

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [4]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

897

Row:

34

Section:

2

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2

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v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: USAEUR Message 9506020. (1 page)	06/04/1995	P1/b(1)
002. report	UNPROFOR: European Contributors Search for a Middle Ground. (5 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)
003. paper	Organization and Role of Bosnian Serb Forces. (4 pages)	05/30/1995	P1/b(1)
004. report	Information Regarding the F-16 Shootdown. (1 page)	06/03/1995	P1/b(1)
005. report	Motivations. (1 page)	06/03/1995	P1/b(1)
006. report	Overview. (2 pages)	06/03/1995	P1/b(1)
007. cable	re: Milosevic and the Good Serb/Bad Serb. (3 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)
008. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, June 6, 1995. Record ID: 9520708. (1 page)	06/02/1995	P1/b(1)
009. cable	re: Letter from Secretary of State. (2 pages)	06/04/1995	P1/b(1)
010. list	Birthdates. [partial] (1 page)	05/31/1995	b(6)
011. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Briefing on NATO OPLAN 40104. Record ID: 9504164. (4 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
012. report	Prospects for the Eastern Enclaves Following a UN Retrenchment. [partial] [CIA Act]. (4 pages)	06/01/1995	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2712

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013a. report	Bosnian Military Situation After the Withdrawal of UN Peacekeepers. [partial] [CIA Act] (8 pages)	06/01/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)
013b. chart	Post-UN Scenarios in Bosnia. (2 pages)	c. 06/1995	P1/b(1)
013c. chart	Forces. (1 page)	c. 06/1995	P1/b(1)

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European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIEDFAX COVER SHEET

TO:

Nelson Drew / NSC

FAX NO:

456-9150

TEL NO:

FROM:

P. Goldberg

FAX NO:

TEL NO:

SUBJECT:

As discussed

This transmission Consists of a Cover Sheet plus 1
Page(s)UNCLASSIFIED

*Embassy of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Washington, DC*

No.02-57/95

The Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina presents its compliments to the Office of Protocol of the United States Department of State and has the honor to request a meeting for Dr. Haris Silajdzic, Prime Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with the President of the United States of America, Mr. William Clinton and the Secretary of State, Mr. Warren Christopher.

Prime Minister Silajdzic will be visiting the United States of America from June 8 to June 14 1995. He will be available for meetings with President Clinton and Secretary Christopher during this period.

The Embassy of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina takes this opportunity to renew to the Department of State the assurances of its highest consideration.

Washington, DC, May 24, 1995

*Department of State of the
United States of America
Washington, DC*

A handwritten signature in dark ink, consisting of a stylized 'E' with a long horizontal stroke extending to the left.

~~SECRET~~

June 5, 1995

SUBJECT: Disposition of U.S. ICFY Monitors

U.S. personnel serving with the ICFY monitoring mission on the inter-Serb border have been withdrawn to their sector headquarters in response to intelligence reports that Bosnian Serbs (or FRY sympathizers) may attempt to take American hostages. The FRY government has ordered increased police presence at sector headquarters and at crossings, assigned police to accompany ICFY monitors at the busiest crossings, and added police and army patrols on the border. The extent to which these orders will be carried out and the effect on the monitors' actual security remains to be seen.

ICFY Head of Mission Nieminen correctly asserts that ICFY cannot carry out its mission without American personnel. Further, he worries that other countries will pull out if the U.S. monitors do not return to duty. Nieminen proposes changes in his operating procedures that would better protect Americans while still allowing him to use them in the field.

Nieminen says that he will re-deploy U.S. monitors under these conditions unless we object by June 6. (Embassy Belgrade has been instructed to ask him to wait for the outcome of the June 6 PC.) Principals should decide whether the USG should acquiesce in Nieminen's proposal to re-deploy U.S. monitors or continue to keep them away from border crossing points.

This decision requires balancing the risk to U.S. personnel, and the consequences if one or more are taken hostage, against the possibility that keeping U.S. personnel off the border may cause the ICFY mission to collapse and take with it a major component of our diplomatic strategy.

