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Folder Title:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early-Mid [4]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	Equip and Train: Diplomatic Considerations. (3 pages)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	Legal Framework for Equip and Train. (3 pages)	09/14/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. draft	Paper: Equipping and Training the Federation. (3 pages)	09/13/1995	P1/b(1)
001d. draft	Paper: Equipping and Training the Bosnian Federation. (6 pages)	09/05/1995	P1/b(1)
001e. paper	Equip and Train. (4 pages)	09/1995	P1/b(1)
002. report	Croatia's Vision on Bosnia. [CIA Act] [partial] (5 pages)	09/11/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)
003. paper	Duplicate of 001a. (3 pages)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1)
004. report	Milosevic, Karadzic, Mladic: Serbs Disunited. (6 pages)	09/05/1995	P1/b(1)
005a. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Bill Clinton. [English Translation] (2 pages)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1)
005b. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Bill Clinton. [Russian] (1 page)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1)
006. paper	Confidence Building/Arms Control. (3 pages)	08/28/1995	P1/b(1)
007. telcon	With Prime Minister Chretien of Canada, September 27, 1995. Record ID: 9507195. (2 pages)	09/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early-Mid. [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2762

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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"Equip and Train"
September 14, 1995

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Concept paper - EUR/Sewer TAB 6

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001b. paper	Legal Framework for Equip and Train. (3 pages)	09/14/1995	P1/b(1)

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001c. draft	Paper: Equipping and Training the Federation. (3 pages)	09/13/1995	P1/b(1)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21047

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: September 8, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger

OMB

Gordon Adams

Keith Bickel

OVP

Leon Fuerth

Rick Saunders

CIA

George Tenet

John Gannon

STATE

Strobe Talbott

John Kornblum

James Steinberg

AID

Thomas Dine

M. Douglas Stafford

TREASURY

David Lipton

Stephen Altheim

JCS

Michael Byron

Douglas Lute

DEFENSE

Jan Lodai

Robert Osterthaler

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

Sue Bremner

USUN

Rick Inderfurth

David Scheffer

Jim O'Brien

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies discussed four topics: 1) the shape and mandate of the political implementation mechanism that would coordinate among the actors in-country during the settlement implementation period; 2) equipping and training the Bosnian Federation; and 3) funding strategies for various aspects of post-settlement policy. They agreed to defer discussion of reconstruction assistance until the return of Ralph Johnson from consultations with the EU.
(S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
VZ 10/1/2013

- What degree of U.S. leadership and what size U.S. contribution to the equip/train effort, will be required to keep negotiations going and further the peace implementation process?
- What type of U.S. involvement will be necessary to give us sufficient leverage to prevent pariah states from undertaking military assistance to the Federation?
- Would lifting the arms embargo be enough, in and of itself, to keep the peace implementation process going? — *commit arms embargo into control region*
- What provisions and strategy should we pursue to ensure that feasible arms control/limitation mechanisms are included in the settlement agreement?
- When should we begin consultations with the Bosnians on their military needs and wishes?
- If a needs assessment is not possible, how can we best make decisions on the size of our contribution?
- What is the legal framework for equip and train?
- How will we finance our contribution? (Action: State/Task Force) *TST*

5. On the issue of funding for the range of post-settlement efforts, Deputies agreed that OMB would produce a paper laying out strategies to obtain sufficient resources to meet our policy goals. (Action: OMB) *TST*

6. Deputies briefly discussed the Croatian offensive inland from the Dalmatian coast toward Jajce and agreed that demarches should be made to Croatian leaders to urge restraint, especially as there were signs that the Serbs perceived the Croatian offensive as occurring in concert with the ongoing NATO strikes. (Action: State/NSC) *TST*

when do we begin equip + train?

*when arms control region kicks in;
and parties commit to it*

*need arms control package (including train)
need consultation in NY as well as NAT*

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002. report	Croatia's Vision on Bosnia. [CIA Act] [partial] (5 pages)	09/11/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

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**DCI Interagency
Balkan Task Force**



11 September 1995

NOTE FOR: The Principals and Deputies

SUBJECT: Croatia's Vision of Bosnia

Please find attached for your information an assessment of Croatia's current objectives vis-a-vis Bosnia. John Deutch thought you might find it useful in connection with Croatian Foreign Minister Granic's visit.

