

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early) [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

896

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

1

Position:

1

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Continuing Hardship for Krajina Serbs. (1 page)	09/11/1995	P1/b(1)
002. memo	Summary of Conclusions for Ad Hoc Interagency Meeting on the War Crimes Tribunal. (1 page)	09/11/1995	P1/b(1)
003. draft	September 8 Draft. (11 pages)	09/08/1995	P1/b(1)
004. report	Milosevic, Karadzic, Mladic: Serbs Disunited. (6 pages)	09/05/1995	P1/b(1)
005. draft	Paper: Diplomatic Considerations. (3 pages)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early) [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2753

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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INTERNATIONAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BELL, BREMNER, CLARKER, DAALDER, FLANAGAN, NODIST, PETERS, SAUNDERS,
SCHWARTZ, SESTAK, VERSHBOW

PREC: RUSH CLASS: INTERNATIONAL DTG:

FM: FBIS

TO:

FBIS

123SEP11

UNCLAS 21

B-H: Karadzic Threatens To Withdraw From Peace Process LD1109192095
Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 11 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Due to the increasingly brutal bombings
and the announced new terrorist actions against the [Bosnian] Serb Republic,
President Radovan Karadzic today sent a letter to U.S. and Russian Presidents
Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin and British Prime Minister John Major.

Here is the text of that letter:

Sirs,

The NATO decision to launch cruise missiles on Banja Luka is incomprehen-
sible. This unprovoked and beyond-all-barbaric act is not just a dramatic
escalation of the conflict, but comes at a time when the peace process
has moved into a firm and resolute direction following the successful
Geneva meeting on 8 September. I believe that if NATO attacks are to
continue, the diplomatic breakthrough made in Geneva will quickly and
easily disappear into the thin air and the entire peace process will be
put into jeopardy.

We face an unprecedented situation when the international community
is investing enormous efforts to secure a peaceful solution to the conflict
on the one hand, and on the other, the same international community is
-- via the Western military alliance -- bombing and destroying its own
diplomatic achievements.

The Serb Republic delegation went to Geneva despite, and not because
of the NATO bombing campaign.

In the light of the continuing attacks, in which mostly civilians
are casualties, the Serb Republic might be forced once more to reconsider
its further participation in peace negotiations.

It must be proven to us that NATO has not taken the law into its
own hands, because it is quite clear that the most powerful military alliance
on this planet has openly sided with our enemies, who, in their own style,
have already started to exploit military opportunities created for them
by the impudent campaign against the Serb Republic.

What is happening now has absolutely nothing to do with the imposition
of peace. NATO has declared war on the Serbs. What is left now is to
see whether the international community as a whole will be capable of
halting these insane developments. The time is running out quickly, the
letter, which our country's president Radovan Karadzic sent to world leaders,
concludes.

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INTERNATIONAL

INTERNATIONAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SCHWARTZ, SESTAK, VERSHBOW

PREC: RUSH CLASS: INTERNATIONAL DTG:

FM: FBIS

TO:

F1123

FBIS

123SEP11

UNCLAS 2I

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INTERNATIONAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN

For Immediate Release

September 8, 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Today's successful meeting in Geneva of the Foreign Ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is an important milestone on the road to peace in the former Yugoslavia. As a result of intensive mediation by Ambassador Holbrooke and his team -- supported by our Contact Group partners in the European Union and Russia -- the three Foreign Ministers have endorsed a set of Agreed Basic Principles that will serve as the framework for a political settlement to the conflict in Bosnia. The Foreign Ministers of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have also agreed to work actively toward a peaceful solution in Eastern Slavonia, the Serb-controlled area of the Republic of Croatia also known as UN Sector East.