Attachment:

Belgrade 2681

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

12 10/1/7013

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Declassify on: OADR

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. paper	Organization and Role of Bosnian Serb Forces. (4 pages)	05/30/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2712

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European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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20708

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 2, 1995

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: NELSON DREW *ND*

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, June 6,
1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Principals meeting on Bosnia to be held June 6, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies

Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *V. Bohner* NARA, Date *6/3/2011*

203-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20708

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 3, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN

DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget


MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the President

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

There will be a Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on June 6, 1995, 2:30 p.m. - 4:00 p.m., in the White House Situation Room. Attendance will be Principals only. The agenda is attached at Tab A. ~~(S)~~


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By Van Thom NARA, Date 6/3/2014

2073-0687-4

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

A

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, June 6, 1995. Record ID: 9520708. (1 page)	06/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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FOLDER TITLE:

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PG.05

CC: STU JONES, S/S
S, D, P, SNO
WATCH, INR
WHSR
PA, USUM/N
EUR, IFSR
PM

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE MINISTERS OF DEFENSE
FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
PARIS, JUNE 3, 1995
INTERVENTIONS BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WILLIAM PERRY

The French Minister of Defense Charles Millon opened the press conference with a statement, the key points of which are contained in the attached press release.

Question: What form will U.S. participation take?

SECRETARY PERRY: I would like to start off by saying that I believe that the results of this meeting are a strong and unambiguous indication of the resolve of the international community and unity concerning the importance of strengthening the UNPROFOR. There are several concrete manifestations of this, certainly the most significant is the establishment of the QRF (Quick Reaction Force), described by Minister Millon and Minister Rifkind. The key contributors to this force are the British, the French, the Dutch and several other nations that indicated an interest in providing troops to that. The United States will not be providing ground troops to this Quick Reaction Force. We strongly support those objectives and we have offered support to the QRF in four different categories: first of those is in close air support, particularly offering the availability of the AC-130 gunship, which has a unique capability for close air support. Secondly, we offered the transfer or loan of various systems including attack helicopters; artillery-locating radars; communications gear; global positioning satellite navigation systems; and night-vision equipment. We offered to assist in the establishment of an intelligence coordination cell with the QRF, with the Quick Reaction Force. That will provide timely intelligence to the military commander, to include inputs from unique U.S. intelligence collection systems. And finally we offered to provide lift, especially airlift, especially strategic airlift of forces and equipment to the theater of operations.

Question: Mr. Perry, will American troops in any way be involved inside the planes that will be supplied? Will there be American troops in any of the equipment that we are going to loan to this rapid reaction force? Will there be American pilots, for example, staffing the planes that you intend to send in?

SECRETARY PERRY: Let me observe first of all, in terms of the U.S. support, it is not as if it is limited to this equipment I am describing. We have had more than 15,000 personnel dedicated to this mission for the last two years. They have been air and naval personnel. Now, in terms of the close air support, yes, all of the airplanes we are supplying, all of the close air support will have American crews in them. In terms of lift, the lift would be American crews. The one exclusion I've made is we are not providing ground forces to support the QRF.

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Question: If the security of Europe was really threatened in the coming future, would the United States reconsider its decision to send troops to intervene militarily, if such was the case?

SECRETARY PERRY: The United States today has more than 100,000 troops in Europe dedicated to the security of Europe. They can be deployed wherever it is necessary, if the security of Europe is truly threatened. We also have another 1.5 million forces in the United States many of which could be redeployed here, if the security of Europe were at stake.

Question: Could you just please clarify two points: firstly, will all of the additional troops going to the former Yugoslavia be wearing blue berets and be under U.N. command? And could Secretary Perry clarify please, does his offer of intelligence resources, effectively an intelligence cell, to this new force mean that there may be a very small number of U.S. troops on the ground, perhaps attached to its headquarters?

