Case Number: 2013-0687-F

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title: Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [7]				
Staff Office-Individual: European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander				
Original OA/ID Number: 897				
Row: 34	Section: 2	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Addressees. Subject: Papers in Support of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia. (3 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	Bosnia: Effects of Demilitarizing. (3 pages)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. paper	Civilian, UNPROFOR Food Supplies. (1 page)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)
001d. paper	Humanitarian Implications of an UNPROFOR Withdrawal. (4 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)
001e. paper	Potential Reaction. (2 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)
001f. paper	Franco-British Views. (2 pages)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)
001g. paper	Croatia. (1 page)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For the Secretary of Defense from Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Subject: U.S. Response to SHAPE Request. (2 pages)	06/15/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Bosnia Funding. Record ID: 9504614. (2 pages)	06/15/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. talking points	Talking Points for Chirac. (1 page)	06/15/1995	P1/b(1)
003c. talking points	Talking Points for Major. (1 page)	06/15/1995	P1/b(1)
004. report	Bosnian Serb Army. (5 pages)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [7]

2013-0687-F
vz2721

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. report	The "Liberation" of Sarajevo. (4 pages)	06/14/1995	P1/b(1)

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001b. paper	Bosnia: Effects of Demilitarizing. (3 pages)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. paper	Civilian, UNPROFOR Food Supplies. (1 page)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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001d. paper	Humanitarian Implications of an UNPROFOR Withdrawal. (4 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [7]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. paper	Potential Reaction. (2 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001f. paper	Franco-British Views. (2 pages)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001g. paper	Croatia. (1 page)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)

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002. memo	For the Secretary of Defense from Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Subject: U.S. Response to SHAPE Request. (2 pages)	06/15/1995	P1/b(1)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4614

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 15, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM: MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN

SUBJECT: Bosnia Funding

Attached is at Tab I is a memorandum to the President as requested.

Concurrence by: Nelson Drew, Bill Daners

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Talking Points for Chirac
Tab B Talking Points for Major
Tab C Letter from Newt Gingrich and Bob Dole

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2014
2013-0674-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TAB A

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Bosnia Funding. Record ID: 9504614. (2 pages)	06/15/1995	P1/b(1)

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003b. talking points	Talking Points for Chirac. (1 page)	06/15/1995	P1/b(1)

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TAB B

B

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. talking points	Talking Points for Major. (1 page)	06/15/1995	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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TAB C

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

June 15, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing with respect to the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) -- a matter we discussed at length with French President Jacques Chirac yesterday evening. It is our understanding that the Administration and the French government would like to pass a resolution authorizing the RRF in the U.N. Security Council this afternoon.

Due to the absence of Administration consultations with the Congress, we have many serious questions and concerns about authorizing the RRF which have not been addressed. The Chairmen of the appropriate committees of jurisdiction have clearly not been consulted nor provided with critical information about the mandate, mission, duration, command arrangements and cost of this new operation.

Nevertheless, in our view, efforts by the French government and other UNPROFOR contributor governments to protect their forces on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be respected. The United States would expect no less from an ally. It is the right of these governments to take measures necessary to protect their soldiers. In this regard, President Chirac informed us that the command arrangements for the RRF -- composed of troops in national uniforms, and not blue helmets -- would not be subject to vetoes by U.N. civilian officials that have to date crippled the UNPROFOR operation. We urge you to make this point explicit in any U.N. Security Council resolution which authorizes the RRF.

President Chirac assured us that he was only seeking U.S. political support, and not a financial commitment. In view of this assurance, we would not object to your Administration's decision to support for President Chirac's efforts to protect UNPROFOR troops. We believe that it is essential, however, that any Security Council resolution make clear that: (1) the costs of the RRF and any additional personnel authorized under the resolution will not be assessed to U.N. member states; and (2) no additional U.S. financial or military obligations will be incurred as a result of the resolution. In our view, if you choose to support a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the expansion of UNPROFOR to accommodate the RRF, the costs

should be borne through voluntary contributions. We oppose funding the RRF through U.N. assessments. This is consistent with our discussion with President Chirac.

We expect that the questions regarding cost, funding, and, most important, U.S. military commitments raised in the June 13th letter from Chairmen Gilman, Livingston, and Rogers will be promptly answered. We note that these are questions that should have been answered in the consultation process required by law. To act without a clear understanding of the consequences is unacceptable. Furthermore, we would request that you inform us of your decision and its underlying rationale so that we may share it with our colleagues.

