

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Bosnia - July 1995: Mid-Late [5]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

896

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

1

Position:

1

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Phone Call to German Chancellor Kohl. Record ID: 9505738. (2 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1)
002. fax cover sheet	Phone Number. [partial] (1 page)	07/27/1995	b(7)(C)
003. telcon	Telcon with British Prime Minister John Major. Record ID: 9505487. (7 pages)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: Mid-Late [5]

2013-0687-F

vz2727

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Contingency Speaking Note

- NATO is committed to helping the UN mission succeed, including through the provision of airpower.
- However, the Alliance will not accept tasks that it cannot effectively fulfill.
- Thus, to mount this particular air operation, a number of conditions would need to be met.
 - First, the NATO Council would want the assurance from our operational commanders that this operation is militarily feasible.
 - Second, the NATO Council would need to authorize, under UN Security Council Resolution 836, the use of airpower in a wider geographic area.
 - Third, our aircraft would need to take protective measures against the air defences in that zone, as well as any other air defences that pose a direct threat to the operation.
 - Fourth, we would need an assurance that the UN "key" would be turned for the full operation and that the NATO commanders would have full flexibility in selecting targets.
 - Fifth, we would all need the political will to deal with the inevitable risk of hostage-taking.
- NATO airpower, even if used effectively with these conditions met, cannot alone achieve a long-term solution.
- We should not go to war with the Bosnian Serbs. Rather, we must convince them that further offensives against the safe areas are unwise and that their objectives are better pursued at the negotiating table.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9505738
RECEIVED: 24 JUL 95 16

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 25 JUL 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY

TELCALL

PERSONS: KOHL, HELMUT

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR PRES TELCALL TO GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT

DUE DATE: 27 JUL 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NSC CHRON

PIFER

VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By Va Bmd NARA, Date 6/11/2014

2013-0687-F

COMMENTS: ORIGINAL TO WH RECORDS MANAGEMENT PER WH STAFF SECRETARY

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORD ID: 9505738

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
002 PRESIDENT
002

Z 95072416 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
Z 95072511 FOR INFORMATION
X 95072515 NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 950725
002 950725

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 5738

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG 90 A/O _____

JP

SEQUENCE TO

INITIAL DATE

DISPOSITION

Harmon

6

JP

Dohse

Sens

Soderberg

Berger

ay

Lake

7

Situation Room

8

West Wing Desk

NA
Natl Sec Advisor 7/25
has seen

Records Mgt.

D POTUS
N

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette

Yes

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5738
REDO

July 25, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call with Chancellor Kohl
of Germany

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding talking points for his use in a telephone call with Chancellor Kohl.

Concurrence by: Steve Pifer *SP*

RECOMMENDATION

That you forwarding the talking points at Tab A to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *Van Zandt* NARA, Date *6/11/2014*

2013-0687-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

20874

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D C 20506

July 25, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: NELSON DREW *N*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 24, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held July 24, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *John T. ...* NARA, Date *6/11/2014*

203-0687 -F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. T.R. PATRICK
Executive Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia, July 24, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By Va. John NARA, Date 6/11/14
2013-0687-f

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: July 24, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS

TIME: 2:00 - 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger

CIA

George Tenet

Dennis Blair

OVP

Leon Fuerth

Rick Saunders

JCS

William Owens

Wesley Clark

STATE

Strobe Talbott

Peter Tarnoff

Jim Steinberg

SPECIAL ENVOY

Robert Frasure

DEFENSE

John White

Walter Slocombe

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

Nelson Drew

USUN

Madeleine Albright

David Scheffer

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies agreed to begin meeting on the Bosnia crisis via SVTS on a daily basis until further notice. ~~(S)~~
2. USUN reported on Boutros-Ghali's refusal to meet with U.S., UK and French Ambassadors to discuss implementation of the London Conference decisions until he was presented with a "non-paper" on the concept being considered by NATO. A joint UK/French/USUN draft was discussed, and Deputies tasked a working group chaired by OSD to revise the non-paper and provide a cleared version for use in New York that evening, drawing on the President's phone

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

v2 10/1/2013

call with French President Chirac (who wanted to ensure a role for General Janvier, UNPF Theater Commander, and the UN SYG, in the decision cycle for initiating any Bosnia-wide phase in an air campaign), and conversations between the CJCS and the National Security Advisor on the best way to respond to the French concerns. The revision was completed and cleared for use in New York. ~~(S)~~

