

# FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

897

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

1

Position:

2

Stack:

V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                      | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001. map                 | Areas of Independent Coverage. (1 page)                                            | 06/22/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 002. email               | Alexander Vershbow to @NSA. Subject: Renewal. (1 page)                             | 06/29/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003a. memo               | For Andrew Sens from Kenneth Brill. Subject: Drawdown of DOD Services. (3 pages)   | 06/27/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 003b. memo               | For Andrew Sens from Kenneth Brill. Subject: Presidential Determination. (2 pages) | 06/28/1995 | P1/b(1)     |
| 004. memo                | For Anthony Lake from Brian Atwood. Subject: Humanitarian Assistance. (2 pages)    | 06/28/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 897

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2715

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20750

Signed 6/13

file/  
active  
6/95

Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: June 6, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting  
on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair  
Anthony Lake

OMB  
Gordon Adams

OVP  
Leon Fuerth

Chief of Staff  
Leon Panetta

State  
Secretary Warren Christopher  
Peter Tarnoff

CIA  
John Deutch

DOD  
Secretary William Perry  
Walter Slocombe

JCS  
LTG Wesley Clark

USUN  
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

White House  
Sandy Berger

NSC  
Sandy Vershbow  
Colonel Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

Negotiations with Milosevic

1. Principals decided to recall Ambassador Frasure from Belgrade meetings with Milosevic for consultations, given the lack of progress on the mutual recognition plan and Milosevic's attempt to up the ante. They agreed that, prior to departing, Frasure should meet with Milosevic to stress (a) the need for Belgrade to be more forthcoming on a workable sanctions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
VZ 10/1/2003

reimposition mechanism in return for sanctions relief; (b) the need for Milosevic to intercede to secure UNPROFOR access in order to resupply its units in the eastern enclaves; and (c) the need for Milosevic to pledge to take action to increase security of U.S. monitors operating along the Serbian-Bosnian border in light of Bosnian-Serb threats to take U.S. personnel hostage (Action: State). ~~(S)~~

#### Future of U.S. ICFY Monitors

2. Principals agreed to return U.S. border monitors to duty under the following conditions: (a) they must be informed of the serious nature of the threat directed toward them, based on our intelligence information, and allowed to resign and leave if they do not want to return voluntarily; (b) Frasure should obtain the security commitment from Milosevic cited above; (c) upcoming congressional testimony about the U.S. role and policy for Bosnia should ensure that Congress is aware of the participation of U.S. civilian contractors in the ICFY border monitoring mission. A message would be sent at once to inform the head of the ICFY of our decision (Action: State). ~~(S)~~

#### Visit of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic

3. Principals recommended scheduling a meeting of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic with the Vice President during Silajdzic's visit to Washington June 8-14, with the option of a drop-by by the President (Action: NSC/OVP). ~~(S)~~

4. Principals also agreed that a meeting should be arranged in the near future between the Secretary of State and Muhamed Sacirbey, in his new capacity as Bosnian Foreign Minister (Action: State). ~~(C)~~

#### Measures to Enhance Protection for Deny Flight Missions

5. Based on a CIA assessment that the current ROE for Deny Flight might not provide adequate protection for NATO/US aircraft in light of recently demonstrated Bosnian-Serb tactics, Principals agreed that CIA will review the nature of the SAM threat in Bosnia, and OSD and JCS will then determine, subject to Principals' review, whether a new definition of "hostile intent" or new ROE are required for further operations (Action: CIA/JCS/OSD). ~~(C)~~

6. In the interim, Principals agreed that Deny Flight operations will continue under existing ROE (considering all of Bosnia to be a high threat area, permitting attack on SAMs demonstrating hostile intent through radar illumination of

aircraft), but will seek to avoid provocative action (Action: JCS/OSD). ~~(S)~~

#### Response to Croat Offensive near Knin

7. Principals agreed that a strong message should be sent to Zagreb and the Croatian Ambassador to the UN urging the Croatians to exercise restraint in their ongoing offensive operations near Knin lest they provoke another major clash with the Krajina Serbs (Action: USUN/State). ~~(S)~~

#### U.S. Support to UNPROFOR

8. Principals reviewed the results of the Paris meeting of Defense Ministers. In this regard, they agreed to await clarification from those providing forces to the UN Rapid Reaction Force to determine the exact nature of lift, air support and equipment that the U.S. might be asked to provide (Action: USUN/OSD). They agreed in principle that the U.S. would support a UNSC resolution to be drafted by France and the UK that would use the Paris decisions as the basis for UNPROFOR reconfiguration rather than any of the four options put forward by the UN SYG (Action: USUN). ~~(S)~~

9. Principals agreed that airdrops to resupply UNPROFOR units isolated in the eastern enclaves would be a high risk option that would be unlikely to provide any long-term resolution to the problem. They agreed on the need to reassess the stocks/supplies available to the Safe Areas (Action: OVP/CIA) to provide a baseline for evaluating the requirements for resupply (Action: JCS). ~~(S)~~

10. Principals agreed on the need to resolve on an urgent basis the issue of how UNPROFOR strengthening and NATO withdrawal planning will be funded. Deputies will be asked to approve a funding strategy at their next meeting, based on proposals vetted through the Peacekeeping Core Group (Action: OMB/NSC). ~~(S)~~

#### Policy Coordination

11. Principals expressed concern that recent announcements of military deployments to Italy had not been adequately coordinated in advance through the interagency process or with the Government of Italy. They agreed to elevate the level of participation in the daily video teleconference (VTC) on Bosnia to the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary or equivalent and to ensure that all agencies used the VTC to inform the others of any upcoming activity relating to the former Yugoslavia (Action: NSC/State/CIA/OSD/JCS). ~~(S)~~

Congressional Consultations

12. Principals reviewed requirements for upcoming Congressional testimony on U.S. policy for Bosnia, and agreed that NSC should serve as a clearinghouse to coordinate all formal testimony and Q&A responses -- which should build on the comprehensive list developed by NSC for the President (Action: NSC/All). They agreed that a concerted effort was required to explain strong administration opposition to unilateral lift measures being introduced in both houses (Action: NSC/All). ~~(S)~~

13. They also agreed that it would be prudent to provide formal 15-day advance contingency 407 notification to Congress of our intent to assist UNPROFOR in Bosnia, in the context of ongoing briefings to Congress on NATO OPLAN 40104 and USG Bosnia policy. This notification should be broad enough to cover NATO withdrawal efforts and support for the UN Rapid Reaction Force, without using potentially provocative funding estimates unless specifically required by law (Action: State/OMB/NSC). ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

20750

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 10, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE  
THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*  
FROM: NELSON DREW *D*  
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals  
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,  
June 6, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held June 6, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve ☒ Disapprove ☐

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies  
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *Van Zandt* NARA, Date *6/3/2014*

*2013-0687-F*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20709

June 5, 1995

*file/*  
*redrc*  
Nat Sec Advisor  
has seen

**NOTED**

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE  
THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*  
FROM: NELSON DREW *N*  
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals  
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,  
May 28, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary  
of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia  
held May 28, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at  
Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove *R*

*file*

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies  
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By *Van Zandt* NARA, Date *6/3/2014*

2013-0687 F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: May 28, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 1:00 - 3:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting  
on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

## PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Samuel Berger

USUN

Madeleine Albright

OVP

Leon Fuerth

CIA

William Studeman

State

Secretary Christopher

John Kornblum

Robert Frasure

JCS

General Shalikashvili

LTG Wesley Clark

DOD

Secretary Perry

Walter Slocombe

NSC

Alexander Vershbow

Colonel Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals met on May 28 to consider a range of policy options in light of the recent developments in Bosnia. They agreed on the following basic points for U.S. policy. (U)

2. **Prospects of additional airstrikes.** The U.S. will not press allies with troops on the ground for further strikes now, but: (a) the possibility of further strikes will not be ruled out; (b) should strikes again become necessary, a more robust approach permitting the UN and NATO to respond at the time and place of their own choosing should be followed rather than continuing to limit options on the basis of "strict proportionality" (Action: JCS); (c) privately we will accept a pause, but make no public statement to that effect; and (d) the Secretary of State will seek allied reactions to planning a substantial contingency strike option if Serb behavior, such as killing hostages, warranted a major attack (Action: State). ~~(S)~~

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

12 10/1/2013

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

3. **Diplomatic efforts at the UN and Contact Group.** We will:

(a) seek a formula with the French and UK on a sanctions reimposition mechanism based on an independent investigative panel and re-engage Milosevic on that basis to seek to conclude a Bosnian-Serb recognition package (Action: State); (b) press Milosevic in the context of such an agreement to push the Bosnian Serbs to release the hostages (Action: State); (c) explore the prospects for Russian assistance in control of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons (Action: State); and (d) renew efforts to gain UN condemnation of Bosnian Serb leadership as the principal obstacle to peace in the region based on recent events (Action: State). ~~(S)~~

4. **Options and prospects for emergency withdrawal.** Principals noted: (a) no one is calling for withdrawal now, but that the situation could arise quickly; (b) NATO OPLAN 40104 would cover emergency withdrawal; (c) U.S. participation requires an immediate effort to complete consultations with Congress, starting with calls to key members and staff the following day (Action: NSC); and (d) non-NATO withdrawal using UK, French and U.S. assets was a possibility, but raised serious problems for NATO and for command and control of the operation (putting stress on the need to complete Congressional consultations on 40104). ~~(S)~~

5. **The future of UNPROFOR.** It was agreed that UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia under the present circumstances would be seen as capitulation to Bosnian-Serb blackmail and should be avoided. Instead, Principals agreed the U.S. strongly should support French efforts to enhance UNPROFOR's ability to perform its mandate by: (a) bolstering its capabilities (short of providing U.S. ground forces, but including provision of U.S. equipment if necessary -- including an offer of both U.S. airlift and equipment, if requested, to the British and French) (Action: OSD); (b) application of more robust ROE; and (c) "regrouping" UNPROFOR to reduce the risk. (Principals also agreed to a re-evaluation of the roles and missions of UNPROFOR to support future decisions on regrouping.) (Action: JCS, OSD). ~~(S)~~

6. **Assistance in UNPROFOR redeployment:** Principals agreed that, while the U.S. was not in favor of an UNPROFOR redeployment that pulled out from the eastern enclaves, U.S. credibility among NATO Allies would be seriously damaged if we were to turn down a request to NATO for assistance in relocating them from positions that had become untenable. It was agreed that the existing U.S. agreement in principle to provide ground troops as part of NATO led operations to assist UNPROFOR withdrawal should apply equally to an UNPROFOR request for assistance to NATO to relocate from positions that have become untenable to a safer area. They agreed that this decision required the approval of the President and consultations with Congress on this option. (Action: NSC) ~~(S)~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH  
Assistant to the Vice  
President for National  
Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. J. BENJAMIN NYE  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Treasury

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS  
Associate Director for  
National Security &  
International Affairs  
Office of Management and  
Budget

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH  
Office of the Representative  
of the U.S. to the United  
Nations

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F.C. WILSON  
Executive Secretary  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on  
Bosnia, May 28, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached  
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By Vin Thibault NARA, Date 6/3/2014

203-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

4958

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

June 27, 1995

The Honorable William J. Clinton  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:


We are writing to urge you to end United States' participation in the U.N.-imposed arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. The world community continues to pursue a policy in Bosnia that is morally bankrupt and an obvious failure. History will condemn the countries that continually appeased the Serbs and prolonged the arms embargo on Bosnia as accomplices to Serbian-led genocide. Considering the values and heritage of our Nation, we believe following such a policy is unacceptable. Underscoring this belief, the House of Representatives -- with broad bipartisan support -- recently voted 318 to 99 to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia.

