

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

896

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34	2	1	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. draft	Balkan Settlement Force Missions Statement. (1 page)	08/28/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. draft	Paper: Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian Federation. (5 pages)	08/22/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	For Brigadier General Don Kerrick. Subject: Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian Federation. (1 page)	08/22/1995	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: Bosnian Settlement Negotiations. (3 pages)	08/30/1995	P1/b(1)
004. email	Eric Schwartz to Sue Bremner, Richard Clarke, Ivo Daadler, et al. Subject: FW: U.N. Preventing. (3 pages)	08/26/1995	P1/b(1)
005. memo	For Sandy Vershbow and Leon Fuerth from David Scheffer and Jim O'Brien. Subject: Proposed Sanctions Relief Package. (4 pages)	08/24/1995	P1/b(1)
006. paper	U.N. Actions for Implementation. (8 pages)	08/26/1995	P1/b(1)
007. paper	Bosnia: Additional Tasks for the PIF. (2 pages)	08/26/1995	P1/b(1)
008a. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Bill Clinton. [English Translation] (3 pages)	08/14/1995	P1/b(1)
008b. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Bill Clinton. [Russian] (2 pages)	08/14/1995	P1/b(1)
009. paper	Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement. (4 pages)	08/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2757

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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002b. memo	For Brigadier General Don Kerrick. Subject: Multilateral Equipping and Training of the Bosnian Federation. (1 page)	08/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]

2013-0687-F
v22757

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UNCLAS "Eyes only"
CLASSIFICATION

WASH FAX COVERSHEET

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CABLES

N

TIME TRANSMITTED (LOCAL)

TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)

FROM Cables OFFICE/DESK SecDEF PHONE NBR 697-8151SUBJECT AMB Holbrook Trip

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:

PAGES 2
(INCLUDING COVER)☐ HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE☒ IMMEDIATELY/URGENT

NOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR
EACH ADDRESSEE REQUIRING AFTER DUTY HOUR DELIVERY

TRANSMIT TO

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL (NAME)	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
<u>WHSR</u>	<u>Sandy Bershow</u>			

REMARKS:

Deliver Per BG Kerrick

WASH FAX OPERATOR (703) 769-9329/9391
SECDEF CABLES (703) 697-8151

UNCLAS
CLASSIFICATION

"EYES ONLY"

CABLES

B-4

TOT 16532

SK

STW ~~TH~~
FAX

Please deliver to MR SLOCOMBE
AND MR LODAL ASAP.

COL Lowe

1820/28 AUG

EYES ONLY

Also Relay to White House Situation
room per Brig Gen Kerrick (For SANDY Bershow)

6 pages including
this cover

Mr Slocombe/Lodal

Aug 28, '95
1800 hrs

This is the Karadzic-Carter package as it now stands. RH is still working it with Harry Barnes. It moves things forward but is far less than what we or the Bosnians want. Important is what it doesn't demand.

RH is trying to delay its publication due to the shelling at Sarajevo. He points out that this is only Karadzic to Carter. Not a US govt. document or officially approved by US.
NSC and State are getting copies.

Jim Pardee

P S A new, cleaned up version will go to Kornblum. Meeting with Izet delayed. May be photo of only today. 2

FAX COVER SHEET
The Carter Center
One Copenhill, Atlanta, GA 30307
Fax: 404-420-5196 Phone: 404-420-5189

Date: August 28, 1995

Number of Pages (incl. cover sheet): 3

To: Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke

Fax: 33 1 4312 2074: Attention Craig Kelley

From: Harry G. Barnes, Jr.

Director, Conflict Resolution and Human Rights Program

Fax: 404-420-5196

Phone: 404-420-5189

Message:

Dick- Herewith the texts I have just received from Pale; they were delayed because of a power outage. I also attach a draft of a statement President Carter is prepared to make.

The covering letter is the same as what I sent you on the plane. Note that in several places the US initiative is welcomed and even accepted.


In the list of items, they dropped the reference to the ~~Contact~~ but President Carter will spell that out in his statement. In addition, Borko told me that Karadzic has very clearly understood that the Contact Group Plan is part of the US initiative.

Item C introduces the word confederal which they say Bildt gave them, but I got Karadzic's agreement to go back to the parallel and special phraseology if confederal bothers you.

Item E is the second of the variations I sent them last night that you said you would try to get acceptance of.

Item H we intend on our own to drop.

I will try calling you as soon as I get word that you have received this.



3

РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА
ПРЕДСЕДНИК РЕПУБЛИКЕ
САРАЈЕВО



REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
SARAJEVO

TO PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER

28 August 1995

Dear President Carter,

In order keep you informed about our position, I wish to convey the following message to you and to ask that you do all you can to use it to promote the earliest possible resumption of peace talks on Bosnia.

