Case Number: 2013-0687-F

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Folder Title: Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [5]				
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	Breaking the Siege of Sarajevo. (5 pages)	06/19/1995	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake and Patrick Griffin. Subject: Response to Letter from Senator McGovern. Record ID: 9504559. (2 pages)	06/19/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Nelson Drew. Subject: OPLAN 40104 FORCEPREP Information. Record ID: 9504705. (1 page)	06/20/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: FORCEREP Notification for NATO OPLAN 40104. Record ID: 9504705. (1 page)	06/20/1995	P1/b(1)
004. memo	For Anthony Lake from Nelson Drew. Assessment of Jimmy Carter's Testimony. Record ID: 9504691. (2 pages)	06/19/1995	P1/b(1)
005. memcon	President's Pull-Aside Meeting with UK Prime Minister John Major in Halifax. Record ID: 9504665. (3 pages)	06/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [5]

2013-0687-F
vz2719

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 19, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AV

FROM: NELSON DREW ND

SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Karadzic Letters

The attached memorandum for the President analyzes the letters from Karadzic to the President and Jimmy Carter, and recommends that the President sign a letter thanking George McGovern for transmitting Karadzic's message, but that he decline to respond directly to Karadzic, and instead authorize Sandy Berger to provide input to former President Carter for use in an unofficial response.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Presidential Letter of Thanks to Senator McGovern
Tab B Letter from George McGovern to the President
Tab C Letter from Bosnian Serb President Karadzic
Tab D Letter to Jimmy Carter from Karadzic
Tab E Carter Testimony to Congress

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By Van Tobin NARA, Date 6/3/2014
2013-0687-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Senator McGovern:

Thank you for passing on the letter from Bosnian-Serb President Karadzic. It is always beneficial to maintain open channels of communication when seeking to resolve situations as complex as those confronting us in Bosnia. In this case, unfortunately, Karadzic seems to be seeking an end to the international isolation of the Bosnian-Serbs without offering any new elements in his negotiating posture. In particular, he continues to seek a solution that would destroy Bosnia-Herzegovina's territorial integrity by recognizing the sovereignty of his self-styled "Serbian Republic."

Nevertheless, like you, I intend to look carefully at any proposal that might lead to a successful and honorable negotiated solution to this conflict, and I appreciate your passing along Karadzic's message.

Sincerely,

The Honorable George McGovern
1730 M Street, N.W., Suite 512
Washington, D.C. 20036

4559.

6/13
Tonylake

George McGovern
1730 M Street, N.W., Suite 512
Washington, D.C. 20036
Tel: (202) 296-6767
Fax: (202) 296-5791

Hand delivered by Geo. McGovern staff to Sandy Vershbow

cc: Tilelli

June 13, 1995

President Bill Clinton
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

For many years I have been a close friend of Mr. Daniel Boyer--a prominent American businessman living in Geneva who has served as Chairman of Democrats Abroad in Europe. He is a Yugoslavian by birth and was a hero in the Yugoslav resistance to the Nazis in World War II. He is a close friend and advisor of Cyrus Vance on Yugoslavian matters.

Mr. Boyer has conveyed to me a letter addressed to you from the Bosnian Serb leader Mr. Karadzik suggesting that you convene a Camp David style conference to negotiate a settlement of the Bosnian crisis.

I do not have the expertise to evaluate Mr. Karadzik's proposal, but I pass it on for your consideration. My own bias leads me to take a careful look at any proposal that might lead to successful and honorable negotiations rather than continued conflict and a larger war.

Sincerely,

George McGovern

РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА
ПРЕДСЕДНИК РЕПУБЛИКЕ
САРАЈЕВО

REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
SARAJEVO

To: Bill Clinton, President, USA

8 June 1995

Dear Mr. President,

I am taking the liberty of appealing to you as the only person who can save the world from the bloody war that is looming ahead.

In 1917 R.G.D. Laffan, a British historian, wrote of us, "If ever a nation bought its union and its liberty with blood and tears, the Serbs have paid that price. For five hundred years they have never been content to submit to slavery, but have unceasingly struggled towards the light". We have not changed since 1917. The price we paid during the Second World War and under Tito s communism was enormous, but we are still prepared to fight and die for our liberty. There should be no mistake about that.

But, like people everywhere, we prefer peace. Americans and Serbs have always been friends and were brothers-in-arms in both world wars. The Serbian people cannot understand why America has turned against them. We hope that some day Americans will come to understand our position.

Serbs have lived in Bosnia for centuries, but are now accused of invading our own land. We did not want to separate from Yugoslavia and, indeed, under the Bosnian constitution, separation, should not have been possible without the consent of the Serbian community, one third of the population. What has been done has been done, however, and we are willing to live along side of the Bosnian Muslims as we have done for years, but we cannot live under Muslim rule and eventually Islamic law.

The media likes to talk of the liberal "multicultural" attitude of the Bosnian Muslims, but Mr Izetbegovic s writings show all too clearly that he and his associates will lead Bosnia down the path of Islamic fundamentalism, Iranian style. When the Shah left Iran, he was not succeeded by Ayatollah Khomeini, but by the liberal secular government of Shahpur Bakhtiar. The world knows what happened to that government, to Mr. Bakhtiar, and to Iran. The fate of Bosnia will be the same.

Whether the majority of Bosnian Muslims want to live in such a society is for them to decide. We do not want to, but we realize that we are neighbors and that a way of living side by side must be established.

What we ask of you, Sir, is to call for a "Camp David" style conference, inviting all parties to the conflict as well as representatives of the international community. We can promise you that in a short time all problems can be settled, peace signed, and normal multinational cooperation established in the Balkans, leading eventually to the region becoming part of the European Union.

