

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - July 1995: End July-Early August [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

896

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

1

Position:

1

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. talking points	Talking Points on Bosnia for Consultations with Allies. (9 pages)	08/13/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. draft	Bosnia: Diplomatic Options. (8 pages)	07/27/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	Diplomatic Initiative: Peace in Place. (3 pages)	07/27/1995	P1/b(1)
003. chart	Schematic of Endgame Strategy. [partial] (2 pages)	07/23/1995	P1/b(1)
004. paper	The Balkan Conflict: NSC Endgame Strategy. (8 pages)	07/31/1995	P1/b(1)
005. cable	Portion of Unknown Cable on Bosnia Endgame. (5 pages)	08/1995	P1/b(1)
006a. memo	For Alexander Vershbow from DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. Subject: Proposal. (1 page)	08/01/1995	P1/b(1)
006b. fax cover sheet	Phone Number, Name. [CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)	08/01/1995	P3/b(3)
007. note	Phone Number, Name. [CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)	08/01/1995	P3/b(3)
008. paper	Name. [CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)	08/01/1995	P3/b(3)
009. telcon	President' Discussion with Yeltsin on Bosnia. Record ID: 9505860. (5 pages)	07/31/1995	P1/b(1)
010. paper	Three Papers on Bosnia. (3 pages)	07/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: End July-Early August [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2728

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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
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Schematic of Endgame Strategy (Revised as of 7/23)



[003]

Success to Failure Continuum			
Success			Failure
GOBH and Pale enter into serious negotiations; cessation of hostilities	Stalemate at low levels of violence; neither side willing to negotiate; UNPROFOR likely to stay	Stalemate at high levels of violence; neither side willing to negotiate; likelihood of UNPROFOR withdrawal increases over time	Bosnian Serb forces continue to seize territory; UNPROFOR's mission collapses; UNPROFOR requests NATO support for withdrawal

A

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
10/1/2013
E.O. 13526
1.4 (c)

1A

UNPROFOR Withdrawal: US and NATO determine scope, duration and objective of withdrawal operation

The mission and ROE for the withdrawal force are a function of the post-withdrawal strategy U.S. and/or allied policy makers wish to pursue. There are four options:

Factors affecting scope and duration:

- Missions assigned the withdrawal force (see below)
- Whether UNPROFOR has withdrawn from enclaves (because enclaves no longer exist and/or UN forces have consolidated in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia)
- GOBH and Bosnian Serbs' capabilities and intentions to resist withdrawal
- Whether any nations decide to commit units currently in UNPROFOR to an UNPROFOR successor force (see below)

Option One: Neutral Withdrawal and US Disengages

- Withdrawal force treats all parties alike and uses force only in self defense
- UNPROFOR equipment is withdrawn or destroyed
- If arms embargo is lifted, USG only supplies arms on a "cash and carry" basis – no military aid or training
- U.S. and allies pursue strategy to contain conflict and keep Belgrade out
 - Belgrade gets substantial sanctions relief to seal border and stay out of conflict
 - UN strengthens peacekeeping forces in Croatia and FYROM
 - Contact Group attempts to reach peace accord in Croatia

Prognosis (assumes FRY and GOC stay out):

- Increased fighting after withdrawal
- Bosnian Serbs may try for knock-out offensive
- GOBH will increase attacks
- GOBH may try to impede UNPROFOR withdrawal
- Military stalemate with balance of forces gradually shifting to Sarajevo

Option Two: Neutral Withdrawal and US stays Engaged (option in NSC "endgame" paper)

- Withdrawal force treats all parties alike and uses force only in self defense
- UNPROFOR equipment removed or destroyed
- U.S. and others provide arms during withdrawal period (b)(1)
- After UNPROFOR units depart
 - US-led air and other military support for Bosnian forces continues for a finite time period
 - USG supplies additional military aid and training (b)(1)
 - USG organizes and helps deploy an UNPROFOR successor force (under UNSC mandate or Chapter 51)
- U.S. and allies try to contain conflict and keep Belgrade out (Same as above)

Prognosis (assumes FRY and GOC stay out):

