

**FIRST LADY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
REMARKS TO THE MICROCREDIT SUMMIT
WASHINGTON, DC
FEBRUARY 3, 1997**

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It is a privilege to be here with so many old and new friends for what is truly an historic occasion. Microcredit is a subject near and dear to all of our hearts. This first global summit offers an unprecedented opportunity to draw attention to the successes of microcredit in developing countries as well as its applications in advanced economies around the world. By bringing together experts from every continent, we will be able to learn from each other's challenges and achievements and apply those lessons within our own borders. And I hope that this conference will engender new understanding of microcredit and its potential to transform the lives of individual men and women, their families, their communities and their nations.

Although it's called "micro," microcredit is really a "macro" idea. I say this because I know there are still some who view microcredit as a worthy tool — but one that, however noble, is too small and too marginal to have much impact on a global economy such as ours.

The Marshall Plan it is not. But on the eve of the 21st century, in an era of greater competition and scarcer resources — an era when the gap between rich and poor is widening in many parts of the world — microcredit represents a new understanding of how we can equip people on the margins of society with the tools they need to take control of their lives and their futures.

A small idea, yes. But a small idea with large consequences. Microcredit is not just about making loans available to the poor. It's not just about improving the lives of individuals and their families. It's about creating the conditions necessary to sustain democracy and the free market system. It's about shifting the balance of power.

Building and sustaining democracy has always required a balance of power: a balance of public political power, private economic power, and the power of civil society, the formal and informal networks that bring people together to make decisions for themselves and for the common good.

Today we need to be reminded that democratic values are at risk when that balance shifts to the extremes -- not only when government becomes too cumbersome or intrusive; not only when the marketplace becomes driven by profits alone; not only when civil society becomes

weakened by larger political and economic forces — but when too many people in too many parts of the world are denied their rightful place in the political, social, economic and civic life of their countries.

Microcredit is a single but important tool that allows democratic values — the values of freedom, opportunity, responsibility, community and respect for human dignity — to be internalized in people's hearts, minds and everyday lives. It enables those without a voice, and in some cases those without a vote, to begin to claim their share of personal, economic and civic power and have a stake in the societies in which they live.

In that way, microcredit has exponential effects that go far beyond the idea itself.

I first learned about microcredit more than a decade ago when my husband, then Governor of Arkansas, and I were involved in the creation of the Good Faith Fund. It was one of the earliest attempts at microcredit in this country and was modeled after the South Shore Bank in Chicago. Muhammad Yunus met with us and offered advice as the project got off the ground. Within a few years we could see that this revolutionary concept -- so contrary to conventional thinking about finance and economic development -- not only could succeed but could do so in diverse cultural and geographic settings.

What we discovered in Arkansas is that the concept -- if not the details -- of Dr. Yunus' Grameen Bank in Bangladesh had universal relevance. For us, the key was to apply that concept in an American context.

Now, more than 10 years later, we can look around this room and appreciate the power of one man's vision. And we can celebrate the courage and dedication it has taken -- on the part of all of you here today -- to challenge conventional wisdom and remain faithful to the notion that providing credit to women and men on the margins of society can reap economic and social benefits for us all.

I don't wish to suggest that microcredit is the only tool available to promote economic and social development. But I would argue that it is a critical tool -- one that has important implications *not only* for poor people, and those moving from welfare to work in my country, but also for the working poor and for communities suffering from lost economic opportunities and enterprise.

While the United States has long supported microcredit programs overseas through the U.S. Agency for International Development, I am pleased to tell you that microcredit today is a growing phenomenon within these borders. This country's young and dynamic microenterprise field has learned much from projects elsewhere in the world. But it also recognizes that microenterprise will only succeed in the United States if it is tailored to our particular economic and social circumstances. As a result, you will find that microenterprise programs in the United States are diverse: They offer many different kinds of loans, resources and business assistance

depending on the clients served.

Just last week the President, joined by Treasury Secretary Bob Rubin, presented the first Presidential Awards for Excellence in Microenterprise Development. The awards recognize efforts within this country to extend credit and economic opportunity to Americans who might otherwise lack the chance to become economically self-sufficient. The awards also underscore the ripple effect that microcredit projects can create -- not only in lifting people out of poverty and moving mothers from welfare to work, but in creating jobs, promoting businesses, and building capital in depressed areas.

The United States is also promoting microcredit through the Small Business Administration's microloan program, a public-private partnership, which has awarded \$70 million in grants to non-profit organizations, with nearly half of those loans going to women. The loans range from \$125 to \$25,000.

Because of the promise that microcredit holds in the United States, the President announced last week that he is requesting substantial increases in federal funding for our Community Development Financial Institutions Fund. His budget calls for a \$1 billion increase over the next five years.

As he said last week at the White House, there are millions of people in our country brimming with initiative and desire who are willing to take responsibility and work hard. But they need what I often call the "tools of opportunity." And one of those tools is microcredit. For a farmer whose livelihood has been undermined by bad luck and bad weather, an inner city parent who is trying to balance a night shift in a factory with family duties, a mother who has been exiled from the workforce because she took time off to raise children, an older person who is retired from a previous job, a disabled person who isn't mobile, a welfare mother who is eager to move off the public dole and into work, microcredit offers a path to the economic mainstream.

Later today, I will have the chance to visit a microcredit project right here in Washington, D.C. called FINCA USA. A few years ago I spent time at a FINCA borrowing group in Managua, Nicaragua, and I'm looking forward to seeing how the FINCA model is being translated on American soil.

What we are discovering around the world is that modest loans are transforming lives, reclaiming cities and rural areas from decay and decline, and helping to reduce the number of people living in substandard conditions or extreme poverty.

I have seen this for myself at microcredit projects in Central and South America and South Asia, many of which are supported by our government through USAID. And I have seen similar successes at microcredit projects in the United States. If you will indulge me for a few minutes, I'd like to share what I have learned at the microcredit projects I have visited, particularly some of the stories I've heard -- stories that offer powerful testimony about the impact of microcredit on

individual lives and the lives of entire communities.

1. THE SELF-EMPLOYED WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION IN AHMADABAD, INDIA

SLIDE 1: HRC and Ela Bhatt in front of SEWA center

I had the opportunity to meet with Ela Bhatt on my trip to South Asia in 1995 to learn more about her organization, the Self Employed Women's Association. As some of you know, Ela Bhatt was a devotee of Gandhi, who himself was quite outspoken about women's rights. Nowadays we might not agree with everything he said. But his emphasis on the full participation of women in society gave Ela Bhatt the philosophical grounding she needed to form this union of women -- women who were vegetable vendors, rag pickers, totally victimized and oppressed in the most dehumanizing ways. Her union gave them the strength to believe in themselves. And that spirit of self-reliance was palpable when I attended their gathering.

SLIDE 2: HRC looking at ledgers inside bank

My first impression was seeing women dressed in beautiful, brightly colored saris, some of whom had walked for 12 to 15 hours to get to this village bank. Although they were poor and under-educated, they were a model of efficiency and organization. These women lined up to get their loans, which were recorded in thick, yellowed stacks of paper. This was their bank. They had created it. They ran it. And they were proud of it.

SLIDE 3: Woman speaking at discussion

One woman stood up and talked about how she used to be afraid of her husband, her mother-in-law, the police. Now, she said, I'm not afraid any more.

SLIDE 4: Faces of women in audience

You may know that Gandhi was influenced by the writings of Henry David Thoreau. And Martin Luther King was influenced by the teachings of Gandhi. So I probably shouldn't have been surprised when, at the end of my visit, the women stood up and sang "We Shall Overcome" in their local dialect. Each woman there carried a sense of individual power born of the solidarity and community they had achieved collectively through SEWA.

SLIDE 5: HRC and CVC with woman making block prints

2. THE GRAMEEN BANK IN BANGLADESH

SLIDE 6: HRC and CVC with Dr. Yunus at discussion

A few days later I met up with Dr. Yunus at the Grameen Bank in Jessore, which I had heard and read so much about. We visited a Hindu village of untouchables outside of Jessore. And what was remarkable was that a nearby Muslim village sent its women to the Hindu village to participate in the meeting. There had never been a gathering like this before -- 150 Hindu women and 150 Muslim women, all there to discuss how their lives had been transformed by virtue of earning income.

SLIDE 7: Women in the audience

We discussed this with the women, who talked about the resistance they met in their own villages. According to the local propaganda, women who joined Grameen were sure to be kidnapped, exiled to distant islands, or forced to become Christians. One woman recounted in great detail how, when she decided to borrow money from Grameen, the local mullah warned her that no member of her family would receive a religious burial. So she and her husband discussed the pros and cons. "We decided to go ahead and borrow the money," she said. "And when my son grows up, he will be a different kind of Mullah!"

These women were willing to take risks because earning income — bringing money into their families — was so central to their progress and survival.

SLIDE 8: The Sixteen Decisions

One of the most compelling aspects of Grameen is the premium it puts on community. Women belong to borrowing groups. Each woman who joins the bank is asked to abide by 16 decisions, or principles, that range from "We shall build and use pit latrines" to "We shall not inflict injustice on anyone, neither will we allow anyone to do so" to "We shall always keep our children and the environment clean." There is even one against dowry, which is extraordinary considering the prevailing attitudes about dowry in that part of the world.

And each woman must wait her turn to get a loan. She can't borrow any money until the woman before her has repaid her loan. So there is a built-in incentive to support each other's enterprises. I saw women, for example, making steel and concrete beams that they can sell to other women who use them to build houses with loans from Grameen. A whole self-sustaining market is created within one village.

Even in this single location I could see the variety of enterprises that women engaged in to produce income. Some made traditional crafts. One woman got up and talked about how, with her first loan, she bought a milk cow. With a second loan, she bought another milk cow. But with her third loan, she decided to do something to encourage her husband to work. So she bought him

a rickshaw. This woman affirmed Dr. Yunus' theory that women who borrow money are likely to convert that loan into an investment in their families.

SLIDE 9: **Girls performing skit**

SLIDE 10: **HRC, CVC and Dr. Yunus observing woman at loom**

3. MI CASA IN DENVER, COLORADO

SLIDE 11: **Discussion with women at MiCasa**

Some months later I visited a microenterprise project in Denver, Colorado. As I said, microcredit can work in many different circumstances. In this case women, many of them Hispanic, receive career counseling, vocational training, and entrepreneurial services. With loans and technical assistance provided by Mi Casa, two of the women I met had started a computer business in a garage. The business had grown into a firm with dozens of employees.

SLIDE 12: **Discussion at Mi Casa**

Another woman said something that will stick with me forever because it summed up the reality for so many poor women and men around our country who are unable to receive credit through traditional commercial lending institutions. She said: "Too many great ideas die in the parking lots of banks."

4. FINCA IN MANAGUA, NICARAGUA

SLIDE 13: **Woman speaking at discussion at FINCA Nicaragua**

About a month after the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, where the Platform of Action included a commitment on microcredit, I was in a poor barrio in Managua where I went to the weekly meeting of members of a FINCA borrowing group. There were about 30 women, who described how they had received small loans to invest in businesses that included neighborhood bakeries, seamstress shops, and one that was making mosquito netting.

SLIDE 14: **Woman giving HRC tortillas**

I was surprised -- and elated -- when one woman stood up and asked me about my trip to India and then described the emotional connection she felt with women halfway around the world.

SLIDE 15: **Woman giving HRC bread**

5. PENA [Pay-Nyah] SOL IN SANTIAGO, CHILE

SLIDE 16: **HRC buying fruit at stand**

This community bank relies on peer networks to promote and sustain local microbusinesses. I visited a local market where vendors put up awnings in matching blue and yellow to show their commitment to the bank and its members.

SLIDE 17: **Woman giving HRC gift (hand-sewn Chilean craft)**

Most memorable to me was meeting a seamstress who could not compete with larger sewing operations in the city because she could only afford an antiquated sewing machine. She felt trapped by her circumstances, she said. But once she got a loan, she was able to buy a high-speed sewing machine, which she said she kissed over and over again. "I felt like a caged bird set free," she told me.

6. BANCO SOL IN LA PAZ, BOLIVIA

SLIDE 18: **HRC with borrowers at BancoSol bank counter**

On my most recent trip overseas, in December, I had the chance to visit BancoSol, which is now the largest bank in Bolivia. Initially supported through a loan from USAID, it is the first commercial bank in the world completely dedicated to microlending. Its success in one of the poorest countries in the world speaks volumes about the potential of microcredit. Even here the default rate is extremely low -- about 2.2 percent -- and the repayment rate extremely high.

SLIDE 19: **HRC in discussion with BancoSol borrowers**

One cannot visit any of these projects without being struck by the tenacity, commitment and entrepreneurial spirit of people who are given a chance to help themselves. We have all heard unfortunate stereotypes about people who are poor. Yet anyone who has worked on microcredit or seen its impact around the world, as I have, will tell you that the stereotypes are just plain wrong. So we need to revise the conventional thinking about poor people and recognize that entrepreneurial spirit is alive and well in most of us if allowed to flourish.

These microcredit projects are proof of what we can accomplish if we unleash the economic and human potential of all of the world's citizens.

Today we can be heartened that commercial banks are beginning to show interest in microcredit. They are impressed with the repayment rates of some of the poorest borrowers in the world. They are discovering that when poor people organize themselves, support each other, and strengthen the bonds of community through community banks and self-employment associations, economic activity grows.

What is becoming increasingly obvious from one end of the globe to the other is that microcredit is about opportunity — about giving people a tool to become economically self-sufficient and contribute to society.

It is about responsibility — about requiring those who are given opportunities to take responsibility for their lives. In this case, borrowers must work hard, build their businesses, and repay their loans.

And it is about community — about working together for the common good. Through microcredit, individuals unite to create jobs, businesses, and capital. And in the process they create stronger families, stronger neighborhoods, and stronger nations.

So I thank you for your dedication and effort on behalf of microcredit around the world -- and on behalf of men, women and families whose lives have improved dramatically not only because they received an infusion of cash, but because they received an infusion of confidence in their ability to succeed.

May God bless you and the work you do every day to help us reach our dream of a healthier, happier and more prosperous world.

Thank you.

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**FIRST LADY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
REMARKS FOR PRESIDENTIAL AWARDS FOR EXCELLENCE IN
MICROENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
JANUARY 30, 1997**

I am delighted to welcome all of you to the White House for a wonderful occasion -- the inaugural presentation of the Presidential Awards for Excellence in Microenterprise Development. Each of our awardees represents the promise of microlending and microenterprise in our country.

That promise is vast and unlimited. Around the world, we've seen the power of microcredit to transform the lives of individual loan recipients, their families and their communities. I've seen firsthand how modest loans are enabling men and women to lift their families out of poverty, make their neighborhoods better places to live, and strengthen their country's economies. I have met with women in some of the most remote parts of India, in some of the poorest barrios in South America, in places that have weathered civil wars and earthquakes, and have listened as they told me how their lives had changed from destitution to inspiration because a community bank had given them the opportunity to start small businesses sewing clothes, selling auto parts, baking bread and pastries and weaving mosquito netting.

I wish that all of you could have been with me at a discussion with members of a microlending network in Santiago, Chile. There, I met a seamstress who told me that for years, she could barely make a living and compete with the large clothing factories in the city. "I felt like I had all this potential and all this energy, like I was a bird in a cage," she said. But buying a high-speed sewing machine with a small loan from the village bank made her feel like "a caged bird set free."

Although our problems are far removed from those I have seen in the developing world, I believe that microcredit and microenterprise can help communities thrive in the developed world as well. And as we will see from the stories of today's award recipients, microlending and microenterprise are already playing vital roles in promoting economic self-sufficiency and spurring economic growth here at home.

For too many citizens across our country, people who work hard, but have little or no collateral, securing a loan to start a small business is a distant dream. As one woman at Mi Casa, a microlending project in Denver told me, "Too many great ideas die in the parking lots of banks."

We hope that these awards, which represents one of the commitments our country made at the U.N.'s Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, will encourage local governments, businesses, and citizens across our country to support microlending, to work together to extend credit and economic opportunity to all Americans hoping to make the most of their lives, especially those striving to become self-sufficient.

FIRST LADY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
GRANT ANNOUNCEMENT
ZAMBUKO MICRO-CREDIT
MARCH 22, 1997

I am pleased to announce that the United States, through the United States Agency for International Development, will provide an additional \$500,000 to Zambuko Trust. I am delighted that Zambuko has decided ~~to~~ use this grant to expand its lending program. This will result in new loans for approximately 3,000 people -- mostly women who are working overtime to become full participants in Zimbabwe's economy.

Let me add that we all know the public sector cannot and should not bear the burden alone. Every other sector of society, including businesses and non-governmental organizations, has a role to play. That's why I was so interested in learning about your efforts to raise financing from the private sector in Zimbabwe. Private sector involvement is crucial to sustaining your work over the long-term.

5/9/97

**FIRST LADY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
REMARKS MICROENTERPRISE SUMMIT
BRIDGETOWN, BARBADOS
MAY 10, 1997**

Acknowledgments: Sir Neville Nichols; members of the Caribbean Development Bank; National Development Foundations; USAID; Peace Corps [work on microenterprise with Carib Indians -- last remaining indigenous group in Eastern Caribbean].

This is one happy day. I am in beautiful Barbados. And I get to learn about and discuss microenterprise. It doesn't get much better than that.

I think we would all agree that this discussion could not come at a more important time. For the people of the Caribbean, life is considerably different from the tranquil, care-free, and undeniably lovely environment many of us encounter when we vacation at your resorts.