Bosnia, as recognized by the United States on April 7, 1992, is a sovereign and independent country. Its people have an inalienable right to defend themselves from Serbian aggression and by failing to lift the arms embargo, the United States is denying the Bosnian people one of their most fundamental rights -- the right to self-defense.

Those who argue that we cannot act unilaterally to lift the arms embargo fail to see the basic difference between the arms embargo on Bosnia, a victim of aggression, and embargoes on renegade countries such as Iraq and Libya. The Bosnian government has taken no action for which we can justify the continuation of this embargo. If our allies and the U.N. cannot recognize that the arms embargo is hurting the very people it is meant to help, then for the sake of our national conscience, we must act unilaterally.

The time has come for the United States to reclaim our role as leader of the free world. In this case, leadership must be by example. The current Bosnia policy is both a failure and immoral. You are in a position to change that policy. We urge you to stop denying the Bosnians what Americans would surely demand for themselves -- the ability to defend their country.

Sincerely,



Jon Christensen

Ken Calvert

Dick Chynoweth

John W. Wright

Barbara Cullen

Fred Henneman

James Greenwood

Wes Cook

Stephen Horn

Tommy Long

Henry Brinkley

Ben Gelman

T. Hutchins

Phil B. Henneman

Linda A. Smith

Sammy Smith

Sam Jones

Lee Myrick

Bill Brown

Bill

~~Bill~~

Henry J. Hyde

James Dunn

Bill Thomas

W. Hayworth

Jim  
McWong

Jack King

Ed Royce

John  
King

Don Lujan

James V. Whelan

George R. Kethercutz Jr.

Jim Rasmussen

Matt Salmon

Pat Deutsch

Martin P. Hoke

Diana Zimmer

Pete King

Beck Legier

Beck McKean

Robert L. Ehrlich Jr.

Jay Kim

Malcolm Mack

Frank Pallone Jr.

Wayne Allard

David Gunderson

Jimmy Will  
Richard A. Fark

Frank Riggs

EC J Tourette

Jim B

Richards Pombo

John T. Doolittle

Ed Whitfield

Christopher Shays

GP B

Bill Barr

Andrew Leachman

Alex Benisek

Mac Collins

Gene Green

Brian P. Bellamy

J. L. Luch

Bill Emerson

Joe Barton

Joe Deen

Colin Smith

Maci Foss

Carl Wilson

Michael P. McQuitty

Lamar Smith

~~CO~~ (17-04)

Eusebio Molinari

Wally Hergen

Dan Rosten

PS OJ

Barney Frank

SE Schiff

Ernest G. Waldmaltz

Tom Latham

Nick Forbes

Jack Metcalf

Sakelly

Jim Talent

Sony Bone

Ph. Rodgers

Tom Davis

Rich Diaz - BAA

Alfred R. Gurn

Marty Meche

Wayne T. Gekker

Walt Achorn

Dave Weldon

Both Lora

John W. Oltz -

Jim Lunsford

Charlie Stubbins

Chris Cox

Doc Hastings

Richard Baker

Michael Kinahan

John E. Ensign

Bill Martin

John Linder

Phil English

Tom Barker

Jerry Lewis

Jim Getkewelt

Ron Packard

**Letter****Rep. George Radanovich****Rep. John Boehner****Page 1**

|                         |                        |
|-------------------------|------------------------|
| Rep. Jon Christensen    | Rep. Stephen Horn      |
| Rep. Ken Calvert        | Rep. Tom DeLay         |
| Rep. Dick Chrysler      | Rep. Sherwood Boehlert |
| Rep. John McHugh        | Rep. Benjamin Gilman   |
| Rep. Barbara Cubin      | Rep. Tim Hutchinson    |
| Rep. Frederick Heineman | Rep. Mark Neumann      |
| Rep. James Greenwood    | Rep. Linda Smith       |
| Rep. Wes Cooley         | Rep. Sam Brownback     |

**Page 2**

|                     |                     |
|---------------------|---------------------|
| Rep. Steve Stockman | Rep. Sue Myrick     |
| Rep. Tom Coburn     | Rep. Dan Miller     |
| Rep. John Mica      | Rep. Henry Hyde     |
| Rep. Jennifer Dunn  | Rep. William Thomas |
| Rep. J.D. Hayworth  | Rep. Jim Kolbe      |
| Rep. Jack Kingston  | Rep. Thomas Ewing   |
| Rep. Gerald Solomon | Rep. Edward Royce   |
| Rep. Ray LaHood     | Rep. Deborah Pryce  |

**Page 3**

|                     |                         |
|---------------------|-------------------------|
| Rep. James Hansen   | Rep. George Nethercutt  |
| Rep. Jim Ramstad    | Rep. Matt Salmon        |
| Rep. Peter Deutsch  | Rep. Martin Hoke        |
| Rep. Dick Zimmer    | Rep. Peter King         |
| Rep. Rick Lazio     | Rep. Howard McKeon      |
| Rep. Robert Ehrlich | Rep. Jay Kim            |
| Rep. Mel Hancock    | Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr. |
| Rep. Wayne Allard   | Rep. David Funderburk   |

**Page 4**

|                        |                        |
|------------------------|------------------------|
| Rep. Gerald Weller     | Rep. Frank Riggs       |
| Rep. William Lipinski  | Rep. Steven LaTourette |
| Rep. Jim Bunn          | Rep. Richard Pombo     |
| Rep. John Doolittle    | Rep. Edward Whitfield  |
| Rep. Christopher Shays | Rep. Richard Burr      |
| Rep. Bill Barrett      | Rep. Andrea Seastrand  |
| Rep. Greg Ganske       | Rep. Mac Collins       |
| Rep. Gene Green        | Rep. Brian Bilbray     |

**Page 5**

|                        |                      |
|------------------------|----------------------|
| Rep. James Leach       | Rep. Bill Emerson    |
| Rep. Joe Barton        | Rep. Joe Skeen       |
| Rep. Christopher Smith | Rep. Martin Frost    |
| Rep. Curt Weldon       | Rep. Michael McNulty |
| Rep. Lamar Smith       | Rep. James Traficant |
| Rep. Susan Molinari    | Rep. Wally Herger    |
| Rep. Dana Rohrabacher  | Rep. Michael Oxley   |
| Rep. Barney Frank      | Rep. Steven Schiff   |

**Page 6**

|                      |                          |
|----------------------|--------------------------|
| Rep. Enid Waldholtz  | Rep. Tom Latham          |
| Rep. Michael Forbes  | Rep. Jack Metcalf        |
| Rep. Sue Kelly       | Rep. James Talent        |
| Rep. Sonny Bono      | Rep. John Shadegg        |
| Rep. Thomas Davis    | Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart |
| Rep. Albert Wynn     | Rep. Martin Meehan       |
| Rep. Wayne Gilchrest | Rep. Matt Salmon*        |
| Rep. Dave Weldon     | Rep. Porter Goss         |

*\* repeat signature*

**Page 7**

|                       |                          |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| Rep. John Olver       | Rep. James Sensenbrenner |
| Rep. Charles Stenholm | Rep. Christopher Cox     |
| Rep. Richard Hastings | Rep. Richard Baker       |
| Rep. Michael Flanagan | Rep. John Ensign         |
| Rep. William Martini  | Rep. John Linder         |
| Rep. Phil English     | Rep. William Luther      |
| Rep. Jerry Lewis      | Rep. Gil Gutknecht       |
| Rep. Ron Packard      |                          |

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

FAX COVER SHEET

NOTE: THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS FACSIMILE MESSAGE IS  
CONFIDENTIAL AND INTENDED FOR THE RECIPIENT ONLY.

DATE: June 27, 1995

TO: Andrew Sens @ NSC

FROM: Chris Walker

Legislative Affairs EW/102

RE: Congressional Correspondence

Page 1 of 11

If there are any problems with this transmission, please call  
(202) 456-7500.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS

FROM: SUSAN BROPHY   
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: CONGRESSIONAL MAIL

Attached is a copy of the letter sent to the White House from several members of Congress regarding the U.N.-imposed arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since this letter relates to national security issues, I would appreciate your assistance in drafting a response.

Thank you very much for your assistance. If you have any questions, please feel free to call Jocelyn Jolley at x67500.

Enclosure

# CURRENT NEWS **EARLY BIRD**

FRIDAY, June 30, 1995

INSIDE THE AIR FORCE

June 30, 1995

Pg. 1

## LACK OF INVESTMENT IN EW LIMITING SHALIKASHVILI'S OPTIONS IN BOSNIA

In the wake of the Serb shoot down of an American F-16 over Bosnia June 2, the Pentagon is scrambling to define a policy for U.S. forces in the region, and is finding that its past investment decisions in electronic warfare are hamstringing its options, according to Pentagon and industry sources. At the same time, Pentagon sources suspect the Serbs are employing their surface-to-air missiles in a way that makes it virtually impossible for NATO to enforce the no-fly zone without an overwhelming display of force, a tactic implemented with some success against the United States during the Vietnam war.