We have been so many times close to a peace agreement that only questions of detail remain to be solved. However, for nearly a year no one has talked to us. The "contact group" is traveling from one place to another in Europe, contacting only themselves, and ignoring us who administer 70% of Bosnian territory, who have an army, police, schools, universities, our own currency, a well-organized judicial system, a freely elected parliament and government, etc. We are grateful that our Serbian brothers in Yugoslavia are negotiating for us, but it is our lives that are in the balance and nothing can be done without our acceptance.

If negotiations are not resumed, we are heading for a totally unnecessary war in which the United States will inevitably be involved. Already we are seeing a military build-up along the borders of former Yugoslavia and soon one force will be sent in to help another force, just as in Vietnam. No one can win, and the suffering will be immense on all sides.

I am fully aware that your government believes us to be in the wrong. The American Ambassador to the United Nations, Mrs. Albright, has called for "punishment of the Serbs". She has predecessors in wanting to "punish the Serbs". In 1914 the Austro-Hungarian Empire sent what it called a "punitive expedition" against Serbia. Austria and its ally, the German Empire, were convinced they would make a short day a work of their little neighbor. Millions died, including Americans. In 1941 Hitler, in what he called "Operation Just Punishment", launched his attempt to destroy Serbia as a nation. Like Austria he failed. The Serbs have shown we can take punishment and still fight back. We will do so again if we must. We may die, but we will not die alone.

Once again, Mr. President, we urge you to call a peace conference before it is too late. If peace is signed, there will be no need for ever-increasing forces in the Balkans. The United Nations can go home. It will regain its respectability and the United States will earn the gratitude, not only of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, but of the world. You will be remembered in history as the President who saved peace at the last moment, not as one who stumbled into war.

President John Kennedy, in an address at Arlington Cemetery on November 11, 1961, said, "No man who has witnessed the tragedies of the last war, no man who can imagine the unimaginable possibilities of the next war, can advocate war out of irritability or frustration or impatience."

I hope you will ponder his words. America has no vital interests in Bosnia; its people have no quarrel with the Serbs. If war is started, it will be as General Shalikashvili said after the NATO bombing last month, out of frustration and impatience.

Had President Kennedy lived, many believe he would have stopped the escalation in Vietnam and its dreadful consequences for America and the Vietnamese people. An unfair destiny prevented him. You, however, can stop this war.

Yours sincerely,

РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА ПРЕДСЕДНИК РЕПУБЛИКЕ

Dr Radovan Karadzic
President of the Republic of Srpska

РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА
ПРЕДСЕДНИК РЕПУБЛИКЕ
САРАЈЕВО

REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
SARAJEVO

To: President Jimmy Carter

7 June 1995

Dear President Carter,

Because of the pressure of work over the past few weeks I have been unable to keep in touch with you. Let me inform you straight away that we would like you to visit the Republic of Srpska again, hopefully very soon. You may well be able to get the peace process off the ground, but it is important to spell out our position very clearly. This is that we are ready to negotiate, with the Plan of the Contact Group as the basis for negotiations of all points. We are also ready, for the sake of achieving peace immediately, to be flexible on the territorial issue. As a sovereign and independent state, we may accept to form ties with the Muslim-Croat Federation. To be more specific on this point I attach a list of five principles which, if the Muslim-Croat Federation accepts, as we already do, can serve as the way of restarting real peace negotiations at once.

You should also know that we are not in a position to accept any new, temporary cessation of hostilities. We want a permanent one. Therefore, as soon as agreement is reached on recommencing peace talks, we propose reinstating the cessation of hostilities agreement of 31 December 1994, which was the result of your efforts and which would now be on a permanent basis.

We cannot make any further concessions. Accordingly, at least in public your visit must not be seen as an ambitious attempt to resolve this conflict because the possibility of failure is not inconsiderable. Therefore, should you embark on another trip to Pale, we recommend that you should describe it as a fact-finding mission. My hope of course is that your visit can achieve a breakthrough.

I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Yours sincerely,

Dr Radovan Karadzic
President, Republic of Srpska

РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА

Proposed Principles for the negotiations

1. During the negotiations there will be defined the form of ties between the Republic of Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2. There shall be equal and balanced treatment of the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3. The territorial proposals of the Contact Group will be open to changes in order to benefit the interests of both parties.

4. Each party would have the right to establish special parallel arrangements with the neighbouring countries, in contrast with the integrity of the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina.

5. The full observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in international instruments will be respected, including the right of refugees and other displaced persons to return to their homes of origin with the assistance in the overall process.

6/14 Sandy V—
Carter's testimony.
What is our response
to his proposals?

Senate testimony about Bosnia-Herzegovina:

Although I have been invited on a number of occasions since leaving the White House, this is the first time I have come to Washington to testify before a Congressional committee. I agreed to do so only after consulting with General John Galvin, whose unique experience and interest in the Balkan region is strongly complementary to my own and whose views seem to be basically compatible. We feel that our joint testimony might be helpful in finding a way to bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We are here as private citizens, with no authority to speak for others and with no desire to be critical of our own government or others who are attempting to prevent violence in the area and to protect innocent people.

We also want to make it clear that we do not excuse or condone any of the human rights abuses, violations of ceasefires, taking of hostages, or failure to comply with United Nations resolutions by any of the combatants in the area.

I have been asked to speak first, and will outline briefly my own recent involvement in the region, since this is the basis for my later recommendations.

At The Carter Center we monitor regularly the world's conflicts, attempting to understand their history, the primary participants, issues that are currently in dispute, and efforts that are being made to resolve them. We receive many requests from active or potential combatants for assistance, but our policy is to encourage mediation by others, and not to duplicate their efforts or compete with them.

When we believe it advisable to accept one of these mediation requests in a sensitive political arena, we first assure that we have the approval of the President of the United States and, when appropriate, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. When our proposal is not accepted, we do not act. We have received such approval in a number of cases, including Nicaragua, Somalia, Liberia, North Korea, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Haiti, and the Sudan.

We constantly face one of two basic questions that make mediation difficult and sometimes unpopular:

How to correlate the inviolability of a nation's sovereignty with self-determination for minority groups?