The entire world is undergoing a profound economic transformation. The information revolution, increased global competition, rapidly opening markets are forever altering the way we work and do business. This change has disrupted lives and economies. And while I firmly believe that it is leading to a freer, more prosperous age, I also know that this transition has not been easy -- particularly for smaller economies and particularly for the economies of the Caribbean. Despite your best efforts, the force of this upheaval has pushed some of your people further away from prosperity's horizon.

The countries of Caribbean and the United States are neighbors. Millions of Americans trace their heritage to these islands. We are united not only by a common body of water, but also by a history of democratic and economic partnership. We will be partners in this transition, too. We will meet its challenges. And we will come through it stronger than ever.

My husband's visit here is an expression of that commitment. So, too, is the Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean he announced earlier today. As part of that initiative, the United States will commit \$2 million to help those Eastern Caribbean countries that are having the hardest time weathering this economic transformation -- particularly the Windward Islands of Dominica, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Grenada. This American investment will support Caribbean-based initiatives that are already in place and that are already making a difference -- efforts to expand and diversify trade, strengthen social services, promote education -- and, of special importance to those of us gathered here today, to foster microenterprise.

Under the President's plan, the United States Agency for International Development will award a grant of \$500,000 for microenterprise assistance. These funds will go to each country's National Development Foundation. The foundations, in turn, will then make loans to deserving entrepreneurs. We know that loans as small as \$100 can make all the difference in the world for someone who has never been able to get credit. Let me add that I very much hope that the Caribbean Development Bank, with its wealth of expertise in this area, will help us to coordinate the overall effort.

The funding the President announced today builds on the work that USAID has been doing to promote microenterprise in the region for the last 20 years. I am proud that USAID has been one of the earliest, strongest and largest supporters of microenterprise in the hemisphere. By working in partnership with the CDB and the foundations, we are building on a proven strategy. We are not reinventing the wheel here -- we are just trying to make it turn a lot faster.

There is no better investment than microenterprise. For microenterprise, as we heard from the people who just spoke, can literally lift people up and transform their lives.

By empowering people at the grassroots, it deepens the commitment of a country's citizens to democracy. By providing credit to the poor, it allows ever-more men and women to pull themselves out of poverty and to enter the economic mainstream. By offering new opportunities to women, it moves us all closer to making real the dream of equality.

I want to draw special attention to this last idea. Microcredit is available to both men and women. But I think we would all agree that it is of special benefit to women.

Though the countries of the Caribbean have made real strides in seeing to it that women receive the same educational opportunities as men, we know that here, and in my country and around the world, too many women still live on the outskirts of opportunity. Not only is that morally wrong -- it is self-defeating. For we are cutting ourselves off from the huge, untapped reservoir of potential that women represent.

A democracy without the full participation of women is a contradiction in terms. Participation goes far beyond being able to walk into a voting booth or even to run for office. Wherever women are undervalued, underpaid, undereducated, under-represented, fed less, fed worse, not heard -- we cannot sustain the democratic values and the way of life we have come to cherish.

Women must have a real place at the table -- and not just when it is time to clear the dishes. Women and girls must have access to what I call the tools of opportunity: education, decent health care, legal protections, and credit -- so they can participate in the economic lives of their countries.

That, as you know, is where microenterprise comes in.

I have had many experts in economics around the world say to me that women's work is not part of the economies of countries.

And yet I have seen with my own eyes, as I have traveled through urban and rural areas alike, something that will surprise none of you: Women are working! Their contributions may not be counted in the gross domestic product of their societies, but they are definitely working. And that work is of value. I have always believed that if women got up tomorrow and announced that they would not work - - inside or outside the home -- the economies of every country would collapse.

What's wonderful about microcredit is that it completely shatters this mythology. Microcredit is a stroke of genius precisely because it brings out into the open and builds on skills that are already there, but which for too long have gone unrecognized by governments, banks, and international aid organizations. Anyone who has seen a mother, night after night, stretch leftovers into a meal to feed her children...anyone who has seen a woman piece together a quilt from the remnants of old clothes...knows the talent women have had to have for making the very best choices out of very little material.

There is a wealth of expertise and energy out there -- and microenterprise has the power to liberate it. Moreover, it is able to do so without huge investments in capital, massive government programs, or expensive technology. In an era of greater competition and scarcer resources, microcredit represents a new understanding of how we can equip people on the margins of society with the tools they need to take control of their lives.

Perhaps that is why this idea travels so well. Around the world, we've seen the power of microcredit to transform the lives of individual loan recipients, their families, and their communities. The concept is universal -- even if its applications are different.

For example, my first experience with microcredit came via Mohammed Yunus. In 1986, he came to Little Rock to help my husband and me understand how the lessons of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh could be applied to development in Arkansas. With his guidance, we started the Good Faith Fund, which is still improving the lives of some of the poorest people in one of the poorest states in my country.

And that was only the beginning. Since then -- in India, in Uganda, in Bangladesh, in Bolivia, in Washington, D.C., and place in-between -- I have been privileged to see over and over again how a modest investment in microcredit can yield enormous returns.

That was certainly my experience in Costa Rica just the other day. At a roundtable and later at a conference, I met with people -- mostly women -- who had started an astonishing range of businesses. One woman opened a laundry; another grew orchids. One made wedding dresses; another, clothing for children.

What they did could not have been more different -- but what they achieved for themselves and their communities was remarkably similar. They spoke of increased self-esteem -- the businesses they started with small loans taught them to believe in themselves. This confidence, in turn, inspired fuller citizenship and greater involvement in public affairs. These people built assets as well as incomes - - one bought a home, another paid for her child's education. They also described how their loans helped to expand the circle of prosperity in their communities -- microbusinesses grew into small businesses, which hired new employees and purchased ever-more raw materials from vendors. And they talked of how microenterprise banks are invaluable not just because they make credit available, but because they train recipients on how to make the best use of that credit.

They also did something that seems to be a habit among microenterprise people the world over: They wanted to know about other microenterprise efforts.

I will always remember a group of women I met at a FINCA bank in Managua. After these women described the businesses they had started, I asked them if they had any questions. One woman stood up and asked me to tell her about women I had met at a microcredit organization in India. She wanted to know what her counterparts a world away were spending money on and what businesses they were starting. At that moment, I knew that microcredit was transforming lives around the globe.

Everything I have seen since has underscored that belief. In Cape Town, South Africa, for example, I met with formerly homeless women who were able to build their first houses because of financing techniques they had learned from **yet another** initiative in India.

In closing, I'd like to make one last point. Until recently, the efforts we are talking about today have been sustained almost entirely by institutions outside the formal banking system. As one woman in Denver told me, "Some of the best ideas in the world die in bank parking lots." But fortunately, the success of microenterprise is slowly getting the attention of the traditional banks. It's easy to understand why. Microentrepreneurs repay their loans. The default rate in the region is well under 10%. That's a rate any bank in any country would be proud to have.

I hope increasing numbers of commercial banks commit their resources to sparking microenterprise development. And I applaud the cutting-edge efforts of the Bank of Nova Scotia in Guyana and the Workers Bank of Jamaica, which is now using its post-office banking network -- a network that reaches 96,000 people in hundreds of rural communities -- to provide microcredit loans.

Democracy depends as much on the internalization of values as it does on institutions like courts and congresses. Microcredit can play a crucial role in that process. If people believe they have a stake in their economies, they are more likely to believe they have a role to play in choosing their leaders. If people are able to improve their lives, then we have a good shot at disrupting the tragic cycle of poverty and violence that is an affront to any civil society. If a young girl can grow up with a mother who is rewarded fairly for her hard work -- well, then that girl has every reason in the world to believe that she will have the opportunity to live up to her God-given promise.

Microcredit probably isn't going to create another Microsoft -- but it will strengthen democracy and expand economic opportunity. And that sounds pretty good to me.

As I look out at this room, I am struck by the fact that despite the differences that separate us, we all want pretty much the same thing. We want to feel safe. We want peace. We want to have the opportunity to make the most of our lives. We want justice, equality, and freedom. And we want this -- and more -- for our children. Microenterprise, in its own quiet, modest way, can help us create that future. If we work together.

Let's get going.

5/8/97 noon

**FIRST LADY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
REMARKS MICROENTERPRISE SUMMIT
SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA
MAY 8, 1997**

Acknowledgments: Mrs. Figueres [Fee-Gay-Raise], President Iglesias [Ee-glai-see-ahs], Mark Schneider, Costa Rica for the remarkable role you have played in bringing peace to Central America and expanding human rights in the region. This remarkable event is made all the more remarkable by its sponsors -- a partnership between the Inter-American Development Bank and USAID.

We gather today because we believe that seemingly small steps can create lasting, positive change in the lives of all people, and especially women. That is, we believe in the power microenterprise.

Few initiatives could be better suited to our time. Or more important.

Think back just a few years. It was not so long ago that this region was torn apart by conflict. The violence extended far beyond any war zone -- it kept children out of school, it forced families from their homes, it took the life out of economies. It seemed the terror would never stop.

But it did. Now Central America is at peace. The accords just signed in Guatemala mark the end of one country's suffering and the beginning of an entire region's stability.

This transformation would never have been possible without the vision of your leaders and your governments. But it also would never have been possible without the simple, courageous acts of individuals -- one day someone decided to put down a gun; another day, two people of opposing views chose to have a conversation in which they actually listened to each other.

Not only have the people of Central America chosen peace over conflict -- they have also chosen democracy over other forms of government. For the first time in 40 years, every country in the region has selected its government in free and fair elections.

It is also appropriate that we gather to discuss microenterprise during the summit of regional leaders -- for these leaders have committed themselves to moving their countries from tightly controlled economies to free and open markets that give full life and scope to human endeavor. Indeed, there is no better expression of their commitment than the joint declaration they signed this morning, which emphasizes the importance of microenterprise in the region.

Central America is undergoing an economic and democratic renewal. But as important as that renewal is the commitment, represented by those of you here -- by citizens, private organizations and governments alike -- to extend its benefits to those whom it has not yet touched.

For microenterprise allows you to build on your progress at all levels. By empowering people at the grassroots, it deepens the commitment of your citizens to democracy. By providing credit to the poor, it allows ever-more men and women to pull themselves out of poverty and to enter the economic mainstream. By offering new opportunities to women, it moves us all closer to making real the dream of equality.

I want to draw special attention to this last idea. Microcredit is available to both men and women. But I think we would all agree that it is of special benefit to women.

Women are the majority in every country represented here today. Yet in my country, in your countries and in countries around the world, too many women still live on the outskirts of opportunity. Not only is that morally wrong -- it is self-defeating. For we are cutting ourselves off from the huge, untapped reservoir of potential that women represent.

A democracy without the full participation of women is a contradiction in terms. Participation goes far beyond being able to walk into a voting booth or even to run for office. Wherever women are undervalued, underpaid, undereducated, under-represented, fed less, fed worse, not heard -- we cannot sustain the democratic values and the way of life we have come to cherish.

Women must have a real place at the table -- and not just when it is time to clear the dishes. Women and girls must have access to what I call the tools of opportunity: education, decent health care, legal protections, and credit -- so they can participate in the economic lives of their countries.

That, as you know, is where microenterprise comes in.

I have had many experts in economics around the world say to me that women's work is not part of the economies of countries.

And yet I have seen with my own eyes, as I have traveled through urban and rural areas alike, something that will surprise none of you: Women are working! Their contributions may not be counted in the gross domestic product of their societies, but they are definitely working. And that work is of value. I have always believed that if women got up tomorrow and announced that they would not work - - inside or outside the home -- the economies of every country would collapse.

What's wonderful about microcredit is that it completely shatters this mythology. Microcredit is a stroke of genius precisely because it brings out into the open and builds on skills that are already there, but which for too long have gone unrecognized by governments, banks, and international aid organizations. Anyone who has seen a mother, night after night, stretch leftovers into a meal to feed her children...anyone who has seen a woman piece together a quilt from the remnants of old clothes...knows the talent women have had to have for making the very best choices out of very little material.

In my country, there was a tradition of something called "egg money." Women who lived on farms and were fortunate enough to have chickens would contribute to their families and their economies by selling eggs by the side of the road, or out the back door of their homes. The small amount they brought in every week would accumulate -- and one day that money would pay for a few more chickens, new clothes, maybe even an education.

Whether it is "egg money" or the countless other efforts of women around the world to turn their talents into better lives, there is a wealth of expertise and energy out there -- and microenterprise has the power to liberate it.

Moreover, it is able to do so without huge investments in capital, massive government programs, or expensive technology. In an era of greater competition and scarcer resources, microcredit represents a new understanding of how we can equip people on the margins of society with the tools they need to take control of their lives.

Microenterprise is important for another reason. I think we have all wondered how we can promote development without sacrificing traditional values. Well, microenterprise offers a partial answer, for it is sustained by those very values that have stood us so well for so long: Hard work, ingenuity, sacrifice, a desire for a better life.

Perhaps that is why this idea travels so well. Around the world, we've seen the power of microcredit to transform the lives of individual loan recipients, their families, and their communities. The concept is universal -- even if its applications are different.

For example, my first experience with microcredit came via Mohammed Yunus. In 1986, he came to Little Rock to help my husband and me understand how the lessons of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh could be applied to development in Arkansas. With his guidance, we started the Good Faith Funds, which is still improving the lives of some of the poorest people in one of the poorest states in my country.

It is for this reason that I am so pleased to take part in this gathering. By bringing together so many experts from Central America, we will be able to learn from each other's challenges and achievements and apply those lessons within our own borders. We will be able to build upon the pledge made by the leaders who took part in the Summit of the Americas in Miami in 1994: To strengthen support for microenterprise as "a key component of sustainable and equitable development." And we will be able to extend the progress we made at the microcredit summit many of you attended in Washington earlier this year.

With that in mind, I would like I would like to share with you some of what I have heard and seen as I have visited microcredit ventures around the world. I would like to talk specifically about initiatives here in the Americas. And I would like to underscore with each the wide spectrum of returns microenterprise can yield.

The breadth of that spectrum was never clearer than this morning, when I had the opportunity to talk with Costa Ricans about their experiences with microenterprise. These people -- mostly women -- had started an astonishing range of businesses. One woman grew corn; another orchids. One opened a laundry, another made clothing for children.

What they did could not have been more different -- what they achieved for themselves and their communities was remarkably similar. They spoke of increased self-esteem -- the businesses they started with small loans taught them to believe in themselves. This confidence, in turn, inspired fuller citizenship and greater involvement in public affairs. These people built assets as well as incomes -- one bought a home, another paid for her child's education. They described how their loans helped to expand the circle of prosperity in their communities -- microbusinesses grew into small businesses, which hired new employees and purchased ever-more raw materials from vendors. And they talked of how microenterprise banks are invaluable not just because they make credit available, but because they train recipients on how to make the best use of that credit.

What I saw in Costa Rica underscored what I have been privileged to see throughout the Americas. I have seen how microenterprise can literally change a person's life. For example, in Santiago, Chile, I went to a community bank that relies on peer networks to promote and sustain small businesses. In a local market, women felt so proud to be involved that they put up matching yellow and blue awnings to show they were part of the organization.

Most memorable to me was a woman -- a seamstress -- who, with a small loan, was able to buy a high-speed sewing machine. That loan enabled her to start a small clothing business and make a living. She told me that the new sewing machine meant so much that she couldn't stop kissing it. She felt, and these are her words, "like a caged bird set free."

I have seen how microenterprise makes economic sense for everyone -- including private banks. In La Paz Bolivia, I had the chance to visit BancoSol, the largest bank in Bolivia and the first commercial bank in the world completely dedicated to microlending. Its success in one of the world's poorest countries speaks volumes about the potential of microcredit. The default rate is about 2.2%. That's a rate any bank in any country would be proud to have.

I have seen how microenterprise can help sustain a culture. Earlier this week in Mexico, I met with women in Merida who, through small loans, were able to start businesses to sell the beautiful arts and crafts they made. In drawing on the great Mayan culture of the Yucatan, not only were they supporting their families, they were ~~also~~ keeping alive their heritage and creating art that people the world over can appreciate.

Finally, I have seen how microenterprise has the power to bring us together and transform lives in developing countries and in advanced economies around the world. In Managua, Nicaragua I went to gathering of women who are small borrowers at the FINCA bank. I should add that this meeting took place in November of 1995 -- shortly after the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, where the platform of action included a commitment to microcredit.

About 30 women described how they had received small loans to start neighborhood bakeries and seamstress shops. One woman was selling mosquito netting and another was selling auto parts door-to-door.

At the end of their presentations, I asked them if they had any questions. One woman stood up and asked me to tell her about women I had met at a microcredit organization in India. She wanted to know what her counterparts a world away were spending money on and what businesses they were starting. At that moment, I knew that microcredit was transforming lives around the globe.

Everything I have seen since has underscored that belief. This year alone, I have visited FINCA outposts in both Kampala, Uganda **and** in Washington, D.C. -- just a couple of miles away from the White House. In Cape Town, South Africa, I met with formerly homeless women who were able to build their first houses because of financing techniques they had borrowed from **yet another** initiative in India.

All in all, microcredit is one of the best investments we can make to lift people out of poverty and to give them hope. I am proud that USAID is one of the largest supporters of microenterprise in the region. In fact, it has invested in virtually every project I mentioned today. And I am pleased that we will build on our commitment -- and respond to the urging of the region's leaders in their joint declaration this morning -- by committing \$40 million in USAID funding for microenterprise in the region this year and \$200 million over the next 5 years.

