

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - August 1995: Early [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. letter	To Alexander Vershbow from David Logan. [with enclosure] (2 pages)	08/08/1995	P1/b(1)
002. draft	Schematics on Bosnia Options. (2 pages)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: Presidential Letter to Prime Minister John Major. (3 pages)	08/05/1995	P1/b(1)
004. cable	re: Presidential Letter to President Jacques Chirac. (3 pages)	08/05/1995	P1/b(1)
005. paper	The Bosnian Army: Requirements for Defending the "Core Area." [CIA Act] [partial] (4 pages)	08/07/1995	P3/b(3)
006a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Balkan Strategy: Options for Discussion at Foreign Policy Group Meeting. Record ID: 9506050. (4 pages)	08/05/1995	P1/b(1)
006b. paper	Strategy for the Balkan Conflict. (6 pages)	08/04/1995	P1/b(1)
006c. draft	Paper: Bosnia Endgame Strategy: What Kind of Bosnian State? (8 pages)	08/02/1995	P1/b(1)
006d. paper	Endgame Strategy: A Sustainable Defense of a Viable Bosnia. (3 pages)	08/05/1995	P1/b(1)
006e. paper	Diplomatic Strategy. (3 pages)	08/05/1995	P1/b(1)
007. draft	Bosnia Endgame Strategy: What Kind of Bosnian State? (8 pages)	08/05/1995	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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2013-0687-F

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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^BC-YUGOSLAVIA-BOSNIA-KARADZIC

^Karadzic attacks Milosevic over Krajina

By Jovan Kovacic

BELGRADE, Aug 7 (Reuter) - Bosnian Serb leader Radovan

Karadzic denounced Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic on Monday, blaming him for the weekend collapse of Krajina, the rebel Serb enclave in Croatia.

Flanked by top aides who have been supporting him in a power struggle with his own generals, Karadzic appeared on Bosnian Serb television to denounce Belgrade leaders.

Krajina leader Milan ``Martic did not order withdrawal and the evacuation of civilians," he said. ``That was directed from Belgrade."

Antagonism among Serb leaders and factions has risen to a new pitch since rebel Serb territory in Croatia was overrun by government forces with neither the Bosnian Serbs or the Serbian-led rump of Yugoslavia moving to help.

Karadzic also attacked army commander General Ratko Mladic, who has defied his efforts to remove him, and the 18 top generals who backed his revolt.

``At this crucial historical moment for our survival in our centuries-old homes ...defence and unity are our only safety," he said in a statement broadcast on television. ``Defiance and uncertainty in following orders are impermissible -- they could destroy the state."

Belgrade news media also denounced Karadzic on Monday.

The pro-government newspaper Politika wrote that ``Karadzic, a gambler from Pale...now risks losing much more in the political roulette game he himself began. His gamble can destroy hundreds of thousands more people."

Vecernje Novosti accused him of treason. Belgrade state television denounced his ``lust for power" calling him and the members of parliament who support him ``a handful of war profiteers."

Karadzic and his hardliners oppose big power proposals to settle the Bosnian war with a federation which would give Serbs local control in almost half the territory. Milosevic supports the plan.

Several hundred people demonstrated against the fall of

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Krajina outside the U.S. embassy in Belgrade on Monday. Police arrested dozens of them, witnesses said.

RB-- 08/07/95 17:52:00

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(b)(3)

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
7 August 1995



The Bosnian Army: Requirements for Defending the "Core Area"

The Army of Bosnia and Hercegovina (ABiH) is a competent defensive force capable of holding most of the territory under its control. Its offensive capability is evolving, but still lacks the firepower and mobility necessary to take and hold much additional territory.



- Since the initial Serb territorial gains were achieved at the beginning of the war, the conflict in Bosnia has been highly positional, centering on trench lines and bunkers that encompass the entire confrontation line in northern and central Bosnia. Military operations by either side have had to penetrate and capture these strong defensive positions before reaching vital objectives--a challenge which has proved difficult for both the ABiH and the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA).



- Aside from losses in the eastern enclaves and Bihac--where Government forces were were ill-equipped and surrounded--the Bosnian Army has managed to defend nearly all of its holdings since 1993 despite repeated BSA offensives. Government troops also have been able to defend most of their core areas in northern and central Bosnia because of their large troop reserves and strong fortifications, which limit the effectiveness of BSA artillery during an attack.

