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Folder Title: Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [2]				
Staff Office-Individual: European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander				
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake and Patrick Griffin. Subject: Response to Gingrich and Dole. Record ID: 9505043. (2 pages)	06/29/1995	P1/b(1)
002. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake and Patrick Griffin. Subject: Use of Section 506(a)(1). Record ID: 9504963. (2 pages)	06/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [2]

2013-0687-F

vz2716

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

UNPROFOR: US QUESTIONS ON RAPID REACTION FORCE: UK RESPONSE

Q. What is the mission of the RRF? Is it designed solely to provide protection to existing UNPROFOR forces, or will it also have a role in making UNPROFOR more effective in implementing its mandate?

A. The mission is to reinforce UNPROFOR in order to reduce the vulnerability of its personnel and enhance its capacity to carry out its existing mandate. The RRF will provide the UNPROFOR commander with well-armed and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to UN personnel. It will reduce the risk of casualties and harassment.

RRF missions could include:

- emergency actions/responses to assist isolated or threatened UN units;
- help with redeployment of elements of UNPROFOR;
- facilitating freedom of movement where necessary.

The RRF will give the commanders additional capacities between a strong protest and air strikes: increase tactical flexibility: and have a deterrent effect. It will not change UNPROFOR's role to peace enforcement. The status of UNPROFOR and its impartiality will be unaffected.

Q. Will it have a role in breaking the siege of Sarajevo or in resupplying the enclaves? Will it help protect the safe areas? Will it secure Sarajevo airport?

A. The RRF will act in support of UNPROFOR in its present activities. These include negotiated efforts to end the siege of Sarajevo, ensure resupply of the enclaves and deter attacks on the safe areas.

Q. Will it come to the assistance of all UNPROFOR troops, or just British, French and Dutch troops?

A. The RRF will act in support of UNPROFOR as a whole.

Q. Who will make decisions on when to employ the force? What command and control arrangements do you envision? Will the force respond to orders from the Secretary General, from SRSG Akashi? Who will be the military commander? Will the force act independently of UN civilian control?

A. The force will operate under the existing UN chain of command. It will be under the operational control of the UN military commanders, who will continue to be under the overall

direction of the UN Secretary General and his Special Representative. The specific tasks assigned to the RRF will be determined by the UN commanders on the ground.

Q. What rules of engagement will the force have? Will they be different from other UNPROFOR units?

A. The force will act under existing UN ROEs. The RRF will operate under national uniform, UN flag and insignia but without blue helmets or white vehicles.

Q. Is this the bulk of the European contribution to OPLAN 40104? How will this force differ from the forces Britain, France and the Netherlands would contribute to an UNPROFOR withdrawal?

A. The Europeans have made separate and substantive commitments to the NATO withdrawal plan.

Q. How would this force coordinate close air support from NATO? Would a dual key apply to close air support requests from the RRF? Would this change the dual key arrangement for other UNPROFOR units?

A. There will be no change to existing dual key arrangements.

Q. Will the RRF be available to assist operations in Croatia or in Macedonia, if needed on an urgent basis?

A. The RRF is intended for operations in Bosnia, but will be an integral part of the overall UN peacekeeping effort in the region.

Q. Will the force act to protect civilians under attack?

A. Protection of civilians is part of the UN's mandate: how the RRF will be used in support of this objective is a matter for the ground commanders.

Q. Will the force have a role in delivering humanitarian assistance?

A. Humanitarian assistance also remains a central part of UNPROFOR's mandate. The precise role of the RRF in such operations will be a matter for the ground commanders.

Q. Will the force have the capability and/or the authority to rescue hostages?

A. The purpose of the RRF is not to rescue hostages. But its missions could include emergency actions to assist isolated or threatened UN units.

Q. What type of assistance are you looking for from the US? (What has the US promised, how will it be funded? We need this information to answer the Gilman letter.)

A. We want the US to fund its full share of the costs of the RRF, to provide material assistance (Defense Secretary Perry has already promised continued CAS, certain types of equipment, strategic lift and an intelligence co-ordination cell), and give the Force its full political backing.

Q. What logistics base will you use to support the force? Will you use UNPROFOR, or is the force self supporting? Given the US position on funding how will you keep the accounts separate?


A. The logistics and other detailed arrangements on the ground are still being worked out.

Q. What circumstances will trigger the deployment to theater of the standby French brigade? Who decides -- the French or the UN?

A. As with other elements of the force, an offer of further reinforcements would be a national decision for the troop contributor concerned, in consultation with the UN. The increase in UNPROFOR's authorised strength by up to 12,500 additional troops, agreed in SCR 998, provides sufficient headroom to include the standby French brigade.

Q. What activities will the RRF engage in when not pursuing protective measures? Can other UN units call on its help for day-to-day activities, or are its mission and personnel sealed off from those of the existing UNPROFOR?

A. The precise day-to-day tasks of the RRF, and other elements of UNPROFOR, are a matter for the ground commanders.



**Estimated
Civilian
Fatalities
in
Bosnia/Croatia
1991-1995
As of 31 March 1995**


*To Date

■ **Bosnia**
■ **Croatia**


CROATIA:

12,500 Killed/Missing
Since June 1991

(Most Deaths Occurred
in 1991).



UNPROFOR Casualties in Balkans 1992-1995



As of 31 March 1995

SOURCE: March 1995 UNPROFOR Facts Sheets

* Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

June 29, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to respond to your decision to provide U.S. funds, material, transportation, and close air support in support of the deployment of the European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to Bosnia and Herzegovina. By doing so, your administration has essentially dismissed the serious concerns we expressed in our June 15 letter to you.

We are displeased by your administration's decision to disregard our strong opposition to funding the RRF through U.N. assessments and to acquiesce to partial funding -- of approximately \$35 million for six months -- through U.N. assessments. In addition to acquiescing in additional assessed contributions, your administration is proposing to provide \$60 million in assistance from the Department of Defense. Under current circumstances, we oppose the provision of this assistance and the exercise of any authorities to waive application of relevant provisions of law. The use of special authorities to draw down defense resources without congressional approval is not what we envisioned in our June 15 letter. Use of such special authorities to circumvent the will of Congress is likely to lead to restriction and limitation of these authorities in future legislation.


Of greater concern than the decision to provide more resources to a bloated and failed operation is the apparent decision to subject U.S. military personnel to greater risks than are necessary. We cannot understand the Administration's acquiescence in the decision by General Janvier -- subsequently reaffirmed by U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali -- to veto the request by Admiral Leighton Smith to attack Bosnian Serb targets, including air defenses, around Banja Luka which threaten U.S. and NATO air crews in Operation Deny Flight. According to U.N. and U.S. officials, the RRF will operate under the same conditions and mandate as UNPROFOR. We are extremely disturbed that you have decided to provide close air support to the RRF in light of these inherently flawed and dangerous command arrangements.

We believe that it is unconscionable for U.S. air crews -- or any other U.S. military personnel -- to be subjected to greater risks than are necessary because of the political sensitivities of U.N. bureaucrats. As such, it is essential that the rules of engagement be immediately reviewed and amended to allow preemptive actions to suppress threats should such measures be necessary. Anything less would unnecessarily risk American lives.

Mr. President, it is our view that U.S. funding for and participation in supporting the RRF is ill-conceived. In Congressional briefings on the RRF late yesterday, the most fundamental questions could not be answered -- questions about the mission, goals, and standards for measuring progress. Furthermore, Administration officials indicated the RRF deployment would not measurably affect UNPROFOR's ability or willingness to implement the mandate given them by the Security Council, in particular, the protection of U.N. designated safe havens and enforcement of the weapons exclusion zones in conjunction with NATO. Recent developments further highlight a hopelessly incompetent operation. In our view, it is time to terminate funding for the entire UNPROFOR operation. Enough is enough -- the Bosnian people, our military personnel, and the U.S. taxpayer deserve better.