Members of the staff of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John Shalikashvili, are putting together policy options for a demarche intended to be transmitted to the Serbian government. The demarche, tantamount to a line drawn in the sand across which the Serbs would step at their own peril, is posing difficulties on many fronts. Although the "cause" part of the policy is obvious — any attacks on NATO forces will elicit an automatic response — the effect is less clear. How much force they will be met with remains to be determined, sources said.

OPTIONS...Pg. 15

LETTERS...Pg. 10

The problem, sources said, is simple and is predicated upon the Pentagon's and Congress' continued reluctance to invest adequately in electronic warfare. The pending retirement of the EF-111 electronic combat support aircraft the halting of the System Improvement Program that would provide EW upgrades, the aging and also underfunded EA-6B, the unfunded Airborne Self Protection Jammer, the retirement of the P-4G, and the slow progress of the development of electronic countermeasures (ECM) pods for fighters combine to limit the options open to Shalikashvili.

One Air Force colonel put it bluntly: "The problem is Congress and the Air Force. O'Grady got shot down because of their continued complacency and disinterest in electronic warfare."

"We don't have the EF-111s to go into the no-fly zone with the fighters, the EA-6Bs are based on carriers and sometimes are out of range, the ECM pods have technical problems and they're all too expensive to operate for a non-war mission," a Pentagon source said. "They are wringing their hands on the joint staff because they have two options only: One, attack and kill every radar target on the ground, which is well within their power. Or bug out, and stop enforcing the no-fly," the source said.

"If [the Serbs] have launchers on the ground and we don't destroy them, then we just have to avoid them," an Office of the Secretary of Defense official said.

The Defense Intelligence Agency has dubbed the Bosnian Serb operation utilizing SA-6s surface-to-air missiles — the kind that shot down Capt. Scott O'Grady's F-16 — "Roving Ambush," the source said. DIA contends that the Serbs have been moving around their mobile missile sites for at least the last few months, just waiting for an opportunity to launch against an American fighter.

As the joint staff continues its investigation of the incident to determine what went wrong, it has been revealed that a U-2 in the area — one of three airborne collection systems covering the former Yugoslavia on June 2 — detected an SA-6 target acquisition signal two hours and 46 minutes prior to the missile launch, with another detection approximately 10 minutes before launch, and ceased collection of the signal two minutes after the launch. It is still unclear whether the signal received was transmitting over the entire period or if it was detected intermittently. The location of the battery was placed with 95 percent confidence outside the known garrison area, sources said.

If it is determined that the radar was on only intermittently, there is cause for concern, sources said. The Bosnian Serbs may be turning on their radar only long enough to allow a missile to get a fairly accurate fix on the target. By launching an SA-6 ballistically into a preprogrammed impact point where it is likely to intercept its target, radar can be turned on for only the last few seconds of flight before impact. This tactic, used by the Viet Cong using SA-2s in an earlier conflict, is difficult to defeat. High Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles launched from a fighter require a fairly steady missile guidance radar signal to reach their target, and pilots' use of evasive maneuvers, such as jamming, chaff and flares, require more wearing time to be effective.


"The only thing you can do against that tactic is stay away from whatever grid is showing radar blips," a retired Air Force pilot who flew in Viet Nam said. "Because if you pick up radar, it could be two seconds from the time you hear it to impact," the source said.

"It's a good tactic if [the Serbs] can afford to waste the missiles," a Navy pilot said. As missiles are only guided by radar in the last few seconds of flight, they can easily miss their target.

Meanwhile, the hand-wringing continues because the technical answers do not exist to make enforcing the no fly zone risk-free.

"ECM is a very difficult area for everyone, and it's very expensive. Every vendor claims to have the 'perfect' answer. But no one system defeats all threats. I don't think we understand ECM, but we do it better than anyone else in the world," an OSD source said.

## UNCLASSIFIED FAX

THE JOINT STAFF  
J-5 EUROPEAN DIVISION

## FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

## ● ORIGINATOR ●

COL Simpson

614-4935

NAME

TELEPHONE#

Cover to 14

TEXT PAGES

SUBJECT

(703) 697-0180

227-0180

TELEPHONE#

AUTOVON #

REMARKS

## ● ADDRESSEE ●

ORGANIZATION

OFC. SYM

NAME

PHONE

NSC

COL Drew

THE JOINT STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C.Action No. J-5A 03007 - 95Date: 30 June 1995MEMORANDUM FOR            ACTION OFFICERS  
  X   PLANNERS (SERVICES)/DIVISION CHIEFS (OTHERS)

|       |                   |      |                    |
|-------|-------------------|------|--------------------|
| USA   | <u>  X  </u>      | USN  | <u>  X  </u>       |
| USAF  | <u>  X  </u>      | USMC | <u>  X  </u>       |
| J-1   | <u>          </u> | J-2  | <u>  X  </u>       |
| J-3   | <u>  X  </u>      | J-4  | <u>          </u>  |
| J-5   | <u>          </u> | J-6  | <u>          </u>  |
| J-7   | <u>          </u> | J-8  | <u>          </u>  |
| OTHER | <u>  OSD  </u>    |      | <u>  LC  </u>      |
|       | <u>  -DOS  </u>   |      | <u>  USSOCOM  </u> |
|       | <u>  -NSC  </u>   |      | <u>          </u>  |
|       | <u>  LA  </u>     |      | <u>          </u>  |

Subject: QFR's from the 8 Jun 95 Senate Foreign Relations Hearing  
on Bosnia

1. The attached JS Form 136 is forwarded for:


|                   |                          |
|-------------------|--------------------------|
| <u>          </u> | Preliminary Coordination |
| <u>  X  </u>      | Final Coordination       |
| <u>          </u> | Information              |

2. Request a response by
- 1500/30 Jun 95

Respond to Lt Col Tony Simpson/EURDIV/(703) 614-9435 DSN=224

3. This is Item
- 
- on the J- Summary of Actions.

NSC - COL DREW 1-203-456-9150 UNCLAS.  
STATE - COHEN, J. 1-203-647-0960 UNCLAS

  
Peter E. Friedel  
Colonel, USA  
Military Secretary, J-5  
Directorate for Strategic  
Plans and Policy

# JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM

|                                                                                  |                                |                                  |                         |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|
| TO<br>DJS                                                                        | CLASSIFICATION<br>UNCLASSIFIED | ACTION NUMBER<br>J-5A 03007 - 95 |                         |
| THRU<br>VDJS                                                                     |                                |                                  | ORIG SUSPENSE<br>1500   |
| SUBJECT<br>QFR's from the 8 Jun 95 Senate Foreign Relations<br>Hearing on Bosnia |                                | ACTION                           |                         |
|                                                                                  |                                | X                                | APPROVAL                |
|                                                                                  |                                |                                  | SIGNATURE               |
|                                                                                  |                                |                                  | INFORMATION             |
|                                                                                  |                                | SJS SUSPENSE<br>30 Jun 95        | J SUSPENSE<br>30 Jun 95 |

## ACTION SUMMARY

- Purpose. To obtain DJS approval of DJ-5 responses (TAB) to Senator Coverdell's additional questions from the 8 June SFRC hearing on Bosnia.
- Background. Senator Coverdell submitted 4 additional questions for the record (QFR)\* following testimony on 8 June. All questions concern involvement of US ground troops in Bosnia as part of an UNPROFOR withdrawal operation. State responses\*\* provided.
- Discussion
  - Answer to Question 1 explains that US participation is necessary to ensure NATO solidarity.
  - Answer to Question 2 lists US unique assets essential for a successful withdrawal.
  - Answer to Question 3 explains the requirement for US ground troops.
  - Answer to Question 4 describes the necessity for US troops even if the Multinational Rapid Reaction Force is employed.
- Recommendation. DJS approve DJ-5 responses (TAB). OCJCS/LA will take follow-on action to forward QFR's for incorporation into the Senate records.

Attachment

| COORDINATION/APPROVAL |             |     |         |             |     |
|-----------------------|-------------|-----|---------|-------------|-----|
| OFFICE                | NAME & DATE | EXT | OFFICE  | NAME & DATE | EXT |
| J-5                   |             |     | USA     |             |     |
|                       |             |     | USN     |             |     |
|                       |             |     | USAF    |             |     |
|                       |             |     | USMC    |             |     |
| J2                    |             |     | NSC     |             |     |
| J3                    |             |     | DOS     |             |     |
| LC                    |             |     | OSD     |             |     |
| LA                    |             |     | USSOCOM |             |     |

ACTION OFFICER/DIV/PHONE

Lt Col Tony Simpson/EURDIV/49435

DATE PREPARED

30 June 1995

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

Classified by

Declassify on

T  
A  
B

## UNCLASSIFIED

## INSERT FOR RECORD

8 June 1995

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

BOSNIA

QUESTION #1

Page 1 of 1

## RATIONALE FOR US PARTICIPATION IN UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

SENATOR COVERDELL: What are the rationale for United States participation in a possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces? What are the rationale for United States participation in a possible redeployment of UNPROFOR forces?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK: Senator, you are asking me to justify, to provide a rationale for, the policy of US participation in an UNPROFOR withdrawal. As a Soldier, I'd feel more comfortable with other agencies of our Government addressing what is fundamentally a policy question. However, as a Soldier, it seems to me keeping faith with one's comrades is a principle fundamental to the military ethic. If our NATO allies, who have responded to US leadership and calls for assistance over the years, are called upon to extract UNPROFOR (which has nine NATO countries), it seems somehow unseemly to stand by passively and watch them bear the burden alone. This rationale is even more cogent if those Allies are called upon and placed at risk because of actions by the US Government, such as lifting the arms embargo which would result in just such a call.

UNCLASSIFIED

INSERT FOR RECORD

8 June 1995  
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
BOSNIA  
QUESTION #2

Page 1 of 1

US UNIQUE MILITARY CAPABILITIES

**SENATOR COVERDELL:** Does the United States possess unique military capabilities that our European allies--namely France and the United Kingdom--cannot duplicate that are essential to a successful evacuation of UNPROFOR? If so, please detail what these capabilities are.