[005]

The Bosnian Serbs, conversely, are a better-equipped and more proficient fighting force, but are thinly stretched along the roughly 1,000 kilometers of front they now hold and lack enough manpower to end the war. The BSA's long frontlines force it to distribute its armor and artillery across a wide area, making it difficult to concentrate its heavy weapons to achieve overwhelming firepower in any given sector.

- Krajina Serb Army units--if able to retreat from Croatia to Bosnia with their heavy equipment--could join the BSA and increase manpower by as much as 35%. It may, however, take time to renovate the force after its disaster in the Krajina before it is an effective addition to the BSA. Additional manpower could help the Serbs in Bosnia to better man their existing lines of confrontation and/or better concentrate their forces for attacks.
- So far the Bosnian Serb have generally used artillery bombardment and armor to make advances, avoiding infantry attacks in well-defended areas with the risk of heavy casualties.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

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Requirements to Defend the "Core Area"

Assumptions:

- Any weapons given to the Bosnians will be used for offensive purposes, given the Government's long-term objective of reclaiming traditionally Muslim-held areas.
- Belgrade continues its current level of support to Bosnian Serbs: limited resupply, some VJ special forces, but no major ground force or air intervention in support of the BSA.
- Islamic assistance to Bosnia remains roughly comparable to current levels: moderate tonnage of supplies, no heavy equipment, negligible numbers of fighters.
- The Croatian government becomes willing to allow heavy weapons into central Bosnia and additional supplies into Bihac. The Bosnian Federation remains more or less intact: some Croat-Muslim military cooperation and maintenance of the cease-fire.

The Bosnian Army would not require major material assistance to defend the "core area"--the central region extending roughly from Tuzla to Mostar. The Croatian Army's breakthrough in UN Sector North has greatly improved the Bihac pocket's strategic position, making its prospects for survival excellent. Unless a land corridor is opened to Gorazde, it probably would eventually fall in the face of an all-out BSA attack, although Government forces in the enclave would not give up without a fight.

[005]

Equipment:

- To bolster the Bosnian Army and provide a more robust defensive capability, Government forces would require roughly 50 additional tanks, over 100 heavy artillery pieces, medium and heavy mortars, and anti-tank munitions. Improvements in the army's support structure--trucks or buses, jeeps, and communications assets--and fixed defenses--mines, machineguns, and barbed wire--would also significantly improve the force's combat capabilities.

Training:

- Most Government troops are relatively well educated and all adult males have had compulsory military training. The ABiH could assimilate personal weapons immediately and could probably train troops to employ crew-served weapons--artillery, mortars, and anti-tank weapons--in under six months, especially if they were familiar systems. However, it would take longer--perhaps six months or more with outside advisors--for its forces to learn to employ them most effectively and as units. Maintenance and supply would stress the army's existing logistic system and probably require additional training.

Airstrikes:

- Continued No-Fly Zone enforcement would be helpful but not critical--so long as Federal "Yugoslav" air forces did not intervene--given the Bosnian Serbs' limited air power and the marginal impact of airpower in the war. The Government would not require air support to hold its core areas against BSA offensives at the current level of fighting. If the BSA were to escalate fighting by trying for a knock-out offensive, Government forces might need limited airstrikes, possibly to help relieve pressure on Sarajevo and Gorazde and disrupt BSA movement along key lines of communication.

Requirements for an Offensive Force**Assumptions:**

- Belgrade provides increased support to the Bosnian Serbs--including overt intervention if necessary--adequate to prevent a decisive Serb military defeat, major loss of support of Serb-majority territory, and/or to counter any Croat-Muslim threat to the Posavina corridor. This would partially offset increased supplies to the Government unless Western aid was so extensive that Belgrade could not keep pace. [005]
- Islamic assistance to Bosnia increases, but is not decisive. More supplies, including some heavy equipment, reach Government forces; however, no outside countries contribute combat troops.
- Croatia and the Bosnian Croats become willing to allow transit of heavy equipment and supplies to the Bosnian Government.