(b)(3)

A. Norman Schindler
Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

[002]

Declassified in Part

E.O. 13526

1.4 (b), (c), (d)

VZ 10/01/2013

2

(b)(3)

Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

11 September 1995



Croatia's Vision of Bosnia (b)(3)

Since Croatia's overwhelming success in retaking the Krajina in August, Croatian leaders believe Zagreb has become the linchpin to achieving peace in the region. In the short term, Zagreb's engagement has improved cooperation with Bosnia. But Croatia's inflated sense of importance bodes ill for long-term cooperation and throws into question the ultimate survivability of the Federation. (b)(3)



Some New Progress in Bosnian-Croat Cooperation...

Zagreb has accelerated its cooperation with Sarajevo in recent weeks.

- The 22 July 1995 Split Declaration established a basis for Croatian military intervention in Bosnia, according to diplomatic reports.
(b)(3)
- Foreign Minister Granic told US diplomats that joint military operations in Bosnia would expand the territory under Federation control to about 60 percent, which would form the basis for Federation demands at the negotiating table. Such operations are temporarily on hold as a result of recent battlefield setbacks for both sides and the peace talks.
- On the political front, press reports indicate the number of high-level meetings has risen considerably since the Split Declaration. The two presidents and foreign ministers met to coordinate their positions for the 8 September Geneva peace talks, for example.
- During the Split talks, the two sides agreed to accelerate implementation of the Federation agreements by merging Bosnian Republic and Herceg-Bosna structures into the Federation, according to diplomatic reporting, although concrete results are not likely soon.
(b)(3)

[002]

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

~~Top Secret~~

3

~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

...But Limits to Cooperation

Despite improved contacts and coordination, a pervasive distrust of the other side's motivations and intentions continues to underlie, and potentially undermine, the relationship. Most progress in Bosnian-Croatian cooperation thus far has been largely superficial and focused on achieving specific goals, such as breaking the siege of Bihac.

- Even after the Split agreement, Izetbegovic said the Bosnian Army can expect only a limited flow of arms via Croatia and tactical support,

(b)(1)

- Bosnian President Izetbegovic fears--probably rightly--that Croatia will try to keep control of land it seizes in Bosnia,

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

- In the long-run, Izetbegovic thinks Zagreb views the Federation as an opportunity to divide Bosnia and create a separate Bosnian Croat political entity. Even Federation President Zubak, a Bosnian Croat, has told US diplomats that Zagreb views it as a "means of partitioning Bosnia."

(b)(3)

[002]

The False Specter of Partition--For Now

In the near term, Croatia is focused on extending Bosnian Croat territory and its control in Bosnia, preventing the establishment of a strong Muslim-dominated Bosnian state, balancing and normalizing ties with Serbia, and achieving a peace agreement conducive to long-term stability. But, heady over Croatia's victory in the Krajina, Tudjman unabashedly has presented his vision for the future of the region to US diplomats, which amounts to a north-south division of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia. Tudjman probably views partition as a long-term process that will inevitably lead to the inclusion of Bosnian Croat territory in a "Greater Croatia"--perhaps substantially expanded at the expense of both the Bosnians and the Bosnian Serbs--and leaving a "rump" Bosnian Muslim state at best as a protectorate of Croatia. There is very little likelihood that Tudjman's "vision" could be achieved any time soon, however, given the certain resistance of the Bosnian Muslims and the international community.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

- A variety of reporting indicates that the Croatians do not favor inclusion of a Muslim entity in the Croatian state, preferring relative ethnic homogeneity, and may even oppose the annexation of Bosnian Croat territory given the widespread Croatian view that it is an economic and cultural backwater, according to US diplomats.
- (b)(1) the Croatian MFA (b)(1) argued that while a Bosnian Muslim state is not possible within its existing borders, Croatia should help preserve a Bosnian Republic as a buffer against Serbia. (b)(3)