SECRETARY PERRY: I'll take the second question. The answer is no. With the wonders of modern communications, that is not necessary. The information is transmitted by ones and zeros over radio links, whether it is pictures or other data. But it is not just a matter of providing intelligence data, it is also a matter of providing the equipment, in particular the synthesizing equipment which collects the data from many different sources and presents the data in a form that is suitable for a commander and then presents it in a form suitable for the commander to pass on to the field.

Question: My question goes to Mr. Perry, could you give us an update on the situation of the pilot of the F-16 and what kind of reaction does the United States envision?

SECRETARY PERRY: I am not going to describe any contingency plans of the United States. We never discuss contingency plans. In particular I would not be interested in discussing them in this case. In terms of the status, I'm going to ask General Shalikashvili to tell you what he knows as the current information on the F-16.

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI: Our information is no different than that which is being reported in the open press and that is that we still do not know for sure the whereabouts of the pilot or his condition. Our search and rescue efforts continue over the suspected crash site, but we have no new news to report to you beyond that which is already in the open press.

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TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESS

- Invited by their French counterpart, Ministers of Defence from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United States, representing members of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance providing support to United Nations mandated operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina met on June 3 in Paris accompanied by their chiefs of defense staff. Mr STOLTENBERG, the UN Peace Force Commander in former Yugoslavia and representatives of the Secretary General of NATO and of the WEU attended this meeting. A representative of the Russian Federation attended this meeting as well.

- Ministers expressed their determination to support the diplomatic process and expressed their hope of an early resumption of negotiations.

- Ministers paid tribute to the action of the United Nation forces and that of the NATO and WEU ground, air and naval units engaged in the Balkans, and to their commanders. They honoured the memory of those who fell in carrying out their peacekeeping missions.

- Ministers discussed the situation in former Yugoslavia. They strongly underlined the fact that recent events could only strengthen their determination. They condemned in the strongest terms the outrageous behaviour of the Bosnian Serbs in shelling safe areas and killing and seizing UN peacekeepers and aggressed the air forces in charge of protecting peace keepers. Yesterday a NATO aircraft was shot down at the very moment when 120 hostages were released by the Bosnian Serbs. The ministers agreed that UNPROFOR needs improved capability to defend itself and to carry out its mission within its existing UN mandate. They expressed their resolve to take appropriate measures to that end.

- Ministers considered a firm stance is essential and is the only way to ensure the United Nation forces safety and to advance the peace process.

- Ministers welcomed the decision already taken by some nations to send reinforcements and to establish a Theatre Reserve Force for the UN in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

- Ministers agreed that the mission of the UN forces is not to enforce a solution by military force, but to operate in support of the peace process in Bosnia and in Croatia, to ensure essential humanitarian aid to civilian population, and to monitor ceasefires concluded between the belligerents.

- To improve the effectiveness of UNPROFOR and to enable the Force commanders on the ground to accomplish these missions within the existing mandate, they agreed on the following objectives :

- to improve the operational capability in order to reduce the vulnerability of the UN forces ;

- to regroup the most exposed units and in particular isolated units ; to achieve the withdrawal of all heavy weapons out of the exclusion zones, thus enabling the closing down of the weapon collection points ;

- maintaining UNPROFOR presence in the enclaves ;

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- to ensure UNPROFOR freedom of movement, particularly to the safe areas ;
- to supply those areas and reopening the access to Sarajevo ;
- to improve the level of equipment where necessary ;
- to sustain the availability of NATO air support for UNPROFOR operations.

• To fulfill these objectives :

- Ministers welcomed the intention to provide UNPROFOR with a rapid reaction capability of two brigades in support of UN forces in Bosnia . They supported a proposal to create for this purpose a multinational brigade with broadly based capability including air mobile forces. This force comes in addition to the British air mobile brigade already offered to the United Nations. Furthermore additional capability could be provided by the brigade sized group on units placed on alert by France. They agreed that the proposal of the multinational brigade should be developed as a matter of urgency, noting that some nations had already indicated their preparedness to provide forces, and that others were prepared to consider doing so, for such a brigade. The force would act under the operational control of UN commanders. Its role would be to carry out missions to enhance the protection of UNPROFOR and assist in the proper execution of its mandate. Final composition and operational concept would follow consultation with the Secretary General of the UN.