Finally, we would like to emphasize that our concurrence for measures to protect UNPROFOR, such as the RRF, should in no way be interpreted as support for the present European and Administration approach to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we discussed with President Chirac, we have fundamental differences over what our policy toward Bosnia should be. We believe that the U.N. operation in Bosnia has been a costly failure. In our view abandoning the present "neutral" approach, withdrawing UNPROFOR, and lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government is the principled and prudent policy to adopt.

Sincerely,

NEWT GINGRICH

BOB DOLE

6/14 Sandy V—
Carter's testimony.
What is our response
to his proposals?

Senate testimony about Bosnia-Herzegovina:

Although I have been invited on a number of occasions since leaving the White House, this is the first time I have come to Washington to testify before a Congressional committee. I agreed to do so only after consulting with General John Galvin, whose unique experience and interest in the Balkan region is strongly complementary to my own and whose views seem to be basically compatible. We feel that our joint testimony might be helpful in finding a way to bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We are here as private citizens, with no authority to speak for others and with no desire to be critical of our own government or others who are attempting to prevent violence in the area and to protect innocent people.

We also want to make it clear that we do not excuse or condone any of the human rights abuses, violations of cease-fires, taking of hostages, or failure to comply with United Nations resolutions by any of the combatants in the area.

I have been asked to speak first, and will outline briefly my own recent involvement in the region, since this is the basis for my later recommendations.

At The Carter Center we monitor regularly the world's conflicts, attempting to understand their history, the primary participants, issues that are currently in dispute, and efforts that are being made to resolve them. We receive many requests from active or potential combatants for assistance, but our policy is to encourage mediation by others, and not to duplicate their efforts or compete with them.

When we believe it advisable to accept one of these mediation requests in a sensitive political arena, we first assure that we have the approval of the President of the United States and, when appropriate, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. When our proposal is not accepted, we do not act. We have received such approval in a number of cases, including Nicaragua, Somalia, Liberia, North Korea, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Haiti, and the Sudan.

We constantly face one of two basic questions that make mediation difficult and sometimes unpopular:

How to correlate the inviolability of a nation's sovereignty with self-determination for minority groups?

How to deal with leaders who are condemned by our government if they are the only ones who can resolve a crisis and prevent further human suffering?

In our work we are always careful to comply with U.S. policy and with any pertinent resolutions of the United Nations. We do not ask for official status or authority, and always submit any potential agreements to our government for final approval and further action.

We have followed these guidelines meticulously in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Last year, on December 7, I was asked by the Bosnian Serb leader, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, to receive a delegation from him. He said that many demands were being made of the Serbs and he had not been able to discuss his responses with anyone in authority.

After calling President Bill Clinton and obtaining his approval, on December 14 I received a three-person delegation at my home in Plains. After extensive discussions, a

tentative agreement was reached that I would go to Bosnia-Herzegovina provided the Serbs would a) release unilaterally all prisoners of war who were less than 19 years old and mutually exchange all other POWs with the government officials in Sarajevo, b) permit United Nations convoys to deliver relief supplies to Sarajevo and other safe havens, c) impose a cease-fire around Sarajevo, d) open the airport there to United Nations flights, and e) guarantee respect for human rights.

By telephone, I confirmed this commitment with Dr. Karadzic and also shared the information with President Clinton, who approved the agreement. Dr. Karadzic then offered to confirm his promises publicly and asked that CNN permit him to do so through a televised live interview.

Following briefings from State Department and White House officials and after being informed by them that the Serb promises to me were "substantially fulfilled," my wife Rosalynn and I traveled to the area, arriving first in Zagreb on December 18. There we met with Croatian President Tudjman and U.N. officials and then proceeded to Sarajevo.

That evening we met with President Alija Izetbegovic and other officials of the Bosnia-Herzegovina government. Although at first skeptical of our mission, they seemed reassured when we explained that our goal was not to initiate a new agenda but to promote negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group plan. Approving this effort, they made it clear that they would accept a cease-fire for not more than three months.

Later that night I drafted what I considered to be a comprehensive cease-fire proposal, based on the discussions

with the Serb delegation in my home, my talks in Zagreb and Sarajevo, and briefings from U.S. and U.N. officials.

Before going to Pale, I requested of the Serbs that both Dr. Karadzic and the military commander, General Ratko Mladic, meet with me, to assure that whatever we evolved would have both political and military backing. Our negotiations in Pale included them and a number of other top Serb officials. We had some difficult moments, but finally concluded an agreement with some modifications of my original draft. Its terms included:

a) An immediate cease-fire and cessation of hostilities for at least four months, to be enforced by the interposition of United Nations forces.

b) The prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons that might damage people or property.

c) A comprehensive peace agrreement to be negotiated during this period, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties.

d) In all respects, both sides to be given equal treatment.

e) During this period, unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo, and the delivery of humanitarian services, with U.N. forces helping to assure that no armamemts or weapons of war are in the cargoes to be delivered.

f) Each side to be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. Special raporteurs are to have unimpeded access to insure compliance.

g) All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, to have the right to live in a location of their choice.

h) An early exchange of all detainees.

The Serbs agreed to negotiate in good faith on the basis of the Contact Group plan that requires a division of territory, with the Serbs to control 49% and the Muslim/Croat federation 51%. Mutually agreed modifications would be negotiated during the peace talks.

By telephone, I read this document to representatives of the State Department and White House and, with their approval, signed the document as a witness to the signatures of Doctor Karadzic and General Mladic. (Enclosure A.)

Back in Sarajevo the next morning, we obtained a closely parallel agreement with President Izetbegovic, with only one difference: a demand that the Serbs accept the 51/49% map as a prerequisite to peace talks. (Enclosure B.)

In order to clarify some issues and make implementation dates earlier and more specific, we returned then to Pale and concluded an additional agreement (Enclosure C.) Back in Sarajevo, President Izetbegovic accepted the additions.

Now we had common agreement for a temporary period of peace during the holidays, a 4-month cease-fire through the month of April, a cessation of hostilities between military forces of both sides with UNPROFOR to interpose its units between them, the withdrawal of government forces from the demilitarized zone on Mount Igman near the Sarajevo airport, an early exchange of all detainees, and an opportunity for the Contact Group to work with both sides to resolve any remaining issues.

I pointed out to the news media on my departure the only unresolved issue: Muslim/Croat officials were insisting that, as a prerequisite to peace talks, the Serbs would have to "accept" the 51/49% plan; the Serbs, on the other hand, were willing to negotiate "on the basis of" the same plan.

Since that time we have received reports from U.S. and U.N. officials and, with their approval, have maintained contact with leaders in the region.

The Bosnian Serbs have presented to us their own territorial proposal, reducing their controlled area from 70% to 53% and professing their willingness to negotiate the remaining differences. I understand that the Bosnian Serb proposal was provided to members of the Contact Group in March.

On one occasion in January, the full Contact Group did have one meeting with the Bosnian Serbs and the U.S. member visited Pale once or twice, but since then the Contact Group has isolated the Bosnian Serbs and maintained a policy of communicating only with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic on matters involving the Bosnian Serbs.

The end of the cease-fire period came at the end of April with no negotiations having been undertaken. Since then, as is well known by members of this committee, government forces have attacked from within the safe zones, the Serbs have responded with shelling, travel through the relief supply routes and the Sarajevo airport has been restricted, NATO planes have bombed Serb positions, hostages have been taken, and a higher level of conflict is now threatened.

The question is, where can we go from here? Although no one can guarantee ultimate results, there are two basic al-

ternatives: the escalation of military conflict or a determined attempt to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement.

The United Nations is facing an almost impossible dilemma, serving as a peace enforcer when there is no peace agreement. However, the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) has performed well, both with its humanitarian mission and also in reducing the level of fighting and the resulting casualties.

Some have called for a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by the U.S. to permit the Muslim-Croat federation to obtain weapons. Under these circumstances, the United Nations military commander has stated that his forces could not fulfill their mission, and both France and Great Britain have stated that their forces will be withdrawn. This would likely result in a much greater involvement of the United States in both military training and support, and an escalation in bloodshed in Bosnia. The war could also widen to Croatia, Serbia, or southward to Kosovo and Macedonia.

With an almost hopeless prospect for ending the crisis through military means, it is time to reassess the possibilities for a mediated settlement of basic issues. What should be the prerequisites for such negotiations?

