

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - August 1995: Early [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

896

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

1

Position:

1

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. map	Variant #1. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
002. map	Variant #2. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
003. map	Variant #3. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
004. draft	Schematic: A Proposed Counter to Bildt. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	Contact Group Map Variants. (1 page)	08/08/1995	P1/b(1)
005b. map	Contact Group's Peace Plan and Selected Economic Activity. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
005c. map	Variant #1. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
005d. map	Variant #2. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
005e. map	Variant #3. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
005f. map	Variant #4. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
005g. map	Selected Economic Activity. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
005h. map	Duplicate of 005b. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
006. paper	Likely Reactions to the NSC Variant. (5 pages)	08/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - August 1995: Early [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2736

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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007. map	Duplicate of 005g. (5 pages)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
008. memo	For Anthony Lake from Sue Bremner. Subject: German Embassy Readout. (3 pages)	08/09/1995	P1/b(1)
009. cable	re: Message from the Prime Minister to the President of the United States. (3 pages)	08/08/1995	P1/b(1)
010. list	Key Interests in a Negotiated Settlement. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
011. draft	Bosnia Endgame Strategy: What Kind of Bosnian State? (8 pages)	08/02/1995	P1/b(1)

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004. draft	Schematic: A Proposed Counter to Bildt. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)

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005a. memo	Contact Group Map Variants. (1 page)	08/08/1995	P1/b(1)

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005b. map	Contact Group's Peace Plan and Selected Economic Activity. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)

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005c. map	Variant #1. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)

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005d. map	Variant #2. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)

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005h. map	Duplicate of 005b. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - August 1995: Early [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2736

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. paper	Likely Reactions to the NSC Variant. (5 pages)	08/08/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. memo	For Anthony Lake from Sue Bremner. Subject: German Embassy Readout. (3 pages)	08/09/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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US/UK TALKS ON THURSDAY 10 AUGUST

UK PARTICIPANTS:

FCO

Jeremy Greenstock
Deputy Under-Secretary of State

Kim Darroch
Head of Eastern Adriatic Unit

David Manning
Head of Policy Planning Staff and
ex-Contact Group

Part-time:

Tony Galsworthy
Deputy Under-Secretary of State

Tom Richardson
Assistant Under-Secretary of State

David Ludlow
Former Private Secretary to Lord Owen

No 10

Edward Oakden
Assistant Private Secretary

MOD

David Omand
Deputy Under-Secretary of State

Brigadier John Reith
Director of Military Operations

Cheryl Plumridge
Bosnia Secretariat (Forward Planning)

Cabinet Office

David Gould
Deputy Head of OPD Secretariat

**DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C.****UNDER SECRETARY**

August 8, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR SANDY BERGER**FROM:** Lawrence Summers ✓**SUBJECT:** Bosnia

Here's a note on what the IMF and the World Bank could do for Bosnia under existing guidelines. It is not very encouraging, since Bosnia is not a member and there are substantial arrears owed by the former Yugoslav Republic. Moreover, any use of IMF gold on an ad hoc basis is likely to be exceedingly difficult. The right way forward, which we will outline in a note to be available tomorrow, is to follow the model used in the Mid-east Peace Process of mobilizing World Bank net income and bilateral assistance. We should discuss how best to approach the World Bank.

International Financial Institutions' Assistance to Bosnia

- Bosnia-Herzegovina is one of two of the five constituent states of the Former Yugoslavia (the other is the Serbia and Montenegro FRY) which has arrears to the IMF and the World Bank and cannot rejoin either institution until these arrears are cleared.
- Bosnia's arrears are currently \$409 million to the Bank and \$36 million to the IMF.
- Membership is a precondition to access to IMF or World Bank resources.¹
- Membership in the IMF is a precondition for membership in the Bank. While it is legally possible for Bosnia to join the IMF but not the Bank, IMF practice has been to establish an informal linkage.
- Admitting Bosnia would require a political consensus -- in the past it has been linked to membership for Serbia -- and mobilizing bilateral grants to clear the arrears. Processing a membership application normally takes three to six months.
- With arrears cleared and membership re-established, Bosnia would have access to the existing lending mechanisms of the institutions and to technical assistance.

IMF Lending

This would entail general balance of payments support for macroeconomic stabilization.

- Under normal terms of a Standby arrangement, Bosnia could have access to up to \$200-300 million over two years, at market terms, with repayment completed within five years. It would need to meet strict economic policy conditions.
- A longer term Extended Arrangement, requiring more extensive, structural commitments, would permit greater access and longer repayment terms.
- A Standby would be the quickest way to access IMF assistance.

¹ The Bank has some scope for directing unallocated income to special purposes, as it did in 1993 for the West Bank and Gaza as part of the peace process (\$50 million) and in 1991 for the FSU (\$30 million). It may be possible to provide technical assistance to Bosnia while a membership application is being processed, but this would not entail substantial amounts.

- It could be subsequently rolled into an a loan from the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) on more concessional terms (10 years and interest rates of only 0.5 percent), assuming Bosnia was under the per capita income threshold for IDA eligibility of about \$865. As of 1991, income was \$3100 but has clearly fallen, but probably not under the threshold.
- A Stand-by agreement would normally take several months to negotiate.
- The United States and other major creditors have traditionally been willing to provide short-term bridge finance to cover the time between completion of negotiations on the terms of an IMF program and the initial disbursement following formal Board approval.
- The IMF does not now have a mechanism for doing anything outside these lending arrangements.
- Sale of IMF gold requires an 85 percent majority of the Board. We need approval of the U.S. Congress to support a sale to finance programs for a restricted class of members.
 - More importantly, any decision to use IMF gold would require that all members in the targeted class be treated equally; the resources could not be targeted for the benefit of a single member.
- At this point, we have no consensus in the Board to move to mobilize gold for post-chaos situations or to relax the normal conditions on or criteria for the IMF's concessional resources. A combination of a political accommodation in the Former Yugoslavia and a reluctance or inability to mobilize sufficient bilateral resources by the Japanese or the Europeans might be sufficiently powerful to get the IMF to embrace some exceptional measure of support.
- Note that, in the Halifax negotiations on a possible post-chaos financing mechanism, the Europeans were confident there would be no constraint on the availability of bilateral resources from European Governments to finance reconstruction.

World Bank lending

Bank lending supports projects and/or policy reforms, including emergency reconstruction, e.g. financing essential imports.

- A lending program for Bosnia would likely consist of a mix:
 - quick-disbursing rehabilitation-oriented sector assistance;
 - funding for the most urgent social sector needs; and

- support for the private sector.
- Based on what was done for Croatia and Macedonia, Bosnia might receive \$100-200 million in the year after achieving membership.
- This would be at market rates, unless its income level were found to have fallen into the IDA-eligible range.
- The Bank could also assume a central aid-coordination role in an emergency rehabilitation program.
- The Bank has some capacity to mobilize net income for exceptional purposes as demonstrated in the Occupied Territories.

Geithner, Lister, Abbott, Crowe
Draft: 8/8/95

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. cable	re: Message from the Prime Minister to the President of the United States. (3 pages)	08/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - August 1995: Early [4]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. list	Key Interests in a Negotiated Settlement. (1 page)	08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - August 1995: Early [4]

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ITALIAN PARTICIPANTS
MEETING BETWEEN NSA ANTHONY LAKE AND U/S EMANEULE SCAMMACCA
AUGUST 12, 1995
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MFA UNDERSECRETARY EMANUELE SCAMMACCA

DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR TO THE PRIME MINISTER, AMBASSADOR SERGIO VENTO

MFA SECRETARY GENERAL FERDINANDO SALLES

MFA ACTING POLITICAL DIRECTOR BENEDETTO AMARI

DEPUTY CHIEF OF CABINET TO FOREIGN MINISTER AGNELLI,
MIN. GIOVANBATTISTA VERDERAME

MFA BALKAN AFFAIRS ACTING DIRECTOR RENATO RICCI

MOD DEFENSE STAFF DIRECTOR OF POL-MIL AFFAIRS,
ADMIRAL GIAMPAOLO DI PAOLA

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. draft	Bosnia Endgame Strategy: What Kind of Bosnian State? (8 pages)	08/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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August 3, 1995

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT

At our meeting on August 1 you asked for each Principal's views on our endgame strategy for Bosnia. I would be largely comfortable with your original paper that envisions a modified lift and strike if UNPROFOR were to collapse.

But I have thought for some time that we must put Bosnia in a larger political context and re-examine our fundamental assumption that the Europeans have a greater stake in resolving Bosnia than we do. In so doing, we may conclude that extending the life of UNPROFOR is no longer in our interest. (Why should we wait for the day when London and Paris tell us that they are leaving?)

The following paper is designed to examine how to shift from a European-led plan to an American-led plan.

Why America Must Take the Lead

Our commitment to use American ground forces to extract UNPROFOR on the one hand or implement a peace plan on the other means that this conflict will be "Americanized" sooner or later. Our previous strategy -- give primary responsibility to the Europeans, help the Bosnians rhetorically and hope the parties will choose peace -- is no longer sustainable. With a stronger Bosnian army unwilling to wait for peace at the negotiating table, and in the aftermath of Srebrenica and Zepa, the Bosnian side and international opinion will simply not allow us to return to the relative success of 1994. Muddle through is no longer an option.

Meanwhile, I strongly believe that the issue has become bigger than Bosnia. Although we may have been correct to limit our role in the past -- on the grounds that the former Yugoslavia was primarily a European responsibility -- the circumstances and our interests have now changed. Our interest in resolving this conflict has broadened.

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

VZ 10/1/2003

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- 2 -

In much the same way that our failure to solve the Haiti problem last year threatened to overshadow all of our other accomplishments, I fear Bosnia will overshadow our entire first term.

The failure of our European allies to resolve the Bosnia crisis has not only exposed the bankruptcy of their policy, but it has also caused serious erosion in the credibility of the NATO alliance and the United Nations. Worse, our continued reluctance to lead an effort to resolve a military crisis in the heart of Europe has placed at risk our leadership of the post Cold War world. President Chirac's comment -- however self-serving -- that "there is no leader of the Atlantic Alliance" has been chilling my bones for weeks.

We have also failed to take into account the damage Bosnia has done to our leadership outside Europe. Moreover, our failure to act in support of Bosnia threatens to undermine moderate Islamic ties to the United States. By contrast, American leadership in support of Bosnia will redound to our advantage throughout the Muslim world for a long time to come and could help shore up key relationships.

For these reasons, I believe we must stop thinking of Bosnia as a "tar baby." Instead, we should recognize that -- notwithstanding our successes in trade, Russia, and the Middle East and despite general agreement regarding Bosnia's complexity -- our Administration's stewardship of foreign policy will be measured -- fairly or unfairly -- by our response to this issue. That is why we must take the lead in devising a diplomatic and military plan to achieve a durable peace. If we agree that American troops will be in Bosnia sooner or later, why not do it on our terms and on our timetable?

The Requirement for Military Pressure

The essence of any new strategy for Bosnia must recognize the one truth of this sad story: our only successes have come when the Bosnian Serbs faced a credible threat of military force. Hence, we must base our plan on using military pressure to compel the Pale Serbs to negotiate a suitable peace settlement. If despite our best efforts, UNPROFOR becomes unsustainable, then a modified form of lift and strike remains the best way to promote an acceptable peace over the long term.

This approach entails significant responsibilities for the United States. It means using our military forces, primarily through the air, to help the Bosnians by changing the balance of power. After a suitable transition period to improve

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- 3 -

Bosnian military capabilities, we can and should disengage. In the absence of this support from us to improve the Bosnian military position, the history of this conflict demonstrates that the Pale Serbs will never feel enough military pressure to negotiate a durable peace settlement.

