

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

896

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

1

Position:

1

Stack:

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For Chairman of the Military Committee. Subject: Current Operations. [NATO] (2 pages)	09/02/1995	P1/b(1)
002. talking points	For the Vice President's Phone Call to Bosnian President Izetbegovic. (1 page)	09/02/1995	P1/b(1)
003. letter	Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic to President Clinton. (1 page)	09/02/1995	P1/b(1)
004. note	For Sandy Vershbow, Sandy Berger, and Tony Lake. Subject: Sunday Evening with Milosevic. (2 pages)	09/04/1995	P1/b(1)
005. cable	re: Muratovic. (2 pages)	09/04/1995	P1/b(1)
006. cable	re: Bosnian Serbs Agree to Comply with Ultimatum. (2 pages)	09/04/1995	P1/b(1)
007. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Phone Call to NATO Secretary General Cleas. Record ID: 9506571. (2 pages)	09/01/1995	P1/b(1)
008. talking points	Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac. Record ID: 9506557. (2 pages)	09/1995	P1/b(1)
009. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 5, 1995. Record ID: 9521024. (1 page)	09/05/1994	P1/b(1)
010. draft	U.S. Proposal. (1 page)	08/31/1995	P1/b(1)
011. talking points	Duplicate of 008. (3 pages)	09/1995	P1/b(1)
012. list	Aircraft. (1 page)	09/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2755

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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013. chart	Sanctions Relief Strategy, 08/28/1995. (1 page)	08/28/1995	P1/b(1)
014. paper	Achieving a Bosnian Peace Settlement: Draft Memorandum for Principals. (5 pages)	08/27/1995	P1/b(1)
015. paper	Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement. (4 pages)	08/25/1995	P1/b(1)
016. letter	To General Ratko Mladic from Lieutenant General Bernard Janvier. [NATO] (1 page)	08/30/1995	P1/b(1)

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UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

United Nations Peace Forces - Headquarters
Forces de Paix des Nations Unies - Quartier Général

Lieutenant General Bernard JANVIER
Force Commander

ZAGREB, 03 September 1995

General

After extensive consultations with both United Nations and NATO authorities, I must inform you that your response to my letter dated 30 August 1995 has not been accepted.

Your assurance that you will not conduct any combat operations or threaten attacks against the Safe Areas is welcomed. However, the form of your agreement on the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the Sarajevo 20 kilometre Exclusion Zone is unacceptable. It does not provide sufficient assurance of your cooperation. Your position on freedom of movement offers no improvement over the current situation. This is wholly unacceptable to the international community, which demands that the UN implement its mandate.

Notwithstanding these differences, political authorities have given their support for a further temporary suspension of NATO air strikes. The continuation of the pause is subject to the following conditions:

- There must be no attacks on Sarajevo or other Safe Areas. Any attack will result in immediate resumption of air operations.
- You must begin immediately the withdrawal of Heavy Weapons from the 20 km exclusion zone around Sarajevo, and complete the withdrawal without any halts or delays. Your progress towards complete withdrawal by 2300 hours on 4 September will be assessed as a measure of your compliance.
- The UN and authorized international humanitarian organizations must be granted complete freedom of movement and the unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport, with no requirement to comply with the "normal procedures" which you have hitherto imposed.

NATO and the UN will assess your compliance with these conditions at 2300 hours (local time) on 4 September 1995. If compliance is not fully satisfactory, air strikes will resume immediately. If compliance is initially satisfactory but there is non-compliance later, air strikes will resume. The London Declaration of 21 July 1995 will remain in effect. I reminded you of the terms of this declaration in my letter of 14 August.

During the pause, NATO aircraft will continue air patrols over Bosnia-Herzegovina. They will react immediately to any attack or display of hostility.

Assuming your compliance, NATO and the UN will expect Bosnian Government forces to show restraint in and around Sarajevo.