The Agreed Basic Principles commit all three governments to support a settlement consistent with the goals we have long sought in Bosnia. Most importantly, for the first time, all three have agreed that Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue as a single state, with its present borders, and with continuing international recognition. Consistent with the Contact Group plan, under the terms of a settlement, all three agree that Bosnia-Herzegovina will consist of two entities: the Federation established under last year's Washington Agreements, and the Serb Republic. The 51:49 parameter of the Contact Group's territorial proposal will be the basis for a settlement, subject to any adjustments that the parties make by mutual agreement. The two entities will have the right to establish relationships with neighboring states, but these must be consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The parties have pledged to adhere to international human rights standards, to ensure freedom of movement and the right of displaced persons to return to their homes, and to collaborate on joint economic projects that will promote transportation links and communication among all of Bosnia's peoples. These are important principles around which we now can move toward intensive negotiations for a full peace agreement.

I want to congratulate the three Foreign Ministers, Secretary of State Christopher, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, Ambassador Holbrooke and his team, and our Russian and other European partners for today's impressive achievement. Much work remains to be done in translating these principles into a final peace agreement. All the parties will need to display the same flexibility and statesmanship that made today's agreement possible if we are turn away from war and achieve our common goal of a durable peace in the Balkans.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21047

September 9, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs.

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget


MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia, September 8, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 7/30/2014

293-0687-1

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: September 8, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger

OMB

Gordon Adams

Keith Bickel

OVP

Leon Fuerth

Rick Saunders

CIA

George Tenet

John Gannon

STATE

Strobe Talbott

John Kornblum

James Steinberg

AID

Thomas Dine

M. Douglas Stafford

TREASURY

David Lipton

Stephen Altheim

JCS

Michael Byron

Douglas Lute

DEFENSE

Jan Lodal

Robert Osterthaler

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

Sue Bremner

USUN

Rick Inderfurth

David Scheffer

Jim O'Brien

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies discussed four topics: 1) the shape and mandate of the political implementation mechanism that would coordinate among the actors in-country during the settlement implementation period; 2) equipping and training the Bosnian Federation; and 3) funding strategies for various aspects of post-settlement policy. They agreed to defer discussion of reconstruction assistance until the return of Ralph Johnson from consultations with the EU.

~~(C)~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

VZ 10/1/2013

2. On the issue of the **political implementation mechanism**, Deputies agreed to the following:

- The mission of the political implementation mechanism will chiefly be to coordinate among, rather than to control, the organizations that will play a role in the region after settlement: the NATO implementation force (IFOR), EU, ICFY, OSCE, IFIs, UN, UNHCR, ICRC and other NGOs, bilateral players, etc. Depending on the terms of the settlement, however, some international elements might report directly to the mechanism, or it could be itself directly responsible for implementing certain tasks.
- The political implementation mechanism will serve as a bridge between the various international actors and local officials.
- There should be a strong leader of political stature as the head of the political implementation mechanism.
- The political implementation mechanism should be established as part of the settlement documents and thus have essentially free-standing authority, although we would hope it would be "blessed" by the Security Council.
- Its role will likely extend beyond the termination of the mandate of the peace implementation force. ~~(S)~~

3. State agreed to revise and combine its papers on the political implementation mechanism into a final draft for Deputies' consideration the week of September 11. The new draft should include:

- a clear mandate and delineation of tasks for the political implementation mechanism, with initial recommendations on degree of authority desirable on a function-by-function basis;
- pros and cons and recommendations on the desirability of an American head;
- possible transitional arrangements for the period prior to the constitution of the new implementation mechanism. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

4. In light of the September 5 Principals' discussions of **equip and train**, Deputies reaffirmed that an interagency Task Force, chaired by State and including OSD, JCS, OMB, and others as necessary, would be formed to reexamine and redefine the U.S. role while adhering to our goal of establishing a Federation self-defense capability. Specifically, the Task Force was asked to look at the following questions and prepare a paper for Deputies' consideration the week of September 11:

- What degree of U.S. leadership, and what size U.S. contribution to the equip/train effort, will be required to keep negotiations going and further the peace implementation process?
- What type of U.S. involvement will be necessary to give us sufficient leverage to prevent pariah states from undertaking military assistance to the Federation?
- Would lifting the arms embargo be enough, in and of itself, to keep the peace implementation process going?
- What provisions and strategy should we pursue to ensure that feasible arms control/limitation mechanisms are included in the settlement agreement?
- When should we begin consultations with the Bosnians on their military needs and wishes?
- If a needs assessment is not possible, how can we best make decisions on the size of our contribution?
- What is the legal framework for equip and train?
- How will we finance our contribution? (Action: State/Task Force) (S)