More importantly, USAID is not alone. It works in partnership with many outstanding NGOs. I want to add, too, how pleased I am that increasing numbers of commercial banks are joining this effort -- committing their resources to sparking microenterprise development.

Democracy depends as much on the internalization of values as it does on institutions like courts and congresses. Microcredit can play a crucial role in that process. If people believe they have a stake in their economies, they are more likely to believe they have a role to play in choosing their leaders. If people are able to improve their lives, then we have a good shot at disrupting the tragic cycle of poverty and violence that is an affront to any civil society. If a young girl can grow up with a mother who is rewarded fairly for her hard work -- well, then that girl has every reason in the world to believe that she will have the opportunity to live up to her God-given promise.

Microcredit isn't going to create another Microsoft -- but it can support democracy. And that sounds pretty good to me.

Tomorrow, I will travel with President Clinton to Barbados. And while I am eager to spend a little time walking on the beach, I am also looking forward to meeting with leaders from the region -- representatives from microcredit organizations, the Caribbean Development Bank, USAID and others -- to talk about ways to expand credit in the Caribbean basin. You can be certain that I will draw on what I have learned here.

As I look out at this room, I am struck by the fact that despite our differences -- differences which are as apparent as the countries we come from and the languages we speak; differences which are as subtle as the way we carry a newborn or greet a friend -- we all want pretty much the same thing. We want to feel safe. We want peace. We want to have the opportunity to make the most of our lives. We want justice, equality, and freedom. And we want this -- and more -- for our children. Microenterprise, in its own quiet, modest way, can help us create that future.

Let's get to work.

FIRST LADY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
REMARKS FOR HUD COMMUNITY FIRST BANK GRANT ANNOUNCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.
DECEMBER 19, 1996

I am delighted to help celebrate the creation of the Community First Bank here in Washington and similar community empowerment banking initiatives in Baltimore and in the Mississippi Delta. Let me thank Secretary Cisneros for his vision, leadership and tireless support of innovative projects to bring jobs and opportunity to communities all across the country. As the President has often said, Secretary Cisneros has been the best HUD Secretary our country has ever had and we will miss him tremendously.

Over the years, we've heard a lot about the unique and often difficult challenges facing the men, women and children who call our Nation's Capital home. Much has been written and debated about what is wrong with this city and what isn't working. And we will all do our part to meet these challenges. But let's not forget that this is a unique place to live, work, and do business. Not only is it the capital city, it is a mecca for tourists, a leading center for biotechnology and medical research, and a nerve center for international communications. It is a place filled with people who are working hard to bring greater prosperity and progress to the District of Columbia.

The Community First Bank of D.C. is but one indication of the energy and vision at work here. This unique partnership between the federal government, private businesses, and neighborhood residents, will bring credit, jobs, and economic independence to people who are willing to work hard and take responsibility. It has the power to transform the lives not only of its loan recipients but entire families, neighborhoods, and communities.

I know this because I've seen firsthand in Bangladesh, in India, in Nicaragua, in Chile, in Bolivia and in our own country how loans as small as \$100 can empower men and women to lift their families out of poverty and make their neighborhoods better places to live.

I have stood in some of the poorest neighborhoods in the world-- neighborhoods that have weathered civil wars and earthquakes -- and have listened as people told me how their lives had changed from destitution to inspiration because a community bank had given them the opportunity to start small businesses selling and sewing clothes, baking bread and pastries and weaving mosquito netting. One woman even told me that she had built a lucrative business selling auto parts door-to-door!

I wish that all of you could have been with me at a discussion with members of a microlending network in Santiago, Chile. There, I met a seamstress who told me that for years, she could barely make a living and compete with the large clothing factories in the city. "I felt like I had all this potential and all this energy, like I was a bird in a cage," she said. But buying a high-speed sewing machine with a small loan from the village bank made her feel like "a caged bird set free." We all laughed when she added, "I kissed that sewing machine over and over

again."

My husband and I were early-believers in the potential of microlending to transform communities. When he was Governor of Arkansas, the President started the "Good Faith Fund," a small microlending project inspired by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh.

Whether it's a sewing shop in Chile or a diner here in D.C., small neighborhood businesses created with microloans -- businesses that bring much-needed jobs, goods and services to low-income areas -- are vital to reclaiming communities from decay and decline. In many cases, a small loan to a low-income citizen has proven to be a reliable catalyst for self-sufficiency. But unfortunately, microlending is still a little-known concept here in the U.S. For many citizens across our country, people who work hard, but have little or no collateral, securing a loan to start a small business or buy a modest home is a distant dream. As one woman at Mi Casa, a microlending project in Denver told me, "Too many great ideas die in the parking lots of banks."

The Community Empowerment Banking Initiative we've announced today can change this situation. Let me commend Assistant HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo for his hard work and leadership in shepherding this initiative. This initiative recognizes that community revitalization must begin with people. It empowers local residents not only to start or expand businesses and buy their first homes, it also encourages them to own stock in the bank. Everyone has a stake not only in the success of the bank, but in the success and prosperity of the neighborhood businesses who are loan recipients.

The bank is a true model of a community working together, creating opportunity for each other and taking responsibility for the future. And I know that the people of Washington will succeed this effort.

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**FIRST LADY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
WOMEN IN HOUSING AND FINANCE DROP-BY
INDIAN TREATY ROOM, OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
January 5, 1996**

Talking Points

[Acknowledgements: Lisa Hafner, WHF president]

- I'm so honored to welcome such a talented and diverse group of housing and finance professionals to the Indian Treaty Room this afternoon.
- You represent a broad spectrum of organizations -- from government lending and regulatory agencies, to Congress, to our nation's commercial banks, to the media and other private businesses -- who are crucial to our nation's economic and social health. So I thank you for all the important work you are doing.
- Unfortunately, this latest government shutdown makes this reception bittersweet. I know it has frustrated and, in many cases, has even paralyzed the efforts of those of you who work for or with our government agencies.
- On an average day, the Federal Housing Administration processes 2500 home purchase loans and refinancings totaling \$200 million to moderate and low-income working families nationwide. So during this shutdown, thousands of families have had to place their dreams of owning and moving into their first homes on hold.
- So let's hope that congress will pass a continuing resolution so we can get everyone back to work to respond to the needs of our fellow citizens.

On Microlending

- I wanted to talk to you briefly about microlending. As you may know, it is a concept that I have been working to promote both here and abroad. Extending modest amounts of credit to poor women around the world, from Bangladesh to Chile to Colorado, can have transforming effects on their and their families' lives.
- It's called micro, but its impact on people is gigantic. It takes a loan of just a few dollars, often as little as \$10 in some parts of the world, to help a woman to self-employment which can lift her and her family out of poverty.
- During a visit to South Asia and South America last year, I saw firsthand the success of some of these loans. At the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, I met a woman who used a small

loan to buy a milk cow, which in turn, lead to a second milk cow and finally a rickshaw for her husband. At a bank in Santiago, Chile, I met a seamstress who said she felt "like a caged bird set free" after using her loan to buy her first sewing machine. And the loan repayment rate at these places is consistently near 100 percent.

Expanding a woman's access to credit is essential to elevating her status in her home and throughout society. This is especially true in developing nations. For the first time, women are responsible for bringing cash into their homes and are empowered to spend it as they see fit. And, as demonstrated by the woman I met in Bangladesh, they spend the money in ways that improve the living conditions of their entire families.

These experiences can and are being transplanted to the U.S. Though our economy is far more complex, microlending networks also have great potential to help our poorest women and families become independent and self-sufficient. In Denver, I met women who with credit and training were able to operate successful small businesses. One woman's two person computer company grew into a business that now employs 60 people.

But even in America, women's access to credit is still very, very difficult. As one woman at Mi Casa, a microlending and training project in Denver said to me, "Too many great ideas die in the parking lots of banks."

I became a believer in microcredit years ago, when my husband was governor of Arkansas. He modelled a small microlending program after the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the South Shore Bank in Chicago. Through that group-based borrowing program, which he called the Good Faith Fund, Arkansans were able to make investments in areas that needed them the most.

Through the creation of the Community Development Financial Institutions Act, the Administration hopes to boost microlending efforts in this country.

As a result of U.S. commitments made at the World Conference on Women in Beijing, the Treasury Department is establishing an annual presidential award for microenterprise excellence. The department will also coordinate a federal microenterprise initiative that will help publicize microcredit and microenterprise, set benchmarks for programs to use in assessing their own efforts, and better standardize existing efforts.

I hope you will, as influential women in the housing and finance industries, use your contacts, networks and expertise to help spread the word about microlending. I hope

you will familiarize yourself with this concept, assess what the institutions you are familiar with are doing or could be doing, and even perhaps assist, on a pro-bono basis, the non-profits who are involved in this work.

■ Thank-you and Happy New Year.

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FIRST LADY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
VIDEOTAPED REMARKS FOR WOMEN'S SELF-EMPLOYMENT PROJECT
TENTH ANNIVERSARY LUNCHEON
FEBRUARY 27, 1996

Good afternoon. Thank-you very much, Mary, for your very kind introduction. I'm sorry I couldn't send my greetings in person, but I did want to take a few minutes to congratulate the Women's Self-Employment Project on a decade of giving hope and opportunity to low-income women throughout my hometown of Chicago.

The basis for any long-term solution to poverty rests in a community's ability to help those living in poverty raise their own incomes. Most of us realize that low-income women are capable and hardworking. What they lack is not initiative, but opportunity and access to credit. As one woman at a microlending project in Colorado said to me, "Too many great ideas die in the parking lots of banks."

The Women's Self-Employment Project has taken this idea to heart. The project has provided thousands of women with opportunity -- the opportunity to borrow small amounts of money, to start small businesses and bring some of their great ideas to life, to prove that they are creditworthy, and most important, to improve their own lives and those of their families.

In my travels throughout our country and around the world, I have seen firsthand the transforming effects small loans to women can have on families. At ~~Mohammed Yunus'~~ ^{the} Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, I met a woman who used a small loan to buy a milk cow. After she paid off the loan with proceeds from the milk, she took out a loan for another cow. After repaying that loan, she decided it was time for her husband to help increase the family income. She took out a third loan to buy him a rickshaw.

For women in America, the route to self-sufficiency and economic security may not be through rickshaws and milk cows, but many of the methods to achieve independence come from the same man: Mohammed Yunus. I want to thank your keynote speaker, Dr. Yunus, for all he has done and all he is doing to help the world's most disadvantaged women help themselves. Your simple idea has enriched the lives of thousands.

The Women's Self-Employment Project, too, has served as a model for microlending projects throughout our country. Your confidence in the abilities of your clients has helped them and their families -- and also our national economy. Just think, the eight million women-owned businesses in this country employ one-third more workers than the Fortune 500 companies.

To the brave women who, with the Self-Employment Project's help, are taking certain steps to fulfilling your God-given potential, the President and I wish you all much success in the years to come.

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FIRST LADY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON
VIDEOTAPED REMARKS FOR ASSOCIATION FOR ENTERPRISE OPPORTUNITY
SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE
APRIL 23, 1996

Good morning. Although we can't join you in person, Secretary Rubin and I wanted to take this opportunity to congratulate the Association for Enterprise Opportunity and all your members on the important work you are doing to expand economic opportunity to all Americans. This is a vital undertaking, and your gathering comes at a crucial time.

The basis for any long-term solution to poverty rests in a community's ability to help those living in poverty raise their own incomes. Low-income Americans are capable and hard-working. What they lack is not initiative, but opportunity and access to credit. As one woman working to establish her small business in Colorado said to me, "Too many great ideas die in the parking lots of banks."

Members of AEO know the importance of microenterprise. You have provided people across our country with opportunity -- the opportunity to borrow small amounts of money and prove that all kinds of people are credit-worthy. You have given people the opportunity to gain technical knowledge, to start small businesses to bring some great ideas to life, and most important, to improve their own lives and the lives of their families.

In my travels throughout our country and around the world, I have seen first-hand the transforming effects small loans can have, especially for women and their families in both the developing and developed world. At the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, I encountered women who told me how they were achieving economic security. I met a woman who used a small loan to buy a milk cow. After she paid off the loan with proceeds from the milk, she took out a loan for another cow. After repaying that loan, she decided it was time for her husband to help increase the family income. She took out a third loan to buy him a rickshaw.

And I met a woman in Chile whose whole outlook on life was changed by the fact that someone took a risk and lent her money to buy a sewing machine. She said she felt like "a bird freed from its cage" when she received her first loan.

Whether it is for a milk cow in Bangladesh or for a computer in Chicago, women and men need help, encouragement -- and credit -- to make that first investment. Here in the United States, we are working to build up a micro-enterprise network. It is still very young, but already several hundred programs, most of them represented here today, have enabled tens of thousands of Americans to gain access to credit and training as well as something more fundamental: self-respect and self-sufficiency. Some of the people served by these programs are on welfare, but they are creating a better future for themselves and their children. And they just

needed a little help -- a jump start -- to realize their own potential. But too often that jump-start is hard to come by.

I became a believer in microcredit years ago, when my husband was governor of Arkansas. We combined elements of the Grameen Bank and Chicago's South Shore Bank to create a development bank and a borrowing fund that began to make the kind of investments in that state that we wanted to see throughout the country.

Last year at the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, where I ~~was~~ privileged to represent our country, the United States made two commitments to further self-employment and micro-enterprise in the United States. First, the President established a new Presidential Awards program to honor outstanding and innovative programs that provide access to credit, training or technical assistance to microentrepreneurs and potential microentrepreneurs. Today, we are happy to announce the formal structure and specifics of these awards.

The President also directed the Treasury Department to coordinate microenterprise programs across a number of our federal agencies to ensure that those programs are doing the job they were designed to do. Additionally, the United States will continue to support microenterprise in developing countries through USAID.

In today's global economy, microenterprise development needs to become a key element in providing economic opportunity for women and men everywhere in the world.

I now have the pleasure of introducing Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, who will discuss the Administration's initiatives and particularly the development of the Presidential Awards for Microenterprise Excellence program.

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Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

January 9, 1998

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton
The First Lady
The White House
2nd Floor, West Wing
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Mrs. Clinton:


We know of your long-standing interest in microcredit as a vehicle to assist poor people and especially poor women in the United States and around the globe. From your days in Arkansas, you and the President have been leaders in promoting this effective anti-poverty tool. We seek your support of our efforts to reach with microcredit those of the poorest in the world who could realize some benefit.


As you may know, last November Members of the Congressional Black Caucus sent a letter to the President urging the Administration, within its African Initiative, to expand its microcredit efforts in Africa to ensure that the benefits of development reach the most economically marginalized people. Along with several other House Members, we would like to present that letter to you personally and discuss with you the opportunities available for the United States to lead the donor nations toward investing more resources in microcredit for Africa, especially programs reaching very poor women. A combined global effort on the part of bilateral and multilateral donors could ensure that one million families in Africa benefit from microcredit.


Thank you for your commitment to microcredit for the poorest people in the nation. We look forward to discussing with you the potential for doing more for Africa in this area.

Sincerely,









Carrie P. Meek

Carolyn C. Zepher

C. McKing

Shirley Jackson

Melvin L. Watt

Corrine Brown

CRS Report for Congress

The Congressional Black Caucus and Foreign Policy: 1971-1995

Raymond W. Copson
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

January 18, 1996



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NOTE

This CRS Report was originally prepared at the request of the Honorable Donald M. Payne, Chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, and is being released for general congressional availability with the Chairman's permission.

The Congressional Black Caucus Secretariat is a
separate, non-profit, non-federal organization.
Members are listed on page 10.

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of expertise.

THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS AND FOREIGN POLICY: 1971-1995

SUMMARY

The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) has been active on foreign policy issues since its founding in 1971, although its role in domestic affairs is more widely known. During the 1970s, the Caucus focused on African issues, particularly in southern Africa, but by the 1980s, Caucus interests had broadened to include Haiti and Haitian refugees, other Caribbean issues, and the defense budget. The Caucus has concentrated on foreign policy issues that have had particular resonance with black American voters. Consensus on foreign affairs issues has declined as the Caucus has grown larger and less urban-based, but a majority still takes quite similar positions on most issues.

As a minority within Congress, the Caucus has worked in coalition with other Members to achieve its objectives. This has required a certain pragmatism and willingness to compromise, although Caucus members have sometimes undertaken dramatic gestures—even risking arrest to protest U.S. policy toward South Africa and Haiti—in order to call attention to the Caucus foreign policy agenda. On most occasions, the Caucus has used more conventional means, including hearings and testimony, statements, and legislation to influence policy. Despite strains, the Caucus has maintained generally amicable relations with Hispanic and Jewish Members of Congress, who are often coalition partners.

Over the past 25 years, many of the objectives sought by the Caucus in foreign policy have been achieved. U.S. policy with respect to Rhodesia sanctions, South Africa sanctions, aid to Africa, and Haiti eventually changed in ways sought by the Caucus—and the efforts of the Caucus in conjunction with like-minded legislators were a significant factor in these changes. On some other issues, however, most notably its effort to shift defense spending toward its domestic priorities and development aid, the Caucus was not been able to convince majorities or forge the coalitions needed to prevail.

The Caucus faces major challenges in defining its foreign policy role and achieving its objectives in the years ahead. South Africa's 1994 universal suffrage elections and the restoration of President Aristide in Haiti brought core Caucus issues to a conclusion. Meanwhile, many members of the overwhelmingly-Democratic CBC lost positions of leadership after the Republican victory in the 1994 congressional elections. Some core issues, such as development assistance levels for sub-Saharan Africa remain, however, and some have suggested that the Caucus develop new issue areas, such as international trade, particularly as it affects black workers.