How to deal with leaders who are condemned by our government if they are the only ones who can resolve a crisis and prevent further human suffering?

In our work we are always careful to comply with U.S. policy and with any pertinent resolutions of the United Nations. We do not ask for official status or authority, and always submit any potential agreements to our government for final approval and further action.

We have followed these guidelines meticulously in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Last year, on December 7, I was asked by the Bosnian Serb leader, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, to receive a delegation from him. He said that many demands were being made of the Serbs and he had not been able to discuss his responses with anyone in authority.

After calling President Bill Clinton and obtaining his approval, on December 14 I received a three-person delegation at my home in Plains. After extensive discussions, a

tentative agreement was reached that I would go to Bosnia-Herzegovina provided the Serbs would a) release unilaterally all prisoners of war who were less than 19 years old and mutually exchange all other POWs with the government officials in Sarajevo, b) permit United Nations convoys to deliver relief supplies to Sarajevo and other safe havens, c) impose a cease-fire around Sarajevo, d) open the airport there to United Nations flights, and e) guarantee respect for human rights.

By telephone, I confirmed this commitment with Dr. Karadzic and also shared the information with President Clinton, who approved the agreement. Dr. Karadzic then offered to confirm his promises publicly and asked that CNN permit him to do so through a televised live interview.

Following briefings from State Department and White House officials and after being informed by them that the Serb promises to me were "substantially fulfilled," my wife Rosalynn and I traveled to the area, arriving first in Zagreb on December 18. There we met with Croatian President Tudjman and U.N. officials and then proceeded to Sarajevo.

That evening we met with President Alija Izetbegovic and other officials of the Bosnia-Herzegovina government. Although at first skeptical of our mission, they seemed reassured when we explained that our goal was not to initiate a new agenda but to promote negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group plan. Approving this effort, they made it clear that they would accept a cease-fire for not more than three months.

Later that night I drafted what I considered to be a comprehensive cease-fire proposal, based on the discussions

with the Serb delegation in my home, my talks in Zagreb and Sarajevo, and briefings from U.S. and U.N. officials.

Before going to Pale, I requested of the Serbs that both Dr. Karadzic and the military commander, General Ratko Mladic, meet with me, to assure that whatever we evolved would have both political and military backing. Our negotiations in Pale included them and a number of other top Serb officials. We had some difficult moments, but finally concluded an agreement with some modifications of my original draft. Its terms included:

a) An immediate cease-fire and cessation of hostilities for at least four months, to be enforced by the interposition of United Nations forces.

b) The prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons that might damage people or property.

c) A comprehensive peace agrreement to be negotiated during this period, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties.

d) In all respects, both sides to be given equal treatment.

e) During this period, unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo, and the delivery of humanitarian services, with U.N. forces helping to assure that no armamemts or weapons of war are in the cargoes to be delivered.

f) Each side to be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. Special raporteurs are to have unimpeded access to insure compliance.

g) All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, to have the right to live in a location of their choice.

h) An early exchange of all detainees.

The Serbs agreed to negotiate in good faith on the basis of the Contact Group plan that requires a division of territory, with the Serbs to control 49% and the Muslim/Croat federation 51%. Mutually agreed modifications would be negotiated during the peace talks.

By telephone, I read this document to representatives of the State Department and White House and, with their approval, signed the document as a witness to the signatures of Doctor Karadzic and General Mladic. (Enclosure A.)

Back in Sarajevo the next morning, we obtained a closely parallel agreement with President Izetbegovic, with only one difference: a demand that the Serbs accept the 51/49% map as a prerequisite to peace talks. (Enclosure B.)

In order to clarify some issues and make implementation dates earlier and more specific, we returned then to Pale and concluded an additional agreement (Enclosure C.) Back in Sarajevo, President Izetbegovic accepted the additions.

Now we had common agreement for a temporary period of peace during the holidays, a 4-month cease-fire through the month of April, a cessation of hostilities between military forces of both sides with UNPROFOR to interpose its units between them, the withdrawal of government forces from the demilitarized zone on Mount Igman near the Sarajevo airport, an early exchange of all detainees, and an opportunity for the Contact Group to work with both sides to resolve any remaining issues.

I pointed out to the news media on my departure the only unresolved issue: Muslim/Croat officials were insisting that, as a prerequisite to peace talks, the Serbs would have to "accept" the 51/49% plan; the Serbs, on the other hand, were willing to negotiate "on the basis of" the same plan.

Since that time we have received reports from U.S. and U.N. officials and, with their approval, have maintained contact with leaders in the region.

The Bosnian Serbs have presented to us their own territorial proposal, reducing their controlled area from 70% to 53% and professing their willingness to negotiate the remaining differences. I understand that the Bosnian Serb proposal was provided to members of the Contact Group in March.

On one occasion in January, the full Contact Group did have one meeting with the Bosnian Serbs and the U.S. member visited Pale once or twice, but since then the Contact Group has isolated the Bosnian Serbs and maintained a policy of communicating only with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic on matters involving the Bosnian Serbs.

The end of the cease-fire period came at the end of April with no negotiations having been undertaken. Since then, as is well known by members of this committee, government forces have attacked from within the safe zones, the Serbs have responded with shelling, travel through the relief supply routes and the Sarajevo airport has been restricted, NATO planes have bombed Serb positions, hostages have been taken, and a higher level of conflict is now threatened.

The question is, where can we go from here? Although no one can guarantee ultimate results, there are two basic al-

ternatives: the escalation of military conflict or a determined attempt to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement.

The United Nations is facing an almost impossible dilemma, serving as a peace enforcer when there is no peace agreement. However, the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) has performed well, both with its humanitarian mission and also in reducing the level of fighting and the resulting casualties.