Sincerely,


NEWT GINGRICH


BOB DOLE

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

June 15, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing with respect to the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) -- a matter we discussed at length with French President Jacques Chirac yesterday evening. It is our understanding that the Administration and the French government would like to pass a resolution authorizing the RRF in the U.N. Security Council this afternoon.

Due to the absence of Administration consultations with the Congress, we have many serious questions and concerns about authorizing the RRF which have not been addressed. The Chairmen of the appropriate committees of jurisdiction have clearly not been consulted nor provided with critical information about the mandate, mission, duration, command arrangements and cost of this new operation.

Nevertheless, in our view, efforts by the French government and other UNPROFOR contributor governments to protect their forces on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be respected. The United States would expect no less from an ally. It is the right of these governments to take measures necessary to protect their soldiers. In this regard, President Chirac informed us that the command arrangements for the RRF -- composed of troops in national uniforms, and not blue helmets -- would not be subject to vetoes by U.N. civilian officials that have to date crippled the UNPROFOR operation. We urge you to make this point explicit in any U.N. Security Council resolution which authorizes the RRF.

President Chirac assured us that he was only seeking U.S. political support, and not a financial commitment. In view of this assurance, we would not object to your Administration's decision to support for President Chirac's efforts to protect UNPROFOR troops. We believe that it is essential, however, that any Security Council resolution make clear that: (1) the costs of the RRF and any additional personnel authorized under the resolution will not be assessed to U.N. member states; and (2) no additional U.S. financial or military obligations will be incurred as a result of the resolution. In our view, if you choose to support a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the expansion of UNPROFOR to accommodate the RRF, the costs


should be borne through voluntary contributions. We oppose funding the RRF through U.N. assessments. This is consistent with our discussion with President Chirac.

We expect that the questions regarding cost, funding, and, most important, U.S. military commitments raised in the June 13th letter from Chairmen Gilman, Livingston, and Rogers will be promptly answered. We note that these are questions that should have been answered in the consultation process required by law. To act without a clear understanding of the consequences is unacceptable. Furthermore, we would request that you inform us of your decision and its underlying rationale so that we may share it with our colleagues.

Finally, we would like to emphasize that our concurrence for measures to protect UNPROFOR, such as the RRF, should in no way be interpreted as support for the present European and Administration approach to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we discussed with President Chirac, we have fundamental differences over what our policy toward Bosnia should be. We believe that the U.N. operation in Bosnia has been a costly failure. In our view abandoning the present "neutral" approach, withdrawing UNPROFOR, and lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government is the principled and prudent policy to adopt.

Sincerely,


NEWT GINGRICH


BOB DOLE

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

June 13, 1995

The Honorable Warren Christopher
Secretary of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We were dumbfounded to learn yesterday that the Administration intends to vote in favor of a United Nations Security Council resolution as soon as tomorrow that will substantially increase the authorized personnel strength of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, thereby increasing the cost of that operation by an estimated \$520 million per year.

This critically important piece of information was revealed to Congress yesterday for the first time at a staff briefing two days before the planned Security Council vote. Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff neglected to mention this detail in his testimony before the International Relations Committee about Bosnia last Thursday, June 8th. Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow also failed to mention it when he briefed the International Relations Committee about Bosnia on Friday, June 2nd.

We are deeply disappointed by what appears to be an unwillingness on the part of the Administration to fully inform Congress about the spiraling costs of its Bosnia policy.


We also are deeply concerned by what this episode suggests about how the Administration intends to handle changes to U.N. peacekeeping operations in the future. The total lack of consultation with Congress about this costly decision is utterly inconsistent with the understandings we thought had been reached about consultation in such cases in section 407 of P.L. 103-236, the "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995". The ease with which the Administration has avoided the meaningful consultation that section 407 was intended to require underscores the urgent need to revise that section along the lines set forth in H.R. 7, the "National Security Revitalization Act".

We urge the Administration to oppose any resolution in the United Nations Security Council that would significantly increase the size and cost of the UNPROFOR operation until you have fully briefed our Committees and provided written answers to the following questions:

1. How much will the resolution add to the cost of UNPROFOR, and how much of that additional cost will be assessed to the United States?
2. What source of funding does the Administration intend to utilize to pay the increased cost to the United States? If the Administration intends to seek additional or supplemental appropriations, have budget offsets been identified, and if so, what are they?
3. To the degree that the resolution will have the effect of reimbursing France, the United Kingdom, and other countries for the cost of the new Rapid Reaction Force they are deploying to Bosnia, why is the United States not receiving similar reimbursement for the costs of its new and existing commitments in support of UNPROFOR?
4. Has the United States sought United Nations reimbursement for its logistics, air support, and other activities in support of UNPROFOR? If not, why not?
5. What additional military obligations would the United States undertake pursuant to the Security Council resolution or any bilateral agreements with France, the United Kingdom, or other countries?

If the Administration proceeds to vote in favor of a Security Council resolution increasing the size and cost of UNPROFOR without adequate consultation and without providing satisfactory answers to these questions, we will have little choice but to oppose any Administration request for the authorization or appropriation of funds to pay for the increased cost to the United States.


Sincerely,



BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
Chairman
Committee on International
Relations



BOB LIVINGSTON
Chairman
Committee on
Appropriations



HAROLD ROGERS
Chairman
Subcommittee on Commerce,
Justice, State and Judiciary



Veleposlanstvo Republike Hrvatske u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama
Embassy of the Republic of Croatia to the United States of America
2343 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington D.C. 20008
tel. (202) 588 5899 fax (202) 588 8937

June 30, 1995

The Honorable
Alexander Vershbow
Director for Europe and
Special Assistant to the President
National Security Council
The Old Executive Office Building
Room 368
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Mr. Vershbow,

Enclosed please find a copy of the letter Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Mate Granić, sent to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, on June 28, 1995.

I am also enclosing a memo with attachments on the direct and active involvement of the Belgrade regime in the occupied territories of Croatia, which has significantly increased in the last few days. This involvement has consisted of sending military equipment and soldiers from Serbia and Montenegro into Croatia. This is an example of what I have been stressing in our recent conversations.

Sincerely,

for Professor Dr. Petar Šarčević
Ambassador



REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINISTER

H.E. Boutros Boutros Ghali
Secretary General
UNITED NATIONS
New York

Zagreb, 28 June 1995

Your Excellency,

The Croatian Government is extremely alarmed and concerned by the latest developments in the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" and by the direct implications and consequences of these developments for the occupied territories of Croatia. The degree of involvement of the Belgrade regime on behalf of their proxies in Croatia and the level of its intervention in the occupied territories of Croatia has increased in a significant way recently, and in the last few days in particular. Your Special Representative Mr. Yasushi Akashi was informed of this matter of critical importance on 26 June 1995 in Zagreb.

The related developments in the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" and the occupied territories of Croatia constitute: (i) unauthorized direct military intervention by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" across an international border of a sovereign state, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and relevant Security Council resolutions; (ii) a continuation of a policy of occupation pursued by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" in violation of General Assembly resolution 49/43; (iii) a violation by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" of the border blockade established by resolution 943 (1994) and reaffirmed by resolution 988 (1995); and (iv) a grave breach of international humanitarian law by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" which amounts to a war crime.

The Croatian Government has already documented in several letters that the "Army of Yugoslavia" is actively engaged in Croatia by sending material from Serbia and Montenegro to the occupied territories; by directing the paramilitary units on the occupied territories through about 6,000 Belgrade-commissioned officers sent to these territories for that purpose; by paying the wages of those officers and of other members of the proxy government and military; and, by forcibly mobilizing citizens of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" and ethnic Serb citizens of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina for military service in the occupied territories of Croatia (S/1995/229, S/1995/401, A/50/229).