You should know that the Republika Srpska welcomes the current US peace initiative and reiterates its commitment to a peaceful solution. In the light of this, the Republika Srpska is prepared to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement which could lead to the formation of a Union constituted by the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The outstanding territorial issues between the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina would be settled in the course of the negotiations.

To provide an indication of the provisions which we believe should guide the negotiations, I am attaching a statement which sets forth the basis for our willingness to accept the US peace initiative as a welcome effort.

Your sincerely,

 Milan Kovacic Karadzic
President, Republic of Srpska

[Handwritten signature]

4

The Republika Srpska is prepared to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, on the basis of the current US peace initiative, which could lead to the following arrangement:

A. A union may be constituted by the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

B. There shall be balanced and equal treatment of the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

C. Both the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall have the right to establish confederal relationships with neighboring countries.

D. Any future political arrangements brought about by any community within either the Republika Srpska or the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will not change the status of the other side, as described in subparagraphs A, B, and C.

E. The territorial proposal contained in the US peace initiative will remain the basis for settlement and will be open for adjustment to benefit the interest of both parties.

F. The full catalogue of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in international instruments will be respected, including the right of refugees and displaced persons to be able to return to their homes of origin, which must be an overall process.

G. As soon as agreement is reached on recommencing peace talks, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of 31 December 1994 will be reinstated on a permanent basis.

H. Nothing will be agreed until all is agreed.

5

Harry: I think these other points will be necessary to meet Holbrooke's needs. J.C.

DRAFT

I have just received a message from Dr. Radovan Karadzic in which he welcomes the current US peace initiative in Bosnia. Let me list several of the main points:

The message advocates the earliest possible resumption of peace talks, and sets forth the basis for his willingness to accept the US peace initiative, (which is understood to include the earlier Contact Group Plan), as well as other elements. As soon as agreement is reached on recommencing peace talks, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of December 31, 1994 ~~will~~ be reinstated on a permanent basis.

He believes the talks can lead to a comprehensive peace agreement within which the outstanding territorial issues between the sides can be settled. The 51-49 parameter of the US peace initiative ~~will~~ remain the basis for settlement and ~~will~~ be open for adjustment through negotiation to benefit the interests of both parties.

In addition, there is an acknowledgement that in any future Bosnian entity the full range of human rights and fundamental freedoms will be respected, including the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes of origin.

This is an important statement which I have already shared with the US government. Peace will not come easily, but there is good reason to take Dr. Karadzic's statement and put it to the test, and to seek comparable helpful efforts from all the other parties involved to move rapidly to talks.

printed
pages

6

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Sanctions Relief Issues for Deputies Discussion

Deputies agreed that sanctions against Belgrade (except for frozen assets) will be suspended once there is a signed agreement and lifted upon implementation. This paper lists remaining sanctions relief issues and indicates how the OVP proposal addresses each. OVP discussed the proposed sanctions relief package with Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and his negotiating team on 8/24. Where appropriate, the team's views on these issues are also listed.

1. *Duration of offer: Open-ended or finite?*

OVP plan says finite -- offer is withdrawn if there is no peace agreement by a date specified (tbd), but Contact Group has option of returning to a "neo-Bildt" approach. The negotiating team likes the idea of a limited-time offer but does not want to specify a termination date prior to getting the FRY's initial reaction to the overall relief plan.

2. *When are sanctions and the border closure on Pale suspended?*

The OVP plan suspends sanctions against Pale and allows opening the border once initial implementation steps are accomplished. These might include initial withdrawal of forces to territorial limits, safe deployment of the NATO implementation force, achievement of specified milestones in the PIF's peace enforcement mission, and/or other clearly identifiable performance criterion.

The negotiating team proposed keeping the border closed between the FRY and the Bosnian Serbs until the settlement is fully implemented. In any event, the team recommends reserving decision on timing of Pale sanctions suspension and opening the border until we have a better idea of how the power struggle between Belgrade and Pale will play out.

3. *When are Pale sanctions lifted?*

The OVP plan lifts Pale sanctions after FRY sanctions are lifted to help guarantee continued Bosnian Serb good behavior.