I expect a reply to this letter within 24 hours. On receipt of your reply, UNPROFOR headquarters will issue instructions concerning the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the establishment of freedom of movement.

General Ratko Mladic

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Ratko Mladic'.

September 2, 1995

Proposed NATO/UN Statement

try this
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Mladic letter is not acceptable as basis to end NATO air strikes.

NATO will continue pause in air strikes for no more than 72 hours ~~further 24-36 hours~~, subject to following:

- No Bosnian Serb attacks on Sarajevo or other Safe Areas. If such attacks occur, pause will end immediately
- Bosnian Serbs begin withdrawal of Heavy Weapons from 20km total exclusion zone around Sarajevo. Further procedures to complete and verify withdrawal to be worked out with UNPROFOR HQ in Sarajevo and promptly implemented.
- Complete freedom of movement for UN and NGOs, and unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport (with no requirement to comply with Bosnian Serbs' "normal procedures").

NATO and UN will assess Bosnian Serb compliance with these conditions on September 3. If compliance is not fully satisfactory, air strikes will resume immediately. If compliance is initially satisfactory but there is non-compliance later, air strikes will resume. July 21 London Declaration will remain in effect.

During the pause and, assuming Bosnian Serb compliance thereafter, NATO and UN will expect Bosnian Government forces to show restraint and not take advantage of the situation in and around Sarajevo.

During the pause, NATO aircraft will continue air patrols over Bosnia-Herzegovina. NATO aircraft will react immediately to any attack or display of hostile intent by Bosnian Serbs.

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STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL
FOLLOWING COUNCIL MEETING - 2 SEPTEMBER 1995

The Council took note of a report by the NATO military commanders on Operation "Deliberate Force".

The reply of General Mladic is not sufficient and does not constitute a basis for terminating air strikes.

We expect the Bosnian Serbs to comply with the conditions of the United Nations and in particular:

- no Bosnian Serb attacks on Sarajevo or other Safe Areas,
- Bosnian Serb withdrawal of heavy weapons from the 20 km total exclusion zone around Sarajevo without delay;
- complete freedom of movement for UN forces and personnel and NGOs and unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport.

The NATO military commanders are authorized to resume air strikes at any moment in conformity with the Council's decisions of 25th July and 1st August.

The NATO military commanders are pursuing for a brief period the suspension of air strikes in order to determine if the conditions of the United Nations have begun to be implemented by

- 2 -

the Bosnian Serbs. This period will be determined by joint agreement of the UN and NATO military commanders.

Assuming Bosnian Serb compliance, Bosnian Government forces are expected to show restraint and not take advantage of the situation in and around Sarajevo.

NATO air operations continue over Bosnia-Herzegovina and NATO aircraft will react immediately to any attack or display of hostile intent against them by Bosnian Serbs.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Jackson, Wyoming

August 28, 1995

Dear Mr. Leader:

I have received your letter expressing your deep concerns about our recent diplomatic initiatives to bring an end to the Balkan conflict. We share a common desire to see a durable peace achieved throughout the Balkans. I launched our new diplomatic initiative out of a conviction that developments on the ground have created real opportunities for us to break the diplomatic stalemate and avoid yet another round of bloodshed.

The team I sent to Europe earlier this month, led by Anthony Lake, found the Europeans firmly supportive of our proposal and our leadership. The Lake team carried a bold new initiative for peace. Building on the results of the Lake mission, I then asked Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke to travel to the former Yugoslav states, where he has had encouraging preliminary consultations.

We all are deeply saddened by the death last Saturday of three members of that team, Ambassador Robert Frasure, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Krüzel and Colonel Nelson Drew. Nonetheless, we intend to persevere in our efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Balkans and are exploring with the parties ideas that include carrots and sticks designed to encourage an early settlement consistent with the principles of the Contact Group plan.

As we have briefed your staff, sanctions remain a critical source of leverage with Serbia in achieving a comprehensive settlement. Thus, we are proposing suspension of a broad range of sanctions -- not full lifting as your letter states -- only if there is agreement on a political settlement in Bosnia.

