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Bosnia - September 1995 (Late) [4]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	The Bosnian Government: Divisions Show Confusion. [CIA Act] [partial] (4 pages)	09/27/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)
002a. memo	For Distribution from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Subject: US/UK Bilateral. (5 pages)	09/25/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	For Distribution from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Subject: US/UK/FR Discussions. (7 pages)	09/27/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. memo	For Distribution from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Subject: Bosnia Peace Implementation. (4 pages)	09/26/1995	P1/b(1)
002d. memo	For Distribution from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Subject: US/RU Bilateral. (5 pages)	09/27/1995	P1/b(1)
003. paper	Cease-Fires in the Balkans. [CIA Act] [partial] (2 pages)	09/27/1995	P3/b(3)
004a. paper	A Strategy for Bosnia Reconstruction. (7 pages)	09/28/1995	P1/b(1)
004b. paper	Organizing the Humanitarian Effort. (5 pages)	09/28/1995	P1/b(1)
005. paper	Continuation of Air Support. (3 pages)	08/31/1995	P1/b(1)

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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Late) [4]

2013-0687-F

v22769

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

27 September 1995



The Bosnian Government: Divisions Show Confusion in Peace Negotiations

(b)(3)



Strong personal rivalries among Bosnian Government leaders and different visions of a future Bosnia will complicate reaching agreements with the Bosnian Government in future negotiations. The rivalry between Prime Minister Silajdzic on the one side and President Izetbegovic and Foreign Minister Sacirbey on the other, as well as their competing visions underlie the indecision and intransigence exhibited by the Bosnian leadership in ongoing peace talks. Based on available reporting, however, it is difficult to identify where their differences reflect personal rivalries or substantive differences. In addition, Bosnian Government leaders appear unsure of the strength of their negotiating hand and are concerned that international pressure may force them to concede too much in talks.

(b)(3)



Sarajevo Leadership Hobbled By Personal Rivalries...

(b)(1)

intense personal rivalries within the top layer of the Bosnian Government.

- In the past, Izetbegovic has encouraged competition among his subordinates, particularly Prime Minister Silajdzic and Federation Vice President Ganic, as a way to control potential challengers, according to US diplomats. [001]
- Since becoming Foreign Minister this year, Sacirbey has become Izetbegovic's right-hand man in negotiations, and has effectively isolated Silajdzic from key discussions on UNPROFOR's withdrawal and the Geneva and New York talks on constitutional principles. Silajdzic and Sacirbey have been rivals since 1991, when Silajdzic beat out Sacirbey for the post of Foreign Minister.
- The two have not attempted to hide their differences. In July, Silajdzic publicly said he could no longer work in the same government with Sacirbey, while in a press interview Sacirbey called Silajdzic a "spoiled prima donna."

Declassified in Part

E.O. 13526

1.4(b), (c), (d)

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(b)(3)

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(b)(3)

- Ganic's return to duty this week after recovering from an automobile accident probably will intensify these tensions because of his long-standing rivalry with Silajdzic. (b)(3)

Silajdzic's frustration with his perceived loss of influence, as well the increasing domination of Muslim hardliners over the ruling SDA party and the government, precipitated a mini-crisis in July when he tendered his resignation.

- (b)(1) Izetbegovic asked Silajdzic to withdraw his resignation because of threats that five of the seven members of the presidency would also resign and the military's concern that Silajdzic's resignation would damage army morale. (b)(1)
(b)(1) Silajdzic remains one of the most popular Bosnian Government leaders, giving him a strong independent base of support. (b)(3)

...And Different Conceptions of A Post-Settlement Bosnia

Bosnian Government leaders appear divided over how far to compromise on their long-standing goal of building a unitary multi-ethnic state. (b)(1) [001]
Izetbegovic's own statements show that he probably would prefer to head a compact Muslim state rather than enter into complicated power-sharing arrangements with Croats and Serbs.