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THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS AND FOREIGN POLICY: 1971-1995

INTRODUCTION

The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), widely known for its domestic policy impact, has also been active on foreign policy issues since its founding in 1971. Electoral politics did not force this active role on the CBC, since for Caucus members—as for most other Members of Congress—foreign policy has typically not been a critical issue in the elections they have faced. Yet, Caucus members have repeatedly taken firm positions on foreign policy issues, led discussions and debates on foreign policy topics in Congress, and sought to inform and engage the wider black American community, and others as well, on a variety of foreign affairs subjects. During the 1970s, these subjects mostly related to Africa, particularly southern Africa. But in the 1980s, other issues, including Haiti and Haitian refugees, other Caribbean concerns, and the defense budget also rose to prominence on the CBC foreign policy agenda.

This report reviews Congressional Black Caucus involvement in foreign policy from 1971 through the first half of 1995—with a brief look at the future in a concluding section. The **Background** section discusses the reasons for CBC involvement in foreign affairs and the means the Caucus has used to influence foreign policy. It also highlights some key successes as well as difficulties the Caucus has experienced. A narrative of the principal foreign policy efforts of the CBC follows. The report is based on primary sources, including the *Congressional Record* and various CBC documents; journal articles and press accounts; and interviews with a number of individuals who have observed or participated in CBC activities over the years.

The Caucus did not take a position on every foreign policy issue. Many such issues had no special interest among black Americans, and there was often no compelling reason for the Caucus to become involved. There has always been a strong sense within the Caucus that the CBC's first priority lay in domestic affairs, and this meant that resources could not be devoted to developing positions on the broad range of foreign affairs issues. In any event, an attempt to develop a CBC position on every issue would surely have proven divisive. No substantial group of Members of Congress is likely to agree on every question, and any caucus that tried to impose a uniform view would likely break apart.

Nor were CBC members necessarily unanimous in accepting the foreign policy positions that were defined. In the early days there was often unanimity on the southern Africa issues of the time, but prospects for unanimity declined as the number of issues of interest to the CBC increased—and as the CBC itself

grew from an initial 12 Members¹ to 40 by 1995. Diversity within the CBC also increased, as newly-elected Members from the South and from rural constituencies joined their colleagues from more urban districts.

The issue of unanimity was sometimes blurred, however, by the absence of CBC resolutions or statements on issues of interest to the Caucus—even though the CBC was widely understood, and was reported in the press, to favor a particular position. At times, as in the case of the foreign policy items in the 61 recommendations presented to President Nixon in 1971, or the defense budget changes the CBC has called for in its annual alternative budget proposals, the CBC position has been explicit. At other times, the CBC position has been understood as the position of a well-recognized leader on a broad issue area, backed by a general consensus—though perhaps not a unanimous consensus—among other Caucus members. During the 1970s, Representative Charles Diggs was the recognized leader on South African issues, a role taken up by Representative William Gray and Representative Ronald Dellums in the 1980s. Representative Dellums' speeches and legislative proposals aimed at slowing defense spending and curbing specific weapons, such as the MX missile, brought him recognition as a leader on defense issues. Representative Shirley Chisholm, who left Congress in 1983, and Del. Walter Fauntroy, who remained until 1991, were accepted as authorities on Haiti by Caucus members.

Reliance on experts among the Members was partly a function of the small size of the Caucus relative to the large number of issues, both domestic and foreign, that had to be dealt with. Since Caucus members lacked the time and resources to become experts on every issue, they accepted the leadership of those willing to focus on an issue area. At the same time, the leader/consensus approach meant that individual Caucus members did not have to take an explicit position on every issue in a broad issue area—at least until those particular matters came to a recorded vote.

Despite the absence of a CBC position on many foreign policy issues, and the rough consensus approach to some issues of interest to the CBC, there has been a high degree of cohesiveness in CBC voting on foreign policy issues over the years. The *National Journal* annually rates Members of Congress on what it judges to be their degree of liberal and conservative voting in foreign affairs. Table 1, which summarizes the liberal dimension scores of CBC members in 1984 and 1994, indicates that most frequent score in both years was at the top of the liberal range.² The *National Journal* interprets a score of 50 to mean that the Member is more liberal in the foreign affairs field than 50 percent of his or her colleagues. Clearly the Caucus was fairly cohesive on the liberal side

¹ Many sources give the initial Caucus number as 13. They are including District of Columbia Delegate Walter Fauntroy, who took his seat on April 19, 1971.

² *National Journal*, June 1, 1985, p.1273-1277; January 14, 1995, p.93-105. The author is grateful to Dr. David Bositis of the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies for suggesting this means of comparison. Other ratings yield similar results on cohesiveness within the CBC.

of the scale even in 1994, when it was nearly twice as large as a decade before--although it is also clear that a somewhat greater diversity of views on foreign affairs had emerged. The 1984 scores are based on voting on 16 foreign policy and national security issues ranging from prohibiting money for the mining of Nicaraguan harbors to banning tests of anti-satellite missiles unless the Soviets conducted such tests. The 1994 scores reflect 12 foreign and defense issues, including a proposed defense budget cut, a limit on U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping, as well as votes on aid to South Africa and Haitian refugees.

TABLE 1. National Journal Liberal Rating of CBC House Members on Foreign Policy Issues		
Rating scores	1984	1994
Caucus members with top score (87 in 1984 and 85 in 1994)	14	17
Between 80 and top score	4	5
70 - 79	1	6
50 - 69	0	8
Below 50	0	1
Number rated	19	37
Number in Caucus	20	39

BACKGROUND

The involvement of the Congressional Black Caucus in foreign policy has itself been a source of some controversy. The Caucus has been criticized for "Balkanizing" foreign policy by assuming that black Americans have a special interest in Africa and the Caribbean.³ According to this line of argument, Americans share common interests in foreign affairs and national security, and should work toward asserting those common interests rather than interests based on racial, ethnic, or religious background. According to another criticism, the Caucus should be focusing on domestic rather than foreign issues because the most pressing problems black Americans face arise from domestic politics and the domestic economy.

Supporters of the Caucus role in foreign affairs offer a number of responses to these challenges. First, they note that the Caucus does indeed devote most of its time and attention to domestic issues. At the same time, they insist that

³ Editor's Comment. "Grenada, The Black Caucus and the Danger of Balkanizing U.S. Foreign Policy." *Lincoln Review*, v.4, Winter 1984. p. 3-9.

it is entirely appropriate for the Caucus to take an interest in foreign affairs, just as do other formal or informal groupings of Members of Congress. Ethnic politics, from this perspective, are a reality of the American political scene, and it is perfectly normal for organizations based on ethnic origin, whether within or outside Congress, to take positions on foreign policy. Thus, Caucus supporters argue, it is hardly fair to single out the CBC and criticize it for Balkanizing policy.

Caucus supporters point out that there has long been interest among black Americans in Africa and the Caribbean, and note that in the years between the Civil War and World War II, black leaders sought to influence U.S. policy toward Haiti, Liberia, and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia.⁴ Awareness intensified during the 1950s and 1960s, when the civil rights struggle in the United States coincided with the independence movement sweeping Africa;⁵ and events in South Africa, Haiti, and elsewhere tended to sustain this awareness in subsequent years. Against this background, it is not surprising that several of the African Americans coming into Congress in increasing numbers would themselves take an interest in these regions.

Moreover, the interests and life experiences of individual Caucus members also made involvement in foreign affairs—and particularly issues related to Africa and the Caribbean—inevitable, many believe. Representative Diggs, for example, the first African-American ever to serve on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, became Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa in 1969, just as he and others were beginning to organize the CBC. He had a lifelong interest in Africa, arising in part from the fact that a grandfather had served as a missionary in Liberia and brought back information and ideas about Africa's importance.⁶ Representative Mervyn Dymally, Caucus Chairman in 1987-1988, was born in Trinidad,⁷ and always took a strong interest in Caribbean affairs as well. In 1981, for example, he helped organize the Caribbean Action Lobby, in an effort to help build a public policy constituency on Caribbean issues;⁸ and in subsequent years, he introduced or supported numerous bills to increase U.S. assistance to the Caribbean nations.

⁴Challenor, Herschelle. *The Influence of Black Americans on U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa*. In Abdul Aziz Said, ed., *Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, revised edition. New York, Praeger, 1981. p.143-181. See also, Ronald W. Walters, *African-American Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy Toward South Africa*, in Mohammed E. Ahari, ed., *Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York, Greenwood Press, 1987. p.68-69.

⁵*Ibid.*, p.159-160.

⁶ Interview with former Member Diggs, June 27, 1995.

⁷ Ragsdale, Bruce A. and Joel D. Treese. *Black Americans in Congress, 1870-1989*. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990. p. 43-44.

⁸For 12 policy recommendations by this lobby, see Rep. Dymally's remarks in the *Congressional Record*, July 15, 1981, p.15946-15947.

Many Caucus Members have also felt that their experiences as African-Americans created a bond with—and a responsibility toward—Africans in Africa itself and in the Caribbean. Representative William Gray argued in 1981 that "as blacks, we share many common heritages, struggles, and concerns..." and called for a U.S. foreign policy devoted to economic development and human rights, among other objectives.⁹ Delegate Walter Fauntroy, addressing a meeting with the Caribbean Action Lobby as Caucus Chairman in 1982, said that "Black Americans and people from the island nations of the Caribbean are brothers and sisters caught in an involuntary African diaspora.... We are cousins in the African family...." Fauntroy added that "(W)e here in North America are a valuable constituency for Black people wherever they may be."¹⁰

Another spur to the Caucus in asserting itself in foreign affairs was the belief that black Americans had been denied a voice in foreign policy proportionate either to their numbers and or their contributions. According to Rep. Gray,

Our involvement in foreign policy issues has been repeatedly questioned over the years. We deplore the arrogance in this attitude. The historical contributions of blacks to advancing U.S. foreign policy have been crucial to this nation's interests.¹¹

Representative Gray also argued that "foreign policy is intimately linked to questions of war and peace and the possibility of black soldiers dying overseas."¹² A set of policy recommendations presented to the Clinton Administration's transition team in December 1992 charged that there was an "institutional racism in our foreign and national security policy apparatus," reflecting "at least in part, the relative absence of input by African-Americans

⁹ *Transcript of Proceedings. The Congressional Black Caucus Presents "An Examination of U.S. Policy in the Caribbean."* Saturday, November 21, 1981. Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc., p. 10-13. Rep. Gray was speaking specifically of relations with blacks from the Caribbean, but his remarks have a broader application.

¹⁰ Remarks inserted by Rep. Shirley Chisolm. *Congressional Record*, October 1, 1982. p. E4601-E4602.

¹¹ *Transcript of Proceedings.* p. 10-11.

¹² Beaubien, Michael. Making Waves in Foreign Policy. *Black Enterprise*, v.12, April 1982. p. 39.

at the highest policy-making levels."¹³ From the beginning, the Caucus has sought to increase employment of blacks at the Department of State.¹⁴

Finally, Caucus members have argued that black Americans must take an interest in foreign affairs because of the relationship between foreign policy and job security and job creation in a global economy. Issues related to international competitiveness and trade agreements, many believe, can have a major impact on black Americans, whose jobs are disproportionately concentrated in manufacturing industries most subject to competition from industrializing nations rather than in the high-technology sector.¹⁵ In Rep. Gray's words, "The whole question of jobs is tied to our relations with overseas markets."¹⁶

MEANS OF INFLUENCING FOREIGN POLICY

The CBC has always had to rely on coalition-building and cooperation with others in Congress to achieve its objectives. Even at its current peak level of 39 members in the House, including a delegate from the District of Columbia with restricted voting privileges, the CBC constitutes only a fraction of the House membership. There has been a CBC member in the Senate only since January 1993, when Senator Carol Mosely-Braun took her seat.¹⁷

This need for coalition partners has led the CBC to employ a variety of means intended to draw public attention to issues of concern and persuade other Members to join with the Caucus in its initiatives. Reliance on coalitions means, however, that the success of Caucus-backed legislation cannot be attributed solely to Caucus efforts, since such victories result from the efforts of all the participants in a coalition. The same is true when the executive branch changes its policies in response to congressional pressure, including pressure from the CBC. Nonetheless, Caucus efforts have clearly been a major factor in a number of issue areas over the years, including the Rhodesia crisis of the 1970s, the 18 South Africa sanctions debate in the mid-1980s, Haiti, and the question of aid levels for sub-Saharan Africa.

¹³ Congressional Black Caucus. Policy Recommendations for the Clinton Transition. Foreign Policy and National Security. p.1. The Caucus saw evidence of institutional racism in the foreign policy concentration on the former Soviet Union and the Middle East, "nearly to the exclusion of Africa and the Caribbean."

¹⁴ Congressional Black Caucus Recommendations to President Nixon. *Congressional Record*, March 30, 1971. p. 8713.

¹⁵ Morris, Milton D. African Americans and the New World Order. *Washington Quarterly*, v.15, Autumn 1992. p. 8-10.

¹⁶ Making Waves in Foreign Policy. p. 39.

¹⁷ Senator Edward Brooke, a Republican who served from 1967 until 1979, maintained a cooperative relationship with the CBC, but was not formally a member.

Representative Charles Diggs pioneered in developing the techniques the Caucus would use to influence foreign affairs. The Caucus gained national attention with a dramatic gesture of protest in January 1971, when members boycotted President Nixon's State of the Union Address. The boycott came after the Administration had refused a Diggs request that the President meet with black Members of Congress and reflected the CBC view that Nixon was refusing to listen to the concerns of black Americans.¹⁸ Subsequently, Diggs led the Caucus to its March 25 meeting with Nixon to present the list of 61 recommendations. The foreign policy portion of this list included a call for disengagement from Southeast Asia, a drastic reduction in military expenditures, increased aid for Africa, economic pressures against South Africa, and a greater role for blacks in making foreign policy. On December 17, 1971, Diggs resigned his position as a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations to protest U.S. policy toward southern Africa and the lack of consultation between the State Department and the delegates on U.S. votes at the U.N.¹⁹

Dramatic gestures of this sort were used in later years by the Caucus in confronting foreign policy issues. On November 21, 1984, for example, Del. Fauntroy, with Randall Robinson of TransAfrica (see below) and Mary Frances Berry, a member of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, were arrested when they refused to leave the office of the South African Ambassador. Fauntroy and the others were demanding the release of political prisoners in South Africa and the convening of a constitutional convention. Their arrest brought demonstrations outside the South African Embassy and sparked the emergence of a nationwide coalition known as the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM).²⁰ Caucus Members themselves led a series of protests that saw Representative Charles Hayes, Representative John Conyers, Representative Ronald Dellums, and Representative George W. Crockett, Jr. arrested outside the Embassy in succeeding days. Some 22 Members of Congress, including many outside the Caucus, were eventually arrested in the demonstrations.²¹ Similarly, in April 1994, Caucus Chairman Kweisi Mfume, and Representative Donald Payne, Chairman of the CBC Task Force on Foreign Affairs, were arrested with three other Caucus members and Representative Joseph Kennedy while linked arm in arm in a demonstration outside the White House.²² The Members were protesting Clinton Administration policy toward Haiti and showing their

¹⁸ Clay, William L. *Just Permanent Interests: Black Americans in Congress, 1870-1991*. New York, Amistad Press, 1992. p. 139. See also, Arthur B. Levy and Susan Stoudinger. The Black Caucus in the 92nd Congress: Gauging its Success. *Phylon*, v.39, December 1978, p. 322-332.

¹⁹ *Congressional Record*, January 18, 1972. p. 108.

²⁰ For a discussion of this event and its consequences, see Ronald W. Walters, *African-American Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy Toward South Africa*, p.75-78.

²¹ Locin, Mitchell. From Selma to Pretoria. *Chicago Tribune Magazine*, October 6, 1985. p. 26.

²² *Newark Star-Ledger*, April 22, 1994.

support for Robinson, who was beginning a hunger strike against that policy. Anger over the 1994 crisis in Rwanda, where the CBC felt the Administration was responding far too slowly to a humanitarian disaster; over Haiti; and over a lack of consultation on a number of other issues, brought a CBC threat to boycott a White House-organized conference on Africa in June 1994. The threat was withdrawn only after the White House promised to give Caucus members extensive briefings on Africa after the conference.²³

These dramatic gestures were sometimes required, Caucus members have argued, because the press, in their view, generally paid far too little attention to Caucus initiatives.²⁴ Nonetheless, if used too often such gestures might have lost their impact—and in fact the Caucus resorted to confrontational tactics infrequently. Most of the Caucus effort in foreign affairs went into more conventional approaches to influencing opinion and building coalitions—holding hearings; testifying; writing or meeting with the President or other top officials; convening meetings; issuing statements, manifestoes, and reports; and introducing legislation—or attempting to amend or defeat legislation introduced by others.²⁵ Representative Diggs, who resigned from Congress in 1980,²⁶ used his years as a subcommittee chairman to hold extensive hearings on a broad range of Africa-related topics. Diggs felt that because of European domination of Africa during the colonial era, which was just coming to an end, Americans had little knowledge of Africa. He saw his early hearings as a way of filling this knowledge gap and building public support for deeper U.S. involvement in Africa. One set of 1971 hearings on "Policy Toward Africa for the Seventies" was spread over 13 days and included testimony from policy-makers and academic experts. Parts I and II of hearings on "U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa" were held over several days in 1971, while Part III was held in 1973 and lasted for 7 more days. By this time, and in later years, Rep. Diggs was also chairing hearings intended to influence U.S. policy toward Africa on specific issues, including the Rhodesia situation, the Sahel drought of the mid-1970s, and the export of nuclear materials and technology to South

²³ Lippman, Thomas W. and Kenneth J. Cooper, Conference on Africa Draws Wide Criticism. *Washington Post*, June 23, 1994.

