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Bosnia - September 1995 [6]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Preservation, Partition, or Protectorate. (4 pages)	09/04/1996	P1/b(1)
002. talking points	Points on Bosnia Elections. (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
003. paper	Election. Record ID: 9620836. (1 page)	09/10/1996	P1/b(1)
004a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Ivo Daadler and John Feeley. Subject: September 5 Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia Elections. Record ID: 9620819. (5 pages)	09/04/1996	P1/b(1)
004b. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia Elections. Record ID: 9620818. (1 page)	09/04/1996	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Ivo Daadler and John Feeley. Subject: PC on Bosnian Elections, September 10, 1996. Record ID: 9620836. (3 pages)	09/09/1996	P1/b(1)
005b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnian Elections, September 10, 1996. Record ID: 9620835. (1 page)	09/09/1996	P1/b(1)
006. draft	Summary of Conclusions for September 5 Deputies Committee Meeting. Record ID: 9620828. (2 pages)	09/05/1996	P1/b(1)
007. paper	Election Day. (1 page)	09/05/1996	P1/b(1)
008. report	Bosnian Serb Opposition. (5 pages)	09/05/1996	P1/b(1)
009. report	Maintaining a Presence in Bosnia. (6 pages)	09/12/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2747

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
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010. cable	re: Bosnian Elections. (3 pages)	09/07/1996	P1/b(1)

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Not Perfect, but Right

By Anthony Lake

This Saturday, the people of Bosnia will go to the polls to elect their national representatives. These elections are an essential step in bringing democracy to Bosnia. They are what the people want, and what Bosnia needs, to help its hard-won peace endure.

We should not, and we do not, expect the election to be perfect. Bosnia is only beginning to recover from four years of devastating war. But Bosnians, with the help of the international community and the NATO-led military force, have made important progress in creating the conditions for successful elections.

Freedom of movement is improving. Last week in the American sector alone — the area around Tuzla in the north — more than 100,000 people crossed the internal boundary between the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation, bringing the six-month total to more than 1.3 million crossings. And to allow more voices to be heard, a wide range of media outlets are operating, including more than 100 independent newspapers, dozens of radio stations and a nationwide independent television network.

Thirteen major parties representing all views are running slates of national candidates, and dozens more are taking part in individual races. Local election committees have been established to oversee voter registration. Some 70 percent of Bosnian refugees living outside the country have cast absentee ballots.

The overwhelming majority of Bosnians, whether Serb, Croat or Muslim, believe the elections are important. In a recent United States Information Agency poll based on nearly 4,000 face-to-face interviews throughout the country, more than 90 percent of respondents in each ethnic group said they intend to vote. Some 96 percent in each group said they believed they could vote for the party of their choice without fear of intimidation. And 83 percent of Muslims, 65 percent of Croats and 89 percent of

Serbs said they believed it was better to vote now than to wait for improved conditions, because delay would only strengthen the forces of separatism.

These people know that the elections will allow the structure of a unified Bosnian state to come to life — a parliament, a presidency and a constitutional court that will represent the interests of all Bosnians, including the hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced people.

The elections will enable government agencies to operate again, hastening the day when Bosnia will function as a normal, stable nation. These institutions will require practical, daily interaction among Bosnia's Muslims, Croats and Serbs. That is the best way to break the status quo of division, weaken the forces of extremism and bring Bosnians together to rebuild their land.

Those who argue that elections would hasten partition fail to explain how delaying elections could make things better. Besides, those of us who wave democracy's banner

The case for holding elections in Bosnia right now.

around the world cannot say that if you fear the results of an election, you should not hold it.

Of course, the elections are just one part of the hard work needed to create a unified, peaceful, democratic Bosnia, and the Bosnians still have a long way to go.

Democratic institutions like the parliament and courts must be nurtured with the help of international advisers. A military balance of power must be achieved through the American-led program to equip and train the armed forces of the Muslim-Croat federation. A civilian police force must be trained. Refugees who fear returning to their homes, or who have no means to get back, must be helped, and economic reconstruction must be fostered.

The United States is committed to

these efforts. As we continue to do our part to help realize the promise of the Dayton accords and to overcome the remaining serious challenges, we should not undervalue how far we have come. One year ago, war was raging in Bosnia, the worst bloodshed in Europe since World War II. Today, there is peace. Marketplaces are full of life, not death. Playgrounds belong to children, not to snipers. Women are no longer prey to mass rape and terror. Once-divided families are being reunited, and some refugees are slowly making their way back. Basic services — running water, electricity and shelter — are steadily being restored.

But just as voters in a democracy are free to make their own choices, so must the people of Bosnia choose their future for themselves. In sending American troops to Bosnia, President Clinton made clear the point of this extraordinary international effort: to give the Bosnians breathing room to rebuild their lives and their land — and to give peace a life and logic of its own. He made equally clear what is not the point: to take on responsibilities that are not ours or to create in Bosnia an unsustainable dependence on the United States or other outsiders.

After so much bloodshed and loss, there can be no guarantee that Bosnia's Muslims, Croats and Serbs will join together, and stay together, as citizens of a shared state with a common destiny. The whole point of the Dayton accord was to give them a chance to try. This weekend, the Bosnian people are putting their faith in the ballot over the bullet. □

Anthony Lake is President Clinton's national security adviser.

While Saddam Plots, His People Suffer

By MARK YOST

ABOARD THE USS VANDEGRIFT—On a visit to the extreme northern tip of the Arabian Gulf, I didn't expect a lesson in embargo economics. But that's what I got when I accompanied a boarding party from this 453-foot U.S. Navy frigate on a routine investigation of a ship coming out of the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. In short, it is possible to restrict the trade of a rogue state like Iraq to the point of inflicting severe hardship. Unfortunately, that hardship is not felt by Saddam Hussein, but by the already hard-pressed Iraqi people.

Long before Saddam Hussein attacked the Kurdish capital of Irbil, U.S. Navy warships were in these waters conducting interdiction operations as part of the United Nations-mandated Operation Southern Watch. Their primary focus, about 15 miles south of the Iraqi coast, has been to track and query cargo ships coming in and out of Iraq. Under U.N. resolutions 661 and 687, passed in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq may import only food and medical supplies, and may not export anything.

Last Thursday night, the Vandegrift's radar picked up a ship coming out of the Shatt-al-Arab, the primary commercial shipping route out of Iraq. After the ship identified itself and its destination, Dubai, the Vandegrift's commanding officer, Cmdr. Joseph A. Corsi, requested that the ship anchor until morning, when a boarding party could inspect its cargo, documents, logs and crew, as U.N. resolutions allow.

The following morning, I joined members of the Vandegrift's crew, who were dressed in desert camouflage fatigues and carrying shotguns and .45-caliber pistols, as they lowered a small inflatable boat into the water, scrambled down a rope ladder and set off to inspect the ship. Navy personnel had boarded it twice before and its captain, who asked that neither he nor his ship be named, knew to have his crew assembled on the bow. This allows the boarding party's security team to keep an eye on them while two inspection teams go through the cargo holds and take samples from the holding tanks.

As Lt. Bruce Roll, the Vandegrift's boarding officer, reviewed the ship's documents and asked its captain questions relayed from the inspection team, I managed to ask him about conditions in Iraq.

"Very bad," he said in good English. "There is no food, there is no rice or sugar; the people are doing everything they can just to eat bread every day."

The captain said that in Iraq many people, including soldiers, come to his ship



and beg for food. Jobs are so scarce that people ask to scrape rust off the ship or to paint it for nothing more than food and \$1 a day. He also said there are frequent power shortages.

"They have been at war for over 15 years, and the U.N. resolutions have been in effect for almost six years," the captain said. "That has hurt very much."

Hurt whom? "Not Saddam," he said with a laugh. "Saddam does not suffer. It is the people who suffer."

When asked what he thinks of Saddam, the captain answered: "I do not have time to think of such things. That's something for the United States and the United Nations to debate. I am too worried about feeding my wife and two children at home. I just take into Iraq what the U.N. will let me and try to make money for my family."

But that testimonial did nothing to allay serious questions raised by the Vandegrift's boarding party. The captain had no engineering log, something a ship usually has; he had no paperwork on the fuel he said he took on in Iraq; there were differing answers from the crew as to how much fuel was on board; and there was some doubt about two engines partly disassembled in a forward storage area.

"He says the engines are for spare parts for the ship's engines," said Lt. Roll. "They match up with the ones in his engine room. But we also know that automobile parts are in high demand in Iraq. He could be selling them for parts, a little bit at a time, every time he goes in."

There wasn't much fuel on board, but the Navy boarding party wondered if the ship was merely smuggling it out in small quantities. After about an hour and a half, they decided to let it go.

"Technically, he wasn't in violation of

the U.N. embargo," said Lt. Roll. "But there was something that just wasn't right about his ship; too many odd configurations of hoses, as if he were offloading a lot of fuel." All the Vandegrift could do was transmit its report to the Navy commodore in charge of interdiction operations and to other Navy ships in the area. The consensus among the boarding party was that the captain may not be smuggling anything out of Iraq, but he was probably smuggling fuel in.

"We'll give him a good going over when he tries to go back into Iraq with another load," said Lt. Roll.

Most ships are complying with the U.N. embargo against Iraq, officers in the region say. That's mainly because the Navy has a constant presence in these waters and the penalty is heavy: Ships in violation are escorted to the United Arab Emi-

rates, their cargoes confiscated and their licenses revoked. The whole process can mean a delay of up to 10 months.

But a few still try. To avoid detection, crews have gotten more creative of late. "They stay in Iran's territorial waters and slip all the way down south and then try to dash across the gulf into Qatar's territorial waters," said Cmdr. Corsi. The Navy can only board ships and question their crews in international waters.

The Navy says it's aware of what ships are doing to skirt the embargo and is trying to keep a ship stationed near Qatar. But due to what it calls "operational commitments," that can't always be done.

Another hole in the embargo also involves Iran. Senior Navy officials in the Gulf say they've been told not to interdict Iranian ships. It's widely believed in the region that the Iranians have been helping their longtime adversaries the Iraqis, both by letting their ships hug the Iranian coast and by providing them with false shipping documents.

"That one's got us scratching our heads," said a senior Navy officer. "We don't know if the two are really working together or if the Iranians are simply extorting the hell out of the Iraqis because they know their backs are up against the wall."

Regardless of whether smugglers are effective in getting around the embargo, neither the ruthlessness of Saddam nor his effective control of his population has abated. "Please, sir," the ship's captain said. "Do not use my name or the name of my ship in your story. If you do, when I go back to Iraq, Saddam's secret police, who are everywhere, will come to my ship, and that will be the end of me."

Mr. Yost is an editorial page writer for *The Wall Street Journal Europe*.

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FAX

From: Richard Sklar

**Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State
of the United States**

**Embassy of the United States of America
Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina**

TEL: 387 71 445 700

387 71

659 743

387 71 659 969

FAX: 387 71 659 722

Date: 9 Sept 96

TO: Ivo Daalder

Fax Number of Addressee: 001 ²⁰² 303 456 9150

No of Pages: 3

Attached is the set of conditions I presented to the Principals Meeting (Sarajevo Version-Bildt, Frowick, Lopez, etc) last night. They bought in on the plan.

My key concern was not the ability of the Bosnians to get some buses on the road, but the failure of the international community to recognize the security problems of mixing up to 6000 bused in Bosniaks with the Serbs who will be voting at the same sites.

That is why I insisted on points a-c which attempt to keep the two groups apart.

Wasserman and Lopez agreed totally. The others quickly came along, and now the challenge is for OSCE to come up with twenty one new stand alone sites to meet my condition "a" and segregate eleven existing sites for my "b".

Frankly, I wouldn't go ahead unless they can make this happen. It is a piece logistical challenge for OSCE this late in the game. However, everyone connected with this process should have picked up on this whole issue months ago. The idea that a mass transit plan is being concocted eight days before the election is insane.

The Bosnians will get a decent number of buses on the road. They estimate between 4-700., I am betting on the low end, but even that will be respectable. We will be working with them on the bus allocation and management plan thru the week, and I plan to put IFOR oversight personnel at each of the thirteen departure sites to urge the Bosnians to follow thru with the plan and use the buses properly. I will set up radio net to stay in touch with them.

SECURE ROUTE MASS TRANSPORTATION PLAN

Preferred Conditions for Successful Bus Delivery of Voters to RS polling places from Federation locations.

a. All voting places(21 Opstinas) with over 500 prospective voters will be newly set up for "bus voters" only, will be on the secure route, within the Opstina, and as close to the IEBL as possible. Preferred sites will be factory or other buildings with large parking areas for bus discharge-loading and turnaround. Sheltered area for voting and waiting will be provided.

b. The eleven (11) Opstinas into which 100-500 voters will be transported will utilize an existing polling places which will be set aside for "bus voters" only. The polling station shall ideally be one on the route, and some distance from center of local voter activity. The arrival time of the buses for these voting sites will be pre-programmed so that local police presence can be assured.

c. The thirteen (13) Opstinas in which less than 100 bus voters are expected may be integrated with local polling stations. No more than two bus loads of 50 each will be delivered to these sites. The arrivals will be at pre-set times. The bus will deliver to the door of the site. The bus will wait at the door, and voters will go directly back onto the bus when voting is completed. Adequate police presence must be provided at and around the bus and inside the polling station. Ideally the site will be on or near the secure route.

d. Buses will operate on a continuous circuit format(except in instance "c" above.), with headway (intervals) pre set based on capacity and demand. Multiple stops will be operated as one loop, unless the certain stops are distant and have small demand, in which case smaller vehicles connecting with the large bus may proceed the from last major stop or limited scheduled service with the bus waiting for the voters may be utilized.

e. To calculate single bus carrying capacity we will divide the "operable hours" by the round trip time for each bus. Operable hours is defined as the hours between 0800 and (1730 minus the one way travel time). Thus a route with a 1 hour one way enroute time will have 8.5 operable hours, and can make 4 round trips. This vehicle will have a daily capacity of $4.25 \times 50 = 212$ voters.

f. We will try to arrange searches at the departure points rather than enroute near the IEBL.

g. We will not concern ourselves with intra-Federation travel, nor will our bus count include buses used for this purpose. There will be no thru bus travel from intra-Federation routes to IEBL crossings. Passengers must disembark from the intra Federation bus and board the buses we have designated and marked for cross IEBL travel. Passengers will be searched pre-load or on the cross IEBL buses.

h. We will use one departure site for each of the 13 take off points. The bus departure point will be in large accessible area where intra-Federation travelers can assemble.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Ivo Daadler and John Feeley. Subject: PC on Bosnian Elections, September 10, 1996. Record ID: 9620836. (3 pages)	09/09/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2747

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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005b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnian Elections, September 10, 1996. Record ID: 9620835. (1 page)	09/09/1996	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2747

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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006. draft	Summary of Conclusions for September 5 Deputies Committee Meeting. Record ID: 96202828. (2 pages)	09/05/1996	P1/b(1)
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Bosnia - September 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. paper	Election Day. (1 page)	09/05/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2747

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 12, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*FROM: J. NICHOLAS DOWLING *JND*

SUBJECT: Presidential Response to George Soros re: Bosnian Elections

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding a suggested response to George Soros regarding the Bosnian elections.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Letter to George Soros
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
JOHN HILLEY

SUBJECT: Response to George Soros

Purpose

To respond to a letter from George Soros.

Background

George Soros wrote to you urging us to delay the Bosnian elections until conditions improve. Our response notes Soros' concerns and reiterates our arguments on why elections should go forward on September 14. The response also recognizes Soros' contribution to creating the Open Broadcast Network (OBN) of independent television stations, part of our independent media democracy building efforts.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to George Soros
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear George:

Thank you for your August 30 letter on the Bosnian elections.

I appreciate your note of support and your concerns about election conditions. However, I do not believe that these problems warrant a postponement of the national and entity elections scheduled for September 14. The national elections remain the essential prerequisite to the formation of a single, democratically elected national government that can exercise authority throughout Bosnia. The establishment of national institutions -- including the Presidency and parliament -- is the critical first step toward restoring a united, multi-ethnic Bosnia and laying the foundation for long-term peace.

While there have been problems in creating the conditions for free and fair elections at the national and entity levels, as you mentioned in your letter, delaying elections will not solve the political divisions in Bosnia. It will only solidify the ethnic rift caused by the war.