4. *How long should Belgrade be held responsible for Pale's actions?*

The OVP plan reduces the extent to which Belgrade is held accountable for Pale's behavior at the point when Pale sanctions and the border closure are suspended. Prior to this time, full sanctions against Belgrade are reimposed if the Bosnian Serbs impede operation of the PIF, violate the cease-fire, block humanitarian supplies, or otherwise violate provisions of the settlement. Once Pale sanctions are suspended, Bosnian Serb misbehavior will lead to reimposition of sanctions and the border closure against Pale. Sanctions against Belgrade would be reimposed only if Belgrade failed to close the border or otherwise support Pale sanctions.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

72 10/1/2013

~~SECRET~~

5. *What are our minimum reimposition requirements?*

a. The OVP plan calls for automatic reimposition of sanctions (as outlined in item 4.) if the PIF commander declares that his force cannot accomplish its peace enforcement mission because of action by the Pale Serbs. The negotiating team recommends that there also be provisions for automatic reimposition if Pale blocks implementation of political aspects of the agreement, as reported by whatever international body is charged with implementing political commitments.

b. The OVP plan also allows reimposition of sanctions by a vote in the UN Security Council so that members of the Security Council can credibly threaten reimposition to punish behavior that does not trigger the automatic reimposition of sanctions. There are two options:

1. Sanctions are suspended for a finite period (60-120 days). The UNSC must vote to extend sanctions relief at the end of each period. A veto by any permanent member would prevent the extension of sanctions relief and force reimposition.

2. Sanctions are suspended for an indefinite period, but any permanent member of the Security Council can call for their reimposition at any time based on evidence that the Serbs are reneging on the settlement. Three out of the five permanent members must agree for reimposition to take place.


6. *Should there be a Croatia linkage?*

OVP plan makes recognition of Croatia a condition for final lift of FRY sanctions. The negotiating team agrees that the U.S. plan must contain a Croatia linkage. At issue is whether progress in Eastern Slavonia should be linked to lift of UN economic sanctions, or to easing the "outer wall" of sanctions (access to IFIs, membership in international organizations, etc.).

7. *Should there be a linkage to the War Crimes Tribunal?*


OVP plan has no such linkage, although it may possible to tie cooperation with the Tribunal and progress on other issues (such as Kosovo) to the pace at which Serbia is allowed to re-enter the international political and financial community.

Sanctions Relief Strategy - 8/25/95

Reimposition mechanisms:

- Automatic reimposition upon report by implementation force commander or other international body charged with responsibility for supervising political aspects of implementation that Pale and/or Belgrade is impeding implementation or otherwise failing to fulfill obligations.
- By direction of UNSC:
 - Option I: Sanctions suspended for finite period (60-120 days); UNSC must vote to extend sanctions relief at end of each period.
 - Option II: Sanctions suspended for indefinite period; any of Perm-5 can call for reimposition vote; sanctions reimposed if 3 of Perm-5 vote for reimposition.

This time-line illustrates reimposition arrangements and how primary accountability could be shifted from Belgrade to Pale during the implementation process.



h/h

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SERPM 2628

Confidence-Building/Arms Control Measures To Accompany Political Settlement

Assumption: It will be important that the U.S. offer the perspective of "arms build-down" in connection with any settlement package -- both to help build political support among allies and partners for the overall U.S. initiative and to assist in creating an environment within which the Federation-Bosnian Serb military balance can more easily be stabilized. Any set of proposals to that effect, however, would have to be phased and flexible, readily adapting to changing circumstances on the ground and open to expansion over time in both scope and application.

Step-by-Step Approach: In the first instance, we should concentrate on political/military confidence-building measures geared to specific areas and tactical situations along lines of confrontation within Bosnia itself. Their immediate objective would be to supplement and help stabilize the ceasefire contained in the settlement; accordingly, they would focus on disengagement of the parties, preliminary forms of weapons control, and transparency.

More specifically, this might include (perhaps within the text of any ceasefire component of a settlement):

- Separation of forces and weapons along designated confrontation lines (e.g., 2 km for infantry, 10 km for mortars, 20 km for heavy weapons).
- Ban of certain military activities, including aircraft activities, in selected areas.
- Establishment of heavy weapons collection/deactivation sites.
- Establishment of joint liaison/communication links among opposing local commanders under the active oversight of the Implementation Force.
- Establishment of procedures for extensive monitoring all of the above measures by designated elements of the Implementation Force.

As progress is made with each of these measures, we would seek to expand them in scope and effect. As some would presumably be intended for a long duration, we would wish to build in the possibility that, as the NATO-led military implementation force draws down with the accomplishment of its basic mission, monitoring/verification duties might be eventually passed to another body -- perhaps some configuration of UN/OSCE observers.

Long-Term Perspective: Even as our immediate focus should be on local stabilizing measures within Bosnia proper to support the ceasefire and settlement, the U.S. should be prepared to offer -- at an appropriate political moment -- a long term

with an emphasis on a comprehensive approach to the problems of the former Yugoslavia.

The stated objective of such a U.S. initiative for confidence-building/arms control measures would be strengthening stability and security throughout the region, with the specific aim of eliminating disparities and capabilities for launching surprise attack and for initiating, at a regional level, large-scale offensive action. Reductions, limitations and the realization of a more defensive set of force postures might be examined as contributions to a more stable military balance.