The forcible mobilization is proceeding on a large scale. As of 14 June 1995, over 4,500 mobilized men were transferred against their will while a further 500 volunteers were also transported to the occupied territories of Croatia. The transfer of military personnel from Serbia and Montenegro, across the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, under the control of Bosnian Serbs, is a direct violation of the Security Council resolutions 752 (1992), 820 (1993), 871 (1993), 943 (1994), and in particular 988 (1995). The soldiers are being transported in vehicles provided by the "Army of Yugoslavia", across the Serbia/Bosnia border at Rača, since 14 June 1995, and entering the occupied territories of Croatia at Dvor, since 15 June 1995. The mobilization in Serbia and Montenegro and reinforcement of the paramilitary forces in the occupied territories is expected to continue. The majority of those mobilized in Serbia and Montenegro and sent to Croatia are civilians, but a significant number of conscripts are members of the special forces of the "Army of Yugoslavia". Some are also sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

According to the information available to the Government of the Republic of Croatia, the primary goal of the Belgrade authorities in this regard is to use the transferred special units of the "Army of Yugoslavia" to further strengthen and reinforce their stronghold in the area of Slunj in Croatia, and thereby secure the occupation of this region, as well as to amass considerable forces for further engagements in the strategically important region of Bihać in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Security Council declared "safe area".

As additional evidence of the direct and increasing involvement of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" in Croatia, I should like to draw your attention to the fact that the commander of the Serb paramilitary forces in Croatia, Lt. Gen. Mile Mrkšić, prior to his present assignment, served as Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the "Army of Yugoslavia", and was responsible for its special forces. Lt. General Mrkšić was also the JNA officer responsible for the siege of Vukovar. Moreover, only during the month of June 1995 the following other senior "Army of Yugoslavia" commissioned officers were assigned for duty in the occupied territories of Croatia:

1. Colonel Slobodan Tarbuk from the "Army of Yugoslavia" Kragujevac corps, transferred to the 39th corps of the so-called Army of RSK in Petrinja, Croatia, on 9 June 1995.
2. Lt. Colonel Vučeković from the "Army of Yugoslavia", transferred to the 11th corps of the so-called Army of RSK in Croatia, on 23 June 1995.
3. Colonel Uroš Despotović from the "Army of Yugoslavia", transferred to the 70th paramilitary Infantry Brigade of the so-called Army of RSK in Plaški, Croatia, in June 1995.
4. Colonel Milivojević from the "Army of Yugoslavia", transferred to the 70th paramilitary Infantry Brigade of the so-called Army of RSK in Plaški, Croatia, in June 1995.
5. Lt-Colonel Miloš Cvjetičanin from the "Army of Yugoslavia", transferred to the 2nd Armoured of the so-called Army of RSK brigade in Croatia, in June 1995.

6. Colonel Milorad Stupar from the "Army of Yugoslavia" Pančevo Special Units corps, transferred to the paramilitary Special Forces of the so-called Army of RSK corps in Croatia, in June 1995.

Furthermore, on 13 June 1995, two "Army of Yugoslavia" tank units totalling 26 M-84 MBTs operated by the "Army of Yugoslavia" 211th Armored Brigade, were sent from from Niš, Serbia, across the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and deployed in Štunj, in the occupied territories of Croatia in sector Glina. On 12 June 1995, one unit of armoured personnel carriers (APCs) consisting of 10 vehicles operated by the "Army of Yugoslavia" Second Motorised Brigade was sent from Valjevo, Serbia, across the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and deployed in the same region in Croatia, at Banovina. In addition, on 19 June 1995, the "Army of Yugoslavia" supplied equipage for two Mi-8 rotary-wing aircraft located at the Udbina airport in the occupied territories, sector Knin, through the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Your Excellency,

I would also like to inform you that as of May 1995, a total of 320 Serb paramilitary troops remain in the zone of separation (ZOS), in violation of the 29 March 1994 cease-fire agreement and resolution 994 (1995). Of these, 70 are in sector "Vukovar", 50 in sector "Glina", and 200 in sector "Knin". On 22 June 1995, two new platoons of paramilitary personnel were deployed in the ZOS in the vicinity of Kasić, in sector "Knin", directly threatening the civilian traffic on the Zadar - Maslenica highway, and on 23 June 1995, two additional platoons of paramilitary personnel were deployed in the ZOS near Osijek. The transfer of soldiers from Serbia and Montenegro may have contributed to a troop build-up in the ZOS.

The aforementioned facts clearly indicate that the Croatian Serb paramilitary forces are a proxy of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" -- organized, equipped, controlled, trained and commanded by the "Army of Yugoslavia". The government in Belgrade must therefore be held fully accountable for conducting open military intervention against a UN Member-State and occupying parts of the sovereign territory of that State.

In this regard, the Government of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" must also be held accountable for grave breaches of international humanitarian law. The forcible mobilization of ethnic Serb citizens of the Republic of Croatia into paramilitary units which are hostile to their country of citizenship, and in which the authorities of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" are involved, represents a grave breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Article 51, and is war crime (1945 London Agreement).

The blatant violation of international humanitarian law and violation of relevant United Nations resolutions, in particular resolution 988 (1995), by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" can not be condoned. My Government hereby submits that the above information should be fully addressed in the upcoming Security

Council review of the suspended sanctions regime pursuant to resolution 988 (1995). The Croatian Government is of the firm view that the above developments constitute a serious breach of resolution 988 (1995), and therefore, the suspended parts of the sanctions regime must be re-instituted without delay. The Croatian Government is also of the view that the Security Council should consider, with utmost urgency, and condemn in the strongest terms the most resent acts of interference by the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" into the internal affairs of Croatia, and take appropriate measures in the spirit and the letter of General Assembly resolution 49/43 and Security Council resolutions 871 (1994) and 994 (1995). The condoning of this serious border violation and silence about Belgrade's intervention in Croatia would be a very serious setback for the situation in the occupied territories of Croatia and for the peace process in the region in general.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Mate Granić

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'M. Granić', with a stylized flourish at the end.



Veleposlanstvo Republike Hrvatske u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama
Embassy of Republic of Croatia to the United States of America
2343 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington D.C. 20008
Congressional Affairs tel (202) 588 5899, ext. 26 fax (202) 588 8938

TO: **Members of the U.S. Congress**
FROM: **Dr. Petar Šarčević, Ambassador**
DATE: June 30, 1995

RE: **BELGRADE REGIME RESPONDS TO OFFERS FOR SUSPENSION OF
SANCTIONS BY STEPPING UP ITS INTERVENTION IN THE
CROATIAN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES**

It is with deep concern that I write to you regarding the dangerous build-up of the Yugoslav army forces in the occupied territories of Croatia.

During the past several weeks the international community has been engaged in intensive negotiations with the Belgrade regime over suspension of sanctions in exchange for the normalization of relations with Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Concurrently, the Belgrade regime stepped up its intervention in Croatia's occupied territories. Croatia has obtained copious evidence that documents the active engagement of the Yugoslav army in Croatia by:

- sending material from Serbia and Montenegro to the occupied territories;
- directing the paramilitary units on the occupied territories through Belgrade-commissioned officers sent to these territories for that purpose;
- paying the wages of those officers and of other members of the proxy government and military;
- forcibly mobilizing citizens of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (Serbia and Montenegro) and ethnic Serb citizens of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina for military service in the occupied territories of Croatia.

Taken together, the above evidence (see Attachment) is tantamount to yet another breach of the internationally recognized borders that UNCRO is supposed to protect, as well as fortifying the unlawful occupation of Croatia's territories. At the same time, this evidence represents an additional build-up in the region, and specifically, threatens the adjacent Bihać safe area in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This situation could result in a renewed attack from occupied Croatian territories on this important Bosniac enclave. My Government would then be placed in a very difficult position in light of its sincere efforts to meet and honor the obligations in bilateral agreements with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

I appeal to you to keep abreast of developments in both the occupied territories of Croatia and neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. Your highest consideration of this escalating situation is essential.

ATTACHMENT¹

Evidence of Forcible Mobilization

The forcible mobilization is proceeding on a large scale and is expected to continue. As of June 14, 1995, over 4,500 mobilized men were transferred against their will and a further 500 volunteers have been transported to the occupied territories of Croatia. In addition, there has been a dramatic increase in the transfer of military personnel from Serbia and Montenegro through the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina in violation of relevant Security Council resolutions. Soldiers have been transported in vehicles provided by the Yugoslav army and entering the occupied territories of Croatia. The primary objective of Belgrade authorities is to further strengthen and reinforce their hold in the area of Slunj in Croatia, and thereby secure the occupation of this region and amass considerable forces for further engagements in the strategically important region of Bihać (UN "safe area") in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Evidence of Direct and Increasing Military Involvement in Croatia

The very fact that the commander of the Serb paramilitary forces in Croatia, Lt. Gen. Mile Mrkšić, prior to his present assignment, served as Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav army, demonstrates the level of military involvement of Belgrade authorities in the occupied parts of Croatia. Mrkšić was responsible for the special forces of the Yugoslav army and the JNA officer responsible for the siege of Vukovar.

Other evidence of Serbian military involvement in Croatia include the following. On June 13, 1995 two Yugoslav army tank units totalling 26 M-84 MBTs operated by the Yugoslav army's 211th Armored Brigade, were sent from Niš, Serbia, across the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and deployed in Slunj, in the occupied territories of Croatia in sector Glina. In addition, on June 12, 1995 one unit of armored personnel carriers (APCs) consisting of 10 vehicles operated by the Yugoslav army Second Motorized Brigade was sent from Valjevo, Serbia, across the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and deployed in the same region in Croatia, at Banovina. Furthermore, on June 19, 1995 the Yugoslav army supplied equipment for two MI-8 rotary-wing aircraft located at the Udbina airport in the occupied territories, sector Knin, through the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

¹ Source: Letter sent by the The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations Secretary General on June 28, 1995,

Croatia has also brought to the attention of the United Nations evidence that throughout June 1995 the following senior officials of the Yugoslav army commissioned officers were assigned for duty in the occupied territories of Croatia:

- Colonel Slobodan Tarbuk from the Yugoslav army Kragujevac corps, transferred to the 39th corps of the so-called Army of RSK in Petrinja, Croatia, on June 9, 1995.
- Lt. Colonel Vučeković from the Yugoslav army, transferred to the 11th corps of the so-called Army of RSK in Croatia, on June 23, 1995.
- Colonel Uroš Despotović from the Yugoslav army, transferred to the 70th paramilitary Infantry Brigade of the so-called Army of RSK in Plaški, Croatia, in June 1995.
- Colonel Milivojević from the Yugoslav army, transferred to the 70th paramilitary Infantry Brigade of the so-called Army of RSK in Plaški, Croatia, in June 1995.
- Lt. Colonel Miloš Cvjetičanin from the Yugoslav army, transferred to the 2nd Armored of the so-called Army of RSK brigade in Croatia, in June 1995.
- Colonel Milorad Stupar from the Yugoslav army Pančevo Special Units corps, transferred to the paramilitary Special Forces of the so-called Army of RSK corps in Croatia, in June 1995.

Violation of the Zone of Separation (ZOS)

As of May 1995 a total of 320 Serb paramilitary troops remain in the zone of separation (ZOS), in violation of the March 29, 1994 cease-fire agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 994 (1995). Of these, 70 are in sector "Vukovar", 50 in sector "Glina", and 200 in sector "Knin". Furthermore, on June 22, 1995 two new platoons of paramilitary personnel were deployed in the ZOS in the vicinity of Kašić, in sector "Knin", directly threatening the civilian traffic on the Zadar-Maslenica highway. On June 23, 1995 two additional platoons of paramilitary personnel were deployed in the ZOS near Osijek.

**REINFORCEMENTS TO THE PARAMILITARY FORCES
IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF CROATIA
FROM "ARMY OF YUGOSLAVIA"
JUNE 1995**

Date:	Reinforcement type:	Number	From:	To:
	EQUIPMENT			
12 June	Armored Personnel Carriers	10	2 motorized brig. [Valjevo]	Banovina [sector Glina]
13 June	Main Battle Tanks M-84	26	211 armored brigade [Nis]	Slunj [sector Glina]
19 June	Anti-Armor Ordinance for Mi-8 rotary-wing aircraft	2	"Army of Yugoslavia"	Udbina airfield [sector Knin]
	PERSONNEL			
4 June	volunteers	100	Serbia	Plaski [Knin]
13 June	volunteers	800	Serbia	Knin [Knin]
13 June	forcibly mobilized	150	Serbia	Batnoga [Glina]
14 June	forcibly mobilized	300-400	Serbia	Vukovar
14 June	forcibly mobilized	400-500	Serbia	Slunj [Glina]
15 June	volunteers	100-120	Serbia	Plaski [Knin]
16 June	forcibly mobilized	700-800	Novi Sad	Slunj [Glina]
17 June	forcibly mobilized	2000-2300	Serbia	Slunj [Glina]
17 June	volunteers	80	Serbia	Soskovci
	TOTAL	4600-5200		

OFFICERS

Date:	Name:	Rank:	From:	To:
9 June	Slobodan Tarbuk	Colonel	Kragujevac Corps, "FRY"	39 Corps
26 June	N. Vuckovic	Lt. Colonel	"Army of Yugoslavia"	11 Corps
June	Uros Despotovic	Colonel	"Army of Yugoslavia"	70 brig. [Plaski]
June	Milivojevic	Colonel	"Army of Yugoslavia"	70 brig. [Plaski]
June	Milos Cvjeticanin	Lt. Colonel	"Army of Yugoslavia"	2 arm. brig/ spec. Corps
June	Milorad Stupar	Colonel	Commando brigade Pancevo, "FRY"	Spec. Forces Corps

Source: Letter from Mr. Hrvoje Sarinic, Head of the Croatian Government's Commission for UNCRO, to Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General, June 28, 1995

0-28-85 1 11:33 1 SECURITY COUNCIL-

212 745 831674 2

*The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Sarajevo*

28 June, 1995

H.E. Mr. Davor Graf Zo Rantau
President of the Security Council
United Nations
New York

Excellency:

In our letter dated 14 June 1995, (B/1995483) and noted in Security Council resolution 998 (1995), we responded to and issued our sovereign consent to the deployment of the "Rapid Reaction Capability" as a reinforcement to UNPROFOR. In our previous letter of 29 March 1995 (B/1995/245) and also noted in resolution 962 (1995), we outlined our concerns regarding the lack of implementation and erosion of the United Nations mandate in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These concerns have not been addressed so far. In fact, there has been a continuing and accelerated erosion of the implementation of the United Nations mandate since our letter of March 29.