5. On the issue of funding for the range of post-settlement efforts, Deputies agreed that OMB would produce a paper laying out strategies to obtain sufficient resources to meet our policy goals. (Action: OMB) (C)

6. Deputies briefly discussed the Croatian offensive inland from the Dalmatian coast toward Jajce and agreed that demarches should be made to Croatian leaders to urge restraint, especially as there were signs that the Serbs perceived the Croatian offensive as occurring in concert with the ongoing NATO strikes. (Action: State/NSC) (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21047

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 8, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: SUE BREMNER *SB*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, September 8, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held September 8, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve *AV* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies

Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *7/30/2014*

2013-0087-F

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 11, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: SUE BREMNER *SB*

SUBJECT: Interagency Meeting on the War Crimes Tribunal

At the interagency meeting on the War Crimes Tribunal I chaired September 8, three papers were tasked and a number of basic concepts agreed to. I propose sending the attached informal summary of conclusions to agencies who participated. It seems to me there may be a need to have those involved with war crimes meet again periodically on an ad hoc basis to share information. An alternative would be to make sure the right players attend an occasional 9:30 a.m. SVTS, where outstanding war crimes issues could be discussed.

Concurrences by: Rick Saunders, Liz Verville, Rob Malley

SB for all

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *Va Zan* NARA, Date *7/30/2014*
2013-0687-Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

TIME OF RECEIPT:

PRECEDENCE: X

**IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE**

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO: _____ CLASSIFICATION: ~~Confidential~~ _____ PAGES: 2 _____
(Including Cover)

FROM: Sue Bremner 456-9151 368
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions of SVTS on War Crimes Tribunal,
Sept. 8, 1995

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
State/DRL	Crystal Nix		647-2126
State/EUR	Jack Zetkulic		647-0608
USUN/W	David Scheffer		736-7555
	Jim O'Brien		
JCS	Freeman Jones		703 614-9435
OSD	Tim Walton		703 695-6516
OVP	Rick Saunders		395-4224

REMARKS: Please keep the attached summary of our discussion of war crimes for the record. Other meetings may be necessary on an ad hoc basis, or as part of the daily SVTS at 9:30. Note due dates for papers. cc: NSC:Verville, Malley

cc

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: W Date: 7/30/2014
7013-0687-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21050

September 11, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *M*

FROM: SUE BREMNER

SUBJECT: Briefing Memorandum for the President's Drop-by at
the September 11 Principals Meeting on Bosnia

Attached is a memorandum containing short talking points for the President's use at today's PC. Issues on which we offer updates include next steps in the negotiations, end-game conference possibilities, and the ongoing UN/NATO air campaign.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Briefing Memo for POTUS
Tab A Talking Points

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By Van Zandt NARA, Date 7/30/2014

2013-0687 -F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Drop-by at the September 11 Principals Meeting on
Bosnia

You have agreed to stop by the Principals Meeting, thank Dick Holbrooke and his team for their efforts, hear a report on where we stand and what we need to accomplish next, and perhaps discuss the NATO air campaign. You could stay in the meeting for as little as ten minutes or as long as your schedule allows.

Diplomatic Initiative

Geneva Results: Friday's gathering in Geneva of the foreign ministers of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia with Contact Group representatives produced agreement on "Basic Principles" of a settlement in Bosnia, including: preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single state within its present borders; the 51:49 parameter as the basis for the territorial division between the Federation and the Serb Republic, but with adjustments possible by mutual agreement; rights for both entities to establish "parallel special relationships" with Croatia and Serbia consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and agreement in principle on mechanisms for dealing with displaced persons, human rights abuses, and dispute resolution.