The Current Diplomatic Track

We should actively pursue a peace settlement now. Recent actions by NATO, as well as the military credibility inherent in the rapid reaction force have given UNPROFOR a small window of credibility. In conjunction with the ascendant threat from Croatia, UNPROFOR's short-lived, new credibility may be sufficient to convince Pale to negotiate seriously.

The steps we are now taking in the Contact Group (i.e., the revised Bildt option) will test this proposition. My strong suspicion, however, is that the Serbs will not be prepared to negotiate on the basis of the Contact Group map, or if they do, their proposals will be so one-sided as to create a stalemate.

Even in 1994, perhaps our best year in Bosnia, a more effective UNPROFOR and improved Bosnian-Croat military cooperation did not bring the Serbs to the table in a serious way. Unless the Bosnian Serbs are convinced that failure at the peace table will mean not only stalemate on the battlefield but worse some roll-back of their military gains, I do not believe they are likely to make the concessions necessary for a durable peace.

In the event a new diplomatic track fails to produce a settlement, the next few months will see a reinvigorated UNPROFOR help reduce fighting, Federation forces poking at Serb defenses around the country, and the Serbs continuing to pick off as many innocent and helpless persons as international opinion will allow. Eventually, all sides will settle in for the winter.

But this pattern will not last. UNPROFOR's window of credibility will begin to shut as the Europeans lose their stomach for military action. (The pattern of strong political will to act followed by erosion of allied support will continue. Just as the allies' commitment to the Sarajevo ultimatum of 1994 eroded one year later, so will their support for NATO's recent decisions soften over time.) And as UNPROFOR weakens, the Serbs motivation to negotiate will wane. Hostilities will increase by spring, and the threat of UNPROFOR's departure will emerge again -- stronger than ever. We could well face the prospect of U.S. forces on the ground in the spring and summer of 1996.

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- 4 -

In addition to the obvious political risks for the Administration, an UNPROFOR withdrawal next year will enable the parties to exploit campaign developments, as they play the candidates off.

New Military Strategy Meets New Diplomatic Strategy

If the foregoing analysis is correct, we should consider taking control of the situation now. We should develop a plan that sets a deadline for the Bildt-plus diplomatic track, after which we would promote the collapse of UNPROFOR and begin the inevitable process of handing off military responsibility for Bosnia to the Bosnians through a modified lift and strike option.

This initiative has two essential advantages over our current policy. First, it ensures that we are not held hostage to the timetable of London, Paris or the Bosnian government. We decide when our commitment to extract UNPROFOR would be operative. Second, by setting a deadline after which the Serbs would face the possibility of a reversal on the battlefield, we would create a powerful incentive for the Serbs to make their concessions now. (For example, once we think Bildt has run its course, we could send an American envoy to Belgrade with a message that the military track will be immediately implemented unless we see some marked change in the Serb position.)

Military Support for Bosnia after UNPROFOR

The objective is handing-off to the Bosnians the responsibility for self-defense and military pressure on the Serbs. This requires lifting the arms embargo and military support, through air strikes and ground-based training, until the Bosnians can act themselves. The sooner we start preparing Federation forces, the sooner they can act on their own. As the NSC paper indicates, a transition period should be some six months to one year.

The Role of Air Power. The linchpin of international assistance will be a credible commitment to the decisive use of air power against the Serbs to prevent a collapse of Sarajevo and other Federation territory before new arms can be integrated into the Bosnian army. This means implementing the type of air strikes NATO has just promised but without the risk of hostages. No fly zone implementation would also continue. (The NSC paper has an effective description of how these missions can be handled.)