²⁴ See, for example, Roger Wilkins on the Black Caucus. Inserted in the *Congressional Record*, by Rep. Mervyn Dymally, June 23, 1981. p. 13482.

²⁵ In its early years, the Caucus also undertook court challenges to executive branch actions with respect to South Africa and Rhodesia, but none of these was successful. See Miller, Jake C. Black Legislators and African-American Relations, 1970-1975. *Journal of Black Studies*, v.10, December 1979, p. 253-254.

²⁶ Diggs had been convicted in October 1978 on charges of mail fraud and falsifying payroll forms. He was censured by the House in July 1979. Ragsdale, Bruce A. and Joel D. Treese, *Black Americans in Congress, 1870-1989*. p. 40.

Africa. Diggs supported his hearings with reports based on his many trips to Africa.²⁷

Letters to executive branch officials, which have sometimes been made public or quoted extensively in the press, have been a frequently-used instrument for the CBC. In April 1976, the Caucus sent a 5-page letter to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who was preparing for his first trip to Africa. The letter criticized Kissinger's past "general indifference to Africa," and offered several policy recommendations on Angola and other issues. This letter persuaded Kissinger to meet with the Caucus for 45 minutes before his departure.²⁸ In October 1982, the Caucus wrote to Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige protesting the licensing of the export of 2,500 shock batons (crowd-control devices) to South Africa. The letter noted suspicions of "purposeful concealment" by the Commerce Department and drew an admission from Baldrige that the licensing was an error.²⁹ A March 1994 letter to President Clinton recommending 11 steps to strengthen U.S. support for the restoration of President Aristide in Haiti contributed to a policy debate that brought major changes in U.S. Haiti policy.³⁰

In its early years, the Caucus sponsored large meetings on foreign policy topics, primarily Africa-related, in order to study and debate policy, make recommendations, and stimulate public interest. The 1972 African-American National Conference on Africa, held at Howard University and chaired by Rep. Diggs, generated recommendations on development aid and southern Africa.³¹ In September 1976, the Caucus convened the Black Leadership Conference on Southern Africa to issue "The African-American Manifesto on Southern Africa."³² Participants included 120 representatives of labor, business, civil rights, and other organizations.

²⁷ See, for example, U.S. Policy Toward Africa and the accompanying "Action Manifesto." *Congressional Record*, January 18, 1972. p. 108-116.

²⁸ On the letter and the meeting, see Austin Scott, Kissinger to See African Liberation Leaders. *Washington Post*, April 15, 1976.

²⁹ U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. The Black Caucus and Africa: The Reagan Administration, January 1981-September 1985. CRS Typed Report by Joseph Gorman, November 1, 1985. p. 4-5.

³⁰ Merida, Kevin. Hill's Black Caucus Faults U.S. Policy on Haiti, Presses for Aristide Return. *Washington Post*, March 24, 1994.

³¹ Strategy Workshops Report, African-American National Conference on Africa. Washington, Congressional Black Caucus, 1972. See also From Gammon to Howard, Proceedings of the African-American National Conference on Africa. Howard University, 1972.

³² *Black Scholar*, January/February 1977. p. 27-32.

The study and debating aspects of these large meetings were later taken over by the Annual Legislative Weekends sponsored by the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation (CBC/F). The Foundation, created in 1976, is organizationally independent of the Caucus itself but includes Caucus members as a minority among its Board of Directors. The Legislative Weekends feature panel discussions called "braintrusts" involving Caucus members, outside experts, and other interested participants. At the International Affairs braintrust, African and Caribbean policy issues are regularly discussed.

CBC legislative efforts, in the form of bills and resolutions introduced by Caucus leaders or attempts to alter or thwart the legislative efforts of others, have of course been a major instrument of the Caucus in its efforts to influence policy. Major legislative efforts on Rhodesia, South Africa, and aid to Africa are discussed in the next section. But Caucus legislation on less prominent issues also had its impact. In October 1990, for example, the full Caucus sponsored H.Con.Res. 388 criticizing remarks that had offended black Americans by Japanese Justice Minister Seiroku Kajiyama. Although Kajiyama did not resign, as the resolution had demanded, he sent a letter of apology to Caucus Chairman Ronald Dellums.³³

The Congressional Black Caucus Alternative Budget Proposal, introduced each year since 1981 (with the exception of 1988 and 1991), has never been enacted, but it has created a context for the CBC to lay out its basic objectives and outline means of achieving them in terms of spending priorities in both domestic and foreign affairs. The proposal, which has had such names as "the constructive alternative budget" or "the quality of life budget", has consistently called for reduced defense spending and typically backed increased aid to Africa and support for international lending agencies as well as the United Nations. CBC Chairman Payne argued that the 1995 alternative, which the Caucus called the "Caring Majority Alternative Budget," would provide for a sound national defense while strengthening the nation by meeting pressing domestic needs. At the same time, he maintained that the plan would allow the United States to exert moral leadership through humanitarian and development aid.³⁴ Some opponents of the alternative praised the Caucus for developing a specific 7-year balanced-budget proposal that encompassed CBC objectives, but concerns over defense and tax aspects of the plan brought its defeat by a 56-367 vote.

The Caucus has at times generated internal sub-units in order to coordinate its efforts in the foreign affairs field. Representative Shirley Chisolm and Del. Fauntroy founded the Congressional Black Caucus Task Force on Haitian Refugees in 1976 to seek humane treatment and equal justice for the Haitians

³³ Reid, T.R. Japanese Apologizes to Black Caucus. *Washington Post*, October 18, 1990. This incident recalled similar events in 1986, following offensive remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.

³⁴ *Congressional Record*, May 18, 1995. p.H5287. The proposal was introduced as an amendment to H.Con.Res. 67, the Republican-sponsored budget resolution.

fleeing to the United States, often under extremely hazardous conditions.³⁵ In 1981, the Task Force dropped the word "Refugees" from its title, took in Members of Congress from outside the Caucus, and began to work for broad changes in U.S. Haiti policy.³⁶ More recently, the Congressional Black Caucus Task Force on Foreign Affairs has sought to articulate Caucus views and objectives for Members of Congress and staff, as well as the public. In June 1994, for example, Task Force Chairman and founder Donald Payne followed up two Caucus letters to President Clinton criticizing Rwanda policy by leading a press conference on Rwanda outside the West Front of the Capitol.³⁷ Representatives of humanitarian agencies anxious to speed the delivery of relief aid to Rwanda spoke at the conference.

In 1976, TransAfrica was founded as an independent public affairs organization that seeks to influence U.S. foreign policy toward people of African descent, particularly in Africa and the Caribbean. Caucus members, staffers working for them, and influential black Americans outside Congress had thought for some years that there ought to be an African-American advocacy group to champion the interests of African and Caribbean peoples. The September 1976 African-American Leadership Conference, convened by the Caucus, determined that the "neglect of African and Caribbean priorities could only be corrected by the establishment of a private advocacy organization."³⁸ Founding members included Ronald Walters, a professor of political science at Howard University, as well as Diggs staffers Herschelle Challenor and Randall Robinson.³⁹ TransAfrica was incorporated in July 1977, and began operations—with Robinson as executive director—in 1978.⁴⁰ In subsequent years, TransAfrica has been very active on a wide range of issues of interest to the Caucus, including South Africa sanctions and African development. Robinson began his hunger strike against the Clinton Administration's Haiti policy on April 12, 1994, and ended it only on May 8, when President Clinton appointed former Caucus member William Gray III as special adviser on Haiti policy. (Gray had retired from Congress in 1991.)

³⁵ See Congressional Black Caucus Statement, inserted in the *Congressional Record* by Rep. Chisolm. October 25, 1979, p. 29703-29704.

³⁶ Binder, David. Haitians Gain Influential Following in America. *New York Times*, September 23, 1987.

³⁷ The press conference took place on June 30, 1994. The CBC Task Force on Foreign Affairs now coordinates the "braintrust" at the annual CBC Foundation Legislative Weekend.

³⁸ McCoy, Frank. TransAfrica Explores New Challenges. *Black Enterprise*, v.23, August 1992, p. 58.

³⁹ Jackson, Henry F. *From The Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960*. New York, William Morrow, 1982. p.124.

⁴⁰ Hughes, Anthony J. Interview: Randall Robinson, Executive Director of TransAfrica. *Africa Report*, January-February, 1980. p. 9.

CBC STYLE

Congressional Black Caucus activities in the foreign affairs field have generally been marked by considerable pragmatism and moderation, as well as persistence in pursuit of some issues over many years. This style of operation reflects the Caucus' need to build and maintain coalitions if it is to have any hope of achieving its objectives. Extreme language, inflexibility and an unwillingness to compromise, and hasty or ill-prepared legislative proposals would only have driven away potential allies, dooming prospects for success.

Some Caucus supporters have at times wished that the organization would be more confrontational in pursuing its foreign policy objectives, but the pragmatic style has generally prevailed. As noted above, however, the Caucus has been willing to undertake dramatic gestures, including the risk of arrest, in order to draw attention to major Caucus priorities. Caucus members have on occasion employed strong language in criticizing U.S. foreign policy and advancing CBC positions. Speaking of Caribbean policy in 1982, Del. Fauntroy, then Caucus Chairman, condemned the "Reagan Administration that has chosen to align itself with the intellectual and immoral heritage of the slave owners and plantation owners...."⁴¹ Referring to the Clinton Administration's Haiti policy in 1994, Representative Major Owens, head of the CBC Haiti Task Force, said "We are upset, we are indignant, and we are declaring war on a racist policy."⁴² The 1992 CBC submission to the incoming Clinton Administration, claimed that the "institutional racism" it decried was responsible for several "foreign policy failures" in Africa and the Caribbean.⁴³ But statements of this sort have tended to be fairly rare, and to come at moments of crisis on issues that have been a long-term focus of CBC attention at a lower level of verbal intensity.

The CBC has normally chosen to focus on issues on which it could plausibly argue that policy has been variance with underlying principles broadly held by the American people. Ending apartheid in South Africa, fighting famine in the Sahel or Somalia, or providing humane treatment for Haitian refugees were objectives that reflected such principles and had broad appeal among Americans. This appeal was an asset to the Caucus in its efforts to build political coalitions and influence policy. Caucus stances in support of such positions tended to place executive branch policy-makers on the defensive, pushing them to argue that they too were in favor of the objectives but constrained by circumstances from pursuing them through the more vigorous means advocated by the Caucus.

⁴¹ Remarks inserted in the *Congressional Record* by Rep. Chisolm, October 1, 1982. p. E4601.

⁴² *Washington Post*, March 24, 1994.

⁴³ Policy Recommendations for the Clinton Transition: Foreign Policy and National Security.

When the Caucus could not convincingly associate its foreign policy stances with fundamental principles, it was less effective. The Caucus was extremely critical, for example, of the U.S. invasion of Grenada, which began on October 26, 1983. Representative Dymally, backed by 15 other Caucus members as cosponsors, introduced a resolution calling for a U.S. withdrawal.⁴⁴ Representative John Conyers described the intervention as a violation of international law, while Representative Gus Savage maintained that the Reagan Administration was seeking to "install a banana republic" in Grenada.⁴⁵ Six Caucus members joined with two other Members of Congress to sponsor a resolution seeking the impeachment of President Reagan on grounds that he had acted unconstitutionally.⁴⁶ Anger over the Grenada operation grew in part from a belief that the Caucus should have been consulted or at least informed before the invasion because of the special CBC interest Caribbean affairs. It also reflected the general lack of sympathy in the Caucus for the Reagan Administration and its policies, a view that the threat posed by Cuba in the Caribbean had been vastly exaggerated by policy-makers, and a suspicion that the Administration was acting forcefully in Grenada to recapture public support after the destruction of the Marine barracks in Lebanon three days before. More broadly, Caucus members saw the invasion as another instance of a Cold War foreign policy, which in their view had long distracted successive Administrations from dealing with domestic priorities. While other Members shared some or all of these views, the Caucus position did not resonate with Congress generally or the American public, where the view that the invasion had served fundamental U.S. foreign policy principles, such as saving American lives or containing the expansion of communist or radical regimes, seemed to hold sway.⁴⁷

The Grenada operation highlighted certain strains in the relationship between the CBC and the Hispanic Caucus, which tended to be less critical of the intervention and more accepting of the view that President Fidel Castro's Cuba constituted a major Caribbean threat. There has also been some background tension between the two groups over a sense in the CBC that Cuban refugees have been better treated than Haitian refugees because most are white.

⁴⁴ H.Con.Res. 199. Introduced on October 17, 1983 and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

⁴⁵ *Washington Post*, October 29, 1983.

⁴⁶ H.Res.370, introduced on November 10, 1983 by Rep. Ted Weiss and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. CBC cosponsors were Representatives Conyers, Crockett, Dixon, Dymally, Parren Mitchell, and Savage. Rep. Mickey Leland regretted signing a petition seeking Reagan's impeachment, calling it "terribly politically inept," and withdrew his name. Dewar, Helen. Leland Has Championed Poor, Bridged Racial Divide in House. *Washington Post*, August 9, 1989.

⁴⁷ Whether or not the invasion had indeed achieved such objectives in Grenada was hotly debated at the time.

On practical grounds, however, the CBC has sought to minimize differences with the Hispanic Caucus, which can provide important coalition partners for the CBC on domestic issues. The CBC has never come forward with a resolution or statement favoring the recognition of Cuba, even though some African-American leaders believe that the United States should take this step⁴⁸—in part because of the belief that Cubans of African descent have risen from the bottom of the Cuban social scale under Castro's regime. Perhaps the sharpest issue arose in January 1993, when the new Clinton Administration floated and then withdrew the name of Mario Baeza, a Wall Street attorney, as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Baeza, a Cuban-American and a black, was strenuously opposed by Cuban-Americans who felt he would be too conciliatory toward Castro or lacked the requisite foreign policy credentials. Caucus Chairman Mfume wrote the White House on behalf of the Caucus, calling Baeza "tremendously qualified" and arguing that his race brought an "important added dimension to his credentials."⁴⁹ Representative Charles Rangel published an op-ed piece in the *Miami Herald* accusing Baeza's critics of "single-issue ideology and racism."⁵⁰ Representative Lincoln Diaz-Balart, speaking on the House floor, responded by calling the column an insult to the Cuban-American community.⁵¹ Despite the intensity of the emotions that had been aroused, the Caucus did not introduce a resolution or take any other action on this issue.

The Congressional Black Caucus has also avoided confrontations with Jewish Members of Congress over U.S. policy toward Israel and other issues—again reflecting the value of good relations with potential alliance partners. Jewish Members value their relationship with the Caucus for the same reason. A recent congressional voting analysis by the American Jewish Congress on National Affairs dealing with both foreign and domestic issues found that,

Contrary to the growing impression that Blacks and Jews no longer share a common core of interests and values, this study demonstrates that Black and Jewish Members of the United States House of Representatives are closely allied on basic issues of concern to their respective communities.⁵²

⁴⁸ Asked in 1980 if the United States should recognize Cuba, TransAfrica head Randall Robinson replied "There's no question about it." *Africa Report*, January-February 1980. p. 11.

⁴⁹ *Congressional Record*, January 27, 1993, p.H275. The letter was sent on January 22.

⁵⁰ *North-South, The Magazine of the Americas*, April-May 1993. p. 55.

⁵¹ *Congressional Record*, January 26, 1993, p. H250.

⁵² *Blacks and Jews in Congress: A House Undivided*. American Jewish Congress, Commission on National Affairs, Washington, 1995. p. 19.

Support from the Jewish community during the civil rights struggle, as well as ongoing support for various causes favored by the Caucus, also tend to draw the CBC and Jewish Members of Congress together. As in the case of the Hispanic Caucus, however, there are some background strains between the two groups, reflecting strains between the wider African-American and Jewish communities⁵³ and perception that Israel receives a disproportionate share of U.S. economic aid at a time of great need in Africa. But the Caucus has sought to prevent these strains from developing into an open rift in Congress.

In March 1972, the Caucus decided to disassociate itself from an anti-Israel resolution passed by the National Black Political Convention, which had convened in Gary, Indiana in an effort to influence the upcoming presidential election. The Caucus had initially sponsored this event, but withdrew from formal participation as expenses mounted and it began to appear that black separatists and nationalists would control the agenda.⁵⁴ After the convention passed the offending resolution, CBC Chairman Louis Stokes issued a press release asserting that

As black elected representatives to the U.S. Congress, we reaffirm our position that we fully respect the right of the Jewish people to have their own state in their historical national homeland. We vigorously oppose the efforts of any group that would seek to weaken or undermine Israel's right to exist.⁵⁵

The resignation of Andrew Young as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations on August 15, 1979, after Israel protested an unauthorized meeting between Young and a representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization, led to several months of strained relations between African-American and Jewish leaders. Many African-American leaders felt that the resignation reflected pressure from Israel but also from Jewish leaders and organizations in the United States.⁵⁶ But in this instance too, the CBC chose to avoid a confrontation.

⁵³ DeConde, Alexander. *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History*. Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1992. p. 182-183.

⁵⁴ Clay, William L. *Just Permanent Interests*. p. 202-211.

⁵⁵ Clay, p. 209. *Congressional Quarterly* explained the Caucus stance by asserting that "The Caucus depended for financial and moral support on a number of white liberal organizations, nearly all of them pro-Israel." May 21, 1977. p. 969. Clay, however, insists that the "relationship between Caucus members ... and Jewish groups was one of choice and convenience, not necessity." p. 209.