Some have called for a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by the U.S. to permit the Muslim-Croat federation to obtain weapons. Under these circumstances, the United Nations military commander has stated that his forces could not fulfill their mission, and both France and Great Britain have stated that their forces will be withdrawn. This would likely result in a much greater involvement of the United States in both military training and support, and an escalation in bloodshed in Bosnia. The war could also widen to Croatia, Serbia, or southward to Kosovo and Macedonia.

With an almost hopeless prospect for ending the crisis through military means, it is time to reassess the possibilities for a mediated settlement of basic issues. What should be the prerequisites for such negotiations?

If comprehensive peace talks without preconditions are not acceptable to the Contact Group, I believe a clear demonstration of good faith by both sides should be adequate. Proven performance of a practical nature can be required, such as those negotiated in December:

a) a cessation of hostilities and disengagement of armed forces,

b) freedom of movement of U.N. peacekeepers,

c) unrestricted movement of United Nations convoys to deliver relief supplies to Sarajevo and other safe havens,

d) the Sarajevo airport open to United Nations flights,

e) the release of all detainees,

f)human rights guarantees, including unrestricted return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

As earlier agreed by the Bosnian Serbs and Muslim-Croat federation officials in Sarajevo, there would be balanced and equal treatment of the two sides.

This period of peace might also include the lifting of United Nations trade sanctions against the Serbs as long as Serbia and the Bosnian groups act in good faith. This would be a powerful incentive for compliance.

Peace talks would best be held in a neutral place under the auspices of the United Nations or the Contact Group, and with an agenda that might include such constitutional issues as the degree of autonomy of the Muslim/Croatian and Serbian groups, mutually agreeable territorial divisions based on the 51/49 proposal of the Contact Group, and the right of special relationships with Serbia and Croatia.

Both sides, the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs, must be at the negotiating table. All those interested in peace, including the government of the United States, should urge both sides to seek a peaceful resolution of this continuing crisis.

Obviously, we cannot speak for any parties to the dispute or for those involved in peacekeeping, but there is every reason for exploring these ideas as a reasonable alternative to the existing deadlock and the strong possibility of another surge in bloodshed.

ENCLOSURE A.

December 19, 1994 Bosnian Serb Agreement

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

We the undersigned agree that we and those under our authority will:

1. Commence negotiations on an agreement for a cessation of hostilities on December 27, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 15, 1995. This agreement would be implemented immediately by instituting a cease-fire by interposition of U.N. forces along the line of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities and the exchange of prisoners, etc. This cessation of hostilities will last for four months or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.

2. We agree that, while the cessation of hostilities is in effect, we shall negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, with the proposal of the Contact Group as the basis for negotiation of all points. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties. All issues are to be resolved in full cooperation with the Contact Group. In all respects, both sides will be given equal treatment.

3. During this period there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may join with UNPROFOR inspectors to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.

4. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the total elimination and prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons of any kind that might be damaging to people or property.

5. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. International observers, including the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, will be free to observe compliance with this agreement.

ENCLOSURE B

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

We the undersigned agree that we and those under our authority will:

1. Immediately implement a cease-fire, monitored by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities and the exchange of prisoners, etc., as described below.

2. Commence negotiations on an agreement for a total cessation of hostilities on December 27, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 15, 1995. This cessation of hostilities will last for four months, or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.

3. While the cessation of hostilities is in effect, negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, on the basis of the acceptance of the peace plan of the Contact Group as a starting point. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties. All issues are to be resolved in full cooperation with the Contact Group.

It is understood that there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may join with UNPROFOR inspectors to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.

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There will be an early exchange of all detainees, under the auspices of the International Red Cross. In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC will have unimpeded access to all detainees to insure that the provisions of this agreement are fulfilled.

In a final agreement, all has to be agreed; otherwise, nothing is agreed.

It is realized that other difficult issues and unresolved questions will have to be resolved. This will be done peacefully, utilizing the services of the Contact Group or UNPROFOR as appropriate.

Signed 20 December 1994

Alija Izetbegovic
President

7 of 9

Jimmy Carter
Witness

ENCLOSURE C

20 December, 1994

Additional agreement to that of 19 Dec. 1994.

1) It is agreed that the negotiations to establish a total cessation of hostilities will commence on 23 December, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by 1 January 1995.

2) A complete cease-fire, throughout Bosnia-Herzogovina, will be implemented at noon, 23 December, 1994, to be monitored by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities.

3) Based on assurances that convoys and humanitarian services will pass freely, the Bosnian forces will withdraw from the Igman demilitarized zone in accordance with the existing agreement, prior to commencement of the negotiations described in item (1) above.

Ragovan Karadzic

Witnessed:
Jimmy Carter

[Note: Since we concluded this agreement during the last few minutes of our stay in Bosnia-Herzigovina, I received approval of all three of these items from President Izetbegovic by telephone from the airport before announcing them and departing.]

Proposed Principles for the Negotiations

(The gist)

1. During the negotiations there will be defeined the form of ties between the Serb Republic and the federation

2. Equal and balanced treatment of both parties

3. Territorial proposals of the Contact Group will be open to change in order to benefit the interests of both parties

4. Each party would have the right to establish special arrangements with the neighboring countries ...

5. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in international instruments...

TALKING POINTS FOR CALLS TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

US RESPONSE TO SHAPE REQUEST FOR PLANNING FORCES FOR OPLAN40104

As you know, in December of last year the President informed our Allies that the US is prepared, in principle, to commit US ground forces to a NATO operation to help UN peace forces withdraw from the Former Yugoslavia.

The President has also committed to consulting the Congress at every step of the planning and execution process.

The SACEUR on May 1 requested nations to identify forces required to implement the withdrawal plan. This is part of the ongoing process between SACEUR and nations enabling him to plan the required force structure, to identify the organization of forces, and to highlight any shortfalls. This call is to inform you that the US is responding to that request with a force list for planning of 24,688. This figure is below the 25,000 level publicly announced by the President and presented in briefings to the Congress. This figure does not include forces already in place in operations DENY FLIGHT, PROVIDE PROMISE, SHARP GUARD, those anticipated for operation DARING LION, or those support troops stationed in Europe.