- Increased fighting after withdrawal
- Bosnian Serbs more likely to try knock-out offensive
- GOBH increases attacks
- Military balance shifts more rapidly towards GOBH
- Increased pressure on Belgrade to aid Bosnian Serbs
- Stalemate at higher levels of violence

Option Three: Level the Playing Field During Withdrawal after which US Disengages

- Withdrawal force attacks Bosnian Serb forces
 - Pre-emptive SEAD campaign
 - Destroy heavy weapons
 - Disrupt command and control system
- UNPROFOR equipment turned over to GOBH (requires lift)
- U.S. and others provide arms during withdrawal period (b)(1)
- After UNPROFOR units depart
 - Air and other military support for Bosnian forces ends
 - USG only supplies additional arms on a "cash and carry" basis – no military aid or training
- U.S. and allies try to contain conflict and keep Belgrade out (Same as above)

Prognosis (assumes FRY and GOC stay out):

- BSA likely to oppose withdrawal operation
- Increased fighting after withdrawal
- GOBH will take offensive during or immediately after withdrawal to take advantage of diminished BSA capabilities
- Increased pressure on Belgrade to aid Bosnian Serbs
- Military balance shifts towards GOBH in immediate aftermath of withdrawal – gradual shift towards GOBH after withdrawal
- Stalemate at higher levels of violence

Option Four: Level the Playing Field During Withdrawal and US Stays Engaged

- Withdrawal force attacks Bosnian Serb forces
 - Pre-emptive SEAD campaign
 - Destroy heavy weapons
 - Disrupt command and control system
- UNPROFOR equipment turned over to GOBH (requires lift)
- U.S. and others provide arms during withdrawal period (b)(1)
- After UNPROFOR units depart
 - US-led Air and other military support for Bosnian forces continues for a finite time period
 - USG supplies additional military aid and training (b)(1)
 - USG organizes and helps deploy an UNPROFOR successor force (under UNSC mandate or Chapter 51)
- U.S. and allies try to contain conflict and keep Belgrade out (Same as above)

Prognosis (assumes FRY and GOC stay out):

- BSA likely to oppose withdrawal operation
- Increased fighting after withdrawal
- Military balance shifts towards GOBH in immediate aftermath of withdrawal – continues to shift towards GOBH after withdrawal
- GOBH may gain enough combat power to retake territory
- Increased pressure on Belgrade to aid Bosnian Serbs

[003]

B

Impact of actions by Serbia and/or Croatia that on the preceding prognoses:

If Serbia intervenes to end the war because balance of power is shifting decisively against the Bosnian Serbs

- BSA, with FRY support, will launch offensives to defeat GOBH or get favorable settlement
- Sharply increased level of violence
- GOBH unlikely to capitulate, but will call for massive assistance from West and OIC

If Croatia makes large-scale attacks against Sectors North and South

- Bosnian Serbs would support Krajina Serbs and go on defensive in Bosnia
- GOBH would step up attacks against Pale
- FRY involvement in Knin and Bosnia likely to increase

If Milosevic and Tudjman cut a deal

- Bosnian and Knin Serbs free to concentrate against GOBH
- Federation will disintegrate
- Bosnian Gov't increasingly isolated

If Milosevic breaks all contacts with Bosnian and Knin Serbs and seals border

- Accelerates weakening of Bosnian Serbs
- BSA may try for knock out punch before balance of power shifts decisively towards GOBH
- GOBH would eventually gain military advantage, may be able to regain territory
- Bosnian Serbs may accept a peace settlement

Range of possible outcomes

Good

Bad

Shift in balance of power brings Pale to the negotiating table; sides reach and implement a peace agreement

Shift in balance of power leads to stable equilibrium after GOBH has regained some territory

GOBH unable to regain territory but can defend current holdings; stalemate ensues

GOBH unable to defend current territory; faces defeat without additional Western support

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CROATIA GUIDANCE

- President met with Foreign Policy team to review situation in Balkans. Focus of discussion was situation in Western Bosnia and Croatia.
- We have welcomed the increased cooperation between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats within the framework of the Federation, as well as the closer cooperation between the Federation and the Government of Croatia.
- In this context, we have expressed understanding about the joint efforts that have been taken to relieve the pressure on Bihac that has taken place in recent weeks with the intervention of Serb forces from the Krajina.
- In meetings with Croatian officials, however, we have urged that their forces exercise the utmost restraint to minimize civilian casualties, to respect the human rights of the civilian population, and ensure the safety of UN personnel.
- We have also cautioned the Croatian leadership about the danger of a wider war.