- Ministers noted the urgent need to resupply the enclaves. Some nations have agreed to provide additional assets in support of these tasks. Ministers declared their full support for UNPROFOR in seeking to resupply Sarajevo and the other U.N. safe areas.

- The Force commander undertook to define his requirements and provide proposals in order to ensure the proper coordination of reinforcements and suggested offers.

- Ministers detailed the actions already taken at national level by a number of nations :

- The United Kingdom have reinforced one of their existing battlegroups with artillery, engineers, signallors and helicopter assets (around 1000 men) so that it could act as an initial theater reserve force and have offered an airmobile brigade (of around 5000 men) to the UN.

- France announced her decision to contribute 1500 to 2000 troops, already available to the rapid reaction force she wishes to see set up. Moreover, an additional force of about 4000 troops is on standby.

- The French proposal of a multinational brigade has been supported by all ministers present and will be presented to the United Nations.

- The Netherlands intend to offer to this force a mortar company of the Royal Netherlands Marines, with 120 mm mortars, and a mortar locating radar group. Final decisions are yet to be taken by the cabinet. A decision by the cabinet will be submitted to Parliament, prior to implementation.

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- Several countries (Canada, Germany, Italy) have proposed to provide support through various ways in order to contribute to the implementation of the objectives as determined by ministers.
- Ministers endorsed the recommendation of the informal CHODS meetings hosted by the Netherlands.
- Ministers agreed that they would continue to consult closely together and would direct their staff and military commanders to take the necessary steps to carry through this program.
- They agreed that the Secretary General of the UN will be informed on the result of this session as early as the beginning of next week.

Vershbow, Alexander R.

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: @UP - APNSA Special Assistants
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Drew, Samuel N.
Subject: Milosevic Points
Date: Saturday, June 03, 1995 3:23PM

Message for Frasure to deliver to Milosevic:

- We request that you contact Bosnian Serbs to clarify status of our pilot.
- If he is in Bosnian Serb hands, we expect that he will be well treated and that he will be released immediately and unharmed.
- Any mistreatment or public exploitation of his detention would only inflame the situation.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. cable	re: Letter from Secretary of State. (2 pages)	06/04/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [4]

2013-0687-F
vz2712

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Office of Management and Budget
National Security Division**

Operations Branch

**Fax Cover Sheet
Fax #: (202) 395-5722**



Number of Pages: 10
(W/ cover sheet)

Date: 5/31/95

TO: See Attached

ORGANIZATION: _____

FAX NUMBER: _____

FROM: Keith Bickel

PHONE: (202) 395-3780

COMMENTS:

Attached is the latest paper on funding Bosnia withdrawal.

The Interagency meeting has been scheduled for Monday June 5th from 1:00-2:30 in 248 Old Executive Office Building. Should details change, John Burnim or I will be in touch immediately.

You may contact Janet Graves, Gordon Adams' assistant, for clearance to the building. She can be reached at 202.395.4657.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. list	Birthdates. [partial] (1 page)	05/31/1995	b(6)

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**INTERAGENCY MEETING ON
FUNDING BOSNIA WITHDRAWAL
MONDAY, JUNE 5, 1995
1:00 P.M. - 2:30 P.M.
ROOM 248, OEOB**

LIST OF INVITEES

[010]

