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Folder Title:

Bosnia - July 1995: Mid-Late [2]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Croatia: Major Conflict Likely this Autumn. [partial] [CIA Act] (11 pages)	07/21/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)
002. memo	For Samuel Berger from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Outline for Today's Deputies Committee Meeting. Record ID: 9520870. (2 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)
003. telcon	Telcon with French President Jacques Chirac. Record ID: 9505739. (4 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1)
004a. letter	To President Clinton from Russian President Boris Yeltsin. [English Translation] (2 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1)
004b. letter	To President Clinton from Russian President Boris Yeltsin. [Russian] (2 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1)
005. note	Points on the London Meeting. (2 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1)
006. email	James Baker to Alexander Vershbow. Subject: RE: Mac. (3 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1)
007. email	Nelson Drew to Alexander Vershbow. Subject: JCS Concerns. (1 page)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)
008. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Phone Call to German Chancellor Kohl. Record ID: 9505738. (2 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1)
009. chart	Schematic of Endgame Strategy. [partial] (2 pages)	07/23/1995	P1/b(1)
010. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Follow-up Message to Yeltsin on Bosnia. Record ID: 9505725. (2 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: Mid-Late [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2724

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. memcon	Memcon of Meeting with Boutros-Boutros Ghali. (4 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)

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~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

21 July 1995



Croatia: Major Conflict Likely This Autumn (b)(3)

Zagreb's growing military confidence and the belief among its leaders that military force will be necessary to reintegrate Serb-held territory probably will lead Croatia to try to seize major portions of UN Sectors North and South this autumn.

- Zagreb would prefer to wait until autumn to launch a major attack, (b)(1) but heavy fighting in Bosnia-- particularly in the Bihac or Posavina areas--or Krajina Serb provocations could spur a Croatian offensive by mid-summer.*
- Croatian military plans include taking the Krajina Serb "capital" of Knin and pushing back Serb artillery from major Croatian cities-- especially eliminating the rocket threat against Zagreb. The Croatian Army will have substantial success in achieving these goals, but could not completely defeat the Krajina Serbs if the Bosnian Serb and "Yugoslav" Army lend substantial support.*
(b)(3)

[001]

Fighting in the Krajina will be the heaviest since 1992 and will prompt Belgrade to lend support.

- The "Yugoslav" Army will at least send increased logistics support, along with some special forces and "volunteer" units to help the Krajina Serbs. Prolonged fighting in Croatia probably would result in large-scale "Yugoslav" Army attacks against Croatia's Northern Corridor and Prevlaka peninsula regions.*
- Croatia would not attack Krajina Serb positions in Sector East for now, in hopes of keeping Belgrade out of the fray. If partially mobilized, the "Yugoslav" Army could send some 22,000 troops with 700 tanks and heavy artillery pieces into Sector East.*

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PER E.O. 13526

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E.O. 13526

1.4 (b), (c), & (d)

(b)(3)

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~~Top Secret~~

(b)(3)

- *International pressure on Croatia to refrain from using military force in reintegrating the Krajina probably will fail, although Zagreb's concern about an adverse international reaction will affect its timing and tactics.* (b)(3)

When fighting resumes, the Krajina Serbs plan to use rockets against Croatian cities--especially Zagreb--where a US MASH unit currently is based.

- *Krajina Serb forces almost certainly will take hostages among the 14,000 UN troops stationed primarily in Serb-controlled areas.*
- *UN withdrawal from Bosnia through Croatia also would be hampered by renewed fighting.* (b)(3)

Irreconcilable Differences

While Zagreb would prefer the peaceful reintegration of Krajina Serb-held territory, the gulf between Zagreb and Knin is growing. Both sides have set unrealistic preconditions for resuming talks, making the prospect of a negotiated settlement increasingly unlikely.

- Croatia's recapture of Sector West in early May and its recent military activity in Bosnia's Livno Valley aimed at isolating Knin have hardened Krajina Serb intransigence. Croatian President Tudjman believes there is almost no chance of restarting serious economic and political negotiations with Knin--particularly since the ouster in May of Zagreb's main interlocutor among the Krajina leadership, former "Prime Minister" Mikelic (b)(1) [001]
- Tudjman has publicly warned that Zagreb cannot wait indefinitely to reunite Croatian lands. He set the end of the UN Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) mandate--30 November--as the deadline for evaluating whether to pursue integration through peaceful means or military force. *Differences between the two sides make it unlikely that UNCRO will fulfill its mandate by 30 November, significantly raising the likelihood Tudjman will claim that military force is his only option.* (b)(3)

This memorandum was prepared by (b)(3) Office Of European Analysis, and Captain Harald Buchholz, USA, Defense Intelligence Agency. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force, at (b)(3)

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(b)(3)

(b)(3)

Zagreb Hoping for a Political Solution...

Without progress soon on the political front, Zagreb--supported by strong public opinion--is increasingly likely to resort to force this autumn to retake Krajina Serb-held territory. In the meantime, Zagreb holds out some hope--though dwindling--that the Krajina leadership struggle and pressure on Knin by Serbian President Milosevic will lead to new opportunities for negotiation.

- Zagreb believes the Krajina Serb leadership crisis--underway at least since Mikelic's ouster--will accelerate the Krajina's disintegration, [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] The political contest between "Prime Minister-designate" Babic and "President" Martic is still smoldering behind the scenes; Babic appears to have the stronger political base in the Krajina. Mikelic also is angling to return to power and is stirring up secessionist sentiments in eastern Slavonia.
- Tudjman also appears hopeful that if he continues to show determination to regain the Krajina by force, both Knin and--more importantly--Belgrade will become more inclined to discuss a deal. [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] Milosevic and Tudjman planned a meeting [redacted] (b)(1) [redacted] to discuss a possible settlement on the Krajina and other disputed territory. *Tudjman is likely to continue to pursue a dialogue with Milosevic--even if fighting resumes--in order to press for a settlement and discourage intervention by the "Yugoslav" Army.*

[001]

(b)(3)

...But Leaning Hard Toward the Military Option

On separate occasions, high-level Croatian officials have told US diplomats that Zagreb would be forced to take military action against the Krajina Serbs if the Contact Group makes a sanctions-for-recognition deal with Milosevic that does not include recognition of Croatia, if Bihac were about to fall, or the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs take concrete steps toward fulfilling their plans to create a unified Serb "state."