Most recently, the "safe area - exclusion zone" in and around Sarajevo has been totally vacated and left unenforced by UNPROFOR in contradiction to existing Security Council Resolutions and NATO decisions. This fact is all but confirmed and sanctioned in the UN Secretary General's letter of June 21, 1995 to H. E. Waly Cissa, the NATO Secretary General. Furthermore, UNPROFOR, and by extension NATO, on at least two occasions refused to enforce the "no-fly zone" as specifically mandated by Resolution 816 (1993). We take note that Resolution 998 (1995) specifically reaffirmed the existing mandate of UNPROFOR and commitment to implement such mandate in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are disappointed that recent actions have not matched the words expressed therein, and have been inconsistent with the terms of Resolution 998 (1995) and our consent given thereto. This lack of action has provided us with a most unfavorable impression regarding the commitment of the Rapid Reaction Force, and overall, UNPROFOR's will to implement the relevant Security Council resolutions. Once again, this perception has been confirmed by the letter of Mr. Jasmil Alkadi to the Karadzic Serbs.

Therefore, we hereby give the formal notice of our intention to review the extension of our sovereign consent to UNPROFOR in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this context, we formally request consultations with the Security Council, the Secretary - General and his representatives, regarding the intentions and actual measures in implementing the relevant Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, we are prepared to consider all relevant contingencies consistent with the review of our consultations.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,


Muhamed Gacanin
Minister

Dod Talking Points--Srebrenica

-Serb attacks against the civilian population of Srebrenica and the Dutch peacekeepers seeking to protect and help them is a raw aggression against the international community and the peace process. Serb seizure of the enclave has created thousands of new refugees and another humanitarian crisis for the people of Bosnia. This Serb action is clearly an outrage.

-US policy in Bosnia continues to support a peaceful resolution of the conflict based on the international efforts of the UN, NATO and the Contact Group.

-Our efforts to strengthen the role of UNPROFOR, to support deployment of the RRF and to pursue a diplomatic process reflect this conviction.

-The US continues to work with the UN, our allies and the Contact Group to ensure that the safety and well being of the civilian inhabitants of Srebrenica and the Dutch peacekeepers are ensured. We call upon the Serb authorities to allow full access by UNHCR to the civilian refugees in the enclave.

--Serbian authorities in Belgrade must make clear in word and deed that in joins with the civilized world in condemning such brutal acts. In particular, Belgrade should redouble its efforts to ensure the complete physical and political isolation of the Pale Regime.

- -US objectives in this conflict have been consistent:

--Reduce human suffering

--Prevent the conflict from spreading.

--Achieve a peaceful settlement which preserves a viable Bosnian State.

--Keep US forces out of the war in Bosnia as a combatant

--Support our allies and friends on the ground and preserve NATO.

-Continue to believe that the best means to promote balance US interests with the peace process is through the UN and NATO.

-We do not believe that the fall of Srebrenica means the collapse of UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia.

RRF

-We continue to believe the deployment of the RRF is the correct action. There is no assurance that the RRF could have prevented the fall of Srebrenica, but UNPROFOR would have been more capable of responding with military force than it is today.

Unilateral Lift

-We recognize the frustration with the UN and the loss of Srebrenica, but that frustration should not lead to precipitous action which could make the situation worse and place the responsibility for UNPROFOR withdrawal on the US.

[-The Bosnian Government demonstrated at Srebrenica that it is not ready to defend its population.] Pouring arms into Bosnia will not solve this problem in time to prevent even a larger humanitarian disaster.

Unilateral lift of the arms embargo is a tempting reaction to current events. Recognize that it will cause the withdrawal of UN forces at a time when the Government of Bosnia is not sufficiently capable to defend itself. Under those circumstances, those who have tried to make UNPROFOR work will place responsibility for conditions in Bosnia on the US.

TALKING POINTS ON BOSNIA

- What is happening in Srebrenica is utterly deplorable.
- United States is working with our Allies and UNHCR to seek to address urgent humanitarian needs of civilians.
- Events of the past few days underscore the importance of strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can carry out its mission more effectively. Had the Rapid Reaction Force we have supported been in country, it would have provided options for peacekeepers which were not available.
- Clearly, the situation in the enclaves is not pleasant, but the alternative being suggested on Capitol Hill -- lifting the arms embargo -- would be worse. It would automatically drive UNPROFOR out of Bosnia and the United States in.

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

5052

June 30, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: NELSON DREW *ND*
SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Gingrich and Dole on RRF
Funding

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President transmitting a revised letter for the President to send to Gingrich and Dole on RRF funding.

Concurrence by: Bill Danvers *BD/AV*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Gingrich/Dole Ltr Opposing RRF Support, 6/29/95
Tab B Gingrich/Dole Ltr Opposing Increase Funding for
RRF, 6/15/95
Tab C Ltrs from President to Gingrich and Dole

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *1/6 Thind* NARA, Date *6/3/2014*
243-0687-F

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE
PATRICK GRIFFIN

SUBJECT: Response to Gingrich and Dole on RRF Funding

Purpose

To provide letter responding to points raised in the Gingrich/Dole letter of opposition to our support of the RRF.

Background

The attached letters have been revised in line with your instructions.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letters to Senator Dole and Speaker Gingrich reaffirming administration policy of support for our Allies in the RRF and rejecting the Dole and Gingrich policy conclusions, and authorize public release of the letters if the Dole/Gingrich letter is made public.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

- Tab A Gingrich/Dole letter opposing RRF support, June 29, 1995
- Tab B Gingrich/Dole letter opposing increased funding for RRF, June 15, 1995
- Tab C Letters to Gingrich and Dole

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By Va. Thiel NARA, Date 6/3/2014

703-0687-7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

June 29, 1995

**The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.**

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to respond to your decision to provide U.S. funds, material, transportation, and close air support in support of the deployment of the European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to Bosnia and Herzegovina. By doing so, your administration has essentially dismissed the serious concerns we expressed in our June 15 letter to you.

We are displeased by your administration's decision to disregard our strong opposition to funding the RRF through U.N. assessments and to acquiesce to partial funding -- of approximately \$35 million for six months -- through U.N. assessments. In addition to acquiescing in additional assessed contributions, your administration is proposing to provide \$60 million in assistance from the Department of Defense. Under current circumstances, we oppose the provision of this assistance and the exercise of any authorities to waive application of relevant provisions of law. The use of special authorities to draw down defense resources without congressional approval is not what we envisioned in our June 15 letter. Use of such special authorities to circumvent the will of Congress is likely to lead to restriction and limitation of these authorities in future legislation.


Of greater concern than the decision to provide more resources to a bloated and failed operation is the apparent decision to subject U.S. military personnel to greater risks than are necessary. We cannot understand the Administration's acquiescence in the decision by General Janvier -- subsequently reaffirmed by U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali -- to veto the request by Admiral Leighton Smith to attack Bosnian Serb targets, including air defenses, around Banja Luka which threaten U.S. and NATO air crews in Operation Deny Flight. According to U.N. and U.S. officials, the RRF will operate under the same conditions and mandate as UNPROFOR. We are extremely disturbed that you have decided to provide close air support to the RRF in light of these inherently flawed and dangerous command arrangements.

We believe that it is unconscionable for U.S. air crews -- or any other U.S. military personnel -- to be subjected to greater risks than are necessary because of the political sensitivities of U.N. bureaucrats. As such, it is essential that the rules of engagement be immediately reviewed and amended to allow preemptive actions to suppress threats should such measures be necessary. Anything less would unnecessarily risk American lives.

Mr. President, it is our view that U.S. funding for and participation in supporting the RRF is ill-conceived. In Congressional briefings on the RRF late yesterday, the most fundamental questions could not be answered -- questions about the mission, goals, and standards for measuring progress. Furthermore, Administration officials indicated the RRF deployment would not measurably affect UNPROFOR's ability or willingness to implement the mandate given them by the Security Council, in particular, the protection of U.N. designated safe havens and enforcement of the weapons exclusion zones in conjunction with NATO. Recent developments further highlight a hopelessly incompetent operation. In our view, it is time to terminate funding for the entire UNPROFOR operation. Enough is enough -- the Bosnian people, our military personnel, and the U.S. taxpayer deserve better.

Sincerely,


NEWT GINGRICH


BOB DOLE

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

June 15, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing with respect to the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) -- a matter we discussed at length with French President Jacques Chirac yesterday evening. It is our understanding that the Administration and the French government would like to pass a resolution authorizing the RRF in the U.N. Security Council this afternoon.

Due to the absence of Administration consultations with the Congress, we have many serious questions and concerns about authorizing the RRF which have not been addressed. The Chairmen of the appropriate committees of jurisdiction have clearly not been consulted nor provided with critical information about the mandate, mission, duration, command arrangements and cost of this new operation.

Nevertheless, in our view, efforts by the French government and other UNPROFOR contributor governments to protect their forces on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be respected. The United States would expect no less from an ally. It is the right of these governments to take measures necessary to protect their soldiers. In this regard, President Chirac informed us that the command arrangements for the RRF -- composed of troops in national uniforms, and not blue helmets -- would not be subject to vetoes by U.N. civilian officials that have to date crippled the UNPROFOR operation. We urge you to make this point explicit in any U.N. Security Council resolution which authorizes the RRF.

President Chirac assured us that he was only seeking U.S. political support, and not a financial commitment. In view of this assurance, we would not object to your Administration's decision to support for President Chirac's efforts to protect UNPROFOR troops. We believe that it is essential, however, that any Security Council resolution make clear that: (1) the costs of the RRF and any additional personnel authorized under the resolution will not be assessed to U.N. member states; and (2) no additional U.S. financial or military obligations will be incurred as a result of the resolution. In our view, if you choose to support a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the expansion of UNPROFOR to accommodate the RRF, the costs

should be borne through voluntary contributions. We oppose funding the RRF through U.N. assessments. This is consistent with our discussion with President Chirac.

We expect that the questions regarding cost, funding, and, most important, U.S. military commitments raised in the June 13th letter from Chairmen Gilman, Livingston, and Rogers will be promptly answered. We note that these are questions that should have been answered in the consultation process required by law. To act without a clear understanding of the consequences is unacceptable. Furthermore, we would request that you inform us of your decision and its underlying rationale so that we may share it with our colleagues.

Finally, we would like to emphasize that our concurrence for measures to protect UNPROFOR, such as the RRF, should in no way be interpreted as support for the present European and Administration approach to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we discussed with President Chirac, we have fundamental differences over what our policy toward Bosnia should be. We believe that the U.N. operation in Bosnia has been a costly failure. In our view abandoning the present "neutral" approach, withdrawing UNPROFOR, and lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government is the principled and prudent policy to adopt.

Sincerely,


NEWT GINGRICH


BOB DOLE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I have received your letter of June 29 regarding my decision to provide funding and support for the UN's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) in Bosnia.

The decision to provide support and funding to the RRF, under existing Presidential authority, was made with both the views of Congress, as expressed in your letter of June 15, and those of our Allies clearly in mind. That decision is in the national interest. As Commander in Chief, I will stand by it and support our Allies.

Having reviewed the alternatives and their likely consequences, I am convinced that UNPROFOR's continued presence is vital. Were UNPROFOR to withdraw, there would be no substitute for its critical role in allowing the parties to end the all-out war that existed prior to its deployment (thus reducing civilian casualties from over 130,000 in 1992 to under 3000 last year), assisting UNHCR in providing aid to over 2.8 million Bosnians, or maintaining peaceful relations among the Federation partners in most of central Bosnia. I agree that more is needed, as do our Allies: that is why they have called for creation of the RRF. Support for the RRF is essential to the strengthening of UNPROFOR. Failure to provide that support would result in a split in the NATO Alliance, a heightened risk that the conflict would spread to neighboring regions, greater suffering by the Bosnian people, and an increased danger that we would need to insert a large number of U.S. forces as part of a potentially dangerous NATO withdrawal operation.

Your concerns about the level and nature of U.S. support for the RRF overlook the fact that it is our NATO Allies who will be putting in the forces, bearing most of the burden, and taking most of the risks. They deserve our support, both politically and materially. At the same time, given the already-considerable U.S. contributions to operations in the former Yugoslavia, we have gained Allied agreement that financing the RRF should not be done on a business-as-usual basis. Accordingly, I have insisted that the bulk of the funding be provided through voluntary

contributions. The partial U.S. funding using UN assessments of \$35 million -- less than 8½ of total RRF costs -- is limited to meeting our obligations under previously agreed UNPROFOR force ceilings.

Because of the importance that we and other Allies attach to the RRF as a means of strengthening UNPROFOR, I strongly believe it is in the U.S. interest to make a voluntary contribution as well. Our Allies need U.S. assistance in transporting their forces to the theater of operations, as well as equipment to make the RRF more effective in dealing with provocations. As we have explained in our Congressional consultations in recent days, this is precisely the kind of assistance that existing drawdown authorities were designed to facilitate.

Finally, I must strongly reject your unfounded assertion that my Administration would acquiesce in any decision that would subject American military personnel to unnecessary danger. As you are aware, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) packages are now an integral part of every Deny Flight mission. NATO planes are authorized to respond -- without a UN dual-key -- if surface-to-air missile sites display hostile intent.

At the same time, you cannot expect NATO or UNPROFOR commanders to acquiesce in decisions that would subject their personnel to unnecessary danger. Once the RRF is deployed, the ground commanders will have the means to better protect their forces. Only under these circumstances could you expect the prospects for a more robust NATO air policy to be enhanced.

Our Allies are continuing to refine the rules of engagement and the appropriate role and mandate of the RRF. I will continue to support a robust RRF mission statement and insist on strong measures to ensure the protection of U.S. forces participating in Deny Flight and other air operations.

As always, I remain ready to discuss this with you further.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Leader:

I have received your letter of June 29 regarding my decision to provide funding and support for the UN's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) in Bosnia.

The decision to provide support and funding to the RRF, under existing Presidential authority, was made with both the views of Congress, as expressed in your letter of June 15, and those of our Allies clearly in mind. That decision is in the national interest. As Commander in Chief, I will stand by it and support our Allies.

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As always, I remain ready to discuss this with you further.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert Dole
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

June 29, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to respond to your decision to provide U.S. funds, material, transportation, and close air support in support of the deployment of the European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to Bosnia and Herzegovina. By doing so, your administration has essentially dismissed the serious concerns we expressed in our June 15 letter to you.

We are displeased by your administration's decision to disregard our strong opposition to funding the RRF through U.N. assessments and to acquiesce to partial funding -- of approximately \$35 million for six months -- through U.N. assessments. In addition to acquiescing in additional assessed contributions, your administration is proposing to provide \$60 million in assistance from the Department of Defense. Under current circumstances, we oppose the provision of this assistance and the exercise of any authorities to waive application of relevant provisions of law. The use of special authorities to draw down defense resources without congressional approval is not what we envisioned in our June 15 letter. Use of such special authorities to circumvent the will of Congress is likely to lead to restriction and limitation of these authorities in future legislation.


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We believe that it is unconscionable for U.S. air crews -- or any other U.S. military personnel -- to be subjected to greater risks than are necessary because of the political sensitivities of U.N. bureaucrats. As such, it is essential that the rules of engagement be immediately reviewed and amended to allow preemptive actions to suppress threats should such measures be necessary. Anything less would unnecessarily risk American lives.

Mr. President, it is our view that U.S. funding for and participation in supporting the RRF is ill-conceived. In Congressional briefings on the RRF late yesterday, the most fundamental questions could not be answered -- questions about the mission, goals, and standards for measuring progress. Furthermore, Administration officials indicated the RRF deployment would not measurably affect UNPROFOR's ability or willingness to implement the mandate given them by the Security Council, in particular, the protection of U.N. designated safe havens and enforcement of the weapons exclusion zones in conjunction with NATO. Recent developments further highlight a hopelessly incompetent operation. In our view, it is time to terminate funding for the entire UNPROFOR operation. Enough is enough -- the Bosnian people, our military personnel, and the U.S. taxpayer deserve better.

Sincerely,


NEWT GINGRICH


BOB DOLE

UNCL

29

Jun

95

CLASSIFICATION

DAY

Z-TIME

MONTH

YEAR

THE JOINT STAFF

J-5

DIRECTORATE



FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

● ORIGINATOR ●

LTC Doug Lute
NAME

J5/EurDiv
OFC. SYM

(703) 693-5608
FAX#

cover + 1
TEXT PAGES

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SUBJECT & CLASSIFICATION

-5605
SECURE FAX#

AUTOVON#

AUTHORIZED RELEASER'S PRINTED NAME, RANK, TITLE AND SIGNATURE

REMARKS Please clear attached memo authorizing US military personnel in Croatia for purpose of RRF air/sea lift support. Call clearance to LTC Lute, (703) 614-9431/2/5.

● ADDRESSEE ●

ORGANIZATION	OFC. SYM	NAME	PHONE
NSC / Eur	—	Sandy Vershbow	202- 456-9151
State / Eur		Chris Hill	202- 647-0608
JSISC#	TIME OF TRANSMIT	VERIFYING OFFICIAL	

6/28/95

14:30

7038046541

DSAA OPERATIONS

2001/001



DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2800

In reply refer to:
I-04325/95*Should
Tony see this?
He knows the
info.*MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: LTG Thomas G. Rhame, Director, DSAA
(Prepared by J. Hirsch, 604-6609, x317)SUBJECT: Approval of Deployment in Former Yugoslavia of U.S. Personnel
Associated with Lift of Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) - ACTION
MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: To authorize deployment of Air and Sealift Support Element to Split, Croatia, in support of lift provided to the Rapid Reaction Force under drawdown authorities.

DISCUSSION: The State Department has notified Congress of the President's intent to drawdown under the authority of Section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act up to \$15 million in defense articles and services to provide emergency military assistance in support of transportation requirements necessary to move the RRF personnel and equipment to Bosnia. Included in this drawdown are air and sealift of British, Dutch, and French forces to Split, Croatia. Successful completion of this mission requires deployment of an air and sealift support element from approximately 30 June to 15 August, composed of 75-100 personnel, to assist in the unloading of aircraft and ships. The cost of these forces will be included in the drawdown authority.

RECOMMENDATION: Approve deployment of a air and sealift support element to Split, Croatia, in support of the movement of RRF personnel and equipment.

COORDINATION OGC _____

OSD/ISA _____

JOINT STAFF _____

OSD/S&R _____

SECDEF DECISION:

_____ Approved

_____ Disapproved

_____ Other

*[Signature]
DTS
6/29 0700**(NEED TO GOOD w/
GTCs when All GOOD
IS COMPLETE BEFORE
GOING TO SECDEF)*

Hachet
Bordeaux
JTF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5043

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 29, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: NELSON DREW *ND*
SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Gingrich and Dole on RRF
Funding

Attached at Tab I is your memorandum to the President reaffirming our policy on the RRF and preparing a response to Gingrich and Dole on RRF funding.

Concurrence by: Alan Kreczko *AK*, Dick Clarke *DC*, Randy Beers *RB*, Bill Danvers

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Gingrich/Dole Ltr Opposing RRF Support, 6/29/95
Tab B Gingrich/Dole Ltr Opposing Increase Funding for RRF, 6/15/95
Tab C President Decision on 506 Drawdown Authority for Initial RRF Lift
Tab D Ltrs from President to Gingrich and Dole

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *Vh 7616* NARA, Date *6/3/2014*

2013-0687-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake and Patrick Griffin. Subject: Response to Gingrich and Dole. Record ID: 9505043. (2 pages)	06/29/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2716

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President
and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed
of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C.
2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement
purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of
financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information
concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

June 29, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing to respond to your decision to provide U.S. funds, material, transportation, and close air support in support of the deployment of the European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to Bosnia and Herzegovina. By doing so, your administration has essentially dismissed the serious concerns we expressed in our June 15 letter to you.

We are displeased by your administration's decision to disregard our strong opposition to funding the RRF through U.N. assessments and to acquiesce to partial funding -- of approximately \$35 million for six months -- through U.N. assessments. In addition to acquiescing in additional assessed contributions, your administration is proposing to provide \$60 million in assistance from the Department of Defense. Under current circumstances, we oppose the provision of this assistance and the exercise of any authorities to waive application of relevant provisions of law. The use of special authorities to draw down defense resources without congressional approval is not what we envisioned in our June 15 letter. Use of such special authorities to circumvent the will of Congress is likely to lead to restriction and limitation of these authorities in future legislation.


Of greater concern than the decision to provide more resources to a bloated and failed operation is the apparent decision to subject U.S. military personnel to greater risks than are necessary. We cannot understand the Administration's acquiescence in the decision by General Janvier -- subsequently reaffirmed by U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali -- to veto the request by Admiral Leighton Smith to attack Bosnian Serb targets, including air defenses, around Banja Luka which threaten U.S. and NATO air crews in Operation Deny Flight. According to U.N. and U.S. officials, the RRF will operate under the same conditions and mandate as UNPROFOR. We are extremely disturbed that you have decided to provide close air support to the RRF in light of these inherently flawed and dangerous command arrangements.

We believe that it is unconscionable for U.S. air crews -- or any other U.S. military personnel -- to be subjected to greater risks than are necessary because of the political sensitivities of U.N. bureaucrats. As such, it is essential that the rules of engagement be immediately reviewed and amended to allow preemptive actions to suppress threats should such measures be necessary. Anything less would unnecessarily risk American lives.

Mr. President, it is our view that U.S. funding for and participation in supporting the RRF is ill-conceived. In Congressional briefings on the RRF late yesterday, the most fundamental questions could not be answered -- questions about the mission, goals, and standards for measuring progress. Furthermore, Administration officials indicated the RRF deployment would not measurably affect UNPROFOR's ability or willingness to implement the mandate given them by the Security Council, in particular, the protection of U.N. designated safe havens and enforcement of the weapons exclusion zones in conjunction with NATO. Recent developments further highlight a hopelessly incompetent operation. In our view, it is time to terminate funding for the entire UNPROFOR operation. Enough is enough -- the Bosnian people, our military personnel, and the U.S. taxpayer deserve better.

Sincerely,


NEWT GINGRICH


BOB DOLE

Congress of the United States

Washington, DC 20515

June 15, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing with respect to the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) -- a matter we discussed at length with French President Jacques Chirac yesterday evening. It is our understanding that the Administration and the French government would like to pass a resolution authorizing the RRF in the U.N. Security Council this afternoon.

Due to the absence of Administration consultations with the Congress, we have many serious questions and concerns about authorizing the RRF which have not been addressed. The Chairmen of the appropriate committees of jurisdiction have clearly not been consulted nor provided with critical information about the mandate, mission, duration, command arrangements and cost of this new operation.

Nevertheless, in our view, efforts by the French government and other UNPROFOR contributor governments to protect their forces on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be respected. The United States would expect no less from an ally. It is the right of these governments to take measures necessary to protect their soldiers. In this regard, President Chirac informed us that the command arrangements for the RRF -- composed of troops in national uniforms, and not blue helmets -- would not be subject to vetoes by U.N. civilian officials that have to date crippled the UNPROFOR operation. We urge you to make this point explicit in any U.N. Security Council resolution which authorizes the RRF.