With regard to your concern over Kosovo, we have already expressed to Milosevic our concern that large-scale resettlement of Krajina Serbs in Kosovo would be a provocative act. Moreover, Belgrade is well aware of the U.S. commitment, which I have reaffirmed, to take action against Serbia in response to Serb-inspired violence in Kosovo. While some Krajina Serbs have moved into Kosovo, others are resisting efforts to resettle them in the

province. We are watching the situation closely. Our position on Kosovo has not changed. We continue to support restoration of autonomy and full respect for the human and civil rights of the people of Kosovo. Furthermore, we will not support full reintegration of Serbia into the international community until a solution for Kosovo is achieved. Our ultimate goal is to achieve a comprehensive settlement that enhances regional stability and provides for economic reconstruction, which is the prerequisite for long-term harmony among states in the region.

I hope this elaboration of our policy makes clear that we have no intention of easing the existing sanctions against Serbia until there is a peace settlement in Bosnia. Our objective here is the achievement of a just peace agreement. While I disagree with your approach of unilateral lift of the arms embargo, I understand that its ultimate purpose is to restore a balance of power that also will lead to negotiations and a peace settlement. I believe we must seize this moment to see if we can achieve a fair and durable settlement now, without another year or more of escalating fighting. I would hope that you will give that effort a full and unencumbered opportunity to be tested and your strong support if it is successful.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Clinton". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

The Honorable Robert Dole
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

United States Senate

OFFICE OF THE REPUBLICAN LEADER

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7010

August 17, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing to express my deep concern about reports regarding U.S. diplomatic initiatives being presented by U.S. representatives to Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian officials. Of greatest immediate concern are the reports that the United States supports fully lifting sanctions on Serbia in the event that Serbia recognizes Bosnia and Croatia and supports a settlement that would result in a 51%-49% partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina.


Such an approach, if adopted and agreed to by Serbian President Milosevic, would in my view reward his pariah regime without requiring real results on the ground in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, and as importantly, it would not address the critical issue of the status and rights of the Albanian majority in Kosova who have been under martial law for over six years now. At this very moment, thousands of Serb refugees are being resettled in Kosova -- which will likely exacerbate the situation there and could lead to conflict. As your administration and the Bush administration have publicly recognized, a conflict in Kosova can be expected to draw in Albania and our NATO allies. Therefore, the issue of the rights and future of the majority Albanian population in Kosova must be addressed as part of any settlement in the former Yugoslavia.

I believe the United States should pursue a long term, comprehensive approach, rather than the apparent short term, piecemeal approach being pursued by your administration. One of America's key objectives should be stability in the region, and this goal cannot be achieved without a military balance in Bosnia and Croatia, and without addressing the status of Albanians in Kosova. The bottom line is that sanctions are the only real leverage the international community has been willing to use on the Belgrade regime. These sanctions should not be lifted until a comprehensive settlement which includes Kosova, is not only agreed to, but implemented.

If we lift sanctions now for what are clearly minimal returns, such a comprehensive settlement will be virtually impossible to reach and implement. Moreover, it will be extremely difficult to reimpose sanctions if and when necessary. In short, your administration's approach would yet again reward

President Milosevic prematurely -- for his promises, rather than his deeds. Therefore, Mr. President, I strongly urge you to reconsider this position. In the event that the administration does not change its position on sanctions, my colleagues and I will have to explore all legislative options.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bob Dole", with a stylized, flowing script.

BOB DOLE

- It appears that the three Balkan foreign ministers (Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia) have agreed to meet in Geneva late next week.
- We would expect Contact Group representatives also to be present. But no decision yet on whether our Ministers should be there.
- Aim of the meeting will be to reach agreement on basic principles of a settlement as the foundation for intensive negotiations aimed at completing an agreement in the following weeks.
- Time is important. Given the complicated situation with the air strikes, etc., we plan to announce this development in Washington this afternoon.
- We are now consulting with the four original Contact Group partners. At the time of the announcement, we would invite expanded group to include Italy, Spain, Canada and Turkey to attend as well. UN rep and Bildt should also be there.
- Dick Holbrooke will discuss the Foreign Ministers' meeting with your representatives at the Contact Group meeting in Bonn tomorrow.

