

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - July 1995: End July-Early August [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

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896

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34

Section:

2

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1

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1

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V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: 1 Aug 95 NAC Guidance. (2 pages)	08/01/1995	P1/b(1)
002. paper	Proposed Council Decisions. [NATO] (4 pages)	07/31/1995	P1/b(1)
003. draft	North Atlantic Council Draft MCM: Stabilizing Bosnia-Herzegovina. [NATO] (14 pages)	07/30/1995	P1/b(1)
004. memo	For Sandy Vershbow and James Steinberg from David Scheffer. Subject: Concept Paper on Bosnia Endgame. (3 pages)	07/26/1995	P1/b(1)
005. paper	Alternatives to Continued UNPROFOR Presence in Bosnia. (12 pages)	07/30/1995	P1/b(1)
006. agenda	NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia. Record ID: 9520893. (1 page)	07/31/1995	P1/b(1)
007. paper	Information Papers on Croatia. (8 pages)	07/28/1995	P1/b(1)
008. paper	Discussion Paper: Bildt Plus. (2 pages)	07/31/1995	P1/b(1)
009. statement	Russian Statement on Bosnia. [English Translation] (1 page)	07/29/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

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Bosnia - July 1995: End July-Early August [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2729

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

INTERNATIONAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BELL, CLARKER, DREW, FETIG, MITCHELL, NODIST, PETERS, SAUNDERS, SCHWARTZ, SESTAK, VERSHBOW

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FM: FBIS

TO:

FBIS

062JUL31 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (SEE 098JUL30)
(FOR COMPARISON TO VERSION FROM ZAGREB HTV TELEVISION NETWORK, SEE FBIS 098JUL30, PARAGRAPH 11) CROATIA: 'Official Version' of Tudjman Letter to Akashi AU3107115295 Zagreb HINA in English 1019 GMT 31 Jul 95
[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brijuni, July 31 (HINA) -- Croatian President Franjo Tudjman sent a letter to UN Secretary General's special envoy Yasushi Akashi last night. Following is the letter:

Your Excellency,

In reply to your fax message with the enclosed proposals of the Knin rebels which I have received at 2130 I hereby inform you as follows:

1) It is surprising that in your letter you do not make reference whatsoever to UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation], the UN peace forces which under this name were given the mandate by the Security Council resolution to operate in Croatia, while at the same time you mention the Knin leadership and RSK [the Republic of Serbian Krajina];

2) It is unacceptable to us that the UNCRO troops be deployed only in the area bordering the Bihac pocket. We have demanded that the UNCRO forces take over control of the internationally recognized borders between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and FRY respectively, which is of special importance because new troops and equipment of the Yugoslav army have been crossing the Danube recently again;

3) Pursuant to point 2), the deployment of the UN border crossings military observers only in the area of the Mount Dinara is out of question;

4) The wish of the rebel leadership to take advantage of the UN representatives and UNCRO yet again can also be seen from their proposal to allow delivery of the humanitarian assistance to Bihac provided that it be delivered to them as well;

5) Such proposals do not represent any basis for peaceful reintegration, and they do not contain answer to a single condition I put forth in my conversation with you on Saturday, 29 July 1995, when I explicitly stated that our negotiations with the Serbs from the occupied areas of Croatia with regard to the peaceful reintegration may commence under the following conditions:

a) The Croatian authorities will not negotiate with Milan Martić who has been put on the war criminals list by the Hague International Tribunal, or with anybody else acting on his behalf;

b) The negotiations may commence if the pipeline through the occupied area is put into operation within 24 hours;

c) Direct talks on the opening of all communication lines [HTV Television version reads "Negotiations on reopening of all roads"] through the occupied areas, particularly the railway line Zagreb- Split via Knin, should start immediately; and

d) Talks on the immediate implementation of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia in the occupied areas, and of the constitutional law on the rights of the Serb ethnic community, are to be held simultaneously.

6) Only on such basis may the peaceful reintegration and the proposed negotiations of the representatives of the military and civilian Croatian authorities with the Serb rebels from the occupied areas occur.

Yours faithfully, President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr Franjo Tudjman. Brioni, 30 July 1995, 2220.

INTERNATIONAL

BOSNIA POINTS FOR MEETING
WITH HOUSE MEMBERS

- Unilateral lift of the arms embargo will force withdrawal of UNPROFOR requiring the United States to send ground troops to Bosnia. The inevitable casualties -- and the debate over responsibility -- will tear our nation apart.
- It will severely undermine NATO and lead to American responsibility for the outcome of the war in Bosnia.
- Unilateral lift will help the Bosnian Serbs in their fight, and increase the risk of a wider war.
- Supporting a strengthened United Nations Mission is our best course to a negotiated peace.