The Bosnian Army is already able to conduct some offensives, and almost any form of material support would--directly or indirectly--improve the ABiH's offensive capabilities. However, to create a Bosnian Army with a genuine capability for sustained offensive operations, it would be necessary to transform many aspects of the fighting force. The Bosnians would require armor and artillery, much better transportation and a true logistics system, and combined-arms training supported by improved communications.

Equipment:

- In order to support successful attacks and regain a significant percentage of the country's territory, the Bosnian Army would require substantial heavy weapons and increased mobility: probably over 100 tanks, hundreds of artillery pieces, enough motorized transport to exploit breakthroughs, mine-clearing and combat engineer units.

Training:

- The Bosnian Army would put any weapons it received to immediate use. However, Government forces probably would require 6-12 months of additional training by large numbers of outside advisors in order to effectively use the new equipment and mount the large-scale, combined arms operations required to capture and hold substantial additional territory.

Airstrikes:

- Airstrikes could significantly support Government offensive operations by blunting Serb counterattacks and destroying Serb resources--especially rear-area supply facilities, logistics infrastructure, and command and control nodes--which the Bosnians could not otherwise attack. A robust Western airstrike campaign would have to be prepared to actively counter Serb air defense threats in Bosnia.

[005]

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August 3, 1995

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
FROM AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT

At our meeting on August 1 you asked for each Principal's views on our endgame strategy for Bosnia. I would be largely comfortable with your original paper that envisions a modified lift and strike if UNPROFOR were to collapse.

But I have thought for some time that we must put Bosnia in a larger political context and re-examine our fundamental assumption that the Europeans have a greater stake in resolving Bosnia than we do. In so doing, we may conclude that extending the life of UNPROFOR is no longer in our interest. (Why should we wait for the day when London and Paris tell us that they are leaving?)

The following paper is designed to examine how to shift from a European-led plan to an American-led plan.

Why America Must Take the Lead

Our commitment to use American ground forces to extract UNPROFOR on the one hand or implement a peace plan on the other means that this conflict will be "Americanized" sooner or later. Our previous strategy -- give primary responsibility to the Europeans, help the Bosnians rhetorically and hope the parties will choose peace -- is no longer sustainable. With a stronger Bosnian army unwilling to wait for peace at the negotiating table, and in the aftermath of Srebrenica and Zepa, the Bosnian side and international opinion will simply not allow us to return to the relative success of 1994. Muddle through is no longer an option.

Meanwhile, I strongly believe that the issue has become bigger than Bosnia. Although we may have been correct to limit our role in the past -- on the grounds that the former Yugoslavia was primarily a European responsibility -- the circumstances and our interests have now changed. Our interest in resolving this conflict has broadened.

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PER E.O. 13526

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- 2 -

In much the same way that our failure to solve the Haiti problem last year threatened to overshadow all of our other accomplishments, I fear Bosnia will overshadow our entire first term.

The failure of our European allies to resolve the Bosnia crisis has not only exposed the bankruptcy of their policy, but it has also caused serious erosion in the credibility of the NATO alliance and the United Nations. Worse, our continued reluctance to lead an effort to resolve a military crisis in the heart of Europe has placed at risk our leadership of the post Cold War world. President Chirac's comment -- however self-serving -- that "there is no leader of the Atlantic Alliance" has been chilling my bones for weeks.

We have also failed to take into account the damage Bosnia has done to our leadership outside Europe. Moreover, our failure to act in support of Bosnia threatens to undermine moderate Islamic ties to the United States. By contrast, American leadership in support of Bosnia will redound to our advantage throughout the Muslim world for a long time to come and could help shore up key relationships.

For these reasons, I believe we must stop thinking of Bosnia as a "tar baby." Instead, we should recognize that -- notwithstanding our successes in trade, Russia, and the Middle East and despite general agreement regarding Bosnia's complexity -- our Administration's stewardship of foreign policy will be measured -- fairly or unfairly -- by our response to this issue. That is why we must take the lead in devising a diplomatic and military plan to achieve a durable peace. If we agree that American troops will be in Bosnia sooner or later, why not do it on our terms and on our timetable?

