

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

897

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

1

Position:

2

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Funding Strategy for U.S. Support. Record ID: 9504779. (5 pages)	06/23/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	U.S. Funding Options Paper. (10 pages)	06/23/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. paper	UK/French/Dutch Funding Paper. (3 pages)	06/23/1995	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For Andrew Sens from Kenneth Brill. Subject: Drawdown of DOD Services. Record ID: 99504966. (3 pages)	06/27/1995	P1/b(1)
003. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: FORCEPREP Notification to NATO for OPLAN 40104. Record ID: 9504705. (1 page)	06/20/1995	P1/b(1)
004a. draft	Memo for the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Funding Strategy for U.S. Support. Record ID: 9504779. (4 pages)	06/21/1995	P1/b(1)
004b. paper	Duplicate of 001b. (9 pages)	06/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2717

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9504779
RECEIVED: 21 JUN 95 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 23 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
UN

BUDGET

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FUNDING STRATEGY FOR US SUPPORT TO UN RAPID REACTION FORCE

ACTION: PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOMS

DUE DATE: 24 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARKE

DREW

NSC CHRON

SHEEHAN

VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By Va. T. [Signature] NARA, Date 6/3/2014
2013-0687-2

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSKDB

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORD ID: 9504779

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z 95062218 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
002 PRESIDENT	Z 95062321 FOR DECISION
002	Z 95062614 PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOMS

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002	950623	VICE PRESIDENT
002	950623	WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 4779
 URG. NOT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC: IN
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

↓ Please note - approvals
on page 5 are "originals"

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 4779

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG AB A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	_____	_____
Sens	_____	<u>ADS</u>	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>6/23</u>	<u>PODESTA</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	<u>4779</u>	<u>6/23</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

Funding Strategies for UN
Rapid Reaction Force
6/23 3 PM

Exec Sec Office has disl

Nelson Draw
has the balance
of this plog
KW

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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001b. paper	U.S. Funding Options Paper. (10 pages)	06/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
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COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

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2013-0687-F

vz2717

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RRF
7/15

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

June 15, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing with respect to the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) -- a matter we discussed at length with French President Jacques Chirac yesterday evening. It is our understanding that the Administration and the French government would like to pass a resolution authorizing the RRF in the U.N. Security Council this afternoon.

Due to the absence of Administration consultations with the Congress, we have many serious questions and concerns about authorizing the RRF which have not been addressed. The Chairmen of the appropriate committees of jurisdiction have clearly not been consulted nor provided with critical information about the mandate, mission, duration, command arrangements and cost of this new operation.

Nevertheless, in our view, efforts by the French government and other UNPROFOR contributor governments to protect their forces on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be respected. The United States would expect no less from an ally. It is the right of these governments to take measures necessary to protect their soldiers. In this regard, President Chirac informed us that the command arrangements for the RRF -- composed of troops in national uniforms, and not blue helmets -- would not be subject to vetoes by U.N. civilian officials that have to date crippled the UNPROFOR operation. We urge you to make this point explicit in any U.N. Security Council resolution which authorizes the RRF.

President Chirac assured us that he was only seeking U.S. political support, and not a financial commitment. In view of this assurance, we would not object to your Administration's decision to support for President Chirac's efforts to protect UNPROFOR troops. We believe that it is essential, however, that any Security Council resolution make clear that: (1) the costs of the RRF and any additional personnel authorized under the resolution will not be assessed to U.N. member states; and (2) no additional U.S. financial or military obligations will be incurred as a result of the resolution. In our view, if you choose to support a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the expansion of UNPROFOR to accommodate the RRF, the costs

should be borne through voluntary contributions. We oppose funding the RRF through U.N. assessments. This is consistent with our discussion with President Chirac.


We expect that the questions regarding cost, funding, and, most important, U.S. military commitments raised in the June 13th letter from Chairmen Gilman, Livingston, and Rogers will be promptly answered. We note that these are questions that should have been answered in the consultation process required by law. To act without a clear understanding of the consequences is unacceptable. Furthermore, we would request that you inform us of your decision and its underlying rationale so that we may share it with our colleagues.