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK:** The US has several unique military capabilities essential to ensuring success of a NATO-led withdrawal. Examples are:

- Strategic lift -- air and sea
- Strategic and tactical reconnaissance assets
- Night/All-weather attack and clandestine infiltration/exfiltration aircraft
- Electronic Warfare assets
- Civil affairs and Psychological Operations Forces
- Intelligence -- integration with the Intelligence Coordination Cell (ICC), providing strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence
- Specialized equipment -- radar, communication, and night vision

UNCLASSIFIED

INSERT FOR RECORD

8 June 1995  
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
BOSNIA  
QUESTION #3

Page 1 of 1

INTRODUCTION OF US GROUND TROOPS

**SENATOR COVERDELL:** If the United States does have unique military capabilities necessary for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces, do these capabilities require the introduction of US ground troops into Bosnia-Herzegovina?

**LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK:** Senator, while some of those unique US capabilities may require a limited number of ground forces, I believe the heart of your question asks why the US should contribute a large number of ground combat troops to support a withdrawal, rather than relying on limited participation through provision of these unique capabilities. Apart from the already stated principle of keeping faith with our Allies, I feel it important to remember the objective of a withdrawal --simply, it would be to get all UN and NATO forces out with the least number of casualties. We've learned from painful military experience one of the surest ways to limit casualties is to undertake an operation with overwhelming force. Only a commitment of US forces can provide our NATO Allies that overwhelming margin, enhancing prospects for a speedy, safer withdrawal.

## UNCLASSIFIED

## INSERT FOR RECORD

8 June 1995

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

BOSNIA

QUESTION #4

Page 1 of 1

## ENHANCEMENTS OF AN ANGLO-FRENCH RAPID REACTION FORCE

SENATOR COVERDELL: Does the introduction of an Anglo-French rapid reactionary force alter the equation in terms of US military capabilities which may have been formerly unique to the Bosnia region? Are there any enhancements to the Anglo-French rapid reactionary force which would make US ground troops less necessary for a possible evacuation of UNPROFOR?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL CLARK: No. The MRRF is not a withdrawal force. It is intended to enhance UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its current mission, not an extraction. The forces in the MRRF may be considered by NATO planners and may constitute some of their Nation's contributions to a withdrawal. US forces and capabilities would still be required to provide that overwhelming force needed for success.



Additional Questions for the Record  
Senator Paul D. Coverdell  
June 9, 1995

Questions for Lt.Gen. Wesley Clark:

1) What are the rationale for United States participation in a possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces?

What are the rationale for United States participation in a possible redeployment of UNPROFOR forces?

2) Does the United States possess unique military capabilities that our European allies -- namely, France and the United Kingdom -- cannot duplicate which are essential to a successful evacuation of UNPROFOR? If so, please detail what these capabilities are.

3) If the United States does have unique military capabilities necessary for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces, do these capabilities require the introduction of U.S. ground troops into Bosnia-Herzegovina?

4) Does the introduction of an Anglo-French rapid reactionary force alter the equation in terms of U.S. military capabilities which may have been formerly unique to the Bosnian region?

(4) Are there any enhancements to the Anglo-French rapid reactionary force which would make U.S. ground troops less necessary for a possible evacuation of UNPROFOR?

Questions for Under Secretary Peter Tarnoff:

1) Which U.S. interests are the basis of the Administration proposal to provide ground troops to assist in the evacuation or redeployment of the UNPROFOR forces?

2) Has the United States any legal obligation to provide ground soldiers to assist in the evacuation or redeployment of UNPROFOR forces?

3) Has the United States entered into any formal or informal agreements with our NATO partners concerning assisting in a withdrawal or redeployment of UNPROFOR forces?

4) Is the United States part of the decision making process to decide when and how a withdrawal or redeployment of UNPROFOR forces might occur?

5) Has any NATO allies formally or informally requested U.S. ground troops to participate in a possible withdrawal or redeployment of UNPROFOR forces?

\*

\*

Question for the Record submitted to U/S Peter Tarnoff  
Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
June 8, 1995

1) Which U.S. interests are the basis of the Administration's proposal to provide ground troops to assist in the evacuation or redeployment of the UNPROFOR forces?

A: The Administration's commitment in principle to assist in a NATO-led withdrawal or emergency evacuation of UN forces is based on several significant U.S. interests.

It is in our national interest for UNPROFOR to remain in Bosnia, where it has played an important role in attenuating the violence and alleviating the suffering. It remains our best insurance against an even worst disaster. The U.S. pledge to assist UNPROFOR bolsters its staying power. Knowing that we stand ready to assist a partial or total withdrawal, troop-contributing nations have strengthened their resolve to maintain UNPROFOR.

NATO solidarity is a key U.S. interest. Nine of our NATO partners have contributed troops to UN peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia. If Allied lives are threatened by attacks on UNPROFOR, we must be prepared to come to their aid. We cannot leave our NATO partners in the lurch. The Alliance rests on our mutual commitment to solidarity in times of crisis.

06/28/95 14:05

202 647 1369

EUR/RPM

003

- 2 -

U.S. global leadership is partly at stake. In addition to the NATO-member troop contributors, there are almost twenty other countries involved in peacekeeping on the ground in the former Yugoslavia. They will be counting on U.S. leadership in a withdrawal or emergency evacuation.

06/28/95 14:05 202 647 1389

EUR/RPM

0001

Question for the Record submitted to U/S Peter Tarnoff  
Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
June 8, 1995

3) Has the United States entered into any formal or informal agreements with our NATO partners concerning assisting in a withdrawal or redeployment of UNPROFOR forces?

A: Last December, the President informed our Allies that the U.S. is prepared, in principle, to offer military assistance to a NATO-led withdrawal or emergency evacuation of UNPROFOR. The North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO's policy-making body, is now reviewing a contingency plan for withdrawal.

On May 1, the SACEUR requested nations to identify forces required to implement the withdrawal plan. The U.S. responded on June 20. Our response does not constitute a commitment to participate in a withdrawal. Such a commitment requires U.S. consent to a separate decision by the NAC and then a review by the President.

06/26/95 14:05 202 647 1369

EUR/RPM

005

Question for the Record submitted to U/S Peter Tarnoff  
Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
June 8, 1995

4) Is the United States part of the decision making process to decide when and how a withdrawal or redeployment of UNPROFOR forces might occur?

A: Yes, the United States would play a central decision-making role in the process. The UN Security Council would be involved in such a decision. NATO's policy-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), will review a UN request, should it come to pass, for assistance for a withdrawal or emergency evacuation. Through its representation on the NAC, the U.S. would play a leading role in determining NATO's response to the UN.

06/28/95 14:06 202 647 1369

EUR/RPM

0006

Question for the Record submitted to U/S Peter Tarnoff  
Senate Foreign Relations Committee  
June 8, 1995

5) Have our NATO allies formally or informally requested U.S. ground troops to participate in a possible withdrawal or redeployment of UNPROFOR forces?

A: NATO's contingency planning for a withdrawal or emergency evacuation is based on the assumption that U.S. participation will be significant.

06/26/95 14:08 202 647 1369

EUR/RPM

007

Follow-Up Os & As for U/S Tarnoff

Drafted: EUR/RPM: FBurton  
6/19/95 SERPMS 8383 7-1563

Cleared: EUR/RPM: JCunningham, DMcElhaney  
P: SBremner  
H: TRobertson

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                           | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 001. map                 | Areas of Independent Coverage. (1 page) | 06/22/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 897

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2715

### **RESTRICTION CODES**

#### **Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1** National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2** Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3** Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4** Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5** Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6** Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**PRM.** Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

**RR.** Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### **Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1)** National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2)** Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3)** Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4)** Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6)** Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7)** Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8)** Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9)** Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

The United States has important strategic and humanitarian interests in Bosnia: to prevent the spread of the conflict, to help limit the loss of life and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there. That is why the U.S. led efforts by NATO to lift the siege of Sarajevo last year; has conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history; has participated in enforcing the No-fly zone; has deployed peacekeeping troops to neighboring Macedonia; and has led diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to this bitter conflict. And that is why we support the protection and strengthening of UNPROFOR, which helped reduce deaths among Bosnian civilians from 130,000 in 1992 to less than 3,000 in 1994.

For all its problems, if UNPROFOR withdraws -- either on its own or especially because of an American action like unilaterally lifting the arms embargo -- the humanitarian crisis would worsen; we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch; and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict. We would face the choice of walking away or committing ourselves to military intervention in the conflict. Such a venture, to succeed, could require American ground troops in the conflict, something neither the President nor our people want to see.

So the wisest immediate course is this: support the RRF and work for a peaceful settlement.

The United States has important strategic and humanitarian interests in Bosnia: to prevent the spread of the conflict, to help limit the loss of life and to keep faith with our NATO Allies who have troops on the ground there. That is why the U.S. led efforts by NATO to lift the siege of Sarajevo last year; has conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history; has participated in enforcing the No-fly zone; has deployed peacekeeping troops to neighboring Macedonia; and has led diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful solution to this bitter conflict. And that is why we support the protection and strengthening of UNPROFOR, which helped reduce deaths among Bosnian civilians from 130,000 in 1992 to less than 3,000 in 1994.

For all its problems, if UNPROFOR withdraws -- either on its own or especially because of an American action like unilaterally lifting the arms embargo -- the humanitarian crisis would worsen; we would either have to send U.S. troops temporarily to help UNPROFOR get out or leave our Allies in the lurch; and the Europeans could then give us primary responsibility for that conflict. We would face the choice of walking away or committing ourselves to military intervention in the conflict. Such a venture, to succeed, could require American ground troops in the conflict, something neither the President nor our people want to see.

So the wisest immediate course is this: support the RRF and work for a peaceful settlement.

Scott F. O'Grady, right, escorted by Captain [unclear] as Hanford, while [unclear] to a transcript of his [unclear] help last Thursday. [unclear] excerpt below, Captain [unclear] is trying to verify [unclear] the distress call is not a [unclear] by the Serbs:

**IN HANFORD** "Basher [unclear] is Basher 11. You're [unclear] and clear."

**IN O'GRADY** "I'm [unclear] I'm alive."

**IN HANFORD** "Copy [unclear] What was your [unclear] iron in Korea?"

**IN O'GRADY** "Juvat, [unclear]"

**IN HANFORD** "Copy [unclear] you're alive. Good to [unclear] your voice."



The New York Times; Photograph by Reuters

## How Honed Dark Skills in Cuba Become a 'Minister' of Crime

By STEVEN GREENHOUSE

WASHINGTON, June 10 — One fall of 1984, the reigning Colombian cocaine, Carlos [unclear], quietly dispatched an [unclear] to Cuba for an audience with L. Vesco, the fugitive wanted in the United States for more than \$200 million.