3. Deputies discussed briefly the problems of expanding the London Conference decisions to include Safe Areas beyond Gorazde. They agreed that USNATO should seek NAC language setting the stage for a transition from a strictly Gorazde-centered policy to one that applied to other Safe Areas, but that it would not be practical to insist on expanding the London ultimatum of extensive air strikes to additional Safe Areas in the July 25 NAC decision. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

4. Deputies noted that the Croatian government had notified Ambassador Galbraith of its intention to launch an attack into the Bihac sector during the early morning of July 25. They agreed that, given the deteriorating military situation in Bihac and the inability immediately to apply the London agreement to Bihac, it would be inappropriate to attempt to dissuade the Croats from their plans. However, it also was agreed that the Croats should be warned against taking this opportunity to launch an attack against Knin, with the accompanying risk of a multi-front campaign and possibly drawing Serbian Government forces into the conflict. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

5. Following a read-out on the President's call to Chirac, Deputies noted that several key elements of what had apparently been agreed in London now seemed to be coming undone. They agreed that a major effort involving multiple phone calls by Principals to their UK and French counterparts should be undertaken to restore the London consensus. This effort would key off the work being done to reach U.S./UK/French agreement on the non-paper for Boutros-Ghali. (Action: All) ~~(S)~~

6. Deputies reviewed the results of the interagency working group tasked on July 22 to develop alternatives to the Dole resolution calling for unilateral lift of the arms embargo on Bosnia and a legislative strategy to preclude the President having to cast an unsustainable veto of the Dole legislation. They endorsed the conclusion of the group that a series of amendments should be sought that would: (1) change the triggering mechanism to ensure that the Bosnian government could not unilaterally start the clock on a requirement for the U.S. to lift the embargo; (2) endorse the efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR through the RRF and the London Conference; and (3) change the requirement from unilateral lift to multilateral lift. They

agreed that a Presidential veto should be recommended if the requirement for unilateral lift remained. They agreed that key Principals would brief a bipartisan Congressional group on July 25 regarding the desired amendments and the implications of the London Conference. (Action: NSC/All) ~~(S)~~

7. Deputies reviewed progress toward satisfying tasking from the July 22 DC regarding the need for new diplomatic initiatives and critical decisions associated with possible transition to a post-UNPROFOR environment in Bosnia. They considered the need to look at multiple diplomatic options and tracks given the fluid nature of the current environment, and the need to move thinking beyond the current "Milosevic track." OVP agreed to work with State in producing a new drafts for further consideration by Deputies and Principals. (Action: OVP/State). ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20873

July 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F.C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on
Bosnia, July 14, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By Van Oord NARA, Date 6/11/2013

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: July 14, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS
TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OMB
Alice Rivlin

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

Chief of Staff
Leon Panetta

State
Secretary Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke

CIA
John Deutch
Dennis Blair

DOD
Secretary Perry
Jan Lodai

JCS
General Shalikashvili
Wesley Clark
Howell Estes

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
(via secure video)
Rick Inderfurth (via secure
video)

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals met on July 14 to consider appropriate responses to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at Srebrenica. ~~(U)~~

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PER E.O. 13526

VZ 10/1/2013

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Declassify on: OADR

Response to French Proposal to Reinforce Gorazde:

2. Principals agreed that we should not say "no" to the French on efforts to make UNPROFOR more robust or their specific proposal to reinforce Gorazde. But we must find ways to turn the discussion to options that are militarily feasible. The immediate decision is to send General Shalikashvili to London to meet on Sunday, July 16, with his French and British counterparts for the purpose of reviewing the military options being considered in the aftermath of Srebrenica. He will raise a series of issues about the French Gorazde option (including U.S. helicopter lift for French reinforcements) designed to focus the discussion on what is realistic from a military standpoint. He will return with answers before a decision is made on whether or not to provide U.S. helicopter lift. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~

3. Principals agreed that if there was to be a decision to make a stand at Gorazde, it would be a decision for Sarajevo, London, Paris and Kiev to make, with our support. We will not seek to drive such a choice if they are not willing to implement it. We will, however, signal to allies at the meeting in London that we believe such a decision would require robust use of air power and that we stand ready to provide it in conjunction with a NATO effort to restore air supremacy over Bosnia. (Action: JCS/OSD) ~~(S)~~

