than expected deficit; connecting the Willow Grove Regional Rail Station and the Horsham Business Center via the Prudential Business Campus the route originally required no subsidy. With first year ridership of 163 daily passengers (compared to an estimated 140 passengers) projected revenues were ahead of costs. However ridership studies revealed that only 40% of passengers were transferring from the regional rail system; the other 60% were transferring from other transit routes on which they paid substantially lower fares. Therefore SEPTA (over strong opposition from the Greater Willow Grove Chamber of Commerce) credited far lower revenues to the routes and projected a first year deficit of \$14,400.


In order to overcome the need for this deficit, SEPTA has suggested cutting back 210 service significantly during mid-day which they predict will lower operating costs without substantially lowering ridership.

Route 211, connecting the Warminster Regional Rail Station with the Ivyland industrial area of Bucks County, has similar problems although it always required a subsidy. In the first year the \$12,600 projected deficit was paid by Bucks County with the Bucks County Industrial Development Corporation agreeing to undertake fund raising efforts to take over second year funding. However, on board surveys showed that only 2/3 of

Reverse Commute and Rail System




Scenario One



Scenario Two

Key



stops at the Lennox Buckhead station which is a large new employment and residential area serving as the hub of the rail network. However staff admit that the scheduling of the buses is less convenient for reverse commute workers; all buses, including Route 10, operate during the peak only. Staff admitted that some reverse riders had asked for the provision of direct downtown Atlanta to Cobb County service but that the closed door agreement with MARTA precluded such activity.

The Cobb County example hints at one of the problems that may be hidden within some reverse commute feeder services; it is illustrated in Figure II. In Scenario One the transit operator (or TMA or employer) provides a feeder to meet rail riders coming from the inner city and takes them two to eight miles to a suburban employment concentration--that situation has been described a half dozen times in the previous sections of this report. But note that under many circumstances it is faster and more convenient for the rider to be provided direct express bus service from the CBD.

In many cases these more direct services are not provided because there are multiple, generally public, transit providers limited by jurisdiction or franchise, or the major regional provider operates the very expensive rail service and has a tremendous incentive to increase rail ridership on reverse commute service. Many of the more successful private reverse commute projects in Philadelphia, Chicago, and Washington were in fact addressing this situation--rail and other suburban transit services actually existed but they required time consuming, inconvenient, perhaps dangerous, sometimes expensive transfers. The private tenant management associations, etc were simply providing direct service.

A Public Transit Brokerage

In 1988 the Maryland Mass Transit Administration was asked to sponsor a private entrepreneur in providing reverse commute services in the Baltimore area. Rather than give assistance to only one provider, the MTA requested an UMTA ESP grant to fashion a program called Access to Jobs which stresses the provision of private suburban transportation services by individual entrepreneurs.

Like many of the transit operators described above, the MTA was often asked by individual employers to operate new services in suburban areas but had to refuse because they were simply too expensive to provide. With Access to Jobs the MTA has a mechanism to foster private transportation in areas which the MTA can not efficiently serve. In the first part of the program the MTA has enlisted a variety of private providers so that employers can choose among appropriate operators. The second part of the program focuses on outreach to suburban employers, to convince them of the advantages of subsidizing some or all of their workers' commute.

The program is designed to use FTA funds to help private entrepreneurs develop and deliver the suburban, often reverse commute, services, required by suburban employers

- *overestimated* the proclivity of inner city workers to travel lengthy distances for low paying, often dead-end service sector jobs.

In short, inner city unemployment is a complex problem of which transportation may not even be part for many individuals; Figure III suggests the problem is a series of overlapping factors and needs.

The study also focused on different provider roles in reverse commute service provision and came to four major policy conclusions:

- non-transit agencies (public or private) appear to provide the most successful reverse commute transportation services for new job seekers, but only when the agencies provide a range of supportive services.

- ◇ These agencies do less well at providing daily repetitive commuter transportation for the people for whom they've gained jobs.

- transit operators can provide successful reverse commute services for those already employed in three ways: they can,

- ◇ rationalize and streamline existing bus services so that already employed workers don't face two and three transfers, commuting hours daily on trips that would take minutes by car,

- ◇ they can provide feeder bus services from regional rail or bus stations to major suburban employment complexes, synchronizing travel and work schedules, and,

- ◇ they can work with suburban employers or employment complexes to establish new bus services that provide fairly direct service from inner city neighborhoods.

- there is an important role for private entrepreneurs in reverse commuting, largely as contractors to public agencies and to transit operators, because most work services cannot be self-sufficient without subsidy; private operators, whether for-profit or not-for-profit can:

- ◇ contract with public agencies to provide inner-city-to-suburban bus/van services;

- ◇ contract with public agencies to run feeder services.

- opportunities for genuine free-market provision of profitable reverse commute services are very limited, given restrictive transit franchising, the low income of

for which they are willing to pay. Entrepreneurs are expected to present their ideas and a business plan showing how they will be self-sufficient within two years. Yellow Transportation Service, the entrepreneur who "started the ball rolling" in 1988 began the first Access to Jobs service in December of 1990 using one van to carry employees to T. Rowe Price. Unfortunately, the service lasted less than three months because the employer had only initiated service to ease the transition to a new site and was unwilling to continue to pay the subsidy.

Although the economy has created serious problems for the program, project staff are hopeful that when there is an upswing there will be more interest in transportation services. Staff feel that the program will be in place when the economy picks up¹⁰³.

Obviously these results are remarkably similar to the problems and barriers faced by other public and private agencies described in previous sections. It is difficult to link transportation and employment, to get suburban fares very low if all costs are counted, or to obtain meaningful employer subsidy for transportation services. Like many of the projects described earlier staff blame the poor economy or employers who don't understand for problems which are much more endemic and complex.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study analyzed both historical and current reverse commute projects and found remarkable, and cheerless, similarities. Overall there is little evidence that the provision of transportation services had any greater impact on inner city unemployment now that it did in the projects undertaken twenty-five years ago, nor that it was any easier to start a self-sufficient transportation system, nor any less difficult to get a public transit agency to take an active role in providing reverse commute service.

More specifically the study found that even during more happy economic times proponents of reverse commute services:

- *overestimated* the real extent of suburban vacancies matched to inner city resident skill levels,
- *underestimated* the costs of operating transportation services,
- *overestimated* the willingness of suburban employers to hire and train inner city workers for the vacancies that actually existed or to subsidize transportation services,
- *underestimated* the reluctance of inner city workers to endanger their families by giving up health and other public assistance benefits to take entry-level jobs, and,

potential riders, and the high costs of service delivery, but they do exist; private operators can:


- ◇ profitably provide services as part of a family of transportation services to inner city neighborhoods, (spreading costs more evenly over the entire day), and,

- ◇ profitably provide services under contracts from private firms.

In addition, many low skilled and semi-skilled workers who are actually employed in the central city (that is, are not reverse commuters) face sometimes substantial bus trips because of the traditional radial nature of urban bus systems. Therefore a five mile trip which could be made in a car in under ten minutes might require almost an hour on a bus because of the need to go out of the way to effect a transfer. It appears that some of those working within the boundaries of the traditional city, as well as those commuting to the suburbs, may need transitional or permanent transportation services.

Finally it's important to note that reverse commute, as commonly defined, is only a problem in older, generally northeastern, urban areas with traditional cores; in fact, there are many (probably more) low income workers who face long and difficult commutes which are suburban to suburban. Clearly such people are a) not reverse commuters, but b) have just as serious a transportation problem. Also fairly clearly, some of the same transportation options which are being widely addressed to meet suburban transportation needs--from vanpools to subscription buses to shared ride taxis--could and should be investigated to meet these central city work trip needs.

Reverse Transportation Services in Perspective



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runs, Routes 747 and 626, revealed that the services influenced the decision to take and retain the jobs of 60 to 66 percent of surveyed passengers (Paquet et al. 1991). Moreover, surveys found that around 30 percent of Pace's reverse commuters formerly drove alone to work.

Employer Vanpool and Subscription Services

Employer-supported vanpools and subscription services are suited for highly dispersed suburban markets, such as office parks in the exurbs. Particularly where fixed route schedules cannot be justified, vans can serve the commute needs of small clusters of workers. They are most economical when employees operate vehicles. Pace's subscription van services, wherein employers and Pace share van purchase and operating expenses and rely on employee drivers, enjoy an 83 percent cost recovery rate (Pace 1992). Over half of Pace's 75 vans serve the new Sears headquarters in Hoffman Estates. The program has been highly successful, with around 30 percent of Sear's 5,000 suburban workers currently commuting by some form of mass transit (Gresiakowski 1993). When Sear's headquarters were in downtown Chicago, 92 percent of the workforce commuted by mass transit, so part of this success is no doubt attributable to workers' ingrained habits of patronizing transit. Pace capitalized on the situation by designing an ambitious market development program that approached all employees about their individual commuting needs and delivered a rich mix of transit options (subscription bus runs, fixed route services, and carpools in addition to employer sponsored vanpools). In Sear's case and others, guaranteed ride home programs and on-site retail and other mixed-use activities have encouraged workers to join vanpools.

HOV Lanes and Dedicated Busways

Dedicated busways and HOV facilities improve suburban services because, unlike rail systems, vehicles can leave guideways and filter into low-density neighborhoods, reducing the need for the dreaded transfer. Around 5 percent of the surveyed U.S. properties have some form of HOV lanes for suburb-to-suburb runs in addition to the more traditional radial services. Ottawa's 30-kilometer busway captures as many as one-third of all trips to several large shopping plazas and work centers outside of the core (Cervero 1986). Houston transitway, slated to extend to 95 miles by 1995, is already the world's largest, a seemingly perfect technology for a region that is spread out but features two dozen or more large-scale activity centers. Despite strong economic growth over the past few years, Houston's average freeway speeds and transit patronage have increased faster, and arterial congestion levels have fallen more, than any large U.S. city over the past five years (Hanks and Lomax 1991; Cervero 1993).

Motivations and Reactions to Suburban Service Reforms

The national survey of 88 U.S. transit properties also elicited information on why various suburban-targeted service reforms have been introduced and the reactions of

different stakeholders to these changes. From the survey, transit managers indicated that most suburban service reforms were introduced in direct response to complaints by suburban customers. The second most cited reason for initiating service reforms was to improve cost-effectiveness in response to budget pressures. Other reasons given were to stem declining ridership, improve service performance (e.g., better schedule adherence and reduced deadheading), and political pressures for fairshare allocation of services within a district.

The survey also revealed that passengers, transit managers, and transit board members were overwhelming supportive of the service changes introduced (Figure 7). Only half of transit operators and union officials, however, supported the changes and 15 percent of those surveyed had negative opinions of the changes. These negative reactions can be partly attributed to the fact that many suburban service reforms have involved some private sector contracting and takeover of services.

Stakeholders




Figure 7. Reactions to Suburban Transit Service Reforms

Land Use Initiatives

A criticism of suburban-targeted strategies is that they reinforce the low-density, auto-reliant development patterns that they attempt to serve. Some observers argue that regions should be restructured so that more people will ride transit. Transit works best when it connects relatively dense nodes along radial axes (Smith 1984). Having mixtures of apartments/condos, office towers, and other activities is also needed for balanced, two-way flows. Greater Stockholm and Toronto have such built environments, and operate world class rail systems that handle upwards of two-thirds of all suburban work trip origins and destinations (City of Stockholm 1989; Pill 1983).

Traditional Neighborhoods

Transit-oriented and neo-traditional developments have gained popularity in recent years as design motifs that reduce auto-dependency and create attractive environments for walking and using transit. Neotraditionalists like Andres Duany and Peter Calthorpe borrow many of the successful elements of traditional turn-of-the-century transit villages: commercial cores within walking distance of a majority of residents; well-connected (typically grid) street patterns; varying densities of housing; and mixed land uses. The jury is still out on whether designing such places in the 1990s will lure many people out of their cars. A Montgomery County MD study found that workers from "transit and pedestrian friendly neighborhoods" use transit 8 percent to 45 percent more often than workers from neighborhoods conducive to automobile use (e.g., with curvilinear roads and no retail shops). All neighborhoods in the study were about the same distance away from transit facilities (MNCPPC 1992). Another recent study of "streetcar" neighborhoods (ones which at one time were served by a streetcar and have inherited higher densities, gridded streets, and mixed uses) and relatively closeby "auto" (postwar typical suburban) neighborhoods reveals some degree of elasticity between urban design and travel behavior (Cervero, et al. 1993B). A comparison of Bay Area neighborhoods matched in terms of comparable average household incomes and levels of bus service intensities shows that the denser, mixed use street car neighborhoods average 5 to 8 percent more work trips by transit and 2 to 14 percent more work trips by walking or cycling.

In recognition of the need to build communities that are more easily served by transit, around 30 U.S. transit properties have prepared site and urban design guidelines over the past decade. These guidelines are meant to encourage developers to incorporate public transportation considerations into their project designs. They also aim to help local planners in their reviews of development projects. Although none of the design guidelines have yet to be codified into local ordinances, around 10 of the transit properties with guidelines have prepared checklists that local planners use in evaluating the degree to which a proposed project encourages transit usage and pedestrian access.



PRIVATE SECTOR BRIEFS



Urban Mass Transportation Administration - Office of Private Sector Initiatives

Volume 4, Number 1

Entrepreneurial Services

September 1991

Access to Jobs Program

Baltimore, Maryland

In 1988, the Mass Transit Administration (MTA) in Baltimore, Maryland was approached by a progressive local private transportation company and the Baltimore Regional Council of Governments to serve as sponsor for an Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) Entrepreneurial Services Program (ESP) grant. The proposal was for operation of reverse commute service which would link inner city workers with suburban jobs in the Baltimore region. While impressed by many aspects of the proposal, the MTA responded that all private transportation providers in the region should have access to such assistance and that signing off on the proposal would give an unfair advantage to a single provider. As a result, the MTA tailored for the region an ESP project known as "Access to Jobs." The ESP program is designed to promote self-sufficient transit services that can be operated without relying on continued public subsidy.

In August 1990, UMTA awarded a \$399,000 three year grant to the MTA to demonstrate the feasibility of a regionally managed, employer-sponsored, privately operated transit service. The State of Maryland agreed to provide an additional \$150,000 to be used for marketing, planning and coordination and private providers agreed to contribute \$125,000 in capital funding. The MTA describes this service as "a customized transit service provided by private operators for suburban employers."

The Baltimore region, like most urban areas in the country, has experienced major suburban growth while unemployment remains high in the central city. As a result of this imbalance, suburban employers have actively voiced their need for transit service to take city residents to outlying jobs. The MTA has initiated some new bus services to take Baltimore residents to suburban jobs. However, these services are very expensive to operate and the MTA cannot begin to meet the demand which exists. Unlike some other public transit agencies, the MTA believes its mission should include promotion of a range of transit services, both public and private. The phrase sometimes used by MTA to describe their agency is a "travel agency for transit services."



The Access to Jobs Program is a grant-in-aid program which reimburses service providers for capital depreciation of vehicles and marketing activities on a per mile basis. The capital portion comes from UMTA's support and is distributed monthly as a per vehicle mileage rate. The MTA established rate for automobiles and mini-vans is \$.20 per mile. The rate for larger vans and mini-buses is \$.30 per mile. Up to \$10,000 per provider is provided by the state for marketing activities. Marketing assistance is set at 15 percent of the capital assistance rates. Thus, marketing assistance is \$.03 per mile for automobiles and mini-vans and \$.035 per mile for larger vehicles. Therefore, the total federal and state contribution rates are \$.23 and \$.345 per mile depending on the type of vehicle. Under this grant services are expected to become self-sufficient within a two year period.

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The program has two parts. One is the enlistment of private operators into the program so that employers can be provided with a choice of operators who are ready, willing and able to deliver transit service. The MTA has sent out over 300 invitations to private operators to enlist them in this program. Twenty-four operators attended an informational meeting in August, 1990 and numerous face-to-face meetings have been held since that time. The MTA makes no attempt to restrict any provider from registering. The provider list gives objective information about each operator which permits employers to make their own assessment of registered providers. Currently ten providers are registered for the program. Providers are responsible for finding their own business and are cautioned against waiting for leads from the program. The MTA in its role as broker does attempt to bring employers and service providers together whenever possible. The MTA also offers assistance to operators in market analysis, service planning, and marketing.

The second major focus of the program is an outreach effort to suburban employers. Solid support from employers is essential to the success of the program. The MTA is encouraging employers to subsidize part or all of the transit costs for these employees since they stand to benefit from reaching these new markets through the program. The MTA hopes to get the message across to employers that the program can, at a modest expense, solve their employees' transit problems. To date, the MTA has contacted over 10,000 employers in the Baltimore Washington International Airport area, has held group meetings with about 50 employers and individual meetings with a dozen different employers. Also, the MTA has used business newsletters, economic development publications, and newspaper articles to publicize the availability of this service.

At this point, it is too early to judge the success of the program. To date, the program has sponsored one suburb-to-suburb van service. T. Rowe Price, a major Baltimore mutual funds investment firm decided to try the program while it was preparing to shift 315 workers from its downtown headquarters to Owings Mills, a burgeoning suburban employment center located about 14 miles from downtown. To make the employees' transition more manageable, the company offered free van service to transport workers from outlying suburban park and ride lots to Owings Mills for the first three months. About 16-25 employees actually used the service. But after three months the company asked employees to pay for the service. Unfortunately, ridership was too low to make the service affordable and the service was discontinued.

MTA staff believe the program has more potential in linking inner city workers with suburban jobs than in relocation situations, such as the T. Rowe Price service. The current

recession has slowed hiring in the area. The few persons who are being hired often have access to automobiles since they are now taking jobs they would not have considered in the past. Certainly, improvement in the area's economy will have a positive impact on this program as local employers resume hiring. In the meantime the MTA will continue serving as a broker for this service in the greater Baltimore area. The MTA estimates that services operated under this program by private operators will cost less than half the cost of the MTA operating service itself.

This project is the first demonstration of its kind where a local transit agency has taken such an active role in implementing an UMTA ESP grant with financial and management support. UMTA hopes to use this innovative demonstration as a model that will be emulated by other local governments and public transit agencies.

The "Access to Jobs" program is an example of how a public-private partnership in transportation service provision can be a win-win situation for everyone:

- The unemployed workers gain access to job opportunities which were foreclosed to them before because they lacked personal transportation;
- The local community wins because improved job access means fewer residents on the welfare rolls and more residents with disposable income, thus boosting the local economy;
- The suburban employers win because they gain access to a larger labor pool while reducing recruiting and training costs and staff turnover;
- The private transportation operators gain a new market for their services and enhanced business opportunity;
- The public transportation agency fulfills its mission of increasing public mobility and expanding service at the least cost to the taxpayer.
- The taxpayer is a winner, too. For by demonstrating that reverse commute services need not be a permanent drain on public resources, the program will help to reduce demands on federal operating subsidies and free public resources for other, more urgent needs.

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SEPTA, facing facts, cuts back shuttle lines in suburbs

Planners hoped to help the environment. Instead they found how hard it is to pry people out of cars.

By Ken Dillanian
INQUIRER CORRESPONDENT

It looked like an idea whose time had come.

To reduce pollution, encourage use of public transit and make it easier for city residents to get to jobs in the suburbs, SEPTA a few years ago set up its "200 Series" of shuttle buses — six routes to travel from suburban train depots to plants and office complexes.

Now the results of the experiment are in. For the most part, the public has voted with its feet — or, more precisely, with its cars.

Because of lack of ridership, SEPTA has pared service on most of the 200-series lines and is preparing to pull the plug on the Route 203 shuttle.

The Route 203 bus began operating last summer to help shuttle workers at Ford Electronics Co. of Worcester and Merck & Co. of West Point between their jobs and the nearby Pennbrook train station in Lansdale.

But faced with \$64,000 in operating losses on the line this year, SEPTA approached the companies last month about scrapping it. Merck and Ford agreed that it was time to stop payment on their \$12,000 annual subsidy, of which Ford paid 80 percent, company officials say.

While world leaders meet in Rio de Janeiro to think globally about the environment, the fate of the 200-series shuttles is a case study of how difficult it can be to act locally.

What's more, many companies face a 1996 federal deadline for getting their employees to stop driving their cars to work. Planners had hoped that the 200-series shuttles would serve as an example of how it could be done.

However, with the exception of the shuttle that services the Great Valley Corporate Center in Chester County, the 200-series routes are not doing well.

What was an hourly shuttle in Willow Grove now runs less frequently. The bus from the Wayne rail station to King of Prussia operates only on Saturdays. The 200 route in Warminster barely escaped elimination earlier this year.

Even the shuttle that Jim McLaughlin, SEPTA operations planner, called "our star," the Route 201 in Fort Washington, has seen ridership decline 40 percent during the last year.

He blames the shuttles' problems in part on the recession, which has

forced companies to scale back work forces. The losses occurred even though, in the case of the Route 203 shuttle, Merck and Ford did try to attract riders, McLaughlin said.

"They even held drawings and gave away free monthly passes," McLaughlin said. "People just weren't interested."

When SEPTA held a public hearing in Kulpsville on May 29 to discuss the Route 203 shuttle's fate, only one person attended.

McLaughlin and other transit experts say the case of the 200-series shuttles is merely another example of how difficult it is to pry Americans from their cars.

Leo Bagley, associate director of the Montgomery County Planning Commission — which was instrumental in establishing the 200-series shuttles — said advocates of "greener" transportation face a daunting inertia of habit.

"I think you need a big change in how people think and how companies think," he said.

But change may have to come soon because American driving habits are on a collision course with federal environmental law.

James Devenney is head of the Transportation Management Association, an obscure agency, funded by government and business, charged with planning for environmentally sound transportation. The agency covers portions of Montgomery and Bucks Counties.

Devenney spends a lot of his time telling companies about a little-known but significant provision of the federal Clean Air Act that re-

quires certain categories of companies to draw up plans to reduce the number of employees who drive to work alone in their cars.

Big employers such as Merck and Ford soon will be affected by the provision.

The plans must be submitted to the state by November 1994. By 1996, the plans must be implemented, or states could face the loss of federal highway money.

"I hope [Ford and Merck] know that they have complicated their future planning, and I would be anxious to see what they are going to do to comply," Devenney said. "Because they just participated in eliminating exactly the kind of thing that's going to be required."

"It doesn't help us any," Ronald Roggenbuck of the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission said of the 200-series woes. His agency disburses the federal funds that could be cut off if the 1996 deadline is not met.

To comply with the law, Roggenbuck said, large employers could reserve choice parking for car-poolers; give workers who use mass transit a

\$20 monthly stipend; set up their own shuttle buses or charge employees to park.

"There's going to be a lot of resistance," said Gary Triplett, who heads the state Department of Environmental Resources Air Resource Management Division.

He said much of the business community did not yet know about the regulations.

Ford spokesman Larry Stewart said the company had not been fully informed about them. "It's not something that came up" during discussions about scrapping the shuttle, he said.

Merck is familiar with the law's provisions, spokesman Dale Hartshorne said, but is unsure how they would be enforced. He said Merck was looking into ways to reduce the number of employees who drive to work alone but was also building a 1,600-space parking garage on its growing West Point campus.

"Maybe the companies will come back to us in 1996, when the rules are in effect," McLaughlin said. "But we have to deal with the present realities."

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A C C E S S T O J O B S

Reverse Commuting from City to Suburbs



CITY OF CHICAGO

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NOV 23 1990

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To whom it may concern:

Attached is the final report entitled Access To Jobs: Reverse Commuting From City To Suburbs. This report represents the completion of work by the City of Chicago Department of Public Works, Bureau of Transportation Planning and Programming on Unified Work Program element 7365.08 under grant IL-09-0081.


The report considers reverse commuting in the Chicago region, focusing on some of the problems associated with getting residents from the Near South and West Side areas of the city, where unemployment levels are high, to five suburban areas to which nearly 20,000 Near South and West Side residents already commute.

Major findings concerning these city-to-suburb commutes include: Over 43% of the households in the study area have no auto, over twice the regional rate. Waits for connections and walks from bus stops extend travel times by transit to 28 to 107 minutes, compared with 22 to 53 minutes by car. Carpools account for 30% of commutes (almost twice the city rate), but are considered unreliable by employers. City transit and suburban buses have fare parity which makes this commute feasible and economical, but time consuming; service and fare changes are needed to make commuter rail service an alternative. Job counselors, unfamiliar with suburban transit services, cannot tell suburban job seekers how to use those services to get to work sites.

The report concludes that a coordinated regional solution is needed to provide city workers with efficient access to suburban employment. Among possibilities that should be considered are scheduling to shorten waiting times, improving transit service to employment sites, integrating regional fare structures, and developing information about city-to-suburb commuting for use by job counselors and job seekers.

If you have any questions regarding this study, please contact Ms. Joan Berry at (312) 744-7740.

Very truly yours,



David S. Williams, Jr.
Public Works Commissioner


Attachment



02 Traffic Mitigation (Center City and Suburban)

Technical Report Documentation Page

1. Report No. UMTA-IL-08-0081-90-1	2. Government Accession No. (NTIS) PB91-132019	3. Information System UMTRIS/Section 8	
4. Title and Subtitle Access to jobs: Reverse commuting from city to suburbs		5. Report Date October 1990	6. DOT Report Number
7. Author(s) Richard Hazlett		8. Performing Organization Report No.	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Chicago Department of Public Works 320 N. Clark Street, Room 411 Chicago, IL 60610		10. Grant or Project No. 11-08-0081	11. Contract No.
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address U.S. Department of Transportation Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) 400 Seventh Street, SW Washington, D.C. 20590		13. Type of Report and Period Covered	
15. Supplementary Notes		14. Sponsoring Agency Code	
16. Abstract The 13.1% of Chicagoans who are unemployed could fill positions in suburban Cook County and in Lake and DuPage Counties, if transportation were available. This report focuses on some of the problems associated with getting residents from the Near South and West Side areas, where unemployment levels are high, to five suburban areas where nearly 20,000 Near South and West Side residents already commute. Major findings concerning these city-to-suburb commutes include: Over 43% of the households in the study area have no auto, over twice the regional rate. Waits for connections and walks from bus stops extend travel times by transit to 28 to 107 minutes, compared with 22 to 53 minutes by car. Carpools account for 30% of commutes (almost twice the city rate), but are considered unreliable by employers. City transit and suburban buses have fare parity which make this commute feasible and economical, but time consuming; service and fare changes are needed to make commuter rail service an alternative. Job counselors, unfamiliar with suburban transit services, can not tell job seekers how use those services to get to work sites. Providing city workers with efficient access to suburban employment is a regional problem that will require a coordinated regional solution. Scheduling to shorten waiting time, improved service to employment sites, integrated regional fare structures, and development of information about city-to suburb commuting are among possibilities that should be considered.			
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ACCESS TO JOBS

prepared by

CITY OF CHICAGO
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
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ACCESS TO JOBS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There is a nationwide trend toward increased job opportunities in suburban regions, while unemployment has increased in central cities, especially among minority populations. The Chicago area is no exception as suburban Cook County and DuPage and Lake counties expect further employment growth while 13.1% of all Chicagoans and 23.2% of non-white Chicagoans are unemployed.* These unemployed city residents could fill positions in suburban areas, if transportation were available. But excessive travel time, incompatible schedules, shortages of route information and gaps in service provision hinder the many Chicagoans who rely on public transportation from pursuing these opportunities.

This report focuses on some of the problems associated with getting residents from the Near South and West Side areas of Chicago, where unemployment levels are high, to five areas in the suburbs where job opportunities exist and to which nearly 20,000 Near South and West Side residents already commute. The five selected areas are used simply to illustrate some typical transportation problems and are not targets for special access improvement efforts. Improved access needs are a regional problem and targeting, if any, should be based on future studies of job opportunities suitable for unemployed city residents.

Major findings of this initial phase of investigation include the following:

- Between 1980 and 1986, the city sustained a net job loss, with the worst losses in the manufacturing sector; suburban areas are experiencing net employment growth, although with little or no growth in manufacturing. This combination indicates a continued need for enhancing city residents' access to areas of suburban job opportunity.
- There is no auto available in 43% and 45% of households in Chicago's West Side and Near South areas, respectively, compared with a regional level of 20%. If residents of these households travel to areas of high employment opportunity in the suburbs, their average transit travel times range from 28 to 107 minutes compared to 22 to 53 minutes by car. Much of the difference is due to time spent waiting for bus connections or walking from the bus stop to work.
- Compared with a share of 16% for all work trips by Chicago residents, carpooling accounts for approximately 30% of trips from the West Side and the Near South to suburban areas. However, carpools have been historically perceived by employers as an unreliable means of access to a job site.

*Based on 1986 Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

- While there is fare parity between CTA and Pace services, making rapid rail/bus trips between the city and suburbs feasible and economical (albeit time-consuming) even for low-wage workers, major service improvements and fare-policy changes would be necessary in order for city residents from the high unemployment areas to utilize Metra services to get to most suburban job locations.
- Along with actual physical/geographical gaps in transit service availability, indications are that job counselors are unfamiliar with the transit services that are provided in the suburbs, and that therefore, clear and up-to-date information on the use of public transit to get to job sites is not being given to job seekers.

Providing city workers with efficient access to suburban employment is a regional problem that will require a co-ordinated regional solution. Scheduling that shortens transfer waiting times, improved service to employment sites, integration of regional fare structures and development of public information for city-to-suburb commuting are among the possibilities that should be considered.

ACCESS TO JOBS

SECTION I.--BACKGROUND

In the last decade, the work of numerous researchers* has described the trend toward increased job opportunities in suburban regions, as contrasted with the large-scale unemployment existing within the limits of the cities nearby. The trend follows development patterns which have been evolving for several decades, and is exacerbated by present transportation networks. Recent reports on the Chicago metropolitan economy indicate that most of the current job growth occurring in the Chicago region is taking place in the suburbs, particularly DuPage and Lake Counties, and that these counties lack the necessary populations to fill lower-paid, entry-level jobs. These are jobs that unemployed city residents could fill, if transportation were available.

This study examines employment and work trip patterns from two areas of the City of Chicago with high unemployment to five Cook County suburbs which have a high ratio of workers commuting from the city and good employment opportunities. Although this study has a narrow focus, the issue of access to jobs at suburban employment centers by city workers spans the six-county Chicago area. Businesses, governmental entities and transportation agencies are all working to address the problem of linking jobs and workers.

The problem has been developing over several decades. In the years shortly after the Depression and World War II, the number of young families in the United States grew. The demand for single-family housing increased, with the government responding by promoting the use of FHA and VA mortgage guarantees. Small communities made up of single-family homes developed--primarily directly outside the established city centers. At the same time, minority populations from the South began to see that the large, industrial northern cities were filled with opportunities for jobs, housing, and education. The minorities migrated to the central-city areas, in many cases utilizing housing vacated by families who had moved to new suburban communities.

In addition to these shifts in population, the industrial base became geographically fragmented. In the late 1950's and during the 1960's, growing numbers of industrial and manufacturing firms located in the suburbs. Lower land values and ample space for expansion, convenient and uncongested expressway access, lower taxes and less stringent anti-pollution requirements offered attractive incentives for industrial growth in the suburbs. And, with the manufacturing firms, the supportive industries--services, retail and wholesale--also tended to shift to suburban locations. Even more recently, suburban fringe areas have developed into "high tech" corridors in which research- and technology-oriented businesses are locating.

The growth that has occurred in suburban areas has necessarily meant changes in work-trip travel patterns. However, in most cases throughout the country, the provision of public transportation has not kept pace with the configurations of suburban sprawl. Locally, with large-scale unemployment evident within the City

*See source list attached.

of Chicago, the fact that many job opportunities now exist outside the city limits is cause for concern. Of even greater importance is the fact that for many individuals in Chicago, these job opportunities are inaccessible by public transportation--for a variety of reasons. Excessive travel time, incompatible work/transit schedules, shortages of route information, and gaps in service provision play a role in keeping some of Chicago's unemployed residents from pursuing job opportunities outside of the city.

This study examines employment work trip patterns in five Cook County suburban areas, ways in which public transportation is serving or failing to serve these patterns, and presents limited recommendations for improvements. Section II outlines city and suburban employment patterns. Section III examines work trip patterns and Section IV assesses public transportation services. Section V discusses the gaps in public transportation provision--whether informational, institutional, or geographical--and provides suggestions for beginning to fill some of the unmet transit needs.

SECTION II. EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS

A. Chicago Employment

Estimates of unemployed residents of the City of Chicago by quarter-section were prepared by the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission (NIPC) from 1980 U.S. Census information. The 1980 Census indicated a relatively high level of unemployment among black and hispanic populations, populations which are residentially concentrated in the West and South areas of Chicago. Bureau of Labor Statistics data (Table I, below) show that unemployment continues to be concentrated in the central city, with minority populations faring worse across the metropolitan area. Thus, central city non-whites have the worst employment outlook. While central city white populations seem to have been able to recover from the 1981-1982 recession by 1986, non-white unemployment jumped over 50%, so that by 1986 the rate was 23.2% of the civilian labor force. For the city as a whole, unemployment increased from 11.1% to 13.1% in 1986.

Table I
Unemployment Rates - Chicago City and Suburbs

Area	1980		1986	
	Civilian Labor Force (1,000)	Percent Unemployed	Civilian Labor ⁴ Force (1,000)	Percent Unemployed
City				
White ¹	900	9.0	826	7.8
Non-White ²	495	15.4	484	23.2
Total	1394	11.3	1376	13.1
Suburbs				
White	1936	4.2	1591	4.3
Non-White	105	13.3	121	16.5
Total	2042	6.3	1763	5.3
SMSA/PMSA ³				
White	2836	6.9	2417	5.5
Non-White	600	15.0	605	21.8
Total	3436	8.3	3139	8.7

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment Annual Averages. See Appendix One for a discussion of these BLS data.

¹White includes non-black Hispanics.

²Non-White includes Blacks, Asians, black Hispanics and all others.

³SMSA is the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, defined in 1980 as Cook, Dupage, Lake, Will, McHenry and Kane counties. The metropolitan area was re-defined by the Bureau of Census in 1986, for statistical purposes, as a Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA) and consists of Cook, Dupage and McHenry counties. Hence the drop in the civilian labor force.

⁴Civilian labor force in 1986 now includes military personnel.

According to 1986 estimates of unemployment prepared by the Mayor's Office of Employment and Training, 10 out of the 12 community areas in the City of Chicago with the highest rates of unemployment are located completely or partially within the Near South and West side areas. (See Table II and Figure 1). Although the data do not account for redistributive changes which happened since 1980, i.e., changes in job and employment location, they do provide the only current available estimates for community level unemployment.

Table II

Chicago Community Areas With An Unemployment

Rate Above the City Non-White Average¹: 1986 Estimates


	<u>Community Area</u>	<u>Unemployment Rate</u>
<u>West Side</u>	26 West Garfield*	26.6
	27 East Garfield*	26.4
	29 North Lawndale*	26.2
<u>South Side</u>	33 Near South Side	26.0
	36 Oakland*	36.7
	37 Fuller Park*	28.3
	38 Grand Boulevard*	30.6
	40 Washington Park*	26.8
	42 Woodlawn*	24.8
	54 Riverdale	31.9
	67 West Englewood*	26.4
	68 Englewood*	23.5

Source: Mayor's Office of Employment and Training, "1986 Annual Average Labor Force Estimates for Chicago Community Areas," May 1987. See Appendix One for a discussion of these data.

*Community area within West Side and Near South Side study areas.

¹Non-White City average from Table One is 23.2%.

Figure 1
Chicago Community Areas With An Unemployment
Rate Above The City Non-White Average¹: 1986 Estimates



Source: Mayor's Office of Employment and Training, "1986 Annual Average Labor Force Estimates for Chicago Community Areas," May 1987. See Appendix One for a discussion of these data.

¹Non-White City average from Table I is 23.2%.

In these West and Near South areas of high unemployment, unemployment rates range from 23.5% in Englewood to 30.6% in Grand Boulevard. Riverdale on the Far South Side had the highest community area unemployment rate (31.9%). These unemployment rates are more than twice the citywide unemployment rate of 13.1% and all exceed the city non-white unemployment rate of 23.2%. (See Appendix Two for unemployment estimates for the balance of community areas.)

These two large residential areas—the West and Near South sides—made up of groupings of the high unemployment quarter-sections, were identified as study areas for this study to provide more meaningful information on trips flows and mode use. These two areas also provide a logical focus for future efforts to improve transit access to employment opportunities in the suburbs. The two areas, outlined in Figure 2, are referred to in this study as the West Side and the Near South areas. Combined, these two areas include 28 out of the 35 quarter-sections with the largest number of unemployed residents.

The West Side area includes all or part of the communities of Humboldt Park, Austin, West and East Garfield Park, and North and South Lawndale. The Near South area includes all or part of the communities of Englewood, Fuller Park, Grand Boulevard, Washington Park, Kenwood, Greater Grand Crossing, and Hyde Park. On the whole, these two study areas of residence are characterized by unemployment levels that exceed the citywide average, and by related levels of income per household that are well below the city average. Altogether, in 1980 nearly 53,000 out of 134,000 unemployed Chicagoans resided in the Near South and West Sides. Not included in these numbers are the "discouraged" unemployed, that is, those individuals who are not actively seeking a job.

B. Job Opportunities in City Areas

As the need for employment opportunities for city residents has increased, employment in the city has declined; and declines have been sharpest in the manufacturing sector. Lower-skilled jobs in this sector historically have paid more and offered more opportunities for future earnings increases than do similar level jobs in the service sector.

The following table presents information on the level of manufacturing job opportunities in Chicago neighborhoods. Note that the table presents the total number of jobs for all categories of employment: clerical, administrative, manual, etc. Thus the table cannot show the actual loss or gain in lower-skilled manufacturing jobs, but does show trends in manufacturing activity.

Table III
Industrial Employment in Chicago City Areas¹

Area ²	Manufacturing			All Industries		
	1981	1984	% Change	1981	1984	% Change
North	54,577	44,088	-19.2	175,406	167,225	- 4.7
Northwest	50,016	39,238	-21.5	110,154	103,913	- 5.7
West	45,891	36,137	-21.2	113,545	99,103	-12.7
Southwest	24,710	21,414	-13.3	64,303	61,463	- 4.5
Inner South	18,534	14,700	-20.7	60,142	55,273	- 8.1
Near South	26,711	24,692	- 7.6	96,544	89,556	- 7.3
Far South	28,689	20,099	-29.9	53,111	44,830	-15.6
Central BD	11,263	8,764	-22.2	239,974	232,749	- 3.1
Outer Bsnss Ring	58,279	54,263	- 6.9	261,650	244,750	- 6.5
TOTALS	318,670	263,395	-17.3	1,174,829	1,098,862	- 6.5

Source: Illinois Department of Employment Security, Where Workers Work in the Chicago Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, 1985.

¹Where Workers Work data are only available to 1984 and are not available for 1980.

²"Areas" are not the same as defined in "Where Workers Work." See Figure 2, following, for a map of industrial employment areas and their relation to Access To Jobs study areas.

Between 1981 and 1984, manufacturing employment within the City of Chicago declined by 17.3%, from 318,670 jobs to 263,395. Within the Near South and West Sides, areas affected by high unemployment, a total of 11,773 manufacturing jobs were lost. (The Near South and West Side "Where Workers Work" areas here are very similar, but not identical, to the same named areas in this report. See Figure 2, following page.) The data suggest that since 1980, opportunities to meet the needs of the unemployed with city-based or neighborhood-based manufacturing jobs have declined.


C. Suburban Employment Study Areas

Five suburban areas of employment were selected for detailed analysis based on the number of work trips to each area that originated in the City of Chicago. While other areas in the suburbs also are now, or are becoming, centers of employment, the intention was to focus initially upon the "close-in" areas that are somehow linked to the city by common transit routes. Moreover, each of the five areas has a high proportion of low-skilled blue collar employment that may make these areas a source of job opportunities for unemployed City residents. Each of the five suburban areas combines several one-mile sections, which have at least 500 city residents employed. These five areas are also characterized by a high

Figure 2
Chicago City Industrial Employment Areas
(From Table III)

POSTAL ZIP CODE MAP - Chicago, Ill.

018667 © The Rand McNally Corporation 1966



Shaded areas indicate high unemployment areas considered by this study.

density of employment (over 4000 jobs per square mile), which is more typical of the concentration of jobs in the city than of that in other suburban areas—where job sites tend to be widely scattered. Nearly one-third of the Chicago residents employed in the suburbs work in one of these five locations. In addition, for all of the areas but Elk Grove Village, employees from the City of Chicago represent at least 20% of the total employment.

Changes in manufacturing activity must also be assessed for the suburban areas of employment opportunity. The following table presents the distribution of industrial employment for these selected suburban areas, as Table III did for the city.

Table IV
Industrial Employment in Suburban Cook County¹


Area ²	Manufacturing			All Industries		
	1981	1984	% Change	1981	1984	% Change
#1 Skokie/ Lincolnwood/ Niles	29,073	28,745	- 1.1	71,113	69,783	- 2.0
#2 Melrose Park/Franklin Park/Northlake	42,846	37,810	-11.2	71,889	54,091	-24.8
#3 Broadview/ Maywood/ Forest Park	5,225	4,100	-11.6	23,770	23,737	- 0.2
#4 Cicero	21,293	15,293	-18.2	35,484	24,818	-30.1
#5 Elk Grove Village	15,078	17,525	+16.2	33,728	38,048	+12.8
TOTALS	113,515	103,473	- 8.8	235,984	210,477	-10.8

Source: Illinois Department of Employment Security, Where Workers Work in the Chicago Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, 1985.

¹Where Workers Work data are only available to 1984 and are not available for 1980.

²"Areas" are as defined in "Where Workers Work." See Figure 3, next page, for a map of areas.

**Figure 3 -- Suburban Cook County
Industrial Employment Centers**



Since 1980, declines in manufacturing have occurred in four out of the five target areas. Only Elk Grove Village had an increase in manufacturing employment between 1981 and 1984. Area #4, Cicero, which has sustained a number of major industrial closings in the last several years, lost nearly 9,000 jobs, two-thirds of which were in the manufacturing sector.

However heavy the manufacturing loss in these suburban areas may seem (22,000 jobs), in fact the loss is much less than that suffered by city areas (60,000 jobs). The total loss for suburban areas (Table IV above) was 8.8%, while for city areas (Table III) was 17.3%.

D. Long-Range Job Outlook - City and Suburbs

Based on employment forecasts for the Year 2005 compiled by the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission (NIPC), manufacturing jobs in the City of Chicago are expected to continue to decline (see Table V). This suggests that areas outside the city or non-manufacturing job sectors will have to be relied on to provide opportunities for city residents. The sharpest declines are expected in the Far South and the Near South Areas, with an anticipated 1980-2005 decline of 9058 and 6383 jobs respectively. Altogether by the Year 2005, roughly only 270,000 manufacturing jobs are expected to remain in the city, compared to 340,070 in 1980.

The total number of jobs in the manufacturing, services, transportation and utilities, and retail sectors in Chicago is expected to decrease. However, growth is projected for the service sector. In general, this sector requires a higher level of skills for well-paying jobs (i.e., computer programmer) and have traditionally paid less to low-skilled workers (i.e., keypunch operator). Unlike in the manufacturing sector, entry-level service workers do not advance as easily because of the amount of formal education required for the higher paying positions.

In the suburban target areas, manufacturing is expected to stabilize, with no overall change in the number of manufacturing jobs expected by the Year 2005 compared to 1980; growth is expected in all other sectors. Due to the proximity of these suburban areas to the city, they are likely to continue to be potential sources of employment for city residents.

Table V
Employment Forecasts for Selected
Industry Groups¹, Chicago City²

<u>Range/ Township</u>	<u>Manufacturing</u>		<u>Services</u>		<u>Trans & Util</u>		<u>Retail</u>	
	<u>1980</u>	<u>2005 % of 1980</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>2005 % of 1980</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>2005 % of 1980</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>2005 % of 1980</u>
Northwest (40-13)	66,410	85.2	36,592	109.3	18,292	94.6	26,161	82.2
North (40-14)	32,488	80.0	44,370	104.3	10,963	95.8	14,744	76.4
West ³ (39-13)	66,757	89.4	32,785	105.7	25,654	101.1	25,018	85.2
Central (39-14)	94,151	72.5	316,670	124.9	101,349	91.3	89,747	81.9
Southwest (38-13)	40,580	85.4	11,260	163.1	26,560	100.1	15,151	89.3
Near South (38-14)	16,269	60.8	40,749	134.3	13,188	96.2	12,186	76.9
Far South (37-14)	23,415	61.3	12,126	365.6	6,287	106.1	7,101	57.7
TOTALS	340,070	79.2	494,552	128.2	202,293	95.0	190,109	81.3

Source: Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission. Forecasts generated in 1986.

¹Government and Self-employed sectors not included.

²See Figure 4 for a map of township areas.

³Includes Cicero, Berwyn and Oak Park.

Table VI
Employment Forecasts for Selected
Industry Groups¹, Chicago Suburbs²

<u>Range/ Township</u>	<u>Manufacturing</u>		<u>Services</u>		<u>Trans & Util</u>		<u>Retail</u>	
	<u>1980</u>	<u>2005 % of 1980</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>2005 % of 1980</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>2005 % of 1980</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>2005 % of 1980</u>
Niles (40-13)	48,560	100.4	19,976	113.2	16,609	109.1	17,405	113.1
Leyden (40-12)	55,824	97.3	19,189	154.3	26,032	101.2	19,340	101.0
Cicero ³ (39-13)	66,757	89.4	32,785	105.7	25,654	101.1	25,018	85.2
Proviso (39-12)	22,621	104.0	18,589	100.3	16,062	104.7	15,442	109.2
Elk Grove (41-11)	28,574	120.5	11,529	130.8	26,835	113.0	8,082	192.6
TOTALS	222,336	100.0	102,068	118.1	111,192	106.6	85,267	112.2


Source: Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission. Forecasts generated in 1986.

¹Government and Self-employed sectors not included.

²See Figure 4, next page, for a map of township areas.

³Includes the West Side area of Chicago (same area as "West Side" in Table V).

Figure 4
Chicago City and Suburban Township and Ranges



SECTION III.—CHICAGO TO SUBURB WORK-TRIP PATTERNS

A. Location of Work-Trip Destinations in Suburban Areas

According to the 1980 U.S. Census, approximately 210,000 Chicago residents hold jobs in suburban areas (Table VII). This represents 18% of the 1.2 million jobs held by all Chicago residents, and 12% of the 1.7 million jobs available in suburban locations.*

TABLE VII

Home and Work Location of
Chicago and Suburban Residents

Home:	<u>Work Location</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>Chicago</u>	<u>Suburb</u>	
Chicago	971,400	210,000	1,181,400
Suburb	446,000	1,482,800	1,928,800
	1,417,400	1,692,800	3,110,200*


*Does not include 80,000 persons who work outside SMSA.

Just over 100 suburban sections (one-mile square zones) were identified as the workplace for at least 500 Chicago residents. These zones are presented in Figure 5. Altogether these 102 zones represent the work locations of over two-thirds of the Chicago residents who have jobs in the suburbs. Geographically, the Chicago-to-suburb work-trip flows are directed primarily at suburban areas within north and northwest Cook County. Of the 102 zones with the highest levels of employment of Chicago workers, all but six are within Cook County.

The location of suburban workplaces for Chicago residents relates not only to the apparent proximity of workplace to place of residence, but also to the concentration of total suburban jobs at these locations. The suburban work locations of Chicago residents are, in most cases, the locations with the highest number of jobs overall.


Figure 6 presents the Chicago origins of the flows to each of the five suburban study areas. This shows that there are substantial volumes of work trips from many areas of Chicago to each of the five suburban study areas. As expected, the highest work-trip flows are from city areas that are close to suburban areas of work. However, there are also considerable numbers of trips to most of these suburban areas from residential locations in Chicago that are more than 10 miles away.

**FIGURE 6--Chicago-to-Suburban Work-Trip Flows:
Residents per Township Employed at Work Destinations**



Work Destinations:

- ① Niles/Skokie/Lincolnwood
- ② Franklin Park/Melrose Park/
Northlake
- ③ Forest Park/Broadview/
Maywood
- ④ Cicero
- ⑤ Elk Grove Village



B. Trips Volumes from City Unemployment Areas to Suburban Areas

As shown in Table VIII, a substantial number of West Side and Near South residents commute to suburban jobs, and a high percentage of residents from these two Chicago locations work in the five major suburban study areas. Over 21,000 work trips from the Near South area, and over 26,000 work trips from the West Side area are made to employment locations outside the city. Trips to the five key suburban employment areas represent half (50%) of the work trips to the suburbs from the West Side and 29% of trips from the Near South. The higher share of trips from the West Side area is probably due to the closer proximity of the area to the five suburban work place locations.

C. Auto Availability

Persons who live in the Near South and the West Side areas are more dependent on public transportation than are persons in most other sections of the city. In the West Side area, 43% of the households have no automobiles, and in the Near South area, 45% of the households have no automobiles (Table IX). These percentages compare with a citywide average of 37% of households with no auto, and with a six-county rate of 20% of households with no auto available. Among those who currently are working, 21% of West Side residents and 24% of Near South residents have no auto available in their household. The percentage of unemployed residents living in households without autos is much higher.

The low availability of autos suggests that, at least for residents in these two areas, adequate transit service is probably an important component of the job search, and may also be necessary to maintain employment.

TABLE VIII

Trips From Areas of High Unemployment

<u>Residence</u>	<u>Job Location</u>	<u>Trips</u>
West Side	1. Niles/Skokie	2252
	2. Franklin Park/Melrose Park	4478
	3. Maywood/Forest Park/Broadview	3147
	4. Cicero	2798
	5. Elk Grove Village	937
Total West Side to	- 5 Suburban Areas	13612
	- All Suburbs	26600
Near South	1. Niles-Skokie	1723
	2. Franklin Park/Melrose Park	1570
	3. Maywood/Forest Park/Broadview	1459
	4. Cicero	907
	5. Elk Grove Village	620
Total Near South to	- 5 Suburban Areas	6279
	- All Suburbs	21400

TABLE IX

Auto Availability in Households

	<u>Percent Household With No Vehicles</u>	<u>Percent Worker Living in Households With No Vehicles</u>
Six-county Metropolitan Area	20	8
Chicago Total	37	20
West Side	43	21
Near South	45	24

SECTION IV.--PUBLIC TRANSIT SERVICE

A. Transit Service from Areas of High Unemployment


Access by transit to suburban work locations for Chicago residents is made primarily by transferring from CTA rapid transit lines to buses operated by the Suburban Bus Division (Pace) of the Regional Transportation Authority or to CTA buses that operate in some suburban areas. Nearly all the quarter-sections of highest unemployment are within one-half mile of a CTA rapid transit line (see Figure 7). West Side residents are served by the Congress, Douglas, and Lake Street Lines. The Near South area is served by the Dan Ryan Line, as well as by the Englewood and the Jackson Park branches of the North-South Line. In most cases, only one rapid transit line is required to reach the bus transfer point for suburban locations; in some cases, however, an additional necessary transfer between rapid transit lines can be made in the Chicago CBD.

Since most quarter-sections of unemployment in the Near South area are adjacent to the Englewood and Jackson Park lines, for Area 1 direct access from the Howard Street Station is possible for connections to Pace or CTA buses. For trips to suburban employment areas west of the City (Areas 2, 3, and 4), access is provided by connecting to either the Lake, Douglas or Congress Rapid Transit lines. One exception is that trips to the northern work locations of the Franklin Park/Melrose Park area require a connection to the Grand Avenue bus in the city, and then a transfer to the Pace Grand Avenue bus. Trips to Elk Grove Village by transit require a change to the O'Hare Line in the CBD, and then a transfer to the Pace bus at the River Road Station.

From West Side locations, access can be made directly to transfer locations in the western suburbs by using one of the three rapid transit lines serving the area. However, from most residential locations, a CTA north-south bus trip and a transfer to the rapid transit line providing connections to a particular work location, is required. As is the case with trips from the Near South area, rapid transit service does not provide direct connections for trips to work locations near Franklin Park.

West Side trips to the Niles/Skokie/Lincolnwood area are possible via rapid transit service on the Congress and the Douglas Lines to Jefferson Park without changing trains. Although the routing of this service is much less geographically direct than using a CTA north-south bus line, the higher speeds of rapid transit make this the fastest mode of access. West Siders travelling to Elk Grove Village also utilize the rapid transit service, although a good deal of "back-tracking" is involved: Riders from the West Side travel east into the CBD and then out west again, and north, to the transfer point for the Pace Elk Grove Village bus. However, even this indirect routing is more convenient than would be making all the bus connections necessary to getting from the West Side to Elk Grove Village.

Figure 7—CTA Services Providing Connections To Suburbs



B. Transit Service in Suburban Study Areas

The level of transit service in suburban areas varies. In some areas, transit service is similar to that found in city areas--making many job locations quite accessible. In other areas, job locations are either difficult to reach or are totally inaccessible by transit. Following is a summary of information about suburban bus access available to each of the five primary suburban areas of employment for city residents.

Area 1: Skokie, Niles, Lincolnwood

Nearly all work locations in the Skokie/Niles/Lincolnwood Area are within walking distance (4 blocks) of a bus line. Moreover, the levels of service provided by bus lines in this suburban area approach those found in many parts of Chicago, especially during the peak hours. Three bus routes operating from the Howard Station provide peak-hour headways (i.e., length of time between buses) ranging from 6 to 15 minutes. From Jefferson Park north to work locations, bus headways also generally range from 10 to 15 minutes.

Some job locations in the northern part of this area are served by the Skokie Swift rapid transit service, which operates express between Howard Street and Dempster, as well as by buses connecting with the Evanston Rapid Transit line at Davis Street.

Area 2: Franklin Park, Melrose Park, Northlake

Area 2 is relatively inaccessible from city locations. Bus service is scheduled much less frequently in Area 2 than in Area 1, and trips to many job locations require a transfer between two suburban buses with long headways; other job locations are beyond reasonable walking distance from a suburban bus route.

The two principal Pace bus routes in this area serve job locations along North Avenue and along Grand Avenue, with runs scheduled at 10- and 15-minute intervals, respectively, during the peak period. Bus service is provided to the far northwestern part of the Area 2, adjacent to the Milwaukee Road rail yards every thirty minutes. In addition, job locations along Fullerton Avenue are not connected directly with CTA transit service except from locations in the city, north of this employment area.

Area 3: Forest Park, Broadview, Maywood

Nearly all job locations in Area 3 are within one-half mile, or walking distance, of an Pace or CTA bus route, which, in turn, is connected with a rapid transit line. In most cases, only one suburban bus route is required to reach major employment locations. Bus headways range from 10 minutes for most locations in the eastern part of this area, to 30 minutes for job locations in the western part of the area. Such infrequent headways make the connections between the rapid transit and the buses something of a "hit or miss" proposition, with even minimal delays on the rapid transit likely to cause lengthy delays in getting to job locations.

Area 4: Cicero

The Cicero area is served directly by CTA rapid transit service. Overall, the transit coverage and frequency in this suburban area matches service within the city limits.

Three stations on the Douglas Rapid Transit line allow access within walking distance of many jobs in Area 4. For other job locations, the combined service of a Pace route and the CTA Cicero bus route provide 10-minute headways during peak hours.

Area 5: Elk Grove Village


Bus service is provided directly to the Elk Grove Village Industrial Park (Area 5) from the River Road Station on the O'Hare Rapid Transit Line. This bus operates at 10-minute intervals during the morning and evening peak hours from the rapid transit station. The route of the bus alternates between an east routing and a west routing, serving each every 20 minutes. The variation allows access to more employment locations but employees generally have to plan to arrive at work earlier than their scheduled start-time in order to avoid being tardy. As is the case with the bus/rail connections necessary in Area 3, even a slight delay in rapid transit service can mean a missed bus—and up to a 20-minute delay in the arrival time at the work location.

C. Commuter Rail Use for City-Suburban Work Trips

The use of commuter rail service is an alternative for city residents travelling to suburban areas that are difficult to reach via the CTA rapid transit service and/or via CTA/Pace bus services. As shown in Figure 8, most of the five suburban study areas are served to some degree by commuter rail lines. And, in some cases—particularly for West Side residents—commuter rail may provide a more direct means of accessing suburban work locations than either the CTA or the Pace services.

However, in 1980, only about 50 of the nearly 20,000 trips between the city areas of high unemployment and the five suburban study areas were made by commuter rail. The potential of commuter rail to serve more workers who live in Chicago is limited by four factors: 1) High fares and lack of fare coordination with CTA and Pace services. This means that it would be far more costly for a Chicagoan to use commuter rail to get to work than it is to use the CTA rapid transit or bus services, or the Pace bus services (see also Section IV-H). 2) Low frequency of service in the direction away from the city in the morning hours. Because the commuter rail service is geared to getting people from the suburbs into the city, the number of trains heading outbound to the suburbs in the mornings is very low. For example, during the morning peak period, Franklin Park is served by eight trains inbound to the Chicago CBD. However, only three trains are scheduled outbound to Franklin Park, and only one of these trains makes more than one intermediate stop within the city limits. This makes it difficult to match train arrival times at suburban stops with the start-times of jobs in the suburbs.

Figure 8--Commuter Rail Services Providing Connections To Suburbs



3) Location of suburban stations. For the most part, suburban commuter rail stations are convenient—either by actual geographic location, or by frequent feeder bus services—to residential areas, but not to most major employment centers in the suburbs. Thus, there is the problem of getting from the train station to the work site. And 4) Lack of convenient connections between commuter rail routes—especially for workers from the South Side of the city. A Chicagoan who needs to use more than one commuter rail line must first ride into the downtown, then possibly walk or take a bus to a second train station, and then travel outbound on the train. Such a trip is time-consuming, inconvenient and expensive, as each of these transportation modes may require a separate fare.

D. Transit Travel Times

An examination of transit travel times between given locations can provide a measure of the convenience of using transit for work trips originating in the city. Moreover, travel times give an indication of the difficulty that unemployed Chicagoans who do not have an auto available might find in searching for a job or taking advantage of new job opportunities in the suburbs.

Table X shows transit travel time information for trips from each of the two Chicago areas of high unemployment to representative locations in the five suburban study areas. Travel times were calculated from bus and rapid transit schedules and include access/egress and wait times.

The transit travel time for trips to Cicero from the West Side is 28 minutes. Travel times by transit for trips to the other four suburban areas from the West Side range from 51 minutes for a trip to the Maywood/Forest Park area, to 81 minutes for a trip to Elk Grove Village. Travel times from the Near South area by transit range from 70 minutes for a trip to Cicero, to 107 minutes for a trip to the Franklin Park/Melrose Park area. With the exception of trips from the West Side to Cicero, travel times to the five suburban areas substantially exceed the 42-minute average transit travel times reported by Chicago residents for work trips to all employment areas, including both those in the city and in the suburbs.

For some trip pairs, especially from the Near South area to locations in Elk Grove Village and the Niles/Skokie area, high travel times are a result primarily of long distances travelled, and for trips to these locations auto travel times also tend to be high. For other trip pairs, however, high travel times are largely a result of the substantial out-of-vehicle times (wait time to transfer between vehicles/modes and time spent walking to/from transit) or the indirect routing of the fastest mode.

Contributing to the high out-of-vehicle times are the transit service factors such as the lack of direct transit access to job locations, the long wait times involved in making the connection from CTA rapid transit service to a Pace bus that operates only infrequently, or the lack of direct service between a bus route serving a suburban job location and a rapid transit transfer location. The problem of circuitous routing is most apparent for trips from the West Side to both the Elk Grove Village area and the western part of the Niles, Skokie, Lincolnwood area. In both cases the lack of good express service requires approximately 12 extra miles of travel, compared

with a more direct routing. A similar problem exists for trips from the Near South to Cicero, where the shortest travel time by transit requires 4 extra miles of travel compared with a routing by the shortest straight-line distance.

E. Auto Travel Times

For comparison purposes, auto travel times were derived from reports by respondents for a sample of the 1980 U.S. Census. The travel times shown in Table X represent combined values, including times for persons who drive alone and for persons who share a ride with others. As shown, for most home-to-work pairs, travel times are substantially lower than the total expected travel time by transit.

F. Mode Share

The relative share of work trips for each mode provides an indication of whether or not city residents will use transit given the travel time and the travel cost information previously presented. It also provides information about the factors that influence the use of transit and other modes for trips to suburban work places, and the potential for transit to serve new trips by Chicago's unemployed residents.

Table XI presents the mode split of trips from both the West Side and the Near South areas to the five major suburban workplace locations, as well as to the region as a whole. Overall, transit accounts for 11% and 18% of work trips to suburban areas from the West Side and the Near South, respectively. The transit share, especially from the Near South, is considerable given that transit has a total market share of 20% for trips within the city (excluding trips to the Central Area, where parking costs and peak period congestion are factors favoring transit use).

Transit share varies strongly according to suburban trip destination. Although transit share is higher from the Near South than from the West Side to all five suburban locations, for both areas of origins the highest transit shares are for trips to the Niles/Skokie/Lincolnwood area and to the Cicero area, with transit share ranging from 19% to 22%. The lowest transit shares are for trips to the Franklin Park/Melrose Park area and the Elk Grove Village area, with transit shares ranging from 2% to 8%.

The share of trips by transit appears to be influenced by overall travel time, and even more so by out-of-vehicle time spent waiting for a transit bus or walking to the workplace from a transit line or a bus route. As an example, while the in-vehicle time spent for trips to the Franklin Park/Melrose Park area is similar to the time to the Niles/Skokie area, the transit share to the Franklin Park/Melrose Park area is dramatically lower. This appears to be attributable to the long headways of the buses required for trips to some locations in the latter area. Also a factor is the unavailability of transit service to some work locations in the vicinity of Franklin Park.

TABLE X

Travel Times to Suburban Study
Areas from City Unemployment Areas

FROM NEAR SOUTH AREA TO:		Out-of-Vehicle	Transit Time		Auto Time
			In-Vehicle	Total	
Area 1	Morton Grove	26	64	90	58
	Skokie	18	62	80	46
	Lincolnwood	15	64	79	47
	Niles	24	57	81	54
	Average	21	62	83	51
Area 2	Schiller Park	38	74	112	49
	Milwaukee Yards	40	83	123	52
	Melrose Park	30	63	93	56
	Northlake	24	70	94	53
	Franklin Park	39	73	112	55
	Average	34	73	107	53
Area 3	Berkeley	30	65	95	58
	Maywood	24	53	77	54
	Forest Park	29	56	85	48
	Hillside	19	66	85	50
	Average	26	60	86	53
Area 4	Cicero	17	53	70	49
Area 5	Elk Grove	28	64	92	53
<u>FROM WEST SIDE TO:</u>					
Area 1	Morton Grove	25	55	80	47
	Skokie	22	50	72	45
	Lincolnwood	17	55	72	40
	Niles	23	57	80	41
	Average	22	54	76	43
Area 2	Schiller Park	36	42	78	39
	Milwaukee Yards	36	48	84	37
	Melrose Park	27	33	60	35
	Northlake	21	40	61	39
	Franklin Park	25	38	63	37
	Average	29	40	69	37
Area 3	Berkely	15	35	50	33
	Maywood	18	23	41	36
	Forest Park	27	29	56	28
	Hillside	18	39	57	37
	Average	20	32	51	34
Area 4	Cicero	12	16	28	22
Area 5	Elk Grove	26	55	81	47

TABLE XI

Mode Share (Percent) for Suburban Trips
Originating in West Side and Near South

		<u>Suburban Study Area</u>				
		<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
		<u>Niles/ Skokie</u>	<u>Franklin Park/ Melrose Park</u>	<u>Maywood/ Forest Park</u>	<u>Cicero</u>	<u>Elk Grove Village</u>
<u>West Side</u>						
Drive Alone	54	46	55	55	55	61
Carpool	32	34	40	35	23	36
Transit	11	19	4	9	20	2
Other*	3	1	1	1	2	1
<u>Near South</u>						
Drive Alone	49	42	55	54	53	44
Carpool	29	35	37	25	25	50
Transit	18	22	8	18	22	6
Other*	4	1	x	3	x	x

* includes Taxi, Motorbike, walk.

x less than 0.5%.

G. Auto Use for City-to-Suburban Trips

Despite the low availability of autos in the two areas of unemployment, auto is the dominant mode of transportation for work trips between Chicago and the suburbs. Altogether, 86% of suburban work trips from the West Side are made by auto, while from the Near South area, the total percentage of workers travelling by auto is 78%.

The low availability of autos is compensated for by the high number of residents in these two areas who share rides with others for their suburban work trip. Compared with a Chicago share of 16% for all work trips by Chicago residents, carpooling accounts for a 32% and a 29% share of trips from the West Side and the Near South, respectively, to suburban areas.

For trips to the five major suburban work areas, the carpool share is highest from both areas to destinations in the Elk Grove Village and the Franklin Park/Melrose Park areas. These are the two areas for which transit share is low, and it appears that in these instances, carpooling fulfills a need for convenient travel when transit travel times are too high.

H. Cost of Public Transportation

The fare structures of the CTA and the Pace bus system are integrated, so that Chicagoans who work in suburban areas can use a combination of CTA rapid transit and suburban bus for \$1.50 (which includes the basic fare of \$1.25 for rapid transit plus a 25-cent transfer charge). The CTA or Pace \$60 monthly pass can also be used interchangeably on both systems. This fare structure allows those with lower incomes to take advantage of job opportunities without regard to distance travelled to work.

As shown in Table XII, the cost of accessing the suburban employment locations by commuter rail is substantially higher (generally 100% higher) than that for a trip to the same location by a combination of CTA and Pace services, even with a commuter rail pass and monthly Link-Up ticket. Although Chicago residents who choose this mode of transportation to get to a suburban work site on a regular basis are most likely to use the least expensive combination of fares (i.e., the combined monthly rail and Link-up passes), for Chicagoans venturing by commuter rail into the suburbs for a job interview, the one-way trip cost is likely to be about equivalent to one hour's wages. Commuter rail then would obviously be viewed as an undesirable form of access, given such a fare structure.

TABLE XII

Fares Between Areas of Unemployment
and Selected Suburban Work Locations

	CTA Rapid Transit and Pace Bus	Commuter Rail*		
		One-way Fare	One-Way With Monthly Rail Pass**	One-Way With Rail & Link-up Pass**
From Near South or West Side to:				
Niles, Franklin Park, or Maywood	\$ 1.50	\$ 5.80	\$ 4.31	\$ 3.71
Cicero	\$ 1.50	\$ 5.00 (N. South) \$ 3.25 (West Side)	\$ 3.86 \$ 2.68	\$ 3.26 \$ 2.08
Elk Grove Village	\$ 1.50	\$ 6.20	\$ 4.67	\$ 4.07

*Includes cost of Pace bus connections from commuter rail stations to/from place of residence and place of work.

**Based on 40 trips per month.

SECTION V--GAPS IN SERVICE PROVISION

A. Time Concerns

I. Excessive Travel Times

The data presented in Section IV of this paper indicate that for the majority of Chicagoans who work in the suburbs, auto is the primary mode of access to suburban job sites. This is not surprising, given the excessive travel times that are associated with public transportation access to the suburbs. These travel times are due in part to the mismatch between job start-times and bus and commuter rail run-times, and are also due in part to geographical "gaps" in service provision. The specific suburban locations where these types of problems exist, and the options for improving such situations are discussed in Section B.

II. Experiences of Employment Counselors

A recurring experience for job counselors is that a job seeker will express a willingness to travel long distances to work via public transportation, but in actuality, the worker finds the excessive work trip unpleasant very quickly. In such cases, the individual either quits the new position or find the means to use a car to get to work. While carpools generally prove a convenient means of access, some employers also feel that this mode tends to lead to excessive tardiness among workers.*

Several employment counselors with whom this issue of access was discussed indicated that by far, the largest percentage of job seekers with whom they come into contact are transit-dependent. Knowing this, the counselors said that they themselves try to determine how long it would take for a client to get to a prospective job site via public transportation—and one counselor even does "trial runs" on the transit system to see if he can reasonably expect his clients to make the same trip daily. The NIPC report entitled "Transportation Availability and Employment Opportunities"*** found that job counselors in the suburbs felt that travel times to work in excess of 60 minutes were inappropriate, although the raw survey data and discussions with counselors whose agencies are located in Chicago revealed that travel times ranging from 60 to 90 minutes were fairly typical for clients from Chicago. Whenever possible, however, job counselors do not encourage job seekers to pursue employment opportunities that would result in travel times exceeding about 75 minutes.

*Douglas report, p. II-2.

**NIPC report, p. 2.

TABLE XIII

Service Gaps and Suggested Improvements

<u>Suburban Area</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Service Gap</u>	<u>Suggested Improvement</u>	<u>Estimated Time-Savings (minutes)</u>
Area 1	Niles Morton Grove	Circuitous rapid transit routing from West Side	Direct limited-stop Pace or CTA bus from West Side	10-15
	Niles Skokie Morton Grove	30-minute headway on some Pace bus routes	Reduce headways to 15 minutes	5-10
Area 2	Franklin Park Schiller Park	No direct connections between work locations and rapid transit; also 30-minute Pace headways	Direct connections to one or more rapid transit lines; reduce Pace headways to 15 minutes	8-24
Area 3	Maywood Forest Park Broadview	Each Pace bus route connects to only one of the three West Side rapid transit lines	Connections to more than one rapid transit line for selected bus routes	4-8
	Western part	20-minute Pace headways	Reduce headways	4-8
Area 4	Cicero	Circuitous routing from Near South	Direct limited-stop CTA bus service to Cicero	10-15
Area 5	Elk Grove Village	Circuitous routing from West Side by rapid transit	Direct limited-stop Pace or CTA bus connecting city to Elk Grove Village	10-15
		20-minute Pace headway to many locations from River Road Station	Reduce headways	4-8

B. Transit Service Gaps and Suggested Improvements

As discussed in Section IV-F, individuals from areas in Chicago where unemployment is high are willing to use public transportation to those suburban areas where the level of transit service is similar to that found in Chicago. However, for trips from the West Side and the Near South to most suburban areas, travel times tend to exceed the 60- to 75-minute maximum travel times job counselors find appropriate. Table XIII identifies some of the specific improvements that might reduce travel times to an acceptable level.

In addition to the improvements presented in this table, better use of commuter rail services may also improve travel times from some city areas to selected suburban employment locations. Unlike changes in Pace or CTA service, however, this may require changes in fare and transfer policies, in addition to schedule changes.

For trips to some suburban areas, improvements in suburban transit services may be justified on the basis of the existing work-trip flows between the city and the suburbs. Such improvements would make transit more convenient to those who are unemployed and who are looking for jobs, as well as to city residents who already hold jobs in the suburbs.

C. Informational Gaps

Transit-dependent persons looking for employment in the suburbs may be faced, at the onset of their job search, with an additional problem relating to access: Many job counselors simply do not have good, current information on what transit service is offered in the suburbs. The raw responses from the NIPC Transportation Availability survey, as well as conversations with individuals who work in job placement offices revealed that while knowledge of the CTA services provided on the rapid transit system is generally good, there is a definite need for expanded information on services offered by the RTA/Pace. The several job counselors with whom public transportation services were discussed had no clear understanding of the jurisdictions of the RTA, versus Pace and the Commuter Rail Board (Metra). While such an understanding is not crucial to assisting job seekers in getting to work locations, a general knowledge of who to call to get information—at a minimum—would be helpful, as would a knowledge of which service board provides bus or rail service.

The need for improved service information was also indicated by the fact that although many job placement agencies have an RTA map posted for client use, the maps used are several years old and are no longer accurate. Apparently, few agencies utilize—or are even aware of—the route literature that is available in the form of pamphlets describing individual routes. Clearly, Pace and Metra need to market their services more effectively, and to provide current literature to as many employment agencies as possible.*

*Some current Pace route information is available on the CTA map, published by the Chicago Transit Authority Public Affairs and Operations Planning Departments. The RTA also has developed a new route map, which is available for a small fee.

Consideration should also be given to having personnel from Pace, and from Metra if necessary, meet with representatives of job placement agencies to thoroughly explain the public transit services that are available in the suburbs. This goal of better marketing should be a particular objective of Pace, because Chicagoans commuting to the suburbs that border the city, form one of the strongest ridership market segments that Pace has to draw upon. Better marketing could increase the ridership level of and the fare-box revenues from Chicagoans even more.

SECTION VI. - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Reverse Commuting Issues

Although only five "close-in" suburban locations were the focus of study herein, it is important to recognize that other suburban locations--generally at greater distances from the city--are also becoming important centers of employment. However, in most cases, the use of public transportation to get to these sites is simply not a convenient or cost-effective option at this time. For the present, it may be more useful and productive to deal with the problems of access "closer to home." But, before specific actions are taken, the implications of the attempts to improve the access to suburban job opportunities for low-income or unemployed residents of Chicago should be considered.

On the positive side of any service/marketing improvements made, there is the potential for greater buying power and higher standards of living that would accrue to individuals who find--and keep--employment because of expanded transit information and services. Much of the disposable income available to such individuals would be spent within the city, with the concomitant multiplier effect benefitting Chicago businesses.

Service improvements in the counter-peak direction may make for more cost-effective usage of existing rolling stock, and expansion of service would allow greater flexibility to suburbanites who wish to travel within their own locales. Increased marketing and peak-hour operations could result in greater general ridership levels during off-peak periods, because existing and prospective riders would become more familiar and comfortable with the notion of using public transportation. All such ridership increases would improve the fare-box recovery ratio for the bus operators.

On the other hand, attempts to improve access to the suburbs may result in additional unwanted shifting of major firms, when Chicago employers realize that prospective employees can indeed get to work outside the city. Although many historical factors have influenced the trend towards suburban flight, actions taken to assist Chicagoans in getting to jobs in the suburbs could be viewed in the long-term as a counterproductive means of dealing with the problem of unemployment in the city. Moreover, although initial attempts to improve access may focus upon the locations where low-skilled individuals are most likely to find job opportunities, improved access might also encourage persons from all skill and educational levels to pursue jobs in the suburbs. Major shifts of skilled and unskilled workers to the suburbs would only be to the detriment of business districts in Chicago.

It can also be expected that Chicagoans who work in the suburbs will also eat and shop near the work-place--at least occasionally. The service and sales tax thus generated in the suburbs represents revenues that could have accrued to the City of Chicago if it harbored an adequate number of job opportunities that in turn helped support commercial/retail ventures nearby. Finally, it is possible that some Chicagoans who find jobs in the suburbs may also eventually find desirable housing in the suburbs. Thus, the trend towards flight from the city could be perpetuated.

B. Summary

With the exception of the central business district of Chicago, most significant job growth in the Chicago metropolitan area is occurring outside the city limits. Within Chicago, unemployment remains high, particularly among minorities.

There is a high rate of transit dependence among unemployed city residents, and present transportation services are not adequate to transport city workers in significant numbers to suburban job sites.

Travel time is often an impediment to workers traveling from the city to the suburbs. These commuters generally exceed the regional average work trip time, due to distance traveled, number of transfers required, infrequency of suburban transit services, and long walks from the final transit connection to the workplace.

Travel times might be improved if reverse commuters could make greater use of commuter rail services. However, regional commuter rail operations are CBD-directed, with far more trains coming into the city in the morning rush period than traveling outbound. The high cost of commuter rail, as compared with other transit modes, also stands in the way of low-paid workers commuting to suburban service and low-skilled industrial jobs.

Two additional problems have been identified as hindering access to jobs: suburban transit service coverage and information dissemination. Suburban job sites tend to be geographically dispersed and not well served by transit. Transit users find gaps in service which entail long walks or prevent transit use. Sometimes gaps in schedule coordination also preclude transit use or require workers to follow schedules which have them arrive at work long before official start times. And finally, information on suburban transit services serving reverse commute markets are not disseminated well to workers and employment counselors.

Some improvements can be made to provide better access to the five employment areas studied. However, to provide access to jobs on a larger scale requires that the major issues of travel time, cost, service coverage and information dissemination be addressed.

C. Conclusions

Access to jobs—or access to workers—is a regional problem which will require a regional solution. It is a social, economic and transportation problem that, if it is to be solved, will need the efforts of many parties in both the public and private sectors.

Efforts to address reverse commute issues are underway. The Regional Transportation Authority has recently convened a study team; an Operation Greenlight Task Force has looked at land use transportation and housing issues; community groups, employers, and even a housing project have undertaken reverse commute projects; employers and planning agencies are studying the potential of van pools; and several regional forums on the issue have been held in the past two years. However other events in the region, such as the relocation of Sears to Hoffman Estates, exacerbate the

problem. Given the complexity of the issue, a more comprehensive, coordinated regional approach seems to be needed.

Providing transit service to widely dispersed residential and employment locations in suburban areas is a problem that is being grappled with throughout the country. The Chicago region may make some contributions, but low-density suburban land use and dispersed travel patterns will pose a problem in attempts to serve reverse commuters. While working on this, the region could take some interim steps. These might include:

1. Evaluating suburban bus service to improve
 - a) connections with rapid transit and commuter rail;
 - b) schedule coordination to permit transferring;
 - c) service to suburban employment centers.
2. Studying commuter rail operations to identify ways to increase the number and frequency of reverse direction trains.
3. Studying regional transportation fare structures to promote integration of fares among modes and service boards.
4. Evaluating public information on city-to-suburb transportation to develop an information program available to workers, job seekers, employment counselors and employers.

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15. "Work Trip Survey," Summary Report. Regional Transportation Authority. April, 1982.

Appendix One: Notes to Data Sources

Bureau of Labor Statistics Annual Averages define non-whites as blacks, Asians, and include non-black Hispanics in the totals for whites. This practice is misleading since blacks, who tend to have the worst employment-related statistics, have their statistics improved by Asians and others who generally have very good employment-related experiences. Similarly, the generally good experiences of non-Hispanic whites are made to look somewhat worse by their grouping with white Hispanics. Thus the gap between whites and non-whites is narrower than it would be if non-Hispanic whites were being compared to blacks.

These data are not, however, the "official" BLS employment and unemployment statistics for metropolitan areas and central cities, which are the basis for determining eligibility for benefits under Federal economic assistance programs. Since CPS data are not available for all localities, the official statistics are generated by a complex modeling formula involving numerous estimations of employment and unemployment, based primarily on State Unemployment Insurance (UI) data.

According to the BLS, however, these "official" estimates are not as reliable as the CPS annual average due to inconsistencies and errors in UI data. Hence the reader may note discrepancies between the data reported here and "official" statistics.

Community area unemployment estimates are based on City of Chicago totals released by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. "Community area estimates were calculated by an automated program developed at MET utilizing 1980 census shares. Put simply, the census share methodology allocates the same proportion of city total employment and unemployment to each community area as that area had at the time of the 1980 census. Therefore, in reviewing the estimates it is important to keep in mind that they do not account for changes affecting particular communities or the changes in the relationships among the levels of employment and unemployment in communities since 1980. Such changes include the consequences of steel mill closing and employment reduction in the southeast part of the City and the labor force growth resulting from new residential developments in the Loop."

"On the other hand, insofar as communities on the City's west and south sides have continued to experience widespread and pervasive labor market difficulties, the model provides a means of estimating the official count of employed and unemployed persons from a current city total. In any case, the census share method is one of the few tools available for generating small area data apart from actual surveys which are costly, time consuming, and labor intensive."

(Quotes indicate language from the Mayor's Office of Employment and Training, 1986, "1986 Annual Average Labor Force Estimates For Chicago Community Areas," May 1986.)

Appendix 2: Unemployment Rates

LABOR FORCE ESTIMATES FOR CHICAGO COMMUNITY AREAS
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY ANNUAL AVERAGE 1986

	AREA	WORKING	LOOKING	TOTAL	RATE
1	ROGERS PARK	29127	2725	31852	8.6
2	WEST RIDGE	30274	1764	32038	5.5
3	UPTOWN	26036	4128	30164	13.7
4	LINCOLN SQUARE	21043	1982	23025	8.6
5	NORTH CENTER	15569	1686	17255	9.8
6	LAKE VIEW	54999	4383	59382	7.4
7	LINCOLN PARK	35306	2082	37388	5.6
8	NEAR NORTH SIDE	34339	2764	37103	7.4
9	EDISON PARK	6175	322	6497	5.0
10	NORWOOD PARK	19844	1133	20977	5.4
11	JEFFERSON PARK	11795	679	12474	5.4
12	FOREST GLEN	8893	461	9354	4.9
13	NORTH PARK	7662	499	8161	6.1
14	ALBANY PARK	20651	2130	22781	9.3
15	PORTAGE PARK	27261	1908	29169	6.5
16	IRVING PARK	23256	2115	25371	8.3
17	DUNNING	17313	1123	18436	6.1
18	MONTCLARE	4959	283	5242	5.4
19	BELMONT CRAGIN	24823	2173	26996	8.0
20	HERMOSA	8497	991	9488	10.4
21	AVONDALE	15190	1896	17086	11.1
22	LOGAN SQUARE	33274	4788	38062	12.6
23	HUMBOLDT PARK	22851	4661	27512	16.9
24	WEST TOWN	32168	5449	37617	14.5
25	AUSTIN	48306	10807	59113	18.3
26	WEST GARFIELD PARK	8753	3166	11919	26.6
27	EAST GARFIELD PARK	7259	2602	9861	26.4
28	NEAR WEST SIDE	12790	3318	16108	20.6
29	NORTH LAWDALE	15145	5373	20518	26.2
30	SOUTH LAWDALE	24510	5373	29883	18.0
31	LOWER WEST SIDE	15517	4160	19677	21.1
32	LOOP	3108	324	3432	9.4
33	NEAR SOUTH SIDE	1633	575	2208	26.0
34	ARMOUR SQUARE	4775	550	5325	10.3
35	DOUGLAS	10775	1897	12672	15.0
36	OAKLAND	2268	1313	3581	36.7
37	FULLER PARK	1322	521	1843	28.3
38	GRAND BOULEVARD	9295	4092	13387	30.6
39	KENWOOD	8925	1368	10293	13.3
40	WASHINGTON PARK	6720	2466	9186	26.8
41	HYDE PARK	16219	1297	17516	7.4
42	WOODLAWN	9934	3279	13213	24.8
43	SOUTH SHORE	32040	6691	38731	17.3
44	CHATHAM	18705	3249	21954	14.8
45	AVALON PARK	6306	893	7199	12.4
46	SOUTH CHICAGO	17039	3021	20060	15.1
47	BURNSIDE	1265	314	1579	19.9
48	CALUMET HEIGHTS	9513	1111	10624	10.5
49	ROSELAND	23658	5132	28790	17.8
50	PULLMAN	4116	842	4958	17.0
51	SOUTH DEERING	7523	1514	9037	16.8
52	EAST SIDE	8911	971	9882	9.8
53	WEST PULLMAN	15583	3348	18931	17.7
54	RIVERDALE	2605	1222	3827	31.9

LABOR FORCE ESTIMATES FOR CHICAGO COMMUNITY AREAS
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY ANNUAL AVERAGE 1986

2

	AREA	WORKING	LOOKING	TOTAL	RATE
55	HEGEWISCH	4989	515	5504	9.4
56	GARFIELD RIDGE	16960	1984	18944	10.5
57	ARCHER HEIGHTS	4618	406	5024	8.1
58	BRIGHTON PARK	13614	1565	15179	10.3
59	MCKINLEY PARK	5571	667	6238	10.7
60	BRIDGEPORT	12490	1678	14168	11.8
61	NEW CITY	19275	3756	23031	16.3
62	WEST ELSDON	6020	448	6468	6.9
63	GAGE PARK	10336	1216	11552	10.5
64	CLEARING	11195	1032	12227	8.4
65	WEST LAWN	11570	905	12475	7.3
66	CHICAGO LAWN	19252	1927	21179	9.1
67	WEST ENGLEWOOD	17060	6107	23167	26.4
68	ENGLEWOOD	14685	4504	19189	23.5
69	GR GRAND CROSSING	15883	3624	19507	18.6
70	ASHBURN	19332	1463	20795	7.0
71	AUBURN GRESHAM	25825	5413	31238	17.3
72	BEVERLY	10238	600	10838	5.5
73	WASHINGTON HEIGHTS	14815	3041	17856	17.0
74	MOUNT GREENWOOD	8706	586	9292	6.3
75	MORGAN PARK	11310	2054	13364	15.4
76	OHARE	6645	405	7050	5.7
77	EDGEWATER	29787	3185	32972	9.7
	CITY TOTAL	1196000	180000	1376000	13.1

FIGHTING POVERTY IN CITIES

Transportation Programs as Bridges to Opportunity

By

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Princeton University and Lincoln Government Fellow

A Research Report of the National League of Cities

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Introduction

The end of the decade is witnessing a revival of concern over the problems of the poor. There are even calls for a renewed "war on poverty". Two Research Reports from the National League of Cities and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, of which this is the second, attempt to provide some basic strategy and tactics for such a war. *Poverty in Cities* reviewed the social science literature on the topic. That review documented the dramatic transformation occurring in many of America's large metropolitan areas. "Poverty in cities is changing in quality and intensity. It is more persistent among particular households, more concentrated in particular neighborhoods, and more isolated from traditional avenues of escape."

As many of America's inner-city neighborhoods have become more isolated, finding ways to connect the ghetto to opportunity has become a paramount concern. This Research Report examines a survey of transportation programs that fight poverty in cities by building bridges to opportunity. These programs are distinguished by their recognition of the isolation of today's poverty areas. These are programs that recognize that transportation can be an important maneuver in the war on poverty. Transportation is not the only, or even the most important, part of a comprehensive antipoverty strategy. Job training and education, childhood intervention, and efforts to increase the earned income tax credit are almost certainly more fundamental. But while these other fronts receive attention, transportation is often neglected. Because of major changes in American cities and suburbs, these more fundamental reforms now underway might well fail if transportation remains unconsidered.

This transportation option will sound familiar to many antipoverty veterans. Several "reverse commute" demonstrations were conducted during the late 1960s and early 1970s. "Reverse commute" refers to trips that reverse the conventional commute from suburbs to central cities. Thus, reverse commuting or outbound commuting refers to city residents who commute to suburban jobs. Fifteen to twenty years ago, several experimental programs aimed at enhancing the reverse commuting prospects of the poor. These were almost uniformly regarded as failures.¹ Evidence discussed below suggests that conditions will be far more amenable to transportation solutions in the 1990s than in the 1960s.

The report consists of five parts. First, the report recapitulates the main argument of *Poverty in Cities*: a new “impacted ghetto” has emerged in many U.S. metropolitan areas that is more violent and isolated than ever before. Second, the report discusses the growing suburban labor shortages facing many metropolitan areas. Third, the report presents a policy strategy based on these two preceding points: an aggressive yet realistic “mobility strategy” that attempts to reconnect the ghetto to opportunity in the suburbs and exurbs. Fourth, the report presents results of a nationwide survey of programs that include the transportation features of the mobility strategy. Fifth, the report draws several lessons for policy makers facing the problems of the impacted ghetto.

It is important to note that few of the programs discussed in this report have been rigorously evaluated. Indeed, this report is intended to identify promising approaches that warrant further scrutiny as well as models for future demonstration projects. But it is also intended to offer some guidance to those at the local level who face the problems of poverty every day — people who cannot wait for scientifically valid evidence, who are likely to try something anyway, and who might benefit from some approaches that seem to be working.

The Impacted Ghetto

One of the fundamental features of urban poverty in the 1980s is the emergence of a new “impacted ghetto” in many metropolitan areas of the Northeast and Midwest.² These inner-city neighborhoods are more violent and isolated from opportunity than ever before. Whereas our cities have contained violent, filthy, and impoverished places throughout our history,³ the impacted ghetto is different in two important ways.

First, the levels of social distress in these neighborhoods exceeds anything we have seen in our cities in decades. Scholars (especially William Julius Wilson in his *The Truly Disadvantaged*⁴) and journalists (for example, Andrew Hacker in the *New York Review of Books*) have helped to refocus attention on life in the impacted ghetto. The physical decay of aged nineteenth-century tenements and unmaintained twentieth-century “projects”, the institutional collapse of public health and public education, and the daily assault of drug-related violent crime have all helped make urban poverty even more enervating than before.

Second, the deprivation endured by the residents of the impacted ghetto is more isolated today than perhaps ever before. We have witnessed an unprecedented change in our large cities during the course of this century. They have been transformed from the common ground of most Americans into a warehouse for the poor and a playhouse for the wealthy. Liberated by the technologies of the automobile and the suburb, and subsidized by the policies of the interstate highway system and the mortgage-interest deduction, many middle-class Americans have traded the central city for the suburbs and beyond.

Employment has followed the suburbanizing population, and most new jobs (and nearly all low-skill jobs) are being created in the suburbs and exurbs of our metropolitan areas.⁵ Chicago, Philadelphia, and Detroit are succumbing to the model provided by Los Angeles, Houston, and Atlanta. Central cities are no longer unchallenged centers of economic and political power, nor even the daily destination for most suburban commuters. The modern metropolis consists of many competing and uncoordinated centers; and today more people commute from suburb to suburb than from suburb to city.

All of these changes have helped create the isolated deprivation of the impacted ghetto. The economy is figuratively moving away from untrained workers by shifting from manufacturing to services — just as the institutions that train workers for those information-intensive jobs are collapsing. Furthermore, the economy is literally moving away from the poor by shifting from the city to the exurbs — just as escalating housing prices, environmental concerns, and racial exclusion make it impossible for the poor to follow. Theories abound and debates continue. But the unquestioned fact is that the impacted ghetto is a devastated place.

The Impacted Ghetto and the Congested Suburb

One of the ironies of impacted ghetto formation is that many of the same changes that have devastated the inner city have caused problems for the outer city as well. During the late 1980s, national magazines such as the *Atlantic Monthly* and the *National Journal*, as well as business-oriented publications such as *The Wall Street Journal* and *Fortune* have documented the rapid development of the suburbs and exurbs.⁶ Increasingly, this development has gone beyond the traditional construction of more and more housing; now suburbia is the major location of new job growth in the United States. These trends have been well-known to geographers and others for some time.⁷

This metropolitan decentralization is the urban trend in late-twentieth-century America. The outlying growth has often outstripped existing suburban infrastructure. This infrastructure dilemma is made more acute by the expectations of suburbanites, old and new: the suburbs are supposed to be places with free and abundant parking, low density housing amid parks and other open space, and perhaps most of all places with uncrowded roads. Overdevelopment (growth ahead of capacity) has become the major issue of local politics in the suburban counties surrounding the central cities of the Northeast and Midwest. During the 1960s, the United States annually spent approximately 2.3 percent of its GNP on its infrastructure of roads, sewers, and so on. During the 1980s, annual infrastructure spending has been roughly 1 percent of GNP.⁸

The politics of traffic congestion, environmental degradation, and school capacity define mayoral and county elections in the suburbs and exurbs.⁹ But the slow-growth movement comes amid the demands of business for new workers. The demographics are very clear. During the 1970s, there was a virtual labor force glut with approximately 2.4 million new entrants to the labor force each year. In the 1990s, census projections predict approximately 1.2 million new workers per year.¹⁰

The national unemployment rate of approximately 5 percent masks the stress created by metropolitan decentralization in places such as Philadelphia, Detroit, and Washington, D.C.

In these areas, the suburban unemployment rate is half the national rate while the impacted ghetto unemployment rate can be twice that of the nation.

Consider Philadelphia, the national leader in impacted ghetto formation.¹¹ There the decentralization of employment has been enormous. Suburban Montgomery County now has more manufacturing jobs than Philadelphia (131,815 versus 128,612).¹² Furthermore, the suburban county unemployment rates range from 2.8 to 3.2 percent while the unemployment rate in Lower North Philadelphia is an estimated 10.1 percent.¹³

The Philadelphia story is not atypical. "Up and down the East Coast...and now across the South, the Midwest, and in California, severe labor shortages are developing...Low-skill, entry-level jobs go begging in the suburbs while in the center cities, jobless rates remain alarmingly high", writes noted urban affairs columnist Neil Peirce.¹⁴ And the demographic trends point to the labor shortages intensifying during the 1990s.

These trends have spawned many efforts by local officials to come to grips with the pressures being generated by metropolitan decentralization.¹⁵ The statements of these local officials echo one another in their recognition of continued suburban job growth, lagging transportation investment, and resulting congestion in the suburbs and employment isolation in the impacted ghetto. There is a strengthening consensus among public officials, regional business leaders, and local community leaders that transportation is an important yet neglected ingredient of an effective strategy to deal with the problems of metropolitan decentralization.¹⁶

To summarize these first two sections, urban poverty is increasingly a two-sided coin. Technology, the economy, and politics have fostered a massive restructuring of our metropolitan regions. The wholesale decentralization of these regions has resulted in outer cities plagued by a growth-choking congestion and inner cities stricken with an isolated deprivation. This stress is most clearly seen in the regional labor markets of our larger metropolises: suburban employers unable to fill jobs and impacted ghetto residents unable to find them. And in this problem are the seeds of at least a partial solution.

A Mobility Strategy

It is important to remember that transportation is by no means the only problem facing the residents of the impacted ghetto. Those problems are many and far from simple. When we view the problems of the urban poor from a regional perspective, however, the general policy goal becomes overcoming isolation by establishing and maintaining connections to opportunity. From this perspective, it should be clear that training for jobs, information about jobs, as well as transportation to jobs, are all important connections.

Poverty in Cities presented a six-part "mobility strategy" that would begin to make those connections. The foundation of the mobility strategy is that the impacted ghetto is in fact part of a larger metropolitan labor market. The strategy moves from the premise that a root problem of the impacted ghetto is metropolitan decentralization and that the proximate problems, that is those which are amenable to public intervention, are the resulting barriers that prevent the city and suburbs from acting as a single labor market.

The regional perspective advocated by the mobility strategy is like a prism. Looking at the problems of the impacted ghetto through that prism can narrow the gap between the problems and the solutions. Why, for example, train people for downtown information-processing jobs when the requirements are generally lower for suburban manufacturing, warehousing, and retail jobs? Why worry about keeping people in \$4-an-hour fast-food jobs downtown when the same jobs in the suburbs pay \$6 an hour? And why limit the job search of ghetto residents to the files of central-county Private Industry Councils when suburban-county PICs are desperate for workers?

One of the chief strengths of the mobility strategy is that it seeks to exploit incentives throughout the metropolitan area. Residents of impacted ghettos gain access to economic opportunity without sacrificing community networks such as extended family and institutional affiliations. Suburban employers gain access to the entry-level workers who are increasingly absent from suburban labor markets. Central-city governments widen the array of employment opportunities for their residents and retain voters who have received the benefits of the strategy. Suburban governments can ease housing development pressures being driven by the excess labor demand of decentralizing employment within the region.

The mobility strategy has six components.

- First, modify policing and correctional practices to protect the residents of the impacted ghetto from the predatory criminals in their midst.¹⁷
- Second, provide day care facilities and subsidies for parents of young children at the training, search, and employment stages.
- Third, increase the level of the earned income credit to supplement the wages of entry-level jobs.
- Fourth, provide job training to prepare city would-be workers for the suburban labor market of retail outlets, back-office operations, and high-tech light industry.
- Fifth, create job information systems to match city workers to suburban employers as in reorganizing county-based Private Industry Councils into regional organizations.
- Sixth, restructure transportation systems to facilitate outbound journeys-to-work.