NAME	AGENCY/OFFICE	PHONE	FAX #
Amb. Robert Frasure (b)(6) (Dep DAS, EUR) f/Amb. John Kornblum (Prin DAS, EUR) Secy: Marty	State	202-647-1126	202-647-0967 (f/Frasure & Kornblum)
John Brehm f/George Ward (Actg A/S IO/PHO) Secy: Colleen (Ward's ofc.)	State	202-647-9602 (Ward's ofc.)	202-736-4116
Mike Usnick f/Craig Johnstone (Dir RPP) Secy: Susan (Johnstone's ofc.)	State	202-647-4427 (Johnstone's ofc.)	202-647-1681 (Johnstone's ofc.)
Dick Clarke (Global) Secy: Wanda	NSC	202-456-9351	202-456-9360
Sandy Vershbow/Nelson Drew (EUR) Secy: Betty	NSC	202-456-9151	202-456-9150
Bill Danvers (Legislative Affairs) Secy: Chris	NSC	202-456-9171	202-456-9170 Rm. 375
Alice Maroni (Prin Dep. Compt) (b)(6) Secy: Susan	DoD	703-697-6142	703-693-0582
Warren Hall (b)(6) w/Alice Maroni	DoD	703-697-9317	703-693-6392
Brig. Gen. Walsh f/Gen. David McIlvoy (JCS) Secy: Sgt Norma Mitchell (Walsh)	JCS	703-697-7857	703-614-1158
Jan Lodal (b)(6) f/Walter Slocombe (USD/P) Secy: Barbara	DoD	703-695-7114	703-697-8520
Chuck Kieffer	OMB	x54790	

FINANCING WITHDRAWAL ONLY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

May 30, 1995

Background

The United States has agreed in principle to participate in a NATO-led withdrawal from Bosnia should that be necessary. The NATO allies may have to initiate a military operation to withdraw the U.N. peacekeeping mission (UNPROFOR) from Bosnia. The cost of a withdrawal operation would be approximately \$1.95 billion, with DOD paying roughly \$1.0 billion (51%) in FY 1995 dollars for its prominent role in the operation (000,000 of a total *withdrawal force* of 000,000, or 000,000 including UNPROFOR forces). There has been considerable discussion both within the Administration and with NATO allies on financing arrangements for such an operation. Due to required planning, forward movement of the operation, and the long lead times to gain approval in NATO and the UN for a funding mechanism and budget authorization, timely action is required to ensure an approved funding mechanism that benefits the United States is in place. This paper discusses options for funding these costs, with varying results for *net* U.S. costs, once we have been reimbursed. Other costs related to our policy in Bosnia that are not associated directly with the withdrawal operation are displayed at Tab A.

Cost Options

The financing options are described on the following pages in terms of both gross U.S. costs (paid up front), net U.S. costs (after reimbursements from either NATO or U.N.), and the estimated supplemental request to Congress that would be needed. (See Table 1 attached for a detailed break-out of the costs for each of the options.) A total of nine options (including five analyzed by NATO) for paying FY 1995 Bosnia costs were considered. However, only three options, representative of major funding approaches and resulting in lower net U.S. costs, are evaluated in this paper. The three options considered are:

- **Hybrid (NATO/non-NATO UN Cost Sharing).** This is a U.S. originated option which would have to be introduced at NATO and the UN. The option shares costs between the U.S., NATO allies, and other U.N. member states and would have the least net cost to the United States.
- **NATO minus UNPROFOR.** This option is under active consideration at NATO and would fund UNPROFOR through the U.N. budget during withdrawal, with NATO and the contributing nations paying for the new additional forces required for withdrawal.
- **Allies Preferred Option (Enhanced UNPROFOR & UN Share).** This is the option preferred by our 15 NATO allies. NATO only funds common costs of HQ and some commo/engineering. The UN would pay most of the in-theater costs, which would be funded through UN assessments. Participating troop countries pay the majority of their own costs.

Regardless of which option is chosen, the Administration will be required to present a request to Congress that identifies how the withdrawal plan will be paid for while remaining within budget ceilings. Such a proposal would need to indicate that agreement can be reached with NATO allies and the UN to support the stated financing and reimbursement mechanisms.

I. Hybrid (NATO/non-NATO UN Cost Sharing) Option

U.S. Gross Cost: \$1,330 m. Net Cost: \$330 m. Supplemental Request: \$1,330 m.