Current situation in Bosnia unacceptable

Three alternatives:

1. Massive NATO commitment, including U.S. ground forces.
2. Unilateral lift of arms embargo.
3. Strengthen United Nations mission to protect Bosnian safe areas against Serbs.

Alternative 1: Massive NATO commitment, including U.S. ground forces.

- No justification
- No public support

Alternative 2: Unilateral lift of arms embargo.

- Leads to introduction of U.S. ground forces as United Nations mission withdraws. We must meet our commitment to our NATO allies.
- Means unilateral responsibility because the U.S. will bear the burden after Allied troops withdraw.
- Increases chances for wider Balkan conflict, affecting heart of Europe and beyond.
- Increases chances of Serb victory. They will not rest as Moslems rearm.
- Sets back chances for a negotiated peace.
- Gives other nations excuse to ignore U.N. arms embargos/resolutions they don't like.

Alternative 3: Strengthen United Nations mission, with serious commitment to NATO power.

- Has produced results, as peace in much of central Bosnia shows.
- Allows stronger UN mission to protect safe area.

- Rapid Reaction Force deployed.
- Allies agreed to use NATO air power if Serbs attack Gorazde.
- Allies can expand this formula to other safe areas.
- "Dual key" system streamlined, in military hands.
- Keeps humanitarian aid flowing.
- Best creates conditions for limited war and negotiated peace.

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FOLDER TITLE:

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2013-0687-F
vz2729

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As you are aware, Carl Bildt arrives in Washington Wednesday to discuss his efforts to negotiate a package which would give sanctions relief to Milosevic in return for recognition of Bosnia and agreement to tighten the closing of the border. His visit will be an important opportunity to advance the peace process, and I wanted to take this occasion to preview some of our thinking on the issues.

I am hopeful that the work Carl Bildt has done could prove to be the catalytic agent that brings the war to a negotiated conclusion. It is therefore vital that we approach his package with the utmost care, understanding that it may be our last best chance to move toward a settlement.

Much has happened in Bosnia since Ambassador Frasure first began to discuss with Milosevic partial sanctions suspension in return for recognition and closing of the border. The brutal Bosnian Serb assaults on Srebrenica and Zepa, the continued problems of humanitarian supply for Sarajevo and other safe areas, and the dangerous fighting around Bihac have dramatically increased the risks of much wider war. In my opinion, we can no longer afford to simply grant Milosevic sanctions relief hoping that, over time, he will bring what influence he has to bear on the Bosnian Serbs. Instead, it is important that any sanctions suspension package have a near-term impact on the situation on the ground.

-2-

Recent statements by various Serb leaders, including statements reported by Foreign Minister Kozyrev, suggest an appropriate way to continue on the path developed by Carl Bildt. According to Kozyrev, Milosevic and Mladic indicated a willingness to halt all offensive action against safe areas, open supply routes, and agree to a country-wide cease-fire. In turn, the cease-fire would be linked to agreement to begin talks on territorial and constitutional issues accepting the Contact Group plan as the starting point, but with both sides free to propose changes, taken together. This would insure that any agreement on these elements would substantially enhance the value of the package negotiated by Mr. Bildt.

At present, the package itself still has some problems, not the least of which is the fact that in its current form it is unacceptable to the Bosnian government (whose country it is destined to stabilize), and also to Croatia. In this regard, I was pleased to learn that Bildt had visited Sarajevo the day after the July 26 Contact Group to discuss the package with President Izetbegovic, especially the issue of sealing the border, which is essential to gain Bosnian government support for the proposals. In my view, Bildt and others should continue to engage with the Bosnian government in order to increase the chances for achieving a negotiations package that is acceptable to President Izetbegovic.

-3-

I still have some specific concerns about other aspects of the plan which Bildt and Milosevic had agreed on. The current package proposes that a five-nation review panel is named to consider sanctions reimposition. I believe that the five nations should be the Contact Group rather than the Perm Five. The package also proposes a nine month grace period during which sanctions could not be reimposed. While I understand the need for an initial grace period, I would prefer that it be in the range of 100-120 days as opposed to nine months. Finally, it is important that we reach a prior understanding with you (as a potential member of the five nation panel) that should we develop credible evidence implicating Milosevic in border violations, or other violations of his commitments under the proposal, that you would agree with us on the need to reimpose sanctions.

Obviously, there is a great deal of further discussion which our respective teams will need to pursue this week.

I want you to know, however, that I am determined to have the U.S. work cooperatively with Carl Bildt and with all of the Contact Group governments in an effort to advance the cause of peace through negotiations.