The New Ground Force. The post-UNPROFOR multinational force on the ground will also be important, both to sustain momentum in Bosniac-Croat reconciliation and to train Federation forces (as well as target acquisition for any

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- 5 -

possible air campaign). In order to show our bona fides to our allies and maximize our influence with the Bosnians, we should offer a small ground contingent, whose primary mission would be training the Bosnian forces. In the light of Congressional support for lift, military trainers should be politically sustainable, especially if limits on their numbers and length of deployment are spelled out from the start.

In response to the obvious charge of "slippery slope," we should point to Haiti, where we set a timetable for deployment and met the deadline. It is simply wrong to argue that a multinational force with a U.S. component spells an open-ended American commitment. Indeed, a U.S. role in the training of the Federation forces would ensure that it could be completed quickly. A side benefit would be the fact that an American contribution of this kind could serve as a magnet for European participation, thus avoiding the possible all-Muslim army scenario many fear.

With U.S.-led air power and training for the Bosnians, this transition can be accomplished with a minimum exposure for the United States. The effect would be a new balance of power that provides the only real chance of concessions by the Bosnian Serbs as well as new leverage for us to play a decisive diplomatic role with all sides.

What Is the End-state?

I would obviously prefer to see the Bosnians achieve a settlement in accordance with the Contact Group principles, that is, a majority of Bosnia's territory and a union established between the Federation and a Serb entity, thus preserving the Republic of Bosnia's territorial borders.

But two significant alterations suggest themselves. And I would condition our support for this modified lift and strike with approval in advance from the Bosnian government for these two modifications.

First, the settlement could be more forward-leaning on the Serbs right to secede peacefully from Bosnia and join a potential "Greater Serbia."

Second, it may be necessary to consider proposals to trade Federation territory for Serb-held territory, especially if the Federation agrees and if the exchange makes the Federation more durable. This means population transfers that we have previously been unwilling to countenance. (In the context of an American leadership role to put military pressure on the Serbs, such transfers are politically and morally defensible).

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The principle would be quality not quantity. Population transfers that increase the viability of both parties could now be safely proposed. For example, Gorazde or Federation territory around the Posavina corridor might be exchanged for territory around Sarajevo and in Central Bosnia. Again, the threat to use decisive force may be dispositive. Exchanges beneficial to the Federation would probably require that the Serbs concede land they assert was Serb-majority. This will require confronting the Serbs with a credible threat of force.

In the context of new engagement by Washington, a serious discussion with Sarajevo should yield these concessions. But even more important, the Bosnian Government must be told bluntly that our support for this initiative is contingent upon its commitment not to seek military gains beyond the Contact Group plan and its guarantee to limit severely the influence of radical Islamic regimes in Bosnia. In summary, we must ensure that all the parties can achieve reasonable objectives and thus their conflict can be contained over the long-term.

How Long a Deadline?

We should set a deadline for the Bildt-plus phase sometime this fall. In as much as withdrawal has become easier and some may choose to stay in a follow-on force in Central Bosnia, our previous timetable under 40104 should be significantly shorter. If diplomacy falls in the near-term, the new variants of 40104 may allow us to begin a withdrawal mid-fall and end it before winter sets in.

What About the Russians?

Some persuading of Britain and France will obviously be necessary, but the prime diplomatic obstacle would be Russia. We should not underestimate the high-level diplomatic effort that will be necessary to avoid a Russian veto in the Security Council and minimize Russian support for Serbia. We will have to make clear that a solution to Bosnia has become America's top priority, and we intend to calibrate our relationship accordingly.

As far as lift is concerned, I would expect they would not want to isolate themselves and veto such a resolution if Britain and France went along and key Muslim Countries were induced to weigh in. Legally, they could accept that withdrawal of UNPROFOR will materially change the circumstances in which the arms embargo was established, leaving it -- unlike other embargoes -- without a rationale. (As the NSC paper points out, we may need some parallel lifting of sanctions on Serbia.)

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How To Deter Serbia and a Third Balkan War?

The NSC paper treats these subjects adequately. Suffice it to say, the entire climate for containment of a wider war and deterrence against Milosevic would be changed if Washington were to engage fully and NATO were to remain united.

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