President Chirac assured us that he was only seeking U.S. political support, and not a financial commitment. In view of this assurance, we would not object to your Administration's decision to support for President Chirac's efforts to protect UNPROFOR troops. We believe that it is essential, however, that any Security Council resolution make clear that: (1) the costs of the RRF and any additional personnel authorized under the resolution will not be assessed to U.N. member states; and (2) no additional U.S. financial or military obligations will be incurred as a result of the resolution. In our view, if you choose to support a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the expansion of UNPROFOR to accommodate the RRF, the costs


should be borne through voluntary contributions. We oppose funding the RRF through U.N. assessments. This is consistent with our discussion with President Chirac.

We expect that the questions regarding cost, funding, and, most important, U.S. military commitments raised in the June 13th letter from Chairmen Gilman, Livingston, and Rogers will be promptly answered. We note that these are questions that should have been answered in the consultation process required by law. To act without a clear understanding of the consequences is unacceptable. Furthermore, we would request that you inform us of your decision and its underlying rationale so that we may share it with our colleagues.

Finally, we would like to emphasize that our concurrence for measures to protect UNPROFOR, such as the RRF, should in no way be interpreted as support for the present European and Administration approach to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As we discussed with President Chirac, we have fundamental differences over what our policy toward Bosnia should be. We believe that the U.N. operation in Bosnia has been a costly failure. In our view abandoning the present "neutral" approach, withdrawing UNPROFOR, and lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government is the principled and prudent policy to adopt.

Sincerely,


NEWT GINGRICH


BOB DOLE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1995

Presidential Determination
No. 95-29MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Determination to Authorize the Furnishing of
Emergency Military Assistance to the United Nations
in Support of the Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia Under
Section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 506(a)(1) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C.
2318(a)(1) (the "Act"), I hereby determine that:

- (1) an unforeseen emergency exists which requires
immediate military assistance to a foreign country
or international organization; and
- (2) the emergency requirement cannot be met under the
authority of the Arms Export Control Act or any other
law except section 506 of the Act.

Therefore, I hereby authorize the furnishing of up to \$12,000,000
in defense services from the Department of Defense to provide
immediate transportation support necessary to move the Rapid
Reaction Force personnel and equipment to Bosnia.

The Secretary of State is authorized and directed to report this
determination to Congress and arrange for its publication in the
Federal Register.

William B. Clinton

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I have received your letter of June 29 regarding my decision to provide funding and support for the UN's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) in Bosnia.

The decision to provide support and funding to the RRF, under existing Presidential authority, was made with both the views of Congress, as expressed in your letter of June 15, and those of our Allies clearly in mind. That decision is in the national interest. As Commander in Chief, I will stand by it and support our allies.

I will of course not subject U.S. air crews or other personnel to unnecessary danger. We are currently discussing the rules of engagement and the appropriate role and mandate of the RRF with our allies. I am supporting a strong RRF mission statement and appropriate measures to ensure the protection of U.S. forces participating in Deny Flight and other air operations.

While certain aspects of UN activities in Bosnia fall short of our goals in important ways, UNPROFOR's continued presence is vital. Support for the RRF is essential to the strengthening of UNPROFOR. Failure to provide that support would result in a split in the NATO Alliance, a heightened risk that the conflict would spread to neighboring regions, greater suffering by the Bosnian people, and an increased danger that we would need to insert a large number of U.S. forces as part of a potentially dangerous NATO withdrawal operation.

As always, I remain ready to discuss this with you further.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Newt Gingrich
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

NEW DRAFT
reflects
Slocumbe
fixes

Dear Mr. Leader:

I have received your letter of June 29 regarding my decision to provide funding and support for the UN's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) in Bosnia.

The decision to provide support and funding to the RRF, under existing Presidential authority, was made with both the views of Congress, as expressed in your letter of June 15, and those of our Allies clearly in mind. That decision is in the national interest. As Commander in Chief, I will stand by it and support our allies.

I will of course not subject U.S. air crews or other personnel to unnecessary danger. We are currently discussing the rules of engagement and the appropriate role and mandate of the RRF with our allies. I am supporting a strong RRF mission statement and appropriate measures to ensure the protection of U.S. forces participating in Deny Flight and other air operations.

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As always, I remain ready to discuss this with you further.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Robert Dole
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake and Patrick Griffin. Subject: Use of Section 506(a)(1). Record ID: 9504963. (2 pages)	06/28/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2716

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4963

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 28, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: R. RAND *RR*

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination Authorizing a 506(a)(1)
Drawdown for Bosnia

The President yesterday authorized formal notification to Congress of his intent to direct Defense to drawdown up to \$15 million in goods and services for the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) in Bosnia. Congress was notified yesterday. The necessary time has passed, and we are asking the President to sign the Presidential Determination. Because of complications related to the transfer of equipment, this PD covers only lift.

Concurrence by: Alan Kreczko, Bill Danvers, *AK* Nelson Drew, *JD*

OMB *JB*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President.

• Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Presidential Determination

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *Jan 26/04*

NARA, Date *6/3/2014*

2013-0687 E

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Determination to Authorize the Furnishing of
Emergency Military Assistance to the United Nations
in Support of the Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia Under
Section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 506(a)(1) of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C.
2318(a)(1) (the "Act"), I hereby determine that:

- (1) an unforeseen emergency exists which requires
immediate military assistance to a foreign country
or international organization; and
- (2) the emergency requirement cannot be met under the
authority of the Arms Export Control Act or any other
law except section 506 of the Act.

Therefore, I hereby authorize the furnishing of up to \$12,000,000
in defense services from the Department of Defense to provide
immediate transportation support necessary to move the Rapid
Reaction Force personnel and equipment to Bosnia.

The Secretary of State is authorized and directed to report this
determination to Congress and arrange for its publication in the
Federal Register.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE**B**

S/S #

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED No. Pages _____
FROM: Bill Pope Serbia TF 736-4932 1950
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION _____

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Sandy Verzhov</u>	<u>456-9151</u>	

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☒ COMMENT ☐REMARKS: As you requested

S/S Officer: _____

INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS**UNCLASSIFIED**
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400**FAX TRANSMITTAL**TO: David SchafferORG/ROOM: Sanctions Task ForceOFFICE PHONE: _____ FAX #: 202-736-4850FROM: OASD/ISA (EUROPEAN/NATO AFFAIRS)
PENTAGON, ROOM 4D762
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400OFFICE PHONE: (703) 695-6516SENT BY: Tim WaltonDATE: 28 JuneNUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET: 2☒ URGENT (DELIVER IMMEDIATELY) ☐ IMPORTANT ☐ ROUTINE

REMARKS:

From Under Secretary Stocomb
Please pass to Tarullo*Sir - From U. Stocomb
Received in the
Task Force at 5:00 pm**Bill Page
6/28*UNCLASSIFIED FAX 24 HRS/7 DAYS A WEEK (703)695-6506
CLASSIFIED FAX FROM 0700-1700 MON-FRI (703)695-4812

UNCLASSIFIED



28 Jun 95

Talking points on Serb Radar Net

- One of the basic conditions of the sanctions suspension is that Belgrade not provide military support to Pale.
 - We have reason to believe that, in fact, the Belgrade Serb radar system is used to provide air traffic information to the Bosnian Serbs which they use for air defense purposes.
 - Thus, Belgrade is providing military support of the most fundamental kind -- current operational intelligence -- to Pale.
 - This is particularly serious as it threatens aircraft and their crews engaged in enforcing UN mandates, notably the NFZ, and standing ready to provide CAS to UNPROFOR forces.
 - The US therefore believes that it is an essential condition of any extension of the current sanctions relief that Belgrade agree to take effective action to cease providing information about air traffic to the Bosnian Serbs and to confirm to the UN that such information is not being provided.
- 