The preservation of Bosnia as a single state represents an important concession on the part of the Bosnian Serbs, who were present at the meeting but operating under Belgrade's proxy. Bosnian Government agreement to the term "Republika ~~S~~ Srpska," on the other hand, confers a degree of legitimacy on the Bosnian Serbs that Sarajevo has been reluctant to grant. Additionally significant is the fact that ranking Serbian leaders met for the first time with Bosnian government officials and agreed to statements that come close to recognition of Bosnia.

Next Steps in Negotiations: Still, the Geneva meeting was important largely for political and symbolic reasons. Many questions remain to be resolved before we have a full-fledged peace agreement. Territorial bargaining has just begun, and negotiations promise to be contentious. Members of Holbrooke's

~~SECRET~~

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✓ 10/1/2013

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

team will be meeting with DOD's mapping experts today to help firm up our own ideas, especially regarding Sarajevo, the Posavina corridor, the Livno Valley corridor to Bihac, and the corridor to Gorazde.

In addition to territorial questions, we still have to determine how the constitutional framework, which will link the Federation with the Bosnian Serb republic and specify arrangements with Serbia and Croatia proper, should be handled by our negotiators. Holbrooke may also raise sanctions and the possibility of some early reward for Milosevic prior to signature of a peace agreement. Our new initiative has been premised on no further sanctions relief for interim steps such as mutual recognition.

End-game Conference Possibilities: The Holbrooke team will travel to Geneva mid-week for a Contact Group meeting, followed by another intensive round with the parties. Holbrooke may express views on the need to move fairly soon from shuttle diplomacy to an "endgame" conference, perhaps involving the presidents of the three sides and Contact Group foreign ministers. This could occur in the U.S. at a nearby site such as Williamsburg, which would allow for pep-talks from the Vice President or from you, if necessary. The conference could move to Washington for a final Summit and signing ceremony if all went well.

Next Steps on Air strikes:

As the diplomatic process moves forward, we need to review the bidding on the NATO/UN retaliatory campaign, which as you know continued over the weekend to include Tomahawk missile strikes. Per our discussion last Thursday, we have continued to support the strikes until the Bosnian Serbs comply with the UN/NATO conditions. We (along with the French and British) have sought to convince them to comply by pressing Izetbegovic for clear assurances that Bosnian Government forces will not take advantage of the air campaign to gain ground around Sarajevo. With Mladic still obdurate, we may want to approach the Bosnian government again and call for concrete measures of restraint, such as a "no offensive action commitment" in and around Sarajevo.

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR DROP-BY MEETING AT
PRINCIPALS MEETING ON BOSNIA

Diplomatic Initiative

- Thanks to all of you for your fine efforts over the past two weeks.
- Getting the sides to sit down face to face and accept the Geneva principles was a real achievement.
- I know you are acutely aware that much work remains to be done. I'd like to hear your views on how to get from here to a final settlement.
- What do you expect from the sides on territory?
- What will be the critical aspects of negotiations on the constitutional framework?
- (If early sanctions relief for Milosevic is raised) I'd like to have the Principals consider that questions before we take any steps.

Next Steps on Air Strikes

- Are we still satisfied with the UN/NATO conditions for ending the current air strikes?
- What effect do you think continuing the campaign and the use of Tomahawks over the weekend will have on the Bosnian Serbs?
- Can we do anything more to encourage restraint on the part of the Bosnian government that might get the Bosnian Serbs to comply with the conditions?

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. report	Milosevic, Karadzic, Mladic: Serbs Disunited. (6 pages)	09/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 (Early) [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2753

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Joint Statement

We have just concluded a meeting, held under the auspices of the Contact Group, of the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Republic of Croatia (Croatia), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia).

The Contact Group announces today that the three Foreign Ministers, speaking for their governments -- the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Republic of Croatia; and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which also represents the Bosnian Serbs in a joint-delegation -- have authorized us to issue the attached Agreed Basic Principles. All three governments -- and their Presidents -- agree that these principles will govern the difficult negotiations to come, and all agreed, after some tough discussions, to the exact words of this important statement. With regard to Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem, the Co-Chairmen are committed to a solution as part of an overall peace settlement and will make it a top priority when they return to the region next week.