FINANCING A PEACE IMPLEMENTATION FORCE

August 28, 1995

The United States will consider participating in peace implementation activities in the Former Yugoslavia in the event a peace settlement is reached. Such activities could include monitoring the peace with a multinational military force that would be NATO, not U.N., led. As a part of such a force, the Administration should consider options that minimize the U.S. costs of participation. Towards that end, this concept paper discusses options for financing a peace implementation force (PIF).

Financing Options

The Contingency Financing Working Group considered four options for financing the NATO-led PIF. The options range from nations paying their own way to full NATO financing with member nations paying only their assessed share of the total operational costs. The Working Group determined that financing U.N.-related operations (e.g. UNPREDEP, humanitarian relief, etc.) in the Former Yugoslavia are an issue separate from financing a PIF. Thus, financing options for U.N. related operations are not considered here. Nevertheless, the Working Group believes the Deputies should account for all U.S. military, economic reconstruction, and U.N. commitments -- such as Deny Flight and UNPREDEP costs -- before determining the level of U.S. contribution to each.

The Working Group considered several options; four were selected as being the most viable for the Deputies to consider.

Option #1: Pay-Your-Own-Way

Financing: Under this option, each nation would pay its own costs for participating in the PIF. There would be no institutional (i.e., U.N. or NATO) budgetary participation. Therefore there would be no assessed costs to the participating nations.

Reimbursements: There would be no reimbursements.

Option #2: Standard NATO Share

Financing: NATO would fund the traditional common costs of headquarters, communications and engineering requirements for the PIF. Based upon estimated 40104 costs, this would amount to approximately 5% of the entire cost of the PIF. To pay its common costs, NATO would assess each of its member nations for their share based on standard NATO assessed rates. For the U.S., this would equal approximately 24% of the common costs. Nations participating in the PIF would pay their remaining costs (e.g.

deployment / redeployment, and sustainment, et al.) of the operation from their own treasuries. This would amount to approximately 95% of the entire cost of the PIF.

Reimbursements: Assuming that NATO does not have time to assess its member nations *before* the operation begins, then it would have to collect assessments and reimburse member nations *afterwards* for common costs that they covered out of their own treasuries. NATO would reimburse out of the assessments that it collects. However, NATO does not currently have any reimbursement mechanism, and some argue the level of NATO reimbursements would be uncertain.

Option #3: Expanded NATO Share

Financing: NATO would fund an expanded set of common costs that cover more than just the traditional headquarters, communications and engineering requirements. Such costs might include, for example, in-theater logistics costs. An expanded set of common costs could be based on those consistently presented by NATO budgeters in the 40104 budget. Based upon the 40104 budget, the expanded common costs would amount to approximately 25% of the entire cost of the PIF. To pay its common costs, NATO would assess each of its members for their share based on standard NATO assessed rates. For the U.S., this would equal approximately 24% of the expanded common costs. Nations participating in the PIF would pay their remaining costs (e.g. deployment / redeployment, and unique sustainment, et al.) of the operation from their own treasuries. This would amount to approximately 75% of the entire cost of the PIF.

Reimbursements: Assuming that NATO does not have time to assess its member nations *before* the operation begins, then it would have to collect assessments and reimburse member nations *afterwards* for common costs that they covered out of their own treasuries. NATO would reimburse out of the assessments that it collects. However, NATO does not currently have any reimbursement mechanism, and some argue the level of NATO reimbursements would be uncertain.