The Requirement for Military Pressure

The essence of any new strategy for Bosnia must recognize the one truth of this sad story: our only successes have come when the Bosnian Serbs faced a credible threat of military force. Hence, we must base our plan on using military pressure to compel the Pale Serbs to negotiate a suitable peace settlement. If despite our best efforts, UNPROFOR becomes unsustainable, then a modified form of lift and strike remains the best way to promote an acceptable peace over the long term.

This approach entails significant responsibilities for the United States. It means using our military forces, primarily through the air, to help the Bosnians by changing the balance of power. After a suitable transition period to improve

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Bosnian military capabilities, we can and should disengage. In the absence of this support from us to improve the Bosnian military position, the history of this conflict demonstrates that the Pale Serbs will never feel enough military pressure to negotiate a durable peace settlement.

The Current Diplomatic Track

We should actively pursue a peace settlement now. Recent actions by NATO, as well as the military credibility inherent in the rapid reaction force have given UNPROFOR a small window of credibility. In conjunction with the ascendant threat from Croatia, UNPROFOR's short-lived, new credibility may be sufficient to convince Pale to negotiate seriously.

The steps we are now taking in the Contact Group (i.e., the revised Bildt option) will test this proposition. My strong suspicion, however, is that the Serbs will not be prepared to negotiate on the basis of the Contact Group map, or if they do, their proposals will be so one-sided as to create a stalemate.

Even in 1994, perhaps our best year in Bosnia, a more effective UNPROFOR and improved Bosnian-Croat military cooperation did not bring the Serbs to the table in a serious way. Unless the Bosnian Serbs are convinced that failure at the peace table will mean not only stalemate on the battlefield but worse some roll-back of their military gains, I do not believe they are likely to make the concessions necessary for a durable peace.

In the event a new diplomatic track fails to produce a settlement, the next few months will see a reinvigorated UNPROFOR help reduce fighting, Federation forces poking at Serb defenses around the country, and the Serbs continuing to pick off as many innocent and helpless persons as international opinion will allow. Eventually, all sides will settle in for the winter.

But this pattern will not last. UNPROFOR's window of credibility will begin to shut as the Europeans lose their stomach for military action. (The pattern of strong political will to act followed by erosion of allied support will continue. Just as the allies' commitment to the Sarajevo ultimatum of 1994 eroded one year later, so will their support for NATO's recent decisions soften over time.) And as UNPROFOR weakens, the Serbs motivation to negotiate will wane. Hostilities will increase by spring, and the threat of UNPROFOR's departure will emerge again -- stronger than ever. We could well face the prospect of U.S. forces on the ground in the spring and summer of 1996.

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In addition to the obvious political risks for the Administration, an UNPROFOR withdrawal next year will enable the parties to exploit campaign developments, as they play the candidates off.

New Military Strategy Meets New Diplomatic Strategy

If the foregoing analysis is correct, we should consider taking control of the situation now. We should develop a plan that sets a deadline for the Bildt-plus diplomatic track, after which we would promote the collapse of UNPROFOR and begin the inevitable process of handing off military responsibility for Bosnia to the Bosnians through a modified lift and strike option.

This initiative has two essential advantages over our current policy. First, it ensures that we are not held hostage to the timetable of London, Paris or the Bosnian government. We decide when our commitment to extract UNPROFOR would be operative. Second, by setting a deadline after which the Serbs would face the possibility of a reversal on the battlefield, we would create a powerful incentive for the Serbs to make their concessions now. (For example, once we think Bildt has run its course, we could send an American envoy to Belgrade with a message that the military track will be immediately implemented unless we see some marked change in the Serb position.)

Military Support for Bosnia after UNPROFOR

The objective is handing-off to the Bosnians the responsibility for self-defense and military pressure on the Serbs. This requires lifting the arms embargo and military support, through air strikes and ground-based training, until the Bosnians can act themselves. The sooner we start preparing Federation forces, the sooner they can act on their own. As the NSC paper indicates, a transition period should be some six months to one year.

The Role of Air Power. The linchpin of international assistance will be a credible commitment to the decisive use of air power against the Serbs to prevent a collapse of Sarajevo and other Federation territory before new arms can be integrated into the Bosnian army. This means implementing the type of air strikes NATO has just promised but without the risk of hostages. No fly zone implementation would also continue. (The NSC paper has an effective description of how these missions can be handled.)