- Croatia, attempting to portray itself as the victim, probably would look to use a localized event as a pretext to launch a broader attack. [redacted] (b)(3)

Zagreb currently is tightening military pressure on the Krajina Serbs and creating conditions for strategic surprise along all confrontation lines, according to various sources. Defense Minister Susak recently told a US official that Zagreb hopes to force Knin to negotiate or to fight on Croatia's terms. *Increased skirmishing is likely and could quickly escalate.*

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(b)(3)

- Partial mobilization has allowed the Croatian Army to bolster its presence along the entire confrontation line, according to a Croatian defense official. Croatian exercises also increasingly are held near front-line areas.
- Large convoys of Croatian Army troops and Interior Ministry special forces moved into the Sector South region in late June, (b)(1)
(b)(1) *The forces could be part of an exercise or a troop rotation, but they also could be prepositioning to launch an attack.*
- We estimate there are up to 5,500 Croatian Army and 4,500 Bosnian Croat forces currently in Bosnia's Livno Valley maintaining pressure on Knin's key supply line at Bosansko Grahovo. The Croats already can interdict the road with artillery fire. (b)(3)

Senior Croatian military leaders assert that Zagreb can retake most of the Krajina,

(b)(1)

- (b)(1)
(b)(1) the Croatian Army remains at the highest state of alert and is capable of attacking within three hours of receiving the order. [001]
(b)(1) the army plans to attack UN Sectors North and South with up to 90,000 troops once the decision is made.
- (b)(1) future military operations are dependent on military developments in Bosnia. (b)(1)
(b)(1) *Croat forces would take advantage of widespread, heavy fighting in Bosnia--especially in the Bihac or Northern Corridor areas--to launch a major offensive.*
- (b)(1)
(b)(1) *Government forces, while unlikely to have much success, will tie down Krajina Serb troops from reinforcing against a Croatian attack.* (b)(3)

(b)(1) Zagreb currently plans to order a major offensive against Sectors North and South this autumn. *The Croatians hope to make key gains and dig in before any major snowfall--which also would hamper Serb counterattacks.*

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(b)(3)

- *The Croatians may plan to attack during the September-October Krajina Serb harvest.* In the past, Krajina Serb units have been removed from front-line positions to help harvest key crops.

(b)(3)

Warning of Attack Likely but Limited

Zagreb almost certainly will give its key Western allies--the US and Germany--limited warning before launching a major offensive. Zagreb also will--as it has in the past--give UN forces at least one hour's warning of an impending attack to minimize UN casualties.

- (b)(1)
- Croatian Army units can quickly mobilize, limiting our ability to predict the exact timing of an attack. (b)(3)

Croatian Military Objectives

Croatia's key military goals are to take the Krajina Serb "capital" of Knin and eliminate the Serb rocket threat against Zagreb. (b)(1) High-level Croatian officials indicate that they plan to achieve these objectives simultaneously. *The Croatian Army probably would have substantial success, but could not retake and hold all the Serb-held areas if Bosnian Serb and "Yugoslav" Army reinforcements arrived and launched counterattacks.* (b)(3) [001]

Zagreb may opt for a less risky strategy in which the Croatian Army would first attack Sector North to eliminate the Serb artillery threat against Zagreb and Karlovac. This option would allow the Croatians to better concentrate their elite forces for an attack which could be supported by Bosnian Government troops in the Bihac enclave. After achieving success in Sector North, the Croatians soon could shift their focus to Knin.

- Croatian forces probably will push back Serb artillery in Sector North, but would have to reach the Bosnian border to protect Zagreb from rocket attacks.
- The Croatians probably will also break through some Serb defenses in Sector South, and at least cut off Knin from the Bosnian Serbs. (b)(3)

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(b)(3)

Zagreb Hopes to Keep Belgrade From Intervening...

(b)(1)

- Croatian military plans call for a rapid attack that would seize major objectives within 72 hours, (b)(1) Zagreb hopes to achieve its goals before Bosnian Serb or "Yugoslav" Army reinforcements could arrive.
- Croatia would not attack Krajina Serb positions in Sector East for now, in hopes of keeping Belgrade out of the fray, (b)(1) (b)(1) If partially mobilized, the "Yugoslav" Army could send some 22,000 troops with 700 tanks and heavy artillery pieces into Sector East.
- Most senior government officials believe that Zagreb can deter large-scale "Yugoslav" Army support for the Krajina Serbs by threatening to rocket Belgrade, (b)(1) (b)(1) one of Zagreb's top defense priorities is to acquire surface-to-surface missiles that can reach Belgrade, (b)(1) (b)(3)

[001]

...But Belgrade and Pale Would Help Fellow Serbs

Krajina and Bosnian Serb leaders established a joint military command in February, according to the Serb press. The level of Bosnian Serb military assistance, however, will depend on the extent of fighting in Bosnia and the success of a Croatian attack.

- Bosnian Serb forces—who face manpower and materiel shortages like the Krajina Serbs—probably could not help Knin quickly enough to prevent the Croats from making significant gains. As of early June, the Krajina and Bosnian Serb General Staffs estimated that because Pale does not have the resources to help Knin, Krajina Serb resistance to expected Croatian offensives in UN Sector South would collapse by autumn, and possibly in Sector North by winter, (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(3)

A "Yugoslav" Government official has told US diplomats that "no government in Belgrade could allow Croatia to take over the Krajina," according to State Department reporting. *Although Serbian President Milosevic would likely measure his*

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assistance, Belgrade immediately would increase its logistics and arms support. Following Croatia's recapture of Sector West in early May, Belgrade sent some special forces units and tanks into Sector East and bolstered nearby positions in Serbia, according to various sources. As recently as late June, elements of two "Yugoslav" Army mechanized brigades deployed into Sector East, (b)(1)

(b)(1)

- Prolonged fighting in Croatia probably would result in large-scale Serbian involvement, but a quick, decisive Croatian victory would present Belgrade with a fait accompli, making "Yugoslav" Army support to save Sectors North and South highly unlikely.
- Covertly, Belgrade would focus on relieving pressure on Knin or in places where Croatian troops make substantial gains by sending more logistics support, special forces, and "volunteer" units. When Belgrade expected a Croatian attack on the Krajina Serbs in spring 1993, the "Yugoslav" Army planned to occupy Bosnian Serb positions in the Northern Corridor region to allow Pale to send reinforcements to the Knin area. (b)(1)
- Overt "Yugoslav" Army support could include an attack through Croatia to widen Bosnia's Northern Corridor, or an assault against Croatia's Prevlaka peninsula, which controls access to key "Yugoslav" Navy facilities. (b)(3) [001]

Implications of Renewed Fighting

Fighting in the Krajina will be the heaviest since 1992, and is likely to prompt tens of thousands of Serb refugees to flee into Bosnia. Bosnian Government forces will take advantage of a Croatian offensive--and could mount coordinated, concurrent attacks against the Bosnian Serbs. Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic met on 21 July, according to State Department reporting, to discuss military cooperation, particularly around Bihac.

- The Krajina Serbs will again use rockets--this time to include the FROG-7--against Croatian cities, such as Zagreb. According to the US Embassy in Belgrade, the Serbs plan to target missile attacks against Croatian infrastructure--probably to include Zagreb Pleso airfield--where a US MASH unit currently is based.
- Although UN troops will be in harm's way during a Croatian attack, Croatian troops will not purposely target UN forces, but some are likely to get caught in the crossfire.

