

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Late) [8]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

896

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

1

Position:

1

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	Balkan Peace Process--Arms Control. (3 pages)	09/18/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. letter	To Secretary Christopher Warren from Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev. [English Translation] (2 pages)	09/21/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. letter	To Secretary Christopher Warren from Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev. [Russian] (2 pages)	09/21/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. letter	To President Bill Clinton from Russian President Boris Yeltsin. [English Translation] (2 pages)	09/22/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. letter	To President Bill Clinton from Russian President Boris Yeltsin. [Russian] (2 pages)	09/22/1995	P1/b(1)
004. paper	Implications of the Croatian Offensive in Western Bosnia. (6 pages)	09/14/1995	P1/b(1)
005. paper	Information on UN Sector East. (3 pages)	09/22/1995	P1/b(1)
006. paper	Prospects for Building Ethnic-Serb Support. (1 page)	09/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Late) [8]

2013-0687-F

vz2773

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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*Email Lake
all week*

Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Washington, DC

30

September 13, 1995

Alexander Vershbow
Special Assistant to the President
Senior Director for European Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC

via facsimile 456-9150

Dear Mr. Vershbow:

Pursuant to your conversation with Ambassador Alkalaj earlier today, I have enclosed the list of the delegation of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that is requesting a meeting with Mr. Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor to the President the week of September 18th, 1995.

The delegation consists of:

1. Stjepan Kljuic, member of the Presidency
2. Ivan Komsic, member of the Presidency
3. Tatjana Ljubic - Mijatovic, member of the Presidency
4. Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Presidency
5. Jovan Divjak, General of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Should you require any additional information, please contact me at (202) 833-3612.

Sincerely,

Alma Musanovic

Alma Musanovic
Executive Assistant to Ambassador Alkalaj

BOSNIA and the HILL:

Action Plan:

-- If we are trying to get Congress to support an authorization and appropriation for an Implementation Force (IF), then we must begin a process of "heavy lifting".

-- We should pick a point-- say six weeks in the future-- as a target date for some expression of Congressional support and have our Hill efforts head toward that point.

-- To that end, NSC, State and DoD legislative offices will draw up a target list of members for principals to meet with or at least call members on the list over the next several weeks.

-- We should task talking points to be regularly updated that would serve as a guide for these conversations.

-- In addition to these ongoing conversations, we will continue to do regular briefings upon request and as events warrant.

-- Finally, we should take advantage of the negotiating team being back in town.. Specifically, BG Kerrick, Jim Pardew and Chris Hill should be asked to brief key staff beginning early next week.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING ALL ITS EARLIER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, AND THE STATEMENT OF ITS PRESIDENT OF 18 SEPTEMBER, 1995 (S/PRST/1995/47),

DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, AND BY THE PLIGHT OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION THERE WHICH CONSTITUTES A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OF SIGNIFICANT PROPORTIONS,

REITERATING ITS FULL SUPPORT FOR THE GENEVA DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES OF 8 SEPTEMBER, 1995 (S/1995/780, ANNEX II),

gravely concerned about ALL OFFENSIVES AND HOSTILE ACTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA BY WHICHEVER PARTY to the conflict, INCLUDING THOSE MOST RECENTLY UNDERTAKEN,

ESPECIALLY CONCERNED BY THE HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT FIGHTING, INCLUDING LOSS OF LIFE AND SUFFERING AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, AND A NEW FLOW OF TENS OF THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS,

limiting restraint in
1. NOTES THE ASSURANCES GIVEN BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA regarding FURTHER OFFENSIVE ACTIONS IN WESTERN BOSNIA AND AFFIRMS THE NEED FOR all parties TO COMPLY FULLY WITH THE DEMANDS SET OUT IN THE STATEMENT OF ITS PRESIDENT OF 18 SEPTEMBER, 1995;

2. DEPLORES THE CASUALTIES SUFFERED BY THE DANISH PEACEMEENERS, EXPRESSES ITS CONDOLENCES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF DENMARK AND TO THE FAMILIES OF THE PEACEMEENERS WHO LOST THEIR LIVES, AND DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES FULLY RESPECT THE SAFETY OF UN PERSONNEL;

3. CALLS UPON ALL ()PARTIES AND OTHERS CONCERNED TO REACH IMMEDIATELY A ()CEASE-FIRE AND A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES THROUGHOUT THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA;