Any initial deliberations among parties as to participation and modalities could take place in an informal setting, although the intention should always be to transfer any such the negotiations back into a more formal OSCE framework at an appropriate time. Recognizing the many inherent difficulties involved in any move towards a more ambitious arms control regime for the region, the U.S. objective would, in the first instance, be as much to set in place an ongoing process as the expectation of any early progress towards a CFE-like regime.

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. memo	For Sandy Vershbow and Leon Fuerth from David Scheffer and Jim O'Brien. Subject: Proposed Sanctions Relief Package. (4 pages)	08/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2757

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. paper	U.N. Actions for Implementation. (8 pages)	08/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2757

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. paper	Bosnia: Additional Tasks for the PIF. (2 pages)	08/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2757

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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SERPM 2628

Confidence-Building/Arms Control Measures
To Accompany Political Settlement

Assumption: It will be important that the U.S. offer the perspective of "arms build-down" in connection with any settlement package -- both to help build political support among allies and partners for the overall U.S. initiative and to assist in creating an environment within which the Federation-Bosnian Serb military balance can more easily be stabilized. Any set of proposals to that effect, however, would have to be phased and flexible, readily adapting to changing circumstances on the ground and open to expansion over time in both scope and application.

Step-by-Step Approach: In the first instance, we should concentrate on political/military confidence-building measures geared to specific areas and tactical situations along lines of confrontation within Bosnia itself. Their immediate objective would be to supplement and help stabilize the ceasefire contained in the settlement; accordingly, they would focus on disengagement of the parties, preliminary forms of weapons control, and transparency.

More specifically, this might include (perhaps within the text of any ceasefire component of a settlement):

-- Separation of forces and weapons along designated confrontation lines (e.g., 2 km for infantry, 10 km for mortars, 20 km for heavy weapons).

-- Ban of certain military activities, including aircraft activities, in selected areas.

-- Establishment of heavy weapons collection/deactivation sites.

-- Establishment of joint liaison/communication links among opposing local commanders under the active oversight of the Implementation Force.

-- Establishment of procedures for extensive monitoring all of the above measures by designated elements of the Implementation Force.

As progress is made with each of these measures, we would seek to expand them in scope and effect. As some would presumably be intended for a long duration, we would wish to build in the possibility that, as the NATO-led military implementation force draws down with the accomplishment of its basic mission, monitoring/verification duties might be eventually passed to another body -- perhaps some configuration of UN/OSCE observers.

Long-Term Perspective: Even as our immediate focus should be on local stabilizing measures within Bosnia proper to support the ceasefire and settlement, the U.S. should be prepared to offer -- at an appropriate political moment -- a long term

with an emphasis on a comprehensive approach to the problems of the former Yugoslavia.

The stated objective of such a U.S. initiative for confidence-building/arms control measures for would be strengthening stability and security throughout the region, with the specific aim of eliminating disparities and capabilities for launching surprise attack and for initiating, at a regional level, large-scale offensive action. Reductions, limitations and the realization of a more defensive set of force postures might be examined as contributions to a more stable military balance.

Any initial deliberations among parties as to participation and modalities could take place in an informal setting, although the intention should always be to transfer any such the negotiations back into a more formal OSCE framework at an appropriate time. Recognizing the many inherent difficulties involved in any move towards a more ambitious arms control regime for the region, the U.S. objective would, in the first instance, be as much to set in place an ongoing process as the expectation of any early progress towards a CFE-like regime.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: LEON PANETTA

FROM: Anthony Lake
Alice Rivlin *AR*

SUBJECT: Administration Priorities for Foreign Assistance

Congressional appropriations action on foreign assistance has been cut dramatically from your budget request. The House cut FY 1996 funding to \$11.9 billion, which is \$1.6 billion, or 12 percent, below the FY 1995 levels and \$2.8 billion below the request. Moreover, since a few large programs are to be funded at or near the request level, the cuts to other foreign assistance programs would be even more draconian. (See table at Tab 1.)

The Senate Appropriations Committee is supposed to take up this budget in the middle of September. We have some opportunity to improve upon the low House levels in this process since the Senate has allocated at least \$375 million more for foreign assistance in the aggregate. The amount may even be higher (by \$68 million), depending on yet to be determined Senate budget scoring rules for the Israel loan guarantees.

A basic issue for you to decide is whether to use these funds to pay for economic reconstruction in Bosnia, or whether to use them for a variety of other purposes from among other Treasury, State and AID programs. The \$443 million available is in the same ballpark that the State planners would like to see for the Bosnian economic plan.

Whatever your decision, we need to communicate quickly the Administration's preferences, especially to Senator Leahy, who is anxious to know what improvements we seek.

White House staff solicited views of State, Treasury and AID, which differ greatly with each other. The following proposed allocation reflects our views, assuming you do not choose to use these funds for Bosnian reconstruction. We have chosen to ignore some bureaucratic imperatives in favor of funding good program choices. If you agree with the allocations, we will inform the agencies and work with Senator Leahy to gain their acceptance with the Senate Appropriations Committee. The table at Tab 2 shows the agency proposals and our recommendations.

Multilateral Development Banks (\$235 million increase). There is White House and agency consensus that the International Development Association (IDA) is the Administration's highest priority for additional funds. The total desired spending for this account would be \$810 million. IDA concessional lending goes to the poorest countries in Africa and elsewhere, and it leverages economic reform by multiplying resources from other contributing countries. With funding in FY 1997, this would allow the United States to complete its previous funding pledges, albeit a year late.

Economic Support Funds (\$78 million increase). In addition to Israel and Egypt, this flexible account can provide grant aid to key countries such as Turkey, Haiti and, potentially, Bosnia. Excluding the Middle East peace process recipients, the total for this account would be \$284 million.

Anti-Crime Initiatives (\$15 million increase). This funding would pay for a variety of initiatives against such problems as money laundering.

Newly Independent States (\$25 million increase). The proposed increase would bring this account up to a total of \$605 million. The low House level reflected Congressional displeasure towards Russia, in part due to the Chechnya situation.

AID personnel reduction plan (\$30 million increase). The House-proposed 10 percent cut (\$52 million) in AID's operating expenses in FY 1996 will oblige the agency to reduce its staff and close many overseas missions. To meet short term budget targets, the high up-front costs of reductions in force can require agencies to lay off significantly more staff than otherwise desirable. In AID's case, it could have to lay off as many as 1,000 staff in FY 1996, when the planned permanent reduction is 500 staff. These funds would only be used to downsize AID.

Global Environmental Facility (\$20 million increase). This World Bank-managed pool of funds is intended to counter the potential, adverse, environmental consequences of regular development projects. The total for this facility would be \$50 million, carrying out a US pledge of multi-year support for the GEF.

International Organizations and Programs (\$20 million increase). This account makes contributions to the UN Development Program as well as organizations working on non-proliferation, population and environmental problems. The total level for this account would be \$175 million.

Peacekeeping Organizations (\$15 million increase). This account is a flexible source of funding to meet political needs abroad. The total for this account would be \$83 million.

Partnership for Peace Program (\$5 million). A small amount of funding would also be sought for Foreign Military Financing to support the Partnership for Peace program.

Setting aside the issue of Bosnia, the above allocations reflects consensus recommendation among the Executive Office of the President as to your priorities. Unless you wish us to do otherwise, we intend to pass these allocations back to the relevant agency heads. Assuming you agree, we will work with the agencies to begin discussions with Senator Leahy and other members of the Appropriations Committee on these priorities.

Decision:

_____ Hold these funds for possible use in Bosnia?

_____ Approve the above allocation, passback to relevant agency heads?

_____ Discuss further?

Foreign Operations Subcommittee	FY 1995 Enacted 1	FY 1996 Request	FY 1996 House 2	FY95 vs FY96 House
Middle East econ. & military assist. (ESF/FMF)...	5,218,200	5,243,200	5,243,200	25,000
Israeli Loan Guarantee Program.....	---	---	68,000	68,000
Other Economic Support Fund (ESF).....	232,400	381,100	206,400	-26,000
Peacekeeping Operations (voluntary).....	72,000	100,000	68,300	-3,700
Other Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Grants...	44,279	132,020	81,279	37,000
Assistance to the New Independent States.....	686,900	788,000	580,000	-106,900
Assistance for Central and Eastern Europe.....	359,000	480,000	324,000	-35,000
International Narcotics Control.....	120,244	228,000	130,000	9,756
Export-Import Bank of the United States.....	831,779	870,000	831,779	---
Overseas Private Investment Corp. (OPIC).....	106,944	95,000	85,000	-21,944
Refugee Assistance (incl. emergency prgm).....	721,000	721,000	721,000	---
International Disaster Assistance (AID).....	169,998	200,000	200,000	30,002
Debt Restructuring for the poorest countries.....	7,000	27,000	7,000	---
Jordan Debt forgiveness.....	275,000	---	---	-275,000
Other Debt Restructuring.....	---	15,000	---	---
Multilateral Development Banks (MDB's) & IMF				
International Development Association (IDA)	1,175,000	1,368,168	575,000	-600,000
Other Soft Loan (AfDF, IDB Spec. Ops, ADF)	251,513	452,611	100,000	-151,513
Global Environmental Facility (GEF).....	90,000	110,000	30,000	-60,000
Hard Loan (IBRD, ADB, IDB, EBRD).....	120,624	149,280	131,339	10,715
Enhanced Structural Facility (IMF).....	25,000	25,000	---	-25,000
Other MDB's.....	<u>143,743</u>	<u>223,806</u>	<u>193,800</u>	<u>50,057</u>
Subtotal, MDB's & ESAF.....	1,805,880	2,328,865	1,030,139	-775,741
AID Program Funds				
Develop. Assist. & Develop. Fund for Africa..	2,009,602	2,102,000	1,183,000	-826,602
Children and Disease Program Fund.....	---	---	<u>592,660</u>	<u>592,660</u>
Subtotal, AID program funds.....	2,009,602	2,102,000	1,775,660	-233,942
AID Operating Expenses.....	515,527	529,027	465,750	-49,777
Aid Personnel Reduction Costs.....	---	---	---	---
International organizations & prgms (IO&P).....	359,000	425,000	155,000	-204,000
Peace Corps.....	231,345	234,000	210,000	-21,345
Special Defense Acquisition Fund.....	-282,000	-220,000	-220,000	62,000
Other Programs.....	272,015	348,452	244,100	-27,915
Technical adjustments.....	<u>-216,136</u>	<u>-281,146</u>	<u>-281,146</u>	---
Total, Foreign Operations Subcomm.....	13,539,977	14,746,518	11,925,461	-1,614,516