The parties themselves, the Contact Group and the OSCE all agree that we should hold elections because the situation is moving in the right direction. The international community has worked tirelessly to create the administrative and security infrastructure necessary for successful elections on September 14. IFOR, in particular, has provided every kind of support possible, including helping meet the enormous logistical demands of the elections effort. IFOR will work with the international and local police to ensure as safe and secure an environment as possible for each and every voter. It will increase its presence in areas where violence may otherwise be possible, will work to facilitate freedom of movement of voters throughout Bosnia, and will have standing orders to intervene if people's lives are threatened.

The presence of 1200 international election supervisors and hundreds of international election monitors on election day will help safeguard positive changes throughout Bosnia and deter intimidation and other abuses. Moreover, as you know, the Open Broadcast Network went on the air on September 7. OBN is providing Bosnian voters an independent voice as they prepare to

cast their votes. Your key role in bringing this project to fruition is greatly appreciated.

The OSCE's vigorous enforcement of the election rules is also helping to improve conditions. The OSCE has acted swiftly, fining candidates and parties involved in irregular activities and banning seven SDA candidates from the elections in response to an attack on Bosnian opposition leader Haris Siljadzic. More recently, the OSCE leveled stiff fines against the SDS for abuses during the election campaigning.

I strongly support the decision by the OSCE to postpone the municipal elections in view of the widespread abuse of registration procedures. The irregularities that led to the OSCE decision to postpone the municipal elections do not affect the elections at the national and entity levels. Voters can vote for candidates on national and entity party lists no matter where they are registered.

Finally, I should note that polls have shown that over 90% of the Bosnian people - whether Serb, Croat or Muslim - view national elections as important, and that the overwhelming majority intend to vote. Rather than prolonging the divisions which still exist in Bosnian society, we should listen to what the ordinary Bosnians want and move ahead with the elections as planned.

Sincerely,

Mr. George Soros
Soros Fund Management
888 Seventh Avenue
New York, New York 10105

SOROS 6077
fund


August 30, 1996

President William J. Clinton
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500-2000

✓
Dear Mr. President,

Further to our conversation last Friday, you have just received a green light from Senator Dole to postpone the Bosnian elections. I very much hope you will avail yourself of this opportunity. Even a two month postponement would safely get us past our own elections, and allow us to pursue more effective policies afterwards, particularly with regard to the war criminals. Going ahead under present conditions would create a very bad precedent and expose you to severe criticism not only from your opponents, but also from supporters like me.

Yours sincerely,


George Soros

GS/ys

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
9-10-96

FROM THE OFFICE OF GEORGE SOROS

**Soros Fund Management
Soros Foundations
888 Seventh Avenue, Suite 3200
New York, New York 10106
Tel: (212) 397-5550
Fax: (212) 977-4057**

Please deliver the following pages to:

**To: President William J. Clinton
The White House
Fax # (202) 456 6703**

From: George Soros

**cc: The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.
The White House, Fax # (202) 456 6218**

**The Honorable Anthony Lake
National Security Council, Fax # (202) 456 2883**

**The Honorable Strobe Talbott
Department of State, Fax # (202) 647 6047**

Date: August 30, 1996

Total # of pages: 2 (including cover sheet)

Please see the attached letter.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. report	Bosnian Serb Opposition. (5 pages)	09/05/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 [6]

2013-0687-F
vz2747

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. report	Maintaining a Presence in Bosnia. (6 pages)	09/12/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

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OPTIONS FOR RESCHEDULING MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN BOSNIA

BACKGROUND

On August 27, Ambassador Frowick postponed the municipal elections because of a pattern of irregularities in the registration of refugee voters, mainly in the FRY. Large numbers of Serb refugees in the FRY had availed themselves of the opportunity under Form II of changing their intended voting residence to certain Republika Srpska (RS) municipalities. The pattern of registration was such that the Serbs were guaranteed a majority of votes in RS municipalities of strategic importance.

Principals in Sarajevo (i.e., OSCE, IFOR and OHR) generally favor an early rescheduling of municipal elections. Frowick suggested consideration of a mid-November timeframe but left open the possibility for a later date. No decision has been made on registration rules. However, OSCE staff have suggested that the rules would remain the same as for the September 14 municipal elections with one major exception. Refugee voters would have the option only to vote in their 1991 residence by absentee ballot or in person. Form II registration, which permits voting in another "intended" place of residence other than the 1991 residence, would be discontinued for these voters. But displaced persons would still be permitted to use Form II and vote in the municipality in which they are currently resident.

ELECTION TIMING OPTIONS

I. Earlier/November Timeframe

Advantages

- The most important is that IFOR will still be in place, thus ensuring robust security. Also this timing does not encourage speculation about any post-IFOR military force.
- Other structures important for the elections could be maintained more easily. The OSCE elections group, the Office of the Coordinator for International Monitoring, and other OSCE programs should be able to function for an additional two months.
- The weather is generally mild in November, thus avoiding winter weather problems, particularly in the mountain areas, that impede travel and logistical support.
- This timeframe provides an early opportunity to fix problems that arise in the September 14 elections (e.g., repeat elections necessary because of fraud).

Downsides

- Time is inadequate to plan and organize municipal elections. Among the key tasks to be completed are printing of some two million ballots, organizing voting for nearly 850,000 refugees, and possibly re-registering 350,000 refugee voters who had originally used Form II (change of voting residence).
- An announcement of early elections in the current tense atmosphere could adversely affect the September elections, the building of national institutions following the elections and the ongoing Brcko arbitration.

One alternative to holding all municipal elections on one day would be to stage the elections over a period of two weeks. This would reduce the requirements for observers and logistical support as the same personnel and other support resources could be used in two or more cities on different days.

II. Later/April-May 1997

Advantages

- Pushing elections into spring 1997 would ensure much more time for logistical and organizational work. (Because of winter weather problems, a date earlier than April would be risky.)
- A later date would also give more time to create and test the new governmental institutions created by the national elections and work out political compromises on the rules for municipal elections. Thorny issues, such as Brcko, would hopefully be resolved by then.

Downsides

- Delaying risks losing the political momentum that we have fostered on building a unified, multi-ethnic state through democratic elections.
- An election date in 1997 will encourage speculation about a post-IFOR military force before a decision has been reached within the USG and among our allies.

OPTIONS ON REGISTRATION RULES

No one registration process will satisfy all three ethnic groups. The SDA and Muslim leaders objected--rightly--that the Serbs' manipulation of the Form II voter registrations would unfairly guarantee election of Serb governments in cities that had been ethnically mixed prior to the war. It appears that large numbers, possibly the overwhelming majority, of Serb refugee voters in the FRY used the change-of-residence Form II because they were instructed or induced to do so by political leaders and not because they truly intended to reside in the municipality of registration.

I. Retain Current Registration Rules

Prior to the war, the Serbs were the minority in many RS cities (e.g., Banja Luka, Brcko, Srebrenica, Prijedor and Doboj). Since the war's end, the Serb population has increased substantially through an influx of Serb displaced persons. Muslim and Croatian minorities, on the other hand, have departed in large numbers because of harassment and the hostile environment. In addition to the displaced persons who had moved to Republika Srpska after the war, Serb leaders were counting on a further 123,000 Serb votes from Serb refugees who completed Form II and are currently living in the FRY.

Advantages

- Retaining the current rules would maintain a consistent framework for both national and local elections.
- The Serbs would find this acceptable and support the elections.

Downsides

- The problems identified by Frowick as the cause for rescheduling the municipal elections would not be addressed. Failing to address these problems undermines the credibility of the elections.
- Muslims and the SDA would strongly oppose holding elections under the current rules and could organize a boycott.

II. Eliminate Form II-Change of Residence Registration

The option would eliminate the change-of-residence option for refugee voters while allowing it for displaced persons in the Federation and RS. The impact of this approach would be greatest on the Serbs and RS. If large numbers of Muslim and Croatian refugees who were RS residents in 1991 choose to vote in the RS municipal elections, the Serbs could lose their majority position and could be forced to accept Muslim and Croat representation in local government. Serbs will likely complain that Serb refugees will have no real option for voting if Form II is eliminated. It will be claimed that most Serbs want to reside in the RS and have no intention of returning to their former residence in the Federation. Thus, by eliminating the option of voting in a new "intended" residence, they are effectively barred from voting in the municipal elections. Since most Serbs are expected to vote in Republika Srpska and not the Federation, the key unknown variable is the number of Muslims and Croats who plan to vote in RS municipal elections because they were residents there in 1991.

Advantages

- Eliminating Form II-Change-of-Residence registration for refugees would prevent the manipulation of refugee votes among Serbs in the FRY--the principal reason for postponing the municipal elections.
- The rule change would be appealing to Muslims and the SDA although it would not satisfy all their concerns.
- While opposing this change, Serbs may in the end accept since voting by large numbers of displaced persons currently resident in the RS could still ensure Serb majorities despite voting by former Muslim and Croatian residents.
- The rule change is defensible as consistent with the Dayton Accord. The broad franchise mandated by Dayton was tied to national and entity voting. Municipal and cantonal elections were only to be held "if feasible." Nothing in the Dayton Accord guarantees voters the right to select a particular place of residence for municipal elections.

Downsides

- Rule change risks triggering a Serb boycott or, worse, an attempt to hold municipal elections independent of OSCE.
- Muslims will not be satisfied with rules that allow Serb displaced persons residing in former Muslim-majority RS cities to vote in the elections.
- Heightened ethnic tensions could impede startup of new national institutions created in the September elections.
- If Muslim and Croatian officials are elected in the RS, we may be faced with Serb opposition to seating these officials.

III. Change of Voting Residence on Exceptional Basis Only

Under this option, all refugees who completed Form II would be required to re-register. Voters would be allowed to register in an intended residence only under exceptional circumstances, such as family ties to the municipality, some previous residency or employment in the locality, or personal hardship based on specific criteria.

Advantages

- By limiting Form II registrations only to special cases, this should greatly reduce the possibility of manipulating the voting of Serb refugees in the FRY.

- At the same time, it could be sold as a compromise since it would continue to allow displaced persons in the RS to vote but would limit voting by Serb refugees.

Downsides

- Serbs are still likely to criticize the rule as caving to Muslim pressure. Resistance in municipalities will be particularly strong in municipalities where the Serb majorities are put at risk.
- Muslims may continue to oppose any rule change that does not allow an ethnic voting mix close to that which existed prior to the war.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

PEC The Provisional Election Commission's mandate is set to expire after the September 14 elections. An Election Commission composed of the Parties would then replace the PEC, and this new body is unlikely to resolve these contentious issues. We should seek a decision on rescheduling the elections through the PEC before it is officially disbanded.

OSCE The OSCE and CIM machinery for elections needs to be kept in place and Frowick's mandate needs to be extended. This means additional financial resources and efforts to replace key personnel that must depart after the national elections.

Logistics Planning The full range of logistics planning for the municipal elections (e.g., printing of ballots, organizing refugee elections, etc.) needs to begin now if a mid November election is to be held.

Voter Registration Analysis In considering the suggested voter registration option and other variants, we need to understand better what the pattern of voting will be between entities. In particular, we need more information on the number of Muslim and Croat voters who plan to vote in their former residences in the RS.

Financing Elections The cost of organizing and monitoring municipal elections is likely to run into the millions of dollars. We need to develop an estimate of the costs and start identifying possible sources of funds within the international donor community.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. cable	re: Bosnian Elections. (3 pages)	09/07/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 851

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - September 1995 [6]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Direct Elections (Sep 14)

BiH Presidency (3 elections, 3 positions)

BiH House of Representatives (42 positions)

Indirect Elections

BiH Council of Ministers

BiH Constitutional Court

BiH House of Peoples(15)

Federation Presidency (president and vice president)

Federation House of Representatives (140 positions)

Federation House of Peoples(approx 74)

Federation Cantonal Assemblies (10 assemblies, total 406 positions)

Republika Srpska Presidency (2 positions)

Republika Srpska National Assembly (83 positions)

Total direct elections: 17, with 676 positions available.

In the light of the decision by the Provisional Election Commission in Sarajevo to postpone municipal elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Contact Group is of the opinion that these elections should be held before the end of this year under international supervision by the OSCE. The Contact Group calls upon the Governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska to agree before 14 September [on the measures necessary] to ensure such international supervision.

Will de Chmi's start

add French agreed

add 9/14 elec

highlight note of extra Dayton process.

except parties to fulfill all obligations

reform for steps in

context before &

by elec but

add send elec

use short

A
Send Mr. Kret
to missions
in Vienna
& Geneva

add sentence - CA encourages

series of work at MIN/land

in CA & SB

up end of year

ldg up to Land Min

FAX COVER

Date 3 SEP 96

Number of pages including cover sheet

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TO:

Doug Smith - Elections Task Force ✓
001-202-647-7094/
001-202-736-7627
Ivo Daalder - NSC 001-202-456-9150
Josiah Rosenblatt - EUR/RPM
001-202-647-0985

Phone

Fax Phone

CC:

FROM:

spence spencer

UNITED STATES EMBASSY
ALIPASINA 43, SARAJEVO
BOSNIA - HERZEGOVINA

Phone 387 71 667 390

Fax 387 71 659 722

Phone

REMARKS: ☐ Urgent ☒ For your review ☐ Reply ASAP ☐ Please Comment

... here's the latest OSCE paper on municipal elections — predicting 3 election days: 17 Nov, 30 Nov, and ~~15~~ 15 Dec. The pressure on the time line is largely refugee voting — the RESGT guys in Vienna say they can't meet a 17 Nov deadline and instead propose 12/15. The compromise time from a technical standpoint is 11/30. Any news on getting OSCE's mandate extended before 9/14?

SS

p.s. note that work on muni's needs to start asap after elections — best — SS



Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina
ADMINISTRATION OF MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

I. Technical Scenario

The organization of municipal elections in a November or December timeframe can be accomplished only if the same basic electoral infrastructure, rules, and procedures which have governed the September 14 events are preserved. There is no margin for error or for the extension of deadlines. Time consuming changes to the process will quickly place such a date out of reach. The effort would have to be resupplied, refugee voting would have to be reconducted, and supervisors and monitors would have to be redeployed.

From a legal standpoint, the international auspices of the election is uncharted. If an extension of the OSCE mandate can be negotiated and the institution of the Provisional Election Commission (PEC) preserved, this would represent a clean and consistent mechanism for the administration of the election. Any consensus on holding these elections will not be as a result of compliance to the Dayton Agreement but rather the outcome of a test of political wills between the international community and the Parties.

The PEC would have to readopt its election regulations with amendments to the following Articles:

Article 3 - to give a new date for municipal elections

Article 6 - to specify that registration for September 14 applies also for November, except as provided in Article 10

Article 10 - to delete the reference to "intend to live in future" for refugees

Legal counsel should review all the Articles and ascertain what additional amendments are required.

Many of the same sites used for polls and counting centers should be reused in November or December. A review can be conducted of these facilities to determine if there were any problems associated with them or if they are suitable for winter weather. The polling station supplies must be reordered, repacked, and reshipped. Danish Camp Supply has indicated that it can provide these supplies to meet a November or December date if an order is placed within the next few days. Forms and voters lists will have to be reprinted. The warehouse operation must be maintained and staffed. The PEC must use the same methods of transport for the polling station supplies, that is, IFOR vehicles. Danish Camp Supply has indicated that it can provide expanded support services in the organization and packing of the polling station kits and management of the

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Municipal Elections
August 31, 1996

warehouse operation.

The political parties and candidates which registered and were qualified to contest in the municipal races originally scheduled for September 14, must be requalified to contest in November or December. However, remedial actions should be taken to assure that the correct number of seats in these assemblies have been identified. Some reduction to candidate lists might be required to reflect the change in seats. Election staff can be employed to draw a line through the names of parties on the ballots which have not fielded lists of candidates in those municipalities. Nothing can be done to correct the candidate versus seat anomalies in Bosansko Grahovo (FBiH), Mostar (RS), Sarajevo Stari Grad (FBiH), and Siroki Brijeg (FBiH).

A new formula for the distribution of monies to political parties and independent candidates will have to be developed. Parties can be instructed to account for the monies which they have left from their original grant and those monies can be counted against any new funding available to them.

The 1991 census would have to remain as the basic document defining voter eligibility. Persons on that list or those who requested and were eligible to be added to the list would be eligible to vote. The Statistical Institute should review the database and provide any additional updates.

Only Form I-type documents would be made available to the voters abroad. A Form II-type document would be used to permit displaced persons to vote where they are now. Current RESG Form I applicants using the postal vote will be automatically be sent a municipal ballot. Current RESG registered Form II applicants, and any other BiH citizens abroad, will be offered an opportunity to request an absentee ballot. There will be no appeal system for Form I verification and decision on eligibility. The Refugee Election Services department should be renamed the Municipal Elections Abroad Program. The Refugee Elections Steering Group (RESG) should be renamed the Elections Abroad Steering Group.

For internally displaced persons, there are two options, requesting an absentee ballot for the municipality of 1991 or requesting to vote at your current residence. Since only 7,500 voters used the future address option for the September election, it can be disregarded as an option.

Both of these forms should be redesigned and renamed Municipal Ballot Application A and B.

For the purposes of projecting absentee balloting, the following figures are anticipated:

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Municipal Elections
August 31, 1996

Absentee-voting abroad	650,000
In-country absentee voting	200,000
Total	850,000

The Statistical Institute lacks the capacity to process these forms into a master database on the scale previously done. Either a modified version should be designed or a manual exercise conducted to determine ballot distribution for in-country absentees and other ballot requests.

After a review of the performance of the individuals on polling station committees, all of those who performed satisfactorily can be recruited for duty in this election. Many of the same messages and instructional pieces can be refashioned to reflect the municipal balloting. The existing training materials can be modified to cover the municipal issues only.

The supervisors responsibilities and deployment strength should be maintained in the same ratio of people to polls as presently organized.

A reserve fund for the LEC payment must be established. If political parties are subsidized for their activities, paying LEC staff will be a necessary cost since the OSCE has rescheduled these elections apart from the auspices of the Dayton Accords.

II. Staffing Scenario

Attachment I is a personnel matrix showing the headquarters and field staffing requirements. Where staff have committed to stay, their names and funding sources have been noted. Questions marks indicate that their status is unknown at this writing. Basically the same organizational structure can be preserved. The only substantial change proposed is to combine the department of Voter Registration and the Municipal Elections Abroad Program.

From a senior staff standpoint, the positions of Senior Deputy for Elections and Director General of Elections can be combined. It is recommended that Patrick Bradley be offered that position. Mr. Bradley is the Chief Electoral Officer of Northern Ireland. He attended the Stockholm conference in January and was a member of the Electoral Advisory Group which visited Bosnia and Herzegovina in July.

The new Senior Advisor for Elections and international member of the Provisional Election Commission should be either Manne Wangborg or Gerry Robinson. Mr. Wangborg works for the Swedish Foreign Ministry. He was a member of the ODIHR-funded Election Assessment

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Team which visited Sarajevo in December 1995 and January 1996; he was an organizer of the Stockholm conference; he was a member of the Electoral Advisory Group in July; and Mr. Wangborg plans to be an election supervisor in September. Mr. Robinson currently serves as a member of the mission and advises on legal matters and the post-electoral environment.

Of those staff members who may be departing, Bob Green, Christian Christensen, Bruce Hatch, and Jeff Fischer may be retained as technical advisors to the Mission and made available for consultative support.

The Electoral Advisory Group should be reconvened in the immediate post-election period. Members of the team include James Lowenstein, Larry Garber, Ron Gould, Dr. Zoltan Toth, and Zoltan Kovac. Alexander Ivanchenko is also suggested.

III. Election Calendar

Also attached is a preliminary election timeline and tasking plan. On this document three election date scenarios are shown: 1) November 17; 2) November 30; and 3) December 15. These election date scenarios require further review for political and technical viability. The timeline is divided into 69 principal steps and assigned to specific units for completion. These steps will have to be divided into smaller decisions and tasks for planning and implementation.

Jeff Fischer
Director General of Elections
8/31/96

MUNICIPAL ELECTION TIMELINES AND TASKING

First Draft

8/31/96

<u>Step</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Tasks</u>	<u>Person/Unit</u>		
1	8-20	9-03	9-18	Identify additional PEC rules which will require modification	Legal
2	8-23	9-05	9-20	Redesign registration program and forms	DGE
3	8-24	9-06	9-21	Extend staff contracts	DGEA
4	8-27	9-09	9-24	Order Municipal Ballot Applications (MBAs)	ES
5	8-28	9-10	9-25	Amend PEC Articles 3, 6, 10 and any others identified; declare election date	PEC
6	8-28	9-10	9-25	Complete MOU on the elections abroad program	DGEA/EASG
7	8-30	9-13	9-27	Update "Registration" training manual	VET
8	8-31	9-13	9-28	Extend MOU arrangements with host governments	EASG
9	8-31	9-13	9-28	Extend facility, service, and equipment contracts	DGEA
10	8-31	9-13	9-28	Complete requisition of replacement staff	DGE
11	9-06	9-20	10-05	Transport core supervisors back to Sarajevo	DGEA
12	9-06	9-20	10-05	Complete review of polling stations for winter suitability	IEOC/RC

Timelines and Tasking
Page Two

<u>Step</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Tasks</u>	<u>Person/Unit</u>
13	9-06 9-20 10-05	Complete review of performance of LECs	JEOC/RC/DDGE
14	9-06 9-20 10-05	Complete review of polling station committees and counting committees	JEOC/RC/DDGE
15	9-06 9-20 10-05	Complete any data clean-up to the voters list	IT
16	9-06 9-20 10-05	Order 6,000 polling station kits	ES
17	9-06 9-20 10-05	Order additional ballots	ES
18	9-06 9-20 10-05	Review performance of polling station forms/order polling station forms	JEOC/VET
19	9-06 9-20 10-05	Complete supply distribution plan	ES/ARRC
20	9-06 9-20 10-05	Print Municipal Ballot Application (MBA) training manual	VET
21	9-06 9-20 10-05	Commence voter education on MBAs	VET/EASG
22	9-06 9-20 10-05	Commence distribution of money from campaign fund	PPS
23	9-06 9-20 10-05	Appoint Polling Station Committees and Counting Committees	LEC/DDGE
24	9-09 9-20 10-05	Transport core supervisors to Sarajevo	DGEA

**Timelines and Tasking
Page Three**

<u>Step</u>	<u>Dates</u>			<u>Tasks</u>	<u>Person/Unit</u>
25	9-09	9-23	10-07	Order six national sets of voter lists	ES/IT
26	9-10	9-24	10-08	Convene Electoral Advisory Group	DGE
27	9-10	9-24	10-08	Commence political campaign period	PPS
28	9-10	9-24	10-08	Request IFOR transport MBAs to LECs	ES
29	9-10	9-24	10-08	Organize international transport of MBAs for voting abroad	ES/EASG
30	9-10	9-24	10-08	Complete reprint of polling station manual	VET
31	9-11	9-25	10-09	Conduct training to LECs on MBAs	VET
32	9-12	9-27	10-11	Complete communications plan for election results	DGE/ARRC
33	9-15	9-30	10-14	Transport long term monitors to Sarajevo	CIM
34	9-17	10-01	10-16	Commence MBA request period	EASG/MEAP
35	10-01	10-15	10-30	Conclude MBA request period	EASG/MEAP
36	10-01	10-15	10-30	Conclude voter education for application period	VET
37	10-01	10-15	10-30	Complete verification of municipal candidate lists	PPS/IT
38	10-02	10-16	10-31	Transport in-country applications to Sarajevo	ES

Timelines and Tasking
Page Four

<u>Step</u>	<u>Dates</u>			<u>Tasks</u>	<u>Person/Unit</u>
39	10-02	10-16	10-31	Transport applications from abroad to Vienna	ES
40	10-03	10-16	10-31	Certify lists of candidates	PEC
41	10-04	10-18	11-02	Begin preparation of ballot packs	ES
42	10-18	11-01	11-16	Commence voter education on balloting abroad	VET
43	10-25	11-08	11-23	Complete preparation of ballot packs	ES
44	10-25	11-08	11-23	Commence Election Day voter education for in-country	VET
45	10-26	11-09	11-24	Transport ballot packs to host countries	ES
46	10-27	11-12	11-27	Transport supervisors for voting abroad	DGEA
47	10-29	11-14	11-29	Commence municipal elections abroad	EASG/MEAP
48	11-03	11-18	12-03	Conclude municipal elections abroad	EASG/MEAP
49	11-03	11-18	12-03	Conclude voter education abroad	VET
50	11-06	11-20	12-05	Transport ballots to Sarajevo for sorting	EASG/MEAP/ES
51	11-06	11-20	12-05	Transport supervisors to Sarajevo	DGEA
52	11-08	11-23	12-08	Transport polling station kits to LECs	ES
53	11-08	11-23	12-08	Transport election monitors to Sarajevo	CIM

**Timelines and Tasking
Page Five**

<u>Step</u>	<u>Dates</u>			<u>Tasks</u>	<u>Person/Unit</u>
54	11-09	11-24	12-09	Train international monitors	CIM
55	11-14	11-28	12-13	Transport ballots to LECs	ES
56	11-17	11-30	12-15	In-country Election Day	ES
57	11-17	11-30	12-15	Commence in-country absentee sorting	ES
58	11-19	12-02	12-17	Conclude in-country absentee sorting	ES
59	11-19	12-02	12-17	Transport sorted ballots to municipalities	ES
60	11-20	12-03	12-18	Commence ballot counting	LEC/ES
61	11-22	12-05	12-20	Conclude ballot counting	LEC/ES
62	11-22	12-05	12-20	Announce election results	LEC/PEC
63	11-22	12-05	12-20	Commence election claims and objections period	EASC
64	11-22	12-05	12-20	Transport supervisors and international monitors out of country	DGEA
65	11-26	12-09	12-24	Conclude election claims and objections period	EASC
66	11-26	12-09	12-24	International monitors report to CIO	CIM
67	11-26	12-10	12-24	Election results are certified	PEC
68	11-27	12-12	12-27	Municipal authorities are inaugurated	PEC
69	12-27	01-12	01-27	Reconcile political party fund	PPS

MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS TIMELINE AND TASKING SUMMARY

PRINCIPAL STEPS LISTED 69

ELECTION SCENARIO I 08-20-96 TO 12-27-96 (130 DAYS)

ELECTION SCENARIO II 09-03-96 TO 01-12-97 (132 DAYS)

ELECTION SCENARIO III 09-18-96 TO 01-27-97 (132 DAYS)

ARRC ACE Rapid Reaction Corps

CIM Coordinator of International Monitors

CIO Chairman-in-Office

DGE Director General of Elections

DGEA Director General of Election Administration

DDGE Deputy Director General of Elections

EASC Election Appeals Sub-Commission

EASG Elections Abroad Steering Group

ES Election Services

IT Information Technology

JEOC Joint Election Operations Center

LEC Local Election Commission

MEAP Municipal Election Abroad Program

PEC Provisional Election Commission

PPS Political Party Services

RC Regional Center

VET Voter Education and Training