This is not a commitment to participate in the withdrawal operation. That commitment requires a separate decision by the NAC (for which the US must consent) and a decision by the President, after consultation with Congress, that the US would participate. It does, however, indicate to NATO the forces the US would provide to an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation form Bosnia should those decisions be taken.

All other NATO nations have already submitted their responses. SACEUR has requested an expedited US response so that he can brief the NAC next Wednesday on responses to the NATO request for planning forces, and so he can continue refining plans and identify potential shortfalls in forces.

Our policy remains to do everything we can to keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia, and we have no requirement to begin withdrawal at this time. However, withdrawal planning must proceed. By identifying US forces to SACEUR we are supporting prudent military planning and preparations by the NATO Commander. It does not, however, represent any additional US commitment beyond what has already been stated previously in public and to the Congress--that, if we decided to participate in

a NATO-led withdrawal operation, we would be prepared to commit as many as 25,000 additional US land, air, maritime, and amphibious forces.

We will continue to keep you informed as withdrawal planning continues.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Nelson Drew. Subject: OPLAN 40104 FORCEPREP Information. Record ID: 9504705. (1 page)	06/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [5]

2013-0687-F
vz2719

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: FORCEREP Notification for NATO OPLAN 40104. Record ID: 9504705. (1 page)	06/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:
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We will continue to keep you informed as withdrawal planning continues.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	For Anthony Lake from Nelson Drew. Assessment of Jimmy Carter's Testimony. Record ID: 9504691. (2 pages)	06/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [5]

2013-0687-F
vz2719

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6/14 Sandy V—
Carter's testimony.
What is our response
to his proposals?

Senate testimony about Bosnia-Herzegovina:

Although I have been invited on a number of occasions since leaving the White House, this is the first time I have come to Washington to testify before a Congressional committee. I agreed to do so only after consulting with General John Galvin, whose unique experience and interest in the Balkan region is strongly complementary to my own and whose views seem to be basically compatible. We feel that our joint testimony might be helpful in finding a way to bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We are here as private citizens, with no authority to speak for others and with no desire to be critical of our own government or others who are attempting to prevent violence in the area and to protect innocent people.

We also want to make it clear that we do not excuse or condone any of the human rights abuses, violations of ceasefires, taking of hostages, or failure to comply with United Nations resolutions by any of the combatants in the area.

I have been asked to speak first, and will outline briefly my own recent involvement in the region, since this is the basis for my later recommendations.

At The Carter Center we monitor regularly the world's conflicts, attempting to understand their history, the primary participants, issues that are currently in dispute, and efforts that are being made to resolve them. We receive many requests from active or potential combatants for assistance, but our policy is to encourage mediation by others, and not to duplicate their efforts or compete with them.

When we believe it advisable to accept one of these mediation requests in a sensitive political arena, we first assure that we have the approval of the President of the United States and, when appropriate, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. When our proposal is not accepted, we do not act. We have received such approval in a number of cases, including Nicaragua, Somalia, Liberia, North Korea, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Haiti, and the Sudan.

We constantly face one of two basic questions that make mediation difficult and sometimes unpopular:

How to correlate the inviolability of a nation's sovereignty with self-determination for minority groups?

How to deal with leaders who are condemned by our government if they are the only ones who can resolve a crisis and prevent further human suffering?

In our work we are always careful to comply with U.S. policy and with any pertinent resolutions of the United Nations. We do not ask for official status or authority, and always submit any potential agreements to our government for final approval and further action.

We have followed these guidelines meticulously in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Last year, on December 7, I was asked by the Bosnian Serb leader, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, to receive a delegation from him. He said that many demands were being made of the Serbs and he had not been able to discuss his responses with anyone in authority.

After calling President Bill Clinton and obtaining his approval, on December 14 I received a three-person delegation at my home in Plains. After extensive discussions, a

tentative agreement was reached that I would go to Bosnia-Herzegovina provided the Serbs would a) release unilaterally all prisoners of war who were less than 19 years old and mutually exchange all other POWs with the government officials in Sarajevo, b) permit United Nations convoys to deliver relief supplies to Sarajevo and other safe havens, c) impose a cease-fire around Sarajevo, d) open the airport there to United Nations flights, and e) guarantee respect for human rights.

By telephone, I confirmed this commitment with Dr. Karadzic and also shared the information with President Clinton, who approved the agreement. Dr. Karadzic then offered to confirm his promises publicly and asked that CNN permit him to do so through a televised live interview.

Following briefings from State Department and White House officials and after being informed by them that the Serb promises to me were "substantially fulfilled," my wife Rosalynn and I traveled to the area, arriving first in Zagreb on December 18. There we met with Croatian President Tudjman and U.N. officials and then proceeded to Sarajevo.

That evening we met with President Alija Izetbegovic and other officials of the Bosnia-Herzegovina government. Although at first skeptical of our mission, they seemed reassured when we explained that our goal was not to initiate a new agenda but to promote negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group plan. Approving this effort, they made it clear that they would accept a cease-fire for not more than three months.

Later that night I drafted what I considered to be a comprehensive cease-fire proposal, based on the discussions

with the Serb delegation in my home, my talks in Zagreb and Sarajevo, and briefings from U.S. and U.N. officials.

Before going to Pale, I requested of the Serbs that both Dr. Karadzic and the military commander, General Ratko Mladic, meet with me, to assure that whatever we evolved would have both political and military backing. Our negotiations in Pale included them and a number of other top Serb officials. We had some difficult moments, but finally concluded an agreement with some modifications of my original draft. Its terms included:

a) An immediate cease-fire and cessation of hostilities for at least four months, to be enforced by the interposition of United Nations forces.

b) The prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons that might damage people or property.

c) A comprehensive peace agrreement to be negotiated during this period, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties.

d) In all respects, both sides to be given equal treatment.

e) During this period, unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo, and the delivery of humanitarian services, with U.N. forces helping to assure that no armamemts or weapons of war are in the cargoes to be delivered.

f) Each side to be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. Special raporteurs are to have unimpeded access to insure compliance.

g) All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, to have the right to live in a location of their choice.

h) An early exchange of all detainees.

The Serbs agreed to negotiate in good faith on the basis of the Contact Group plan that requires a division of territory, with the Serbs to control 49% and the Muslim/Croat federation 51%. Mutually agreed modifications would be negotiated during the peace talks.

By telephone, I read this document to representatives of the State Department and White House and, with their approval, signed the document as a witness to the signatures of Doctor Karadzic and General Mladic. (Enclosure A.)

Back in Sarajevo the next morning, we obtained a closely parallel agreement with President Izetbegovic, with only one difference: a demand that the Serbs accept the 51/49% map as a prerequisite to peace talks. (Enclosure B.)

In order to clarify some issues and make implementation dates earlier and more specific, we returned then to Pale and concluded an additional agreement (Enclosure C.) Back in Sarajevo, President Izetbegovic accepted the additions.

Now we had common agreement for a temporary period of peace during the holidays, a 4-month cease-fire through the month of April, a cessation of hostilities between military forces of both sides with UNPROFOR to interpose its units between them, the withdrawal of government forces from the demilitarized zone on Mount Igman near the Sarajevo airport, an early exchange of all detainees, and an opportunity for the Contact Group to work with both sides to resolve any remaining issues.

I pointed out to the news media on my departure the only unresolved issue: Muslim/Croat officials were insisting that, as a prerequisite to peace talks, the Serbs would have to "accept" the 51/49% plan; the Serbs, on the other hand, were willing to negotiate "on the basis of" the same plan.

Since that time we have received reports from U.S. and U.N. officials and, with their approval, have maintained contact with leaders in the region.

The Bosnian Serbs have presented to us their own territorial proposal, reducing their controlled area from 70% to 53% and professing their willingness to negotiate the remaining differences. I understand that the Bosnian Serb proposal was provided to members of the Contact Group in March.

On one occasion in January, the full Contact Group did have one meeting with the Bosnian Serbs and the U.S. member visited Pale once or twice, but since then the Contact Group has isolated the Bosnian Serbs and maintained a policy of communicating only with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic on matters involving the Bosnian Serbs.

The end of the cease-fire period came at the end of April with no negotiations having been undertaken. Since then, as is well known by members of this committee, government forces have attacked from within the safe zones, the Serbs have responded with shelling, travel through the relief supply routes and the Sarajevo airport has been restricted, NATO planes have bombed Serb positions, hostages have been taken, and a higher level of conflict is now threatened.

The question is, where can we go from here? Although no one can guarantee ultimate results, there are two basic al-

ternatives: the escalation of military conflict or a determined attempt to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement.

The United Nations is facing an almost impossible dilemma, serving as a peace enforcer when there is no peace agreement. However, the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) has performed well, both with its humanitarian mission and also in reducing the level of fighting and the resulting casualties.

Some have called for a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by the U.S. to permit the Muslim-Croat federation to obtain weapons. Under these circumstances, the United Nations military commander has stated that his forces could not fulfill their mission, and both France and Great Britain have stated that their forces will be withdrawn. This would likely result in a much greater involvement of the United States in both military training and support, and an escalation in bloodshed in Bosnia. The war could also widen to Croatia, Serbia, or southward to Kosovo and Macedonia.

With an almost hopeless prospect for ending the crisis through military means, it is time to reassess the possibilities for a mediated settlement of basic issues. What should be the prerequisites for such negotiations?

If comprehensive peace talks without preconditions are not acceptable to the Contact Group, I believe a clear demonstration of good faith by both sides should be adequate. Proven performance of a practical nature can be required, such as those negotiated in December:

a) a cessation of hostilities and disengagement of armed forces,

b) freedom of movement of U.N. peacekeepers,

c) unrestricted movement of United Nations convoys to deliver relief supplies to Sarajevo and other safe havens,

d) the Sarajevo airport open to United Nations flights,

e) the release of all detainees,

f)human rights guarantees, including unrestricted return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

As earlier agreed by the Bosnian Serbs and Muslim-Croat federation officials in Sarajevo, there would be balanced and equal treatment of the two sides.

This period of peace might also include the lifting of United Nations trade sanctions against the Serbs as long as Serbia and the Bosnian groups act in good faith. This would be a powerful incentive for compliance.

Peace talks would best be held in a neutral place under the auspices of the United Nations or the Contact Group, and with an agenda that might include such constitutional issues as the degree of autonomy of the Muslim/Croatian and Serbian groups, mutually agreeable territorial divisions based on the 51/49 proposal of the Contact Group, and the right of special relationships with Serbia and Croatia.

Both sides, the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs, must be at the negotiating table. All those interested in peace, including the government of the United States, should urge both sides to seek a peaceful resolution of this continuing crisis.

Obviously, we cannot speak for any parties to the dispute or for those involved in peacekeeping, but there is every reason for exploring these ideas as a reasonable alternative to the existing deadlock and the strong possibility of another surge in bloodshed.

ENCLOSURE A

December 19, 1994 Bosnian Serb Agreement

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

We the undersigned agree that we and those under our authority will:

1. Commence negotiations on an agreement for a cessation of hostilities on December 27, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 15, 1995. This agreement would be implemented immediately by instituting a cease-fire by interposition of U.N. forces along the line of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities and the exchange of prisoners, etc. This cessation of hostilities will last for four months or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.

2. We agree that, while the cessation of hostilities is in effect, we shall negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, with the proposal of the Contact Group as the basis for negotiation of all points. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties. All issues are to be resolved in full cooperation with the Contact Group. In all respects, both sides will be given equal treatment.

3. During this period there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may join with UNPROFOR inspectors to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.

4. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the total elimination and prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons of any kind that might be damaging to people or property.

5. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. International observers, including the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, will be free to observe compliance with this agreement.

ENCLOSURE B

Comprehensive Peace Agreement

We the undersigned agree that we and those under our authority will:

1. Immediately implement a cease-fire, monitored by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities and the exchange of prisoners, etc., as described below.

2. Commence negotiations on an agreement for a total cessation of hostilities on December 27, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 15, 1995. This cessation of hostilities will last for four months, or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.

3. While the cessation of hostilities is in effect, negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, on the basis of the acceptance of the peace plan of the Contact Group as a starting point. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties. All issues are to be resolved in full cooperation with the Contact Group.

It is understood that there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may join with UNPROFOR inspectors to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.

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There will be an early exchange of all detainees, under the auspices of the International Red Cross. In accordance with the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC will have unimpeded access to all detainees to insure that the provisions of this agreement are fulfilled.

In a final agreement, all has to be agreed; otherwise, nothing is agreed.

It is realized that other difficult issues and unresolved questions will have to be resolved. This will be done peacefully, utilizing the services of the Contact Group or UNPROFOR as appropriate.

Signed 20 December 1994

Alija Izetbegovic
President

Jimmy Carter
Witness

ENCLOSURE C

20 December, 1994

Additional agreement to that of 19 Dec. 1994.

1) It is agreed that the negotiations to establish a total cessation of hostilities will commence on 23 December, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by 1 January 1995.

2) A complete cease-fire, throughout Bosnia-Herzogovina, will be implemented at noon, 23 December, 1994, to be monitored by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities.

3) Based on assurances that convoys and humanitarian services will pass freely, the Bosnian forces will withdraw from the Igman demilitarized zone in accordance with the existing agreement, prior to commencement of the negotiations described in item (1) above.

Ragovan Karadzic

Witnessed:
Jimmy Carter

[Note: Since we concluded this agreement during the last few minutes of our stay in Bosnia-Herzigovina, I received approval of all three of these items from President Izetbegovic by telephone from the airport before announcing them and departing.]

РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА
ПРЕДСЕДНИК РЕПУБЛИКЕ
САРАЈЕВО

REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
SARAJEVO

To: President Jimmy Carter

7 June 1995

Dear President Carter,

Because of the pressure of work over the past few weeks I have been unable to keep in touch with you. Let me inform you straight away that we would like you to visit the Republic of Srpska again, hopefully very soon. You may well be able to get the peace process off the ground, but it is important to spell out our position very clearly. This is that we are ready to negotiate, with the Plan of the Contact Group as the basis for negotiations of all points. We are also ready, for the sake of achieving peace immediately, to be flexible on the territorial issue. As a sovereign and independent state, we may accept to form ties with the Muslim-Croat Federation. To be more specific on this point I attach a list of five principles which, if the Muslim-Croat Federation accepts, as we already do, can serve as the way of restarting real peace negotiations at once.

You should also know that we are not in a position to accept any new, temporary cessation of hostilities. We want a permanent one. Therefore, as soon as agreement is reached on recommencing peace talks, we propose reinstating the cessation of hostilities agreement of 31 December 1994, which was the result of your efforts and which would now be on a permanent basis.

We cannot make any further concessions. Accordingly, at least in public your visit must not be seen as an ambitious attempt to resolve this conflict because the possibility of failure is not inconsiderable. Therefore, should you embark on another trip to Pale, we recommend that you should describe it as a fact-finding mission. My hope of course is that your visit can achieve a breakthrough.

I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Yours sincerely,

РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА

Dr Radovan Karadzic
President, Republic of Srpska

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

June 13, 1995

The Honorable Warren Christopher
Secretary of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We were dumbfounded to learn yesterday that the Administration intends to vote in favor of a United Nations Security Council resolution as soon as tomorrow that will substantially increase the authorized personnel strength of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, thereby increasing the cost of that operation by an estimated $520 million per year.

This critically important piece of information was revealed to Congress yesterday for the first time at a staff briefing two days before the planned Security Council vote. Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff neglected to mention this detail in his testimony before the International Relations Committee about Bosnia last Thursday, June 8th. Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow also failed to mention it when he briefed the International Relations Committee about Bosnia on Friday, June 2nd.

We are deeply disappointed by what appears to be an unwillingness on the part of the Administration to fully inform Congress about the spiraling costs of its Bosnia policy.

We also are deeply concerned by what this episode suggests about how the Administration intends to handle changes to U.N. peacekeeping operations in the future. The total lack of consultation with Congress about this costly decision is utterly inconsistent with the understandings we thought had been reached about consultation in such cases in section 407 of P.L. 103-236, the "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995". The ease with which the Administration has avoided the meaningful consultation that section 407 was intended to require underscores the urgent need to revise that section along the lines set forth in H.R. 7, the "National Security Revitalization Act".

We urge the Administration to oppose any resolution in the United Nations Security Council that would significantly increase the size and cost of the UNPROFOR operation until you have fully briefed our Committees and provided written answers to the following questions:

1. How much will the resolution add to the cost of UNPROFOR, and how much of that additional cost will be assessed to the United States?

2. What source of funding does the Administration intend to utilize to pay the increased cost to the United States? If the Administration intends to seek additional or supplemental appropriations, have budget offsets been identified, and if so, what are they?

3. To the degree that the resolution will have the effect of reimbursing France, the United Kingdom, and other countries for the cost of the new Rapid Reaction Force they are deploying to Bosnia, why is the United States not receiving similar reimbursement for the costs of its new and existing commitments in support of UNPROFOR?

4. Has the United States sought United Nations reimbursement for its logistics, air support, and other activities in support of UNPROFOR? If not, why not?