1. FY 1995 values include supplemental appropriations and rescissions.

2. CBO scoring estimates \$68M in BA & OL for Israeli Loan Guarantees -- OMB scores program at zero.

Headroom Given House Funding	
House-Passed Funding Levels.....	11,925
(House did not use its entire allocation)	
Senate 602(b) Allocations.....	12,300
(Senate allocation is \$100M higher and they intend to use it all)	
Headroom.....	375
Additional Headroom Potential	
Senate-directed scoring of Israeli Loan Guarantee Program.....	68
Total Potential Headroom.....	443

Key Accounts/Programs	House Passed	Proposed Allocation of Headroom				EXOP Consensus
		State	Treasury	AID	EXOP	
International Develop. Assoc (IDA).....	575	225	260	225	235	810
Economic Support Fund (ESF).....	206	50	---	50	78	284
Crime Control/International Narcotics..	113	15	---	10	15	128
Global Environ. Facility (GEF).....	30	20	49	---	20	50
AID Personnel Reduction Costs.....	---	30	---	30	30	30
Foreign Military Financing (FMF).....	81	5	---	---	5	86
Assistance to the NIS.....	580	15	---	15	25	605
International Orgs & Prgms..... *	155	35	---	25	20	175
Peacekeeping Operations.....	68.3	---	---	---	15	83
Asian Bank soft loans.....	100	5	70	---	---	100
World Bank hard loans.....	23	5	5	---	---	23
Inter-American Bank soft loans.....	---	10	21	---	---	---
Europ. Bank for Reconst. & Dev.....	69	---	13	---	---	69
Enhanced Struct. Adj. Facility (IMF).....	---	5	5	---	---	---
Poorest Country Debt Forgiveness.....	7	10	20	11	---	7
AID Development Assistance..... **	1,247	10	---	60	---	1,247
AID Housing Guarantee.....	7	---	---	16	---	7
Total/ Proposed Increase.....	3,262	440	443	442	443	3,705

Notes:

- * The Request included \$100M for UNICEF. The House provided for UNICEF in a new account. The EXOP consensus option level does not include funding for UNICEF. It is assumed that the Senate will fund it in the IO&P account.
- ** House mark for Dev. Assist. does not include @\$492M for children's programs funded in the new account referenced above. It is assumed that the Senate will provide much of this funding in the Development Assistance account.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21002

August 24, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the
United Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget


MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting
on Bosnia, August 23, 1995 (S)

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. (S)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 7/31/14
203-0887-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: August 23, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 3:35 p.m. - 6:25 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger

OMB

Phebe Vickers

Rodney Bent

OVP

Leon Fuerth

Richard Saunders

CIA

Dennis Blair

Norman Schindler

STATE

Strobe Talbott

James Steinberg

John Kornblum

Ralph Johnson

AID

Thomas Dine

Dalena Wright

DEFENSE

John White

Walter Slocombe

Jan Lodal

JCS

Wesley Clark

John Walsh

USUN

David Scheffer

(via secure video)

James O'Brien

NSC

Sandy Vershbow

Richard Clarke

Donald Kerrick

Stephen Flanagan

Summary of Conclusions

Implementation of a Bosnia Peace Settlement

1. Deputies met to finalize development of an integrated political/military plan for implementation of a Bosnian peace settlement. They reached agreement on several elements and tasked papers on several issues that require further analysis. These papers and a further and more detailed iteration of the OSD paper on the Peace Implementation Force (PIF) will be reviewed at another Deputies Meeting on Monday, August 28 (Action: OSD). (S)

Deputies will also review a paper for Principals summarizing key recommendations and issues for decision (Action: NSC). ~~(S)~~