All but the last of these components have received substantial research attention during the 1980s.¹⁸ We know very little about the prevalence of transportation-based antipoverty programs around the country right now. Many commentators will casually cite a suburban McDonald's franchiser who leases a van for use by downtown employees, but no one has gauged the extent of such programs around the country.

The remainder of this Research Report focuses on this transportation component and on the findings of a survey, co-sponsored by the National League of Cities and the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, that sought to determine the extent of this activity and to identify promising programs for further study.

A Survey of Connections

During the months of May and June 1989, a telephone survey was conducted of key informants in the metropolitan areas of the U.S. containing the fifty largest cities. This group of large regions is the most likely location for the problems of metropolitan decentralization described above. For each metropolitan area, key informants were identified who could be expected to know of the region's current problems and ongoing efforts at solving them. These contacts typically included the economic development reporter of the region's major daily newspaper, the director of research at the region's principal planning organization, and the chief of operations or planning at the region's principal transportation authority. This initial round of contacts was followed by telephone calls to any contacts supplied by the key informants.

Each telephone interview consisted of a conversation (typically ten to fifteen minutes long) about inner-city poverty in the region, the relative health of the region's suburban labor market, and the existence of any programs to connect the two. This strategy of largely unstructured interviewing eventually led to 109 telephone conversations. The raw results of the survey are presented in three appendices.

The first appendix is a schematic representation of all the contacts made. These are disaggregated by the institutional affiliation and metropolitan area of the contact. The second appendix lists the names and affiliation of most contacts made in the survey, plus additional useful references. Some interviewees, particularly employers, specifically requested anonymity, and these contacts have been omitted from the list. This appendix is intended to serve as a resource for those wishing to follow up about particular programs. The third appendix is a list of the programs identified in the survey. This list is a distilled product of these conversations. The many vague references made by the contacts have been omitted, and only concrete programs with particular actors and activities have been included. Activities in the planning stages of development, however, have been included.

In those metropolitan areas in which impacted ghetto formation has been extensive, there turns out to be a great deal of activity along the lines envisioned by the transportation element of the mobility strategy. As reported in *Poverty in Cities*, the largest impacted ghettos

in 1980 were located in Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, Baltimore, Cleveland, and Washington, D.C. All of these areas have ongoing programs to connect the impacted ghetto with opportunity on the metropolitan periphery.

The survey identified fifty-three programs in which there was a specific transportation component to an employment program for the poor and/or low-income workers. These programs are found in twenty-five metropolitan areas. Twenty-nine of these programs have received funding from a relatively recent program of the Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA). This program has been critically important to much of this activity, and so it warrants some introduction.

UMTA's Entrepreneurial Services Program (ESP)

In late 1987, UMTA announced its Entrepreneurial Services Program (ESP). This grant program is designed to spur the development of private-sector innovations in transportation. As of March 1989, UMTA had received more than 200 proposals, and had funded fifty-three grants totaling \$5.4 million for ESP services in more than forty communities twenty-four states. Although this program was open to any entrepreneurial idea, a majority (twenty-nine) of successful applicants were proposing "reverse commuting" services. These programs typically consist of small private operators who initiate service between inner-city neighborhoods and specific sites in the respective suburban labor market. The grant program has allowed a substantial degree of experimentation in this type of program. Significantly, ESP has been reauthorized for two additional years of grant reviews with a total budget of \$10 million.

One interesting aspect of the ESP experience is the prominence of reverse commuting. Essentially, what began as a privatization program evolved into a reverse commuting program. This evidence supports the argument made in the preceding sections of this report. The process of metropolitan decentralization has created such severe strains on many regional labor markets that the kinds of connection programs advocated here can often represent an entrepreneurial opportunity.

This is a point this report will return to again and again. Although for present purposes, the mobility strategy (especially the transportation component) is an antipoverty program, the strategy is equally attractive from the perspective of regional business leaders. There is a market for the mobility strategy precisely because it seeks to meet the needs of the regional as a whole. Urban poverty is a two-sided coin.

Two Descriptive Dimensions

With the benefit of these extended conversations with key informants around the nation, there emerge two useful dimensions along which these connection programs can be organized. The first important distinction regards the nature of the service provider. The transportation providers range from the traditional city and regional public transit authorities operating buses and trains to private companies operating vans and automobiles;

in between, there are organizations that link small private vehicles with the existing public transit system.

The second important distinction regards the orientation of the service provider. Some are neighborhood-based organizations that understand their mission as primarily serving the needs of poor residents; others are workplace-oriented organizations that have evolved with the growing concerns of employers. Occupying the center of this dimension are organizations that play a broker role acting as an entrepreneur responding to a market opportunity.

There are advantages associated with each end of both of these dimensions: public comprehensiveness, private flexibility, workplace demand, neighborhood supply. Public comprehensiveness allows riders to exploit the benefits of the transit system for other than commuting trips. For example, a monthly ticket to a suburban workplace might cost \$70. However, if a poor resident of the impacted ghetto is already transit-dependent and currently purchases a \$35 monthly pass for routine trips within the city, then the additional cost of the reverse commute is cut in half. Private flexibility allows providers to target specific markets quickly and unencumbered by the constraints often facing public systems. Workplace-oriented organizations are in a position to understand and fill the needs of employers, while neighborhood-oriented organizations are well-suited to sustaining the connection to the often threatening and difficult environment of the impacted ghetto.

Each of the programs discussed in the next section highlights a particular strength. But of course, each is a mix of strengths. By definition, a connection has an origin and a destination — both a neighborhood and a workplace. And by common practice, a journey-to-work often involves a mix of public and private providers — a public bus ride to the place one catches the private van, etc. But each case is used as a particularly illuminating example of the strengths associated with a particular attribute.

SEPTA: A Comprehensive Public Provider

The Philadelphia region provides the paradigm case for the public-sector capacity to accommodate workplace-oriented pressures. Philadelphia has undergone some of the most extensive metropolitan decentralization in the country. The region's remarkable employment growth during the 1980s has occurred almost entirely in the suburban counties along the highway corridors created by the Pennsylvania Turnpike and Route 202. As in many other metropolitan areas, a collective consciousness about the changing economic relations among the city and suburbs was awakened by a series of influential studies of the region.¹⁹

Suburban employers were already feeling the pinch of labor shortages in the mid-1980s. Not surprisingly, many of these firms complained to their landlords, the developers of the large suburban office parks that typically dominate the roadside landscape of suburban areas. Many of the tenants of these office parks are having extreme difficulty filling entry-level openings.

The Seltzer Organization is the developer of several Philadelphia area business campuses, including the Fort Washington Office Center along the Pennsylvania Turnpike. Tenants include Honeywell, Rorer, a regional banking operation, many smaller firms, and several

hotels. In September 1986, Seltzer approached the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) hoping they could persuade SEPTA to improve public transportation to the office park. This represents a fairly fundamental change in the mindset of employers and developers. For decades, all that was necessary to accommodate workers was a sufficiently large parking lot. But shrinking local labor pools and choking suburban roads have forced many employers to look elsewhere.

SEPTA designed a new bus route that would connect the Seltzer facility with the nearest suburban rail station. However, feasibility study projections failed to identify a level of ridership large enough to initiate the new service. SEPTA projected a weekday ridership of 110 persons, while 180 passengers would be necessary to recover the cost of the operation through revenue. In what is rather strong evidence of the degree of labor shortage, Seltzer and their major tenants agreed to subsidize the difference in revenues between 110 and 180 weekday passengers.

That private subsidy would soon prove to be unnecessary, however. The new Route 201 service began in March 1988. Average weekday ridership increased every month. By April 1988, ridership was equal to the projected 110 passengers. By June 1988, average weekday ridership had reached 186, exceeding the level needed to cover operating expenses. By September 1988, ridership was at 237 passengers, and now the excess revenue from the new bus route is used to reduce the public subsidy devoted to the existing rail service that feeds the Route 201 buses.

There are several key ingredients to the success of SEPTA's Route 201 service. First, the willingness of suburban employers to experiment with a transportation innovation was crucial. In an era of stable or declining public subsidies, new transit services are very difficult to initiate. Second, the relevant officials at SEPTA were responsive to the opportunity. These entrepreneurial public managers aggressively sought to increase their market share. Third, the Philadelphia region is the inheritor of an unusually dense regional rail network that creates the opportunity for the kind of shuttle service represented by Route 201. Fourth, SEPTA devoted considerable attention to the marketing of the service. They recognized that information can be as big a barrier as lack of service. They cleverly integrated bus and train schedules into a uniform brochure that was easy to use and that included a map showing that the bus passes the very doors of most employers in the office park.

Clearly, there are several open questions. The first is whether or not the new service is making a difference in the impacted ghetto of North and West Philadelphia. How many of the riders are making the trip out from the inner city? How many were already employed at the office park prior to the initiation of the service? Current research being conducted at the Woodrow Wilson School of Princeton University, including ridership surveys onboard the 201 buses, should provide some answers to these questions. We do know, however, that programs such as Route 201 make accessible suburban jobs that before would have been all but impossible to reach from the impacted ghetto. And we know that many employers are willing to pay to have such accessibility sustained because they calculate the service as necessary to attract entry-level workers.

Indeed, SEPTA has designed a total of fifteen 200 Routes between suburban rail stations and employment areas. Five of these are now funded and in at least the early stages of

operation. All have received private employer guarantees against revenue shortfalls. Even if this innovative program is not reaching the impacted ghetto to a significant degree, it demonstrates the both a remarkable level of demand by suburban employers for entry-level workers and the possibility of building bridges. No amount of job training and job search is likely to succeed if newly placed workers must walk three or four miles from a suburban train station to their new workplace.

Accessible Transportation, Inc.: A Flexible Private Provider

The second example program also comes from the Philadelphia metropolitan area. Accessible Transportation, Inc. provides an example of the flexibility that can come from private-sector provision of transportation. Accessible Transportation is involved in several efforts, adapting its services to the specific needs of the situation. Perhaps the most innovative effort is the "Job Relay System", designed with help from the University of Pennsylvania and run jointly by Accessible Transportation and the Job Training Centers of Philadelphia.²⁰

The Job Relay System was funded by a grant from UMTA and began operation in April 1988. The system transports inner-city workers door-to-door from their residences to entry-level and semi-skilled jobs along suburban employment corridors. As of February 1989, there were ten vans in operation transporting approximately 160 workers per day. The vans operate on three shifts: early, day, and midnight. The service costs ten dollars per day, of which 40 to 60 percent is contributed by employers and the rest by the riders.

Rather than evolving from a particular neighborhood or workplace, Accessible Transportation plays a classic entrepreneurial role. They remain flexible in their routes and schedules, and adapt to the changing geographical demands of the regional labor market.

Human Development Institute, Inc: Keyed Into the Demands of the Workplace

The Baltimore metropolitan area provides a useful example of an approach that retains a workplace orientation while attempting to supplement public transit with a flexible transportation program of its own. The Human Development Institute was founded in 1987 by Betty and George Merrill. Both founders manage the program in a very "hands on" fashion. HDI provides an eight-week training cycle designed to prepare welfare recipients for the workplace and to place them in available jobs throughout the Baltimore region.

HDI focuses on providing its clients with basic job skills: confidence, punctuality, appearance. Perhaps more important, HDI attempts to connect clients to the array of support services available to them: day care, help with housing problems, reporting domestic violence, even providing a thrift shop of clothes suitable for office environments. Essentially, HDI helps clients adapt to the transition from welfare to the world of work. For many of the clients, this is the very first job and HDI provides an intensive and comprehensive immersion into the expectations of the labor market.

In this way, HDI provides something of a screening service for employers. Indeed, after three years of operation, HDI has developed ongoing relationships with large area employers. This provides a steady source of labor demand for the approximately forty graduates a month that HDI currently produces. (According to HDI records, 70 percent of these clients are still working in their initial job ninety days after placement; the average wage is \$4.57 per hour.)

For present purposes, the most salient feature of HDI program is the recognition of the transportation needs of many of its clients. Ten percent have access to a private automobile. Most of the employer relationships established by HDI have been located in suburban Howard and Carroll Counties. In keeping with its commitment to deal comprehensively with the barriers confronting its clients, HDI has established a transportation component to its services.

Although the transportation assistance ranges from helping clients understand transit schedules to organizing ride-sharing, the bulk of the transportation assistance consists of HDI's own fleet of three vans. During its first year, HDI ran a 365-day-a-year schedule, from 4 a.m. to midnight. This proved an enormous task and, since the second year of operation, HDI has contracted out its transportation service. Clients pay \$35 a month, with an equal amount contributed by the employer; the system is also subsidized by local government. This service provides a crucial link between the clients and the public transit system.

The public funding for the transportation has been unstable and HDI is moving toward a fuller integration with the Baltimore Metropolitan Transit Authority. Essentially, HDI has demonstrated the need for several possible new express bus routes; the organization hopes to use its own transportation experience as market research to help convince MTA to establish such new routes.

HDI demonstrates the ability of well-managed organizations to identify productive potential employees from the welfare roles and to move them into the workplace in as little as eight weeks. Their comprehensive approach to the problems of their clients is crucial, as is their ability to strengthen the client's approach to the employer with the backup support of HDI's reputation.

Kenilworth-Parkside Resident Management Corp.: Rooted in the Neighborhood

Washington, D.C., provides perhaps the nation's best known example of resident-managed public housing: the Kenilworth-Parkside Resident Management Corporation (KPRMC) headed by Ms. Kimi Gray. This resident management group and seven other similar organizations are also examples of private transportation initiatives emerging from neighborhood-oriented organizations.

The Kenilworth-Parkside development consists of 464 low-rise units constructed during the late 1950s. Beginning in the early 1970s, residents led by Ms. Gray began to organize themselves to improve the problems caused by poor maintenance and vandalism. The problems proved to be overwhelming, and by 1982 the development was without hot water

or heating, approximately 80 percent of the residents were receiving public assistance, and Kenilworth-Parkside had the highest crime rate of any public property in the District.

During that year, the management of the development was taken over from the District by Ms. Gray and KPRMC. The residents began to work with the District police department to close the neighborhood's notorious open-air drug markets. They enforced rent collection themselves with the incentive of scheduling and performing their own maintenance. After the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, the surplus created by better rent collection and lower maintenance costs have allowed KPRMC to establish day-care and health centers, and create approximately one hundred local service jobs for the community (a beauty shop, a moving company, a screen-door shop, among others).

As public safety, physical maintenance, and services for families and children were slowly put into place, it became clear to KPRMC that the next step for a long-term solution to the neighborhood's problems was a stable employment base for the adult population. They identified the booming suburban economy as the most likely source of such a base. In 1988, KPRMC and seven other resident management organizations were awarded planning grants to organize reverse commuting systems from the neighborhoods to suburban job sites.

It is too early to learn much from the experience of the resident management sponsored reverse commute programs. Each group is taking a slightly different approach to the problem. For example KPRMC is negotiating with several metropolitan planning and business organizations to coordinate the service with other providers and with the needs of employers. The Bromley-Heath Tenant Management Corporation in Boston is surveying employers directly to develop relationships. The B.W. Cooper Tenant Management Corporation in New Orleans is focusing on transporting its residents to job training centers rather than to employers.

All of the resident management organizations are taking a comprehensive approach to the problems of the neighborhoods, and understand transportation as a relevant service only after job training and readiness are in place. For this reason, most are working closely with particular employers doing on-the-job training or with their local Private Industry Councils.

Even though we are not in a position yet to evaluate the efficacy of the resident management sponsored reverse commute programs, their very existence does provide further evidence of the changing mindset of many people in the neighborhoods that make up the impacted ghetto. These eight neighborhood-based organizations with a proven track record of providing services to residents are shifting their focus from economic redevelopment toward taking part in the existing boom of the surrounding suburbs.

Just Jobs, Inc: Doing It All

Just Jobs, Inc., of Chicago provides an example of an approach that attempts to bridge these various strengths and to occupy the crossroads of the two dimensions. The organization is based in three particular Chicago inner-city neighborhoods and has developed a strong, long-standing relationship with Chicago area employers. Also, Just Jobs is committed to

developed a complete menu of transportation opportunities for its clients from public to private. This combination of strengths makes Just Jobs a very promising model.

The organization was founded in 1971 with the stated mission of "enhancing employment opportunities for disadvantaged men and women who lack typical access to the job market". Just Jobs serves the three neighborhoods of Uptown, North Lawndale, and Little Village. To enhance opportunities available in these neighborhoods Just Jobs has developed a temporary job placement service. During its eighteen-year history, Just Jobs has aggressively captured a top market share in the Chicago region for light industrial temporary employment. It currently places an average daily workforce of 700 persons earning an annual payroll of \$5.6 million. The average starting wage during 1988 was \$6.11 per hour.

Detailed monitoring of individual progress allows Just Jobs to increase client pay after 300 and 600 hours of work. This builds important incentives for lower wage workers to invest themselves in their jobs. Furthermore, Just Jobs is developing a system it calls "out-placement." People who fill the same job everyday for ninety days will be designated "working job applicants." Just Jobs is attempting to move these clients out of temporary positions and into regular positions with private firms.

The organization's leadership explicitly understands its purpose as a dual one: filling the needs of suburban firms while providing employment opportunities of neighborhood residents. Furthermore, Just Jobs is an explicit mechanism for economic redevelopment in the target neighborhoods — but by "importing income" from suburban employment rather than by attempts at job creation in the target neighborhoods themselves. And finally, transportation is understood to be a fundamental barrier to access: "The challenge accepted by Just Jobs is that of building viable transportation bridges from specific inner city neighborhoods to the work in the suburbs," reports a summary of the organization's goals.

The organization is attempting to build those bridges through a multi-part transportation strategy. First, Just Jobs plans to design and manage neighborhood-based carpool systems. A computerized file of origins and destinations would allow Just Jobs to match workers with similar trips. The system would allow participants to reduce the costs of driving as well as providing an insurance against automobile breakdowns. Second, Just Jobs plans to lease or purchase their own fleet of buses and vans. This fleet will allow the organization to expand their penetration of the suburban labor market and to experiment with routes and schedules. Third, Just Jobs hopes to use the experiences gained from their own fleet to lobby the Regional Transportation Authority and the suburban PACE authority to initiate new service. Thus, the organization will in effect remove some of the risk for new service and provide the public providers with a very reliable form of market research: a steady history of actual ridership.

This brief description of Just Jobs is enough to suggest a strong and promising program. That promise derives in part from two factors. The first is the two-sided nature of the organization. Just Jobs is at once an organization committed to the improvement of three particular neighborhoods and their residents, and a successful competitive business with a reputation among Chicago area businesses. Thus, Just Jobs has built an organization that is itself a solid institutional bridge between the inner city and the outer city.

The second important factor is Just Jobs pragmatic attitude toward the provision of transportation for its operations. Through a commitment to a variety of options, Just Jobs can keep its attention on the outcome — connection — and not be too tied to public or private provision. An important question for the organization as it expands its own private fleet of vehicles is whether it can maintain its openness toward the public system. Given the advantages of being a part of a comprehensive regional transit system, it is important to retain the fleet's function as a flexible start-up and market-research device, and to refrain from allowing the fleet to develop its own organizational imperative.

Just Jobs provides the best example of a program that draws strength from its knowledge of neighborhood supply as well as of workplace demand, and that recognizes the transportation advantages of both private flexibility and public comprehensiveness. It is certainly an organization that appears to hold some promising lessons for those facing the problems of the impacted ghetto.