The New Ground Force. The post-UNPROFOR multinational force on the ground will also be important, both to sustain momentum in Bosniac-Croat reconciliation and to train Federation forces (as well as target acquisition for any

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possible air campaign). In order to show our bona fides to our allies and maximize our influence with the Bosnians, we should offer a small ground contingent, whose primary mission would be training the Bosnian forces. In the light of Congressional support for lift, military trainers should be politically sustainable, especially if limits on their numbers and length of deployment are spelled out from the start.

In response to the obvious charge of "slippery slope," we should point to Haiti, where we set a timetable for deployment and met the deadline. It is simply wrong to argue that a multinational force with a U.S. component spells an open-ended American commitment. Indeed, a U.S. role in the training of the Federation forces would ensure that it could be completed quickly. A side benefit would be the fact that an American contribution of this kind could serve as a magnet for European participation, thus avoiding the possible all-Muslim army scenario many fear.

With U.S.-led air power and training for the Bosnians, this transition can be accomplished with a minimum exposure for the United States. The effect would be a new balance of power that provides the only real chance of concessions by the Bosnian Serbs as well as new leverage for us to play a decisive diplomatic role with all sides.

What Is the End-state?

I would obviously prefer to see the Bosnians achieve a settlement in accordance with the Contact Group principles, that is, a majority of Bosnia's territory and a union established between the Federation and a Serb entity, thus preserving the Republic of Bosnia's territorial borders.

But two significant alterations suggest themselves. And I would condition our support for this modified lift and strike with approval in advance from the Bosnian government for these two modifications.

First, the settlement could be more forward-leaning on the Serbs right to secede peacefully from Bosnia and join a potential "Greater Serbia."

Second, it may be necessary to consider proposals to trade Federation territory for Serb-held territory, especially if the Federation agrees and if the exchange makes the Federation more durable. This means population transfers that we have previously been unwilling to countenance. (In the context of an American leadership role to put military pressure on the Serbs, such transfers are politically and morally defensible).

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The principle would be quality not quantity. Population transfers that increase the viability of both parties could now be safely proposed. For example, Gorazde or Federation territory around the Posavina corridor might be exchanged for territory around Sarajevo and in Central Bosnia. Again, the threat to use decisive force may be dispositive. Exchanges beneficial to the Federation would probably require that the Serbs concede land they assert was Serb-majority. This will require confronting the Serbs with a credible threat of force.

In the context of new engagement by Washington, a serious discussion with Sarajevo should yield these concessions. But even more important, the Bosnian Government must be told bluntly that our support for this initiative is contingent upon its commitment not to seek military gains beyond the Contact Group plan and its guarantee to limit severely the influence of radical Islamic regimes in Bosnia. In summary, we must ensure that all the parties can achieve reasonable objectives and thus their conflict can be contained over the long-term.

How Long a Deadline?

We should set a deadline for the Bildt-plus phase sometime this fall. In as much as withdrawal has become easier and some may choose to stay in a follow-on force in Central Bosnia, our previous timetable under 40104 should be significantly shorter. If diplomacy falls in the near-term, the new variants of 40104 may allow us to begin a withdrawal mid-fall and end it before winter sets in.

What About the Russians?

Some persuading of Britain and France will obviously be necessary, but the prime diplomatic obstacle would be Russia. We should not underestimate the high-level diplomatic effort that will be necessary to avoid a Russian veto in the Security Council and minimize Russian support for Serbia. We will have to make clear that a solution to Bosnia has become America's top priority, and we intend to calibrate our relationship accordingly.

As far as lift is concerned, I would expect they would not want to isolate themselves and veto such a resolution if Britain and France went along and key Muslim Countries were induced to weigh in. Legally, they could accept that withdrawal of UNPROFOR will materially change the circumstances in which the arms embargo was established, leaving it -- unlike other embargoes -- without a rationale. (As the NSC paper points out, we may need some parallel lifting of sanctions on Serbia.)

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How To Deter Serbia and a Third Balkan War?