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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20893

July 31, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and
Croatia, August 1, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia and Croatia to be held August 1, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *Van Tol* NARA, Date *6/11/14*
2013-067-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20893

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. DOUGLAS GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F.C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on August 1, 1995, from 2:30 to 4:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 6/11/14

203-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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AMENDMENT TO FY 1996-97 STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATION BILL

Dole, Pressler

Viz:

At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following new section:

SEC. ____ . POLICY ON THE EXTENDED SUSPENSION AND TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO.

It is the policy of the United States that prior to the termination of United States sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro or the suspension of sanctions for a period longer than 90 days against Serbia and Montenegro --

(1) The repression of ethnic Albanians must be halted and full civil and human rights must be restored to the people of Kosova, and international human rights observers must be permitted to enter Kosova to monitor the civil and human rights of the majority Albanian population in Kosova.

(2) The elected parliament of Kosova must be permitted to freely assemble and the people of Kosova must be permitted to exercise their right to self-governance and self-determination;

(3) There should be no final settlement with respect to the former Yugoslavia without the full participation of Albanian representatives from Kosova in the negotiations.

(4) The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro) must halt all forms of support, including manpower, arms, fuel, financial subsidies and military material, for separatist Serb militants and their leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia;

(5) The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia must recognize the independent governments and the territorial integrity of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.

SEC. ____ . RESTRICTIONS ON THE TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO.

(a) RESTRICTIONS.- No sanction prohibition or requirement under Section 1511 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160) may cease to be effective unless a certification is made as provided in subsection (b):

(b) CERTIFICATION.-A certification described in this subsection is a certification effective for a period not more than ninety days and provided by the President to Congress of his determination that:

(1) systematic violations of the civil and human rights of the people of Kosova, including institutionalized discrimination and structural repression, have ended;

(2) the elected government of Kosova is exercising its legitimate right to democratic self-government;

(3) monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, other human rights monitors, and U.S. and international relief officials are free to operate in Kosova, and enjoy the full cooperation and support of local authorities;

(4) the political autonomy of Kosova, as exercised prior to 1981 under the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, has been restored as a first step toward self-determination;

(5) full civil and human rights have been restored to

ethnic non-Serbs in Serbia, including the Sandjak and Vojvodina;

(6) the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has halted aggression against the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia;

(7) the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has terminated all forms of support, including manpower, arms, fuel, financial subsidies, and war material, by land or air, for Serbian separatist militants and their leaders in the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia;

(8) the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has terminated all forms of support for the control and occupation by Serbian forces of any and all regions within the sovereign territories of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia;

(9) the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has terminated all contacts between its political and military leadership and those of the Serbian separatist militants in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia;

(10) the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has extended full respect for the territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;

(11) the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has cooperated fully with the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, including by surrendering all available and requested evidence and those indicated individuals who are residing in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro.

SEC. _____ TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.

Section 1511 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160) is amended by striking subsection (e) of that section.

SEC. _____ REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the President of the United States shall prepare and submit to the president Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House a detailed report on--

(1) the systematic human rights violations against the ethnic Albanian majority living in Kosova, to include reports of "ethnic cleansing;"

(2) the nature and extent of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's support for Serb militant separatists and their leaders in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, to include fuel, financial subsidies, arms, and war material, as well as the means by which these are being provided.

(3) the nature and extent of contacts between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's political and military leadership and the leaders of the Serb militant separatists in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia.

Options for Responding to the Bildt-Milosevic Package

In an informal meeting July 31, Deputies agreed that we should respond to European pressure to endorse the Bildt-Milosevic package in a way that keeps the diplomatic process moving forward while protecting our key interests. Two options were considered:

Option 1: Bildt Plus: *Broaden the package to obtain positive steps by the Bosnian Serbs toward de-escalation and initiation of peace negotiations as the precondition for implementing new sanctions relief for the FRY, along with improvements to the terms of the package.*

Concept: In light of Yeltsin's claim that Kozyrev secured commitments by Mladic on the safe areas and an offer for a ceasefire leading to new peace talks on the basis of the Contact Group plan, we might have the makings of a "package deal" for renewed peace talks that could be presented to Contact Group partners as a broadening of the Bildt-Milosevic package. (This would, of course, need to be discussed first with the Bosnians.) The elements would be:

A. Mutual recognition between the FRY and Bosnia and measures to close the border along the lines of the Bildt package, but modified to remedy the most serious flaws:

- Serious commitment to seal the border and cut off all military support to the Bosnian Serbs, backed up by the deployment of 400-500 monitors.
- A sanctions reimposition mechanism based on the idea of a five-nation review panel, but modified as follows:
 - participants would be the five Contact Group members rather than the UNSC Perm Five;
 - if the suspension period is to be of indefinite duration, then we would have to have a shorter grace period (e.g. 100 or 120 days) as opposed to 9 months; and
 - we would need to have a private side-understanding with the UK and France guaranteeing that they would vote to reimpose sanctions if we presented evidence that Milosevic had failed to meet *any* of a set of criteria that would be specifically agreed in advance by London and Paris;¹

B. Implementation of the sanctions suspension would be delayed until:

- The Bosnian Serbs have halted offensive action against all the safe areas and opened supply routes (as agreed at the July 26 Contact Group meeting); and
- The Bosnian Serbs have agreed to a country-wide 6-month ceasefire in tandem with agreement to begin talks on territorial and constitutional issues using the Contact Group plan as the starting point, but with both sides free to propose changes.
- *As a fallback to the latter condition:* A commitment by Milosevic to secure Bosnian Serb agreement to the ceasefire and initiation of negotiations by the end of the grace period; sanctions would be suspended during this time, but with the clear understanding that they would be reimposed if Bosnian Serb agreement were not forthcoming.

¹ We would need to develop a list of verifiable criteria to minimize the risk of disagreements over the significance of intelligence data --e.g. no tampering with physical barriers to seal off all but a handful of permitted border crossings; shut down all telecommunications and air-traffic-control links; etc.

In selling this approach to our Allies, we would point out that, if successful, it would reduce the likelihood that NATO would have to implement the decisive air strikes we have already threatened for the defense of Gorazde as well as similar action to protect Bihac and the other safe areas. (We would make clear, however, that there should be no perception of backing away from the commitment to implement the Gorazde decision, and that we believe our negotiating leverage would be enhanced by immediate extension of that decision to Bihac, Tuzla and Sarajevo.)

Analysis: This option would deny Milosevic the rewards of the Bildt package until he has obtained a down payment of positive performance from the Bosnian Serbs. We would thereby have a more defensible basis on which to justify new sanctions relief to Milosevic in the wake of Srebrenica and Zepa, and gain a 6-month window of opportunity for obtaining a final peace settlement. Given the additional "deliverables" required of Milosevic, we could, perhaps, sweeten the pot by suspending more sanctions, as long as we obtained satisfaction on the sanctions reimposition formula. We would be following Kohl's recommendation to the President to "put Milosevic to the test," and testing Yeltsin's claim that Mladic is ready to exercise restraint and negotiate on the basis of the Contact Group plan even if Karadzic is not. We would be building on our Contact Group partners' proposal at the July 26 meeting in London to tie implementation of the Bildt package to Bosnian Serb de-escalation measures on the ground.

The fallback position mentioned under "B" may prove necessary to overcome Contact Group resistance. It may, in fact, be required to gain Milosevic's agreement if he argues that he needs the political cover of substantial sanctions suspension before he can exert real pressure on the Pale leadership to agree to negotiations that use the Contact Group plan as the starting point.

Option 2: Improved Bildt: *Seek improvements to the package without tying it to Bosnian Serb actions.*

Concept: This option would seek the improvements to the Bildt-Milosevic package listed under "A" above, but without linking implementation of sanctions relief to Bosnian Serb de-escalation or agreement to new peace talks. It would be based on the assumption that our Contact Group partners will reject the linkage and use any such proposal as grounds for charging the U.S. with seeking to torpedo the negotiating track, which they could use as a pretext to withdraw UNPROFOR this year. It reflects the further assumption that, with or without the modifications proposed above, Milosevic is unlikely to come to closure with Bildt, and that therefore there is no need to worry about the defensibility of providing additional sanctions relief.

Analysis: If the above assumption about the allies' position is correct, then this is the lowest-risk course, ensuring that we maintain Contact Group unity and deny the Allies the ability to charge us with bad faith. If the second assumption about Milosevic is not correct, however, it would put us in a position of having to suspend additional sanctions without any Bosnian Serb down payment, and we would have forfeited the opportunity to use the latest developments on the ground to restart negotiations between the parties that could lead to a political settlement over the next six months.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. paper	Information Papers on Croatia. (8 pages)	07/28/1995	P1/b(1)

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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: End July-Early August [2]

2013-0687-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. paper	Discussion Paper: Bildt Plus. (2 pages)	07/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

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009. statement	Russian Statement on Bosnia. [English Translation] (1 page)	07/29/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

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Bosnia - July 1995: End July-Early August [2]

2013-0687-F
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