Impact on the Peace Talks

As peace negotiations move forward, Croatia is likely to take positions-- particularly on constitutional issues-- (b)(1)

(b)(1)

- (b)(1)

- Peace talks could falter temporarily if Croatia proceeds with plans for extensive military operations in Bosnia. Nonetheless, the threat of decisive Croatian military action against the Bosnian Serbs could increase Pale's interest in a peace settlement. (b)(3)

[002]

Implications for the Federation

As long as the international community stands firm against the secession of Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb territory, however, Zagreb probably can be convinced that serving as Bosnia's protector and maintaining at least the trappings of the Federation is in Croatia's best interest. Strong pressure from the West-- particularly if specifically linked to Croatia's ties to the EU or membership in the Partnership for Peace--could provide substantial leverage to keep Croatia on board.

- Croatia will want to maintain a modicum of goodwill with Sarajevo to ensure fair political and economic treatment of Bosnian Croats living within Bosnian Government-controlled territory.

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

~~Top Secret~~

~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

- Croatian leaders may want to maintain the Federation as a means of limiting Islamic influence. Tudjman recently told EU officials that "we're in the Federation to keep the Bosnian Muslims under control."
- Without de jure control over Bosnian Croat territory, the Federation will remain the best way for Croatia to exert influence over Bosnia. Indeed, Tudjman may plan to use the Federation as a Trojan horse to gain eventual control over the Bosnian state—although any attempts by Zagreb in this regard will be resisted strongly by Sarajevo. (b)(3)

If the West's active engagement in the region recedes over time, however, the survivability of the Federation and a "rump" Bosnian Muslim state may be in danger.

- Zagreb is likely to further strengthen an independent Bosnian Croat identity and codify as much as possible its already extensive de facto control. Without pressure from Zagreb to cooperate with Bosnian officials, Bosnian Croat leaders probably will throw up further barriers to deepening cooperation and could provoke renewed Muslim-Croat fighting.
- Croatia's policy of ensuring that a Bosnian state remains weak and dependent will make it perpetually vulnerable to outside aggression. Such a state would invite Serb expansionism, particularly to retake areas lost in a settlement. While Croatia would prefer a Bosnian buffer state, it would not be willing to renew war with Serbia to ensure Bosnia's survival and might be tempted to try to carve up the rump Bosnian state with Serbia. (b)(3)

[002]

This memorandum was prepared by (b)(3) Office Of DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Norm Schindler, Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. (b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

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Date: 01-01-90 Time: 02:39 Transmitter ID: CINCUSAEUR COMMO

Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem

As to the territory of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem, known as UN Sector East in Croatia, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will work actively toward a peaceful accommodation leading to an ultimate overall normalization of relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Date: 01-01-90 Time: 02:32 Transmitter ID: CINCUSAEUR COMMO

Draft

Joint Statement of the Co-Chairmen
and the Contact Group

We have just concluded a meeting, held under the auspices of the Contact Group, of the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

As a result of today's meeting, the Contact Group is issuing a set of Agreed Basic Principles. When we say agreed, we mean exactly that: Speaking for their governments, the three Foreign Ministers -- Muhamed Sacirbey, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Mate Granic, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Croatia; and Milan Milutinovic, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, agreed to the exact words of the statement we are releasing now. That statement has the full backing of their respective Presidents. In addition, the Governments of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have agreed to an additional statement concerning Eastern Slavonia, which we are also releasing now.

The two statements take us an important step closer to peace. Important as they are, these statements do not constitute the end of the tragedy in the Balkans. Far from it. Vast and significant differences exist between the sides -- differences that will require continued intense negotiations. We will return to our respective capitals tonight for consultations. Next week, the co-chairmen of today's meeting -- Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke and European Union Special Negotiator for the Former Yugoslavia Carl Bildt -- will return to the region with their delegations to resume the search for peace. We will hold a meeting of the (expanded) Contact Group -- the five nations here today, plus Italy, Spain and Canada. This meeting will be held in (Rome) *Geneva*. Then we will return to the Balkans.