Conclusion:

A War on Poverty that Everybody Wins

These five particular cases are offered only as exploratory evidence. No evaluation of their effects on the impacted ghetto has been attempted here, nor has any use been made of the internal evaluations that several of these organizations have wisely built into their programs. These cases are definitely not offered as clear success stories. Rather the goal in discussing them has been three-fold.

First, the report has uncovered extensive "connection" activity in many of the nation's largest metropolitan areas. This level of activity is perhaps surprising given the dismal results of reverse commute demonstrations conducted fifteen to twenty years ago. This suggests that the twin forces of metropolitan decentralization and demographic change have lead to labor shortages that make transportation-based programs more feasible. People who face these problems every day — suburban employers, neighborhood organizers, transit planners — are increasingly adding connection programs to their strategic thinking and their concrete programs.

It is important to understand this shift toward a connection strategy as much more than transportation. "Connection," broadly understood, means thinking of urban poverty in regional rather than in local terms. Again, urban poverty is increasingly a two-sided coin: the same changes that have devastated the inner city are having some negative consequences for the outer city as well. "Connection," broadly understood, means job training for the regional labor market, job search for region-wide opportunities, and a journey-to-work made feasible by regional transportation options.

Clearly, there is also a necessary role for federal leadership and involvement. Although there are connection programs around the country, federal funding for demonstrations has already and could continue to assist and accelerate the process. Also, changes in existing programs could help reorient incentives so that federal programs avoid fragmenting regional efforts at cooperation and instead encourage it.

Second, this report has illustrated two important features of connection programs: their relative reliance on public and private services, and their relative orientation to the sending neighborhoods or the receiving workplaces. Connection programs are almost inevitably a mixture of these elements. The cases were used to illustrate the special strengths of each element and to show the advantages of bridging the neighborhood and workplace through a variety of public and private options.

SEPTA's public 200 Routes make suburban workplaces an accessible part of a comprehensive regional public transit system. Accessible Transportation's private van service offers both employers and workers flexible adaptations to particular needs. HDI's job counseling and placement programs present the needs of the workplace to HDI clients and help clients fill those needs. KPRMC's array of resident services provide its neighborhood with ongoing support from safe streets to child-care as well as a private transportation service—all delivered by members of the community itself. And Just Jobs delivers nearly twenty years of experience with particular neighborhoods and particular employers, adding a variety of private and public transportation options as needed.

Third, this report has identified programs that warrant closer evaluation and that appear to be good models for future experiments and demonstrations. The latter do not just fall from the sky, and the basic features of possible connection demonstration projects are well-drawn by these five program cases.

The most basic of these features is a comprehensive and regional approach to the problem. The mobility strategy contains many familiar elements: job training, day care, and so on. But each of these elements are seen from a metropolitan perspective: training for jobs best suited to workers's skills and aspirations whether they are in the city or the suburbs; child supervision delivered in the neighborhood or at the workplace. Less familiar elements are also part of the mobility strategy. When viewed from a metropolitan perspective, antipoverty strategies must be more responsive to the transportation needs of the poor. Transportation is by no means a sufficient solution to the problem, but in the decentralized metropolis of the 1990s it will be an increasingly necessary part of any comprehensive solution.

Clearly, the pieces of this puzzle will not simply fall into place and remain fixed. Metropolitan areas are complex and dynamic. Some people will get jobs and incomes and buy cars. Some people will get jobs and incomes and move to the suburbs. The broadest goal of the mobility strategy is to transform the impacted ghetto into a viable place with access to the resources that make any neighborhood viable: safe streets, education, employment. People may want to move when given the choice or people may choose to rebuild their neighborhoods rather than leave them. But whatever their choice, the mobility strategy would be successful precisely because the poor would have a real choice: between safe, decent, accessible neighborhoods in the inner city or the attractions of the suburbs. The mobility strategy does not make hostage the fortunes of impacted ghetto residents to our political and economic capacity to rebuild downtown blue-collar economies or to open up the suburbs to affordable housing.

By taking a comprehensive and regional approach to urban poverty, the programs highlighted in this report are drawing on the opportunities created by metropolitan decentralization, national demographics, and the resulting suburban labor shortage. These opportunities

are the engine of the mobility strategy. There are substantial gains to all the relevant participants. Impacted ghetto residents gain access to economic opportunity and resources necessary to stabilize their neighborhoods. Since people vote and are taxed where they live, city governments import income while retaining benefited voters. Suburban firms gain access to entry-level workers, while suburban governments can ease the pressures on infrastructure driven by growth. And transit providers gain market share. Everybody wins.

Notes

1. For a good review of the experiences in Boston, Hartford, and Washington, see *Regional Labor Market Barriers and Transportation Policies* (The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Planning and Development Department, December 1987, pp. 25-27).
2. M.A. Hughes, *Underclass Fallacy, Ghetto Reality: A Geographical Perspective on Urban Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming in 1990).
3. For an excellent introduction to these places, see D. Ward, *Poverty, Ethnicity, and the American City, 1840-1925* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
4. W.J. Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
5. These findings were first made prominent by John D. Kasarda. For his most recent discussion, see J.D. Kasarda, "Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass" in *The Annals of the AAPSS* (January 1989, pp. 26-47).
6. For example, see C. Lockwood and C.B. Leinberger, "How Business is Reshaping America" in *The Atlantic Monthly* (October 1986, pp. 43-52) and "Los Angeles Comes of Age" in *The Atlantic Monthly* (January 1988, pp. 31-56); N.R. Peirce, "Can the Suburban Jobs Boom Reach the Ghetto?" in *National Journal* (13 August 1988, p. 2108); B. Wysocki, "The New Boom Towns" in *The Wall Street Journal* (27 March 1989, pp. B1-2); J.A. Tannenbaum, "Firms Try Busing to Ease Labor Shortage" in *The Wall Street Journal* (30 December 1988, p. 1); and V. Brownstein, "A Growing Shortage of Workers is Raising Inflation Risks" in *Fortune* (10 April 1989, pp. 33-34).
7. See especially, P.O. Muller, *Contemporary Suburban America* (Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall Publishers, 1981); and J.D. Kasarda, "Changing Occupational Structure of the American Metropolis" in B. Schwartz (ed) *The Changing Faces of the Suburbs* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, pp. 113-136).
8. James W. Hughes, "Future Demographics and Housing Demand" in a paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, 1 August 1989.
9. For a good overview, see D.E. Dowall, *The Suburban Squeeze* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).
10. J.W. Hughes, op.cit.
11. M.A. Hughes, "Formation of the Impacted Ghetto: Evidence from Large Metropolitan Areas: 1970-1980" in *Urban Geography* (forthcoming).

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12. Data from the Harris Industrial Directory cited in P. Binzen, "Traffic, and More, Goes Two Ways Between City and Suburb" in *The Philadelphia Inquirer* (2 April 1989, p. 7-C).
13. Data from U.S. Department of Labor and Philadelphia City Planning Commission as reported in *The Mismatch Between Jobs and Labor in Metropolitan Philadelphia* (Fund Distribution and Community Problem Solving Department, United Way of Southeastern Pennsylvania, May 1989).
14. Peirce, op.cit.
15. *Population and Employment Forecasts (Delaware Valley [PA and NJ] Regional Planning Commission, 1987); Regional Labor Market Barriers and Transportation Policies* (The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Planning and Development Department, December 1987); *Baltimore Region Transportation Needs* (Baltimore Regional Planning Council and the Greater Baltimore Committee, January 1989); *Reducing Chronic Joblessness in Greater Detroit* (Metropolitan Affairs Corporation of Detroit and Southeast Michigan, April 1989); *The Mismatch Between Jobs and Labor in Metropolitan Philadelphia* (Fund Distribution and Community Problem Solving Department, United Way of Southeastern Pennsylvania, May 1989).
16. See, "Jobs Go to the Suburbs, Mass Transit Doesn't" in the *Chicago Tribune* (15 September 1986, p. 1); "Home in the City, Job in the Suburbs" in *The New York Times* (15 September 1986, sCN p. 1); "Septa to Carry City Workers to Suburban Office" in *The Philadelphia Business Journal* (22 February 1988, p. 1); "Suburban Economic Hubs Vying for Workers" in *The Washington Post* (22 July 1986, s. A p. 1); and "Transit Key to Overcoming Economic Segregation" in *Metro Monitor* (Minneapolis-St Paul) (July-August 1988, p. 6).
17. J.J. DiIulio, Jr. and M.A. Hughes, "The Real Underclass" (Paper presented at the APPAM Meetings, Seattle WA, 1988); J.J. DiIulio, Jr., "The Impact of Inner City Crime" in *The Public Interest* (Summer 1989, pp28-43).
18. In particular, see S. Danziger and D. Weinberg (eds) *Fighting Poverty: What Works and What Doesn't* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); R. Freeman and H.J. Holzer (eds) *The Black Youth Employment Crisis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); L. Schorr and D. Schorr, *Within Our Reach* (New York: Anchor Press, 1988); D.T. Ellwood, *Poor Support: Poverty in the American Family* (New York, N.Y.: Basic Books, 1988).
19. In particular, A.A. Summers and T.F. Luce, *Economic Development With the Philadelphia Metropolitan Area* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987); and *Population and Employment Forecasts* (Delaware Valley [PA and NJ] Regional Planning Commission, 1987)
20. J. Vogel, "City's Jobless Get a Lift to Suburban Jobs" in *The Penn Paper* (13 October 1988, p. 3).

Appendix I: Survey Responses by Metropolitan Area and Affiliation

SMSA	Newspapers	Transportation Planning	Community Organizations	Other	Totals
Atlanta	1	-	1	-	2
Baltimore	-	1	1	-	2
Birmingham	1	1	-	1	3
Boston	1	2	-	3	6
Buffalo	1	1	-	-	2
Chicago	2	2	1	2	7
Cincinnati	1	1	1	-	3
Cleveland	1	1	-	1	3
Columbus	1	1	1	-	3
Dallas/Ft. Worth	1	2	-	-	3
Denver	-	1	-	-	1
Detroit	1	2	1	-	5
El Paso	-	-	-	-	-
Honolulu	-	-	-	-	-
Houston	-	1	-	-	1
Indianapolis	1	-	-	-	1
Jacksonville	2	1	-	-	3
Kansas City	1	1	-	-	2
Los Angeles	1	2	-	-	3
Louisville	1	1	-	-	2
Memphis	1	1	-	-	2
Miami	1	2	1	-	4
Milwaukee	1	1	1	-	3
Minneapolis/ St. Paul	1	1	-	-	2
Nashville	1	-	-	-	1
Newark	1	1	-	-	2
New Orleans	1	-	-	-	1
New York	-	3	-	-	3

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SMSA	Newspapers	Community Transportation	Planning	Organizations	Other	Totals
Norfolk	1	1	-	-	-	2
Oklahoma City	-	-	-	-	-	-
Omaha	1	1	-	-	-	2
Philadelphia	1	1	1	1	-	4
Phoenix	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pittsburgh	1	2	-	1	-	4
Portland, Ore.	1	-	-	-	-	1
Rochester	1	-	1	-	1	3
St. Louis	1	-	1	-	-	2
San Antonio	1	-	-	-	-	1
San Diego	-	1	1	-	-	2
San Francisco	1	1	1	-	-	3
San Jose	1	-	-	-	1	2
Seattle	1	-	2	-	-	3
Tampa	1	-	2	-	1	4
Toledo	1	-	-	-	-	1
Tulsa	2	-	-	-	-	2
Washington, D.C.	-	1	1	2	-	4
Totals	39	38	17	11	5	110

Appendix II: List of Useful Contacts (survey respondents plus others)

ATLANTA

1. Pam Fine, reporter, Atlanta Journal & Constitution, (404) 526-5151.
2. Harry West, Director, Atlanta Regional Council, (ARC), (404) 656-7735.
3. Phil Boyd, Director, Transportation Planning, ARC, (404) 656-7735.
4. Gerry Pachucki, Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, (MARTA), (404) 848-5323.

BALTIMORE

1. Brian Betlyon, Senior Planner, Baltimore Regional Planning Council, (301) 554-5630.
2. Betty Merrill, Executive Director, Human Development Institute, (301) 338-0330.
3. Sam Triandos, Maryland Mass Transit Administration, (301) 333-3434

BIRMINGHAM

1. Andy Kilpatrick, reporter, Birmingham Post-Herald, (205) 325-2487.
2. Barbara Murdoch, Metro Area Exchange (MAX), (205) 322-7701.
3. John Roberts, Assistant General Manager, Wendy's Restaurant, (205) 991-9555.

BOSTON

1. Jerry Ackerman, reporter, Boston Globe, (617) 929-2000.
2. Jim Nolan, Administrator, Service & Planning Office, Suburban Transportation, Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, (617) 722-3430.
3. Gretchen Ashton, Manager, Commuter Mobility Program, Caravan, (617) 973-7189.

4. Donna Smallwood, Caravan, (617) 973-7189.
5. Bob Sloane, Joint Regional Transportation Committee, (617) 973-7142.
6. Rosemary O'Connor, Transportation coordinator, Bromley Heath Tenant Management Corporation, (617) 445-8515.

BUFFALO

1. Robert McCarthy, reporter, Buffalo News, (716) 849-3434.
2. Edward Small, Staff Director, Niagara Frontier Transportation Committee, (716) 856-2026.
3. David Franko, General Manager, Planning, Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, (NFTA), (716) 855-7242.
4. Art Page, State University of NY, Buffalo, (716) 636-2626.
5. Alfred Savage, Executive Director, NFTA, (716) 855-7242.

CHICAGO

1. Gary Washburn, reporter, Chicago Tribune, (312) 222-3232.
2. Pat Szymczak, reporter, Chicago Tribune, (312) 850-3359.
3. John Gaudette, Assistant Executive Director, Chicago Regional Transportation Authority, (RTA), (312) 917-0764.
4. Vincent Petrini, Public Affairs, RTA, (312) 917-0858.
5. Dick Brazda, Manager, Operations Planning, Suburban Bus Agency, PACE, (312) 364-7223.
6. Florence Boone, PACE, (312) 364-7223.
7. Joanne Williamson, Operations Manager, LeClaire Court Apartments, Tenant Management Corporation, (312) 767-1516.
8. Stan Horne, Executive Director, LeClaire Court, (312) 767-1516.
9. Debra Stone, Chicago Metropolitan Planning Commission, (312) 922-5616.
10. Larry Christmas, Director, North East Illinois Planning Commission, (312) 454-0400.
11. Toby Sachs, North East Illinois Planning Commission, (312) 454-0400.

CINCINNATI

1. Steve Kimmie, reporter, Cincinnati Enquirer, (513) 721-2700.
2. Marty Griesel, City Economic Development Department, (513) 352-3950.
3. Roland (Ron) Docter, Administrator, Resources & Planning, City Planning Department, (513) 352-3294.
4. Carl Palmer, Queens City Metro, (513) 632-7542.

CLEVELAND

1. Jim Lawless, reporter, Cleveland Plain Dealer, (216) 344-4500.
2. Ron Tober, General Manager, Greater Cleveland Regional Transportation Authority, (RTA), (216) 566-5218.

3. Tom Binaut, Acting Director, Planning Department, Cleveland RTA, (216) 566-5038.
4. Cornell Calhoun, Lakeview Terrace, Tenant Management Corporation, (216) 348-3791.

COLUMBUS

1. Felix Hoover, reporter, Columbus Dispatch, (614) 461-5219.
2. Bruce Mansfield, Mid Ohio Regional Planning Commission, (614) 228-2663.
3. Richard Simonetta, General Manager, Central Ohio Transit Authority, (614) 275-5850.

DALLAS

1. Terry Nefos, Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART) (214) 828-6726.
2. John Gobis, Service Development Department, DART, (214) 658-6406.
3. Suda Palani, Transportation Planner, DART, (214) 658-6342.

DENVER

1. Cleveland Brown, Manager, Systems Planning, Denver Regional Transit District, (303) 628-9000.

DETROIT

1. Dan Gilmore, reporter, Detroit Free Press, (313) 222-6400.
2. Bob Newhauser, Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG), (313) 961-4266.
3. Don Shelton, SEMCOG, (313) 961-4266.
4. Carmin Palombo, Head of Planning, SEMCOG.
5. Jim Maslanka, Manager for Planning, Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART), (313) 256-8603.
6. Claryce Gibbons-Allen, Supervisor, Planning, Marketing & Scheduling, Detroit Department of Transportation (DDOT), (313) 833-7690.
7. Dan Greeden, Administrator, St. Benedict's Nursing Home, (313) 554-2700.
8. Dave Sanders, Metropolitan Affairs Corporation, (MAC) (313) 961-2270.

HOUSTON

1. Keith Hom, Houston Metro Transit Authority, (713) 739-6063.

INDIANAPOLIS

1. Morris Wildey, Business Editor, Indianapolis Star, (317) 633-1240.

JACKSONVILLE

1. Jerry Falstrom, reporter, Florida Times-Union, (904) 359-4550.
2. Terri Langford, reporter, Florida Times-Union, (904) 359-4550.
3. Charlie Dickson, Head, Jacksonville Transportation Authority, (904) 630-3109.

KANSAS CITY

1. Elaine Adams, reporter, Kansas City Times, (816) 234-4420.
2. Richard Davis, General Manager, Kansas City Area Transportation Authority, (KCATA), (816) 346-0210.
3. Donna Brown, KCATA, Manager, Planning, KCATA, (816) 346-0311.
4. Richard Salazar, Full Employment Council (FEC), (816) 471-1430 or Luther Chandler, same.
5. Fred Schwarz, Transportation Director, KCATA, (816) 474-4240.

LOS ANGELES

1. Richard Connell, reporter, LA Times, (213) 237-5000.
2. Gary Spevak, Southern California Rapid Transit District, (213) 972-4880.
3. Jim Simms, LA County Transportation Commission, (213) 626-0370.
4. Art Leahy, Operations Manager, LA Rapid Transit District, (213) 972-4322.
5. Al Predon, Operations Division, LA RTD, (213) 972-4312.

LOUISVILLE

1. Michelle Johnson, reporter, Louisville Courier-Journal, (502) 582-4011.
2. Susan McDonald, Director, Marketing & Communications, Transit Authority of River City, (502) 561-5118.

MEMPHIS

1. Tom Jordan, reporter, Memphis Commercial Appeal, (901) 529-5855.
2. Fred Gilliam, General Manager, Memphis Area Transportation Authority, (901) 722-7111.

MIAMI

1. Craig Gemoules, reporter, Miami Herald, (305) 350-2111.
2. Mario Garcia, Chief, Metro Dade Transit Agency for Planning & Development, (305) 375-5000.
3. Danny Alvarez, Acting Assistant Director, Metro Bus, Metro Dade Transit Agency, (305) 375-5675.
4. Reginald Walters, Director, Planning Department, Metropolitan Dade County, (305) 375-2840.

MILWAUKEE

1. Tim Cuprisin, reporter, Milwaukee Journal, (414) 224-2000.

2. Ken Yunker, Southeast Wisconsin Planning Commission, (414) 457-6721.
3. Gerry Schwerm, Director, Department of Public Works, Milwaukee County Transit System, (414) 344-4550.
4. John Hartz, Wisconsin Department of Transportation, (608) 266-1379.
5. Tanya Nelson, Chief of Transit, Wisconsin Department of Transportation, (608) 266-1379.