Description: A contract would be negotiated between NATO and the U.N. whereby NATO, in charge of all forces, provides all withdrawal services and initially pays for them. In return, the U.N. would assess other non-NATO nations to help pay for NATO withdrawal costs.

Financing Mechanism: The U.N. would establish a separate fund to receive contributions; this fund would help pay for withdrawal. The U.N. would then assess all its non-NATO member states for their normal share (approx. 32%, or \$620 million) of the \$1.95 billion withdrawal operation. These assessments would be used by the U.N. to fund the costs of withdrawing non-NATO UNPROFOR forces to their home countries as well as U.N. administrative and support costs estimated at \$200 million. Any remaining funds (approx. \$420 million) would be given to NATO to reimburse NATO members' costs. NATO would pay the remaining 68% of the \$1.95 billion withdrawal cost (i.e. roughly \$1,330 million) by assessing each of its members for their share based on NATO administrative cost assessed rates.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would incur up front roughly \$1.0 billion in costs for withdrawal. It would also pay up front approximately \$320 million in new NATO assessments (i.e. 24% of \$1,330 million). The State Department would incur a nominal, new U.N. assessment of roughly \$10 million to cover UNPROFOR soldier and equipment deployment flights to Germany.

Reimbursements: The U.N. would reimburse NATO with the resources remaining in the contribution fund. In turn, NATO would have to reimburse its member states out of the U.N. reimbursement as well as out of its own assessments. (NATO does not currently have any reimbursement mechanism.) DOD would expect to be reimbursed its entire initial cost of operations (i.e. deployment and logistics costs of \$1.0 billion incurred before the U.N. or NATO has raised funds from its assessments) from these resources.

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress would be \$1,330 million. DOD's share would be \$1,320 m. (\$1,000 m. withdrawal + \$320 m. NATO Assessment). State Department's share would be \$10 m. The supplemental request would in principle be offset by later reimbursements (approximately \$1.0 billion). Any reimbursements would be deposited with Treasury. If offset by reimbursements, the net supplemental request would equal \$330 million.

Advantages

- Lowest net U.S. cost; U.S. taxpayer pays less than in other options; relatively easier to find offsets
 - Congress likely more receptive to lower costs.
- Spreads some burden of withdrawal costs to non-NATO U.N. members providing greater equity between U.S., other NATO, and other U.N. members.

Disadvantages

- Might be difficult to gain agreement from the U.N. and NATO to implement for several reasons:
 1. U.N. asked to pay for part of NATO's costs but has no command over forces since this is a NATO "rescue" of U.N. peacekeepers.
 2. Dual funding mechanisms between U.N. and NATO have never been used before. Would require a level of cooperation and coordination between U.N. and NATO that has never been attempted before. Process to reach agreement likely to be time consuming and difficult with certain NATO allies.
 3. NATO allies costs greater than in other options (adds NATO assessment).
 4. Russians and others may balk at underwriting NATO through UN assessments.
- Significant senior White House and policy official involvement would likely be required to secure NATO allies and UN agreement.
- Reimbursements from NATO may be very slow or may not be made.

II. NATO Minus UNPROFOR Option

U.S. Gross Cost: \$1,430 m. Net Cost: \$430 m. Supplemental Request: \$1,430 m.

Description: NATO would provide and pay for the new troops and equipment needed for withdrawal. The U.N. would retain budgetary control over all UNPROFOR forces, including those of NATO member states, for the six month period they are being drawn down.

Financing Mechanism: The U.N. would fund all costs (approximately \$210 million) incurred by UNPROFOR forces (e.g. logistics) during withdrawal. It would do so partially out of its current UNPROFOR budget. For the remainder, the U.N. would assess its member states to redeploy UNPROFOR troops and equipment back to their home countries. NATO would fund the costs (e.g. deployment/ redeployment, basic logistics) of all forces used for withdrawal that were not originally in UNPROFOR. It would do so by assessing NATO member states for their share of the operation, which is anticipated to total approximately \$1,740 million.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would pay up front roughly \$1.0 billion for withdrawal. It would also pay up front approximately \$420 million in new NATO assessments (i.e. 24% of \$1,740) as part of its share to cover all NATO costs. The State Department would incur a nominal, new U.N. assessment of roughly \$10 million to cover UNPROFOR soldier and equipment deployment flights to Germany.