The patronage of the Cuban [unclear] del Castro, Mr. Vesco had [unclear] up in splendid exile. Liv- [unclear]-slung beachfront villa, [unclear] owned two private jets, a [unclear] cars, and three boats that [unclear] on the dazzling blue [unclear] waters. Average Cubans [unclear] on black beans and rice; [unclear]'s guests dined on lobster [unclear] pagne.

his wealth Mr. Vesco was [unclear] idle. In fact, during his 23 [unclear] the run, intelligence offi- [unclear] prosecutors and West- [unclear] mats said, Mr. Vesco had [unclear] himself as a white-collar [unclear], plying the same Gulf

elite throughout the region.

But today Mr. Vesco's mansions are sealed and his fate is uncertain. Cuban officials today confirmed that they have arrested him on suspicion of being a "provocateur and agent for foreign special services." In Washington, officials continued to wait this weekend to see if Havana planned to follow up the hints it dropped recently that Cuba planned to hand him over to American authorities.

For all the new millions Mr. Vesco made by being of use to criminals and politicians over the years, he has not been able to secure one thing for himself or his family: a permanent home. If he is thrown out of Cuba, it will be only the last in a series of sudden evictions. In Costa Rica and in the Bahamas, Mr. Vesco has found that his notoriety has eventu- ally either made him too hot to han- dle, or a useful bargaining chip.

Still, it was because Mr. Vesco

## No 'Rambo,' And 6 Days On the Run

By CELESTINE BOHLEN

AVIANO AIR BASE, Italy, June 10 — As he lay in the bushes near where his parachute landed, his face in the dirt and his ears covered with cam- ouflage gloves, Capt. Scott F. O'Grady thought that a few feet away there were people looking to kill him.

"It wasn't that they were just walking around me," the 29-year-old pilot said today. "It was that they were shooting their rifles, and they weren't just shooting at bunny rabbits, because I never saw any bunny rabbits, I never saw a squirrel. I think they thought they saw some- thing that was me — and were trying to kill me."

At his first news conference since his dramatic rescue two days ago, Captain O'Grady, whose F-16 jet fighter was downed by a Serbian missile while on NATO patrol over Bosnia, told how he managed to sur-

## WESTERN OFFICIALS SAY SERBIA HELPS BOSNIAN COMRADES

### GIVING FUEL AND MONEY

### Air Defense System Remains Linked to Yugoslav Army Computers in Belgrade

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG  
and ERIC SCHMITT

WASHINGTON, June 10 — Even as the West courts Serbia's Presi- dent in hopes of bringing peace to Bosnia and winning the release of the remaining United Nations hos- tages, his military is secretly con- tinuing to deliver a range of assist- ance to the Bosnian Serbs, American and European officials say.

The Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, vowed last year to seal the border between Serbia and Bos- nia and won an easing of United Nations sanctions as a result. Mr. Milosevic insists that since then only non-lethal aid has been sent to the Bosnian Serbs, an assertion gener- ally accepted by a team of United Nations monitors.

But American and European offi- cials with access to intelligence re- ports said the federal Yugoslav Army was paying the salaries of many Bosnian Serb officers and is also supplying their forces with fuel, spare parts, training and ammuni- tion.

Several American analysts said the Yugoslav Army provided the [unclear] parts and technicians for main- taining the Bosnian Serb air defenses that last week shot down an F-16 jet fighter on a NATO monitoring mis- sion. The system remains electroni- cally linked to the Yugoslav Army's computers and radars, although there has been no evidence that the Yugoslav Army was directly in- volved in shooting down the Ameri- can plane, officials said.

While there are differences among analysts about precisely how much military matériel is flowing from Yugoslavia to the Bosnian Serbs, American experts say assistance from Belgrade has enabled the Bos- nian Serbs to remain an effective fighting force. Even those skeptical of the reports agreed that the supply line to the Bosnian Serbs had been curtailed, but not cut off.

...canoeer, plying the same Gulf Stream routes as the pirates of two centuries earlier. They said Mr. Vesco offered himself as a consultant, middleman, tutor and occasional dealmaker to established dictators and a newly emerging criminal

...it was because Mr. Vesco had adroitly managed to maintain his high-level connections for so long that his arrest came as such a shock. Mr. Vesco flexed those connec-

Continued on Page 10, Column 3



Jim Wilson/The New York Times

Wilson Lee, in Norwalk, Calif., broad powers to search gang members.

## pon Prompts a Rights Debate

because of the latest innovation in efforts to clear the streets of violent gangs: Norwalk and a growing number of other California cities are obtaining carefully tailored court injunctions, based on local nuisance ordinances, to prohibit a list of people identified by name from engaging in specified activities that in many cases are perfectly legal for everybody else.

From Westminster, Burbank, Van Nuys and San Fernando here in Southern California to San Jose in the north, various injunctions have barred youths identified by the authorities as gang members from sitting in parks, climbing trees or roofs, whistling, making gang hand sig-

nals, wearing large belt buckles or carrying bottles, baseball bats or flashlights.

"It's legalized harassment," Deputy Lee declared happily.

Civil libertarians agree, and are raising vigorous challenges in higher courts.

The cities' pre-emptive strikes on crime, critics say, violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression and assembly, use civil injunctions to deny the programs' targets the protections they would enjoy in criminal cases and — since a young gang member identified in an injunction may not even be suspected of a crime — rest on the

WHERE DO YOU COME OUT? SEE THE ADVERTISING IN today's Week In Review — ADVT.

Continued on Page 23, Column 1

...survive for six days in a Bosnian forest, hiding by day, never sleeping for more than half an hour at a time, moving around only at night, and even then never ranging farther than a mile and a half.

He scrounged for water — even wringing a few drops of rainwater from the wool socks he was wearing — and dug for ants. And he gave nicknames — Leroy and Alfred — to two pestering cows who twice closed in on his hiding place, together with their cowherd, whom he called Tinkerbell.

Once, at the start of the news conference, Captain O'Grady broke down and cried as he was listening to a tape of the radio conversation he had in the early hours of Thursday with his friend Capt. Thomas O. Hanford, then flying 30,000 feet over his

Continued on Page 14, Column 3

...curtailed, but not cut off.

"Despite what Mr. Milosevic would like you to think, they have not severed their ties," one Administration official said of the military deliveries. "The support is there."

That view is not universally embraced by Clinton Administration policymakers, who have urged the negotiations with Mr. Milosevic, not by the Government's intelligence analysts. Some believe Mr. Milosevic is acquiescing in his military commanders' support of their Bosnian Serb colleagues, rather than actively directing it. Others question the extent of the Yugoslav shipments to the Bosnian Serbs described in what one official termed "anecdotal" reports.

In response to questions, Defense Secretary William J. Perry issued a statement that said while what he called "leakage" persists, he knew

Continued on Page 14, Column 2

## TODAY'S SECTIONS

### Arts and Leisure/Section 2

"Pocahontas," the big animated summer film about an American Indian princess, works hard to avoid stereotypes. It was not always so at Disney.

### Automobiles/Section 11\*

### The City/Section 138

### Editorials and Op-Ed/Section 4

### Magazine/Section 6

The debate on affirmative action is finally out in the open. Its proponents have never successfully made the case to a dubious public, though the case to be made is strong.

### Money and Business/Section 3

For the first time in its 61-year history, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Government agency responsible for safeguarding trillions of dollars of investors' money, may operate with only two commissioners.

### Real Estate/Section 9\*

A corporate park in New Jersey gets a new tenant: a day-care center for adults.

### Regional Weeklies/Section 134

### Television/Section 12\*

### Travel/Section 5

For weekend getaways, three options: Bermuda's pastel charm, Montreal's good food and good manners, and, with kids, upstate New York resorts.

### Week In Review/Section 4

### Employment Advertising/Section 10\*


\* In New York City and the metropolitan region. († Elsewhere, auto pages are in section 3.)

‡ In most parts of New York City.

§ In Long Island, Westchester, Connecticut and central and northern New Jersey.

The New York Times

## Book Review



### Special Today:

### Book Review/Section 7

The annual summer reading issue, with a vacation book list; surveys of travel; cooking and gardening; a section on golf (led off by George Plimpton), and many other getaway devices.



## 1995 U.S. OPEN

### Sports Sunday/Section 8

The United States Open takes place this week on a course that seems more Scottish than American but speaks in a language of pure golf: Shinnecock Hills at Southampton, L.I.



THE NEW YORK TIMES is available for home or office delivery in most major U.S. cities. Please call, toll-free: 1-800-NYTIMES. Ask about the Transmedia TimesCard. ADVT.

# U.S. and West Contend Belgrade Still Aids Bosnian Comrades

Continued From Page 1

of no "credible evidence" that the Bosnian Serbs were receiving a broad range of military help from the federal Yugoslav Army.

Since the Bosnian Serbs began fighting three years ago in opposition to the declared independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, American intelligence agencies have mounted extensive efforts to eavesdrop on communications and compile satellite photographs of troop and equipment movements.

This has produced persistent reports that the Bosnian Serbs have continued to receive help from the old Yugoslav Army, which is based in Belgrade, the capital of both Serbia and federal Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia now consists only of Serbia and Montenegro and is dominated by Serbia.

According to American and European officials, the reports say the Bosnian Serbs' trucks, tanks, and other heavy equipment are maintained with parts supplied by the Yugoslav Army.

American officials said they have evidence of regular conversations and consultations between the Yugoslav Army's general staff in Belgrade and the officers directing operations in Bosnia. They said Bosnian Serbs wounded in battle are flown by helicopter to Yugoslav military hospitals.

## U.S. and West Face A Thorny Question

Intelligence reports about Mr. Milosevic's continuing role in the war raise a nettlesome question for European and American leaders. Should the West lift economic sanctions against a government that appears to be sustaining the Bosnian Serbs' war effort, even as it pledges to do the opposite?

Several American and European

officials said that having decided not to directly confront the Bosnian Serbs, the West has little choice but to bargain with Mr. Milosevic. That conclusion, said a European official, has made both Washington and its European allies more eager to gloss over or play down reports of fuel and military assistance flowing to the Bosnian Serbs.

"The guy is a key factor to a resolution," one senior American official acknowledged, referring Mr. Milosevic. "Whether we want to deal with him or not, we have to."

The talks with Mr. Milosevic are at a delicate turn. Some of the lesser economic sanctions against Serbia were lifted last year after Mr. Milosevic announced that he would close the border with Bosnia. Now, the so-called "contact group" of five nations trying to find a peace formula for the Balkans is offering to suspend the remaining sanctions on Serbia if Mr. Milosevic recognizes Bosnia.

The Serbian President rebuffed that offer after an American envoy, Robert Frasure, insisted on an independent means of reimposing the sanctions if Mr. Milosevic reneges. American officials said Mr. Milosevic wants that matter solely in the hands of the United Nations Security Council, where the Russians, historical allies of the Serbs, hold a veto.

## Good Cop, Bad Cop: A Serbian Version

American officials disagree about the significance of the split between the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, and Mr. Milosevic. Over the past week, for example, Mr. Milosevic said he had intervened to gain the release of about half of the United Nations soldiers taken hostage by the Bosnian Serbs after NATO air raids on a Bosnian Serb ammunition depot. Then, Mr. Milosevic cited his cooperation on the hostages as an argument for lifting the sanctions on his terms.

The military relationship between Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs began long before war erupted in April 1992. In the months before the conflict, the Yugoslav Army moved tons of tanks, artillery, and heavy equipment to Bosnia, where there were already huge stocks of ammunition from the time when Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of Yugoslavia. After fighting broke out, the communication networks left behind by the Yugoslav Army remained tied to Belgrade.

That summer's campaign of "ethnic cleansing," in which Bosnian Serb soldiers and paramilitary militias rounded up Bosnian Muslims and detained them in camps or drove them from their homes, were directed by officers in the Yugoslav Army's headquarters in Belgrade, according to a former American official who was briefed on the European allies intercepts of military communications.

The Yugoslav Army's heavy weapons, many of which were pounding Sarajevo from strategic high points around the Bosnian capital, remain the Bosnian Serbs' key military advantage over the more numerous Bosnian Government forces.

There also were extensive personal ties between the Yugoslav Army and the Bosnian Serbs. Gen. Ratko Mladic, the commander of the Bosnian Serb forces, was a career officer in the Yugoslav Army and was selected to lead the Bosnian Serbs by Mr. Milosevic shortly before the conflict began.

As the war continued, the Yugoslav Army openly supported the Bosnian Serbs, sending convoys of trucks and oil tankers across the border. At times, elite Yugoslav Army units reportedly joined the fighting. This open support of the Serbs prompted the West to impose economic sanctions on Yugoslavia and ban all trade with the country.

Belgrade proved adept at evading the sanctions and smuggling goods. But the sanctions nonetheless hurt

and by last fall, Mr. Milosevic was looking for a deal to lift them. He offered to close the border with Bosnia, and allow an international mission to monitor his compliance.

On Oct. 3 of last year, two Western mediators — Lord Owen of the European Union and Thorvald Soltenberg of the United Nations — announced that the border had been closed. At the same time, however, Lord Owen declared that oil tankers and trucks going across Bosnia to the Serb-held areas of Croatia were not subject to the cutoff.

Immediately, American officials say, 50 to 60 oil tankers a week began showing up at the border crossings with papers indicating that they were traveling to Croatia. The international monitors had no means of checking whether they ever arrived, or whether, as many American officials suspect, they dropped their cargo in Bosnia.

In rural Serbia, several Yugoslav Army officers told American diplomats that they were still running supplies to Bosnia, according to cables sent back to Washington. Since then, American officials agree, there has been some tightening of the border, with fuel shipments to Bosnia initially cut as much as 50 percent. This has prompted fuel shortages in Bosnian Serb territory.

But the officials asserted that the military assistance and fuel deliveries have continued, and that the Bosnian Serb Army has had no difficulties in sustaining its operations. Indeed, two American experts said this week that the cross-border traffic was increasing as the combat resumes in Bosnia after a winter cease-fire.

American officials agree that the deliveries of fuel and repair of vehicles are an essential element of the support from Belgrade. The Bosnian Serb forces are outnumbered, yet American officials say they maintain the upper hand along a 1,000 mile front by moving armor and heavy weapons rapidly to counter

## Who Is Paymaster For Bosnian Serbs?

Another aspect of Belgrade's support is more basic: The salaries of many Bosnian Serb officers serving at their headquarters in Pale, near Sarajevo, and elsewhere in Bosnia are paid by the Yugoslav Army. The Bosnian Serbs use the same currency as Yugoslavia, the dinar, and one official said, "We've seen instances of Pale Serb commanders going to Belgrade and saying 'Hey, where's our cash?'"

The air defense radars illustrate the continuing ties between the two armies. Brig. Gen. Selmo Cikotic, the Bosnian Embassy's military attaché in Washington and a former Yugoslav Army officer, said the radars in Bosnia and Serb-held Croatia remain linked to a national grid in Belgrade.

General Cikotic, who was himself an air defense officer, asserted that the SAM-6 missile that shot down the NATO F-16 jet last week was equipped with a Russian-manufactured modification supplied to the Bosnian Serbs by the Yugoslav Army in the last few months.

American officials could not confirm that detail, but said that spare parts for the system were sent by Belgrade. The operator who fired the SAM-6 missile had either "prior training" or "current technical assistance" from the Yugoslav Army, one Administration official said. "It's not something someone could just up and do, and be successful."

Asked to assess the true relationship between the Yugoslav Army's general staff and Bosnian Serb forces, an American official pointed to the recently appointed commander of Serbian forces in Croatia: Lieut. Gen. Mile Mrksic. Until a few weeks ago, the official said, General Mrksic was serving on the general staff Yugoslav Army in Belgrade.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                          | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 002. email               | Alexander Vershbow to @NSA. Subject: Renewal. (1 page) | 06/29/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 897

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2715

### **RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

LONDON TIMES

June 29, 1995

Pg. 15

# Serb radar link-up poses challenge to Nato pilots

By MICHAEL EVANS  
DEFENCE CORRESPONDENT  
AND DESSA TREVISAN

NATO is holding urgent discussions to resolve how to meet the serious threat to its combat aircraft flying over Bosnia posed by the Serb newly integrated air defence system which targets every flight over the Adriatic.

General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, said yesterday on a visit to London: "The radars are clearly linked and together with their ability to move their mobile Sam-6 missile systems around, this now presents a formidable challenge to our pilots." America's senior military commander said the radar system was one that had existed before the break-up of Yugoslavia but it was only recently that the Serbs had learnt how to link it all up and had "shown willingness to use it against Nato aircraft". While he said there was no evidence that Belgrade had helped in integrating the air defence system, it was likely that Serbian expertise had been involved. General Shalikashvili said that since the radars had been linked up,

every air patrol over Bosnia under Nato's Operation Deny Flight had to be accompanied by aircraft capable of electronic jamming and protecting the patrolling jets from missile attacks. The American general has been discussing this issue with his British counterpart, Field Marshal Sir Peter Inge, during his visit to Britain.

He said the Serb air defence system controlled a whole range of anti-aircraft weapons including Sam-2s, Sam-6s and hand-held missiles. The general said it was vital to take precautions so that Nato pilots were not "put in harm's way". Earlier this month, Captain Scott O'Grady, an American pilot, ejected safely from his F16 jet when it was hit by a Serb Sam-6 missile over Banja Luka.

It has been reported in Belgrade that the Serbs have long-range surveillance and three-dimensional radars of American and British manufacture installed on Mount Jaborina, southeast of Sarajevo, capable of monitoring Adriatic air space and all the Nato planes coming across from their bases in Italy. There are also claims of under-

ground facilities on the mountain linked to a main command chamber.

The radar centre, installed by the former Yugoslav Army while Yugoslavia was still unified, is believed to contain command and control, communications and intelligence electronic systems, as well as digital and integrated sensors and computers. An English-language Belgrade newspaper, *VIP Daily News Report*, reported recently that the whole underground system lay on special steel springs intended to protect it from vibrations caused by a huge air strike.

Asked at a press conference at the American Embassy whether Nato should consider bombing the radar system to remove the threat to alliance pilots, General Shalikashvili said nothing had been ruled out. But he issued a warning that the countries with troops serving with the UN in Bosnia could not brush aside the possible reaction such a mission might provoke from the Serbs.

He said that Nato was ready to help with a UN troop pullout. His offer came as Nato ambassadors gave provisional approval to the withdrawal contingency plan.

WALL STREET JOURNAL

June 29, 1995 Pg. 1

Rockets fired by rebel Serbs blew large holes in Sarajevo's TV center and an apartment building, killing five civilians and wounding dozens of residents and foreign reporters. Three other people were killed in shelling elsewhere in the Bosnian capital.

WASHINGTON TIMES

June 29, 1995 Pg. 7

## Vietnam ties hit

Rep. Robert K. Dornan opened a new round of hearings yesterday on American servicemen missing in Southeast Asia by denouncing improved U.S.-Vietnam relations.

"How can we be even discussing normalizing with a country where the war criminals are still at the top?" said Mr. Dornan, California Republican and chairman of the House National Security subcommittee on military personnel.

The former Air Force pilot and outspoken hawk on military matters has long contended that American prisoners of war were left behind in Vietnam and Laos after the Vietnam War and that both the U.S. and Vietnamese governments have concealed information about their fate.

Mr. Dornan, in his new roles as chairman of the subcommittee and a GOP presidential candidate, said he will hold a series of hearings on the issue.

WASHINGTON TIMES June 29, 1995 Pg. 10

## SECURITY CHECK

The Justice Department's review of security measures at federal buildings found that most facilities fall short of the government's proposed new security standards. The report recommends a series of management actions to upgrade security, including:

- Re-emphasize that the General Services Administration (GSA) has primary responsibility for implementing federal facility security.
- Direct all agencies to immediately begin upgrading security at their facilities to meet the recommended minimum security guidelines, as current funding permits.
- Establish building security committees at each facility to identify required security enhancements for each building and submit proposals to the GSA.
- Work with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to identify funding needed for major security upgrades.
- Upgrade the GSA's Federal Protective Service, which provides security for much of the federal work force with uniformed and contract security guards.
- Improve hiring and training standards for contract security guards and require that background checks be completed before guards are allowed on duty.
- Make the Federal Protective Service responsible for maintaining a comprehensive database on physical security at all federal facilities.
- Create a permanent Interagency Security Committee to develop security policies and monitor their implementation.

Source: Justice Department

The Washington Times

## SECURITY...from Pg. 1

closing Pennsylvania Avenue between 15th and 17th Streets NW in front of the White House. Later streets were also closed on Capitol Hill.

"I think people took [security] for granted until the Oklahoma bombing," said Everett Kelly, a financial analyst at the Commerce Department. "I think it's a good thing, especially in D.C., where a lot of buildings could be prime targets."

The recommendations, consisting of 52 security standards, cover such things as control over parking adjacent to government buildings, better lighting, shatterproof windows, greater use of physical barriers, closed circuit television monitoring, strengthened security at entrances and exits, better employee and visitor identification and reconsideration of where best to locate day-care centers for employees' children.

The report also calls for upgrading the Federal Protective Service, the

GSA's uniformed security force, by raising hiring and training standards and completing background checks before new hires begin work.

At some buildings, including the U.S. Customs Service office on Constitution Avenue, security has remained tight since the bombing. Security project manager Calvin Harrod said security officers are now required to touch the badges of each employee entering the building and verify they are properly identified.

Still, some would like to see more measures. Chuck Winwood, a customs official, said he approved of tighter security "as long as there is a balance. The public has to have access to their government. But there is also a need for increased security. The bad guys have painted bull's-eyes on these people, and you just can't ignore it."

Garelick stressed that since each federal building presents different

SECURITY...Pg. 16

CURRENT NEWS ANALYSIS & RESEARCH SERVICE  
ROOM 4C881, PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-7500  
Tel: (703)695-2884/897-8765 Fax: (703)695-6822/7260

CHIEF: Bill Monroe CURRENT NEWS BRANCH: Tatt Phoebus, Chief, Marilyn Phipps, Acting Early Bird Editor Elmer Christian, Janice Goff, Linda Lee, Meredith Johnson, Lisa Stafford Writer-Editors RESEARCH BRANCH: Denise Brown, Chief Alice Boyd, Pat Finnegan, Sharon Foster Writer-Editors SYSTEMS ADMINISTRATOR: Carol Rippe ADMINISTRATION: Tonya Pollard PRODUCTION: Defense Printing Service (Room 4C853) ELECTRONIC EARLY BIRD DISTRIBUTION: Defense Technical Information Center (703-274-7251, DSN 284-7251)

# CURRENT NEWS EARLY BIRD

THURSDAY, June 29, 1995

16/4

WASHINGTON POST

June 29, 1995

Pg. 1

## New Security Measures Ordered by President

### Federal Facilities to Get Stricter Controls

By John M. Goshko  
and Scott Bowles  
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Clinton yesterday ordered all federal agencies to protect their workers and facilities against terrorism like the Oklahoma City bombing by beginning immediately to

institute new minimum security standards recommended by the Justice Department for all federal buildings.

For approximately 1 million federal civilian employees, nearly a third of them in the Washington area, yesterday's action will change workaday life in ways large and small.

For anyone working in space

owned or leased by the General Services Administration, the new security measures could mean fewer parking spaces, long lines at metal detectors, wearing new types of ID cards, relocating day-care centers and having bags and purses X-rayed daily.

Many say they welcome the headaches. Shortly after the Oklahoma City bombing, some employees say, security tightened briefly only to return to normal weeks later.

Lisa Johnson, a secretary for the Department of Commerce, said that three weeks after the bombing, security at her office was "the same old same old." "They don't even look at your passes," she said. "You could just flash anybody's pass and you're in."

That may change soon for employees in the 654 buildings owned or leased by the federal government in

the Washington area. The president's order could include altering identification systems used to allow employees into buildings, as well as employing roving patrols outside buildings.

"We owe it to our federal workers and to the citizens who visit federal offices every day to take these sensible steps to protect their safety," Deputy Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick said in making the report public.

Clinton ordered the study on April 20, the day after a truck loaded with explosives was blown up in the street outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, shattering the edifice and killing 168 people.

The tragedy caused Clinton to bow to the Secret Service's insistence on

SECURITY...Pg. 2

EUROPEAN STARS &amp; STRIPES

June 29, 1995

Pg. 1

## Air Force media work in Ashy case assailed

By CHUCK VINCH  
Washington bureau

WASHINGTON — Air Force public affairs officials badly mishandled media inquiries into two questionable flights aboard military aircraft by a four-star officer last year, according to the Pentagon inspector general.

A report issued Tuesday said the Air Force was "incompetent" in its response to the media and presented "a series of incorrect facts, careless communications and lack of central direction."

Defense Department and Air Force policy call for timely release of information, even if it reflects negatively on the military. Air Force policy states: "When bad news occurs, release it quickly and candidly. Experience proves candor is best."

In this case, "the Air Force did not comply with its policy objectives," the IG report said.

Brig. Gen. Ronald T. Scomyers, Air Force director of public affairs, said he is reviewing the report. "We will make ap-

propriate changes to ensure that we have a public affairs program that is responsive to both the needs of the Air Force and the media."

The report focuses on two flights made last year by Gen. Joseph W. Ashy, former chief of NATO air forces in Southern Europe and now head of the U.S. Space Command and North American Air Defense Command at Peterson AFB, Colo. The flights were investigated by several news organizations.

Ashy flew aboard a nonstop C-141 from Naples, Italy, to Colorado in September at a cost of at least \$116,000, accompanied by only his cat and an enlisted aide. The day after arriving, he took a C-21 executive jet to Washington to receive his fourth star.

The report absolved Ashy of wrong-

ASHY...Pg. 4

WALL STREET JOURNAL

June 29, 1995 Pg. 1

## Alamogordo Braces Itself for an Invasion By the Luftwaffe

Germans Are Coming to Train  
In New Mexico and Spend  
Money All Around Town

By ROBERT TOMSHO

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL  
ALAMOGORDO, N.M. — With base closings threatening other military towns, this desert outpost is thrilled about the buildup planned for nearby Holloman Air Force Base.

But the godsend will arrive on some peculiar wings, and that has people here seeking advice from the likes of Anja Lyles, co-owner of the new Bavarian House restaurant. "This is the most important thing," says the German-born restaurateur, jabbing at the air with a lighted cigarette. "A Wiener schnitzel is not a hot dog."

Knowing the difference has become something of a civic duty as this town of 33,000 scrambles to become a home away

from home for the German Luftwaffe.

### A Permanent Presence

Since World War II, small contingents of foreign troops and officers have regularly attended U.S. military academies and trained at American bases. Pressed for space in their own densely populated country, German pilots and air-defense crews have trained in the U.S. since the 1960s. For the past three years, Holloman has played host to a small German fighter-jet training squadron.

But now the German air force has something much grander planned for Alamogordo, a town built by the railroads nearly a century ago in the parched

GERMAN...Pg. 3

This publication is prepared by American Forces Information Service (AFIS/OATSD-PA) to bring to the attention of key personnel news items of interest to them in their official capacities. It is not intended to substitute for newspapers and periodicals as a means of keeping informed about the meaning and impact of news developments. Use of these articles does not reflect official endorsement. Further reproduction for private use or gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. Please pass this copy on to someone else who needs current news information, then...



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9505021  
RECEIVED: 29 JUN 95 10

TO: SENS

FROM: BRILL, K

DOC DATE: 29 JUN 95  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FMF  
FRANCE  
NETHERLANDS

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA  
GREAT BRITAIN  
UN

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: USE OF SEC 614 AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO UN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 03 JUL 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SHEEHAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION  
SHEEHAN

FOR CONCURRENCE  
BEERS  
CLARKE  
DREW  
GARDNER  
PETERS  
SIMON

FOR INFO  
DANVERS  
LORIN  
SCHWARTZ  
SEATON  
SESTAK  
VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By VR NARA, Date 6/3/2014

2013-0687-F

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



## United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

June 30, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Presidential Waiver of Statutory Restrictions on  
Providing Assistance for Countries Participating in  
the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) in Bosnia

This memorandum requests that the President authorize the Department of State to consult with, and provide the attached written policy justification to, relevant committees of the Congress concerning the proposed waiver of legal restrictions on providing assistance to countries participating in the RRF in Bosnia.

On June 27, the Department notified Congress of the President's intention (Tab 2) to exercise his authority under section 506(a)(1) of the FAA to provide up to \$15 million in defense articles and services (\$12 million in strategic lift and \$3 million in equipment) for the Department of Defense to support the RRF. On June 28, the Department recommended (Tab 3) that the President sign a determination to authorize the Department and DoD to draw down up to \$12 million in defense services (for strategic lift). We chose to defer moving forward with the \$3 million for equipment drawdown pending further discussions with Congress and DoD pertaining to end-user issues.

Section 505(c) contains a requirement to terminate further grants of military equipment and supplies to any country "having sufficient wealth to enable it, in the judgment of the President, to maintain and equip its own military forces at adequate strength, without undue burden on its economy." In view of this restriction, we designed the initial package as a drawdown -- at least informally -- to the United Nations, though defense articles and services would, for all practical purposes, be provided to support British, French and Dutch units. Nevertheless, the DoD raised concerns (technology disclosure) that defense articles contemplated under the drawdown (e.g., night vision goggles, laser target designators) were of a generation that it would only transfer such items to very close allies, and not to the UN.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

DoD and the Joint Staff also raised issues concerning (a) difficulties and delays in negotiating end-use, retransfer and security assurances with the UN that might address their concerns of transferring to the UN; and (b) the possibility that the UN could refuse to cooperate, opting instead to offer alternative equipment or sources in lieu of U.S. defense articles.

It is important that the RRF move quickly to enhance UNPROFOR's ability to defend itself and deal firmly with Serb interference in fulfilling its existing humanitarian and peacekeeping mandate. Providing our allies with the necessary equipment immediately is a major factor in how effective the RRF will be in performing its vital mission.

We concur with DoD and JCS' concerns in that we could be faced with undue delays in using the UN as a conduit for getting U.S. defense articles to the allies to meet immediate operational needs. We believe that the most effective means of ensuring that the allies receive the necessary equipment in a timely manner is to waive the section 505(c) prohibition against providing military equipment and supplies to "wealthy" countries.