The two statements we are issuing today are an important milestone in the search for peace. The second one commits Croatia and Serbia to "work actively toward a peaceful accommodation leading to an ultimate overall normalization of relations between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." We all welcome this step back from the brink.

As for Bosnia, today's statement contains many significant points. Within its current internationally recognized borders, Bosnia will be comprised of two democratic entities, the existing Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a Serbian political entity, Republica Srpska. Bosnian territory will be divided between them -- the Federation with 51 percent and the Serbian entity with 49 percent. They have agreed today to adhere to accepted

Date: 01-01-90 Time: 02:34 Transmitter ID: CINCUSAEUR COMMO

international human rights standards and to create a Commission to enforce those standards. They have agreed to allow freedom of movement within Bosnia's borders and to allow displaced persons to return to their homes. Each entity will be self-governing, with its own constitution. At the same time each has agreed to cooperate with the other in joint public projects to facilitate transportation and communication. They have agreed to establish a commission to preserve national monuments and cultural and religious facilities, with the aim of reducing the destruction that has caused major ethnic and religious friction. And finally, they have agreed to binding arbitration of all disputes between them in the future.

Clearly much remains to be done. The hardest work still lies ahead. The entities have yet to develop a design for a central connecting structure to oversee the agreed cooperative efforts and to elaborate other joint efforts in areas where cooperation is the only way to solve common problems. In addition, the parties need to define their internal borders within Bosnia in accordance with the 51-49 principle. We should be under no illusions that these will be easy tasks; they can be solved only through intense negotiations backed by a genuine desire to achieve peace. Finally, any agreement must be implemented by all sides, and this could be the hardest part.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. report	Milosevic, Karadzic, Mladic: Serbs Disunited. (6 pages)	09/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early-Mid. [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2762

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Bill Clinton. [English Translation] (2 pages)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early-Mid. [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2762

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Bill Clinton. [Russian] (1 page)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early-Mid. [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2762

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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For immediate release

Embassy of the Russian Federation

2650 Wisconsin Avenue, Washington D.C., 20007

tel.(202)298-5718, fax (202)298-5759

Press Release # 27 September 7, 1995

PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN'S STATEMENT (September 7, 1995)

Continued NATO air strikes and artillery shelling of Bosnian Serbs undermine the efforts for political settlement. It goes beyond the framework of the UN Security Council decisions, draws international community into the hostilities against one of the sides in Bosnian conflict. While speaking about its "peacekeeping mission" the North Atlantic alliance virtually has assumed the role of a judge in the conflict, as well as that of an executor. If this policy is to be continued, we'll have to reconsider thoroughly our strategy including our approaches to the relations with the North Atlantic alliance. There is critically little time left to find political solutions to the crisis, but time is still available.

The Russian side will actively contribute to make the Geneva meeting of the foreign ministers of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia under the aegis of the Contact Group fruitful. Personally I am anxious to cooperate vigorously in search of political solutions. Now the main thing - to abandon the reflexes to use power in favor of well-thought-out approach and collective efforts at the negotiating table. It is understood in Moscow. It should be understood by our partners.

I am calling upon all who are interested in peaceful settlement to understand all seriousness and importance of the moment.

(end)

Date: 01-01-90 Time: 02:35 Transmitter ID: CINCUSAEUR COMMO

The following Basic Principles have been agreed upon today by Mohamed Sacirbey, Mate Granic, Milan Milutinovic, and witnessed by Representatives of France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and by the European Union Special Negotiator for the Former Yugoslavia.

AGREED BASIC PRINCIPLES

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue its legal existence with its present borders and continuing international recognition.

2. Bosnia and Herzegovina will consist of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as established by the Washington Agreements, and the Republica Srpska (RS).

2.1 The 51:49 parameter of the territorial proposal of the Contact Group is the basis for a settlement. This territorial proposal is open for adjustment by mutual agreement.