If comprehensive peace talks without preconditions are not acceptable to the Contact Group, I believe a clear demonstration of good faith by both sides should be adequate. Proven performance of a practical nature can be required, such as those negotiated in December:

a) a cessation of hostilities and disengagement of armed forces,

b) freedom of movement of U.N. peacekeepers,

c) unrestricted movement of United Nations convoys to deliver relief supplies to Sarajevo and other safe havens,

d) the Sarajevo airport open to United Nations flights,

e) the release of all detainees,

f)human rights guarantees, including unrestricted return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

As earlier agreed by the Bosnian Serbs and Muslim-Croat federation officials in Sarajevo, there would be balanced and equal treatment of the two sides.

This period of peace might also include the lifting of United Nations trade sanctions against the Serbs as long as Serbia and the Bosnian groups act in good faith. This would be a powerful incentive for compliance.

Peace talks would best be held in a neutral place under the auspices of the United Nations or the Contact Group, and with an agenda that might include such constitutional issues as the degree of autonomy of the Muslim/Croatian and Serbian groups, mutually agreeable territorial divisions based on the 51/49 proposal of the Contact Group, and the right of special relationships with Serbia and Croatia.

Both sides, the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs, must be at the negotiating table. All those interested in peace, including the government of the United States, should urge both sides to seek a peaceful resolution of this continuing crisis.

Obviously, we cannot speak for any parties to the dispute or for those involved in peacekeeping, but there is every reason for exploring these ideas as a reasonable alternative to the existing deadlock and the strong possibility of another surge in bloodshed.

ENCLOSURE A.

December 19, 1994 Bosnian Serb Agreement

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

We the undersigned agree that we and those under our authority will:

1. Commence negotiations on an agreement for a cessation of hostilities on December 27, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 15, 1995. This agreement would be implemented immediately by instituting a cease-fire by interposition of U.N. forces along the line of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities and the exchange of prisoners, etc. This cessation of hostilities will last for four months or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.

2. We agree that, while the cessation of hostilities is in effect, we shall negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, with the proposal of the Contact Group as the basis for negotiation of all points. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties. All issues are to be resolved in full cooperation with the Contact Group. In all respects, both sides will be given equal treatment.

3. During this period there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may join with UNPROFOR inspectors to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.

4. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the total elimination and prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons of any kind that might be damaging to people or property.

5. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. International observers, including the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, will be free to observe compliance with this agreement.

ENCLOSURE B

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

We the undersigned agree that we and those under our authority will:

1. Immediately implement a cease-fire, monitored by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities and the exchange of prisoners, etc., as described below.

2. Commence negotiations on an agreement for a total cessation of hostilities on December 27, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 15, 1995. This cessation of hostilities will last for four months, or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.

3. While the cessation of hostilities is in effect, negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, on the basis of the acceptance of the peace plan of the Contact Group as a starting point. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties. All issues are to be resolved in full cooperation with the Contact Group.

It is understood that there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may join with UNPROFOR inspectors to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.

Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the total elimination and prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons of any kind that might be damaging to people or property.

Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. International observers, including the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, will be free to observe compliance with this agreement.

There will be an early exchange of all detainees, under the auspices of the International Red Cross. In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC will have unimpeded access to all detainees to insure that the provisions of this agreement are fulfilled.

In a final agreement, all has to be agreed; otherwise, nothing is agreed.

It is realized that other difficult issues and unresolved questions will have to be resolved. This will be done peacefully, utilizing the services of the Contact Group or UNPROFOR as appropriate.

Signed 20 December 1994

Alija Izetbegovic
President

1 of 9

Jimmy Carter
Witness

ENCLOSURE C

20 December, 1994

Additional agreement to that of 19 Dec. 1994.

1) It is agreed that the negotiations to establish a total cessation of hostilities will commence on 23 December, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by 1 January 1995.

2) A complete cease-fire, throughout Bosnia-Herzogovina, will be implemented at noon, 23 December, 1994, to be monitored by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities.

3) Based on assurances that convoys and humanitarian services will pass freely, the Bosnian forces will withdraw from the Igman demilitarized zone in accordance with the existing agreement, prior to commencement of the negotiations described in item (1) above.

Ragovan Karadzic

Witnessed:
Jimmy Carter

[Note: Since we concluded this agreement during the last few minutes of our stay in Bosnia-Herzigovina, I received approval of all three of these items from President Izetbegovic by telephone from the airport before announcing them and departing.]

Basic costs

To date

— Dog [illegible]

— Vaccines

— Assessment payments

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. report	Bosnian Serb Army. (5 pages)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [7]

2013-0687-F
vz2721

RESTRICTION CODES

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UNCLASSIFIED

PREC: RUSH

CATEGORY: INTERNATIONAL

NWSID: R0291968

SOURCE: Reuters

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^BC-GROUP 2NDLD (SCHEDULED, PICTURE)
^**G7** issues urgent appeal for halt to Bosnia fighting
(Adds Friday economic talks, quotes)
By Randall Palmer

HALIFAX, Nova Scotia, June 16 (Reuter) - Leaders of rich industrial nations, deeply worried by the conflict in Bosnia, unexpectedly devoted the first day of their summit to an urgent appeal to the warring factions to halt their fighting.

``We send out to all the parties a strong call for the greatest restraint,'' Canadian Prime Minister Jean **Chretien** said in a statement read on behalf of **G7** leaders late on Thursday after a working dinner in this Canadian coastal city.

``We appeal to the Bosnian Serbs and to the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to establish an immediate moratorium on military operations in order to allow political negotiations...to resume as soon as possible,'' said **Chretien**, who is hosting the Group of Seven summit.

Worried that the massing of tens of thousands of Bosnian government troops north of **Sarajevo** could lead to the bloodiest conflict of the war, the rich nations' club spent most of its first working session hammering out the statement.

Even as **Chretien** spoke, reports came in from **Sarajevo** of heavy small arms, machinegun and mortar fire in the city, gripped by days of rumours of an impending government assault to lift the 38-month-long Serb siege of the city.

Leaders of the **G7**, which groups France, Italy, Germany, the United States, Japan, Britain and Canada, had not been expected to get to Bosnia until Friday on arrival of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who faces his own violent crisis in breakaway Chechnya.

Instead a working dinner which included venison in wine sauce and the spring delicacy of fern shoots at Halifax's ornate Government House was turned in a mini-foreign office with printers and computers installed and foreign ministers racing in and out of the dining room.

A Canadian government official said France's new President

Jacques Chirac had suggested that the meeting start with a discussion of the worsening situation in Bosnia and that the leaders issue an immediate statement.

``Something that you thought had gone from bad to worse, went from bad to worse to terrible....We seem to be coming to a moment of truth,'' a Canadian official said.

Fuller talks on the issue will be held when Yeltsin arrives with his foreign minister and a Canadian official said further public statements on Bosnia were expected after the **G7** discusses it with the Russian leader.

Despite the strong wording of the **G7** statement, it appeared unlikely to have any real effect on the conflict.

But the statement was a surprise ending to the first day of a summit filled with ceremony, bagpipe greetings and bilateral talks – including a heated one between the United States and Japan over their bitter dispute on car imports.

U.S. President Bill Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama traded tough language over the dispute, but they avoided a major rift at the start of the summit, ordering their negotiators to redouble efforts to resolve the issue.

Nevertheless Clinton, who held a joint news conference with Murayama, said he would go ahead with heavy sanctions against Japan on June 28 if the negotiations failed to open Japanese markets to U.S. car imports.

Although the crisis in Bosnia has overshadowed other issues on the agendas of the rich nations, Friday's sessions are expected to turn to concerns such as revamping global financial institutions and reforming the U.N..

The leaders are to release a joint communique on Friday afternoon but as the document was leaked last week its contents are unlikely to be a major surprise.

The communique's proposals include increasing the amount of money available to countries in deep financial trouble.

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PREC: RUSH

CATEGORY: INTERNATIONAL

NWSID: R0290707

SOURCE: Reuters

a0034
^BC-YUGOSLAVIA-GROUP 1STLD (SCHEDULED)
^**G7** appeals to Bosnian factions to stop fighting
By Patrick Worsnip
HALIFAX, Nova Scotia, June 16 (Reuter) - The world's top industrial democracies, seeking to head off a bloody new round of fighting in Bosnia, appealed to all parties to the conflict to halt military actions to make way for peace talks.

``We send out to all the parties a strong call for the greatest restraint,'' Canadian Prime Minister Jean **Chretien** said in a statement late on Thursday on behalf of a Group of Seven summit here.

Chretien issued a special statement on Bosnia to reporters after the opening dinner of the three-day summit, where foreign ministers were unexpectedly called in to discuss the worsening situation in former Yugoslavia.

Chretien said that ``all information indicates that there is a danger of renewed intensification of fighting in Bosnia, in particular in **Sarajevo**.''

``We appeal to the Bosnian Serbs and to the federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to establish an immediate moratorium on military operations in order to allow political negotiations, without which no lasting solution is possible, to resume as soon as possible,'' **Chretien** added.

The leaders, who had not been expected to discuss Bosnia so soon in the summit, issued their appeal as the Moslem-led Bosnian government was reported to have massed thousands of troops for a possible bid to break the Serb siege of **Sarajevo**.

The **G7** statement, which also called on the government in neighbouring Croatia and rebel Serbs there to show restraint, appeared to have little chance of inducing any of the warring factions in former Yugoslavia to lay down their arms.

Officials indicated the main concern of the summit leaders was to rush out a statement on Bosnia in view of the worsening situation there.

``They wanted to have a statement immediately. They didn't want to wait further,'' a Canadian official told reporters.

The official, speaking on condition he was not identified, said the statement contained ``no threat or suggestion of a withdrawal (by U.N. peacekeeping forces in Bosnia) either in the short term or the long term.''

Chretien declined to take reporters' questions after reading the statement. Officials said the summit leaders would have a fuller discussion of Bosnia after Russian President Boris Yeltsin arrives in Halifax on Friday.

Earlier, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher denied suggestions that he had advised the Bosnian government against an offensive. He told reporters he had merely urged Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic to ``carefully consider the consequences'' of such a move.

The Bosnia statement followed a decision by the **G7** leaders to press ahead with the creation of a 10,000-strong rapid reaction force to beef up U.N. peacekeeping troops in the Balkan republic, despite lack of agreement on how to fund it.

British officials said U.S. President Bill Clinton had admitted that after receiving a letter from Republican leaders in Congress expressing strong opposition to U.S. financing of the force he could not commit Washington to paying a share.

The formula agreed on for the British-French-Dutch force, expected to be launched by a U.N. Security Council resolution early on Friday, postpones the question of how to pay for it.

French officials, who played a key role in pushing through the resolution, insisted the delay could only be brief and gave Clinton just a few days to strike a deal with Congress.

The United States normally pays around 31 per cent of a peacekeeping mission. The rapid reaction force is expected to cost between $300 and 400 million for the first six months.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. report	The "Liberation" of Sarajevo. (4 pages)	06/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JUNE 16, 1995

ANTHONY LEWIS

Nothing But Shame

The Western alliance, the greatest military and political force on earth, has cringed to a gang of nationalist terrorists. That is the meaning of recent events in Bosnia.

When the Bosnian Serbs took United Nations soldiers hostage, the West vowed to be strong. There would be no negotiations with the kidnappers. A new road, protected by a determined new force from NATO countries, would be built to get food through to Sarajevo. Serbian blockades of relief convoys would not be tolerated.

All those firm words have evaporated. Sarajevo remains besieged, its food reserves exhausted; there will be no new road. No convoys are getting through to even more desperate enclaves in eastern Bosnia.

One of the main U.N. accomplishments, the exclusion of heavy weapons from zones around Sarajevo and other "safe areas," has effectively been abandoned. The Serbs have taken almost all the weapons from U.N. storage depots.

The United Nations mission is not just negotiating with the Serbs; it is begging. Its chief, Yasushi Akashi, scaled down U.N. force activity after a promise from the Serbian leaders to let some relief trucks through. He said this would "stabilize the situation in Bosnia." The Serbs immediately broke the promise.

The Serbs have evidently even obtained an understanding that there will be no more NATO air strikes. They are now essentially dictating to a humiliated U.N. force.

The lesson is: Hostage-taking works. Or it works with a Western alliance that does not have the will to resist ruthless aggressors in Europe. NATO, and most notably its American leaders, have turned their faces away from among other things one of the worst outrages in the Western world: the siege of Sarajevo.

When large numbers of Bosnian Government troops massed this week for what looked like a possible attempt to break the siege, President Clinton urged restraint. The Bosnians must allow more time for diplomacy to work, he said. But why will weakness bring success to diplomats who are already a plaything for the Serbs?

The reasons for the weakness are not military. Bernard E. Trainor, a retired Marine general who is now at Harvard, wrote in The Boston Globe recently that a proper Western military campaign with heavy air support would make "short work" of the Bosnian Serb forces. And General Trainor is no hawk on the Bosnian conflict.

No, the weakness is in political leadership: most of all America's. President Bush made the disastrous initial mistake when he shrugged off Serbian aggression against Croatia in 1991. President Clinton promised much to Bosnia but has turned away, again and again, from action that might actually stop the aggressors.

What is driving Mr. Clinton's policy now is not the need to stop the first genocidal aggression in Europe since the Nazis. It is not the wish to prevent humiliation of the Western alliance. It is the urgent desire, for domestic political reasons, to keep American troops out of Bosnia.

Mr. Clinton promised to supply up to 25,000 soldiers to help the U.N. forces withdraw if they decide to do that. So he is doing all he can to keep the U.N. mission going, however useless it is, however much it has to beg the murderous leaders of the Bosnian Serbs for permission even to supply its own forces.

The President says that Americans will not stand for U.S. involvement. But he has not told them what is at stake: a civilized country being ravaged in a war of aggression fomented by politicians maddened by power and nationalism.

President Chirac of France told the truth at a dinner of European leaders last week. When the Greek Prime Minister asked for understanding of Serbs fighting for their religion, Mr. Chirac said: "Don't talk to me of wars of religion. These people have no faith and know no law. They are terrorists."

The other day I had a letter from a Sarajevan who fled to Germany, Dr. Milan Stern. He is Jewish, he said, his wife Leila Muslim. His 9-year-old daughter, Selma, said the Americans would save them. Dr. Stern wrote a small poem:

America
You my moonflights
You my Woodstocks
You regret.

Why make children
Dream of freedom
And then tell them
To forget? □

In Bosnia, hostage-taking works.

SRB

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILIAM J. PERRY
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
14 JUNE 1995

U.S. Contingency Operations and Their Funding

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be here to discuss the current contingency operations of America's armed forces and the continuing problem of providing funding for such operations.

One particular contingency operation--Bosnia--has been dominating my attention in recent weeks, and I would be happy to take your questions on that situation, or on any other of our ongoing operations. However, I want to discuss the general challenge facing the President, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Congress, regarding the funding of such operations. Following my statement, General Shalikashvili will provide an overview of our major operations around the world.

First, I must again thank this and DoD's other oversight committees for their efforts in ensuring that the FY 1995 Emergency Supplemental was appropriated in time to permit the Department to meet this year's funding requirements for current contingency operations, thereby avoiding the diversion of funds from other programs. Such a diversion would have undermined the readiness of our armed forces during these latter months of the fiscal year.

Last week's dramatic rescue of a downed American pilot in Bosnia reminds us of how important it is for our forces to have adequate funding for training, maintenance, and combat essentials. Captain Scott O'Grady demonstrated--when it counted--how superbly he had been trained for the dangerous mission assigned him. And it would have been too late to make up for past neglect, if the personnel and equipment marshaled to rescue him had not been primed and ready. In our pride for the success of this operation, we must vow never to shortchange the courageous men and women who could someday face this same kind of danger and test of their preparedness.

As it should every year, this year's Department of Defense budget request outlines what is needed to ensure that our armed forces sustain their high quality and peak readiness. But because contingency operations are by definition unpredictable, the President's request does not include funding for such operations. This means that we must continue to rely on supplemental appropriations, which are by nature highly time sensitive and a risky way to ensure force readiness.

This is the year when we can and must develop a better way to fund contingencies. To that end, earlier this year I recommended approval of a Readiness Preservation Authority, which would enable the Secretary of Defense to avoid diverting money from readiness accounts to pay for contingency operations late in the current fiscal year. This

authority would enable DoD to protect readiness in anticipation of later funding. I have been disappointed with the lack of congressional support for this approach, which fully recognizes the constitutional roles of both branches of government.

I am especially troubled by the alternative contingency-funding approach recommended by the House National Security Committee. The House authorization bill imposes inappropriate restrictions on the ability of the President to conduct contingency operations that are essential to the protection of U.S. national interests. Both the restrictions on funding available to the President to commence a contingency operation and the requirement to submit a supplemental appropriations request to continue an operation are unwarranted restrictions on his constitutional authority.

At the Pentagon, we are making sure that we do everything possible to facilitate the funding of contingencies. We have identified and are continuing to update our likely funding requirements for operations expected to carry into the next year. We have provided to the oversight committees an estimate of our FY 1996 unbudgeted costs for contingency operations. Our $1.2 billion estimate of the cost of those operations is necessarily based on assumptions. But it is essential that that amount be funded in FY 1996, if we are to protect force readiness next year.

My staff and I am eager to work with this and the other DoD oversight committees to achieve a better way of funding contingency operations. I look forward to advancing that important goal during this timely hearing.