MINNEAPOLIS

1. Laurie Blake, reporter, Minneapolis Star Tribune, (612) 372-4141.
2. Bev Auld, Assistant Administrator, Metropolitan Transit Commission, (612) 349-7511.
3. Judy Hollander, Regional Transit Board, (612) 229-2704.

NASHVILLE

1. Jane Dubose, reporter, Nashville Banner, (615) 259-8281.
2. Jo Fiederspil, General Manager, Metropolitan Transit Authority, (615) 242-1622.

NEWARK

1. Guy Baehr, reporter, Newark Star-Ledger, (201) 877-4040.
2. Jeff Zupan, Director, Planning & Policy, New Jersey Transit, (201) 643-4653.
3. Stan Rosenbloom, New Jersey Transit, Transit Check Program, (201) 643-4575.
4. Reverend Robert Blount, A. Harry Moore Public Housing project, Jersey City.
5. Katherine Wolfolk, Booker T. Washington Public Housing project, Jersey City.

NEW ORLEANS

1. Charlie Blaine, reporter, New Orleans Times Picayune, (504) 826-3418.
2. Yvonne Merrero, B.W. Cooper Housing Project, (504) 821-5150.

NEW YORK

1. Karen Kahn, Economic Division, NY Port Authority, (212) 432-5310.
2. Amos Ilan, Economic Division, NY Port Authority, (212) 432-5310.
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4. Richard Bickel, Director, Strategic Planning, DVRPC, (215) 592-1800 x131.

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2. Alan Bealer, Director, Planning & Business Development. Port Authority of Allegheny County, (PAAC), (412) 237-7327.
3. George Hazimanolis, Marketing Department, PAAC, (412) 237-7330.
4. Gregory Herndon, North Side Employment Project, (412) 231-4840.

PORTLAND, OREGON

1. Brian Cour, reporter, The Oregonian, (503) 221-8327.

ROCHESTER

1. Ellen Rosen, reporter, Rochester Times, (716) 232-7100.
2. Larry Kessler, owner, Kessler Franchise Group, (17 Burger King Franchises), (716) 424-5277.
3. Lynne Clark, Monroe County Economic Development, (716) 428-4504.
4. Sue Forbes, City of Rochester Economic Development, (716) 428-6808.
5. Don Carson, Rochester Downtown Development Corporation, (716) 546-6920.
6. Neal Jascik, Genessee Transportation Council, (716) 232-6240.
7. Patricia Jackson, Ashanti Tenant Management Corporation, (716) 235-7900.

ST. LOUIS

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2. Les Sterman, East West Gateway Council of Governments, (314) 421-4220.
3. Pat Ferguson, Cochrane Gardens Tenant Corporation, (314) 241-2733.

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SAN DIEGO

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3. Robert Halligan, California Department of Transportation, Division of Mass Transportation, CALTRANS, (415) 923-4301.
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4. Mike Smith, Regional Transportation Planner, PSCOG, (206) 464-7090.
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3. Vicki Crouch, Research Department, Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council, (813) 224-9380.
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TOLEDO

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TULSA

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2. Kimi Gray, Kenilworth Parkside TMC, (202) 396-2327.
3. Butch Hopkins, Anacostia Economic Development Corporation
4. Reverend Verlon Brown, Community Family Life Service, (202) 347-0511.
5. John Williams, Transportation Planning Department, Washington Council of Governments, (202) 223-6800.
6. Dick Cantor, Project coordinator, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, (202) 366-1674.
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3. Doug Burney, Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) (202) 366-1666.
4. Robert Woodson, The National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise, NCNE, (202) 331-1103.
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7. Rich Diamond, UMTA, (202) 366-4060.
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Appendix III:

Programs Identified in Survey

These brief summaries of the open-ended surveys are intended to provide leads for readers interested in more information about specific programs or cities. All of what follows are the comments of the interviewees, and nothing has been independently confirmed. The survey is a starting point, not a conclusion.

ATLANTA

1. Atlanta is receiving some UMTA money. The money will fund several proposed programs that have not begun yet. The proposed projects include the formation of a transportation management association to transport employed and unemployed persons to jobs at the employment area. The Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) and the Metropolitan Planning Organization for the Atlanta area are assisting in the formation of the TMA.
2. In DeKalb and Fulton counties there are several transit management associations that are examining the range of possibilities of private and public partnerships that would provide access to jobs for entry level employees. This is not underway, but is being studied. The area of increased development is the George 400 Area, where there are many job opportunities.

BALTIMORE

1. The Human Development Institute is an intensive job training and placement program. It trains welfare mothers and finds them jobs. In addition, it provides these workers with transportation to and from their places of employment. The program has been in existence since 1986.

The HDI receives money from UMTA in order to lease the vans that transport workers to job sites that are usually beyond public transportation access.

The HDI would like to expand its program so that it reaches others in Howard County, but this expansion has not begun.

BIRMINGHAM

1. Wendy's fastfood restaurant operates a number of franchises in the Birmingham area. The franchise in downtown Birmingham has no problem hiring workers, but the one along the Route 280 corridor has had significant difficulty in finding workers.

John Roberts, the assistant general manager at the suburban Wendy's has instituted a program where a Wendy's company car, driven by one of the employees, transport workers from the downtown location to the suburban one.

This service has been in existence for about one year. Although Walter Kirkland, the Wendy's general manager, has tried to get public transportation to the area, no service is being provided.

BOSTON

1. The Bromley Heath Tenant Management Corporation is a tenant-owned public housing project. It is currently identifying potential employees that will be transported to job sites along the rapidly growing Route 128 corridor.

Bromley Heath is in its nineteenth year of tenant management, although the transportation component of the project has only been in existence for two years.

Bromley Heath receives funding from UMTA, Caravan and the National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise. This money enables Bromley Heath to lease vans and target potential employers who have job vacancies. Bromley Heath does not undertake any of the job training, although it may in the future.

2. The Mission Hill section of Boston is a poor and minority neighborhood. The Mission Hill Link has run its own bus system for the past four to five years. The Link is jointly funded by the New England Baptist Hospital, where many of the residents work.
3. There are several transportation management associations (TMAs) in the Boston area. The Route 128 transportation management group picks up employees at the Ale Wife and Riverside T-Stations (end-of-the-line stops) and transports them to Wellesley Office Park and Cummings Office Park.
4. Caravan for Commuters is a not-for-profit group that works with developers, businesses and commuters to encourage public transportation and private van pooling initiatives. There are two components, one that deals with the suburban commute and the other (not as well established yet) that provides inner city and reverse commuting transportation.

The inner city component of Caravan is looking to coordinate activity with the Boston for Boston program. This is still in the initial planning phase.

5. A private building cleaning company picks up employees at an inner city location and transports them to the 128 corridor.

CHICAGO

1. LeClaire Court Apartments is a tenant owned and managed housing project. It works in conjunction with the Clarence Darrow Center to provide job training, placement and transportation to job sites, especially in DuPage County.

LeClaire Court is funded by an UMTA grant, as well as support from the National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise. LeClaire Courts has decided to purchase three vans, rather than more, to begin there program. They are not running yet.

2. PACE, the suburban bus authority, has extended some trial or experimental service. One of these routes, the 747 DuPage Connection, which began in 1987, operates in a reverse commute fashion; at least part of the ridership is minority and entry level employees.
3. Just Jobs Inc's Suburban Job Link is a transportation based job training and information program designed to connect the Chicago neighborhoods of North Londale, Little Village and Uptown to job opportunities in Chicago suburbs. Suburban Job Link receives funding from the Department of Health and Human Services, Chicago based foundations and conventional lending resources.

CINCINNATI

1. Similar to other cities, Cincinnati has undergone rapid development in the area beyond their Belt Freeway in Hamilton County. There has been some discussion about establishing three private bus routes that would bring suburban commuters in to the city and on the return trip, provide transportation to inner city residents. This project has not begun operation.
2. Queens City Metro, the transportation authority in Cincinnati, has begun to coordinate a private van pool service. Metro subsidizes the cost of this service, so that the approximate cost is \$1.00. This service is primarily for entry level employment in the service industry.

CLEVELAND

1. Lakeview Terrace is a tenant management corporation that receives funding from both UMTA, the Center for Neighborhood Enterprise, and other Cleveland area foundations.

There is 60% unemployment in Lakeview Terrace and the TMC hopes to tap that large potential labor pool, provide some job training, in conjunction with JTPA, and then transport workers to employment sites. One of the targeted employers is Stouffer's in Solon, Ohio, where numerous jobs exist.

Lakeview Terrace has submitted a proposal for \$109,000 for vans, drivers, maintenance and insurance for one year. The program has not begun operation yet.

2. BP America is another large employer in the region. While they do not want to pay the entire cost of van service, they will subsidize private groups in order to set up a reverse commute.

COLUMBUS

1. Based on a 1987 study on labor trends and recent development, there is a grant pending from UMTA for a transportation management association to develop a suburban mobility plan. This has not begun yet.

DALLAS

1. In 1985, DART cosponsored a job fair with the Dallas Chamber of Commerce that encouraged private and public partnerships and brokering service. DART is in contact with 350 companies to determine what their transportation needs are.
2. There is a program in Dallas where shelter residents who are looking for work or going to interviews are given free transportation. In return, the shelter residents work for DART.

DENVER

1. The Denver Regional Transit District is in the "talking stages" for a plan to provide private sector van service to outlying employment centers. There have been policy discussions about suburban sprawl, but so far, no coordinated action.

DETROIT

1. The Detroit Department of Transportation has, on a trial basis, begun to expand hours and routes of the bus service to the suburbs. This will aid inner city employees without cars. The Imperial Express Route is one of these experimental routes.
2. The St. Benedict's Nursing Home has a facility in downtown Detroit, as well as a facility in a suburban area. While the downtown location has no problem filling jobs, the suburban site is experiencing difficulty. Dan Greeden, the Administrator of the Nursing Home, has established a private van service that transports workers from the inner city to the suburban facility.
3. The Metropolitan Affairs Corporation is a private, not-for-profit organization that recently published a report on the chronically jobless in Detroit. They are attempting to initiate programs that will coordinate private employers with the Southeast Michigan Council of Governments and other transportation vendors to provide adequate service.

HOUSTON

1. Compaq Computers has recently moved to Houston and is having problems locating low income workers and providing transportation to the employment site. It is beginning to look at alternate ways to transport workers who cannot live near to the job site or do not have access to cars.
2. The Houston Galveston Area Council (HGAC) received a grant from UMTA to examine the demand for and the feasibility of public transportation services in eastern Harris County. The results of the study will determine the suitability of developing financially viable, self-sustaining public transportation to serve the area.
3. An Entrepreneurial Services Project (ESP) grant was awarded to Houston, San Antonio and Beaumont to assist local entrepreneurs to provide a basic level of mobility for families participating in the Federal Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. With this service, those participating in the program will be able to participate in job-training and employment programs. The Texas Department of Human Services is under subcontract to work with the state and local agencies and employers to develop the operations plan, organization and management plan, and financial plan.

KANSAS CITY

1. The city runs a summer youth jobs program that includes transportation for these youth to the job sites.
2. The Full Employment Council (FEC) has attempted to locate jobs for inner city residents. Potential employees go to the FEC building in downtown Kansas City and vans transport them to job sites in the suburbs.
3. A private, seasonal employer [House of Lloyd in Grandview, Missouri] needs many workers during its busy months. It sends its own private buses to the inner city and picks up workers.

LOUISVILLE

1. The Transportation Authority of River City in Louisville recently conducted a \$50,000 marketing study to determine whether the bus system (primarily used by Black inner city residents) was providing adequate transportation.

There is some talk about extending routes to the suburbs where the new job growth is, but nothing has been done yet.

MILWAUKEE

1. The state of Wisconsin operates a Job-Ride Program. This is a demonstration project between Wisconsin Department of Transportation and private sector. The job-ride program contracts with the commuting group to supply vans and transport employees.
2. There is a Milwaukee County study, due out at the end of 1989, that seeks to determine the magnitude of the problem in Milwaukee, as well as track the labor trends of the area.
3. There is a \$150,000 reverse commute pilot program from Milwaukee county to Waukesha county that is being sponsored by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation.

MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL

1. The Metropolitan Council of Minneapolis, which is the Metropolitan Planning Organization for the Twin Cities area, is developing an action plan and strategy to implement a privately operated reverse commute service that will carry inner-city residents to suburban job markets. The Independent Transportation Management Service, Inc. (ITMS), a minority private operator has initiated contact with private employees, local agencies, and community groups to assess the potential for a self sufficient reverse commute service in several suburban communities.

NEW ORLEANS

1. B.W. Cooper Tenant Management Corporation is currently working to establish van service from the public housing project to employment training sites. It is funded by UMTA as well as the National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise.

The B.W. Cooper TMC is taking a different approach than other TMCs; it is taking residents to job training centers, not to the jobs themselves. New Orleans has unique problems because of the number of job openings that exist that require specific training and/or skills.

NEWARK

1. The Transit Check is a pass that a company purchases at a reduced cost. The pass is tax-free to both employees and companies, and is sponsored by New Jersey Transit.
2. New Jersey Transit operates a route that runs from Trenton to Route 1, the Route M service. This takes inner city residents to job sites along the Route 1 corridor, especially hotels and fastfood restaurants. This service is being cut because of low ridership and reduced funding.
3. New Jersey has several transportation management associations (TMAs). One of them operates from Newark to the Meadowlands area where there are employment opportunities for low skilled workers. This is called Meadowlinks Ride Sharing. The other two TMAs, Greater Princeton and Morris County Rides are suburban, in focus and ridership.

4. There are three public housing projects that are tenant-owned and managed in Jersey City. They are: A. Harry Moore, Booker T. Washington and Montgomery Gardens. They receive funding from UMTA and the National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise. They are currently working on reverse commuting and job training strategies.

NEW YORK

1. The Transportation Planning Group at the NY Port Authority is trying to coordinate efforts with New Jersey Transit and the NJ Department of Labor to train people for work and then provide transportation through the Meadowlinks TMA. This has not begun yet.
2. The Port Authority recently completed a study on the trends in the labor force. This should help to identify job site locations so that service needs can be targeted and provided.

PHILADELPHIA

1. SEPTA sponsors several bus routes, called the Route 200 Series. The Route 201 service began in March, 1988 and ridership has increased each month. The Route 201 buses were subsidized by suburban employers, but sufficient ridership has made that unnecessary. The bus service integrates the regional rail network with the shuttle service represented by Route 201.
2. Accessible Transportation, Inc. is a private group that has been in operation for one and half years. It is a transportation service that is driven by the private sector. It began through an initial seed grant of \$30,000 from UMTA, but it now operates on its own. Welsh estimates that the service has saved Washington, D.C. approximately \$1 million. Accessible Transportation utilizes inner city groups, community based organizations and neighborhood groups to identify potential employees and match them with jobs.

The employers pay about 60 percent of the transportation cost and the riders pay the remainder. The routes are flexible and respond to the changing trends in job growth.

Accessible Transportation sponsors several programs:

- a) Chester, PA has a fixed route with a goal of 1,000 riders. This includes day care and job training, in addition to transportation. The service is contracted out to the West Delaware County Reverse Commute Corporation.
 - b) New Jersey Transit will probable cut service to Camden, NJ. Accessible Transportation will then put on vans/buses to transport workers to job sites along the Route 1 corridor.
 - c) Accessible Transportation is trying to work with the Urban Women Group in Camden, N.J., which is a tenant management corporation. There is access to 10,000 people in housing projects and has a job training component.
 - d) Funds were provided to the University of Pennsylvania to plan and assist in the initiation of a pilot project to established an unsubsidized privately operated reverse commute service from Philadelphia to suburban job centers in order to link inner city unemployed to suburban job markets.
3. The Fort Washington area has many office parks. It is among the largest (employing about 16,000) and the oldest (operating for 25 years). The closest train station is three and a half miles from the development. Employers at the job site have subsidized van service so that inner city residents can reach their jobs. At Ft. Washington, between 6 a.m. and 7 p.m., vans and buses run every fifteen minutes during peak hours, and at least hourly at other times.
 4. The Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission (DVRPC) is implementing a program to encourage and assist small and minority business entrepreneurs in the development of innovative, self-sustaining

transportation services tailored to suburban and inner-city persons who are not well served by existing public transportation. DVRPC is receiving a grant from UMTA to conduct the study for this proposed service.

PITTSBURGH

1. The North Side Conference is a community based organization comprised of thirteen neighborhood groups. They have begun the North Side Employment Project, which helps refer North Side residents to jobs. It also has a training and placement component. It is partially funded by the United Way of Pittsburgh.

ROCHESTER

1. The Ashanti Tenant Management Corporation is funded by both UMTA and the National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise. It is still working on getting buses or vans to transport residents to jobs.

They have the backing and support of the mayor, but the van service is not yet in operation.

2. The Kessler Groups owns and operates seventeen Burger King franchises in the Upstate New York area. Larry Kessler, about two years ago, was finding difficulty in locating workers for the suburban Burger Kings. With his own money, he purchased a bus and designed a route that would pick up and drop off employees.

In the beginning, the problem was solved and all the shifts were filled. However, within a year of operation, problems arose. There were conflicts between inner city and suburban residents. Eventually the inner city workers lost interest and he had to end the service.

SEATTLE

1. The Puget Sound Council of Governments, over the past four years, has become increasingly aware of the changing labor force and labor market. Rapid development outside the traditional central business district (CBD) has forced Seattle to reexamine its transportation system. The PSCOG published a brochure on these trends in the region. While there is a labor mobility issue and growing needs, nobody is doing anything to address the problem.

ST. LOUIS

1. Cochran Gardens Tenant Management Corporation is jointly funded by UMTA and the National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise. It has not begun to operate van service, but hopes to do so soon. It will identify potential workers from the housing project and then transport them to job sites.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

1. Kenilworth Parkside is a tenant owned and managed housing project. The tenant management corporation (TMC) is currently working on purchasing vans to run a reverse commute to employment sites in Northern Virginia.

Kenilworth Parkside is developing a good system and strong foundation so that when the program is in operation, it runs smoothly and successfully. The reverse commute is being subsidized by grants from UMTA, as well as the National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise.

2. The Anacostia Economic Development Corporation (AEDC) is a Washington D.C. based group that is taking the lead role in setting up a reverse commute that focuses on suburban Maryland. The new organization will consist of AEDC, Southeast Neighborhood House, Senior Citizens Counseling and

Delivery Service, and Southeast Neighborhood Development Corporation. The new organization will be known as the Southeast Area Transit (SEAT).

3. The Community Family Life Services is a community based organization that has been operating a reverse commute since 1985. Although this specific program, providing access to jobs at Dulles Airport, CFLS still operates some reverse commute routes.

People are taken to job sites in Virginia, as well as some construction sites in the District. When the program operated to Dulles, about 120 people were involved, seven days a week, three shifts a day. Marriott, the largest employer at Dulles, subsidized the cost of the trip.

CFLS is now soliciting businesses whom they know need employees; they are targeting the Dulles Access Road.

CFLS receives funding from UMTA, DOT, and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, (WMATA).