2.2 Each entity will continue to exist under its present constitution (amended to accommodate these basic principles).

2.3 Both entities will have the right to establish parallel special relationships with neighboring countries, consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2.4 The two entities will enter into reciprocal commitments (a) to hold complete elections under international auspices; (b) to adopt and adhere to normal international human rights standards and obligations, including the obligation to allow freedom of movement and enable displaced persons to repossess their homes or receive just compensation; (c) to engage in binding arbitration to resolve disputes between them.

3. The entities have agreed in principle to the following:

3.1 The appointment of a Commission for Displaced Persons authorized to enforce (with assistance from international entities) the obligations of both entities to enable displaced persons to repossess their homes or receive just compensation.

3.2 The establishment of a Bosnia and Herzegovina Human Rights Commission, to enforce the entities' human rights obligations. The two entities will abide by the Commission's decisions.

Date: 01-01-98 Time: 02:37 Transmitter ID: CINCUSAEUR COMMO

3.3 The establishment of joint Bosnia and Herzegovina public corporations, financed by the two entities, to own and operate transportation and other facilities for the benefit of both entities.

3.4 The appointment of a Commission to Preserve National Monuments.

3.5 The design and implementation of a system of arbitration for the solution of disputes between the two entities.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. paper	Confidence Building/Arms Control. (3 pages)	08/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early-Mid. [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2762

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20905

① MK-C

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: August 1, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Anthony Lake

CIA

John Deutch
Dennis Blair

OVP

Leon Fuerth

JCS

Gen. John Shalikashvili
LTG Wesley Clark

STATE

Peter Tarnoff
James Steinberg
Richard Holbrooke

SPECIAL ENVOY

Robert Frasure

DEFENSE

William Perry
Walter Slocombe

White House

Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

USUN

Madeleine Albright
James O'Brien

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

Summary of Conclusions

NATO Air Strikes Decision: Principals were informed by the CJCS that, while the NAC had just approved extension of the Gorazde decision to the other safe areas (Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla), many problems were still unresolved regarding implementation of this and the earlier Gorazde decision. In particular, the UN commander had not yet agreed to a large Zone of Action around Gorazde, nor to the definition of the Zone of Action for the other safe areas. Principals recommended Presidential letters to

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

VZ 2010-0533-M

5/1/2014

Major and Chirac on this issue (Action: JCS/State) as well as follow-up at the UN by USUN. ~~(S)~~

Bildt-Milosevic Package: Principals agreed we needed to improve the terms of the package negotiated by EU mediator Bildt with Serbian President Milosevic on sanctions relief and mutual recognition. In particular, they agreed we should tie implementation of any new sanctions relief to positive Bosnian Serb actions (de-escalation around the safe areas and agreement to begin new peace negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group plan). Principals acknowledged that we were unlikely to come to closure with Milosevic any time soon, and that we should seek to minimize frictions with our Allies in the August 2 meetings with Bildt and Contact Group representatives. They tasked the Deputies to finalize agreement on the U.S. position on the basis of the NSC paper "Bildt Plus" (Action: NSC). ~~(S)~~

Croatia: Principals noted the likelihood of a large-scale Croatian assault on the Krajina (Sectors North and South) in the coming days, barring Krajina Serb capitulation to President Tudjman's ultimatum on acceptance of the Croatian constitution. They agreed we should continue to warn Tudjman of the dangers of precipitating FRY intervention, and stressed the urgency of developing a strategy for containing the spread of the conflict. (S)

Longer-Term Strategy: Principals agreed we needed to look beyond the immediate crises and decide where we want to be in the longer term. Each agency will complete its recommendations by Thursday on the "end state" we should seek to establish if a political settlement cannot be achieved in the near term and if UNPROFOR withdrawal becomes unavoidable. Recommendations to the President should be completed by August 4, as a basis for decisions on a possible U.S. diplomatic initiative. ~~(S)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7076

September 26, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *W*
FROM: JOHN FEELEY, JR. *JD*
SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Dole Letter on Bosnia
Peace Implementation Force

Senator Dole and nine other Republican Senators signed a letter to the President on September 25 calling upon the administration to answer thirteen questions about U.S. commitments to NATO allies and the Bosnian government regarding U.S. participation in a peace implementation force.