4. It was agreed that Sarajevo is important to a successful UNPROFOR strategy as is Gorazde. Principals agreed that we should not only support using the RRF to open a secure land route but measures to enable UNPROFOR to counter Serb artillery attacks on the city. The JCS will develop a list of equipment deemed essential to the protection of Sarajevo, such as advanced counter-battery artillery systems that could be provided as part of our planned \$50 million in drawdown contributions to the RRF. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~

5. Principals determined that the risk of Serbian attempts to take hostages would increase as UNPROFOR adopted a more robust policy of actively defending the remaining enclaves and that therefore we should urge that the UNMO missions be withdrawn from Serb-controlled territory. (Action: State/USUN) ~~(S)~~

Dole Resolution on Lift:

6. Principals agreed that as a strategy for opposing the unilateral lift bill being put forward by Senator Dole, the administration should encourage efforts to amend the language in order to remove the most onerous provisions of the legislation but serve notice that even with amendments, a requirement that the U.S. unilaterally violate binding UNSC resolutions would be

subject to Presidential veto. Secretary Perry will take the lead in approaching Senator Nunn to seek his assistance in getting amendments to:

- extend the time allowed before lift would take effect from 12 weeks to the 22 weeks necessary to implement OPLAN 40104;
- link any requirement for lifting the arms embargo to its likely consequences by including Congressional authorization for U.S. participation in a NATO-led withdrawal operation;
- ensure that the trigger for implementation of lift is not just a request from the Bosnian government but rather a decision by the UN Security Council; and
- change unilateral lift to multilateral lift.

Secretary Perry will make clear to Nunn that even if he succeeds on the first three points, the bill will be subject to veto as long as it still requires unilateral lift. (Action: NSC/OSD)

~~(S)~~

Negotiations with Milosevic:

7. Principals received word of a new agreement that EU mediator Carl Bildt was close to concluding with Milosevic to obtain a mutual recognition package between Bosnia and Serbia. They agreed that the deal would go too far in restricting U.S. ability to reimpose sanctions if Milosevic did not live up to his commitment to seal the border. (It would require a majority among either the five Contact Group members or the five UNSC Permanent members to reimpose sanctions after 9 months.) Ambassador Frasure will meet with Bildt next week to explain our reservations. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 25, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*
FROM: NELSON DREW *N*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals
Committee Meeting on Bosnia, July 14, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia held July 14, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *✓* Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *Van Bibb* NARA, Date *6/11/14**2013-0087-F*

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

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MESSAGE NO.: _____

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

TOTAL: 15
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH SITROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee

Meeting on Bosnia, July 14, 1995

NSC LOG # 20873

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBE
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State

Executive Secretary

Defense

Executive Secretary

CIA

Executive Secretary

JCS

Secretary

USUN/State

Indefurth, Rick

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: YZ Date: 6/11/94

2013-0687-F

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Clinton Library

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHSR CONTROL
TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE

- ☐ FLASH
☐ IMMEDIATE
☐ PRIORITY
☒ ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DATE/TIME: _____

MESSAGE #: _____

FROM: National Security Council PHONE: 202-456-2291 ROOM: WHSR
SUBJECT: ~~Nation of Meeting~~ Summary of Conclusions PAGES: 85

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

DEPT/AGENCY	NAME/OFFICE	PHONE	SECURE FAX
<u>USUN New York</u>	<u>Mr. Rick Inderfurth</u>	<u>(b)(7)(c)</u>	

[002]

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS

Eyes Only for Rick Inderfurth for hand delivery to Ambassador Madeline Albright.
If Mr. Inderfurth is not available please deliver to Nancy Buss.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: R Date: 6/11/14

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9520872
DATE 27 JUL 95

SUBJECT: SOC FOR DC MTG ON 11 - 12 JUL ON BOSNIA
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. LEON FUERTH OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT VIA NOELLE JENSEN ROOM 292, OEOB WASHINGTON, DC 20506	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
MR. KENNETH C. BRILL DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX+1</u>
COL ROBERT P. MCALEER DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
DR. GORDON M. ADAMS OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET ROOM 238 OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG WASHINGTON, DC 20503	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>1</u>
AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS USUN/W - ATTN: DAVID SCHEFFER ROOM 6333, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 2201 C STREET NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520-6319	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>

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Initials: VZ Date: 6/10/14

203-0687-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DATE 27 JUL 95

SUBJECT: SOC FOR DC MTG ON 11 - 12 JUL ON BOSNIA
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20872