Option #4: NATO Pays

Financing: NATO would fund the entire cost of the PIF. To pay for all of the costs, NATO would assess each of its members for their share based on standard NATO assessed rates. Thus the U.S. would pay for approximately 24% of the entire peace implementation operation.

Reimbursements: Assuming that NATO does not have time to assess its member nations *before* the operation begins, then it would have to collect assessments and reimburse member nations *afterwards* for common costs that they covered out of their own treasuries. NATO would reimburse out of the assessments that it collects. However, NATO does not currently have any reimbursement mechanism, and some argue the level of NATO reimbursements would be uncertain.


Assumptions

In developing the financing options, the Working Group made only the following assumptions:

- Nations participate in a multinational peace operation that is NATO-led.
- NATO member troops currently in UNPROFOR would revert back to their respective nations' militaries and come under NATO command and control.
- Non-NATO nations currently in UNPROFOR that choose to participate in the PIF would also revert to their respective nations' militaries. They would no longer be under U.N. auspices, and they would pay their own way.
- Financing and reimbursements would be for *incremental* not total costs.
- Planning assumptions made by other organizations hold true.

The Force / Financing Trade-Off

In general, every \$1 of U.S. costs that is assumed by NATO saves the U.S. approximately 75 cents. This is because NATO costs are spread among its member nations, and the U.S. pays roughly one quarter of NATO assessments. Therefore, in every instance where the U.S. would pay more than 24% (the U.S. assessment rate) of PIF costs that NATO would otherwise cover, then the U.S. saves money. This would presumably occur if the U.S. contributes more than 24% of the force structure of the PIF. In such cases, the Working Group determined that the U.S. should seek to have NATO cover as much of the costs as negotiable (Options #3 and #4 above). Conversely, where NATO covers costs that the U.S. would otherwise pay less than 24% of, then the U.S. pays disproportionately more. This would presumably occur if the U.S. contributes less than 24% of the force structure of the PIF. In those cases, the U.S. is better off having NATO pay none or only some of the costs (Options #1 and #2 above). This force / financing trade-off is best illustrated in the following spectrum diagram:



Moving from left to right across the spectrum, as the U.S. commits to a greater share of PIF force levels and costs, then it is in the U.S. interest to seek greater NATO coverage of PIF costs. By the same token, the U.S. can expect its NATO allies to resist expanding NATO budgetary coverage if they determine that they would pay a higher portion of the PIF than under a more limited NATO budgetary involvement.

In the absence of adequate force structure and cost data, the Working Group can not at this time recommend to the Deputies a financing option. Funding estimates can be made once force levels are determined. Thus, as such data become available this week, the Working Group will be able to make such a recommendation.

Voluntary Fund

Finally, the working Group considered the idea of establishing a voluntary fund -- into which nations not participating in the PIF would contribute to help pay for the PIF -- and determined that such a fund would be a useful cost offset for each one of the financing options discussed above. Thus the Group encourages the Administration to lead the way in establishing such a fund into which others may contribute.

However, the Working Group also determined that a voluntary fund for the PIF could not be established in isolation from (and indeed, would compete with) a similar fund to offset economic reconstruction costs. Thus only one umbrella voluntary fund may be warranted. In that context, the Deputies would have to discern on what basis voluntary contributions would be used to offset economic vice military operations. Indeed, contributing nations might consistently earmark funding only for economic reconstruction, rendering voluntary contributions for the PIF a moot issue.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21017

August 31, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the
United Nations

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting
on Bosnia, August 28, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

By VZ NARA, Date 7/30/2014
203-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: August 28, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:00 p.m. - 4:10 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia (~~S~~)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger

OMB

Gordon Adams

Mark Sandy

OVP

Leon Fuerth

Richard Saunders

CIA

Dennis Blair

Norman Schindler

STATE

Strobe Talbott

John Kornblum

Ralph Johnson

AID

Thomas Dine

Dalena Wright

TREASURY

Jeffrey Shafer

Stephen Altheim

JCS

Michael Byrum

John Walsh

DEFENSE

John White

Walter Slocombe

Ted Warner

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

Steven Simon

Sue Bremner

Stephen Flanagan

USUN

David Scheffer

James O'Brien

Summary of ConclusionsImplementation of a Bosnia Peace Settlement

1. Deputies met to advance the integrated political/military plan for implementation of a Bosnian peace settlement. They agreed to finalize a draft memo to Principals by Wednesday, August 30, summarizing their main conclusions and recommendations

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

RZ 10/1/2013

on: (A) issues affecting the ongoing negotiations, and (B) issues relating to implementation of a Bosnian peace settlement (Action: NSC). ~~(S)~~

2. Peace Implementation Force: Deputies expressed satisfaction with the latest draft of the DoD concept paper on "Implementing a Peace Settlement." In reviewing the NSC paper on "Additional Tasks for the PIF," they agreed that the PIF should only play a limited role, as essential to the conduct of its core mission, in such areas as civil works, population movements, and relief support. They also agreed that some of the possible additional functions, such as border demarcation/monitoring and arms control implementation, should be conducted by civilian authorities. State offered to address the integration of requisite political and military functions in its paper on the political counterpart to the PIF Joint Commission. They also agreed that the IWG should review the DoD paper on Gorazde at the August 29 SVTS (Action: State/NSC). ~~(S)~~

3. DENY FLIGHT, Air Cover, and the PIF: Deputies discussed the problems of creating a stable military balance during and after the implementation of the settlement given the fact that the Bosnian Government has no aircraft or air defenses to counter the Bosnian Serb's Air Force and links to the integrated air defense network of the former Yugoslavia. JCS and OSD noted that giving the Bosnian government aircraft or even a limited air defense capability would be very costly. State argued that if NATO air strikes were the equalizer in the pre-PIF era, they should remain so during implementation of a settlement and, if necessary, for a period of time after the PIF's departure. Deputies agreed these issues should be highlighted in the memorandum to Principals and that they would discuss this issue further in the context of their review of a State paper on timelines for implementation of a settlement. As a first step, JCS will draft a paper on continuation of air support beyond the PIF (Action: JCS). ~~(S)~~

4. Economic Reconstruction Plan: Deputies agreed that discussion with the parties, other donors, or the Congress of specific dollar figures for the reconstruction plan at this point is both premature and possibly counterproductive. They agreed that Principals should endorse a general statement on the scope of the plan and a range of U.S. contributions to it. They agreed the plan should include: a humanitarian element, which would decline over a two-year period; provisions for reconstruction of infrastructure, with a major role for the IFIs; and support for market reforms and restructuring to ensure that the old socialist economic legacy is overcome. They also agreed that the U.S. should serve as a catalyst in this effort, with the EU taking the lead and with major contributions from Japan and the Islamic states -- including those in Southeast Asia. They agreed that the State paper on reconstruction should be refined to clarify

the scope of the plan. State was also tasked with a gameplan for consultations with the EU, Japan, Islamic states, and the IFIs to be presented to Principals. Treasury agreed to do a paper examining various debt issues, including arrearages (Action: State/Treasury). ~~(S)~~

5. Sanctions Relief: Deputies reviewed the OVP papers on sanctions relief under the U.S. diplomatic initiative. They agreed to defer the question of whether the offer of suspension is open-ended or time-limited. They also discussed the mechanism for reimposition and the linkage to Croatia, noting the time-sequencing problem if achievement of a settlement on Eastern Slavonia takes longer than the 10-12 months envisioned for sanctions suspension. They agreed that the issues of sanctions relief for Pale and how long to hold Milosevic accountable for the Pale Serb actions should be open to review as the negotiations evolve (No new action). ~~(S)~~