The attached memorandum forwards an initial Presidential response that restates administration policy, rejects the charge of partitioning Bosnia, and commits to providing answers to the thirteen questions in a subsequent letter.

Concurrence by: Bill Danvers *JD*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Suggested Reply
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: Initial Response to Letter from Senator Dole
et al. on Bosnia Peace Implementation Force

Purpose

To provide an immediate response to a letter signed by Senator Dole and nine other Senators posing questions about U.S. commitments to NATO allies and the Bosnian government regarding U.S. participation in a peace implementation force.

Background

The letter from Dole and nine other Senators complains about a lack of consultations with Congress on Bosnia peace implementation and warns that, without Congressional concurrence, our commitment to participate in an implementation effort "will not be fulfilled." The letter goes on to pose thirteen specific questions, as well as the more basic question of whether the U.S. should place its soldiers in harm's way to partition a sovereign country.

We have drafted an initial response which restates administration policy, rejects the charge that Bosnia-Herzegovina is being partitioned, and commits to providing answers to the thirteen questions in a subsequent letter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize autosignature for copies of the letter to each of the Senators who signed the letter to you.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Suggested Reply
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Dear Mr. Leader:

I have received the letter of September 25 that you and your colleagues signed expressing your concerns about U.S. participation in the implementation of a peace settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As you will recall, since February 1993 I have repeatedly said that the United States is committed to support a peace settlement in the Balkans through participation in a NATO-led peace implementation force. This commitment is, of course, subject to Congressional consultations. While we have not yet overcome many of the obstacles to a settlement, the progress to date has prompted us to accelerate planning for implementation, both here and at NATO.

I believe that in order to ensure the success of a political settlement, a strong international presence will be essential. Our view is that an implementing force must be NATO-led, under a NATO chain of command, operating with strong rules of engagement. We also believe that for the NATO operation to be effective, U.S. participation is essential. Just as U.S. leadership has been critical to the progress we have made toward a peace settlement, so will U.S. leadership be indispensable to ensuring that the settlement is successfully implemented.

I will provide detailed answers to your questions in a subsequent letter. I want to emphasize, however, that we are neither imposing a peace on the Bosnians, nor partitioning a sovereign and independent country. The basic principles to which the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia agreed in Geneva on September 8 confirmed that Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue as a single state, with its present borders, and with continuing international recognition. The subsequent agreement reached in New York this week reaffirms this central point, and spells out in greater detail the constitutional structures of the Bosnian state -- including the establishment of a national parliament, Presidency and constitutional court.

In your letter you suggest abandoning current negotiations, lifting the arms embargo, and allowing the Bosnians to fight on until there is a stable military balance. While Bosnian forces

have strengthened their position on the ground in recent weeks, the Bosnian Government has reaffirmed its commitment to completing a settlement on the basis of the principles adopted in Geneva and New York. Therefore I cannot agree that we should substitute our judgment for that of the Bosnian Government and forego the present opportunity for a political settlement. That would only lead to more bloodshed for a people who have already suffered enough.

I look forward to further discussions with the Congress on our negotiating strategy and our thinking on implementation of a settlement.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert Dole
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

BOB DOLE
KANSAS

7076

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

September 25, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

It is our understanding that your administration, together with our NATO allies, is completing plans to enforce a potential settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina -- a settlement not yet finalized. Much to our dismay, what we have learned about possible U.S. troop obligations has been largely from press reports. To date, your administration has failed to consult with the Congress on the nature and extent of commitments made to our NATO allies and the Bosnian government regarding U.S. participation in a force to implement a settlement. We are especially concerned since those forces must consist primarily of ground troops. There should be no doubts that without the concurrence of the Congress these commitments will not be fulfilled.