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- Krajina Serb forces almost certainly will take hostages among the 14,000 UN troops stationed primarily in Serb-controlled areas.
- UN withdrawal from Bosnia through Croatia would be hampered. Zagreb probably would keep the UN off of roads used by the Croatian Army to supply its troops, and Krajina Serb forces would target these roads with artillery fire. (b)(3)

Zagreb Unlikely To Heed Western Objections

International pressure on Zagreb to forego military force in reintegrating the Krajina probably will alter Croatia's timing and tactics, but not its strategy. Growing frustration with the international community has reinforced Zagreb's view that it will have to act alone to solve the Krajina problem and has reduced Western influence over Zagreb's actions, at least temporarily.

- Croatian officials cite as examples of declining Western support the current Contact Group sanctions-for-recognition proposal to Milosevic and their fear that the UN Rapid Reaction Force may be used against the Croatian forces. (b)(1)
- (b)(1) Zagreb also resents UN scrutiny of Croatia's human rights record and criticism of its recent military actions, claiming the Serbs' record is worse in both respects. [001]
- Tudjman believes a relatively quick campaign in Sectors North and South would not have any lasting damage on Croatia's standing with the international community and the EU. (b)(1)
- (b)(1) *To help ensure this, Croatia will try to minimize perceptions of "ethnic cleansing," but will have a more difficult time than in Sector West because Sectors North and South have much larger Serb populations.*
- *Zagreb already is laying the groundwork for its public justification for military action against the Krajina Serbs.* Croatian leaders have stepped up complaints about UNCRO's inability to secure Croatia's borders or move the peace process forward. They also have tried to portray the Knin leadership as unreasonable and unwilling to negotiate and underlined its links to Serbia. (b)(3)

The EU and its member governments continue to have some economic leverage with Zagreb that could affect Zagreb's tactics, according to diplomatic reporting.

Top Secret

(b)(3)

- Bonn formally warned Zagreb on 16 June that new military action would jeopardize negotiations on a trade and cooperation agreement with the European Union and participation in its PHARE assistance program, according to US diplomats. (b)(3)

Krajina Serbs Stuck Between a Rock and the Croatian Army

The Krajina Serb Army (KSA) has major personnel shortages and little defensive depth, thus requiring it to hold fighting positions as far forward as possible to stop--or at least delay--a Croatian attack. Most KSA corps lack sufficient reserves to block or turn back successful Croatian thrusts.

- Manpower shortages have forced Krajina Serb units to maintain a high alert status, thus wearing down their troops, lowering individual morale and unit esprit. There is no indication that Serb morale has dangerously eroded; *however, faced with a large-scale Croatian offensive and deteriorating battlefield situation, KSA commanders could encounter widespread collapse of both discipline and force cohesion.*
- *Continued political isolation and economic hardship will further degrade the Krajina Serbs' motivation to fight, making a collapse more likely--either army-wide or in an individual region--if the Croats launch a major offensive. The danger of collapse will increase if neither the Bosnian Serb Army--which has similar problems--nor the "Yugoslav" Army can quickly provide substantial support.* (b)(3)


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Top Secret

Croatia



	Croatian Army (HV)	Krajina Serb Army (RSK)
Ground forces	80,000-115,000 ^a	up to 60,000 ^b
Tanks	300-350	300-375
APCs	150-250	115
Artillery ^c	1,000-1,100	800-850
Attack aircraft	21-26	20
Helicopters ^d	35-41	8

^a Increases up to 200,000 upon full mobilization.
^b When fully mobilized.
^c Artillery over 100-mm, including mortars.
^d Including attack and transport versions.

Croat-controlled area

Serb-controlled area

Muslim-controlled area


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Serbia and Montenegro have asserted the formation of a joint independent state, but this entity has not been formally recognized as a state by the United States.

(b)(3)

[001]

Sectors North and South



[001]

PRESS STATEMENT**(Attributable to a Spokesman for the Secretary-General) :**

The Secretary-General and his advisers have concluded their study of the letter from NATO Secretary-General Willy Claes about the North Atlantic Council's decisions last night relating to the use of NATO air power to deter Bosnian Serb attacks on Gorazde.

As indicated in my earlier statement today, the Secretary-General welcomes the commitment of the North Atlantic Alliance to support the United Nations in the implementation of Security Council resolutions, and looks forward to working with NATO toward that end. He fully supports the decision taken by the North Atlantic Council, as conveyed in Secretary-General Claes' letter, and agrees with its conclusion that an attack by the Bosnian Serbs on Gorazde should be met by a firm and decisive response, including through air strikes.

On the question of the "dual key", the relevant Security Council resolutions call for close co-ordination between the United Nations and NATO on the use of NATO air power and this is reflected in the NATO decision. In order to streamline decision taking within the United Nations chain of command when the use of air power is deemed to be necessary, the Secretary-General has decided to delegate the necessary authority in this respect to his military commanders in the field. He has accordingly delegated authority in respect of air strikes, which he has hitherto retained himself, to General Bernard Janvier, the Commander of United Nations Peace Forces, with immediate effect. As regards close air support, which is the use of air power to defend United Nations personnel, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, after consulting the Secretary-General, has today delegated the necessary authority to General Janvier, who is authorized to delegate it further to the UNPROFOR Force Commander when operational circumstances so require.

- 2 -

The Secretary-General is deeply concerned by current attacks on Sarajevo and on the Bihac pocket and notes that the North Atlantic Council has asked the NATO Military Authorities, in consultation with the United Nations Peace Forces, to formulate proposals on the possible use of air power in these situations also.

The Secretary-General is informing the Security Council of the measures that he is taking. He again expresses his appreciation for the continuing close co-operation which he enjoys with the Secretary-General of NATO. In furtherance of co-operation between the United Nations and NATO, he has today instructed the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Mr Kofi Annan, and the Force Commander, Gen. Janvier, to travel to Brussels for consultations with NATO on the operational modalities for implementing last night's decision of the North Atlantic Council.

TOTAL P.02

TOTAL P.03

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 25, 1995

Dear Mr. Leader:

I am writing to express my strong opposition to S.21, the "Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995". While I fully understand the frustration that the bill's supporters feel, I nonetheless am firmly convinced that in passing this legislation Congress would undermine efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and could lead to an escalation of the conflict there, including the possible Americanization of the conflict.

There are no simple or risk-free answers in Bosnia. Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo has serious consequences. Our allies in UNPROFOR have made it clear that a unilateral U.S. action to lift the arms embargo, which would place their troops in greater danger, will result in their early withdrawal from UNPROFOR, leading to its collapse. I believe the United States, as the leader of NATO, would have an obligation under these circumstances to assist in that withdrawal, involving thousands of U.S. troops in a difficult mission. Consequently, at the least, unilateral lift by the U.S. drives our European allies out of Bosnia and pulls the U.S. in, even if for a temporary and defined mission.