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006a. memo	For Alexander Vershbow from DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. Subject: Proposal. (1 page)	08/01/1995	P1/b(1)

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TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)

Unclassified Upon Removal
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VZ.07/15/2014 2013-0687-F

~~FOR RELEASE~~ PRESS STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOLLOWING
THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING ON 1ST AUGUST 1995

Last week, the North Atlantic Council approved the necessary planning to deter an attack by Bosnian Serbs against Gorazde. The warning we issued on that occasion has thus far been heeded - and we expect it to continue to be heeded. For any attack on Gorazde will be met with the firm and rapid response of NATO's airpower. Today NATO is ready to take the same robust action to defend the other Safe Areas in Bosnia - Bihac, Tuzla and Sarajevo.

The North Atlantic Council has reviewed the work of the NATO Military Authorities on how our planning for Gorazde can be applied to these three other Safe Areas. We have been particularly concerned by the very serious situation in Bihac. The Council has today approved the necessary planning to deter attacks by any party - I stress any party - on the Safe Areas of Bihac, Tuzla and Sarajevo. As is the case already with Gorazde, our planning will ensure that military preparations which are judged to represent a direct threat to the UN Safe Areas or direct attacks upon them will be met with the firm and rapid response of NATO's airpower. We will use this airpower under the procedures approved last week by the Council and which were subsequently agreed with the UN for Gorazde. Let me add that at the request of the UN we will use NATO airpower also to provide close air support to any UN personnel throughout Bosnia and the UN sectors of Croatia that come under attack.

- 2 -

Our decisions today therefore build on those that were taken with respect to Gorazde. At the same time, we recognize that the application of NATO's airpower must take the different characteristics of each Safe Area into account. Bihac, in particular, is a complex case because of the large number of different parties involved in the fighting. Because of its proximity to Croatia I will be informing President Tudjman of certain aspects of our decisions that relate to Bihac.

A few moments ago I informed the Secretary General of the United Nations of the decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council today. I have asked him, if appropriate, to issue warnings to all the parties and to communicate to them that it is the intention of these decisions to protect safe areas and not to assist any of the parties to take action against another.

Finally, I wish to stress once again that NATO's actions are in support of the United Nations. We continue to support the presence of the UN forces in the Former Yugoslavia. Our actions are intended to underpin the search for a political settlement. In this respect, the Alliance is gravely preoccupied by the extremely dangerous situation both in Croatia and in Bosnia which carries the risk of an even wider, more explosive conflict. We urge all parties both in Croatia and in Bosnia to exercise restraint and to desist from further military action. We call on them to enter into serious negotiations to achieve a lasting peace throughout the former Yugoslavia.

14805/press8b

- 2 -

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

8-1-95

SANDY VERSHAW
ALAN KREZKO
RANDY BEERS

CIA PREPARED THE
ATTACHED UNCLASSIFIED
PAPER ON ETHNIC
CLEANSING AT THE REQUEST
OF SSCI - SEN SPECTER.

CIA HAS ASKED IF WE
WOULD LET THEM KNOW
IF WE HAVE ANY PROBLEMS
WITH IT. THEY HAVE
ALSO ASKED STATE FOR
COMMENTS.

SSCI HAS SCHEDULED A
HEARING (CLOSED) FOR
WEDNESDAY AT 2:00.

COULD YOU LET ME KNOW
ASAP IF YOU HAVE COMMENTS?
Thanks MIKE

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. note	Phone Number, Name. [CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)	08/01/1995	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: End July-Early August [1]

2013-0687-F
vz2728

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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1 August 1995

(b)(3)

Attached is the 7-page "ethnic cleansing" paper I discussed with you. The closed SSCI hearing on the subject is scheduled for tomorrow at 2:00 in Hart 219. As I indicated, we have been asked to let Senator Specter know what he can say on the matter that is not classified. From a CIA perspective, this paper is not classified, but we need a policy perspective as well. We will take any changes you have to offer. Please get back to me as soon as possible.

[007]

(b)(3)

Thanks.

(b)(3)

July 1995 -

"Ethnic Cleansing" and Atrocities in Bosnia***Summary***

Evidence drawn from refugee interviews, press reports, international relief agencies, and other sources of information indicate that ethnic Serbs are responsible for the vast majority of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

Croats and Muslims in Bosnia have also committed atrocities and forced other ethnic groups to flee--the Croat destruction of Mostar is a powerful example--but the ethnic cleansing actions of the Bosnian Serbs are unrivalled in scale and intensity. We have no evidence, moreover, that Croats or Muslims have planned or carried out systematic, large-scale ethnic cleansing.

Sustained campaigns of ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serbs since 1992 have resulted in the likely deaths of tens of thousands of non-Serbs, the displacement of hundreds of thousands more, and radical change in Bosnia's demographics. Up to 90 percent of non-Serbs who lived in the 65 percent of Bosnia now under Serb control have been forced to flee, were detained, or were killed. Well over 3,000 settlements--mainly in Serb-controlled areas--have been destroyed and some 1.3 million Bosnians, primarily Muslims, displaced, primarily as a result of ethnic cleansing.

The Bosnian Serb Army, paramilitary groups, Bosnian Serb political leaders, and security elements have played pivotal coordinating roles in ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Consistent patterns of political-military collusion and coordination are evident in Serb seizures of Bosnian towns. Many non-Serb refugees from throughout Bosnia have described Serb takeovers in strikingly similar terms.

The bloodiest rounds of ethnic cleansing took place earlier in the Bosnian conflict in 1992 and 1993, but Serb efforts to expel non-Serbs continue. More than 16,000 have been evicted from northern Bosnia since last summer, and thousands more have been forced from the eastern enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa this month alone.

The apparently systematic, widespread nature of Serb actions strongly suggests that, from the beginning of the conflict, Bosnian Serb political and military leaders have played a central role in the purposeful destruction and dispersal of Bosnia's non-Serb population.

Introduction

Ethnic cleansing has been carried out in Bosnia since at least early 1992, primarily by Bosnian Serb political and military forces opposed to the Bosnian Government's declaration of independence following a republic-wide referendum in early March 1992. The Bosnian Serbs boycotted the vote. Refugees have indicated that Bosnian Serbs probably were planning takeovers of some towns, such as Brcko, before the referendum and reportedly sought help from the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and paramilitary groups formed in Serbia to do so.

In many cases, ethnic Serbs did not constitute majorities or significantly greater pluralities in key multiethnic towns that they subjected to ethnic cleansing. Official census data shows, for example, that in early 1992 Muslims constituted a majority of 56 percent in the northeastern city of Brcko. The Muslim population was about equal to that of Serbs in the northwestern town of Prijedor (39 and 40 percent, respectively), as well as in the larger *opstina* of Prijedor (44 and 43 percent, respectively). Both areas have since been virtually depopulated of non-Serb residents.

Well over a million of those displaced since early 1992, primarily by Serb ethnic cleansing, remain in Bosnia. A majority are Muslims forced into overcrowded enclaves and towns in Bosnian Government-held areas. Ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serbs continues today, although the most brutal and widespread incidents took place in 1992 and 1993, when some of the most notorious detention camps were forced to close following extensive international publicity. More than 16,000 non-Serbs have been expelled from Serb-controlled areas of northern Bosnia alone since last summer, and thousands more have been forced from the eastern enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa this month.

Croats and Muslims have also committed atrocities during the Bosnian conflict, but their actions have consisted overwhelmingly of random, discrete--though sometimes fierce--episodes that lack the sustained intensity, orchestration, and scale of the Bosnian Serbs' efforts. (see page 7 text box) The majority of refugee accounts--corroborated by information from the UN, international relief organizations, and other sources of information--indicate that ethnic Serbs are responsible for the overwhelming majority of the destruction, displacement, and loss of life associated with ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

Key Actors in Ethnic Cleansing by Bosnian Serbs

A substantial body of evidence indicates that political, security, military, and paramilitary elements all played central, coordinated roles in carrying out ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Statements by refugees from affected towns as distant from each other as Prijedor, Brcko, and Foca reveal a strikingly similar pattern. They describe how non-Serbs were disarmed and Serb political, security, and military forces took control of towns, setting up new local government structures with identical names or functions in each case, and systematically rounding up, interrogating, torturing, and imprisoning or expelling members of non-Serb élites--usually Muslims. The almost simultaneous timing of the takeovers of many towns in spring 1992 also suggests collusion among Bosnian Serb authorities. The balance among these political and military elements appears to have shifted over the past two years--the military, for example, has expanded its role in ethnic cleansing through its offensives--but all appear to remain involved.

The Serbian Democratic Party and Internal Security

Local and regional members of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic's Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) appear to have been responsible for many tactical decisions involving the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs. Numerous refugee accounts name the SDS as having orchestrated Serb takeovers of previously multiethnic towns, where they put in place new régimes, set up interrogation centers, established mock "courts," and moved thousands of non-Serb civilian prisoners to detention camps.

The SDS mayor of Prijedor, who took office following the takeover of the town in April 1992, stated to a US news organization in a fall 1992 interview that the three principal detention sites in the area--Keraterm, Trnopolje, and Omarska, where thousands reportedly were tortured and died--were "formed on decisions of the Prijedor civil authorities." Many ethnic Serbs identified as local SDS activists have also been affiliated with local paramilitary or irregular units reported to have terrorized the non-Serb populace.

Local SDS officials have also worked closely with internal security elements. Interior Ministry officials traditionally control the local police, and their authority for dealing with public order gives them access to municipal records. Many refugees have reported that, in town takeovers, prominent local non-Serbs have been quickly rounded up by police using organized lists. Bosnian Serb internal affairs officials also reportedly have commanded interrogation sites and detention camps for

civilians, such as Omarska, according to various refugee - interviews.

Karadzic has consistently denied that Serbs have engaged in ethnic cleansing or that his régime is responsible for any atrocities, but he and his associates apparently have exercised authority over some Bosnian Serb detention camps. Journalists, for example, have described having to arrange visits to detention camps in 1992 through Karadzic's office, and other Westerners reportedly toured camps accompanied by SDS "escorts." This information and the consistent patterns evident in the takeovers of towns throughout Bosnia strongly suggest that top SDS leaders, including Karadzic, knew about ethnic cleansing plans from the outset--and that they probably initiated them in coordination with internal security organs and the military.

The Bosnian Serb Military

The Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), which was formed from the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) in mid-May 1992, has been a central participant in ethnic cleansing campaigns against Muslims and Croats. BSA units have conducted systematic ethnic cleansing operations, controlled detention camps, and methodically destroyed Muslim villages, in particular, most notably in northern and eastern Bosnia. BSA forces have often operated in conjunction with Serb paramilitary units identified as the perpetrators of some of the worst atrocities of the Balkan conflict.

The BSA has operated many of the detention camps that have held primarily Muslim and Croat civilians--rather than bona fide POWs--according to press accounts and statements by refugees. BSA-run camps, notorious for their alleged brutality and high death tolls, include facilities at Manjaca and Batkovic. A significant part of the Serb detention camp and prison system in Bosnia was an integrated entity organized within the corps structure of the BSA, according to information from various sources. Some former detainees claim to have been able to discern the military command structure in BSA-run camps and, in some cases, identify former JNA officers then serving in the camps' commands. The BSA's security service reportedly exercised command and control of the camp system using military police as guards.

As the BSA, under the command of General Ratko Mladic, has intensified its military operations, its role in ethnic cleansing has grown. The BSA has incorporated into its campaigns the systematic destruction of villages--primarily Muslim--to ensure that their inhabitants will not return. BSA forces in both the January-April 1993 Srebrenica offensive and the April 1994

Gorazde attack, for example, razed Muslim villages well after Bosnian Serb troops had control of the areas surrounding them.

Paramilitary Forces

Numerous Bosnian refugees have indicated that both Bosnian Serb and Serbian paramilitary units initially operated in conjunction with the JNA and later the BSA, as well as local police forces, to seize control of territory and ethnically cleanse areas in 1992. There is some circumstantial evidence that the JNA/BSA and the Serbian Interior Ministry armed Bosnian Serb and Serbian paramilitaries in 1992.

In many cases, the JNA/BSA secured the area around a town and fired artillery or tank rounds into the area to terrorize the population, according to a variety of reports. Paramilitary units appeared to operate in close coordination with the Army--if not under its command--typically following up on the Army's encirclement of the town by entering it to "ethnically cleanse" it through murder, terror tactics, and expulsions. The BSA appears to have disbanded most paramilitary units or incorporated them into the Army in the past two years for a various reasons. Volunteer paramilitary units that have operated since that time appear to have functioned under BSA command or as part of BSA units.

The Toll of Ethnic Cleansing

There is no reliable estimate of how many Bosnians have died as a result of Serb ethnic cleansing, but information from refugees and press reports strongly suggests that they number in the tens of thousands. Although information on deaths is mostly anecdotal and not the result of formal investigations or exhumation--because most deaths claimed took place in areas under Serb control to which access for outsiders is denied--the refugees reporting it claim in many cases to have witnessed the atrocities involved.

Approximately 2,000,000 people from states of the former Yugoslavia have been displaced and now reside outside their home republics. About 1,300,000 of those displaced persons are in Bosnia, a majority of them Muslims forced to leave Serb-controlled areas. In addition, approximately 1,000,000 more refugees from the former Yugoslavia have fled abroad, according to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), most of them to Europe. Although it is difficult to estimate the breakdown of Balkan refugee populations by ethnic group, either within the former Yugoslavia or abroad, a clear, though unspecified, majority almost certainly is Bosnian Muslim.

Conclusion

Sustained ethnic cleansing campaigns in Bosnia over three years have radically altered the formerly multiethnic state. Restoring its pre-war demographic balance and ethnic distribution now appears virtually impossible. The actions of ethnic Serb political and military forces have created a Bosnian--mainly Muslim--diaspora. At the same time, ethnic Serbs have succeeded in securing their hold over large parts of Bosnian territory and made significant strides toward their apparent objective of establishing, or expanding, an ethnically pure Serb state.

Croat and Muslim Atrocities in Bosnia

The vast majority of deaths and expulsions because of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia have been the work of ethnic Serbs, according to all available sources of information. Bosnian Muslims and Croats, however, have also been responsible for atrocities against each other and ethnic Serbs--though on a significantly lesser scale. Both groups have detained, abused, expelled, and killed civilians, particularly in central Bosnia.

- Some notorious detention sites, such as the Tarcin camp run by the Bosnian Government Army, reportedly still operate and may hold some civilians along with Bosnian Serb Army POWs.

Reports also persist of localized brutality and persecution of minorities.

- Although many detention sites, such as those run by Muslim forces in Bugojno in central Bosnia, reportedly have been closed, refugees indicate that harrassment and expulsions of Serb civilians continued as late as last summer.
- Press reports note that Bosnian Croats have been trying since spring 1994 to evict Muslims from western Mostar, which the Croats control.

Despite this record of offenses, there is no information nor pattern of events suggesting that either Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Croat leaders have encouraged large-scale ethnic cleansing efforts to gain and hold territory.

- Estimates by various of international humanitarian and human rights organizations of the number of deaths and displaced persons in Bosnia suggest, when compared with 1991 census data for Bosnia, that far fewer ethnic Serbs than Muslims and Croats have been killed or expelled from their homes.