(b)(1)

Despite his personal preferences, however, the government's long-standing goal of creating a unitary state and the broad support this objective enjoys with the Bosnian population, limit Izetbegovic's room to compromise unless the unitary state option is foreclosed by outside developments, such as a major breakdown of the Federation. In fact, official Bosnian Government statements between the signing of the Geneva principles and the talks this week in New York were marked by their commitment to a unitary state and strong denials that Sarajevo would agree to a weak central government.

This memorandum was prepared by (b)(1), (b)(3) Office of European Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force, at (b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

~~Top Secret~~

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(b)(3)

(b)(1)

Silajdzic has criticized any compromises that would weaken ties among Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, and Croats and decrease the sovereignty of the central government.

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

strong public sentiment for Silajdzic's view of a unitary Bosnian state would limit Izetbegovic's maneuver room. (b)(1)

Silajdzic complained the Geneva talks failed to produce clear principles relating the Bosnian Serb entity to the Federation and objected to calling the Bosnian Serb entity the Serb Republic.

(b)(3)

Gains on the Ground Open Doors to More Differences...

Recent Croat-Muslim military successes, while improving the perception of Bosnian leaders of their negotiating position, have made it more difficult for the Bosnians to unify behind one plan. [001]

- Izetbegovic's bottom line that a settlement is needed to gain back Muslim territory at the negotiating table is undercut by their recent military successes, while strengthening support for Silajdzic's maximalist demands for creating a unitary state. (b)(3)

If Croatian support for the Bosnian Government wanes--as Bosnian leaders already fear--and the Bosnian Serbs stabilize the front, Sarajevo probably will see the limits of its military capabilities, and this will strengthen advocates of a negotiated settlement. (b)(3)

(b)(3)

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(b)(3)

...While Indecision and Lack of Confidence Spell Trouble for Sarajevo

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1) Izetbegovic himself pressed for the Bosnian delegation to issue a unilateral statement at the 8 September Geneva meeting stressing that the principles guarantee the sovereignty and unity of Bosnia, and to preclude any one entity from unilaterally seceding,

(b)(1)

[001]

(b)(1) Sacirbey's reactions to the outcome of the Geneva talks as nervous and not optimistic (b)(1)

(b)(1) Sacirbey reportedly was concerned how to explain the agreement to Bosnian Government officials and worried that he might have conceded too much, especially on constitutional principles.

(b)(1) the Geneva statement of principles would cause difficulties because Izetbegovic and Sacirbey had not consulted other government officials including Silajdzic and key SDA members of Izetbegovic's inner circle,

(b)(1)

(b)(3)

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002a. memo	For Distribution from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Subject: US/UK Bilateral. (5 pages)	09/25/1995	P1/b(1)
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002c. memo	For Distribution from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Subject: Bosnia Peace Implementation. (4 pages)	09/26/1995	P1/b(1)
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(b)(3)

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
27 September 1995

Cease-Fires in the Balkans: A Historical Overview

The previous country-wide cease-fires that have lasted the longest have done so either because the warring parties had some mutual interest in temporarily reducing the level of violence or because weather would have limited fighting in any event. The presence of peacekeeping forces probably has influenced somewhat the longevity of cease-fires, but has not been decisive. (b)(3)

UN forces in Bosnia are adequate to monitor implementation of an in-place cease-fire as long as they enjoy complete freedom of movement. They are not sufficient, however, to deter any of the warring parties from deciding to abandon the peace process. (b)(3)

Some incentive for both sides to comply with a cease-fire--possibly including a desire to build up forces prior to renewed fighting--has been the key factor in cease-fire maintenance. The "successful" cease-fires to date have codified a willingness to cease offensive actions when none of the factions would benefit by them:

[003]

- The interposition of UN forces between government forces and Krajina Serbs in Croatia in 1991 limited fighting, but the conflict had more or less stalemated by the time a lasting cease-fire was finally worked out. Moreover, both Croats and Krajina Serbs initially chose to interpret the UN's mandate as working in their favor, and each had an incentive to halt the fighting. UNPROFOR then increasingly served to maintain an armistice line rather than to observe a cease-fire. Croatia used the cease-fire to build up its forces until it had gained a significant military advantage, whereupon the "cease-fire" collapsed abruptly with Zagreb's seizure of three of the four UN sectors this year.
- The Croat-Muslim cease-fire which led to the establishment of the Federation in 1994 has successfully held to this day, although the Croat-Muslim relationship remains uneasy. Both Croats and Muslims had good reason to halt the bloody interethnic fighting which plagued central Bosnia in 1992 and 1993, and the cease-fire allowed both Bosnian Croats and Muslims to confront a common Serb adversary jointly.

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- The longest-lasting Bosnian cease-fire, from 1 January to 1 May of this year, was in effect during the winter, when poor weather effectively limited any side's ability to conduct ground operations. During that period, the Bosnian Serbs largely settled into a defensive posture, while the Bosnian Army used the cease-fire to train, equip, and re-organize its forces before resuming offensive operations later in the spring. (b)(3)

The presence of even relatively large numbers of UN peacekeepers has not deterred/determined Balkan combatants from mounting attacks:

- When Croatia attacked into UN Sector West in May and into UN Sectors North and South in August, the presence of large numbers of UN peacekeepers was not an effective deterrent or brake on operations. Croatian Army forces were simply directed to bypass any UN positions which had not already been occupied and to continue their advance.
- The Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) overran the Srebrenica and Zepa safe areas in July, despite the presence of UN peacekeepers in both towns and small-scale NATO airstrikes immediately prior to the fall of Srebrenica. (b)(3)

Conversely, a small number of observers may be able to patrol a confrontation line, if they are allowed freedom of movement and there is some reason for the combatants to respect that confrontation line or demilitarized zone.

[003]

- A minor UN presence--about eight personnel--backed up by a credible threat of NATO airstrikes has so far prevented any Bosnian Serb offensive against Gorazde since the British and Ukrainian peacekeepers departed in late August.

(b)(3)

If the negotiating parties entered into a cease-fire agreement in good faith, the UN could monitor compliance relatively quickly using existing peacekeepers and military observers. Large numbers of outside forces would not be needed immediately so long as observers already in the country enjoyed freedom of movement and the terms of the peace agreement--such as demilitarized zones, limitations on training and maneuvers, and on-site inspections of heavy weapons at declared sites--were designed to simplify verification of compliance.

- Greater problems may arise with the transition from the current UNPROFOR to a Peace Implementation Force, as some UNPROFOR elements withdraw, some remain and assume new mandates, and other new implementation forces enter the country. (b)(3)

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Equipping and Training the Federation (U)

Background (S): International efforts to negotiate peace in the former Yugoslavia are more likely to result in an enduring peace if the Bosnian Muslim - Bosnian Croat Federation (the "Federation") has a military capability to defend itself against the Bosnian Serbs. The USG will support an international effort to provide military assistance to the Federation so it can develop a more viable defense vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs. Recent Bosnian successes against the Bosnian Serb Army do not change this fundamental judgment, because they have been so dependent on Croatian efforts.

Net Assessment (S): The military balance in Bosnia and the Federation's specific needs will require a detailed assessment, including an in-country evaluation of Federation capabilities. That said, considerable information is now available.

Discussions with regional specialists in the US intelligence community have indicated that an equip and train effort may be necessary, but only on a limited scale. The Bosnian Serbs have an equipment advantage (~4:1 in tanks, ~10:1 in APCs, ~2:1 in artillery), whereas the Federation has a manpower advantage (2:1). Qualitatively, the Federation's military effectiveness is limited by both equipment shortages (the Muslim army cannot even provide small arms to all of its combat troops) and by a lack of operational coordination between Muslims and Croats. The Bosnian Serbs have shown better organizational skills, but are constrained by manpower shortages. Both sides' skills in static defenses and the resulting stalemates in many parts of the country and, more recently, dynamic results on the battlefield attest to only a modest imbalance in aggregate capability.

Based on the above, equip and train requirements will probably be modest and include small arms and ammunition, man-portable air defenses, ground mobility vehicles and perhaps small numbers of tanks and artillery. Training efforts will likely center on newly-provided equipment and on defensive skills and tactics.

Objective (S): Assist the Federation in attaining a more effective self-defense capability so that the Bosnian Serbs will be deterred from aggression. Do so without significantly increasing the offensive power projection capabilities of the Federation, upsetting the regional arms balance, or permitting radical states or extremist groups to gain undue influence in the region.

Desired End State (S): The Federation has enhanced its capability to defend its territory against Bosnian Serb aggression by 31 December 1996.

Mission (S): Once a peace agreement is reached, a coordinated multinational coalition will provide defensive military equipment and training to selected elements of the Federation forces to enhance their ability to defend the territorial integrity of the Federation.

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DRAFT

Assumptions ~~(S)~~:

- A peace agreement is negotiated, is implemented by a NATO-led peace implementation force (IFOR), and, by lifting the arms embargo generally, permits providing military assistance to the Federation.
- A coalition of willing nations provides military assistance (equipment and training) to the Federation.
- A phased assessment of Federation capabilities, including in-country portions, is conducted to identify the highest priority requirements.
- The military assistance mission is totally separate from the NATO-led IFOR.
- The military assistance mission conforms to US and international law.
- Enabling legislation is enacted to give legal authority for the US to provide assistance and to provide funding.
- Radical nations (e.g., Iran, Libya, Iraq, Sudan) are excluded from participating in the mission. Federation acceptance of assistance from radical/pariah states is prohibited by the assistance agreement with the Federation.
- To facilitate achieving a more stable military balance, a cap on the numbers of selected categories of major weapon systems available to each of the parties may be included as an element of the peace agreement.
- Confidence building measures may be included in the peace agreement to further reduce the likelihood of a breakdown of the peace.

Guidelines ~~(S)~~:

Equipment

- Equipment provided would address the Federation's most significant defensive vulnerabilities:
 - Antiarmor capabilities (antitank weapons, tanks (modest numbers))
 - Artillery capabilities (artillery, fire direction systems)
 - Maneuver unit mobility (APCs)
 - Anti-air capabilities (MANPADs/AAA)
- For compatibility, mostly former WP equipment will be provided.
- Equipment which is principally offensive in nature, or which could represent a significant threat to regional nations, will not be provided. (Examples: Attack aircraft, TBMs, other offensive weapon systems, large armor forces)

Training

- Training will focus on defensive deficiencies and developing a sustainable organic training capability. Offensive tasks will not be addressed.
- Training may address individual, unit, or multi-unit needs.
- Training will principally address operational/tactical activities and operation/maintenance/employment of newly provided equipment.

- Training may be conducted both within and outside Federation territory.
- Specifics of training to be provided will be based on assessment of Federation deficiencies in defensive operations and available resources.
- Training may [will] be provided by contractor personnel and non-IFOR military, rather than by active duty US (or other IFOR nation) military personnel. Sufficient US personnel will be involved to both coordinate the operation and provide continuity in military-to-military contacts.
- The training effort could include:
 - New equipment training
 - Leader training in defensive tactics
 - Basic soldier/unit defensive skills
 - Organizational procedures for combined arms

Mission Completion (S): The mission will be complete when equipment and training have been provided to the Federation forces to permit an effective defensive capability and the ability to sustain it. The mission will be terminated when complete, but not later than 31 December 1996.

Continuing Operations (S): A small US security assistance presence might continue after mission completion to help the Federation sustain its capabilities and to maintain military-to-military contacts.

Rev 11, 21 Sep 95

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 28, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: WILLIAM C. DANVERS

SUBJECT: President's Leadership Meeting on Bosnia

We have prepared a memo for the President (Tab I) on a meeting with the Leadership on Bosnia for Friday, September 29.

Attached are points for the President (Tab A) and a list of invitees (Tab B).

We have recommended that after making some brief opening remarks that the President turn to Secretary Christopher on the current state of negotiations and to Secretary Perry and Admiral Owens on the military situation and current planning for an IFOR, since there is keen Hill interest in this issue. If you agree with this approach, you may want to discuss this with the three of them prior to the meeting.

Concurrence by: Sandy Vershbow

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memo and points.

Attachments

Tab I	Memo to the President
Tab A	Talking Points
Tab B	Participants

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

DATE: September 29, 1995

LOCATION: Indian Treaty Room

TIME: 2:15 p.m. - 3:15 p.m.

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFINI. PURPOSE

To consult with the Congressional Leadership on the current situation in Bosnia, as well as possible need for the U.S. to participate in a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR).

II. BACKGROUND

Hill critics of our Bosnia policy have shifted their focus from unilateral lift to skepticism over U.S. participation in an IFOR.

Members of Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC) asked a number of critical questions last week during General Shalikashvili's confirmation hearing last week; Senator Dole sent a letter to you last week asking a number of questions on what an IFOR might look like; and Senator Dole also made a statement highly skeptical of such a force earlier this week.

We will likely have a great deal of work to do to "sell" U.S. participation in an IFOR. This meeting is part of a drive to get necessary Hill support for our policy and that participation.

We have structured the meeting to include a wide-ranging group of Members and Senators who have a key role in national security policy or who have played an important role in Congressional debate over Bosnia.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Attached at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE

We suggest that you make brief opening remarks, then turn to Secretary Christopher to discuss the current state of negotiations and then Secretary Perry and Admiral Owens to discuss the military situation including where we are in the planning of an IFOR.

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points

Tab B Participants

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP

- Glad to have opportunity to bring you up to date on our efforts to achieve political settlement in Bosnia.
- While we still have a long way to go, we have made much progress -- enough that we need to begin discussing with you what it will take to implement peace agreement.
- Hope we all agree that U.S. leadership, which is proving so crucial to progress at negotiating table, will also be critical to ensuring peace settlement succeeds.
- Our standing in the world, and credibility of NATO Alliance, are both riding on this.
- A few words about peace process: in early August, I decided time had come for U.S. to launch new diplomatic initiative.
- Changing situation on the ground, along with our successful effort over several months to gain NATO's renewed commitment to use air power to protect safe areas, provided window of opportunity to achieve comprehensive settlement based on Contact Group plan.
- I sent Tony Lake to present our initiative to our Allies and the Russians, who expressed their strong support.
- More than six weeks since our negotiating team began its shuttle diplomacy. Effort was temporarily delayed by tragic accident near Sarajevo which cost lives of three talented U.S. diplomats.
- Important results have been achieved, although much work remains to be done.
- NATO has upheld commitments to defend safe areas. As result of NATO's sustained air campaign, Serbs have withdrawn heavy weapons from around Sarajevo and opened up land and air routes into the city.
- Thanks to work of Ambassador Holbrooke and his negotiating team, on September 8 in Geneva the three Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia met for first time and agreed on basic principles for a settlement.
- They confirmed that Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue as a single state, with its present borders, and with continuing international recognition. And they accepted the other central principles of the Contact Group plan.

- Tuesday, in New York, there was a second meeting of the three Foreign Ministers together with our Contact Group partners.
- That meeting produced another important step toward a peace settlement in Bosnia.
- The three Foreign Ministers agreed on the constitutional structures of Bosnia, including the establishment of a national parliament, Presidency and Constitutional Court.
- Also committed to holding free democratic elections under international supervision.
- While many difficult issues remain to be resolved, Geneva and New York agreements underscore Bosnia will remain a single state. We will strongly oppose partition.
- Have sent negotiating team back to Balkans to continue search for settlement.
- Secretary Christopher can elaborate on next steps.

Implementation Planning

- While settlement not yet in hand, we are moving forward on internal planning for settlement implementation, including military, economic and political aspects.
- Will insist military implementation force be led by NATO, with tough rules of engagement and clear chain of command. Will oppose any UN dual key.
- While not planning to impose peace, strong NATO presence at an early stage will be essential to deter violations and prevent resumption of hostilities. Parties believe international presence is essential to give them confidence to make peace.
- As leader of Alliance, U.S. must be part of NATO mission if it is to succeed.
- That is why I have reaffirmed my commitment -- first made in February 1993 -- to provide U.S. ground forces to help implement a settlement, subject to consultations with Congress.
- NATO planning is now underway.
- Until settlement provisions become clear and planning is complete, cannot say what size of overall force or U.S. contribution will be. But Secretary Perry and Admiral Owens can tell you more about our current thinking.

- Hope Russia and other non-NATO countries -- especially members of Partnership for Peace -- will also provide forces for this operation.
- We are now working on ways to make this possible -- addressing Russian political sensitivities without creating a second chain of command.
- In addition to participating in NATO implementation force, United States also needs to do its part for economic reconstruction.
- European Union has indicated their intent to take lead. Hope Islamic countries and Japan, as well as World Bank and IMF, will also play major role.
- Too soon to say what U.S. contribution to humanitarian and reconstruction effort will be.
- But this is another area where American resources will be needed to back up our diplomatic leadership and to give parties to conflict a real stake in peace.
- No risk free/cost free way to end tragedy of Bosnia. But we have a chance -- now -- to help parties make peace and to help take hold. No more unthinkable than agreement signed yesterday by Rabin and Arafat.
- But for peace to happen, U.S. must lead and I genuinely hope we can do so as a united nation.

PARTICIPANTS

Senators

Dole
Daschle
Byrd
Hatfield
McConnell
Leahy
Stevens
Inouye
Gramm
Hollings
Helms
Pell
Lugar
Biden
Thurmond
Nunn
Specter
Kerrey
Exon
Levin
Warner
Lieberman

House

Gingrich
Gephardt
Livingston
Obey
Callahan
Wilson
Young
Murtha
Rogers
Mollohan
Gilman
Hamilton
Spence
Dellums
Combest
Dicks
Hoyer
Neumann

Administration Officials

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Christopher
Secretary Perry
Admiral Owens
Ambassador Albright
Leon Panetta
Tony Lake
Patrick Griffin
Sandy Berger
Leon Fuerth

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. paper	A Strategy for Bosnia Reconstruction. (7 pages)	09/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Late) [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2769

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. paper	Organizing the Humanitarian Effort. (5 pages)	09/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Late) [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2769

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Visit of Administrator J. Brian Atwood to Sarajevo

USAID's Reconstruction Plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina

Budget and Timeline

The United States foreign assistance program seeks a stable post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina with the emergence of a market economy and a democratic government. To meet this goal, USAID's program will meet the basic human needs of displaced persons and other vulnerable groups; bolster ethnic reconciliation; promote a market economy, and foster development of enduring democratic structures at national and local levels.

USAID's Program Until There Is Peace

Until a peace agreement can be achieved, USAID will continue its existing program in Bosnia. FY 1995 funding is \$173 million to date, all but \$25 million being emergency and humanitarian assistance. The country program funded under the SEED Act consists of assistance for ethnic reconciliation and income generation in central Bosnia and natural gas, medical supplies, and the U.N. Trust Fund for Sarajevo. Plans in FY 1996 include:

- emergency and humanitarian relief according to need
- provision for special needs of displaced persons, eg, trauma counselling, especially women and children.
- expansion of municipal rehabilitation within the four cantons where it now operates
- planning for development of the financial sector and for restructuring towards a private economy

USAID's Immediate Response to Peace

When a peace agreement is concluded, USAID will immediately expand its emergency and humanitarian activities, continuing them for up to a year after the peace is agreed. We will continue and refine our existing program in Bosnia to assist in stabilization and reconstruction. The program will be developed in coordination with the European Union and the World Bank; consultations with them have already begun. Economic stabilization measures will be required to minimize inflation and economic insecurity. Preliminary programs under consideration include:

- Assistance for key imports and technical assistance for local, small-scale reconstruction projects.
- Technical assistance to the Federation Government to organize its central bank, finance ministry, and related financial institutions.

Reconstruction of the economic and social foundations of Bosnia will commence immediately after the peace agreement. Areas we are interested in working include:

- Ethnic reconciliation through community-based ethnic reconciliation councils.
- Small businesses and agriculture.
- Non-structural, temporary rehabilitation of dwellings for vulnerable populations.
- Preparatory studies for large infrastructure projects to be financed by other, especially multilateral donors.
- A targeted activity for Sarajevo in economic reactivation or housing rehabilitation.

Transition to a Market Economy and Democratic Government

Within months after the peace, USAID will initiate programs to address the systemic issues of economic transformation and the development of democratic institutions and processes. We have capacity to address the following:

Market Economy

- Privatization of state-controlled enterprises such as agribusiness, timber, and factories.
- Development of commercial and other laws necessary for a well-functioning private economy.
- A system for private mortgage financing for the housing sector and for agricultural land purchase.

Democratic Government

- Technical assistance in municipal administration for revenue collection and provision of services.
- Technical assistance and training for the eight cantonal governments and the Federation government.
- Elements of a democratic environment such as the conduct and observation of elections and development of political parties.
- Continued funding for the Federation Arbitrator until the court system is functioning.
- Technical assistance to the constitutional court, supreme court, human rights advocates, public defenders, and judicial administration.
- Technical assistance to the Parliament for legal drafting and its role as a check and balance on the executive branch.

The budget and timeline count month zero as the date of signing of a peace accord. Immediate implementation for some activities is possible because they will build on existing programs.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. paper	Continuation of Air Support. (3 pages)	08/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Late) [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2769

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JOINT STATEMENT

For the second time in three weeks, the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have met under the auspices of the Contact Group. The meeting was held at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations and co-chaired by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard C. Holbrooke and EU Special Negotiator Carl Bildt.

The Contact Group and EU Special Negotiator announce today that the three Foreign Ministers, speaking for their governments -- the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which also represents the Bosnian Serbs in a joint delegation -- have authorized us to issue the attached Further Agreed Basic Principles. All three governments -- and their Presidents -- agree that these principles will govern additional negotiations. Moreover, the Co-Chairmen reiterated that the issues of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem will be a top priority in an overall peace settlement.

The principles issued today take us one more important step on the road to peace. As important as this step is, we remain a long way from peace.

Although we still have a long and difficult path ahead of us, today's agreement does mark another important step forward for several reasons.

First and foremost, it establishes clearly that both sides agree that Bosnia and Herzegovina will have a Parliament or national assembly, a Presidency, a Constitutional Court, and makes provisions for free and democratic elections under international supervision. In our view this means direct, free and democratic elections would be held as soon as possible when the necessary conditions exist.

These are obviously significant, if incomplete, achievements, which must be fleshed out in much greater detail in the next round of negotiations. For example, what are the "other matters" referred to in the second sentence of paragraph 6.6? Although this must be negotiated, in our view they should include such important matters as foreign trade, customs administration, international financial affairs, currency administration, citizenship and passports, protection of borders, and other matters. These issues must be solved before we can achieve the settlement we seek.

- 2 -

There are many other important issues not resolved, or even addressed, in today's document. Above all, the territorial issues are still unresolved, and will be the subject of very tough negotiations. In this connection, the Contact Group reiterates its strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states of the region.

We are also committed to insuring that, at the end of the negotiating process, the above institutions and their manner of operations and decision-making will be fully consistent with democratic principles. We shall continue to avoid mechanisms that could make the governmental institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina un-democratic or non-functioning in their operations.

We also must address the presence of several different military forces on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in such a manner as to ensure that their presence and activities are consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The American negotiating team will return to the region, starting in Sarajevo, on Thursday. The EU Special Negotiator, Carl Bildt, will continue work also on the constitutional and reconstruction efforts which will be addressed by the EU Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg October 2 before he proceeds to the region. Russian negotiator, First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, will return to the region next week.

The attached Basic Principles have been agreed upon today by H.E. Muhamed Sacirbey, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina), H.E. Mate Granic, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Croatia (Croatia); and H.E. Milan Milutinovic, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), and witnessed by Representatives of France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and by the European Union Special Negotiator for the Former Yugoslavia.

New York
September 26, 1995

FURTHER AGREED BASIC PRINCIPLES

(additional to those issued September 8, 1995, in Geneva)

4. Each of the two entities will honor the international obligations of Bosnia Herzegovina, so long as the obligation is not a financial obligation incurred by one entity without the consent of the other.

5. It is the goal that free democratic elections be held in both entities as soon as social conditions permit. In order to maximize the democratic effectiveness of such elections, the following steps will be taken by both entities.

5.1 Both governments will immediately pledge their full support, starting immediately, for (a) freedom of movement, (b) the right of displaced persons to repossess their property or receive just compensation, (c) freedom of speech and of the press, and (d) protection of all other internationally recognized human rights in order to enhance and empower the democratic election process.

5.2 As soon as possible the OSCE (or other international organization) will station representatives in all principal towns throughout the Federation and the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina and publish monthly reports as to the degree which (a) the obligations listed in all of the Agreed Basic Principles have been fulfilled, and (b) social conditions are being restored to a level at which the election process may be effective.

5.3 Within 30 days after the OSCE delegations have concluded that free and democratic elections can be properly held in both entities, the governments of the two entities will conduct free and democratic elections and will fully cooperate with an international monitoring program.

6. Following the elections, the affairs and prerogatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be vested in the following institutions, in accordance with all of the Agreed Basic Principles.

6.1 A parliament or assembly, two-thirds of which will be elected from the territory of the Federation, and one-third from the territory of the Republika Srpska. All parliamentary actions will be by majority vote provided that the majority includes at least one-third of the votes from each entity.

6.2 A Presidency, two-thirds of which will be elected from the territory of the Federation, and one-third from the territory of the Republika Srpska. All Presidency decisions

will be taken by majority vote, provided, however, that if one-third or more of the members disagree with a decision taken by the other members and declare that decision to be destructive of a vital interest of the entity or entities from which the dissenting members were elected, the matter will be referred immediately to the appropriate entity's/entities' parliament. If any such parliament confirms the dissenting position by a two-thirds vote, then the challenged decision will not take effect.

6.3 A cabinet of such ministers as may be appropriate.

6.4 A Constitutional Court with jurisdiction to decide all questions arising under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina as it will be revised in accordance with all of the Agreed Basic Principles.

6.5 The parties will negotiate in the immediate future as to further aspects of the management and operation of these institutions.

6.6 The foregoing insitutions will have responsibility for the foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The parties will negotiate further to determine the extent to which these institutions will also have responsibility for other matters consistent with all of the Agreed Basic Principles.

New York, September 26, 1995

AGREED BASIC PRINCIPLES

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue its legal existence with its present borders and continuing international recognition.

2. Bosnia and Herzegovina will consist of two entities; the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as established by the Washington Agreements, and the Republica Srpska (RS).

2.1 The 51:49 parameter of the territorial proposal of the Contact Group is the basis for a settlement. This territorial proposal is open for adjustment by mutual agreement.

2.2 Each entity will continue to exist under its present constitution (amended to accommodate these basic principles).

2.3 Both entities will have the right to establish parallel special relationships with neighboring countries, consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2.4 The two entities will enter into reciprocal commitments (a) to hold complete elections under international auspices; (b) to adopt and adhere to normal international human rights standards and obligations, including the obligation to allow freedom of movement and enable displaced persons to repossess their homes or receive just compensation; (c) to engage in binding arbitration to resolve disputes between them.

3. The entities have agreed in principle to the following:

3.1 The appointment of a Commission for Displaced Persons authorized to enforce (with assistance from international entities) the obligations of both entities to enable displaced persons to repossess their homes or receive just compensation.

3.2 The establishment of a Bosnia and Herzegovina Human Rights Commission, to enforce the entities' human rights obligations. The two entities will abide by the Commission's decisions.

3.3 The establishment of joint Bosnia and Herzegovina public corporations, financed by the two entities, to own and operate transportation and other facilities for the benefit of both entities.

3.4 The appointment of a Commission to Preserve National Monuments.

3.5 The design and implementation of a system of arbitration for the solution of disputes between the two entities.

Geneva, September 8, 1995