4. CALLS UPON MEMBER STATES INVOLVED IN PROMOTING AN OVERALL PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE REGION TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS WITH THE PARTIES TO ENSURE THAT THEY TAKE NO ADVANTAGE FROM THE CURRENT SITUATION AND SHOW UTMOST RESTRAINT;

5. DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH ON THE BASIS OF THE GENEVA DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES OF 8 SEPTEMBER 1995 WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING LASTING PEACE THROUGHOUT THE REGION;

() = LANGUAGE DELETED

-2-

- 6. REITERATES THAT THERE CAN BE NO MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA;

- 7. URGES ALL STATES AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS TO INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO HELP TO ALLEVIATE THE PLIGHT OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS,

- 8. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

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POINTS FOR CONGRESSIONAL CALLS

September 15, 1995

- The UN has announced that the Bosnian Serbs have stated that they will comply with the conditions that the UN and NATO have set for a cessation of the air strikes launched in response to the August 28 Bosnian Serb attack on the Sarajevo market. As a result, the UN and NATO have temporarily suspended the air strikes.
- We have made clear to the Bosnian Serbs that they should have no doubt that NATO will resume the air strikes at any time if we determine that they are not following through on their commitment, or if they resume attacks on Sarajevo or the other safe areas.
- Following extensive meetings Wednesday night in Belgrade with Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and his team, the Bosnian Serb leadership signed a document agreeing to end all offensive operations within the Sarajevo exclusion zone, to withdraw all their heavy weapons from the zone within six days, and to allow unimpeded road and air access to Bosnia's capital within 24 hours.
- This document was signed by Bosnian Serb President Karadzic, Vice President Koljevic, Assembly President Krajisnik and General Mladic, the Military Commander. It was witnessed by Serbian President Milosevic.
- The NATO and the UN commanders suspended air operation for 72 hours (beginning at 4:00 p.m. Thursday EDT) to monitor Serb compliance with these commitments. If the Serbs are carrying out their commitments, then there will be a further 72-hour pause to permit the completion of the withdrawal of the heavy weapons.
- We understand that the UN will be running convoys into Sarajevo over several routes today, as well as flying a test flight into the Sarajevo airport, in order to test Serb compliance with their commitments to ensure free and unimpeded access.
- As the President said, this agreement is the direct result of the steadfastness displayed by the members of the NATO Alliance in carrying out their decisions to protect the safe areas, along with the close cooperation between the UN and NATO commanders throughout the operation.
- It also reflects intensive diplomatic efforts by Dick Holbrooke and the rest of the U.S. negotiating team, reinforced by the efforts of the Russians and our other European partners.
- If the Bosnian Serb commitments are carried out, this should give further impetus to our common search for a lasting political settlement to the Balkan conflict, building on last Friday's agreement on "basic principles" of a settlement by the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. But if they don't comply, the air strikes will resume.
- While the Bosnian Serbs called for the Bosnian Government to accept a formal cessation of hostilities within the Sarajevo zone and to discuss a country-wide cessation of hostilities, the Serbs' commitment to withdraw the heavy weapons and comply with the other UN demands were not conditional on Bosnian Government actions.
- That being said, the Bosnian Government said on Sunday that it will refrain from offensive actions in and around Sarajevo. We understand that this assurance still stands, and we regard it as welcome step.

(703) 695-1807

JOINT STAFF, J5

Page 1 Job 128

Sep-16 Sat 11:26 1995

Date: 01-01-90 Time: 07:31 Transmitter ID: CINCUSAEUR COMMO

CLOSE HOLD

Deputy Chief of Staff, J5, J5Z, J5M
Commander, United Nations Protection Force
Sarajevo
Republic of Bosnia & Herzegovina

8300

General R. MLADIC
PALE

14 September 1995

Dear General,

1. I am told that you have agreed to the "Framework Agreement for a Cessation of Hostilities within the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone" to which President Milosevic was a witness. I can confirm that NATO bombing operations throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina were suspended at 2200 hours 14 September 1995. NATO and UN Commanders will assess whether to extend this suspension at 2200 hours 17 September 1995 based on your compliance with the provisions of the Agreement. In the meantime NATO Demy Flight, and reconnaissance missions will continue. These flights will be non-provocative. NATO will respond under existing ROE to hostile acts.
2. I have been instructed to inform you of the modalities for the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone under this Framework Agreement. These modalities are contained in Annex A.
3. In accordance with the Addendum to the Framework Agreement I include the following additional weapon categories and systems:
 - a. Artillery, howitzers and mortars with a calibre of 76 mm and above. This includes the 76mm mountain artillery piece possessed by both sides.
 - b. All Anti-aircraft weapons of 20mm and above; the removal of these weapons is covered in the Airport Agreement of June 1992.
4. In order to avoid misunderstandings and to facilitate the process of the withdrawal of your weapons, we should meet as soon as possible at a place of your choice within the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone. At this meeting any further details, particularly over Freedom of Movement and the Airport will be explained.
5. I further ask that you continue to direct your subordinate commanders in the Sarajevo area to start discussions with the Commander of Sector Sarajevo in order to coordinate the verification measures for the withdrawal of your heavy weapons, the movement to and from Sarajevo and the opening of the Airport.

(703) 695-1807

JOINT STAFF, J5

Page 2 Job 126

Sep-18 Sat 11:26 1995

Date: 01-01-98 Time: 07:33 Transmitter ID:

CINCUSAEUR LUTINU


CLOSE HOLD

09SEP 15 '95 11:35PM NAVEUR NAPLES SPAC INC

TO (81) AC232

P.1 P.04

6. I await your early response and I suggest that we establish telephone communications between the two of us as soon as possible.



R A SMITH
Lt Gen
Comd UNPROFOR

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
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Draft proposal for the future of Sarajevo

1. Sarajevo is and will remain the capital of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which is and will remain a member state of the United Nations Organization.
2. The area of Sarajevo containing the state institutions and the political governing institutions of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina - such as the Presidency, the Government, the High Court, etc. will possess the domestic legal status of a district under the direct control of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One example of what we have in mind is the District of Columbia in USA.
3. Sarajevo shall remain open and free to all citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
4. Sarajevo will consists of boroughs which will remain integral units with economic and communication links.
5. Sarajevo can remain under UNPROFOR for the time being.
6. For the purpose of affirming the democratic traditions, integrated life and full ethnic equality on the levels of authority in Sarajevo, the City Government of Sarajevo shall be based upon the principle of ethnic parity. The boroughs shall be governed on the principle of proportional representation. No person should suffer ethnic discrimination. All cultural institutions and media can be independent and mono-ethnic with joint projects as a result of agreement.

For the Serbian Civil Council:

Dr. Mirko Pejanovic



For the Croatian National Council:

Dr. Ivo Komsic



THE SERBIAN CIVIC COUNCIL OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
AN APPEAL TO THE SERBIAN PEOPLE IN THE BOSNIAN KRAJINA

The tragedy to which the Pale regime has led the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina is clearly shown these days. When the Pale regime is losing, then, unfortunately, the innocent Serbian people suffer as well.

Organize your own local authorities. Request urgently talks through UNPROFOR with the state authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and protect the civilian population from the consequences of military operations.

Nobody can take away from you your right to free life, national equality and local autonomy. Request from the international community and authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina whose citizens you also are, to guarantee that right to you.

Elect delegations of citizens in the city of Banja Luka and other cities for talks with representatives of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community. Express your wish for a peaceful life with your neighbors, Croats and Bosniaks, in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A part of the Serbian people who live in Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Mostar are doing everything through the Serbian Civic Council, and with the support of the international community, to protect human, civil, and national rights in Banja Luka and other towns under control of the Pale regime.


A delegation of the Serbian Civic Council is right now discussing the guarantees for the protection of human rights with the officials of the American Administration in Washington.

Remain in your ancient homes! Show both to yourselves and to your Croat and Bosniak neighbors that it is possible to live in conditions of equal rights for all people who observe the values of modern European civilizations.

Washington - Sarajevo,
September 18, 1995

The Serbian Civic Council of
Bosnia and Herzegovina

President Mirko Pejanovic



Washington, September 18 1995

Proposal for establishing basic principles for Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Agreement on Basic Principles for Bosnia and Herzegovina made in Geneva, on September 8, 1995 that envisions that Bosnia and Herzegovina will be divided into two entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republica Srpska) is unacceptable. Such solution to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina can only temporarily stop the hostilities, but all reasons for the new war will remain.

This agreement does not start from the legality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is an internationally recognized country nor does it envision the institutions of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the contrary, beside the constitution of the Federation, the constitution of "Republica Srpska" is also recognized, thus transferring the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a new state of constitution as if the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina no longer existed.

The internal rearrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina into two constitutional and legal entities creates conditions for those entities to exist independently of each other, and to fully separate in the future through inertia, which will eventually lead to the division and dissolution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Agreement fully negates the multiethnic nature of Bosnia and Herzegovina because it does not envision joint institutions of all three peoples. The agreement also lets out of sight that thus constituted entities will be entirely "ethnically pure". "Republica Srpska" is already at this point ethnically "pure", and if we observe the present movement of the population in the Federation, there are nationally homogenous territories created within it as well. The Geneva agreement will only accelerate these processes that will end in a peaceful way and create conditions for a lasting division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The so-called Croatian republic of Herzeg-Bosna, that was politically defeated by the Washington agreement could resurrect after the recognition of "Republica Srpska". This would be a new war. What is especially unacceptable in the Geneva agreement is that the Serbian entity is constituted under the name of "Republica Srpska". It was precisely the American Administration that was against national cantons in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is visible in the Washington agreement. With "Republica Srpska", the results of genocide are recognized, and a political survival is ensured for a criminal regime, and two asymmetric creations are created in Bosnia and Herzegovina - the "ethnically pure" "Republica Srpska" and the multiethnic Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is no example of such a country in the world, and this asymmetry will be a lasting source of conflicts.


In the end, we would like to emphasize something that is utterly incomprehensible: The American Administration did not persevere in its basic principle that they have been holding onto thus far, and that is the preservation of the country of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Geneva agreement does not mention anywhere in the text the joint institutions that would unite both envisioned entities. These institutions would have to exist "de jure", regardless of their actual power in the beginning. People who incited hatred and war-mongers, and especially those accused of war crimes could not take part in

these institutions. Croatian, Bosniak and Serbian people would take equal parts in the joint institutions.

Beside all of these things that the solution to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina should include, it has to be known that each of these solutions can be realized only with the immediate assistance of the United States of America and the European Union. This means that Bosnia and Herzegovina would have to be admitted to the European Union and NATO "Partnership for Peace" immediately following the signing of the peace agreement.


For the Serbian Civic Council:

Dr. Mirko Pejanovic

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Mirko Pejanovic', written in a cursive style.

For the Croatian National Council:

Dr. Ivo Komsic

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ivo Komsic', written in a cursive style.

Press Statement

Meeting together, President Tudjman of the Republic of Croatia, President Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and President Zubak of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina agreed to the following principles. They:

- affirm their support for the American peace initiative.
- reaffirm their commitment to the Washington Agreement, the Federation Constitution, and to subsequent agreements aimed at strengthening the Federation.
- reaffirm their commitments to the Split Agreement and declare that the strategic cooperation will continue with the goal of liberating occupied territory and preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- agree that the political arrangements for the liberated territory shall be determined later through political dialogue consistent with the Washington Agreement and the Geneva Principles and without regard to the identity of the liberating army.
- reaffirm their commitment to the continuing presence and work of international humanitarian organizations.
- agree that all refugees and displaced shall have the right to return to their homes.
- welcome and support the continuing, critical work of the arbitrator.
- agree to resolve issues related to the continuing deployment and operation of the Rapid Reaction Force in its mission around Sarajevo.

Joint Statement by Admiral Smith and General Janvier

20 September 1995

Admiral Smith and General Janvier have concluded that the Bosnian Serbs have complied with the conditions set out in General Janvier's letter of 3 September 1995.

Specifically, they have withdrawn defined heavy weapons from the Sarajevo EZ. This withdrawal has been supervised by UNPROFOR. UN patrols have moved freely through the EZ to verify the removal of the weapons and the destruction of those that remain. The airport has been opened. UN and humanitarian traffic has unimpeded access on the main routes into Sarajevo. As confidence grows, access should include civilian traffic. Admiral Smith and General Janvier have therefore agreed that the resumption of air strikes is currently not necessary.

The Bosnian Serbs have expressed their willingness to discuss a cessation of hostilities agreement at any time. The UN and NATO continue to urge all parties to join the Bosnian Serbs and finalise a cessation of hostilities agreement for the Sarajevo area with Chief of Mission and Commander UNPROFOR with a view to extending it to a complete and countrywide cessation of hostilities at the earliest opportunity.

Notwithstanding the above decision, at this point, Admiral Smith and General Janvier emphasize that any subsequent attack on Sarajevo or any other safe area, or other non-compliance to the Exclusion Zone, freedom of movement or the functioning of the Airport would be subject to investigation and resumption of air strikes.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 20, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

LPL MB

LPL SV

THROUGH: MORTON H. HALPERIN AND SANDY VERSHBOW

FROM: MATTHEW LORIN^hSUBJECT: Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in support of
Balkans peace initiative and Implementation Force

There is a general consensus within the bureaucracy that we should utilize public diplomacy, public affairs and psychological operations (PSYOPS) in support of the U.S. peace initiative in the Balkans. Such operations would be instrumental in reducing risk to U.S. personnel on the ground as well as enhancing our ability to achieve policy goals.

This Memorandum is to inform you of the establishment of an informal working group subordinate to the Vershbaw interagency working group on the Balkans that would be dedicated exclusively to public diplomacy, public affairs and information coordination in the Balkans. Chaired by the NSC, this sub-IWG would include State, USIA, OSD, JCS, CIA, OVP and NSC Communications.

The increasing probability of a significant presence of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Bosnia demands the development of a comprehensive strategy to reduce unnecessary exposure to risk, and increase overall likelihood of policy success. This can be achieved through an enhanced information campaign designed to inform allies and influence perceptions, and perhaps ultimately the behavior, of our intended audiences.

The need to coordinate the public diplomacy, public affairs, and PSYOPS methods of communicating with foreign audiences has been widely acknowledged. Our successful effort in support of U.S. policy toward Haiti provides strong evidence to that effect. Yet, in the case of the Balkans, no similar effort has been undertaken in support of U.S. policy.

Admittedly, the situation in Bosnia is complicated -- considerations of NATO, the UN, the Contact Group, U.S./Russian relations -- but these considerations affect the formulation of policy, not our need to use all the informational capabilities of the USG to articulate that policy in a culturally tailored, coherent, coordinated and persuasive manner.

The below examples of informational efforts by the USG are meant to be illustrative of the issues to be discussed by the sub-IWG. I am NOT seeking your approval of these issues at this time.

Immediate Activity

- In the event of the introduction of U.S. military personnel in the Implementation Force, a coordinated internal and external information program, in collaboration with NATO, SHAPE, and the United Nations, will be essential to minimize risk to those participating in the peacekeeping operations. U.S. PSYOPS and public affairs personnel should be employed to support the peacekeeping effort well in advance of the arrival of forces (much as they were in Haiti) to ensure local populations have a proper understanding of the role the forces will play in implementing the provisions of a cessation of hostilities and to gain the support of those populations for that role.
- Once an effective, coordinated information mechanism targeted on the Balkans has been developed and campaigns initiated, this mechanism would be available to support these and other diplomatic initiatives.
- USIA could enhance its radio and television broadcast coverage of events in the Balkans. VOA's WorldNet satellite delivery system provides objective news files and other broadcast offerings. Through it, films, newscasts, and documentaries (produced and/or acquired by USIA) are placed overseas.
- USIS PAOs, augmented by DoD personnel, should mount an aggressive public diplomacy effort detailing the successes of the cease fire and the contribution of the USG, along with U.S. PVOs/NGOs to the re-establishment of viable infrastructures throughout the region.

Long-term

- Over the longer term, more complex and sophisticated operations as well as public diplomacy should be expanded to support moderate elements throughout the region while undercutting support for radical ultranationalist attitudes.
- Encouragement of conferences and other public activities in which Balkan moderates could interact with Western European counterparts on global issues would tend to diffuse insular views, as would enhanced USIA cultural and academic exchanges.

- Stimulating the independent media sector as well as the flow of Western media into the region should also be encouraged, as well as developing local media contacts who can exert some influence over content.

All agencies mentioned in this Memorandum have been contacted and are in concurrence.

Concurrence by:


Dick Clarke

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. paper	Prospects for Building Ethnic-Serb Support. (1 page)	09/20/1995	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
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Bosnia - September 1995 (Late) [8]

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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

BOSNIA

Key Points

- American **leadership**, NATO resolve and skillful diplomatic initiative have brought us to a decisive moment for resolution of the Bosnia tragedy. We are making progress although there are still tough obstacles to overcome.
- As a result of NATO's firmness, the Serbs have withdrawn their heavy weapons from the exclusion zone. The Sarajevo airport has been opened. UN and humanitarian traffic is moving along the main routes into the city.
- Today the people of Sarajevo can walk the streets of Bosnia's capital safe from savage shelling.
- All parties must now turn from the battlefield to the bargaining table. The time has come for reconciliation and reconstruction in the Balkans.
- I have instructed our U.S. negotiating team to make an all-out effort in the coming weeks to clear away the remaining obstacles to a political settlement. A lot of work remains, but we should be proud of what we've done so far.

Next Steps - Diplomatic Track

- There will be a second meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with representatives of the Contact Group on Tuesday, September 26 in New York. The meeting will be co-chaired by the United States and the European Union.
- The aim of this meeting is to build upon the outstanding results at Geneva, where the three Foreign Ministers endorsed a set of Agreed Basic Principles for a settlement in Bosnia.
- As you know, some difficulties have emerged in negotiating the text of a set of additional principles that would round out what was agreed in Geneva.
- Three of our negotiators are in Sarajevo now seeking to work out the remaining hitches. We are still hopeful that tomorrow's meeting will go forward and produce a significant result.
- As we've seen in the Middle East, there are often ups and downs in any difficult negotiation. But we intend to persevere until we can reach a balanced settlement that preserves Bosnia as a state and ends the killing for good.

Next Steps - Implementation

- We remain in close consultation with the Congress in all our diplomatic and planning work.
- American leadership is crucial to ensuring that the peace agreement, once reached, is implemented successfully and a lasting settlement is achieved.

U.S. Ground Forces

- We will stand by our commitment to contribute U.S. forces as part of a NATO-led operation to help implement a peace agreement.
- This mission will have a single NATO chain of command and robust rules of engagement. There will be no dual key command in this operation.
- I hope Russia and other Partnership for Peace members will join the NATO forces in implementing an agreement when it is reached.
- Until NATO planning is complete, I'm not going to speculate on the size of the overall force or our contribution to it.
- We are consulting with Congress as our plans develop.
- There will be no peace without an international presence to reassure the parties; I am concerned that international presence must be NATO-led if it is to be effective; and as the leader of NATO, the U.S. must be a part of that effort.

Reconstruction Aid

- The U.S. has consulted with the EU on the size and shape of an economic reconstruction effort, should a peace settlement be achieved.
- The Spaniards, in their EU presidency capacity, have agreed to take the lead in planning for the effort. We are consulting with Congress on what the U.S. might be prepared to provide.
- I expect the effort to include reconstruction assistance, IFI debt relief, humanitarian aid and encouragement of regional economic interdependence in terms of trade and other economic activities. We still are in planning stages and it is premature to speculate about the size of such a program before there even is a peace agreement.
- Clearly reconstruction must seek to knit today's warring communities together in ways that encourage peaceful cooperation.

GoBH/Croatian Offensives in western Bosnia/threats to Banja Luka

- We understand that offensive actions in western Bosnia have wound down.
- We have urged all parties to exercise restraint and turn their energies to the peace process.
- We have told the Bosnian and Croatian governments that military moves that risk drawing the Serbs into the conflict are very risky and unwise, and could lead to increased suffering for the civilian population.
- We welcome the statements last week by Croatian and Bosnian leaders that they will not attack Banja Luka.

Will the Bosnian Offensive Derail U.S. Diplomatic Efforts?

- We continue to believe that this conflict will not be settled on the battlefield, and that all parties should redouble their efforts to arrive at an early diplomatic solution. That remains the goal of our policy.

Map/Charges of Partition

(If asked whether the new diplomatic effort divides Bosnia)

- This agreement will preserve Bosnia as a single state.
- We will not partition Bosnia.
- It cannot be emphasized too strongly that according to the Geneva agreements, Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a single state, retaining its seat in international organizations and its bilateral diplomatic relations with other countries in the world, including the U.S.

Are you presenting a U.S. map/Have you ceded Gorazde to the Serbs?

- We are discussing a number of ideas, including some notions on territorial issues.
- We are not presenting a U.S. map, nor are we insisting on any particular territorial trades.

Did the Bosnians reject our plan out of hand?

- No. They have been very supportive, as has Serbian President Milosevic.