⁵⁶ In contrast, the Director of the American Jewish Congress charged that "the suggestion in some black quarters that Ambassador Young was brought down by Jewish pressure is a blatant falsification of the facts and an incitement to bigotry." *Facts on File*, 1979, p. 606.

Young was a widely-respected civil rights leader and had been a Member of Congress and the CBC before his appointment to the U.N. post. He tried to prevent the controversy from developing into a black/Jewish issue, as did some other black as well as Jewish leaders. Nonetheless, the Rev. Jesse Jackson said that because of the resignation, relations between blacks and Jews were more tense "than they've been in 25 years."⁵⁷ On August 22, 1979, 200 black politicians, civic leaders, and others met in New York to protest the resignation, and Del. Fauntroy, who was present, read a statement agreed to at the meeting asserting that no group had "any more right to be involved in the development and conduct of U.S. foreign policy than Americans of African descent."⁵⁸

The CBC approved a special award for Young for his contributions to international peace and security, and invited him to present the principal address at its annual dinner, held in late September.⁵⁹ Some of those present were disappointed that Young did not use the occasion to denounce President Carter (who was not invited to the dinner) and those who had forced Young to resign⁶⁰—but the Caucus itself took no further action on the issue.⁶¹

⁵⁷ *Facts on File*, 1979. p. 606.

⁵⁸ Morgan, Thomas and Lee Lescaze. Foreign Policy Voice Demanded by Top Blacks. *Washington Post*, August 23, 1979.

⁵⁹ Inserted in the *Congressional Record* by Rep. Diggs, October 10, 1979. p. 27722-27724.

⁶⁰ Clay, *Just Permanent Interests*, p.305.

⁶¹ Black/Jewish strains were evident again after the September 1993 CBC/F Legislative Weekend, which saw then Caucus Chairman Kweisi Mfume, in an effort to promote unity among black organizations, announce that the Caucus was entering into a "Sacred Covenant" with the Nation of Islam. Many members of the Jewish community view the Nation and its leader, Louis Farrakhan, as anti-semitic—a charge that Farrakhan rejects. This incident, which did not directly involve foreign policy, faded when Mfume stated that the Caucus had no formal ties with the Nation of Islam. Rep. Major Owens said that the "sacred covenant" announcement reflected only Mfume's personal view and pointed out that the Caucus had never passed a resolution on any relationship with the Nation of Islam. See Rep. Owens' speech, *Congressional Record*, February 3, 1994, p. E93; Kevin Merida, Black Caucus Says It Has No Official Working Ties With Nation of Islam, *Washington Post*, February 3, 1994; and Peter J. Boyer, The Rise of Kweisi Mfume, *New Yorker*, August 1, 1994.

PRINCIPAL ISSUES

The Congressional Black Caucus has taken an interest in many foreign policy issues over the years, and this section can only outline the major topics of CBC involvement. During much of the 1970s, most of these topics related to Africa, but since the later 1970s, a broader range of subjects—from Haiti to the defense budget—have also drawn Caucus attention.

AFRICA

From 1971 through April 1994, the Caucus had three principal objectives in Africa policy: to strengthen U.S. support for ending white minority rule in southern Africa; to increase U.S. economic development assistance for sub-Saharan Africa generally; and to enhance the U.S. response to African humanitarian tragedies when they occur. White minority rule in southern Africa finally did come to an end in April 1994, with South Africa's first universal suffrage elections, leaving the Caucus to focus primarily on its aid and relief agenda for Africa. By this time, however, budgetary constraints had shifted the objective of boosting development aid for Africa toward one of protecting Africa aid from reductions.

Southern Africa

The Congressional Black Caucus summarized its objective for southern Africa policy in its 1976 letter to Secretary of State Kissinger: "The U.S. must take a strong, unequivocal stand for majority rule in southern Africa and undergird this policy with concrete actions."⁶² This statement encapsulated the determination of the CBC to press for stronger U.S. policies against apartheid in South Africa and against white minority rule in Rhodesia. It also reflected Caucus concerns over U.S. policy toward Angola and the regional military role of the white South African government in the wake of the collapse of Portuguese colonialism.

Rhodesia Sanctions. With respect to Rhodesia, Caucus goals during the 1970s were two-fold: to restore U.S. compliance with United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia and to assure that sanctions were not lifted before the system of white minority rule was brought to an end. Representative Cardiss Collins explained the Caucus position as follows:

This is a fundamental question for us, not because the minority is white, but because the oppression of Africans there, and similarly of people anywhere, is fundamentally wrong.⁶³

⁶² *Washington Post*, April 15, 1976.

⁶³ *Congressional Record*, May 21, 1979. p. 12008.

The white minority government of Rhodesia had issued its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain, which had been pushing for progress toward majority rule, in 1965. In 1966, the United Nations Security Council determined that the situation in Rhodesia was a threat to international peace and security and imposed economic sanctions against Rhodesia. By 1972, African movements opposed to continuing white rule had launched a large-scale guerrilla war.⁶⁴

The United States supported the U.N. sanctions, but by 1969, Rep. Diggs was already concerned that the Nixon Administration was not doing all it could to end minority rule in Rhodesia.⁶⁵ Meanwhile, however, an attack on U.S. policy was being launched from an entirely different quarter, and in 1971, Congress passed an amendment sponsored by Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, which had the effect of prohibiting the President from banning the importation of critical and strategic materials from Rhodesia—despite the United Nations ban on such imports.⁶⁶ Supporters of the amendment argued that U.S. participation in the U.N. sanctions had risked making the United States dependent on the Soviet Union for chromium imports.

The Congressional Black Caucus made repeal of the Byrd amendment a priority⁶⁷ and supported repeal efforts, which began almost immediately. Many other Members were working for repeal as well, and congressional staff established coordination networks among offices and between chambers.⁶⁸ The Nixon Administration also supported repeal but Caucus members were always suspicious that this support was not sincere—and indeed that Nixon, in the words of Rep. Diggs, "tacitly supported" the Byrd Amendment.⁶⁹ This was a charge that Administration spokesmen always denied.

The Byrd Amendment was finally modified so that it no longer applied to Rhodesia in March 1977, shortly after the Carter Administration took office. Relations between this Administration and the Congressional Black Caucus were

⁶⁴ For a review of the Rhodesian crisis, the U.S. response, and congressional reaction, see U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Executive-Legislative Consultation on Foreign Policy: Sanctions Against Rhodesia, by Raymond W. Copson. Congress and Foreign Policy Series, No. 6, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1982.

⁶⁵ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Africa. Rhodesia and United States Foreign Policy. Hearings, 91st Congress, 1st sess. October 17, 31; Nov. 7 and 19, 1969. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.

⁶⁶ Armed Forces Appropriation Act of 1971 (P.L.92-156), Sec. 503.

⁶⁷ See the remarks of Rep. Parren Mitchell, *Congressional Record*, March 2, 1977. p. 5953.

⁶⁸ Executive-Legislative Consultation on Foreign Policy, p. 30-31.

⁶⁹ Cited in *ibid.*, p. 27.

initially quite good—six members of the Caucus had appeared with the President-elect, for example, in Plains, Georgia, in December 1976 on the occasion of Rep. Young's appointment as United Nations Ambassador. The good relations between the new Administration and congressional supporters of repeal certainly facilitated modification of the Byrd Amendment. But congressional observers believe that the modification would not have occurred so soon after Carter took office if the advocates of repeal, including the CBC, had not laid the groundwork on Capitol Hill over the six preceding years. A key factor in the success of the repeal effort was the revelation that specialty steel companies in the United States had grown less reliant on Rhodesian chrome—a fact that was brought out in congressional hearings, including hearings before the House Africa subcommittee, chaired by Rep. Diggs.⁷⁰ The bill to modify the Byrd Amendment was introduced by Rep. Young just before he joined the Administration.⁷¹

In March 1978, the white government in Rhodesia negotiated an "internal settlement" with some black political leaders, though not the principal resistance movements, and this launched a new congressional effort to lift the sanctions against Rhodesia. Supporters of these efforts alleged that the guerrilla movements in Rhodesia were Marxist oriented and argued that the internal settlement would protect U.S. security interests at a time when the Soviet Union was making gains in Ethiopia and other African countries.

The Congressional Black Caucus, others in Congress, and the Carter Administration itself strongly opposed efforts to lift the sanctions on grounds that the internal settlement would prolong *de facto* white rule—and hence the fighting—for years to come. Representative Stephen Solarz, who had succeeded Rep. Diggs as chairman of the House Africa Subcommittee at the beginning of 1979, was not a member of the CBC, but he worked closely with the Caucus in organizing a Rhodesia strategy group to oppose congressional efforts to lift the sanctions.⁷² A complex legislative battle ensued, but in the end U.S. participation in the sanctions was preserved until December 1979, when a British-administered transition to full majority rule finally got underway. The transition resulted from lengthy, U.S.-supported negotiations in London and led to universal suffrage elections in Zimbabwe, as the country was renamed, in February 1980.

Covert Operations in Angola. Continuing Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique, the last major vestige of European colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa, was a Caucus concern in the first half of the 1970s. Caucus members felt

⁷⁰ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations, Subcommittees on Africa and International Organization. The Rhodesian Sanctions Bill. Hearing, Feb. 24, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. p. 45-46.

⁷¹ H.R. 1746, introduced by Rep. Young on January 11, 1977, became Public Law 95-12 on March 18.

⁷² Executive-Legislative Consultation on Foreign Policy. p. 56.

that the United States had a special responsibility for Portuguese behavior, since Portugal was a U.S. ally in NATO and cooperated militarily with the United States by allowing access to air and naval facilities in the Azores, a Portuguese territory.

Congress did not reduce U.S. military cooperation or take other steps against Portugal on the Angola issue, but it did become alarmed as Angola seemed about to become a major stake in the Cold War in the mid-1970s. Portuguese rule collapsed in Angola—and Mozambique as well—following a 1974 military revolution in Portugal. With the Soviet Union and Cuba supporting the Marxist-oriented government that took power from Portugal in Angola, South Africa intervened in support of Angolan opposition movements, which were also given covert assistance by United States. The spread of the Cold War to Africa and the prospect of a "new Vietnam", South African intervention outside its borders, and U.S. support for groups also backed by South Africa were highly sensitive issues for the Caucus and galvanized its opposition to the Angola policies of President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger. On January 27, 1976 the Caucus voted for the "Tunney Amendment," which cut off any funding for operations in Angola, apart from intelligence gathering.⁷³ The Caucus also supported the subsequent "Clark Amendment," which prohibited U.S. involvement in Angola, apart from humanitarian operations, without the approval of Congress.⁷⁴ In March 1981, the Reagan Administration announced that it would seek repeal of the Clark Amendment, but proponents of repeal decided not to bring the measure to the House floor in the face of opposition organized in part by the CBC.⁷⁵

In 1985, however, the Caucus was unable to stave off a new attempt by the Reagan Administration to repeal the amendment. Many who voted for repeal accepted the Administration's argument that the Clark Amendment was an unusual and unjustified restriction on presidential authority in foreign affairs. Moreover, the Administration insisted that it had no immediate plans to undertake covert operations in Angola, and some Members felt that any future covert action proposals would be adequately monitored by the recently-established House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Others were concerned by the continuing presence of Cuban troops in Angola, and hoped that

⁷³ Representative Diggs was not present for this vote, but the remainder of the Caucus voted in favor of the amendment, named for its originator, Senator John Tunney. *Congressional Record*, January 27, 1976. p. 1057. The Tunney Amendment was part of the 1976 Defense Appropriations Act (P.L. 94-212).

⁷⁴ The Clark Amendment, named for Senator Dick Clark, was originally Sec. 404 of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329), which became law on June 30, 1976. A somewhat modified version of the amendment became Section 118 of the International Security Assistance and Development Cooperation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-533).

⁷⁵ Making Waves in Foreign Policy, *Black Enterprise*, April 1982. p. 40. The Senate, where the Caucus was not represented, did pass a repeal provision.

Administration would soon begin to help the Angolan opposition. By 1986, a covert but publicly-acknowledged program of U.S. assistance to the armed Angolan resistance had begun.

The impact of the positions favored by the Caucus and its allies on Angola were the subject of much debate. Despite eventual repeal of the Clark amendment, supporters of the Caucus believed that it had helped to prevent an escalating superpower confrontation and a possible "proxy war" during a decade of particularly intense Cold War competition between the superpowers. By the time covert aid was resumed, some felt, it was not as disruptive as it might have been, since by this late date prospects for large scale superpower confrontations in the Third World, even by proxy, had waned significantly. For critics of the Caucus, however, its Angola positions, and particularly its support for the Clark Amendment, had reduced U.S. leverage in Angola, encouraged eastern bloc adventurism in Africa, and delayed the negotiations, beginning in 1988, that eventually brought a Cuban withdrawal from Angola. These negotiations also resulted in independence for Namibia, which had been under South African rule.

South Africa Sanctions. South Africa has always been a central foreign policy focus for the Congressional Black Caucus, and the Caucus objectives for U.S. policy toward South Africa—including unequivocal U.S. support for majority rule, racial justice, and higher living standards for black South Africans—have been consistent throughout. Short term objectives, however, have varied in response to the situation in South Africa itself and Caucus perceptions of what could be achieved in the U.S. policy environment. Representative Diggs, for example, did not push for comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa during his years as Chairman of the House Africa subcommittee. Instead, he urged a series of lesser measures, such as the closure of a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) tracking station in South Africa, while he sought to educate the Congress and the public on the South African situation through hearings, study missions, and reports. Only in the 1980s, with growing public awareness and a series of violent incidents in South Africa itself, did Caucus leaders introduce comprehensive anti-apartheid legislation.⁷⁶

Representative Diggs was not successful in his early effort to end South Africa's sugar quota, but in 1973, NASA announced that the tracking station, where Diggs had found discriminatory practices during a 1971 visit, would be closed. The move came shortly after Representative Charles Rangel had introduced an amendment to NASA's authorization that would have prohibited funding for the station. NASA cited changing technical requirements in explaining the closure, which finally took place in 1975.

⁷⁶For a comprehensive study of congressional action and the CBC role, see Ronald W. Walters, *U.S.-South Africa Relations: A Legislative Review*. Washington, Howard University, 1985. Sponsored by the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation.

The Caucus was continually suspicious that the executive branch, regardless of Administration, was not doing all it could to combat apartheid in South Africa because of Cold War calculations, an exaggerated assessment of the value of South Africa's minerals, and even a preference for white regimes. The 1974 leak of a National Security Council options paper, prepared at the direction of Henry Kissinger when he was the White House National Security advisor, tended to deepen these suspicions.⁷⁷ Option 2 of the memorandum, though phrased as a means of achieving constructive change, was based on the premise that "the whites are here to stay" in southern Africa and concluded that the United States should "maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states."⁷⁸ Rep. Diggs, among others, reportedly believed that Nixon/Kissinger policy was indeed based on Option 2,⁷⁹ although Administration supporters maintained that the options paper was nothing more than a discussion document. Many of the Africa subcommittee's hearings in this period dealt with areas in which the United States might be relaxing pressures on South Africa, including arms sales and nuclear cooperation.

The September 1977 death of anti-apartheid leader Steve Biko in South African police custody led to widespread violent protests in South Africa and the declaration of a harsh state of emergency by the white government. The crisis drew renewed public attention to South Africa, and the House passed a resolution sponsored by Representative Cardiss Collins condemning the South African regime for repressive acts.⁸⁰ This was the first anti-apartheid resolution to be adopted by either House.⁸¹ The Caucus also recommended a 12-point plan of action against South Africa to President Carter, which was not adopted—although some lesser steps were taken.⁸²

The suspicion that the executive branch would ease pressure on South Africa intensified once again in 1981, with the inauguration of the Reagan Administration. There were rumors that South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha would be invited to the White House, prompting Representative Julian Dixon to introduce a resolution against visits by high level South African

⁷⁷ El-Khawas, Mohamed A. and Barry Cohen (eds.). *The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: National Security Study Memorandum 39 (secret)*. Westport, Connecticut; Laurence Hill; 1976. The memorandum was written in 1969.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p.105-106.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p.19.

⁸⁰ H.Con.Res. 388, adopted October 31, 1977.

⁸¹ Coker, Christopher. *The United States and South Africa, 1968-1985*. Durham, Duke University Press, 1986. p. 149. The Senate did not act on this resolution.

⁸² Daneher, Kevin. In Whose Interest? Washington, Institute for Policy Studies, 1984. p. 122.

officials.⁸³ The Caucus unsuccessfully sought the ouster of Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations in March 1981, after she met with South African Lt. Gen. P. W. van der Westhuizen and other military officers in violation of U.S. Policy. The White House maintained that Kirkpatrick had not understood the General's full role in the South African government.⁸⁴

The Reagan Administration's South Africa policy of "constructive engagement" devised by Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, became a source of deep concern to the CBC. Crocker described his policy partly as a regional strategy intended to reduce tensions in southern Africa by dealing with the Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola and securing a South African withdrawal from Namibia. At the same time, he was willing to accept and encourage incremental or piecemeal reforms in South Africa as a contribution to evolutionary change that could ultimately lead to a "democratic, non-racial order."⁸⁵ The CBC, however, did not accept that incremental changes introduced by the white regime would ever lead to majority rule in South Africa. Representative Gray, who visited South Africa at mid-decade, was told by President P.W. Botha that "One-man, one-vote is out; Blacks don't want it." For Gray, "this intransigence" required "tough economic sanctions against South Africa."⁸⁶ In 1981, Gray had already introduced legislation to ban new investment in South Africa.⁸⁷

Meanwhile, the House Africa Subcommittee, working with members of the CBC, had been attempting to develop comprehensive sanctions legislation that would have a chance of passage. No final action was taken on the initial bill, H.R. 3008, which was introduced in 1981 by Rep. Solarz with Gray and other Caucus members as co-sponsors. This bill would have codified the "Sullivan principles" on fair employment practices by U.S. firms in South Africa; prohibited the importation of krugerrands, the South African gold coin; and banned new loans. In May 1983, the House Foreign Affairs Committee inserted the provisions of H.R. 3008 into the Export Administration Amendments Act of 1983 (H.R. 3231), and in October 1983, during floor debate on this bill, a Gray amendment banning new investment in South Africa passed the House. The

⁸³ H.Con.Res. 98 was not brought out of committee.