Reimbursements: There would be no reimbursements from the U.N. NATO would reimburse its member states out of its own assessments. However, NATO does not currently have any reimbursement mechanism and some argue the likelihood of NATO reimbursement is uncertain. Nonetheless, DOD would expect to be reimbursed its entire initial cost of operations (approx. \$1.0 billion).

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress would be \$1,430 million. DOD's share would be \$1,420 m. (\$1,000 m. withdrawal + \$420 m. NATO Assessment). State's share would be \$10 m. The supplemental request might be offset by reimbursements (approx. \$1.0 billion). Any reimbursements would be deposited with Treasury. If fully offset by reimbursements, the net supplemental request would equal \$430 m.

Advantages

- Fairly simple division of responsibility between UN and NATO.
- A lower net cost for the U.S. (though higher than Option 1).
- NATO allies and UN more likely to accept this option from among the three presented as fallback from our NATO allies' preferred option at Tab 1.

Disadvantages

- Higher net U.S. costs than Hybrid option.
- U.S. share of NATO assessment would increase if any NATO nation makes a political decision to opt out of participating in withdrawal, since assessment shares are based upon the number of nations participating in operations.
- Reimbursements from NATO would require new financial procedures to be created and may be very slow or may not be made.

III. Allies Preferred Option (Enhanced UNPROFOR & UN Share)

U.S. Gross Cost: \$1,100 m. Net Cost: \$990 m. Supplemental Request: \$1,100 m.

Description: This is the preferred option of our 15 NATO allies as it places as much of the withdrawal costs as possible in the UN and U.S. (as opposed to NATO) budgets. The U.N. would fund some of the withdrawal costs of NATO. Specifically, it would maintain control of *all* UNPROFOR forces (as in NATO minus U.N. Option above) *and* it would fund the basic logistics costs of all troops (NATO and UNPROFOR) on the ground in Bosnia. Nations sending troops for the withdrawal operation would pay the majority of costs (e.g. deployment / redeployment, logistics outside of Bosnia, et al.). NATO would fund only the common costs of headquarters and communications / engineering requirements.

Financing Mechanism: The U.N. would increase the size of the UNPROFOR budget by the equivalent of 6,000 additional troops that had been authorized in the original mandate (although no troops would actually be added to UNPROFOR). The U.N. would use the increased funds to pay partially all costs incurred by UNPROFOR forces during withdrawal (as in NATO Minus U.N. Option above). It would also assess its member states for the

costs of providing logistics to the withdrawal force in Bosnia. The participating nations would pay those costs not covered by the U.N. or NATO (for common costs of approx. \$110 million) out of their own treasuries. NATO would assess its member states to cover its common costs.

U.S. Gross Costs: DOD would pay up front roughly \$1.0 billion for withdrawal. It would also pay up front approximately \$30 million in new NATO assessments for common costs. The State Department would incur a new U.N. assessment of approximately \$70 million. These costs total \$1,100 million.

Reimbursements: Both the U.N. and NATO would owe DOD reimbursements totaling approximately \$110 million.

Supplemental Request: The new supplemental request to Congress would be \$1,100 million. DOD's share would be \$1,030 m. (\$1,000 m. withdrawal + \$30 NATO Assessments). State Department's share would be \$70. The supplemental request might be offset by reimbursements (approx. \$110 million). Any reimbursements would be deposited with Treasury. If offset by reimbursements, the net supplemental request would equal \$990 million.

Advantages

- NATO allies strongly support: they pay much lower UN assessments than NATO assessments -- e.g. for U.K., UN assessment is 3 times lower than for NATO).
- Obviates the need for agreement on a NATO assessments and reimbursement mechanism.

Disadvantages

- