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Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [6]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Samuel Berger from Michael Sheehan. Subject: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia Funding. Record ID: 9520765. (3 pages)	06/16/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia Funding. Record ID: 9520764. (1 page)	06/16/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. paper	Deputies Committee Discussion Paper Bosnia. Record ID: 9520764. (5 pages)	06/17/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	For Sandy Berger from Nelson Drew. Subject: June 13 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9520755. (5 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. draft	Revised French/British Draft Statement. (2 pages)	06/09/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. cable	re: June 12: Resolution on Proposed Rapid Reaction Force. (7 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)
002d. draft	U.S. Suggested Changes to the French/UK Draft Resolution. (1 page)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)

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2013-0687-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Tab A

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia Funding. Record ID: 9520764. (1 page)	06/16/1995	P1/b(1)

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Tab B

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001c. paper	Deputies Committee Discussion Paper Bosnia. Record ID: 9520764. (5 pages)	06/17/1995	P1/b(1)

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Tab C

Executive Summary

OpPlan 40104 Withdrawal Financing Options

- NATO OpPlan 40104 costs in total about \$2 billion for all participants. DOD's role constitutes about 50% of the operation (or \$1 billion). With NATO/U.N. assessments, U.S. upfront costs could go as high as \$1.4 billion.
- Of the four financing options outlined, the three U.S.-crafted options all have some form of cost sharing - either through a combination of NATO and UN assessments or by calling on Allies to pay our U.N. assessment for UNPROFOR. Allies and others in UN unlikely to be sympathetic to U.S. options to assess others (NATO/UN) to pay for U.S. participation. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) funding outcome is a new factor; impact of RRF on options needs to be assessed.
- If a funding request to Congress is made, Congress likely will demand that offsets be presented. (Oklahoma City requests are offset). There are no known offsets at this time.
- U.S. costs are largely Defense O&M expenditures. Costs are estimated to occur both in FY 95 and FY 96; as time passes, more costs will shift to FY 96. Funding can be obtained:
 - for FY 95, by requesting an offset supplemental appropriations or by absorbing within existing resources (both very difficult in last quarter of FY 95);
 - for FY 96, through adjustments within FY 96 appropriations bills now pending in Congress. A Presidential decision to shift funds (offsets) would be required.
- **Option I (HYBRID)** is most financially advantageous to U.S. It shares costs between NATO Allies (including U.S.), which bear 2/3rds of costs, and other U.N. members, which bear 1/3rd of costs. The NATO costs are funded by levying NATO infrastructure/admin cost sharing on its members (heretofore never done for operations). U.S. and others reimbursed largely by other NATO allies. The net U.S. cost after reimbursements is \$330 million.
- **Option II (NATO minus UNPROFOR)** is the next most financially advantageous to U.S. It splits costs between those units originally in UNPROFOR (U.N. pays these) and those NATO forces involved in withdrawal (NATO pays through its infrastructure/admin cost sharing formula). U.S. and others reimbursed for participating through NATO assessments. Net U.S. cost is \$430 million.
- **Option III (Allies Preferred Option)** costs U.S. the most and NATO Allies pay significantly less than under other options. Most of withdrawal costs are funded either by U.N. assessments or by NATO participating countries with the U.S. paying most of its own way. Utilizes existing structures (U.N. assessments and NATO infrastructure/admin cost sharing). U.S. is reimbursed very little (only \$160 million out of \$1 billion). Net U.S. cost is \$1,020 million.
- **Option IV (Pay Your Own Way/Voluntary Fund)** would require all participating nations to pay their own national costs (U.S. = \$1 billion). There would be an agreement that others (NATO/other U.N.) would pay U.S. assessments to the UN for the cost of UNPROFOR including arrears. Net U.S. cost is \$1,010 million.

FINANCING WITHDRAWAL ONLY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

June 16, 1995

Background

The United States has agreed in principle to participate in a NATO-led withdrawal from Bosnia should that be necessary. The cost of a withdrawal operation would be approximately \$1.95 billion, with DOD paying roughly \$1.0 billion (51%) in FY 1995 dollars for its prominent role in the operation. There has been considerable discussion both within the Administration and with NATO allies on financing arrangements for such an operation. Due to required planning, forward movement of the operation, and the long lead times to gain approval in NATO and the U.N. for a funding mechanism and budget authorization, timely action is required to ensure an approved funding mechanism that benefits the United States is in place. This paper discusses options for funding these costs, with varying results for *net* U.S. costs, once the U.S. has been reimbursed. The effect of the new Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) on these options, including costs and viability of options, has not been assessed pending resolution of the funding/operational questions of RRF.

Cost Options

The financing options are described on the following pages in terms of both gross U.S. costs (paid up front), net U.S. costs (after reimbursements from either NATO or U.N.), and the estimated supplemental request to Congress that would be needed. (See Table 1 attached for a detailed break-out of the costs for each of the options.) A total of nine options (including five analyzed by NATO) for paying FY 1995 Bosnia costs were considered. However, only four options, representative of major funding approaches and resulting in lower net U.S. costs, are evaluated in this paper. The four options considered are:

- **Hybrid (NATO/non-NATO U.N. Cost Sharing).** This is a U.S. originated option which would have to be introduced at NATO and the UN. The option shares costs between the U.S., NATO allies, and other U.N. member states and would have the least net cost to the United States.
- **NATO minus UNPROFOR.** This option is a U.S. government proposed variant of one originated by NATO. It would fund UNPROFOR through the U.N. budget during withdrawal, with NATO paying for all remaining costs, including transportation, of the additional forces required for withdrawal.
- **Allies Preferred Option (Enhanced UNPROFOR & U.N. Share).** This is the option preferred by our 15 NATO allies. NATO would only fund common costs of HQ and some commo/engineering. The U.N. would pay most of the in-theater costs, which would be funded through U.N. assessments. Participating troop countries would pay the majority of their own costs.

- **Pay-Your-Own-Way/Voluntary Contribution Fund.** DOD would pay its \$1.0 billion estimated share of the withdrawal operation without any reimbursements. State Department FY 1995 assessed U.N. peacekeeping costs for Bosnia (approximately \$500 million) would be paid by other nations to a U.N. voluntary contribution fund.

Financing Budget Costs

Regardless of which option is chosen, the Administration will be required to present a request to Congress that identifies how the withdrawal plan will be paid for while remaining within budget ceilings. At present, Defense Comptroller has estimated DOD costs by fiscal year, assuming a six month operation starting July 1. FY 1995 costs are estimated at \$530 million and FY 1996 costs are estimated at \$470 million. This does not include any possible NATO assessment (which could add up to an additional \$420 million).

There are no known offsets to cover these costs in FY 95 or in FY 96. A Presidential decision would be required to identify the necessary offsets. Offsets required for FY 1995 would be exceedingly difficult as we are entering the fourth quarter and most FY 1995 appropriations have already been spent. Final resolution of the FY 1995 supplemental/rescission bill, which the President vetoed, is also a factor.

For any proposal presented to the Hill, Congress likely will also want to know the nature of the reimbursement arrangements (from either NATO or the UN) to insure that if it credits reimbursements against the budgetary costs, there is a reasonable chance that these reimbursements will be made as projected. Given past experience, should there be any costs incurred in FY 95, reimbursements would only be made after FY 95 has ended.

I. Hybrid (NATO/non-NATO U.N. Cost Sharing) Option

U.S. Gross Cost: \$1.330 m. Net Cost: \$330 m. Supplemental Request: \$1.330 m.

Description: A contract would be negotiated between NATO and the U.N. whereby NATO, in charge of all forces, provides all withdrawal services and initially pays for them. In return, the U.N. would assess other non-NATO nations to help pay for NATO withdrawal costs.

Financing Mechanism: The U.N. would establish a separate fund to receive contributions; this fund would help pay for withdrawal. The U.N. would then assess all its non-NATO member states for their normal share (approx. 32%, or \$620 million) of the \$1.95 billion withdrawal operation. These assessments would be used by the U.N. to fund the costs of withdrawing non-NATO UNPROFOR forces to their home countries as well as U.N. administrative and support costs estimated at \$200 million. Any remaining funds (approx. \$420 million) would be given to NATO

to reimburse NATO members' costs. NATO would pay the remaining 68% of the \$1.95 billion withdrawal cost (i.e. roughly \$1,330 million) by assessing each of its members for their share based on NATO administrative cost assessed rates.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would incur up front roughly \$1.0 billion in costs for withdrawal. It would also pay up front approximately \$320 million in new NATO assessments (i.e. 24% of \$1,330 million). The State Department would incur a nominal, new U.N. assessment of roughly \$10 million to cover UNPROFOR soldier and equipment deployment flights to Germany.

Reimbursements: The U.N. would reimburse NATO with the resources remaining in the contribution fund. In turn, NATO would have to reimburse its member states out of the U.N. reimbursement as well as out of its own assessments. However, NATO does not currently have any reimbursement mechanism, and some argue the likelihood of NATO reimbursement is uncertain. DOD would expect to be reimbursed its entire initial cost of operations (i.e. deployment and logistics costs of \$1.0 billion incurred before the U.N. or NATO has raised funds from its assessments) from these resources.

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress would be \$1,330 million. DOD's share would be \$1,320 million (\$1,000 million withdrawal + \$320 million NATO Assessment). State Department's share would be \$10 million. The supplemental request would in principle be offset by later reimbursements (approximately \$1.0 billion). Any reimbursements would be deposited with Treasury. If offset by reimbursements, the net supplemental request would equal \$330 million.

Advantages

- Lowest net U.S. cost; U.S. taxpayer pays less than in other options;
 - Congress likely to be more receptive to lower costs.
- Requires fewer offsets for supplemental request.
- Spreads some burden of withdrawal costs to non-NATO U.N. members providing greater equity between U.S., other NATO, and other U.N. members.

Disadvantages

- Might be difficult to gain agreement from the U.N. and NATO to implement for several reasons:
 1. U.N. asked to pay for part of NATO's costs but has no command over forces since this is a NATO "rescue" of U.N. peacekeepers.
 2. Dual funding mechanisms between U.N. and NATO have never been used before. Would require a level of cooperation and coordination between U.N. and NATO that has never been attempted. Process to reach agreement likely to be time consuming and difficult with certain NATO allies.
 3. NATO allies costs greater than in other options (increases NATO assessment).
 4. Russians and others may balk at underwriting NATO through U.N. assessments.
- Significant senior White House and policy official involvement would likely be required to secure NATO allies and U.N. agreement.
- Reimbursements from NATO may be very slow or may not be made.

II. NATO Minus UNPROFOR Option

U.S. Gross Cost: \$1,430 m. Net Cost: \$430 m. Supplemental Request: \$1,430 m.

Description: NATO would provide and pay all costs for the new troops and equipment needed for withdrawal. The U.N. would retain budgetary control over all UNPROFOR forces, including those of NATO member states, for the six month period they are being drawn down.

Financing Mechanism: The U.N. would fund all costs (approximately \$210 million) incurred by UNPROFOR forces (e.g. logistics) during withdrawal. It would do so partially out of its current UNPROFOR budget. For the remainder, the U.N. would assess its member states to redeploy UNPROFOR troops and equipment back to their home countries. NATO would fund the costs (e.g. deployment/ redeployment, basic logistics) of all forces used for withdrawal that were not originally in UNPROFOR. It would do so by assessing NATO member states for their share of the operation, which is anticipated to total approximately \$1,740 million.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would pay up front roughly \$1.0 billion for withdrawal. It would also pay up front approximately \$420 million in new NATO assessments (i.e. 24% of \$1,740 million) as part of its share to cover all NATO costs. The State Department would incur a nominal, new U.N. assessment of roughly \$10 million to cover UNPROFOR soldier and equipment deployment flights to Germany.

Reimbursements: There would be no reimbursements from the U.N. NATO would reimburse its member states out of its own assessments. However, NATO does not currently have any reimbursement mechanism and some argue the likelihood of NATO reimbursement is uncertain. Nonetheless, DOD would expect to be reimbursed its entire initial cost of operations (approx. \$1.0 billion).

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress would be \$1,430 million. DOD's share would be \$1,420 million (\$1,000 million withdrawal + \$420 million NATO Assessment). State's share would be \$10 million. The supplemental request might be offset by reimbursements (approx. \$1.0 billion). Any reimbursements would be deposited with Treasury. If fully offset by reimbursements, the net supplemental request would equal \$430 million.

Advantages

- Fairly simple division of responsibility between U.N. and NATO.
- A lower net cost for the U.S. (though higher than the Hybrid Option).
- NATO allies might accept this option as a fallback from its preferred option.
 - However, NATO allies might not agree to NATO paying transportation costs, preferring instead that nations pay their own transport costs.

Disadvantages

- Higher net U.S. costs than Hybrid option.

- U.S. share of NATO assessment would increase if any NATO nation makes a political decision to opt out of participating in withdrawal, since assessment shares are based upon the number of nations participating in operations.
- Reimbursements from NATO would require new financial procedures to be created and may be very slow or may not be made.

III. Allies Preferred Option (Enhanced UNPROFOR & U.N. Share)

U.S. Gross Cost: \$1,180 m. Net Cost: \$1,020 m. Supplemental Request: \$1,180 m.

Description: This is the preferred option of our 15 NATO allies because it places as much of the withdrawal costs as possible on the U.N. and U.S. (as opposed to NATO) budgets. The U.N. would fund some of the withdrawal costs of NATO. Specifically, it would maintain control of *all* UNPROFOR forces (as in NATO minus U.N. Option above) *and* it would fund the basic logistics costs of all troops (NATO and UNPROFOR) on the ground in Bosnia. Nations sending troops for the withdrawal operation would pay the majority of costs (e.g. deployment / redeployment, logistics outside of Bosnia, et al.). NATO would fund only the common costs of headquarters and communications / engineering requirements.

Financing Mechanism: The U.N. would increase the size of the UNPROFOR budget by the equivalent of 6,000 additional troops that had been authorized in the original mandate (although no troops would actually be added to UNPROFOR). The U.N. would use the increased funds to pay partially the costs incurred by UNPROFOR forces during withdrawal (as in NATO Minus U.N. Option above). It would also assess its member states for the costs of providing logistics to the withdrawal force in Bosnia. The participating nations would pay those costs not covered by the U.N. or NATO (for common costs of approx. \$110 million) out of their own treasuries. NATO would assess its member states to cover its common costs.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would pay up front roughly \$1.0 billion for withdrawal. It would also pay up front approximately \$30 million in new NATO assessments for common costs. The State Department would incur a new U.N. assessment of approximately \$150 million. These costs total \$1,180 million.

Reimbursements: Both the U.N. and NATO would owe DOD reimbursements totaling approximately \$160 million.

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress would be \$1,180 million. DOD's share would be \$1,030 million (\$1,000 million withdrawal + \$30 NATO Assessments). State Department's share would be \$150. The supplemental request might be offset by reimbursements (approx. \$160 million). Any reimbursements would be deposited with Treasury. If offset by reimbursements, the net supplemental request would equal \$1,020 million.

Advantages

- NATO allies strongly support: they pay much lower U.N. assessments than NATO assessments -- e.g. for U.K., U.N. assessment is 3 times lower than for NATO).
- Obviates the need for agreement on a NATO assessments and reimbursement mechanism.

Disadvantages

- Highest net U.S. costs (more than double the other options) of almost all options.
- U.S. pays disproportionately vis-a-vis other NATO allies because of the sizeable U.S. role in the withdrawal.
- Congress likely to balk at this arrangement.
- Requires large offsets (around \$1 billion) in agency budgets, displacing other high priority programs.
 - Offsets may not be available this late in the fiscal year.

IV. Pay-Your-Own-Way/Voluntary Contribution Fund Option

U.S. Gross Cost: \$1.010 m. Net Cost \$1.010 m. Supplemental Request: \$1.010 m.

Description: Each nation would pay its own costs in executing the withdrawal operation. NATO member troops currently in UNPROFOR would revert back to their respective nations' militaries. Non-NATO members of UNPROFOR would remain under UNPROFOR while being drawn down.

Financing Mechanism: Each nation would pay its own costs from its own treasury. The U.N. would cover the costs of extracting non-NATO UNPROFOR troops from within the existing UNPROFOR budget. Because the U.S. would be paying the majority of withdrawal costs (i.e. \$1.0 of \$1.95 billion) while representing just over one third of all forces in theater (including UNPROFOR troops being withdrawn), our NATO allies and others (Japan, Saudi Arabia, et al.) would agree to pay \$500 million (or more depending upon Rapid Reaction Force funding outcome) to a special U.N. voluntary fund. This fund would be used to pay the FY 1995 State Department U.N. assessment arrearages for UNPROFOR. As a practical matter, this option shifts the burden of U.S. international peacekeeping obligations in Bosnia from the State Department budget to the Defense budget. This occurs because DOD bears costs, that otherwise would be reimbursed, to permit the U.S. to solicit funds to cover the existing UNPROFOR assessment.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would pay up front roughly \$1.0 billion for withdrawal. State would have a small \$10 million cost for UN assessments.

Reimbursements: There would be none.

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress for DOD's costs would be \$1 billion (gross and net). State would have a small \$10 million cost for UN assessments. There would be no offsetting reimbursements.

Advantages

- Would eliminate U.S. UNPROFOR arrears.
- Helps maintain U.N. solvency.

Disadvantages

- Would have significantly higher U.S. net costs because there would be no reimbursements to the U.S.
- Would be difficult to sell to the Congress, since U.S. covers the majority of the costs of the withdrawal effort.
- The other countries would have to commit in advance to paying certain amounts to the U.N. fund to insure that commitments exist to cover the \$500+ million. This would require active solicitation of funds along the Desert Storm model. Most other countries are not likely to make contributions.
- Would be strongly resisted by DoD and most likely Congress as an attempt, albeit indirect, to cover U.N. assessments in the DoD budget by precluding a supplemental request for State to pay its U.N. assessment arrearages.
- Some believe this raises questions of H.R. 7 'crediting' for U.N. assessments that the Administration opposed.

Table 1: Financing Options for WITHDRAWAL Only from Bosnia
(\$ in Millions: Assumes Full Reimbursement from NATO and/or U.N.)

	Option 1 Hybrid	Option 2 NATO-UN	Option 3 Allies Prefer	Option 4 Pay Own Way
Total Withdrawal Costs (For 6 Months of Operations)	1,950	1,950	1,950	1,950
Financed By: NATO	1,330	1,740	110	
Financed By: National Costs			1,310	1,910
Financed By: United Nations	620	210	530	40
Gross US Costs re Withdrawal Op'n	1,330	1,430	1,180	1,010
State	10	10	150	10
New Withdrawal Assessment	10	10	40	10
FY 1995 UN Assessment	na	na	110	0
DOD	1,320	1,420	1,030	1,000
Withdrawal Cost	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
New NATO Assessment	320	420	30	0
Withdrawal Cost Reimbursements	1,000	1,000	160	0
DOD	1,000	1,000	160	0
Net US Costs re Bosnia For FY95	330	430	1,020	1,010
State	10	10	150	10
New Withdrawal Assessment	10	10	40	10
FY 1995 UN Assessment	na	na	110	0
DOD	320	420	870	1,000
Withdrawal Cost	0	0	840	1,000
New NATO Assessment	320	420	30	0

Table 2: Total FY 1995 Potential Supplemental Requests to Congress
(\$ in Millions)

	Option 1 Hybrid	Option 2 NATO-UN	Option 3 Allies Prefer	Option 4 Pay Own Way
New Request to Congress	1,330	1,430	1,180	1,010
State	10	10	150	10
New	10	10	150	10
DOD	1,320	1,420	1,030	1,000
Withdrawal Costs	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
NATO Assessment	320	420	30	0
Reimbursements to the Treasury	1,000	1,000	160	0
DOD	1,000	1,000	160	0
Net U.S. Supplemental	330	430	1,020	1,010
State	10	10	150	10
DOD	320	420	870	1,000

Tab D

ISSUE PAPER

Issue: This paper provides a rough order of magnitude assessment of the current USG support provided to the UN in support of UNSCRs in the Former-Yugoslavia. In addition, we provide a brief assessment of the potential impact of USG support for the Rapid Reaction Force authorized by the UN Security Council on 16 June.

DOD OUTLAYS (Reimbursed & Non-reimbursed)

This section outlines the cost of USG contributions to the operation of UNPROFOR and associated UN Security Council Resolutions governing the operations in and around the former-Yugoslavia. In general, the US pays approximately \$300 million* per year in support of the operations (\$297 million in FY 94, \$317 million in FY 95 based on FY 94 level of operations, and \$363 million in FY 96 based upon current FY 95 outlays). Reimbursement for these costs is negligible, \$1.0 million in FY 94. The cost of the USG's 30.4% peacekeeping assessment for support of UNPROFOR must be added to this figure for a comprehensive cost accounting. Cost of UNPROFOR in FY 94 was \$1.6 billion resulting in a US assessment of approximately \$530 million. Total cost is therefore estimated to be \$847 million for FY 95.

* This figure of \$300 million for USG support includes our participation in DENY FLIGHT, SHARP GUARD, humanitarian airlift, ABLE SENTRY and PROVIDE PROMISE FORWARD.

DOD IMPACT

For FY 95 any significant increase in the costs of US operations in the former-Yugoslavia as a result of our support for the RRF would require either a supplemental or reprogramming. In the current political atmosphere, it is highly unlikely we could obtain any supplemental that would not require offsets. Limited assistance to the RRF in FY 95 could probably be absorbed in current O&M levels.

There are no funds in the FY 96 budget for UNPROFOR operations. SECDEF has stated that any additional O&M funds provided by Congress would be used to pay for contingency operations. Baseline contingency operation costs for FY 96 are \$1.2 billion. Any significant additional costs for the RRF or 40104 would require a supplemental or reprogramming. Again it is highly unlikely we could obtain any supplemental funding that did not require offsets.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ALLIED NON-ASSESSED COSTS FOR UNPROFOR

1994 Unreimbursed Expenditures for Peacekeeping-related Activities in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Data were provided by contributing nations and may not reflect the same assumptions or accounting methods.

The Netherlands

Operation Sharp Guard:	\$14.6 million
<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>\$14.6 million</u>

France

UNPROFOR:	\$430 million
UAV* overflights:	\$79.3 million
UAV from Istrana	\$20.8 million
ECMM	\$1.4 million
<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>\$531.5 million**</u>

Britain

UNPROFOR	\$203.8 million
Operation Deny Flight	\$41.2 million
Operation Sharp Guard	\$3.1 million
Carrier Group	\$31 million
ECMM	\$5 million
ICFY Border Mission	\$.62 million
Sanctions Assistance Mission	\$.5 million
<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>\$285.22 million</u>

**Total reported contributions during 1994 were \$843.5 million, less \$96 million in reimbursements from the UN; reimbursement figures were not broken out by operation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Estimates of UNPROFOR Reimbursements Earned
(Dollars in Millions)

<u>Period 10/1/94 - 3/31/95</u>	<u>UN Total</u>	<u>European Share</u>	<u>UK/French Share</u>
Military Personnel and Contingent Owned Eqpmt	454.8	259.2	95.5

Basis for calculations: European forces amount to 57 percent of UNPROFOR total and UK/French forces amount to 21 percent.

Source: "Financing of United Nations Protection Force,"
A/49/540 Add. 2 (3 May 1995).

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Amount U.S. Owes and Will Owe for UNPROFOR
(Dollars in Millions)

FY 1995 (at 30.4 percent rate)

Current Bills Outstanding (Covers up to
June 30, 1995) \$396

Expected Additional Bill before Expansion
for July 1 to September 30, 1995 \$123

Total Owed before Expansion \$519
==

Amount We Can Pay After October 1, 1995 (at 25 percent rate)

Total from FY 1995 at 25 percent rate \$427
===

Expansion of UNPROFOR - Six Months Costs

At 30.4 percent rate
\$414 million x 30.4% \$126

At 25 percent rate
\$414 million x 25 % \$103

NOTE: Although the United States pays at a rate of 30.4 percent and will unilaterally reduce the payment to a 25 percent rate as of October 1, 1995, the UN will continue to bill the U.S. at a 31.2 percent rate and will consider the difference an arrearage.

Department of State

Impact of Funding Crisis on UN Ability to Operate

-- The Rapid Reaction Force has brought to a head the peacekeeping funding problem. Even without this additional strain on UN budgets, we were concerned about the potential for UN insolvency by next summer. Adding more than \$800 million to the UN tab would make a financial crisis more likely.

-- The danger will be most acute next summer, but there is some chance of a financial crisis in October when the UN regular budget will be \$170 million overdrawn. An overdraft of about \$50 million in October is normal, and usually covered by borrowing from peacekeeping until we pay our assessment. This year our non-payment of peacekeeping assessments may leave the PK account too poor to cover the UN's cash flow needs.

-- If the RRF is deployed as a UN funded operation, with the UN providing the lift and accommodations, but not reimbursing troop contributors or governments, we would estimate a UN out of pocket cost of about \$180 million for the first six months without the standby French force and about \$230 million if it deploys. While this cash flow requirement would greatly increase the risk of an early insolvency, our best guess is that UN peacekeeping would still be able to operate into 1996. This does not take into account the unknown cost of other ongoing deployments undertaken by the UN to bring UNPROFOR up to its authorized troop strength.

-- The UN owes commercial creditors and governments about \$1 billion for services and supplies and governments about \$700 million for troop reimbursements and equipment depreciation. When 1995 equipment depreciation costs are added in early 1996 the total owed for peacekeeping will jump to about \$2.5 billion.

-- The UN stays afloat by paying its most urgent bills first, and letting governments wait for reimbursement. In the past most UN peacekeeping debts were to member states. An increased reliance on more cost-effective commercial contractors and a debt overhang that will exceed \$2.5 billion dollars in early 1996 has left the UN vulnerable to a "run on the bank scenario" if cash flows dries up. If that happens, all operations, including those in the Middle East and Cyprus, could be affected. Some troops could be stranded in the field.

-- Last fall we received \$1.2 billion in supplemental and FY-95 money for peacekeeping. Our remittances to the UN were used to make long-overdue payments to troop contributing countries. Prior to our payment several countries had threatened to withdraw their troops from existing operations. This problem will likely resurface in the fall.

-- Although it is not an imminent problem, we could lose our vote in the General Assembly if our arrears reach the amount of our assessments for the preceding two years.

Tab E

-- By the end of FY-95 we will owe the UN \$670 million for peacekeeping; more if the RRF is an assessed operation.

-- State has requested \$445 million for peacekeeping in FY-96. This included only \$211 million for UNPROFOR; enough for six months. DoD requested \$65 million to pay for UNMIH (Haiti) and UNPREDEP (Macedonia); they will not get this money. We have no money budgeted for MINURSO (Western Sahara), which was to have ended in FY-95. By the end of FY-96 we may owe the UN more than \$1 billion for peacekeeping.

-- There is bipartisan concern, approaching outrage, on the Hill about our willingness to incur large obligations for peacekeeping without adequate consultation. The Gilman, Livingston, Rogers letter, the notification provisions of the FY 94-95 State authorization bill, and the peacekeeping provisions of HR 7, S 5 and this years funding legislation for State clearly demonstrate Congress's ire.

-- Our request this year for a \$672 million emergency supplemental for peacekeeping was rejected. At typical 150 account foreign aid outlay rates it would require several billion dollars in program cuts to offset this request.

-- We tried last year to establish a contingency fund for peacekeeping to get around problems created by not knowing when the budgets are submitted what crises will occur. Congress was not receptive.

-- Recently, however, Rogers, Domenici, Kassebaum, Hamilton and a few others have signaled that they might be open to discussing the funding problem. Any solution would require closer consultations with Congress on peacekeeping.

-- Monthly briefings have informed staff, but there is a need for face to face exchanges between senior Administration officials and key Members of Congress.

-- The Peacekeeping Core Group has endorsed a State proposal to offer Congress regular consultations between senior Administration officials and key Congressional leaders in exchange for the creation of an ERMA like contingency fund for peacekeeping.

-- Our first opportunity for such consultation may come next week. Unfortunately, it will involve MINURSO (Western Sahara), an operation viewed by many on the Hill as fundamentally flawed and by some as a prime example of UN mismanagement. Congress even passed a rescission of MINURSO's remaining FY-95 funds, but the President vetoed the bill. Since it was due to close in 1995 we have no money budget for FY-96. If we extend MINURSO without adequate consultation with Congress and a plan for how we will pay, we can expect a Congressional reaction similar to that we saw last week.

-- We will also need to explain our decision on funding the RRF.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	For Sandy Berger from Nelson Drew. Subject: June 13 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9520755. (5 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2720

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. draft	Revised French/British Draft Statement. (2 pages)	06/09/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [6]

2013-0687-F

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9

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 12, 1995

MEMORANDUM TO: THE DEPUTIES COMMITTEE

FROM: The Peacekeeping Core Group

SUBJECT: Paying for Expanded UN Operations in Bosnia

The PCG proposes the following policy on the issue of the funding the expansion of UN operations in Bosnia:

1. The US will support the expansion of UN forces in and around Bosnia by approximately 10,000 forces, which will be under UN command and for which costs will be assessed as a UN operation.
2. Toward that end, the US will support a Security Council resolution to increase the ceiling of the peacekeeping force as necessary (the ceiling needs to be increased by 6000 to permit an addition to the force of 10,000).
3. The US will assist the expanded force by providing lift, equipment and support for that equipment, on a reimbursable basis with the UN. The US will also provide intelligence and close air support on a non-reimbursable basis.
4. The assessed cost to the US of the expanded UN force will be assumed by the State Department (150 account CIPA funds). Although the cost for the expanded UN force is not certain yet, it may exceed \$150 million per year above the cost of the previously existing force. There are currently no funds in FY95 of FY96 to cover this expense. State will, however, consult with Congress about ways in which to appropriate such funds.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. cable	re: June 12: Resolution on Proposed Rapid Reaction Force. (7 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [6]

2013-0687-F

vz2720

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. draft	U.S. Suggested Changes to the French/UK Draft Resolution. (1 page)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [6]

2013-0687-F
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REPORT TO CONGRESS OF POSSIBLE PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN SUPPORT OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

Pursuant to section 407(a)(5) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994-1995, P.L. 103-236, this report provides notification of the possibility that the United States may provide assistance to the United Nations in support of its peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia.

As was briefed to certain members and staff on March 20 and April 21, the Administration has authorized the prepositioning in Croatia of 20 U.S. military communicators as part of a NATO group of 80 persons. Our senior military commanders recommended this action as an essential step to ensure that a communications network is in place to support NATO should a decision be made to assist in the withdrawal of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) from Bosnia. The Department of Defense has informed us that the cost of sustaining these 20 communicators and associated equipment in Croatia for a period of six months will not exceed one million dollars. The cost of this prepositioning did not, therefore, pass the formal notification threshold. The U.S. expense for this deployment will be borne by the Department of Defense.

NATO planning also calls for a follow-on precautionary repositioning in Croatia of about 1,500 communicators and support staff, of which it is anticipated the U.S. would provide approximately 460 persons. The purpose of this step is to complete the preparations for the communications network begun by the earlier group of 80 persons, to be ready to be used should the decision be made for NATO assistance in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We are discussing with our NATO allies how the full cost of the predeployment is to be shared. We are not seeking reimbursement. We anticipate that the costs to the U.S. government will exceed the notification threshold of \$3 million.

The decision to deploy the 1500-person group has not yet been taken.

These precautionary steps do not represent any change in the U.S. position that UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia. Prudent planning to ensure the efficient and safe withdrawal of UNPROFOR, if necessary, can help convince troop contributors to maintain their commitment to UNPROFOR. NATO's military authorities advise that this repositioning is essential to maintain NATO command and control over a withdrawal operation.

I shall provide notification in a subsequent message of other possible U.S. steps to provide assistance to UN peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, in light of recent developments.

REPORT TO CONGRESS OF POSSIBLE PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN SUPPORT OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

Pursuant to section 407 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994-1995, P.L. 103-236, this report provides notification of the possibility that the United States may provide assistance to the United Nations to support peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. This could include assistance in connection with either a withdrawal of UN related personnel from Bosnia, or an emergency extraction of UNPROFOR units from positions which have become untenable to positions elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia which are safe, or the establishment of a rapid reaction force.

The Administration has previously discussed possible assistance to UNPROFOR with certain members and staff of the designated Congressional committees in phone calls on March 20, April 21, and May 29. Staff were also briefed on March 31 and Members on May 19 and May 26. ~~On June 9,~~ we ^{are} submitted ^{ing} a *separate* notification with respect to prepositioning of communicators and support staff in Croatia as a precautionary step in case withdrawal became necessary.

NATO planning for a possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR calls in addition for early action involving training and exercises, preparations for a possible deployment of NATO forces, and acquisition of communications equipment that would be NATO owned, but which could be used in a possible evacuation of UN forces. We are discussing with our NATO allies how the full cost of the predeployment is to be shared. We are not seeking reimbursement. We anticipate that the costs to the U.S. government will exceed the notification threshold of \$3 million.

As was made clear in the briefings on May 19 and 26, and in the statement released after the May 29 meeting of the Contact Group, the Administration strongly supports UNPROFOR's continued operation in Bosnia. No final decision has been made on U.S. participation in a withdrawal, beyond the initial deployment of 20 personnel. The President informed our Allies last December, however, that the U.S. is prepared, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation to assist UN Peace Forces to withdraw from the former Yugoslavia if the UN decides that it can no longer perform its mission and requests NATO's help in withdrawing, and if the North Atlantic Council approves acting on the UN request. This action would also extend to helping in an emergency extraction of UN Peace Forces from positions which have become untenable to positions of safety within the former Yugoslavia.

-2-

Should an UNPROFOR withdrawal or partial withdrawal be necessary, a deployment in which the U.S. would provide a substantial number of troops and other assistance could be authorized. We are discussing with our NATO allies how this cost would be shared. We are also discussing within the Administration how the U.S. will fund its share of the operation.

We have also joined the Contact Group call for a reinforced UNPROFOR. While we do not contemplate any new U.S. role in UNPROFOR, we might join and assist in a NATO effort, if requested, to make UNPROFOR more robust and more defensible.

Our allies in NATO, and in particular France and Britain, which already have troops on the ground in Bosnia and some of whose peacekeeping forces have been taken hostage by the Bosnian Serbs, have proposed the creation of a rapid reaction force that would protect and support the peacekeepers. At this time, it is contemplated that the force would be authorized as part of UNPROFOR by the Security Council in a resolution. The U.S. is prepared to provide appropriate assistance and support, for such a force. This could logically include, for example, close air support to assist in the defense of the force; transfer or loan of equipment, including attack helicopters, radars, communications gear and night vision equipment; airlift support to move forces and equipment to the theater of operation; and provision of intelligence to local commanders. The modalities for creating and deploying such a force are at a formative stage, and we are now discussing this matter within NATO and bilaterally. At this time, until we have determined the precise elements of the support and the terms on which it would be provided, a reliable estimate of its cost is not available.

short of
ground
forces,

The Administration intends to continue to consult with the Congress on assistance to UN peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia. As the situation develops, we will provide the Congress with more detailed information about U.S. assistance and support through consultations and the monthly reports submitted under section 407.

George F. Ward, Jr.
Acting Assistant Secretary
International Organization Affairs

RTW
5/3/95
C-056UP A378
INHOUSEP89

07-Jun-95

SUMMARY
U.S. Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities
(Dollars in Thousands)

30.49% / 25.0%

Contribution to UN Force/Region	1994 Actual	1995 Estimate 1/	1995 Supplemental	1995 Bills 2/ Received	(Paid)	FY1996 Budget Request
UNDOF	6,288	13,581		6,994	(6,994)	8,884
Golan Heights						
UNIFIL	42,950	44,797		20,488	(20,488)	38,898
Lebanon						
UNIKOM	3,343	-	5,856	1,985		3,428
Iraq/Kuwait						
UNAVEM II	10,273	89,158		6,970	(6,970)	112,872
Angola						
MINURSO	-	17,810	10,000			-
Sahara						
ONUSAL	8,834	5,832				-
El Salvador						-
UNTAC	26,148	4,603				-
Cambodia						
UNPROFOR	459,722	163,748	506,049	398,870		211,403
Yugoslavia						
UNOSOM II	330,883	18,837	150,000	84,004		-
Somalia						
ONUMOZ	110,724	26,648		10,778	(10,778)	-
Mozambique						
UNFICYP	-	6,700		2,931	(2,931)	5,788
Cyprus						
UNMIH	464	58,177		48,858	(25,433)	-
Haiti						
UNOMIG	1,784	8,428		3,071	(5,071)	5,310
Georgia						
UNAMIR	1,107	72,601		45,384	(24,613)	47,250
Rwanda						
UNOMUR	32,874	-				
Rwanda						
UNMOT		1,514		888		1,386
Tajikistan						
UNOMIL	12,251	12,000		3,274	(3,274)	10,000
Liberia						
Subtotal	1,050,716	610,212	672,000	842,264	(106,551)	446,000
Advance Payments	20,882	23,092				
Total	1,071,607	633,304	672,000	842,264	(106,551)	446,000

NOTE: 1/ Includes \$180,074 mil for 1994 outstanding bills.
2/ New bills in FY 1996.

DOD REQUEST FOR FY-96 IS \$65 million
for HAITI + MACEDONIA. IT ^{PROBABLY} WILL NOT
BE FUNDED

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(Dollars in Millions)

FY 1995 (at 30.4 percent rate)

Current Bills Outstanding (Covers up to
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Estimates of UNPROFOR Reimbursements Earned
(Dollars in Millions)

<u>Period 10/1/94 - 3/31/95</u>	<u>UN Total</u>	<u>European Share</u>	<u>UK/French Share</u>
Military Personnel and Contingent Owned Eqpmt	454.8	259.2	95.5

Basis for calculations: European forces amount to 57 percent of UNPROFOR total and UK/French forces amount to 21 percent.

Source: "Financing of United Nations Protection Force,"
A/49/540 Add. 2 (3 May 1995).

6/16/95

USG Funding/Assistance for the Former Yugoslavia
International Affairs Budget (Function 150)
\$ in Millions

<u>Budget Account</u>	<u>FY 1994 Actual</u>	<u>FY 1995 Estimate</u>	<u>FY 1996 Request</u>	<u>Outlay Rate</u>
Contrib. for Intl. Peacekeeping (CIPA - assessed)				100%
UNPROFOR	459.7	153.7 ¹¹	211.4	
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO - voluntary)				69%
Sanctions Asst. Monitors (Serbia)	11.2	17.0	23.0	
War Crimes Tribunal	3.0	—	—	
Humanitarian Assistance:				
Disaster Assistance	30.6	40.0 ¹²	N/A ¹³	25%
Food Aid (PL 480 Title II)	95.7	58.0	N/A ¹³	64%
Migration & Refugees (MRA)	85.4	61.9	54.1	75%
Support for Eastern European				
Democracies (SEED)	43.3	59.6	114.9	5%
Food Aid (PL 480 Title I - Croatia)	10.0	0.0	0.0	57%
Economic Support Funds (Macedonia)	5.0	0.0	0.0	25% ¹⁴
TOTAL, FUNCTION 150	<u>743.9</u>	<u>390.2</u>	<u>403.4</u>	

¹¹ Supplemental request of \$506 million for UNPROFOR not appropriated by Congress.

¹² \$14.8 million in disaster assistance spent as of 6/15/95.

¹³ Estimates of allocations are not made in advance of fiscal year for emergency programs.

¹⁴ Outlay rate for Israeli ESF equals 100%.

1994 Unreimbursed Expenditures for Peacekeeping-related Activities in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Data were provided by contributing nations and may not reflect the same assumptions or accounting methods.

The Netherlands

Operation Sharp Guard: \$14.6 million

TOTAL: \$14.6 million

France

UNPROFOR: \$430 million

UAV* overflights: \$79.3 million

UAV from Istrana \$20.8 million

ECMM \$1.4 million

TOTAL: \$531.5 million**

Britain

UNPROFOR \$203.8 million

Operation Deny Flight \$41.2 million

Operation Sharp Guard \$3.1 million

Carrier Group \$31 million

ECMM \$5 million

ICFY Border Mission \$.62 million

Sanctions Assistance Mission \$.5 million

TOTAL: \$285.22 million

**Total reported contributions during 1994 were \$843.5 million, less \$96 million in reimbursements from the UN; reimbursement figures were not broken out by operation.

A glossary of operations is shown on the next page.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

FRY: Former Republic of Yugoslavia

Sharp Guard: WEU & NATO-enforced blockade of FRY ports on the Adriatic Sea (1993-present)

ECMM: European Community Monitoring Mission, monitoring in the FRY (1992-present)

Deny Flight: NATO-enforced "no-fly" zone over Bosnia (1993-present)

UNPROFOR: United Nations Protection Force (in FRY & FYROM, 1992-present)

ICFY Border Mission: International Conference on Former Yugoslavia mission to monitor closure of the Serbia-Montenegro/Bosnia-Herzegovina border (1994-present)

Sanctions Assistance Mission: OSCE Sanctions Assistance Mission (SAMCOMM) to monitor sanctions along the Danube River in the FRY (1993-95)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

NON-REIMBURSED CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPINGIntroduction

The attached matrix shows contributions reported by twelve countries, including the United States, to peacekeeping activities conducted in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions. The matrix intends to provide a "snapshot" of calendar year 1994.

The criteria used in compiling this matrix were: (1) that the funds spent were not part of a country's regular or peacekeeping assessments for the UN; (2) that calculations of funds contributed used an "incremental" cost-basis (meaning the cost over and above what the country would have paid to maintain its troops/equipment had they not participated in an operation); and (3) that the operation(s) supported related directly to UN Security Council-authorized peacekeeping.

The list does not reflect contributions which were more humanitarian than peacekeeping in nature. Contributions for CIVPOL, demining, infrastructure rebuilding, economic assistance and other activities not directly related to peacekeeping are not shown in this matrix.

Each country provided this cost data in its own format, e.g. expenditures over a two-year period, expenditures during a particular fiscal year, etc. Thus the figures shown are, in some cases, our extrapolations for calendar year 1994. There may also be unrecognized differences among countries' accounting methods or definitions of terms such as "incremental" that could skew their figures.

A glossary is provided at the back of this document to assist readers with unfamiliar acronyms and operations.

Office of Peacekeeping and
Humanitarian Operations,
Bureau of International
Organizations Affairs

April 11, 1995

NON-REIMBURSED CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING
(for NATO Countries plus Japan, Australia)

Costs shown are estimates or actuals for fiscal or calendar year 1994.
ALL AMOUNTS ARE SHOWN IN U.S. DOLLARS.

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>Operation or Purpose</u>	<u>Amount Spent</u>	<u>Reimbursement from UN, if any</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>Total</u>
Belgium					
	FRY Sharp Guard	6.8 million	None	6.8 million	
	FRY ECMM	1.25 million	None	1.25 million	
	Haiti (peacekeeping)	1.1 million	None	1.1 million	
	UNAMIR (airlift and training, Malawi battalion)	1.6 million	None	1.6 million	
					10,750,000.
The Netherlands					
	Iraq Deny Flight	36.3 million	None	36.3 million	
	FRY Sharp Guard	14.6 million	None	14.6 million	
					50,900,000.

Costs shown are estimates or actuals for fiscal or calendar year 1994.
ALL AMOUNTS ARE SHOWN IN U.S. DOLLARS.

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>Operation or Purpose</u>	<u>Amount Spent</u>	<u>Reimbursement from UN, if any</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>Total</u>
France	MINURSO	363,000	See below	See below	
	UNIFIL	21 million	"	"	
	UNIKOM	5.3 million	"	"	
	UNTSO	1 million	"	"	
	UNOMIG	34,000	"	"	
	UNPROFOR	430 million	"	"	
	UNMIL	1.3 million	"	"	
	ONUSAL	505,000	"	"	
	Observers (in UNIKOM, MINURSO, UNTSO)	3.7 million	"	"	
	Iraq Southern Watch	81 million	"	"	
	Rwanda Operation Turquoise	195 million	"	"	
	Somalia Restore Hope	2.8 million	"	"	
	FRY UAV* overflights	79.3 million	"	"	
	FRY UAV from Istrana	20.8 million	"	"	
	FRY ECMM	1.4 million	"	"	
	*Unmanned aerial vehicle		96 million	747,502,000.	747,502,000.

page three. NON-REIMBURSED CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING

Costs shown are estimates or actuals for fiscal or calendar year 1994.
ALL AMOUNTS ARE SHOWN IN U.S. DOLLARS.

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>Operation or Purpose</u>	<u>Amount Spent</u>	<u>Reimbursement from UN, if any</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>Total</u>
Greece	UNFICYP	6.5 million	None	6.5 million	6,500,000.
	Plus small (under 100,000) contributions to other PKOs.				
Norway	Peacekeeping	110.5 million	16.8 million	93.7 million	93,700,000.
Japan	UNPROFOR Assistance Trust Fund	330,000	None	330,000	
	ONUMIDEZ	10.2 million	None	10.2 million	
	UNTAC (security for UNTAC personnel)	1.1 million	None	1.1 million	
	UNAMIR	3 million	None	3 million	
					14,630,000.

Costs shown are estimates or actuals for fiscal or calendar year 1994.
ALL AMOUNTS ARE SHOWN IN U.S. DOLLARS.

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>Operation or Purpose</u>	<u>Amount Spent</u>	<u>Reimbursement from UN, if any</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>Total</u>
Britain					
	FRY UNPROFOR	203.8 million	None	203.8 million	
	FRY Deny Flight	41.2 million	None	41.2 million	
	FRY Sharp Guard	3.1 million	None	3.1 million	
	FRY Carrier Group	31 million	None	31 million	
	FRY ECM4	5 million	None	5 million	
	FRY ICFY Border Mission	620,000	None	620,000	
	FRY Sanctions Assistance Mission	500,000	None	500,000	
	UNFICYP	44.2 million	None	44.2 million	
	Iraq Southern Watch	18.3 million	None	18.3 million	
					347,720,000.

Costs shown are estimates or actuals for fiscal or calendar year 1994.
ALL AMOUNTS ARE SHOWN IN U.S. DOLLARS.

COUNTRY	Operation or Purpose	Amount Spent	Reimbursement from UN, if any	Difference	Total
U.S.	FRY	289 million	None	289 million	
	Haiti - MNF	196.8 million	None	196.8 million	
	Haiti - Sanctions	65.8 million	None	65.8 million	
	Somalia	528 million	None	528 million	
	Iraq Southern Watch	333 million	None	333 million	
					1,412,600,000.
Italy	UNOSOM/UNITAF/ ONUMOZ (contributions above assessments)	453 million	None	453 million	
	FRY ECMM	6.6 million	None	6.6 million	
					459,600,000.

ADDITIONAL SUPPORT, NOT QUANTIFIED: USE OF ITALIAN AIRFIELDS IN SUPPORT OF UNPROFOR;
INTERDICTION FORCES IN THE ADRIATIC SEA; USE OF ITALIAN BASES AT PISA AND BRINDISI IN SUPPORT
OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

page six. NON-REIMBURSED CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING

Costs shown are estimates or actuals for fiscal or calendar year 1994.

ALL AMOUNTS ARE SHOWN IN U.S. DOLLARS.

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>Operation or Purpose</u>	<u>Amount Spent</u>	<u>Reimbursement from UN, if any</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>Total</u>
Germany	FRY UN Monitoring Mission	5.8 million	None	5.8 million	
	FRY WEU/Danube Operation	2.6 million	None	2.6 million	
	FRY Sanctions Assistance Missions	1.2 million	None	1.2 million	
	FRY ICFY Border Mission	364,000	None	364,000	
	FRY Sharp Guard	36.2 million	None	36.2 million	
	UNPROFOR Equipment	11.4 million	None	11.4 million	
					57,564,000.
Australia	Peacekeeping **	15.5 million	2 million	13.5 million	13,500,000.

** Not including costs for MIF participation.

page seven. NON-REIMBURSED CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING

Costs shown are estimates or actuals for fiscal or calendar year 1994.
ALL AMOUNTS ARE SHOWN IN U.S. DOLLARS.

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>Operation or Purpose</u>	<u>Amount Spent</u>	<u>Reimbursement from UN, if any</u>	<u>Difference</u>	<u>Total</u>
Canada	UNPROFOR	99.1 million	44.2 million	54.9 million	
	FRY Sharp Guard	6.5 million	None	6.5 million	
	UNDOF	3.4 million	2.8 million	600,000	
	UNTSO	536,000	None	536,000	
	UNAMIR	18.2 million	17.7 million	500,000	
	UNITAF	8.5 million	None	8.5 million	
	UNFICYP	1.1 million	893,000	207,000	
	ONUMOZ	179,000	None	179,000	
	MINURSO	179,000	179,000	None	
					71,922,000.

(NOTE: \$71,922,000 is exclusive of all UN assessments; amounts spent reflect only incremental costs. Additionally, Canada participated in or otherwise supported the following operations: ECOM (FRY), DEMY FLIGHT (FRY), UNSCOM, UNIKOM. In these operations, Canada either incurred no incremental costs or costs were met by UN reimbursements.

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GLOSSARY:
NON-REIMBURSED PEACEKEEPING CONTRIBUTIONS MATRIX

FRY: Former Republic of Yugoslavia

FYROM: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Sharp Guard: WEU & NATO-enforced blockade of FRY ports on the Adriatic Sea (1993-present)

ECMM: European Community Monitoring Mission, monitoring in the FRY (1992-present)

UNAMIR: United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (1993-present)

Deny Flight: NATO-enforced "no-fly" zone over Bosnia (1993-present)

MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (1991-present)

UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (1978-present)

UNIKOM: United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (1991-present)

UNTSO: United Nations Treaty Supervision Operation (Jerusalem, 1948-present)

UNOMIG: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (1993-present)

UNPROFOR: United Nations Protection Force (in FRY & FYROM, 1992-present)

UNMIH: United Nations Mission in Haiti (1995-present)

ONUSAL: United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (1991-present)

Southern Watch: U.S. military-enforced "no-fly" zone in southern Iraq (1992-present)

Operation Turquoise: French-led multinational coalition force to safeguard civilians in southwest Rwanda and eastern Zaire (1994)

Restore Hope: U.S. military relief mission in Somalia (1992-93)

UNFICYP: United Nations Force in Cyprus (1964-present)

ONUMOZ: United Nations Operation in Mozambique (1992-94)

UNTAC: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (1992-1993)

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Glossary

-2-

ICFY Border Mission: International Conference on Former Yugoslavia mission to monitor closure of the Serbia-Montenegro/Bosnia-Herzegovina border (1994-present)

MNF: Multinational Force, U.S.-led coalition force in Haiti (1994-5)

UNITAF: United Nations Interim Task Force (Somalia, 1992-93)

UN Monitoring Mission: part of UNPROFOR (see above)

WEU/Danube Operation: OSCE Sanctions Assistance Mission (SAMCOMM) to monitor sanctions along the Danube River in the FRY (1993-95)

UNDOF: United Nations Observer Force on the Golan Heights (1974-present)

UNSCOM: United Nations Special Commission, monitoring Iraqi compliance with UN Security Council resolutions regarding weapons of mass destruction (1991-present)