⁸⁴ *Facts on File*, 1981. p. 205.

⁸⁵ Crocker, Chester A. *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood*. New York, W.W. Norton, 1992. p. 74-77.

⁸⁶ Gray, William H., III. Standing for Sanctions. *Africa Report*, March-April 1986. p.28, 29.

⁸⁷ H.R. 3597, introduced on May 14, 1981.

Senate, however, would not accept the South Africa provisions in this legislation, and H.R. 3231 never became law.⁸⁸

In March 1985, Gray, now chairman of the powerful Budget Committee, introduced H.R. 1460, the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985, which would have banned all new investment in South Africa, forbidden bank loans, and prohibited the import of krugerrands. The bill had 145 co-sponsors, including the entire CBC—although many CBC members would have preferred stronger measures. Representative Dellums affirmed his own preference for complete economic disengagement, including "mandatory disinvestment," or a complete withdrawal of all U.S. firms currently in South Africa, and a ban on all imports and exports.⁸⁹ H.R. 1460 passed the House on June 5, and in July, the Senate passed its own more modest sanctions package lacking the investment ban. The conference version of the bill also lacked this prohibition but still included a number of mandatory sanctions. Faced with this congressional determination to take firm action against South Africa, President Reagan imposed limited sanctions and took other steps against apartheid by executive order on September 9, just hours before the Senate was to vote on the conference report.⁹⁰ Opponents of the measure then launched a filibuster, and on September 11, eleven CBC members went to the Senate chamber to try to persuade their Senate colleagues to impose cloture and vote on the report.⁹¹ They were not successful, however, and the sanctions bill was withdrawn from the agenda.

President Reagan's executive order might under normal circumstances have defused pressure for further action against South Africa for some time to come. But events in South Africa, including harsh new rules against press coverage of unrest, as well as attacks by South African armed forces against alleged guerrilla bases in neighboring countries, provoked a new round of congressional action in 1986. On May 22, 1986, Representative Gray introduced H.R. 4868, to ban new investment and loans; prohibit imports of coal, uranium, and steel from South Africa; terminate landing rights for South African Airways; and impose other measures against apartheid. The bill was expected to be approved, in view of previous House action, but there was great surprise when much stronger legislation proposed by Rep. Dellums passed by voice vote as an amendment to

⁸⁸ The 98th Congress and Export Control Legislation, by Theodor W. Galdi. Appearing in U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Congress and Foreign Policy-1984. p. 113-123.

⁸⁹ A Dellums amendment to this effect was defeated in the House on June 5, 1985. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Congress and Foreign Policy, 1985-1986. The 99th Congress and South Africa Sanctions, by Robert B. Shepard. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988. p. 18.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 22-23.

⁹¹ *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, 1985. p. 90.

the Gray bill. Dellums' proposal would have imposed a trade embargo and complete disinvestment.

Representative Mark Siljander, Republican strategist against the Gray bill, did not ask for a recorded vote on the Dellums proposal, arguing that it was so extreme as to make rejection by the Senate and the President inevitable.⁹² The Senate did, however, pass a measure banning new investment; terminating South African landing rights; and prohibiting the import of iron, steel, uranium, coal, and agricultural products from South Africa—among other measures. House supporters of sanctions, including CBC members, held numerous strategy sessions on how to proceed.⁹³ While many would have preferred a result closer to the Dellums bill, they decided to accept the Senate legislation because of a promise from Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, to defend the legislation even in the face of a presidential veto.⁹⁴ In the event, the President did veto the bill on September 26, and the House—with the full support of the CBC—voted to override on September 29. The Senate followed suit, and the sanctions became law.⁹⁵

African Humanitarian Crises

Members of the Congressional Black Caucus have consistently been leading advocates of higher levels of U.S. aid in response to African humanitarian crises. Chairman Louis Stokes brought issues related to the 1973-1975 Sahel drought to the floor of the House with a Caucus statement calling for increased food aid and a long-term rehabilitation program for the region.⁹⁶ The House Africa Subcommittee, chaired by Rep. Diggs, held hearings on the situation,⁹⁷ and CBC members supported legislation providing emergency assistance to the Sahel nations. When famine struck again a decade later, Representative Mickey

⁹² Congress and Foreign Policy, 1985-1986. p. 25.

⁹³ Congress and Foreign Policy, 1985-1986, p. 29.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 29.

⁹⁵ P.L. 99-440, "Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986."

⁹⁶ Urgent Need For Long-Term Rehabilitation Program in the Sahel. *Congressional Record*, November 2, 1973, p. 35866. Later, Stokes sought a "Marshall plan" for the Sahel. Ibid, March 4, 1974. p. 5164.

⁹⁷ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Africa. Crisis of the African Drought. Hearing held November 19, 1974. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975.

Leland, Chairman of the House Select Committee on Hunger, was among three original sponsors of a bill to provide \$1 billion in relief and recovery aid.⁹⁸

Representative Leland, who chaired the CBC in the 99th Congress (1985-1986), had co-sponsored the legislation that created the Select Committee on Hunger with Representative Benjamin A. Gilman in 1984.⁹⁹ Leland made use of his position as Chairman to call attention to not only to hunger within the United States, but also to hunger and famine overseas, particularly in Africa. He was on his way to inspect refugee camps in Ethiopia in August 1989, when his plane crashed and he was killed.¹⁰⁰ A tribute to Leland at the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation Annual Awards Dinner, held in September 1989, drew a crowd of 3,000.¹⁰¹

Somalia. The Caucus was broadly supportive of the December 1992 landing of U.S. troops in Somalia in an effort to bring an end to the prolonged suffering of the civilian population due to war and famine. As the situation was deteriorating in August 1992, Rep. Payne sought and obtained House approval of S.Con.Res. 132, which condemned the violence in Somalia and urged President Bush to work with the United Nations in the deployment of security guards to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies.¹⁰² In October, Representative John Lewis introduced H.Con.Res. 370, which stated in a "whereas" clause that 2 million were facing starvation in Somalia and urged the President to inform the United Nations of U.S. willingness to participate in the deployment of security guards. This resolution passed both the House and Senate and served as an indicator of congressional views as the President deliberated on how to respond to a worsened situation in Somalia after Congress had adjourned. In November, Rep. Payne, who visited Somalia with five other

⁹⁸ H.R. 100. Some \$784 million was eventually approved. See *The 99th Congress and the African Economic Crisis*, by Carol Lancaster. Congress and Foreign Policy, 1985-1986. p. 147.

⁹⁹ House Creates Special Panel to Study Hunger. *Congressional Quarterly*, February 25, 1984. p. 466.

¹⁰⁰ Fifteen people died in the crash, including three congressional staffers; four employees of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development; and Ivan Tillem, a private philanthropist who had been a friend of Leland's. Adela Gooch, Profiles of 8 Americans Who Accompanied Congressman on Flight, *Washington Post*, August 14, 1989.

¹⁰¹ Roberts, Roxanne. In the Spirit of Leland, *Washington Post*, September 18, 1989.

¹⁰² The resolution passed on August 10, 1992. Rep. Payne thanked Rep. Dymally and Rep. Gilman for their own efforts on the Somalia issue.

Members of Congress, said "We cannot sit by and actually allow a country to commit suicide before the world."¹⁰³

By mid-1993, however, as U.S. troops remaining in Somalia to support a United Nations force became entangled in efforts to apprehend defiant warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed, members of the Caucus—with other Members of Congress—experienced mounting misgivings.¹⁰⁴ Some wanted U.S. policy-makers to persist in supporting U.N. efforts to arrange a lasting settlement in Somalia, but others were concerned over the danger of U.S. combat deaths—and over the risk that U.S. troops might find themselves in a confrontation that would bring the deaths of many Africans. On September 29, 1993, most Caucus members voted for an amendment to the Defense Department Authorization requiring the President to report to Congress on U.S. goals and objectives in Somalia and to seek congressional approval for any deployment beyond November 15.¹⁰⁵ In October, Rep. Dellums, who had become Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee earlier in the year, wrote to President Clinton to warn of the dangers of continued U.S. involvement in combat in Somalia.¹⁰⁶ This warning came just days before 13 Americans were killed and 78 wounded in a firefight that also killed many Somalis, precipitating sharp congressional demands for a U.S. withdrawal. Following the firefight, and in the face of these demands, the Clinton Administration scaled back the U.S. role in Somalia and brought the deployment to an end in March 1994.

Rwanda. Rwanda's ethnic upheaval began on April 6, 1994, when the country's president, Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, was killed in a still unexplained plane crash at the Kigali, Rwanda airport. The death set off a wave of violence by members of the Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority, and by the time the killing had subsided, more than one million people, primarily Tutsi, had been killed. In July 1994, the Rwanda Patriotic Front, a predominantly Tutsi opposition army that had been observing a ceasefire before the April crisis, completed its takeover of Rwanda. In response, a million or more Hutu refugees fled across the border into eastern Zaire. Cholera and other diseases took a heavy toll in the Zaire refugee camps.

The Clinton Administration, stung by the U.S. experience in Somalia, was reluctant to support a large international peacekeeping operation in Rwanda.

¹⁰³ Representative Payne visited Somalia again in May 1993. See J. Scott Orr, Payne Departs on Somali Mission with Planeload of Medical Supplies. *Newark Star-Ledger*, May 29, 1993.

¹⁰⁴ Merida, Kevin and Kenneth J. Cooper. As the Crisis Grows, the Support of Black Politicians Fragments. *Washington Post*, October 9, 1993.

¹⁰⁵ Some support for this amendment to H.R. 2401 reflected a desire to stave off stronger measures that would have compelled a U.S. withdrawal, but concerns within the CBC over the U.S. role in Somalia were strong. See *ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

Indeed, in late April, the Administration backed a reduction in the small U.N. force that was already in Rwanda monitoring a peace agreement between the government and the RPF. On May 17, the United States voted for a U.N. Security Council resolution to expand the operation once again, but the force was slow to deploy. Finally, on July 22, as the scale of the refugee disaster became apparent, President Clinton ordered an "immediate and massive increase" in the U.S. humanitarian effort, and some 2,600 U.S. troops eventually took part in "Operation Support Hope," as the U.S. effort was known. Most of these troops remained outside Rwanda, and the operation came to an end on September 30, 1994.

Defenders of Administration policy maintain that policymakers responded as best they could to a distant humanitarian crisis while minimizing the risk of long-term involvement in Central Africa. President Clinton said on July 24 that "We've been working [on the Rwanda crisis] since May and I have done all I knew to do."

The Congressional Black Caucus, however, was strongly dissatisfied with the Administration's efforts. On May 4, 1994, Chairman Mfume and Rep. Payne told the President in a letter that the Caucus had met, voiced its "urgent concern about the terrible situation in Rwanda," and was requesting Clinton's "personal attention" to the crisis. The Caucus had not yet received a reply by June 16, when Mfume and Payne wrote the President again to criticize what they regarded as "mixed signals" from Administration officials and the alleged slowness of the Department of Defense in deploying armored personnel carriers that had been promised to peacekeepers. This letter was particularly critical of the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright. Anger over the pace of the Administration's response to the Rwanda crisis was a key factor in the Caucus threat to boycott the June 1994 White House conference on Africa, noted above. At his June 30 press conference on Rwanda, Payne accused Albright of "participating in one stalling maneuver after another" to delay a U.N. response to the Rwanda crisis.

Caucus criticisms of Rwanda policy led to a July 11 meeting between White House staff and staffers from the Caucus, who insisted that top Administration officials meet with the Caucus to discuss Rwanda and other Africa policy concerns. On July 26, Payne himself met with President Clinton prior to flying to Rwanda with Secretary of Defense William Perry to review U.S. operations.¹⁰⁷ In Rwanda, Payne recalled that he had been critical of Administration policy since April, but that with the decision to launch Operation Support Hope, the Administration had moved decisively. "It is very impressive to come here and see how fast the U.S. military has moved in to help," he said.¹⁰⁸ Nonetheless, at an August 4 White House meeting, Payne reiterated his criticism of what he regarded as a lack of U.S. leadership at the

¹⁰⁷Gannon, Bill. Perry, Payne Applaud Relief Effort in Rwanda. *Newark Star-Ledger*, August 1, 1994.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

Security Council. This meeting was attended by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Ambassador Albright, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, and Brian Atwood, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. Payne and other Caucus members used the opportunity to raise several other Africa-related issues, including Nigeria policy and U.S. assistance levels.

Long-term Development Aid

The Congressional Black Caucus, in addition to responding to Africa's humanitarian crises, has also sought to promote long-term development in Africa through U.S. development assistance programs. During the 1970s, the Caucus consistently championed increased aid to Africa through the regular U.S. aid programs. In 1977, Rep. Collins co-sponsored legislation introduced by Representative Don Bonker (not a Caucus member) to create an innovative new aid institution, the African Development Foundation (ADF), which would provide small grants directly to African self-help organizations. In addition, the ADF would foster local, indigenous development institutions and grassroots development research. While no final action was taken, several more Caucus members co-sponsored ADF legislation in 1978; and in 1979, Rep. Gray joined with Rep. Bonker to introduce the ADF bill (H.R. 6288) for a third time. Virtually the entire Caucus co-sponsored this bill, and H.R. 6288 was incorporated into the development assistance authorization in 1980 and enacted into law.¹⁰⁹

The CBC and its members have also been strong supporters of the Development Fund for Africa (DFA), which since FY 1988 has earmarked a specified minimum in development assistance for sub-Saharan Africa.¹¹⁰ The Caucus has yet to see the DFA reach the funding levels of \$1 billion or more favored by many members, but the DFA has attained a level of approximately \$800 million in recent years. The Caucus sought to protect this level during the 1995 debate on foreign aid reductions, but a Caucus-backed amendment to set the DFA at \$802 million for FY 1995 and FY 1996—the same level as in FY 1995—failed in a House vote on the foreign assistance authorization (H.R. 1561) on May 24, 1995. House leaders, however, postponed a planned vote on the bill; and Representative Louis Stokes attributed the delay to the successful efforts of an "alliance between Jews and blacks."¹¹¹ With aid to Israel protected in the bill, CBC members concerned about a proposed DFA level of \$629 million in FY

¹⁰⁹ Title V, P.L. 96-533.

¹¹⁰ The DFA guidelines first appeared as a guideline in the conference report accompanying (H.Rept. 100-498) the FY1988 appropriations legislation and were enacted into law in 1990 (P.L.101-513, Section 562), becoming Chapter 10 of Part I the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

¹¹¹ Cooper, Kenneth J. African American-Jewish Alliance Stalls House Vote on Foreign Aid Bill. *Washington Post*, May 26, 1995.

1996 and \$614 million in FY 1997, had met with Jewish lawmakers and won their support for increased Africa aid in a show of solidarity.¹¹² House leaders insisted that they had the votes to pass the bill despite this alliance, but an en bloc amendment sponsored by Rep. Gilman restoring \$20 million to the DFA earmark in each fiscal year passed on June 7, eased House passage of the bill on June 8. At this writing, the final outcome of the FY 1996 aid debate remains to be seen, but CBC members continue to try to protect Africa aid levels.

Saving the Africa Subcommittee

Since African issues constitute a major portion of the CBC agenda in foreign policy, the House Africa Subcommittee has always been a key forum for the pursuit of Caucus objectives. This was true not only when the subcommittee was chaired by Caucus members Charles Diggs (chairman from 1969 through 1974 and 1977-1978) and Mervyn Dymally (1991-1992), but also under the chairmanships of Representative Stephen Solarz (1979-1980), Representative Howard Wolpe (1981-1990), and Representative Harry Johnston (1993-1994), who were frequent allies of the Caucus in foreign affairs. They consulted closely with Caucus members on the Africa subcommittee, and with other CBC members active in foreign affairs.

The Africa Subcommittee, among other subcommittees, has at times been endangered by congressional reorganization efforts intended to enhance efficiency. Under reforms in the 94th Congress (1975-1976), the subcommittee was temporarily abolished, and Rep. Diggs was appointed Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy. He kept the focus on African affairs in this position, holding hearings on such subjects as "Disaster Assistance in Angola"¹¹³ and "Resources in Namibia: Implications for U.S. Policy."¹¹⁴

At the end of the 102d Congress, in December 1992, the House Democratic Caucus voted to limit each major committee to six subcommittees in the next Congress. Since the House Foreign Affairs Committee had eight subcommittees at the time, there was wide speculation that the Africa subcommittee would again be eliminated or merged with another subcommittee. CBC Chairman Edolphus Towns wrote to Speaker Foley to express the "vehement opposition"

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Hearings held November 5 1975; February 26 and March 10, 1976. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.

¹¹⁴ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Hearings held June 10, 1975 and May 13, 1976. Washington, U.S. government Printing Office, 1977. The subcommittee also held a hearing on "Resources in Rhodesia."

of the Caucus to such a move¹¹⁵ on grounds that drought and famine in Africa, as well as "fledgling dreams for democracy" around the continent begged "for American political support and humanitarian aid." Rep. Payne sent a memorandum to Committee Chairman Lee Hamilton advancing arguments against eliminating the subcommittee, and he also launched an "action alert" among Caucus members urging them to contact Hamilton as well. With letters supporting the subcommittee coming in from black organizations, and from non-governmental organizations involved in Africa aid efforts, the Democratic Caucus eventually decided to grant a waiver to the Foreign Affairs Committee allowing the Africa subcommittee to survive.

As the 103d Congress drew to a close, Africa Subcommittee Chairman Johnston, together with Caucus members Payne and Hastings, met with Speaker Foley seeking assurances that the waiver would be renewed in the 104th Congress.¹¹⁶ The waiver issue was overtaken by the Republican victory in the November 1994 congressional elections and the prospect of sweeping congressional reforms in the 104th Congress. There was renewed speculation that the subcommittee would be merged or eliminated, and the Caucus again led an effort to save it. Representative Payne and other CBC members met with Representative Newt Gingrich, the incoming speaker, on the issue and won the support of other members of the new Republican leadership; so that once again subcommittee was preserved.

HAITI: REFUGEES AND DEMOCRACY

Caucus efforts to influence Haiti policy through the Caucus-founded Congressional Task Force on Haiti, and through speeches, letters, and protests have already been noted elsewhere in this report. Until 1985, the Caucus focus was on achieving fairness for Haitian refugees, but with mounting political protests within Haiti, the Caucus, led on this issue by Del. Fauntroy, also began to stress the importance of free elections and the restoration of Haitian democracy as the long-term solution to the suffering of the Haitian people. Jean-Claude ("Baby Doc") Duvalier fled Haiti in February 1986, ending 29 years of dictatorial rule by the Duvalier family, raising hopes of early change. A long period of instability and military coups followed, however, and elections generally regarded as free and fair did not take place until December 1990. Haitian voters overwhelmingly chose Jean-Bertrand Aristide as president, but he was overthrown in September 1991, after just 8 months in office.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Letter dated December 8, 1992.

¹¹⁶ Kahn, Gabriel. Against Wishes of Foreign Affairs Chairman, Johnston Seeks Waiver Again for Africa Panel. *Roll Call*, September 26, 1994.

¹¹⁷ U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Haiti: Chronology of Its Troubled Path Toward Democracy. CRS Report 94-852 F by Steven R. Bowman, Mark P. Sullivan, and Maureen Taft-Morales. November 2, 1994.

For the Caucus, it was clear that only the restoration of Aristide would resolve the refugee crisis, which had intensified with Aristide's ouster. In late 1992, the Caucus urged the incoming Clinton Administration "to focus its attention, not only on the refugee issue, but to attack its cause by demonstrating its unequivocal support for the restoration of democratic government in Haiti" and the return of Aristide.¹¹⁸ The Caucus also asked Clinton "to implement a policy of equitable treatment of refugees regardless of color." The CBC was not satisfied with initial Clinton Administration policy, which centered on persuading Aristide, before returning, to agree that he would govern through consensus or "power-sharing" with his opponents. Meanwhile, Haitian refugees continued to be turned back. In October 1993, the Caucus urged the strongest possible sanctions against the Haitian military regime and advocated protective military intervention, if necessary, to restore Aristide and the Haitian legislature.¹¹⁹ The March 18, 1994 Caucus letter to Clinton, signed by all 40 members, insisted that "The United States Haiti policy must be scrapped."¹²⁰

The Caucus supported heightened U.N. and U.S. sanctions imposed against Haiti in May and June 1994, although some Caucus members doubted that sanctions would succeed¹²¹ and hoped for stronger measures. Representative Major Owens, Chairman of the Haiti task force, said on July 12, 1994 that he supported the intensified sanctions and that the Caucus as a whole was still in favor of a peaceful transition. At the same time, he noted that the Haitian military appeared capable of resisting sanctions for some time to come, and that an invasion might still be necessary to restore democracy.¹²² Some Caucus members were uneasy about the risks and costs of an invasion, however, and Chairman Mfume emphasized that any U.S. intervention should be brief.¹²³

An armed assault on Haiti was averted on September 18, 1994, when former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell, who had been sent to Haiti by President Clinton, persuaded Haiti's military rulers to resign and to permit the unopposed entry of U.S. forces as well as the

¹¹⁸ Policy Recommendations for the Clinton Transition, p. 5.

¹¹⁹ See the remarks of Rep. Major Owens. *Congressional Record*, July 12, 1994, p. H5541.

¹²⁰ Boyer, Peter J. The Rise of Kweisi Mfume, p. 34.

¹²¹ James, Daniel. The Divided But Revealing Views of the Congressional Black Caucus. *Washington Times*, June 30, 1994.

¹²² *Congressional Record*, July 12, 1994, p.H5539-H5542.

¹²³ Taylor, Ronald A. Black Caucus Split on Haiti. *Washington Times*, September 16, 1994. According to Rep. Melvin Watt, a Caucus member, "Some of us have real misgivings about an invasion."

restoration of President Aristide. U.S. troops began to arrive on September 19, and force levels eventually peaked at 20,000.¹²⁴

The arrival of U.S. troops did not end the Haiti controversy, and some critics of the operation charged that the CBC had virtually forced the Clinton Administration to intervene in a situation where the United States had no vital interest.¹²⁵ Representative Gary Franks, then the sole Republican Party member of the Caucus, was concerned about the costs of the Haiti operation and what he regarded as the lack of a credible plan for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Charging that the Clinton Administration had "blatantly ignored" the wishes of the American people with respect to Haiti, he added that "A majority of the Congressional Black Caucus wanted the United States to invade Haiti, and President Clinton caved in.... This is the fundamental problem of allowing caucuses and special interests to have a disproportionate influence on U.S. foreign policy."¹²⁶ Even before the invasion, former diplomat Lawrence Pezullo, an architect of the "power-sharing" policy, had been arguing that Aristide had used the Caucus to pressure the Administration into an invasion so that he could regain power. Pezullo, who had been recalled to diplomatic service by President Clinton as Special Envoy to Haiti and then replaced by Gray, maintained that Haiti would be ungovernable under Aristide.¹²⁷

Against these criticisms, CBC supporters could argue that the Caucus was hardly large enough to force the President to make any decision contrary to his own better judgement; and that the Caucus had been justified in taking a stand on Haiti not only for humanitarian reasons but also because the refugee crisis had constituted a genuine U.S. vital interest. Two Caucus members, Rep. Dellums, then Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and Rep. Hastings were among the principal authors of a House-passed resolution (H.J.Res. 416) authorizing the Haiti operation to continue without imposing a specific withdrawal date. The Caucus need to work with broader coalitions, however, was reflected in the wording of this resolution, which was far from a ringing endorsement of the Haiti intervention. It affirmed that the departure of Haiti's military rulers was in the best interests of the Haitian people, but stated that the President should have sought congressional approval for the deployment, called for a "prompt and orderly" withdrawal of U.S. forces, and

¹²⁴ Congressional Research Service. Haiti: Chronology of Its Troubled Path Toward Democracy.

¹²⁵ Rusher, William. Clinton Under Caucus Siege. *Washington Times*, July 22, 1994.

¹²⁶ *Congressional Record*, September 23, 1994, p. E1927.

¹²⁷ Robertson, Brian. Black Caucus Wields Clout, But to Whose Benefit? *Insight* (*Washington Times*), September 26, 1994, p. 6-7.

required various reports from the President.¹²⁸ This resolution won the support of nearly the entire Caucus, including strong advocates of U.S. intervention who were relieved that it did not set a withdrawal deadline. Representative Owens, however, voted "present," and objected to the resolution because: "It refuses to recognize President Clinton's decision to liberate Haiti as noble, unselfish, courageous and with no political rewards...."¹²⁹

COLD WAR AND THE DEFENSE BUDGET

The Congressional Black Caucus consistently took the view that the Cold War and associated struggles, such as the war in Vietnam, distorted American policies and priorities, both domestic and foreign. For the Caucus, policy-makers in the executive branch overemphasized pursuit of Cold War objectives throughout the 1970s and 1980s, causing them to neglect needs and concerns in Africa and the Caribbean that were independent of the superpower struggle. Caucus members insisted that they recognized the need for a strong defense.¹³⁰ Nonetheless, the Caucus maintained that the high levels of defense spending associated with the Cold War detracted from the ability of the United States to deal with pressing domestic social and economic problems that in their view were weakening the United States over the long term. The Caucus was concerned about the risks Cold War conflicts could pose to black soldiers and opposed the 1980 reinstitution of registration of young men for conscription.¹³¹ The Caucus also argued forcefully against increased defense spending in the Carter and Reagan Administrations; supported a 1983 congressional resolution calling for a nuclear freeze;¹³² and opposed efforts to strengthen capabilities for fighting a nuclear war or intervening in the Third World.¹³³

Critics of the CBC approach to defense policy argued that it would weaken the United States militarily while creating larger and more costly social welfare programs at home. But the Caucus maintained its position throughout the Cold War period and beyond. In its 1971 meeting with President Nixon, the Caucus called for disengagement from the Vietnam conflict, not only because of the

¹²⁸ H.J.Res. 416, passed the House October 6, 1994. Rep. John Murtha and Rep. Norman Dicks were also principal sponsors. The Senate passed this resolution without amendment, and it became P.L. 103-423.

¹²⁹ *Congressional Record*, October 6, 1994, p. H11114.

¹³⁰ See the views of Del. Fauntroy, as reported by Roger Wilkins. Inserted by Rep. Mervyn Dymally in the *Congressional Record*, June 23, 1981, p. 13482.

¹³¹ *Congressional Record*, July 17, 1979. p.19131.

¹³² *Congressional Record*, September 13, 1983. p. 23935-2396.

¹³³ Statement by Rep. Dellums on the FY 1988 Alternative Budget Proposal. *Congressional Record*, April 9, 1987. p. H1975.

suffering it caused in Vietnam but also because of the "the continued draining away in this futile conflict of the human and financial resources needed to rebuild this society." In addition, the Caucus sought a drastic reduction in defense expenditures generally, and a "redirection of these funds to finance much needed domestic programs—such as economic security and economic development, community and urban development, justice and civil rights, and many other unfulfilled interests of the black community."¹³⁴ Years later, with the Cold War at an end, the Caucus advised President-elect Clinton that "Any proper assessment of our total national security needs must also consider the state of our economy, our educational institutions, and our industrial infrastructure. In the CBC view, we have made over the last dozen years far too great an investment in weaponry and far too little an investment in these other critical elements of our national security."¹³⁵ Similarly, in introducing the CBC alternative budget proposals, CBC spokespersons consistently maintained that redirecting a part of the defense budget toward education, "reindustrialization," and other domestic priorities would strengthen the United States rather than weaken it.

Caucus members worried that executive branch policy-makers tended to view African affairs through a Cold War prism, with adverse consequences for Africa and for Africa policy. This was the essence of Caucus criticism of Kissinger's Angola policy and the arming of Angolan guerrillas. There was also a sense that successive administrations were reluctant to take firm action against apartheid in part because the Cold War led them to overvalue South Africa's strategic location and mineral wealth. In 1983, the Caucus opposed reported efforts by some executive branch officials to cut aid to Zimbabwe after that country abstained on a U.N. Security Council vote condemning the U.S.S.R. for downing a South Korean passenger plane.¹³⁶ Noting that Zimbabwe had voted as a regional representative after polling neighboring states, the Caucus asked in a statement: "Of what benefit can it be to compound this tragedy by using it to undermine our relations with Zimbabwe?"¹³⁷

Through its efforts on Rhodesia, Angola, South Africa, and other African issues, the Caucus pushed policy-makers to view Africa from outside the Cold War paradigm and to recognize the importance, in Africa, of such principles as anti-colonialism, racial justice, and majority rule. Eventual modifications in policy on a number of African issues suggest that the Caucus had some success in these efforts. But with respect to the broader challenge of shifting defense spending toward domestic priorities and development aid, it would be difficult

¹³⁴ *Congressional Record*, March 30, 1971, p.8711, 8713.

¹³⁵ Policy Recommendations for the Clinton Transition, p.16.

¹³⁶ U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. The Black Caucus and Africa: The Reagan Administration, January 1981-September 1985. CRS Typed Report by Joseph Gorman, November 1, 1985. p. 7.

¹³⁷ *New York Times*, October 7, 1983. Cited in *ibid.*

to demonstrate clear Caucus gains. The national consensus on defense and security issues was strong enough to assure that the Caucus could not find coalition partners in sufficient numbers to give it any hope of enacting the sweeping changes encompassed in its alternative budgets. Caucus supporters might argue, however, that the alternative budget at least confronted Congress and the nation with an alternative way of thinking about national security, contributing to the efforts of Caucus members and others to focus attention on the tradeoffs among domestic, international, and defense programs.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Changes abroad and at home make it difficult to predict the future role of the Congressional Black Caucus in foreign affairs—or to estimate Caucus prospects for success. Abroad, key foreign policy concerns that resonated with the African-American community and brought allies and coalition partners to the CBC, have faded or disappeared altogether. Portuguese colonialism and white rule in Rhodesia came to an end long ago; and in 1994, South Africa's universal-suffrage elections closed the era of apartheid. Haitian refugees are no longer arriving on American shores in significant numbers, and Haiti appears to be making progress in its democratic transition with the support of international peacekeepers. Events in South Africa or Haiti could of course take an unfavorable turn, but for the moment neither country is at the forefront of the U.S. foreign policy debate.

At home, many members of the overwhelmingly-Democratic CBC lost positions of influence in Congress when Republicans became the majority party in Congress in January 1995. The CBC, like other legislative service organizations, lost its staff in congressional reforms undertaken by the new majority. The power shift in Congress has led to intense debates on domestic social and economic issues that may to some degree be diverting the attention of CBC members from foreign affairs. Meanwhile, in today's expanded Caucus, drawn from many diverse constituencies, consensus can be lacking on important foreign policy and defense issues before Congress. For example, on June 13, 1995, some 17 Caucus members voted to preserve funding for additional B-2 bombers, even though such funding seemed contrary to longstanding Caucus positions against increased spending for advanced weapons.¹³⁸ Representative Dellums, regarded as a CBC leader on defense issues, had made a strong speech against the B-2 funding before the vote.

Nonetheless, some core Caucus issues remain and will likely inspire a consensus, if not unanimity, in the Caucus in years ahead. African humanitarian crises seem certain to recur, and the CBC will no doubt take a

¹³⁸ The vote was on an amendment to the Department of Defense Authorization, H.R. 1530. The amendment, by Representative John Kasich, would have prevented procurement of more than 20 deployable and one test aircraft. An editorialist noted that the 17 votes provided a crucial margin in the 203-219 vote. McGrory, Mary. *Stealth Vote*, *Washington Post*, June 22, 1995.

leading role in urging a swift and substantial U.S. response. African development needs remain very great, and the Caucus can be expected to continue to oppose development aid reductions for Africa. A Caucus majority, moreover, will likely advocate long-term U.S. support for Haitian democratization and development. The Caucus will surely continue to work for expanded opportunities for black Americans in the foreign policy-making bureaucracy.

Whether consensus can be forged beyond these issues remains to be seen. As the B-2 vote suggests, the consensus over cuts in defense spending may already have weakened, in part because some Caucus members now represent districts where defense industries are important to the local economy. Defense spending has been gradually declining since the later 1980s, when the Cold War began to draw toward its conclusion, and this has intensified concerns over protecting defense-related jobs.

TransAfrica leader Randall Robinson has urged African-American leaders to be more outspoken in criticizing African dictators and human rights violators, and his organization has launched a protest campaign against what he has called the "brutal, corrupt, rapacious government" of Nigeria.¹³⁹ Most of the Caucus cosponsored a House-passed resolution critical of Nigeria and urging limited sanctions in 1994,¹⁴⁰ and Rep. Payne introduced legislation calling for additional measures in 1995.¹⁴¹ But it is not yet clear that the Caucus will make either Nigeria in particular, or authoritarian practices in Africa generally, major Caucus issues. Some have suggested that the Caucus develop positions and coordinate legislative efforts on international trade issues, since trade has an important bearing on American jobs—particularly on manufacturing jobs important to black workers. But again, the emergence of a definitive Caucus consensus in the trade area is not yet apparent.

In the post-Cold War period, the foreign policy-oriented community generally has been challenged in defining broad U.S. foreign policy objectives and developing recommendations on the means of achieving those objectives. The Congressional Black Caucus, confronted by a period that is post-Cold War, post-apartheid, and post-Haiti intervention, has faced perhaps a more difficult challenge in foreign affairs. The CBC response to that challenge, like the broader U.S. response to this new era in international relations, will emerge only gradually and may not be fully clear for some time to come.

¹³⁹ Pan, Philip P. 16 Arrested at Nigerian Embassy. *Washington Post*, August 31, 1995.

¹⁴⁰ H.Con.Res. 151, introduced by Rep. Payne. Passed the House, July 25, 1994 and referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 26. At the end of 1993, there had been some controversy over donations from the Nigerian government and an opposition figure to the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation. See Mary Jacoby, *Experts Question Nigerian Donations. Roll Call*, December 6, 1993.

¹⁴¹ H.Con.Res. 40, introduced on March 15, 1995.



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