UNCLASSIFIED

DCI Interagency Task Force
1 August 1995

Prisoners in Bosnia: Status and Trends

Negotiations between the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serbs to exchange prisoners following the fall of the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves has, again, put the spotlight on the status of prisoners in Bosnia. In relative terms, there have been fewer prisoners -- civilian or military -- detained in the first half of 1995 than at any other time during the war, but this trend reversed with the sharp increase of fighting this summer.

Bosnian Government Camps

The Bosnian Government has never held prisoners on a scale as large as the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs have. Those prisoners it has held have been true POWs for the most part as opposed to civilian detainees.

- ☐ The Bosnian Government currently is holding approximately 500 Bosnian Serb prisoners, the large majority of whom are POWs; it is holding very few Bosnian Croat prisoners.
- ☐ Conditions at Bosnian Government camps generally have been much better than conditions at either Bosnian Croat or Bosnian Serb camps, with a few notable exceptions - the treatment of Bosnian Croat POWs in Bugojno in 1993 being one.
- ☐ There have been unconfirmed reports that the Bosnian Army has pressed small groups of ethnic Croats and ethnic Serbs into forced labor along front lines.

Bosnian Croat Camps

The HVO (Bosnian Croat Army) held more prisoners than the two other armies combined in the second half of 1993. Most of those prisoners were Muslim civilian males from central Bosnia. Conditions generally were poor at the camps and physical abuse reportedly was widespread. Most of those prisoners were pressed into forced labor gangs until their release with the implementation of the Federation agreement in 1994.

- ☐ The number of prisoners currently held by the HVO is difficult to determine, but the Croats are likely holding several hundred Bosnian Serb POWs. The number of civilians held, however, is probably very low.

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Bosnian Serb Camps

Ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serbs began in April 1992, and the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) and paramilitary groups began using numerous buildings as collection sites for non-Serb civilians, often stadiums and schools. They then converted nearby facilities into large regional detention camps holding several thousand prisoners each.

- ☐ The primary purpose of these camps was to hold non-Serbs until they could be expelled, but thousands reportedly died at these camps in the summer of 1992. By the end of 1992, in the wake of international publicity, most of these camps were disbanded and the Bosnian Serbs began using smaller, more numerous sites to hold prisoners.

Since late 1993, the Bosnian Serbs have mainly used their detention camps to hold non-Serb POWs and civilian forced laborers.

- ☐ As a result, the sites are now smaller and -- except for a few prisons -- are designed as temporary housing for transient work crews. The current number of prisoners is probably several thousand.
- ☐ The BSA has come into more direct control of these sites (while previous sites had often been under the control of civil police or paramilitary units) and reportedly still maintains a few facilities capable of holding several thousand prisoners each.

Conditions at Serb detention camps are reportedly still harsh and the physical abuse of prisoners appears widespread - many of these camps are not registered with human rights or aid agencies.

- ☐ The majority of current civilian prisoners are military-aged males "ethnically cleansed" from their homes. They are kept as forced laborers, usually for several months, before being released into non-Serb territory.

Many larger population centers in Bosnian Serb territory have enacted "obligatory labor" laws for non-Serbs residents in the last two years.

- ☐ Women are usually forced to work on local farms, in factories, or for individual ethnic Serb residents.
- ☐ Males usually work on local farms or are taken in small groups by BSA units to perform manual labor on the front lines. Most non-Serbs in Serb-held territory

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. paper	Name. [CIA Act] [partial] (1 page)	08/01/1995	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: End July-Early August [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2728

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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reportedly wish to leave but are unable to pay the "transit fees" required by local authorities and transport "agencies."

Title: Prisoners in Bosnia: Status and Trends



[008]

Date: 31 July 1995

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5860

July 31, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Memorandum of Presidential
Telephone Conversation with President Boris
Yeltsin ~~(S)~~

The attached Memorandum of Conversation from the meeting between the President and President Boris Yeltsin is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Moscow for the Ambassador only. ~~(S)~~



Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By ✓ NARA, Date 6/11/14

2013-0687 -f

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tab A

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. telcon	President' Discussion with Yeltsin on Bosnia. Record ID: 9505860. (5 pages)	07/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

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2013-0687-F

vz2728

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. paper	Three Papers on Bosnia. (3 pages)	07/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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