5. What additional military obligations would the United States undertake pursuant to the Security Council resolution or any bilateral agreements with France, the United Kingdom, or other countries?

If the Administration proceeds to vote in favor of a Security Council resolution increasing the size and cost of UNPROFOR without adequate consultation and without providing satisfactory answers to these questions, we will have little choice but to oppose any Administration request for the authorization or appropriation of funds to pay for the increased cost to the United States.

Sincerely,

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
Chairman
Committee on International Relations

BOB LIVINGSTON
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations

HAROLD ROGERS
Chairman
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

June 15, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing with respect to the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) -- a matter we discussed at length with French President Jacques Chirac yesterday evening. It is our understanding that the Administration and the French government would like to pass a resolution authorizing the RRF in the U.N. Security Council this afternoon.

Due to the absence of Administration consultations with the Congress, we have many serious questions and concerns about authorizing the RRF which have not been addressed. The Chairmen of the appropriate committees of jurisdiction have clearly not been consulted nor provided with critical information about the mandate, mission, duration, command arrangements and cost of this new operation.

Nevertheless, in our view, efforts by the French government and other UNPROFOR contributor governments to protect their forces on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be respected. The United States would expect no less from an ally. It is the right of these governments to take measures necessary to protect their soldiers. In this regard, President Chirac informed us that the command arrangements for the RRF -- composed of troops in national uniforms, and not blue helmets -- would not be subject to vetoes by U.N. civilian officials that have to date crippled the UNPROFOR operation. We urge you to make this point explicit in any U.N. Security Council resolution which authorizes the RRF.

President Chirac assured us that he was only seeking U.S. political support, and not a financial commitment. In view of this assurance, we would not object to your Administration's decision to support for President Chirac's efforts to protect UNPROFOR troops. We believe that it is essential, however, that any Security Council resolution make clear that: (1) the costs of the RRF and any additional personnel authorized under the resolution will not be assessed to U.N. member states; and (2) no additional U.S. financial or military obligations will be incurred as a result of the resolution. In our view, if you choose to support a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the expansion of UNPROFOR to accommodate the RRF, the costs

should be borne through voluntary contributions. We oppose funding the RRF through U.N. assessments. This is consistent with our discussion with President Chirac.

We expect that the questions regarding cost, funding, and, most important, U.S. military commitments raised in the June 13th letter from Chairmen Gilman, Livingston, and Rogers will be promptly answered. We note that these are questions that should have been answered in the consultation process required by law. To act without a clear understanding of the consequences is unacceptable. Furthermore, we would request that you inform us of your decision and its underlying rationale so that we may share it with our colleagues.

Finally, we would like to emphasize that our concurrence for measures to protect UNPROFOR, such as the RRF, should in no way be interpreted as support for the present European and Administration approach to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we discussed with President Chirac, we have fundamental differences over what our policy toward Bosnia should be. We believe that the U.N. operation in Bosnia has been a costly failure. In our view abandoning the present "neutral" approach, withdrawing UNPROFOR, and lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government is the principled and prudent policy to adopt.

Sincerely,

NEWT GINGRICH

BOB DOLE

UNPROFOR: CONDITIONS FOR STAYING AND PURPOSE OF REINFORCEMENT

It is our long-standing policy that:

- UNPROFOR's purpose is to support efforts to achieve a political settlement, and meanwhile to help the civilian population and contain the conflict;

- UNPROFOR should carry on in Bosnia so long as it can do useful work without unacceptable risk;

- UNPROFOR could not carry on if the arms embargo were lifted;

- UNPROFOR should continue as long as the parties cooperate in efforts to reach a political settlement and do not seek a military solution;

The Rapid Reaction Force will be part of UNPROFOR and under UN command. Its purpose is:

- to improve UNPROFOR's ability to protect itself;

- to enable UNPROFOR to carry out its peacekeeping mandate more effectively and safely;

- to strengthen UNPROFOR's credibility;

- and thereby to try to ensure that the conditions which might otherwise trigger withdrawal do not arise;

- the Rapid Reaction Force will increase the flexibility available to UNPROFOR's Commanders. It will be able to respond to a range of requirements: protecting UNPROFOR units; escorting convoys; mine clearance; mobility to bypass closed routes.

06/14/95 WED 18:04 FAX APNSA 001
JUN-14-95 18:28 FROM:BRITISH EMBASSY TO:2892721R29A PAGE 2/2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 19, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's Pull-Aside Meeting with UK Prime Minister John Major in Halifax

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the President's Pull-Aside meeting with UK Prime Minister John Major on June 16, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation of the Pull-Aside meeting to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation of the Pull-Aside meeting be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By [illegible] NARA, Date 6/3/2014
2013-0687-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of the President's Pull-Aside Meeting with UK Prime Minister John Major

The attached Memorandum of Conversation from the pull-aside meeting between the President and Prime Minister John Major is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in London for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(C)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memcon w/Prime Minister Major

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2014
2013-0087-F

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. memcon	President's Pull-Aside Meeting with UK Prime Minister John Major in Halifax. Record ID: 9504665. (3 pages)	06/19/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [5]

2013-0687-F
vz2719

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

DC Outcomes on Bosnia Funding

1. A no host, informal roundtable in NY among major financially concerned nations and the UN to explore the Bosnia peackeeping related funding issue.

2. USG approval of the concept of a Voluntary Fund to buy down the UN operations costs, including highest level appeals to FRG, Japan, and certain Arab states.

3. A budget amendment request from the President to the Congress to increase the FY96 150 account top- line to include $200m for CIPA for Bosnia. This request could be reflected in the San Francisco speech.

4. An application of Shared Responsibility by having DOD agree to some contribution either through a) waiving repayment for support contracts for the RRF as part of a negotiated package with the Allies, b) reprogramming unneeded Bosnia Humanitarian Airlift funds to pay for some direct costs for the RRF, or c) some other proposal that DOD might originate.