July 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F.C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on
Bosnia, July 11-12, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 6/11/14

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: July 11-12, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS
TIME: 11:00 - 11:30 a.m.
12:30 - 1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meetings
on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger

Rick Inderfurth (7/12 only)
David Scheffer

OVP

Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders (7/12 only)

OMB

Gordon Adams (7/12 only)
Keith Bickel (7/12 only)

STATE

Peter Tarnoff
John Kornblum
Christopher Hill (7/11 only)

CIA

George Tenet (7/12 only)
Dennis Blair (7/11 only)
Norman Schindler

DEFENSE

John White (7/11 only)
Walter Slocombe
Joe Kruzel (7/12 only)

JCS

William Owens
Wesley Clark
Howell Estes (7/11 only)

USUN

Ambassador Madeleine Albright
(7/11 only -- via secure
video)

NSC

Alexander Vershbow
Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met on July 11 and 12 to consider appropriate responses to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at Srebrenica. ~~(U)~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

vz 10/1/2013

2. Deputies agreed on the need to reassert UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its humanitarian and protection missions in Bosnia, and to halt the pattern of successful Bosnian Serb military aggressiveness that has marked the past month. They also agreed that failure to reverse this pattern will result in attacks on the other enclaves and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission and initiation of a withdrawal under circumstances that will be perceived as defeat for the UN, NATO and our allies. They also expressed concern that it would accelerate passage of unilateral lift legislation by the Congress in a manner that would damage relations with our allies. ~~(S)~~

3. Deputies agreed on the following immediate actions ~~(U)~~:

- To support the UNSCR introduced by the French calling for the use of all available resources to restore the Srebrenica Safe Area, although acknowledging privately that UNPROFOR does not now possess the military capability to reverse the Bosnian Serb occupation of Srebrenica (nor, in all likelihood, to prevent the fall of Zepa). (Action: State/USUN) ~~(S)~~
- To weigh in with Milosevic (and, through the UN, with Karadzic and Mladic) to obtain support for UNHCR efforts to assist in the movement, care and supply of the refugees and the Dutch UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica; at the same time, to work with the Bosnian government to obtain their consent for the evacuation of the refugees to Tuzla rather than forcing them to remain unsupported behind Serb lines. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- To use public statements and consultations with allies to send a clear signal of continuing U.S. resolve to support the retention of UNPROFOR as the best available option for resolving the crisis short of a major Balkan war. (Action: All) ~~(S)~~
- To review the viability of U.S. and NATO quick/emergency withdrawal options as a matter of highest priority in light of the speed with which Srebrenica was overrun. (Action: OSD/JCS) ~~(S)~~

4. Beyond these immediate actions, Deputies also agreed on the need to work with allies on the development of a follow-on strategy to deter further Serb provocations and prevent the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission (Action: NSC/State/OSD): ~~(S)~~

- At a minimum, this strategy must preserve Bosnian government presence in and access to Sarajevo, and it must sustain

UNPROFOR deployments in Federation territory so as to continue maintaining peace where it exists. ~~(S)~~

- To this end, we will support robust use of the existing elements of the RRF to secure overland access to Sarajevo using the Mt. Igman route and possibly to restore control over Sarajevo airport. ~~(S)~~
- Given the political imperative not to be seen as abandoning all of the eastern enclaves and the fact that NATO credibility (through commitment to enforcing the weapons exclusion zone) is engaged in Gorazde, the strategy should include a commitment to protect this safe area, even if protection of Zepa proves unfeasible. ~~(S)~~

5. Finally, Deputies agreed that efforts to stabilize the situation will be critical to our efforts to avoid Congressional action on unilateral lift. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

20872

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 25, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*
FROM: NELSON DREW *N*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee
Meeting on Bosnia, July 11-12, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Deputies is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia held July 11-12, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve *N* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By *Jan 7611* NARA, Date *6/11/14*
2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

July 17, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*FROM: MARY ANN PETER *MAP* / NELSON DREW *ND*

SUBJECT: Telcon with British Prime Minister John Major

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and British Prime Minister Major on July 14, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *JM* _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *Van Thinh* NARA, Date *6/11/14*

2013-0687-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. telcon	Telcon with British Prime Minister John Major. Record ID: 9505487. (7 pages)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: Mid-Late [5]

2013-0687-F
vz2727

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]