The NSC paper treats these subjects adequately. Suffice it to say, the entire climate for containment of a wider war and deterrence against Milosevic would be changed if Washington were to engage fully and NATO were to remain united.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. paper	Strategy for the Balkan Conflict. (6 pages)	08/04/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexancer Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - August 1995: Early [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2734

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006c. draft	Paper: Bosnia Endgame Strategy: What Kind of Bosnian State? (8 pages)	08/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexancer Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - August 1995: Early [2]

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RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006d. paper	Endgame Strategy: A Sustainable Defense of a Viable Bosnia. (3 pages)	08/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexancer Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - August 1995: Early [2]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006e. paper	Diplomatic Strategy. (3 pages)	08/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexancer Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - August 1995: Early [2]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. draft	Bosnia Endgame Strategy: What Kind of Bosnian State? (8 pages)	08/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexancer Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

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~~To all Bosnia~~

The Dallas Morning News

26 July 1995

Aric Schwan
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Schwan,

We are publishing a story in our Friday, July 28 edition that details a recent proposal for peace negotiations by Dr. Radovan Karadzic. It is our understanding that this proposal was conveyed to the U.S. Charge d' affaires in Belgrade, Central Intelligence Agency officers, and to representatives of the Clinton Administration. The proposal was first offered in October, 1994, and again within the past week.


The proposal was conveyed to these individuals by Dr. Ron Hatchett, director of the Center for International Studies at the University of St. Thomas and a former senior Defense Department arms negotiator.

We have contacted the office of Mr. George Stephanopoulos and were informed that he had received the proposal but had been unable to schedule time to discuss it with Dr. Hatchett. We would like to know if the State Department has responded to this proposal or has it under consideration. We'd also like to talk with a State Department representative who might be able to assess the merits of the proposal and/or its sincerity.

I've sent with this letter copies of Dr. Karadzic's proposal, his July 19 letter to Dr. Hatchett, and a copy of a map he sent that marks proposed land exchanges.

I'd appreciate any assistance you can offer. I can be reached at (214) 977-8070 after 11 a.m. EDT.

Sincerely,



Ed Timms

РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА
ПРЕДСЈЕДНИК РЕПУБЛИКЕ
САРАЈЕВО



REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
SARAJEVO

Dr Ronald L. Hatchett
Director
Lord Byron Foundation

Sarajevo-Pale, 18 July 1995

Dear Professor Hatchett,

Thank you very much for your recent letter, enquiring about the "bottom line" position of the Republic of Srpska with regard to the present political and diplomatic imbroglio in our part of the world. I appreciate your efforts to help establish communication where there is none at the moment. Furthermore, I hope that your interlocutors will prove as willing to adopt a bold and imaginative approach in their search for a lasting solution as the Lord Byron Foundation has proven itself to be.

The real issue in this war is the attempt - initially inspired from Bonn, and subsequently underwritten by Washington - to create a "Bosnian" state on the ruins of Yugoslavia. Many key players in the outside world still pretend not to see what is obvious: that the dynamics of Yugoslavia's disintegration applied to an even greater degree in former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Inevitably, all subsequent decisions based on this basic flaw were doomed to fail. Washington has long encouraged the Bosnian Muslims to veto any plan they dislike, but there is no sign that it is prepared to put pressure on the Muslims to make any concessions to the Serbs. And yet, the only alternative to giving us a peace plan that meets our minimum requirements is to defeat us militarily. This means widening of the war by the introduction of NATO forces, or turning existing UN troops into combatants. All sane people are rightly adamant that this must not happen.

Our "bottom line" is simple and clear. We ask that the principle of self-determination of the constituent nations of former Yugoslavia be accepted as the basis for any post-Yugoslav settlement. In fact, a blueprint for peace along those lines was proposed in Geneva, way back in the autumn of 1993, under the name of the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. We accepted it; so did the Croats. The Muslims rejected it. What we have instead is the Contact Group "plan", over a year old, which consists of a badly drawn map - and no political/constitutional solution to the problem. It demands consent to that map, while the constitutional dimension remains in limbo.

We do not need any more territory; in fact, it is widely known that we are prepared to trade some of the land for peace. The only delay is caused by the Muslim side-bet on America and its ability to impose decisions on the "international community". Needless to say, we do not want to "destroy" the Muslims; had we wanted that, we could have done so in the summer of 1992. But while we may accept a compromise about territory, we cannot give up our freedom, Contact Group brinkmanship and U.N. lack of even-handedness, coupled with an aggressive determination of the Muslim leadership to pursue the war, have forced us to act.