Since we are not prepared to conclude that the UK, France and the Netherlands do not satisfy the section 505(c) standard, it is necessary to waive the restrictions in this section. Section 614(a)(1) of the FAA provides the means for overcoming the legal restriction of providing these countries grant defense articles. The provision authorizes the President to furnish assistance under the FAA "without regard to any" provision of the FAA, or any other law authorizing or appropriating funds under the FAA.

Before exercising section 614(a)(1) authority, the President must consult with, and provide a written policy justification to, the Appropriations Committees, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House International Relations Committee. The President must then determine, and notify in writing to the Speaker and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that the furnishing of assistance under this authority "is important to the security interests of the United States." As a matter of practice, generally we proceed to take action under section 614 only if Congressional consultations do not indicate a contrary course of action.


Despite the President receiving a June 29 letter from Speaker Gingrich and Majority Leader Dole expressing opposition to our providing material support for the RRF, including use of the 614 waiver provision, we continue to believe that our foreign policy interests argue strongly for going forward with the drawdown to our Allies, using this waiver authority.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

- 3 -

Accordingly, we recommend that the President authorize notifications, consultations and the furnishing of a justification to Congress. If these consultations do not suggest a different course of action, we will recommend that the President sign a Determination exercising his authorities as described above.



Kenneth C. Brill  
Executive Secretary

Attachments

- Tab 1 - Memorandum of Justification
- Tab 2 - Draft Congressional Notification Letters

UNCLASSIFIED

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                    | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 003a. memo               | For Andrew Sens from Kenneth Brill. Subject: Drawdown of DOD Services. (3 pages) | 06/27/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 897

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2715

### **RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                      | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 003b. memo               | For Andrew Sens from Kenneth Brill. Subject: Presidential Determination. (2 pages) | 06/28/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 897

### FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [1]

2013-0687-F  
vz2715

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Presidential Determination  
No. 95-29

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Determination to Authorize the Furnishing of  
Emergency Military Assistance to the United Nations  
in Support of the Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia Under  
Section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 506(a)(1) of  
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C.  
2318(a)(1) (the "Act"), I hereby determine that:

- (1) an unforeseen emergency exists which requires  
immediate military assistance to a foreign country  
or international organization; and
- (2) the emergency requirement cannot be met under the  
authority of the Arms Export Control Act or any other  
law except section 506 of the Act.

Therefore, I hereby authorize the furnishing of up to \$12,000,000  
in defense services from the Department of Defense to provide  
immediate transportation support necessary to move the Rapid  
Reaction Force personnel and equipment to Bosnia.

The Secretary of State is authorized and directed to report this  
determination to Congress and arrange for its publication in the  
Federal Register.

*William B. Clinton*

**Memorandum of Justification for  
Presidential Determination Regarding the  
Drawdown of Defense Articles and Services  
for the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF)**

Our principal goals in the Balkans remain to relieve human suffering as well as to contain the conflict while seeking a peaceful solution. We also seek to preserve the unity of NATO but without greater involvement of U.S. forces in the war in the Balkans. In this regard, we believe UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia, if at all possible, because of its contributions to improving the situation. Civilian casualties declined dramatically from 130,000 in 1992 to 2,500 in 1994. Thousands have received food and medical supplies through the UNHCR airlift which operates under UNPROFOR-provided security. UNPROFOR withdrawal now would trigger an even greater humanitarian disaster, including many allied casualties and risk of spillover of the conflict. But to remain, UNPROFOR must be able to conduct its mission more effectively and in greater security.

We are convinced that recent steps taken to enhance UNPROFOR's ability to protect itself -- including the creation of a RRF -- offer the best prospects of achieving the objectives of UNPROFOR's mission. The British and French governments are clear in stating that without the RRF, they will withdraw from UNPROFOR. Without them, UNPROFOR will collapse, producing an explosion of fighting that would result in a resumption of all-out war, undermine prospects for a negotiated settlement, and increase casualties and humanitarian suffering. Such a scenario has the high probability of involving U.S. ground troops in combat.

The proposed RRF will be part of the existing UN peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia. The RRF will be under the existing UN chain of command and under the operational control of the UN military commanders in the theater. However, there is considerable room for a more robust response under existing procedures. Our allies want this force to protect their other troops, and are sending them in national uniforms, without blue helmets or vehicles painted white, so that the force can more effectively fill its force protection roll. The British and French have told us that they will give maximum authority to commanders on the ground. It means they will look to LGEN Janvier and BGEN Smith to make decisions on the employment of the RRF.

Current planning calls for France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to form the nucleus of a multinational brigade with rapid reaction capability. The British will also provide an airmobile brigade and the French will earmark an additional standby brigade. Total RRF troops will number 15,000.

The RRF will act in support of UNPROFOR and function within its existing mandate. The primary mission of the RRF is to ensure greater flexibility for the UN commander in carrying out his mandate through added protection and mobility. It is an important addition to UNPROFOR's capability to defend itself. The RRF could assist isolated or threatened UN units in emergency actions, help redeployment of UNPROFOR elements, and facilitate freedom of movement where necessary. It is intended to help UNPROFOR defend itself, decrease its vulnerability to hostage taking, and do its job better. It will make UNPROFOR able to respond expeditiously and forcibly to those who threaten it and its mission. NATO will provide close air support to the RRF under existing arrangements. The existence of the RRF would enhance the ability of UNPROFOR to conduct a withdrawal, if needed.

We support the RRF because we want UNPROFOR to continue operations in support of its mandate. The more secure UNPROFOR is, the more effective it will be in providing humanitarian aid and promoting a climate favorable to a negotiated settlement. To facilitate the RRF's deployment to Bosnia, we have offered American military capabilities in strategic lift and associated support equipment so that it can quickly make its presence felt. Initial indications are that approximately \$12 million in logistics lift will be provided. This includes the use of four Roll-On/Roll-Off ship missions to move British equipment and up to 50 C-5 flights for UK, French and Dutch requirements. The balance of approximately \$38 million will be comprised of equipment. While the list of requested items is still being evaluated, agreement has been reached on the following: Tactical Satellite Terminals, Night Vision Goggles, and Laser Target Designators.

Section 505(c) of the FAA contains a requirement to terminate further grants of military equipment and supplies to certain countries "having sufficient wealth to enable them to maintain and equip their own military forces at adequate strength. In view of concerns related to designing these transfers as transfers to the United Nations -- the possibility of difficulties and delays in negotiating end-use, retransfers and security assurances to address such concerns -- it is our view that it is important to the security interests of the United States to effect these transfers directly to our NATO allies who will be contributing troops for this effort. In order to proceed in this fashion, it will be necessary for the President to invoke the authority of section 614 of the FAA to furnish the assistance without regard to applicable statutory restrictions, including section 505(c) of the Act.

It is important that the RRF be able to move quickly to enhance UNPROFOR's ability to defend itself and deal firmly with Serb interference in fulfilling its existing humanitarian and peacekeeping mandate. It has never been the intention to

send UNPROFOR to war. Within its existing mandate, however, UNPROFOR has the authority to become a more credible presence than it has been to date. The RRF will permit UNPROFOR to do so. It is in the national interest of the United States to contain the current conflict in Bosnia and address the humanitarian situation. Support for UNPROFOR and the RRF assists in realization of this national interest.

For these reasons, the use of the President's authority -- pursuant to section 614 of the Act -- to enable the United States to provide urgent equipment support to the RRF participating countries is important to the security interests of the United States.

Letter to be transmitted to:

Speaker of the House  
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations  
Chairman, House International Relations  
Chairman, Senate Appropriations  
Chairman, House Appropriations

Dear \_\_\_\_\_:

I wish to inform you that the President proposes to exercise his authority under Section 614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the "Act"), to provide \$3 million in defense articles and services to countries participating in the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) in Bosnia.

On June 27, the Department notified you of the President's intention to exercise his authority under section 506(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to authorize the furnishing of up to \$15 million in defense articles and services from the Department of Defense to provide emergency military assistance in support of equipment and transportation requirements necessary to support the RRF. On June 28, the President signed a determination (P.D. 95-29) which authorized DoD to draw down up to \$12 million in defense services (strategic airlift and sealift) necessary to move the RRF and its equipment to Bosnia. The President chose to defer the other \$3 million in authority pending further discussions with Congress pertaining to end-user issues.

The end-user issues focused on whether the equipment would be provided bilaterally to participating RRF countries or to the United Nations. As explained further in the attached memorandum of justification, we decided that the equipment needed to be transferred directly to participating RRF countries. In order to provide this equipment directly to participating countries, it is necessary to waive restrictions

contained in section 505(c) of the Act, which contains a requirement to terminate further grants of military equipment and supplies to certain countries having sufficient wealth to enable them to maintain and equip their own forces at adequate strength.

As indicated in the course of informal consultations with interested committee staff, and as described in detail in the attached memorandum of justification, we believe that the waiver of legislative restrictions on providing this assistance to countries participating in the RRF will contribute significantly to relieving human suffering as well as to containing and helping bring to an end the ongoing conflicts which threaten our interests in European stability and integration.

I hope that this report is useful to you. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,

- Wendy R. Sherman  
Assistant Secretary  
Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:

Memorandum of Justification

TO: LAKE

FROM: ATWOOD, J

DOC DATE: 28 JUN 95  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE  
UN

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA  
AID

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: US-AID MEMO ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PLANNING FOR BOSNIA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 03 JUL 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SIMON

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION  
SIMON

FOR CONCURRENCE  
BEERS  
CLARKE  
DREW  
HALPERIN  
SHEEHAN

FOR INFO  
DANVERS  
LORIN  
PETERS  
SCHWARTZ  
SEATON  
SESTAK  
VERSHBOW

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines,  
September 11, 2006

By Vm 16W NARA, Date 6/3/2014

2013-0687 -F

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO.<br>AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE                                                                   | DATE       | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------|
| 004. memo                | For Anthony Lake from Brian Atwood. Subject: Humanitarian Assistance. (2 pages) | 06/28/1995 | P1/b(1)     |

### **COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)  
OA/Box Number: 897

### **FOLDER TITLE:**

Bosnia - June 1995: Mid-Late [1]

2013-0687-F  
vz2715

### **RESTRICTION CODES**

#### **Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### **Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]