2. Overall Concept: Deputies agreed that our goal in implementing a settlement is to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state comprised of two highly autonomous units. Our priority is to ensure the survival of the Bosniac-Croat Federation; this should be accomplished in the context of unity with the Bosnian Serb entity along with rights of association with Croatia and Serbia. ~~(S)~~

Deputies agreed that the Peace Implementation Force (PIF) should be deployed primarily (but not exclusively) in Federation territory. The operational commander should have broad authority for self-protection of the force and to enforce the cease-fire and separation of forces against incidents initiated by any party, using overwhelming force if necessary. At the same time, Deputies agreed the PIF should have defined limits on the scope of its responsibilities and operational conduct. The Deputies agreed that the response to massive violations of the agreement would be "evenhanded but asymmetrical." In the event of Bosnian Serb violation of the agreement, the PIF should be authorized to respond using air and ground forces, but this response should follow a ladder of escalation. In the event of serious Bosnian Government violation of the agreement, the PIF would withdraw. Deputies further agreed the PIF should not disarm the parties and that some tasks, such as demarcation of borders and resettlement of civilians, could be accomplished by civilian officials or agencies. ~~(S)~~

Taskings: State to draft brief overall mission statement for the PIF reflecting the limited tasks above. NSC to write a short paper identifying possible additional tasks for the PIF that may prove necessary, for example, if the settlement establishes a stronger central government or Bosnia-wide institutions. CIA to do an assessment of the Bosnian government's conception of a settlement and how this may alter the PIF's mission. OSD to do detailed mission statement as part of OSD paper. ~~(S)~~

3. Gorazde: Deputies noted that Principals, in light of Bosnian Government resistance to trading Gorazde for other territories, had requested an examination of the requirements for ensuring the viability of Gorazde if it remains part of the Federation under the terms of a settlement. ~~(S)~~

Taskings: DOD and CIA to assess implications for the PIF and the longer-term defense requirements for Gorazde following the departure of the PIF, using the Contact Group map as the baseline, but considering territorial improvements (e.g., larger corridor) as well. ~~(S)~~

4. Arms Limitations: Deputies agreed that our goal of establishing a stable military balance could best be achieved by a hybrid approach that would support enhancement of the self-defense capabilities of Federation armed forces (ABH and HVO) in tandem with efforts to reach agreement among all the parties to certain arms limitations or reductions. They agreed to separation zones (DMZs) and to examine inventory limits on CFE treaty limited equipment. They agreed that an arms control regime should have a regional context. ~~(S)~~

Taskings: State, in coordination with OSD, to develop detailed options for narrow DMZs, separation of heavy weapons and/or exclusion zones, overall limits on heavy weapons and confidence-building measures that could be included as part of the settlement and/or pursued following implementation of a settlement. ~~(S)~~

5. Exit Strategy: Deputies agreed that we need to establish a date certain for completion of the PIF mission. There was a consensus that the PIF should be terminated by the end of 1996. At the same time, we should identify mission-essential tasks that we would seek to complete prior to that date, although the PIF would withdraw whether or not all those tasks had been accomplished. ~~(S)~~

Taskings: State to draft an initial timeline paper defining political, economic and military benchmarks for accomplishment of critical tasks. CIA to do an assessment of how the parties would react to knowing there was a date certain. ~~(S)~~

6. National Participation/Funding: Deputies agreed that the PIF would be a NATO operation with limited non-NATO involvement. While there would be a UNSC resolution authorizing NATO to conduct the mission, there would be no dual key or other limitations on NATO command and control. Deputies agreed that no Ally should be excluded, but that the need for NAC consensus would force us to deal with Greek approval of Turkish participation. Deputies acknowledged that operational efficiency might be compromised by involvement of non-NATO forces but recognized that non-NATO participation will be politically necessary and, in some respects, desirable (e.g., as a proving ground for Partnership for Peace countries to operate with NATO forces). Non-NATO forces would be under NATO operational control similar to a CJTF. ~~(S)~~

On funding, Deputies agreed that we would seek to follow the normal NATO approach, i.e., NATO and other contributors would pay their own way, with common costs assessed according to a variant of the NATO infrastructure formula. Funding arrangements more

advantageous to the U.S. would be difficult to negotiate with our Allies, but will be explored. ~~(S)~~

Taskings: JCS/OSD to examine the political/military requirements and constraints of making the PIF a NATO-plus force, involving PFP partners and other non-NATO militaries. This should draw on previous NATO planning for implementation of the Vance-Owen plan (40103) and UNPROFOR extraction (40104). OSD/JCS to complete a cost estimate for the probable U.S. contribution to the PIF. The Peacekeeping Funding Group to reexamine alternative cost-sharing arrangements among the participants. ~~(S)~~