6. Arm and Train: Deputies discussed the DoD paper briefly and agreed that training could be conducted in Bosnia by non-PIF personnel. They also agreed that the IWG should review the following questions during its August 29 SVTS: provision of close air support/no-fly enforcement during the implementation period; how to exclude participation by Iran in the coalition; legal matters; funding; involvement of allies/others; whether/how this program could be conducted in the absence of a UN Security Council resolution to lift the arms embargo; and Croatia's involvement (Action: IWG). ~~(S)~~

7. Outstanding Papers: Deputies agreed to review at a later date State papers on arms control, implementation timelines, and a political analogue to the Joint Commission; DoD papers on cost estimates for the U.S. contribution to the PIF and how to make the PIF work as a NATO force; and OMB's paper on financing options for the PIF. ~~(S)~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6571

September 1, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *W*
FROM: SUE BREMNER *SB*
SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call with NATO Secretary
General Claes

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding talking points for his use in a telephone call with NATO Secretary General Claes.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 7/30/2014

2013-0687-F

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Declassify on: OADR

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Phone Call to NATO Secretary General Cleas. Record ID: 9506571. (2 pages)	09/01/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2755

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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FBIS S 336AUG30 (SEE 326AUG30)

UNCLAS 2Y

FRY: TANJUG Reports 'Text' of Agreement With Bosnian Serbs LD3008211095
Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1852 GMT 30 Aug 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 30 Aug (TANJUG) -- A joint meeting of the leaderships of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] and of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic [RS] was held yesterday, 29 August. An agreement was reached according to which Pale accepts Belgrade's peace policy, i.e., the RS leadership agrees to fully coordinate its approach to the peace process with the FRY leadership in the interest of achieving peace.

Peace talks on resolving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be held by a six-member delegation (three members each from the FRY and the RS), led by Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia.

The joint meeting was attended by FRY President Zoran Lilic; Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic; Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic; Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic; Federal Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic; and Colonel General Momcilo Perisic, chief of general staff of the Yugoslav Army, on behalf of the FRY, and by Radovan Karadzic and Biljana Plavsic, the president and vice president of the Serb Republic; Assembly President Momcilo Krajsnik; RS Prime Minister Dusan Kozic; Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha; and Colonel General Ratko Mladic, chief of general staff of the Serb Republic Army; with Generals Zdravko Tolimir, Milan Gvero and Djordje Djukic on behalf of the Serb Republic.

The meeting was also attended by Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and Bishop Irinej Bulovic.

The following is the text of the agreement:

1. The RS leadership agrees to fully coordinate its approach to the peace process with the FRY leadership, in the interest of achieving peace.

2. To this aim the RS will delegate the following three members to a single six-member delegation which, led by Republic of Serbia President Slobodan Milosevic, which will hold talks on the overall peace process for Bosnia-Herzegovina:

Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic,
Momcilo Krajsnik, president of the RS Assembly, and
Col. Gen. Ratko Mladic, commander of the general staff of the Serb

INTERNATIONAL

INTERNATIONAL

Republic Army.

The delegation has been charged on behalf of the Serb Republic with signing the part of a peace agreement that refers to the Serb Republic, with the duty of implementing the achieved agreement strictly and consistently.

3. The RS leadership agrees that the delegation will adopt all binding decisions in connection with the peace plan by a simple majority.

In the event of a tie, President Slobodan Milosevic will have the casting vote.

4. The FRY Government will elect the members of the FRY delegation.

5. President Slobodan Milosevic will decide on possible changes to the FRY delegation, and President Radovan Karadzic will decide on any changes to the RS delegation, on condition that the changes to the delegations do not affect the provisions of this agreement.

The text of the agreement was signed by all participants in the joint meeting.