The statement takes us an important step closer to peace. Yet, important as it is, this statement does not constitute the end of the tragedy in the Balkans. Far from it. Significant differences exist between the sides -- differences that will require continued intense negotiations. We will return to our respective capitals tonight for consultations. Next week Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke and European Union Special Negotiator for the Former Yugoslavia Carl Bildt will return to the region with their delegations, and tomorrow First Deputy Minister Igor Ivanov of Russia will go to Belgrade.

The Contact Group will meet again in Geneva next week at the Russian Mission to the United Nations. Subsequent meetings will be held in Moscow and in an expanded format in Rome. Following yesterday's important meeting in Paris, we have also been consulting closely with the representative of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and will continue to do so within an institutionalized coordinating structure.

The statement we are issuing today is an important milestone in the search for peace. Today's statement contains many significant points. Within its current internationally recognized borders, it is agreed that Bosnia and Herzegovina will be comprised of two democratic entities, the existing Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republica Srpska. Bosnian territory will be divided -- the Federation with 51 percent and the Serbian entity with 49 percent. They also agreed today to create a Commission to enforce accepted international human rights standards

within their territories. They agreed to allow freedom of movement within Bosnia's borders and allow displaced persons to return to their homes. Each entity will be self-governing, with its own constitution. While the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue, additional joint institutions at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina are envisioned.

Clearly much remains to be done. The hardest work still lies ahead. The entities have yet to develop a design for a central connecting structure to oversee the agreed cooperative efforts and to elaborate other joint efforts in areas where cooperation is the only way to solve common problems. In addition, the parties need to define their internal borders within Bosnia in accordance with the 51-49 principle. We should be under no illusions that these will be easy tasks; they can be solved only through intense negotiations backed by a genuine desire to achieve peace. Finally, any agreement must be implemented by all sides, and this could be the hardest part.

The attached Basic Principles have been agreed upon today by H.E. Muhamed Sacirbey, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina); H.E. Mate Granic, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Croatia (Croatia); and H.E. Milan Milutinovic, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), and witnessed by Representatives of France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and by the European Union Special Negotiator for the Former Yugoslavia.

Final

AGREED BASIC PRINCIPLES

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue its legal existence with its present borders and continuing international recognition.

2. Bosnia and Herzegovina will consist of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as established by the Washington Agreements, and the Republica Srpska (RS).

2.1 The 51:49 parameter of the territorial proposal of the Contact Group is the basis for a settlement. This territorial proposal is open for adjustment by mutual agreement.

2.2 Each entity will continue to exist under its present constitution (amended to accommodate these basic principles).

2.3 Both entities will have the right to establish parallel special relationships with neighboring countries, consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2.4 The two entities will enter into reciprocal commitments (a) to hold complete elections under international auspices; (b) to adopt and adhere to normal international human rights standards and obligations, including the obligation to allow freedom of movement and enable displaced persons to repossess their homes or receive just compensation; (c) to engage in binding arbitration to resolve disputes between them.

3. The entities have agreed in principle to the following:

3.1 The appointment of a Commission for Displaced Persons authorized to enforce (with assistance from international entities) the obligations of both entities to enable displaced persons to repossess their homes or receive just compensation.

3.2 The establishment of a Bosnia and Herzegovina Human Rights Commission, to enforce the entities' human rights obligations. The two entities will abide by the Commission's decisions.

3.3 The establishment of joint Bosnia and Herzegovina public corporations, financed by the two entities, to own and operate transportation and other facilities for the benefit of both entities.