Srebrenica is only one consequence of the cavalier way we have been treated: by failing to demilitarize it, as originally promised to us, the U.N. has compromised any claim to its status as a "safe haven". The only way to prevent further escalation is to spell out our right to sovereignty, thus discouraging the Muslims from further pursuit of their absurd ambition to rule a unitary Bosnian state. We are at the negotiating table, waiting for this one assurance. This has been, and still is, the only real issue in former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Yours sincerely,



Dr Radovan Karadzic
President of the Republic

Serbian Plan for Revision of the Existing Contact Group Peace Plan

1. Karadzic says the Bosnian Serbs will never accept the map proposed under the current contact group plan. According to Karadzic, the problem is not in the amount of territory the Serbs are given -- he will accept 49% of the territory. However the 49% allocated to the Serbs must constitute a viable entity. Under the current proposal, the Northern corridor linking Serb lands in the east and west is too narrow, making the connection vulnerable to Muslim/Croat severing. The Sarajevo-Gorazde-Zepa-Srebrenica salient the current map gives the Muslims completely cuts off Serbs in the southeast from other Bosnian Serb areas. Moreover, Karadzic says the current plan gives 80% of the Bosnian industrial and business base to the Muslim/Croat Federation, leaving only 20% to the Serbs. In combination these shortcomings make the Serbian political entity inviable and therefore unacceptable.
2. The key shortcoming of the current peace plan is the absence of any constitutional guarantees that the Serbs will be truly in charge of their own destiny, free from Muslim domination. Karadzic says that if specific constitutional arrangements guarantee Serb sovereignty over their territory, he is willing to accept some sort of Confederation of Bosnian Republics that would give the image of a single Bosnian state operating in the international community, e.g. at the U.N.
3. Karadzic believes that a negotiated outcome of the conflict is possible, but it requires serious face to face meetings of all the protagonists with the aim of producing a comprehensive settlement of the disputes in Krajina and Bosnia. He believes that a Camp David meetings sponsored by President Clinton would be the right forum.
4. Karadzic claims that he has had extensive discussions with Croatian leaders inside Bosnia and with the Tudjman government of The Republic Croatia, and they have already reached an agreement on a settlement of Bosnian and Krajina issues affecting their factions. Serbian lands in Western Slavonia (the Krajina) and in the hinterland of Dubrovnik is to be traded for Croatian lands in the northern corridor of Bosnia.
5. In the Camp David negotiations, Karadzic hopes to trade Serb territories in the Sarajevo area to the Muslims for the three Muslim eastern enclaves of Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica.
6. These territorial trades would give the Serbs what they consider to be a viable political entity.
7. Karadzic says that the only alternative to the Camp David approach is an all out war and for the Serbs this must come sooner than later, as they fear that their military advantage will erode as the sanctions cut into their strength while leaks in the arms embargo already are flooding the Muslims with arms and an official lifting of the arms embargo will see the Americans provide high technology arms and training.

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P. 07

Proposal from Radovan Karadzic to President Clinton Regarding a Negotiated Settlement of the Conflict in Bosnia

1. President Clinton should convene a Camp David type meeting of all the factions involved in the Bosnian conflict; i.e. the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats, Krajina Serbs, the Tudjman government of Croatia, the Milosevic government of Yugoslavia. The aim would be a comprehensive settlement of the disputes in Krajina and Bosnia. If President Clinton desires, he may invite Russia to co-sponsor the conference but Karadzic believes that U.S.- only sponsorship is sufficient. Karadzic is ready to receive a high level Presidential envoy such as former President Jimmy Carter or Representative Lee Hamilton to discuss parameters for a Camp David meeting.
2. Karadzic believes that the time is right for a Camp David solution to the Bosnian conflict. After two years of fighting and two years of diplomatic maneuvering all factions know their relative strengths and weaknesses vis a vis each other. In face to face meetings moderated by the United States the sides should be able to reach an agreement acceptable to all.

PROPOSED PEACE MAP BY RADOVAN KARADZIC