I agree that UNPROFOR, in its current mission, has reached a crossroads. As you know, we are working intensively with our allies on concrete measures to strengthen UNPROFOR and enable it to continue to make a significant difference in Bosnia, as it has -- for all its deficiencies -- over the past three years. Let us not forget that UNPROFOR has been critical to an unprecedented humanitarian operation that feeds and helps keep alive over two million people in Bosnia; until recently, the number of civilian casualties has been a fraction of what they were before UNPROFOR arrived; much of central Bosnia is at peace; and the Bosnian-Croat Federation is holding. UNPROFOR has contributed to each of these significant results.

Nonetheless, the Serb assaults in recent days make clear that UNPROFOR must be strengthened if it is to continue to contribute to peace. I am determined to make every effort to provide, with our allies, for more robust and meaningful UNPROFOR action. We

are now working to implement the agreement reached last Friday in London to threaten substantial and decisive use of NATO air power if the Bosnian Serbs attack Gorazde and to strengthen protection of Sarajevo using the Rapid Reaction Force. These actions lay the foundation for stronger measures to protect the other safe areas. Congressional passage of unilateral lift at this delicate moment will undermine those efforts. It will provide our allies a rationale for doing less, not more. It will provide the pretext for absolving themselves of responsibility in Bosnia, rather than assuming a stronger role at this critical moment.

It is important to face squarely the consequences of a U.S. action that forces UNPROFOR departure. First, as I have noted, we immediately would be part of a costly NATO operation to withdraw UNPROFOR. Second, after that operation is complete, there will be an intensification of the fighting in Bosnia. It is unlikely the Bosnian Serbs would stand by waiting until the Bosnian government is armed by others. Under assault, the Bosnian government will look to the U.S. to provide arms, air support and if that fails, more active military support. At that stage, the U.S. will have broken with our NATO allies as a result of unilateral lift. The U.S. will be asked to fill the void -- in military support, humanitarian aid and in response to refugee crises. Third, intensified fighting will risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-reaching implications for regional peace. Finally, UNPROFOR's withdrawal will set back prospects for a peaceful, negotiated solution for the foreseeable future.

In short, unilateral lift means unilateral responsibility. We are in this with our allies now. We would be in it by ourselves if we unilaterally lifted the embargo. The NATO Alliance has stood strong for almost five decades. We should not damage it in a futile effort to find an easy fix to the Balkan conflict.

I am prepared to veto any resolution or bill that may require the United States to lift unilaterally the arms embargo. It will make a bad situation worse. I ask that you not support the pending legislation, S.21.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Robert Dole
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 25, 1995

Dear Mr. Leader:

I am writing to express my strong opposition to S.21, the "Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995". While I fully understand the frustration that the bill's supporters feel, I nonetheless am firmly convinced that in passing this legislation Congress would undermine efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and could lead to an escalation of the conflict there, including the possible Americanization of the conflict.

There are no simple or risk-free answers in Bosnia. Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo has serious consequences. Our allies in UNPROFOR have made it clear that a unilateral U.S. action to lift the arms embargo, which would place their troops in greater danger, will result in their early withdrawal from UNPROFOR, leading to its collapse. I believe the United States, as the leader of NATO, would have an obligation under these circumstances to assist in that withdrawal, involving thousands of U.S. troops in a difficult mission. Consequently, at the least, unilateral lift by the U.S. drives our European allies out of Bosnia and pulls the U.S. in, even if for a temporary and defined mission.

I agree that UNPROFOR, in its current mission, has reached a crossroads. As you know, we are working intensively with our allies on concrete measures to strengthen UNPROFOR and enable it to continue to make a significant difference in Bosnia, as it has -- for all its deficiencies -- over the past three years. Let us not forget that UNPROFOR has been critical to an unprecedented humanitarian operation that feeds and helps keep alive over two million people in Bosnia; until recently, the number of civilian casualties has been a fraction of what they were before UNPROFOR arrived; much of central Bosnia is at peace; and the Bosnian-Croat Federation is holding. UNPROFOR has contributed to each of these significant results.

Nonetheless, the Serb assaults in recent days make clear that UNPROFOR must be strengthened if it is to continue to contribute to peace. I am determined to make every effort to provide, with our allies, for more robust and meaningful UNPROFOR action. We

are now working to implement the agreement reached last Friday in London to threaten substantial and decisive use of NATO air power if the Bosnian Serbs attack Gorazde and to strengthen protection of Sarajevo using the Rapid Reaction Force. These actions lay the foundation for stronger measures to protect the other safe areas. Congressional passage of unilateral lift at this delicate moment will undermine those efforts. It will provide our allies a rationale for doing less, not more. It will provide the pretext for absolving themselves of responsibility in Bosnia, rather than assuming a stronger role at this critical moment.

It is important to face squarely the consequences of a U.S. action that forces UNPROFOR departure. First, as I have noted, we immediately would be part of a costly NATO operation to withdraw UNPROFOR. Second, after that operation is complete, there will be an intensification of the fighting in Bosnia. It is unlikely the Bosnian Serbs would stand by waiting until the Bosnian government is armed by others. Under assault, the Bosnian government will look to the U.S. to provide arms, air support and if that fails, more active military support. At that stage, the U.S. will have broken with our NATO allies as a result of unilateral lift. The U.S. will be asked to fill the void -- in military support, humanitarian aid and in response to refugee crises. Third, intensified fighting will risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-reaching implications for regional peace. Finally, UNPROFOR's withdrawal will set back prospects for a peaceful, negotiated solution for the foreseeable future.

In short, unilateral lift means unilateral responsibility. We are in this with our allies now. We would be in it by ourselves if we unilaterally lifted the embargo. The NATO Alliance has stood strong for almost five decades. We should not damage it in a futile effort to find an easy fix to the Balkan conflict.

I am prepared to veto any resolution or bill that may require the United States to lift unilaterally the arms embargo. It will make a bad situation worse. I ask that you not support the pending legislation, S.21.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Thomas A. Daschle
Democratic Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Jul 26 prp

Press Points After July 25 NAC Meeting

- Early this morning in Brussels, NATO acted swiftly and resolutely to implement significant decisions taken at least week's International Meeting on Bosnia in London.
- After intensive action by NATO military authorities, the North Atlantic Council approved planning for use of substantial NATO airpower in deterring Bosnian Serb attacks on the UN safe area of Gorazde.
- Just as importantly, NATO Military authorities were instructed to formulate command and control arrangements for protecting other safe areas, particularly around Bihac.
- Authority for the decisions taken at NATO already exist under current UNSC resolutions. We understand that NATO Secretary General Claes discussed the new arrangements with UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali after the NAC decision.
- The measures agreed to in Brussels confirm the London decisions to modify substantially the "dual key" previously in effect. These new arrangements will ensure that the use of airpower is substantial and decisive. Such operations, once initiated, will not be lightly discontinued. In short, there will be no more pinpricks.
- The Alliance recognizes that there are risks involved in use of substantial airpower, but will not be deterred.
- They are consistent with the requirements of the U.S. military and have its endorsement.
- Working with our NATO Allies, the United States has embarked on a qualitatively different approach to preserving the UN mission in Bosnia.
- New command and control arrangements agreed to in Brussels last night, combined with British and French resolve in using their Rapid Reaction Forces to secure routes into Sarajevo, are vivid examples our heightened resolve.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	For Samuel Berger from Alexander Vershbow. Subject: Outline for Today's Deputies Committee Meeting. Record ID: 9520870. (2 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: Mid-Late [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2724

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5739

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 25, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: ANTHONY GARDNER *AG*

SUBJECT: Telcon With French President Jacques Chirac

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and French President Jacques Chirac on July 24, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By *Van Zbind* NARA, Date *6/11/14*
2013-0687-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5739

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the
President and French President Jacques Chirac (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and French President Jacques Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Paris for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(C)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By Jan T. Bohl NARA, Date 6/11/2014

723-0687-7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. telcon	Telcon with French President Jacques Chirac. Record ID: 9505739. (4 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: Mid-Late [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2724

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. letter	To President Clinton from Russian President Boris Yeltsin. [English Translation] (2 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: Mid-Late [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2724

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. letter	To President Clinton from Russian President Boris Yeltsin. [Russian] (2 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: Mid-Late [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2724

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. note	Points on the London Meeting. (2 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: Mid-Late [2]

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Points on the Dole Amendment

- The Dole Amendment and other measures advocating unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would hinder our efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia.
- Unilateral lift would widen the conflict, increase pressures for direct U.S. military support to the Bosnian government, damage relations with allies, and risk confrontation with Russia and Serbia.
- Unilateral lift would make Bosnia a unilateral U.S. responsibility.
- Despite many shortcomings and frustrations, UNPROFOR and the international community's other efforts have yielded significant benefits.
- UNPROFOR should remain because it continues to play a vital role in reducing the killing and suffering in Bosnia, despite its inability to stop the attacks on Srebrenica and Zepa.
 - UNPROFOR provides essential support for delivery of relief to 2.2 million people. Its presence has deterred massive Serb assaults on Sarajevo and other parts of Central Bosnia.
 - UNPROFOR helped end the war between Croats and Muslims in Central Bosnia and is fostering a process of reconciliation between these two communities.
- But UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater security. The Rapid Reaction Force and other steps our Allies have taken to enhance UNPROFOR offer the best prospect of enabling it to continue its missions.
- Adoption of the Dole amendment now would undercut efforts by our European partners to strengthen UNPROFOR. Given that our Allies are taking the risks on the ground, we need to give them limited support and time to prove themselves.
- The Administration has always believed the arms embargo is unfair, but we continue to oppose unilateral lift.
- Announcing a virtually automatic commitment to unilateral lift while UNPROFOR forces are still in place would make the withdrawal operation much more dangerous for U.S. and allied forces.
 - Serbs would have strong incentives to impede this process. The Bosnian Government would want NATO extraction forces in place until it was able to operate effectively with its new arms and might even seek to use NATO forces as shields for their operations.

- The Dole Amendment's provision that the U.S. should end the arms embargo within 12 weeks of the date the Bosnian government asks the Security Council to order withdrawal virtually ensures Allied entanglement in the war. NATO plans for UNPROFOR withdrawal envision that completion of the mission could take up to 22 weeks.
- Unilateral lift would lead to a wider and bloodier conflict, with a very uncertain outcome for which the U.S. would have ultimate responsibility. The Bosnian Serbs would have the ability to make major gains in the months before the Bosnian government forces could be rearmed and trained.
- It would lead to the Americanization of the war.
- By provoking an UNPROFOR withdrawal, it will allow the Allies to place the blame for UNPROFOR's failure on the U.S.
- The U.S. would send 25,000 troops to help UNPROFOR withdraw.
- The U.S. would be blamed for the deteriorating military and humanitarian situation.
- Having provoked UNPROFOR's withdrawal, the U.S. would be under great pressure to intervene to stem the deteriorating situation.
- We could well be held accountable for events throughout the remainder of the war -- thus making the war a unilateral U.S. responsibility.
- Unilateral lift could place us in a direct confrontation with Russia, which like Serbia, would likely provide military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs.
- Unilateral lift would undermine other UN resolutions and sanctions regimes, such as those against Iraq and Libya. that serve critical U.S. interests. Many would reject our efforts to distinguish between Bosnia and other situations.
- Finally, the President has particular responsibility under the Constitution with respect to decisions that could involve the U.S. in hostilities or results in the exposure of U.S. armed forces and other Americans to imminent risks. The Dole Amendment would unduly interfere with these core Presidential responsibilities.
- The fundamental issue is this: at the moment that our allies are saying they are prepared to put some more backbone into UNPROFOR, do we test that proposition and see if the effort works, or do we take this moment to pull the rug out from under them, undertake the costs and risks of an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation, and assume for ourselves the responsibilities for aiding and protecting the Bosnians that will follow?
- Can we count on you to oppose the Dole bill on unilateral lift?

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. email	James Baker to Alexander Vershbow. Subject: RE: Mac. (3 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: Mid-Late [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2724

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DRAFT 16/7 - 2

FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE CONTACT GROUP

- 1. Contact Group countries have stated, that a key to the future stability of the region of former Yugoslavia is the early and mutual recognition between all its states within their internationally recognized borders as this provides the basis for the negotiations that are essential in order to promote the political settlements of the disputes of the region, and paves the way for the peaceful cooperation between all the peoples and states of the region.**
- 2. In the context of mutual recognition between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and provided that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia respectively supports or implements the other provisions below, the Contact Group governments are prepared to recommend to the UN Security Council the sanctions relief as envisaged in the annex, to take effect simultaneously with recognition.**
- 3. In an act of recognition between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders.**
- 4. As the basis for the realization of the Contact Group plan, it is agreed that:**
 - A. Bosnia and Herzegovina should be a union of two entities, the "Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina" and the "Republika Srpska."**
 - B. There should be balanced and equal treatment of the "Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina" and the "Republika Srpska."**
 - C. Both the entities should have the right to establish parallel special relationships with neighbouring countries, consistent with the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.**

D. Any future political rearrangements brought about by any community within either entity will not change the status of the other entity within the union, as described in subparagraphs A, B and C above.

E. The 51:49 parameter of the territorial proposal of the Contact Group would remain the basis for a settlement. This territorial proposal would be open for adjustment by mutual agreement.

F. There would be provision in the settlement for refugees and displaced persons to be able to return to their homes of origin.

5. Redeployment to the lines agreed would take place as soon as there was agreement between the two sides on any territorial adjustments and on constitutional arrangements.

6. A cessation of hostilities agreement should be concluded to enable the opening and completion of the negotiations. Such an agreement should include all the elements of the cessation of hostilities agreement of 31 December 1994.

7. As regards Croatia, following the passage of Security Council resolution 981, there should now immediately be further normalization of economic relations and the start of negotiations on a final political settlement between Zagreb and Knin.

8. The Contact Group underlines the need for maintenance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the border closure except for humanitarian assistance. The ICFY Mission will be reinforced.

DRAFT 16/7**SANCTIONS RELIEF ANNEX**

1. All UN mandated trade, financial and economic sanctions against the FRY except those on trade in strategic goods* (aside from oil and petroleum products which will be subject to a special regime) and except the freeze on existing accounts will be suspended sine die.
2. New accounts will be able to operate freely, and cash brought from the FRY can be deposited in them.
3. The FRY will be able to import each month seasonally adjusted amounts of oil and petroleum products in a quantity not to exceed normal monthly usage. The FRY will assure that none of these supplies will be reexported or allowed to leave the country. The FRY agrees that oil and petroleum products will be imported through the port of Bar and via the Danube.
4. Sanctions that have been suspended would be reimposed by decision of a panel consisting of the five permanent members of the Security Council if, after a report by the Secretary General on the basis of the ICFY Mission, or a report by a permanent member of the Security Council, it is concluded that the FRY is not implementing its decision to close the border with Bosnia except for humanitarian assistance or is no longer supporting the Contact Group plan. Such a decision can be taken no earlier than after reviewing nine months after sanctions have been suspended in accordance with this agreement. The decision of the panel is taken by a simple majority (three out of five).
5. After Bosnian Serb authorities accept the Contact Group plan as a starting point for negotiations, the lifting of sanctions against the FRY will begin, commencing with the phase one sanctions now suspended. **Simultaneously, the FRY will restore conditions for normal trade and contacts with Bosnia and Hercegovina.**
6. When a cessation of hostilities is in place and negotiations by the Bosnian parties have begun on the implementation of the Contact Group plan, suspended sanctions will be lifted. Strategic sanctions will be suspended and the oil regime will remain in effect.

7. When the Contact Group plan is implemented on the ground and the respective forces have withdrawn to the agreed territorial delimitations, the remaining sanctions will be lifted, aside from those frozen assets associated with state succession questions.

ALTERNATIVES:

* UNSC resolutions define strategic goods as including crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment, iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of all types.

* Strategic items to be crude oil, petroleum products, coal, iron, steel, other metals, petrochemicals (other than for agricultural uses, textiles, and normal plastics and steel production), and energy-related equipment for new production.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

IO/UNP

UNCLASSIFIED FAX

ROUTINE

IMMEDIATE

URGENT

TEL: 647-0045

FAX: 647-0039

COVER + 1 PAGESDate 7/25

FROM:

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Sandra Shipshock

TO:

NSC - Nelson Drew/Sandy Vershbow 456-9150

NSC - Mike Sheehan 456-9360

OSD - John Klekas 703-695-6506

JCS - ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ 703-695-6905

LTC. LUTE

703-693-5608

SUBJECT:

Final version of Note for
Secretary General

ACTION:

Please review - provide clearance
by end of SVTS

COMMENT:

This text was cleared by Amb.
Albright with Principals last
night - a few state fixes have been
incorporated, mainly grammatical.
~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Wanted you to
see this before it is used at 10:00.

NOTE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL

- The British, French and American Governments have delivered a military warning to General Mladic (copy of that warning is attached).
- The belief of the British, French, American and German Governments is that the authority for airstrikes in SCR 836 is wide, and clearly covers the decisive action with respect to Gorazde envisaged at London and in this warning. Such action must be coordinated with the UN, but it must be effective in relation to the objective of deterring the Bosnian Serbs from attacks upon safe areas.
- ~~(need insertion of an outcome of NAC decision. EUR/RPM, please provide).~~ There must be consultation between the UN and NATO on coordination in the current circumstances. We believe that an essential element in deterring an attack on Gorazde, which will depend on the Bosnian Serbs perceiving that our reaction will be swift and decisive, must be the delegation of the UN authority to approve air actions to the UN Commander in theatre. The UNPF Commander will delegate the tactical decision on initiation of the use of air power for CAS and for air operations in the ~~area of~~ Gorazde (including necessary air defense suppression) to the UNPROFOR Force Commander, with the advice from his subordinate Commanders. This needs to be done as soon as the NAC decision is taken.
- With respect to the other safe areas, existing arrangements and authorizations would stand for now. With respect to Sarajevo deployment of elements of the RRF to that area is in hand. The warning to General Mladic makes clear that necessary action will be taken in response to attacks in the other safe areas. Should it become necessary, the approach described above could be needed.

any case of question.

BH / 24 July, 1995

FOR YOUR INFO !**The Security Council:**

A: Reaffirming all its previous resolutions, and in particular Resolutions 819 (1993), 824 (1993), 836 (1993), and 1004 (1995)

B: Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

C: Gravely concerned at the deterioration in the situation in and around the safe area of Zepa, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at the plight of the civilian population there,

D: Condemning in the strongest possible terms the offensive by the Bosnian Serb forces against this safe area,

E: Determined to prevent the repetition of the similar plight of civilians as it has occurred during and after the occupation of the safe area of Srebrenica by the Bosnian Serb forces,

D: Determined to ensure the protection of the civilian population of the safe area of Zepa and secure their full safety,

E: Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands that the Bosnian Serb forces cease their offensive and withdraw from the safe area of Zepa immediately;

2. Decides to ensure the protection of the civilian population, and to provide for the safe and UNPROFOR escorted evacuation, including by air, from the safe area of the ill, wounded, women, children, and elderly to Government held territory;

3. Authorizes UNPROFOR to use all means necessary to carry out this evacuation of the civilian population of the safe area of Zepa;

4. Demands unimpeded access for the UNHCR, ICRC and other humanitarian agencies to the safe area of Zepa in order to alleviate the plight of the civilian population;

5. Request the Secretary General to use all resources available to him to ensure that these measures are carried out, and calls on the parties to cooperate to that end;

6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. email	Nelson Drew to Alexander Vershbow. Subject: JCS Concerns. (1 page)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: Mid-Late [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2724

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

5738
REDO

July 25, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*
SUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call with Chancellor Kohl
of Germany

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President forwarding talking points for his use in a telephone call with Chancellor Kohl.

Concurrence by: Steve Pifer *SP*

RECOMMENDATION

That you forwarding the talking points at Tab A to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *va Gohl* NARA, Date *6/11/2014*

2013-0687 -F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Phone Call to German Chancellor Kohl. Record ID: 9505738. (2 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: Mid-Late [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2724

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. chart	Schematic of Endgame Strategy. [partial] (2 pages)	07/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: Mid-Late [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2724

RESTRICTION CODES

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
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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~~SECRET~~

Schematic of Endgame Strategy (Revised as of 7/23)



[009]

E.O. 13526

1.4 (c)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
10/1/2017

A

1A

UNPROFOR Withdrawal: US and NATO determine scope, duration and objective of withdrawal operation

The mission and ROE for the withdrawal force are a function of the post-withdrawal strategy U.S. and/or allied policy makers wish to pursue. There are four options:

Factors affecting scope and duration:

- Missions assigned the withdrawal force (see below)
- Whether UNPROFOR has withdrawn from enclaves (because enclaves no longer exist and/or UN forces have consolidated in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia)
- GOBH and Bosnian Serbs' capabilities and intentions to resist withdrawal
- Whether any nations decide to commit units currently in UNPROFOR to an UNPROFOR successor force (see below)

Option One: Neutral Withdrawal and US Disengages

- Withdrawal force treats all parties alike and uses force only in self defense
- UNPROFOR equipment is withdrawn or destroyed
- If arms embargo is lifted, USG only supplies arms on a "cash and carry" basis – no military aid or training
- U.S. and allies pursue strategy to contain conflict and keep Belgrade out
 - Belgrade gets substantial sanctions relief to seal border and stay out of conflict
 - UN strengthens peacekeeping forces in Croatia and FYROM
 - Contact Group attempts to reach peace accord in Croatia

Prognosis (assumes FRY and GOC stay out):

- Increased fighting after withdrawal
- Bosnian Serbs may try for knock-out offensive
- GOBH will increase attacks
- GOBH may try to impede UNPROFOR withdrawal
- Military stalemate with balance of forces gradually shifting to Sarajevo

Option Two: Neutral Withdrawal and US stays Engaged (option in NSC "endgame" paper)

- Withdrawal force treats all parties alike and uses force only in self defense
- UNPROFOR equipment removed or destroyed
- U.S. and others provide arms during withdrawal period (b)(1)
- After UNPROFOR units depart
 - US-led air and other military support for Bosnian forces continues for a finite time period
 - USG supplies additional military aid and training (b)(1)
 - USG organizes and helps deploy an UNPROFOR successor force (under UNSC mandate or Chapter 51)
- U.S. and allies try to contain conflict and keep Belgrade out (Same as above)

Prognosis (assumes FRY and GOC stay out):

- Increased fighting after withdrawal
- Bosnian Serbs more likely to try knock-out offensive
- GOBH increases attacks
- Military balance shifts more rapidly towards GOBH
- Increased pressure on Belgrade to aid Bosnian Serbs
- Stalemate at higher levels of violence

Option Three: Level the Playing Field During Withdrawal after which US Disengages

- Withdrawal force attacks Bosnian Serb forces
 - Pre-emptive SEAD campaign
 - Destroy heavy weapons
 - Disrupt command and control system
- UNPROFOR equipment turned over to GOBH (requires lift)
- U.S. and others provide arms during withdrawal period (b)(1)
- After UNPROFOR units depart
 - Air and other military support for Bosnian forces ends
 - USG only supplies additional arms on a "cash and carry" basis – no military aid or training
- U.S. and allies try to contain conflict and keep Belgrade out (Same as above)

Prognosis (assumes FRY and GOC stay out):

- BSA likely to oppose withdrawal operation
- Increased fighting after withdrawal
- GOBH will take offensive during or immediately after withdrawal to take advantage of diminished BSA capabilities
- Increased pressure on Belgrade to aid Bosnian Serbs
- Military balance shifts towards GOBH in immediate aftermath of withdrawal – gradual shift towards GOBH after withdrawal
- Stalemate at higher levels of violence

Option Four: Level the Playing Field During Withdrawal and US Stays Engaged

- Withdrawal force attacks Bosnian Serb forces
 - Pre-emptive SEAD campaign
 - Destroy heavy weapons
 - Disrupt command and control system
- UNPROFOR equipment turned over to GOBH (requires lift)
- U.S. and others provide arms during withdrawal period (b)(1)
- After UNPROFOR units depart
 - US-led Air and other military support for Bosnian forces continues for a finite time period
 - USG supplies additional military aid and training (b)(1)
 - USG organizes and helps deploy an UNPROFOR successor force (under UNSC mandate or Chapter 51)
- U.S. and allies try to contain conflict and keep Belgrade out (Same as above)

Prognosis (assumes FRY and GOC stay out):

- BSA likely to oppose withdrawal operation
- Increased fighting after withdrawal
- Military balance shifts towards GOBH in immediate aftermath of withdrawal – continues to shift towards GOBH after withdrawal
- GOBH may gain enough combat power to retake territory
- Increased pressure on Belgrade to aid Bosnian Serbs

[009]

B

Impact of actions by Serbia and/or Croatia that on the preceding prognoses:

If Serbia intervenes to end the war because balance of power is shifting decisively against the Bosnian Serbs

- BSA, with FRY support, will launch offensives to defeat GOBH or get favorable settlement
- Sharply increased level of violence
- GOBH unlikely to capitulate, but will call for massive assistance from West and OIC

If Croatia makes large-scale attacks against Sectors North and South

- Bosnian Serbs would support Krajina Serbs and go on defensive in Bosnia
- GOBH would step up attacks against Pale
- FRY involvement in Knin and Bosnia likely to increase

If Milosevic and Tudjman cut a deal

- Bosnian and Knin Serbs free to concentrate against GOBH
- Federation will disintegrate
- Bosnian Gov't increasingly isolated

If Milosevic breaks all contacts with Bosnian and Knin Serbs and seals border

- Accelerates weakening of Bosnian Serbs
- BSA may try for knock out punch before balance of power shifts decisively towards GOBH
- GOBH would eventually gain military advantage, may be able to regain territory
- Bosnian Serbs may accept a peace settlement

Range of possible outcomes			
Good	←	→	Bad
Shift in balance of power brings Pale to the negotiating table; sides reach and implement a peace agreement	Shift in balance of power leads to stable equilibrium after GOBH has regained some territory	GOBH unable to regain territory but can defend current holdings; stalemate ensues	GOBH unable to defend current territory; faces defeat without additional Western support

July 24, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: COIT BLACKER

FROM: STEVE PIFER

SUBJECT: Follow-up Presidential Message to Yeltsin
on Bosnia

The memorandum at Tab I recommends a short Presidential message to Yeltsin on Bosnia, following up on the President's July 20 message and taking account of the London conference.

Concurrence by: Alexander Vershbow

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Follow-up Presidential Message to
Yeltsin on Bosnia
Tab B July 20 Presidential Message to Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 6/11/2014

2013-0687-f

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Follow-up Message to Yeltsin on Bosnia. Record ID: 9505725. (2 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: Mid-Late [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2724

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. memcon	Memcon of Meeting with Boutros-Boutros Ghali. (4 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 896

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995: Mid-Late [2]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

not sent

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *TL*
PATRICK GRIFFIN *PG*

SUBJECT: Letters to Senators Dole and Daschle on Bosnia

Purpose

To forward letters to Senators Dole and Daschle on Bosnia.

Background

The Senate began debate on July 18 on S. 21, a bill offered by Senator Dole and others calling for the unilateral lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia. The debate will continue with a possible vote on final passage on Wednesday, July 19. You are meeting with a group of Senators who either oppose Dole or are undecided in an effort to hold Dole's expected victory to levels which would enable a veto to be sustained. In addition to this meeting, it is clear that many Senators are looking for a strong signal from you clearly stating your opposition to Dole's bill.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letters to Senators Dole and Daschle stating your opposition to unilateral lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia.

Attachment

Tab A Letters to Senators Dole and Daschle

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Leader:

I am writing to express my strong opposition to S.21, the "Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995". While I fully understand the frustration that the bill's supporters feel, I nonetheless am firmly convinced that in passing this legislation Congress would undermine efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and could lead to an escalation of the conflict there, including the possible Americanization of the conflict.

There are no simple or risk-free answers in Bosnia. Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo has serious consequences. Our allies in UNPROFOR have made it clear that a unilateral U.S. action to lift the arms embargo, which would place their troops in greater danger, will result in their early withdrawal from UNPROFOR, leading to its collapse. I believe the United States, as the leader of NATO, would have an obligation under those circumstances to assist in that withdrawal, involving thousands of U.S. troops in a difficult mission. Consequently, at the least, unilateral lift by the U.S. drives our European allies out of Bosnia and pulls the U.S. in, even if for a temporary and defined mission.

I agree that UNPROFOR, in its current mission, has reached a crossroads. As you know, we are working intensively with our allies to agree upon concrete measures to strengthen UNPROFOR and enable it to continue to make a significant difference in Bosnia, as it has -- for all its deficiencies -- over the past three years. Let us not forget that UNPROFOR has been critical to an unprecedented humanitarian operation that feeds and helps keep alive over two million people in Bosnia; until recently, the number of civilian casualties has been a fraction of what they were before UNPROFOR arrived; much of central Bosnia is at peace; and the Bosnian-Croat Federation is holding. UNPROFOR has contributed to each of these results.

Nonetheless, the Serb assaults in recent days make clear that UNPROFOR must be strengthened if it is to continue to contribute to peace. I am determined to make every effort to find common ground with our allies for more robust and meaningful UNPROFOR

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action. Congressional passage of unilateral lift at this delicate moment will undermine those efforts. It will provide our allies a rationale for doing less, not more. It will provide the pretext for absolving themselves of responsibility in Bosnia, rather than assuming a stronger role at this critical moment.

It is important to face squarely the consequences of a U.S. action that forces UNPROFOR departure. First, as I have noted, we immediately would be part of a costly NATO operation to withdraw UNPROFOR. Second, after that operation is complete, there will be an intensification of the fighting in Bosnia. It is unlikely that the Bosnian Serbs would stand by waiting until the Bosnian government is armed by others. Under assault, the Bosnian government will look to the U.S. to provide arms, air support and if that fails, more active military support. At that stage, the U.S. will have broken with our NATO allies as a result of unilateral lift. The U.S. will be asked to fill the void -- in military support, humanitarian aid and in response to refugee crises. Third, intensified fighting will risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-reaching implications for regional peace. Finally, UNPROFOR's withdrawal will set back prospects for a peaceful, negotiated solution for the foreseeable future.

In short, unilateral lift means unilateral responsibility. We are in this with our allies now. We would be in it by ourselves if we unilaterally lifted the embargo. The NATO Alliance has stood strong for almost five decades. We should not damage it in a futile effort to find an easy fix to the Balkan conflict.

I want to state clearly that I will veto any resolution or bill that may require the United States to lift unilaterally the arms embargo. It will make a bad situation much worse. I ask that you not support the pending legislation, S.21.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert Dole
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Leader:

I am writing to express my strong opposition to S.21, the "Bosnia and Herzegovina Self-Defense Act of 1995". While I fully understand the frustration that the bill's supporters feel, I nonetheless am firmly convinced that in passing this legislation Congress would undermine efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and could lead to an escalation of the conflict there, including the possible Americanization of the conflict.

There are no simple or risk-free answers in Bosnia. Unilaterally lifting the arms embargo has serious consequences. Our allies in UNPROFOR have made it clear that a unilateral U.S. action to lift the arms embargo, which would place their troops in greater danger, will result in their early withdrawal from UNPROFOR, leading to its collapse. I believe the United States, as the leader of NATO, would have an obligation under those circumstances to assist in that withdrawal, involving thousands of U.S. troops in a difficult mission. Consequently, at the least, unilateral lift by the U.S. drives our European allies out of Bosnia and pulls the U.S. in, even if for a temporary and defined mission.

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action. Congressional passage of unilateral lift at this delicate moment will undermine those efforts. It will provide our allies a rationale for doing less, not more. It will provide the pretext for absolving themselves of responsibility in Bosnia, rather than assuming a stronger role at this critical moment.

It is important to face squarely the consequences of a U.S. action that forces UNPROFOR departure. First, as I have noted, we immediately would be part of a costly NATO operation to withdraw UNPROFOR. Second, after that operation is complete, there will be an intensification of the fighting in Bosnia. It is unlikely that the Bosnian Serbs would stand by waiting until the Bosnian government is armed by others. Under assault, the Bosnian government will look to the U.S. to provide arms, air support and if that fails, more active military support. At that stage, the U.S. will have broken with our NATO allies as a result of unilateral lift. The U.S. will be asked to fill the void -- in military support, humanitarian aid and in response to refugee crises. Third, intensified fighting will risk a wider conflict in the Balkans with far-reaching implications for regional peace. Finally, UNPROFOR's withdrawal will set back prospects for a peaceful, negotiated solution for the foreseeable future.

In short, unilateral lift means unilateral responsibility. We are in this with our allies now. We would be in it by ourselves if we unilaterally lifted the embargo. The NATO Alliance has stood strong for almost five decades. We should not damage it in a futile effort to find an easy fix to the Balkan conflict.

I want to state clearly that I will veto any resolution or bill that may require the United States to lift unilaterally the arms embargo. It will make a bad situation much worse. I ask that you not support the pending legislation, S.21.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Thomas A. Daschle
Democratic Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510