7. **Joint Commission:** Deputies agreed that a Joint Commission with local subsidiaries should be established (comprising NATO, the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs) to resolve problems in implementing the military aspects of a settlement. This might have national and regional components. Deputies also agreed that there would be other aspects of settlement implementation (political, economic, humanitarian) that could be beyond the purview of the Joint Commission, and that we needed to develop a concept for how these would be handled and whether there would be a senior Secretary General's Representative for NATO, the UN or, perhaps, the OSCE. They agreed that any arrangement should exclude interference with the operation of the PIF (i.e., no dual keys). ~~(S)~~

Tasking: State to draft a paper on the political analogue to the Joint Commission for implementing the non-military aspects of a settlement. ~~(S)~~

8. **Population Movements:** Deputies agreed that the parties should have primary responsibility for population movements, with international relief agencies (UNHCR) providing secondary support. The PIF should generally avoid involvement in population movements, but it should be prepared to protect UNHCR personnel, aid convoys, and refugees in transit as necessary. Deputies also agreed that restitution and other forms of compensation were alternatives to resettlement that we should encourage the parties to explore. ~~(S)~~

Tasking: State and USUN will do a paper on policy toward population movements, forced departures and associated enforcement mechanisms. ~~(S)~~

Post-War Reconstruction Assistance

9. Deputies agreed that we urgently need a conceptual framework and initial plan for post-war regional reconstruction, as well as rough estimates of the overall cost, and the preferred cost-sharing among the U.S., EU, Japan and Islamic countries. They

also expressed concerns about the difficulties of offsetting the U.S. contribution to the program on the basis of reductions in other programs. Deputies agreed that we would actively pursue the EU's offer to take the lead and press the EU, Japan and the Islamic states to clarify their contributions to the package. Deputies agreed that, in order to encourage Bosnian Government flexibility in the negotiations, Ambassador Holbrooke should be in a position by Monday to suggest the size of the U.S. contribution that the President will seek from the Congress in the event of a settlement (between \$500 million and \$1 billion over 3-5 years). They also agreed that we needed to inform the Congress immediately of our thinking on post-war reconstruction in the context of consultations on the progress of the U.S. diplomatic initiative. ~~(S)~~

Taskings: State to develop a post-war reconstruction program for the region, in coordination with NSC, OMB, AID and other agencies. State to draft talking points for a call by National Security Advisor Lake to Spanish Foreign Minister Solana to reconfirm the EU's willingness to take the lead on reconstruction and to offer the parties such carrots as EU association and enhanced market access. State and NSC to draft talking points for Holbrooke's use with the Bosnians on August 28. State and NSC to draft a gameplan and talking points for Congressional consultations August 26-28; these points should be in the context of an overall review of the status of the peace initiative and should also reference our commitment to participate in an implementation force if there is an agreement they will explain our goals and why solid U.S. financial backing is essential. ~~(S)~~

Sanctions

10. Deputies affirmed agreement on the main elements of our approach to sanctions relief for the FRY in the context of the U.S. diplomatic initiative: all UNSC sanctions, except those governing frozen assets subject to claims, would be suspended once there is a signed agreement; there would be a complete lifting of sanctions once implementation of the plan is completed; and Belgrade would receive less sweeping suspension of sanctions if it failed to agree to a solution for Eastern Slavonia at the time of signature. It was agreed that Deputies would need to decide at their next meeting how long we should hold Belgrade accountable for the actions of the Pale Serbs, and what would be the precise conditions for sanctions lifting. ~~(S)~~

Tasking: OVP to circulate a paper on a proposed sanctions strategy, highlighting the 4 or 5 fundamental issues needing Deputies' attention, including the sanctions reimposition mechanism and linkages to a Croatia settlement and war crimes, in preparation for the Deputies' meeting on August 28. ~~(S)~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008a. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Bill Clinton. [English Translation] (3 pages)	08/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2757

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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008b. letter	Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Bill Clinton. [Russian] (2 pages)	08/14/1995	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

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Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]

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- Duration of offer?
 - Open ended or finite time span?
 - If offer withdrawn, what happens then?
- When does the FRY get sanction relief?
 - Upon start of negotiations & satisfaction of other conditions?
 - or upon formal completion of an agreement?
- When are sanctions on Pale suspended?
- When are FRY sanctions lifted?
- When are sanctions on Pale lifted?
- Are FRY and Pale treated the same throughout?
 - If different, for what purpose and how?

Reimposition

- ~~Response~~ mechanism:
 - Automatic mechanisms
 - Set review peirods with votes *to be renew?* or ~~review~~?
 - Right of challenge with votes to extend?
- What to do about a Croatia linkage?
 - Decouple? - Other
 - Delay final lift?
- Whether & how to include a war crimes linkage?

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. paper	Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement. (4 pages)	08/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2757

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