3.4 The appointment of a Commission to Preserve National Monuments.

3.5 The design and implementation of a system of arbitration for the solution of disputes between the two entities.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

21047

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 8, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: SUE BREMNER *SB*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee
Meeting on Bosnia, September 8, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held September 8, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *7/30/14*

2013-0687-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. AARON S. WILLIAMS
Executive Secretary
Agency for International
Development

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the
United Nations

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia, September 8, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VR NARA, Date 7/30/2014
2013-0687-7

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies CommitteeDATE: September 8, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12 noonSUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger

OMBGordon Adams
Keith BickelOVPLeon Fuerth
Rick SaundersCIAGeorge Tenet
John GannonSTATEStrobe Talbott
John Kornblum
James SteinbergAIDThomas Dine
M. Douglas StaffordTREASURYDavid Lipton
Stephen AltheimJCSMichael Byron
Douglas LuteDEFENSEJan Lodal
Robert OsterthalerNSCAlexander Vershbow
Sue BremnerUSUNRick Inderfurth
David Scheffer
Jim O'BrienSummary of Conclusions

1. Deputies discussed four topics: 1) the shape and mandate of the political implementation mechanism that would coordinate among the actors in-country during the settlement implementation period; 2) equipping and training the Bosnian Federation; and 3) funding strategies for various aspects of post-settlement policy. They agreed to defer discussion of reconstruction assistance until the return of Ralph Johnson from consultations with the EU.

~~(C)~~~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

VZ 10/1/2013

2. On the issue of the **political implementation mechanism**, Deputies agreed to the following:

- The mission of the political implementation mechanism will chiefly be to coordinate among, rather than to control, the organizations that will play a role in the region after settlement: the NATO implementation force (IFOR), EU, ICFY, OSCE, IFIs, UN, UNHCR, ICRC and other NGOs, bilateral players, etc. Depending on the terms of the settlement, some international elements might report directly to the mechanism, or it could be itself directly responsible for implementing certain tasks.
- The political implementation mechanism will serve as a bridge between the various international actors and local officials.
- There should be a strong leader of political stature as the head of the political implementation mechanism.
- The political implementation mechanism will be established as part of the settlement documents and thus have essentially free-standing authority, although we would hope it would be "blessed" by the Security Council.
- Its role will likely extend beyond the termination of the mandate of the peace implementation force. ~~(S)~~

3. State agreed to revise and combine its papers on the political implementation mechanism into a final draft for Deputies' consideration the week of September 11. The new draft should include:

- a clear mandate and delineation of tasks for the political implementation mechanism;
- further examination of and recommendations on the desirability of an American head;
- exploration of whether the organization was best connected with an existing entity (the UN, OSCE, ICFY, P-5, G-7, etc.), or whether it would work better sui generis;
- possible transitional arrangements for the period prior to the constitution of the new implementation mechanism. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

4. In light of the September 5 Principals' discussions of **equip and train**, Deputies reaffirmed that an interagency Task Force, chaired by State and including OSD, JCS, OMB, and others as necessary, would be formed to reexamine and redefine the U.S. role while adhering to our goal of establishing a Federation

self-defense capability. Specifically, the Task Force was asked to look at the following questions and prepare a paper for Deputies' consideration the week of September 11:

- What degree of U.S. leadership, and what size U.S. contribution to the equip/train effort, will be required to keep negotiations going and further the peace implementation process?
- What type of U.S. involvement will be necessary to prevent pariah states from undertaking military assistance to the Federation?
- Would lifting the arms embargo be enough, in and of itself, to keep the peace implementation process going?
- How do we avoid inadvertently contributing to an arms race?
- What can we do to ensure that feasible arms control/limitation mechanisms are included in the settlement agreement?
- When should we begin consultations with the Bosnians on their military needs and wishes?
- If a needs assessment is not possible, how can we best make decisions on the size of our contribution?
- What is the legal framework for equip and train?
- How will we finance our contribution? (Action: State/Task Force) ~~(S)~~

5. On the issue of **funding** for the range of post-settlement efforts, Deputies agreed that OMB would produce a paper laying out strategies to obtain sufficient resources to meet our policy goals. (Action: OMB) ~~(C)~~

6. Deputies briefly discussed the **Croatian offensive** inland from the Dalmatian coast toward Jajce and agreed that demarches should be made to Croatian leaders to urge restraint, especially as there were signs that the Serbs perceived the Croatian offensive as occurring in concert with the ongoing NATO strikes. (Action: State/NSC) ~~(S)~~

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. draft	Paper: Diplomatic Considerations. (3 pages)	09/07/1995	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

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