In our view, your administration must answer the following questions as soon as possible in order that the Senate may begin to fulfill its responsibility to carefully evaluate this matter:

- (1) What specific commitments regarding U.S. troop participation have been made by your administration to our NATO allies?
- (2) What specific commitments regarding U.S. troop participation have been made by your administration to the Bosnian government?
- (3) What is the range of total NATO ground force levels, related to enforcement of a Bosnian peace settlement, being considered in the administration and at NATO headquarters? What would the U.S. contribution of forces be? What is the estimate of the number of reservists that would need to be called up? What is the estimated impact of such a deployment on readiness?
- (4) Would this be a NATO-only operation or would Russian troops and/or other troops, from Islamic countries for example, also be a part of that total force enforcing a settlement?
- (5) Would NATO be in complete command of all forces involved in an enforcement operation? Or would Russian forces and non-NATO forces be under different command arrangements? If so, how would these varied command arrangements be ultimately integrated in order to achieve unity of command? Is there to be another dual-

key command?

(6) When would NATO forces be deployed -- immediately after an agreement is signed or after Bosnian government and Bosnian Serb forces withdraw to lines of demarcation? What if the fighting does not stop after an agreement is signed?

(7) Is there a time table for UNPROFOR withdrawal? Would some of these U.N. units, from NATO contributing countries, remain as part of the new force?

(8) When would the "dual key" be eliminated? Would there be any other U.N. input into the command arrangements?

(9) What would the rules of engagement for NATO forces be?

(10) Where would NATO troops be deployed? In Bosnian Serb controlled territory?

(11) Would Bosnian government forces be supplied with additional arms during this enforcement period so that Bosnia can better defend itself against aggression after NATO forces leave? If so, what types of weapons would be provided and by whom? Has a commitment to provide military assistance -- to include arms and/or training-- to the Bosnian government in a post-settlement period been made by Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, or any other administration officials to Bosnian government officials?

(12) How long would NATO troops be deployed? What is the exit strategy?

(13) What are the estimated costs of such a NATO deployment? What would the U.S. share be and how does the administration plan to pay for it?

Mr. President, these are not the only questions that will need to be answered, but they are essential to any Congressional debate and consideration of commitments made by you and your administration with respect to U.S. troops participating in an enforcement operation.

There are also matters of principle that will have to be carefully considered. First and foremost is a very fundamental question -- whether United States forces should be deployed to partition a sovereign and independent country into two entities. Our men and women in the military have protected our freedom and our interests and defended our principles. Do we want to place our soldiers in harms' way to defend the compromise of our principles? We must also ask whether or not any settlement reached has been agreed to freely by the Bosnian government and without coercion. We are concerned about news reports that senior administration officials gained Bosnian government agreement on the first set of "Agreed Principles" by threatening a halt in NATO bombing. Finally, we must ask whether it would

not be more just and more wise to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina, and allow the Bosnians to fight until there is a stable military balance -- the precondition for any settlement which would not require the deployment of thousands of American and NATO troops to police it.

Mr. President, we have serious concerns about the commitments you and your administration reportedly have made with respect to U.S. participation -- to include thousands of ground forces -- in enforcing a possible Bosnian peace settlement. We hope that you will begin to consult earnestly and forthrightly with the Congress in the very near future.

Sincerely,

John Warner

Sen. Dan

Paul Coburn

John Kyl

Bob Smith

Dirk Kempthorne

Jerome Helms

Sen. Kyl

Allen Spitzer ^{Bosnia}

Rep. Bailey Hutchinson

BOB DOLE
KANSAS

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7020

FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

TIME: _____

DATE: 9/25/95

TO: BILL DANVERS

FROM: MIRA BARATTA

RE: _____

3 PAGES TO FOLLOW THIS COVER SHEET

COMMENTS: PLEASE FORWARD TO THE PRESIDENT
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THANKS!

SENT BY: _____

TELEPHONE: (202) 224-7771

September 28, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW **CHRON FILE**

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President and Prime Minister Chretien of Canada

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Prime Minister Chretien of Canada which took place in the Oval Office on September 27, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 7/7/2014

2013-0687-E

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Prime
Minister Chretien of Canada (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Prime Minister Chretien of Canada is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to the Embassy in Ottawa for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(C)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 7/31/2014

2013-0607 -F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. telcon	With Prime Minister Chretien of Canada, September 27, 1995. Record ID: 9507195. (2 pages)	09/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early-Mid. [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2762

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]