Finally, we would like to emphasize that our concurrence for measures to protect UNPROFOR, such as the RRF, should in no way be interpreted as support for the present European and Administration approach to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we discussed with President Chirac, we have fundamental differences over what our policy toward Bosnia should be. We believe that the U.N. operation in Bosnia has been a costly failure. In our view abandoning the present "neutral" approach, withdrawing UNPROFOR, and lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government is the principled and prudent policy to adopt.

Sincerely,



NEWT GINGRICH



BOB DOLE

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

June 13, 1995

The Honorable Warren Christopher
Secretary of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We were dumbfounded to learn yesterday that the Administration intends to vote in favor of a United Nations Security Council resolution as soon as tomorrow that will substantially increase the authorized personnel strength of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, thereby increasing the cost of that operation by an estimated \$520 million per year.

This critically important piece of information was revealed to Congress yesterday for the first time at a staff briefing two days before the planned Security Council vote. Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff neglected to mention this detail in his testimony before the International Relations Committee about Bosnia last Thursday, June 8th. Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow also failed to mention it when he briefed the International Relations Committee about Bosnia on Friday, June 2nd.

We are deeply disappointed by what appears to be an unwillingness on the part of the Administration to fully inform Congress about the spiraling costs of its Bosnia policy.

We also are deeply concerned by what this episode suggests about how the Administration intends to handle changes to U.N. peacekeeping operations in the future. The total lack of consultation with Congress about this costly decision is utterly inconsistent with the understandings we thought had been reached about consultation in such cases in section 407 of P.L. 103-235, the "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995". The ease with which the Administration has avoided the meaningful consultation that section 407 was intended to require underscores the urgent need to revise that section along the lines set forth in H.R. 7, the "National Security Revitalization Act".

We urge the Administration to oppose any resolution in the United Nations Security Council that would significantly increase the size and cost of the UNPROFOR operation until you have fully briefed our Committees and provided written answers to the following questions:

1. How much will the resolution add to the cost of UNPROFOR, and how much of that additional cost will be assessed to the United States?
2. What source of funding does the Administration intend to utilize to pay the increased cost to the United States? If the Administration intends to seek additional or supplemental appropriations, have budget offsets been identified, and if so, what are they?
3. To the degree that the resolution will have the effect of reimbursing France, the United Kingdom, and other countries for the cost of the new Rapid Reaction Force they are deploying to Bosnia, why is the United States not receiving similar reimbursement for the costs of its new and existing commitments in support of UNPROFOR?
4. Has the United States sought United Nations reimbursement for its logistics, air support, and other activities in support of UNPROFOR? If not, why not?
5. What additional military obligations would the United States undertake pursuant to the Security Council resolution or any bilateral agreements with France, the United Kingdom, or other countries?

If the Administration proceeds to vote in favor of a Security Council resolution increasing the size and cost of UNPROFOR without adequate consultation and without providing satisfactory answers to these questions, we will have little choice but to oppose any Administration request for the authorization or appropriation of funds to pay for the increased cost to the United States.


Sincerely,



BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
Chairman
Committee on International
Relations



BOB LIVINGSTON
Chairman
Committee on
Appropriations



HAROLD ROGERS
Chairman
Subcommittee on Commerce,
Justice, State and Judiciary

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO.: _____

CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOTAL: 26
(PAGES INCLUDING COVER)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK WR
(NAME)

(202) 456-9425
(PHONE NUMBER)

WH SITROOM
(ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: FUNDING STRATEGY FOR US SUPPORT TO

UN RAPID REACTION FORCE

NSC LOG # 4779

TO (AGENCY)

DELIVER TO

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBE

JOE HARMON FOR POTUS

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: VR Date: 6/3/2014

203-0687-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4779

June 21, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ^{AD for} ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/RICHARD A. CLARKE ^{AB}

FROM: ^{AD} NELSON DREW/MICHAEL SHEPHERD ^{MS}

SUBJECT: Funding Strategy for U.S. Support to the UN Rapid Reaction Force

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President transmitting the funding strategy for U.S. support to the UN Rapid Reaction Force.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Funding Options Paper

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 6/3/2004

2013-0677-F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

Drawdown Notification to Congress for the Rapid Reaction Force

- The President has determined that it is both in our interest, and consistent with our leadership role, for the U.S. to support the creation and deployment of the UNPROFOR RRF.
- The RRF is an important addition to UNPROFOR's capability to defend itself more credibly -- and thus be in a position to carry out its existing mandates effectively.
- This step is critical if our allies are to sustain and strengthen UNPROFOR -- rather than risk an UNPROFOR withdrawal that would:
 - put American forces on the ground to assist our Allies' withdrawal;
 - lead to a resumption of all-out war that would increase casualties and humanitarian suffering;
 - risk the spread of the conflict; and
 - effectively end the prospect for a negotiated settlement.
- Clearly, the long-term costs in terms of our security and economic interests of walking away from UNPROFOR at this point will be far greater than short-term cost of supporting our allies who have troops deployed in the field.
- The U.S. therefore joined in passing UNSC Resolution 998 on June 16, 1995, establishing the RRF and increasing the authorized troop level for UNPROFOR by 12,500.
- (if asked only): The RRF will operate under normal UN command and control and ROE arrangements. However, there is considerable room for a more robust response under existing procedures. Our allies want this force to protect their other troops, and are sending them in national uniform, without blue helmets or vehicles painted white, so that the force can more effectively fill its force protection role.
- The British and French have told us that they will give maximum authority to commanders on the ground. It means they will look to Janvier and Smith to make decisions on the employment of the RRF.
- We heard the clear message from Congress that financing the RRF should not be done on a business-as-usual basis. We agree. Our vote for UNSC 998 was cast with the clear

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understanding that financing for the operation would be determined later.

- Since the 16th we have been in close contact with both Congressional staff and our allies as we search for a way for the U.S. to support our allies while not incurring obligations the Congress will be unwilling to support.
- We want to share with you now our plan for how the U.S. can support the RRF.

VOLUNTARY FUND

- Under our proposal, voluntary contributions should be the principal means of supporting the force. We will be working at the UN and with our friends and allies to create and fund a voluntary account to help defray the cost of the RRF.
- It is unrealistic, however, to expect that this fund will cover the entire costs. We recognize that those providing troops on the ground will continue to bear the preponderance of costs and risks.
- We are planning on making our contribution in the areas of close air support, strategic lift, intelligence and equipment.
- The majority of our contribution under consideration will be provided by drawing down defense goods and services under Foreign Assistance Act authorities. The total requirement for these drawdowns is currently estimated to be within a \$50 million ceiling. These drawdowns would be accomplished in a manner that does not compromise U.S. readiness in any manner.
- An initial drawdown to meet urgent requirements is needed now. We estimate that up to \$15 million in equipment and transportation support could be needed. The initial list of equipment requested includes 15 tactical satellite communications terminals and associated support, teletypes and secure telephones for a tactical Air Control Center, seven laser target designators for precision fire support and night vision goggles.
- Other equipment requested by our allies includes communications, aircraft survivability equipment, precision navigation and refueling equipment and small arms.

- The U.S. is also considering other in-kind contributions of up to about \$10 million worth of CAS and intelligence support.

CONTRIBUTIONS UNDER EXISTING UNPROFOR AUTHORITY

- We do not intend to pay UN assessed funding for any RRF forces above the previously agreed UNPROFOR ceiling of 44,870 troops.
- Those providing troops to the RRF now tell us that up to 4,500 of those forces can come from troops under that ceiling. We believe we have an obligation to honor that commitment.
- Under our proposal, the remainder of the approximately 15,000 troops in the RRF -- those authorized by the increase of the UNPROFOR ceiling to 55,370 -- would be covered under the voluntary mechanism. All of our contributions to that fund will be in the form of in-kind contributions of equipment and services.
- We will be seeking no new funding authority to support the RRF.
- Since the commitment to the full authorized troop level was approved long ago, the Secretary General has the authority to include additional troops without further reference to the Security Council.
- (if asked) Any additional cost for new troops under the authorized ceiling would add to our existing arrears at the UN. Though very preliminary, our best estimate for the cost to the U.S. of including the 4,500 RRF troops under the existing UNPROFOR budget would be about \$35 million for the next six months.
- However, as you may be aware 2,500 of the 15,000 RRF troops were already part of the assessed UNPROFOR operation. These 2,500 are already funded under the existing assessment.
- (if pressed) We will also need to work with the Congress to address our larger peacekeeping funding problem.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9504966
RECEIVED: 28 JUN 95 08

TO: SENS

FROM: BRILL, K

DOC DATE: 27 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: UN
PEACEKEEPING

FMF
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DRAWDOWN OF DOD SERVICES TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO UN IN SUPPORT OF
RAPID REACTION FORCE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 01 JUL 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: CLARKE

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
SHEEHAN

FOR CONCURRENCE
BEERS
CLARKE
DREW
SEATON
SIMON

FOR INFO
DANVERS
SCHWARTZ
SESTAK
STEPHENS
VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 6/3/2014
2013-0687-F

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Letters to Speaker of the House
House Committee on International Relations
House Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Senate Committee on Appropriations

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In accordance with Sections 506(b) and 652 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the "Act"), I wish to inform you that the President intends to exercise his authority under Section 506(a)(1) of the Act to authorize the furnishing of up to \$50,000,000 in defense articles and services from the Department of Defense to provide emergency military assistance to the United Nations in support of equipment needs and transportation requirements necessary to move the Rapid Reaction Force's (RRF) personnel and equipment to Bosnia.

This assistance is required on an urgent basis to provide the support needed to allow UNPROFOR the capability to defend itself and carry out its existing mandates -- to address specifically its vulnerability to being taken hostage, need to conduct emergency responses to assist isolated/threatened units, redeployment requirements, and freedom of movement. As indicated in the course of informal consultations with interested committee staff, and as described in greater detail in the attached memorandum of justification, we believe that a drawdown for these purposes will contribute significantly to relieving human suffering as well as to contain and help bring to an end the ongoing conflicts which threaten our interests in European stability and integration.

I hope that this report is useful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

Wendy R. Sherman
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Attachment:
Memorandum of Justification

**Memorandum of Justification for
Presidential Determination Regarding the
Drawdown of Defense Articles and Services
for the United Nations**

Our principal goals in the Balkans remain to relieve human suffering as well as to contain the conflict while seeking a peaceful solution. We also seek to preserve the unity of NATO but without greater involvement of U.S. forces in the war in the Balkans. In this regard, we believe UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia, if at all possible, because of its contributions to improving the situation. Civilian casualties declined dramatically from 130,000 in 1992 to 2,500 in 1994. Thousands have received food and medical supplies through the UNHCR airlift which operates under UNPROFOR-provided security. UNPROFOR withdrawal now would trigger an even greater humanitarian disaster, including many allied casualties and risk of spillover of the conflict. But to remain, UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater security.

We are convinced that recent steps taken to enhance UNPROFOR's ability to protect itself -- including the creation of a RRF -- offer the best prospects of achieving the objectives of UNPROFOR's mission. The British and French governments are clear in stating that without the RRF, they will withdraw from UNPROFOR. Without them, UNPROFOR will collapse, producing an explosion of fighting that would result in a resumption of all-out war, undermine prospects for a negotiated settlement, and increase casualties and humanitarian suffering. Such a scenario has the high probability of involving U.S. ground troops in combat.

The proposed Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) will be part of the existing UN peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia. The RRF will be under the existing UN chain of command and under the operational control of the UN military commanders in the theater. Current planning calls for France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to form the nucleus of a multinational brigade with rapid reaction capability. The British will also provide an airmobile brigade and the French will earmark an additional standby brigade. Total RRF troops will number 15,000.

The RRF will act in support of UNPROFOR and function within its existing mandate. The primary mission of the RRF is to ensure greater flexibility for the UN commander in carrying out his mandate through added protection and mobility. It is an important addition to UNPROFOR's capability to defend itself. The RRF could assist isolated or threatened UN units in emergency actions, help redeployment of UNPROFOR elements, and facilitate freedom of movement where necessary. It is intended to help UNPROFOR defend itself, decrease its vulnerability to hostage taking, and do its job better. It will make UNPROFOR

able to respond expeditiously and forcibly to those who threaten it and its mission. NATO will provide close air support to the RRF under existing arrangements. The existence of the RRF would enhance the ability of UNPROFOR to conduct a withdrawal, if needed.

We support the RRF because we want UNPROFOR to continue operations in support of its mandate. The more secure UNPROFOR is, the more effective it will be in providing humanitarian aid and promoting a climate favorable to a negotiated settlement. To facilitate the RRF's deployment to Bosnia, we have offered American military capabilities in strategic lift and associated support equipment so that it can quickly make its presence felt. Initial indications are that approximately \$20 million in logistics lift will be provided. This includes the use of four Roll-On/Roll-Off ships to move British equipment and up to 50 C-5 flights for UK, French and Dutch requirements. The balance of approximately \$30 million will be comprised of equipment. While the list of requested items is still being evaluated, agreement has been reached on the following: Tactical Satellite Terminals, Night Vision Goggles, Laser Target Designators, HAVE QUICK Radios, and sniper rifles. Of the \$50 million draw down authority, an initial urgent requirement of \$15 million (\$12 million in lift and \$3 million in equipment) is necessary. We are also prepared to assist by adding AC 130 gunships to NATO's close air support capability and in establishing an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely intelligence data. We are not offering U.S. ground forces or air crews for the RRF.

It is important that the RRF is able to move quickly to enhance UNPROFOR's ability to defend itself and deal firmly with Serb interference in fulfilling its existing humanitarian and peacekeeping mandate. It has never been the intention to send UNPROFOR to war. Within its existing mandate, however, UNPROFOR has the authority to become a more credible presence than it has been to date. The RRF will permit UNPROFOR to do so. It is in the national interest of the United States to contain the current conflict in Bosnia and address the humanitarian situation. Support for UNPROFOR and the RRF assists in realization of this national interest.

JUN-22-95 THU 12:28
06.22.95
SENT BY:

10/UNP
12:02

PM *US MISSION *POLSEC*
6-22-95 12:11 SECURITY COUNCIL

FAX NO. 202 646 4179

P.02
P02/03
84154418: 1/2

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters
Siege des Forces de Paix des Nations Unies
Zagreb

CZM - 1009
CZC - 818 P2/3

Special Representative of the Secretary-General
for the Former Yugoslavia

19 June 1995

Dear Dr. Karadzic,

I wish to inform you that the Security Council has recently reviewed the latest report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the mandate of UNPROFOR. On 16 June 1995, it adopted resolution 998 (1995), a copy of which is attached for your information. This resolution covers a number of different issues, including the status of the safe areas, and makes provision for the establishment of a rapid reaction capacity to enable UNPROFOR to carry out its mandate in a secure and safe environment.

Despite the recent intensification in hostilities, the United Nations and troop contributors remain committed to the continued presence of UNPROFOR in order to alleviate the suffering of all the people of Bosnia, and to facilitate the earliest possible end to hostilities through peaceful means. However, risks to UNPROFOR have increased dramatically and there has been a marked lack of respect by all sides with the security, safety and freedom of movement of UNPROFOR personnel. The Security Council has accepted the offer of a number of countries to provide flexible and mobile reserve military reinforcements in order to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel and to enhance the force's capacity to carry out its humanitarian tasks.

I wish to assure you that these theatre reserve forces will operate under the existing United Nations peace-keeping rules of engagement and will not in any way change the essential peace-keeping nature of the UNPROFOR mission. While the reserve will enhance UNPROFOR's security, the understanding and cooperation of the parties themselves will be the best guarantor of the Force's continued effectiveness as an impartial force. The United Nations, troop contributing states and the Security Council have all recognised that the reserve force cannot and will not be a substitute for a political process aimed at an overall peaceful settlement of the Bosnian conflict.

H.E. Dr. Radovan Karadzic
PALE

. 2 .

I would like to emphasize that assistance for the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the protection of civilians from deliberate attacks, continue to be central to UNPROFOR's mandate. Alleviation of the very serious humanitarian situation created by recent events in Sarajevo and other enclaves will be one of UNPROFOR's primary objectives. In this regard, the Security Council has demanded that all parties respect the status of the safe areas and has underlined the need for their demilitarization by mutual agreement, in order that attacks both into and out of the safe areas cease forthwith. I am confident that urgent action to achieve progress in this direction would be of enormous benefit to all parties. It would go a long way towards realizing an overall stabilization of the current situation.

The Secretary-General has, in his recent report on UNPROFOR, emphasized that the United Nations cannot operate in a political vacuum. In the past few days, leaders of the international community have also repeatedly emphasized that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the measures set out in Security Council resolution 998 (1995) should be seen in this light. In view of the critical situation facing us all, I would urge you to take advantage of the current international climate in order that we may promote initiatives favourable to a dynamic and comprehensive peace settlement.

Yours sincerely,



Yasushi Akashi

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

UNCLASSIFIED
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



FAX TRANSMITTAL

TO: Molson DrewORG/ROOM: NSCOFFICE PHONE: 202-456-9151 FAX #: 202-456-9150

FROM: OASD/ISA (EUROPEAN/NATO AFFAIRS)
PENTAGON, ROOM 4D762
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

OFFICE PHONE: (703) 695-6516SENT BY: Tim Walton, Bureau Task ForceDATE: 28 JuneNUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET: 3

☐ URGENT(DELIVER IMMEDIATELY) ☒ IMPORTANT ☐ ROUTINE

REMARKS:

Any problems with these?
If we can't hear by COB today, we will
assessing delay now OK.

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CLASSIFIED FAX FROM 0700-1700 MON-FRI (703)695-4812

UNCLASSIFIED



**Response to Questions taken for the Record
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Slocombe's Testimony to
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
June 8, 1995**

Question #3: "What are the United States' "unique capabilities" that might necessitate out participation in the withdrawal or redeployment of UNPROFOR forces?"

The following uniques U.S. capabilities would be necessary for a successful UNPROFOR evacuation:

- **Strategic lift--air and sea**
- **Aerial strategic reconnaissance**
- **Enhanced Close Air Support (CAS)--to include early warning and electronic countermeasures aircraft**
- **Civil affairs and Psychological operations**
- **Intelligence--integration with the Intelligence Coordination Cell (ICC), providing strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence**
- **Specialized equipment--radar, communication, and night vision**
- **Aerial exploitation aircraft (battlefield reconnaissance)**
- **Aircraft carrier operations**

**QFR from Under Secretary Slocombe's
Testimony to the SFRC on 8 June 95**

4a) What would be the cost to utilize those "unique capabilities" if we were to participate in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces?

Preliminary estimates for the total cost of UNPROFOR withdrawal, assisted by NATO, are approximately \$2.1 billion. US forces would participate as an integral part of NATO OPLAN 40104. The exact cost for employment of our unique capabilities is embedded within the approximate \$1B estimate for our participation in OPLAN 40104 and are yet to be determined.

4b) What would be the cost to utilize those "unique capabilities" if we were to participate in the redeployment of UNPROFOR forces?

In an emergency, OPLAN 40104 supports redeployment of part of UNPROFOR. We are unable to estimate the exact cost of such a contingency because it would depend upon the emergency at hand, the number and type of UN troops needing emergency redeployment and the subsequent tailoring of the NATO force which would be dispatched to perform the mission.

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 20 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
NATO

DEFENSE POLICY
CONGRESSIONAL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FORCEPREP NOTIFICATION TO NATO FOR OPLAN 40104

ACTION: PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM PER BERGER DUE DATE: 23 JUN 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: DREW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DANVERS

DREW

NSC CHRON

VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By VL NARA, Date 6/3/2014

2013-0687-E

COMMENTS: WALKED TO PRES BY BERGER

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSDRS

DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9504705

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE	Z 95062009 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
002 PRESIDENT	Z 95062009 FOR DECISION
002	X 95062012 PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM PER BERGER

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 950620	VICE PRESIDENT
002 950620	WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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National Security Council
The White House

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Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>OKS 6/20</u>	<u>N</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS: walk-in to pres by Berger -
see note

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National Security Council
The White House

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Sens	_____	_____	_____
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Lake	<u>7</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: FORCEPREP Notification to NATO for OPLAN 40104. Record ID: 9504705. (1 page)	06/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2717

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TALKING POINTS FOR CALLS TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

US RESPONSE TO SHAPE REQUEST FOR PLANNING FORCES FOR OPLAN40104

As you know, in December of last year the President informed our Allies that the US is prepared, in principle, to commit US ground forces to a NATO operation to help UN peace forces withdraw from the Former Yugoslavia.

The President has also committed to consulting the Congress at every step of the planning and execution process.

The SACEUR on May 1 requested nations to identify forces required to implement the withdrawal plan. This is part of the ongoing process between SACEUR and nations enabling him to plan the required force structure, to identify the organization of forces, and to highlight any shortfalls. This call is to inform you that the US is responding to that request with a force list for planning of 24,688. This figure is below the 25,000 level publicly announced by the President and presented in briefings to the Congress. This figure does not include forces already in place in operations DENY FLIGHT, PROVIDE PROMISE, SHARP GUARD, those anticipated for operation DARING LION, or those support troops stationed in Europe.

This is not a commitment to participate in the withdrawal operation. That commitment requires a separate decision by the NAC (for which the US must consent) and a decision by the President, after consultation with Congress, that the US would participate. It does, however, indicate to NATO the forces the US would provide to an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation from Bosnia should those decisions be taken.

All other NATO nations have already submitted their responses. SACEUR has requested an expedited US response so that he can brief the NAC next Wednesday on responses to the NATO request for planning forces, and so he can continue refining plans and identify potential shortfalls in forces.

Our policy remains to do everything we can to keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia, and we have no requirement to begin withdrawal at this time. However, withdrawal planning must proceed. By identifying US forces to SACEUR we are supporting prudent military planning and preparations by the NATO Commander. It does not, however, represent any additional US commitment beyond what has already been stated previously in public and to the Congress--that, if we decided to participate in

a NATO-led withdrawal operation, we would be prepared to commit as many as 25,000 additional US land, air, maritime, and amphibious forces.

We will continue to keep you informed as withdrawal planning continues.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4705

June 20, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: NELSON DREW *ND*

SUBJECT: OPLAN 40104 FORCEPREP Information Memorandum to President

The attached Information Memorandum to the President explains the state of play regarding the need to go forward with Congressional calls and notification to NATO of the U.S. FORCEPREP for OPLAN 40104.

OSD/JCS would like to move on this in time for SACEUR's briefing to the NAC tomorrow morning in Brussels. The OPLAN will not be up for approval tomorrow, although that could occur as early as next week.

Concurrence by: Bill Danvers *BD*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the attached memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Information Memorandum to the President on OPLAN 40104
FORCEPREP
Tab A Talking Points for Congressional Calls

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *VR* NARA, Date *7/03/2014*

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4779

June 21, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH:

AD ALEXANDER VERSHBOW/*AOZ* RICHARD A. CLARKE

FROM:

AD NELSON DREW/MICHAEL SHEFFAN *MS*

SUBJECT:

Funding Strategy for U.S. Support to the UN Rapid Reaction Force

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President transmitting the funding strategy for U.S. support to the UN Rapid Reaction Force.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Funding Options Paper

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *V2* NARA, Date *6/3/2014*

213-0617-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. draft	Memo for the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Funding Strategy for U.S. Support. Record ID: 9504779. (4 pages)	06/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2717

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. paper	Duplicate of 001b. (9 pages)	06/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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OA/Box Number: 897

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