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FBIS 08/30/95 17:08:00

FROM:
SITREPT

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. talking points	Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac. Record ID: 9506557. (2 pages)	09/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2755

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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009. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 5, 1995. Record ID: 9521024. (1 page)	09/05/1994	P1/b(1)
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National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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2013-0687-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. draft	U.S. Proposal. (1 page)	08/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [2]

2013-0687-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. talking points	Duplicate of 008. (3 pages)	09/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2755

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. list	Aircraft. (1 page)	09/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2755

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. chart	Sanctions Relief Strategy, 08/28/1995. (1 page)	08/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [2]

2013-0687-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
014. paper	Achieving a Bosnian Peace Settlement: Draft Memorandum for Principals. (5 pages)	08/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2755

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
015. paper	Implementing a Balkan Peace Settlement. (4 pages)	08/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early): Early Sept. [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2755

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United Nations Peace Forces - Headquarters
Forces de Paix des Nations Unies - Quartier Général

Lieutenant General Bernard JANVIER
Force Commander

ZAGREB, 30 August 1995

Dear General,

Following the events in Bosnia of earlier today, and in an effort to stabilize the situation and prevent its further deterioration, I propose the following:

1. The cessation of all attacks and threats of attack by Bosnian Serb forces against the Safe Areas of Bihac, Gorazde, Sarajevo and Tuzla.
2. The complete withdrawal of all your heavy weapons from the 20 kilometer exclusion zone around Sarajevo; this withdrawal would be subject to air and ground verification, with which Bosnian Serb forces will fully cooperate.
3. An immediate and complete cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including all the elements of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement of 31 December 1994 relating to the aforementioned Safe Areas.

Fulfillment of the above conditions would be satisfactory to meet the requirements explained in my letter to you of earlier today. Once you have accepted the above three points, I will recommend to NATO that its present air attacks be halted. Air attacks will continue until I receive your positive response. Be assured that, in the event of any broken agreements on your part, I will not hesitate to recommend re-starting the air attacks. I ask that you immediately convey to me in writing your acceptance of the above proposals.

General Bernard JANVIER

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
016. letter	To General Ratko Mladic from Lieutenant General Bernard Janvier. [NATO] (1 page)	08/30/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman

For Immediate Release
Taken Question (August 29, 1995)

August 29, 1995

LETTER FROM KARADZIC TO PRESIDENT CARTER

Q: What is the Department's reaction to the letter sent by Radovan Karadzic to former President Carter?

A: -- THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IS STUDYING THE LETTER SENT BY RADOVAN KARADZIC TO FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER. CERTAIN PARTS WILL NEED CLARIFICATION, BUT THERE ARE SOME POTENTIALLY POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN IT WHICH WE ARE EXAMINING CAREFULLY. ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE IS MEETING NOW WITH THE BOSNIAN LEADERSHIP IN PARIS TO DISCUSS THIS NEW DEVELOPMENT.

OPTIONAL FORM 39 (7-80)

FAX TRANSMITTAL

of pages 1

To <u>S. Vershrow</u>	From <u>Aric Schwab</u>
Dept./Agency	Phone #
Fax #	Fax #

NRN 7540-01-317-7388

5029-101

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

Date: 01-01-90 Time: 02:05 Transmitter ID: < User ID Info >

*Izetbegovic Proposal***Bosnia: Post-Peace Agreement
Constitutional Structure**

- 1.) The existing Republic would continue to exist, with existing borders and international recognition.
- 2.) It would be composed of two autonomous entities, the existing Federation and an autonomous Serb entity, (ASE).
- 3.) The Republic's foreign affairs functions would be delegated to and fulfilled by appropriate officials of the Federation in the name of the Republic.
- 4.) Although the ASE would not be an internationally recognized state and would be unable to field a recognized diplomatic corps, it would have the right to post ASE representatives at Republic embassies.
- 5.) Since both constituent entities have an interest in the enforcement of internationally recognized human rights, the Republic, (acting on behalf of both constituent entities), would maintain a seven-person Human Rights Court, (two Bosnians, two Croats, two Serbs, and an international member appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice), to hear and decide and provide an appropriate remedy for any human rights complaint voiced by any citizen of either constituent entity.
- 6.) Either constituent entity would have the right to maintain cultural and economic relations with other countries, (eg., as between the ASE and Serbia).

SENSITIVE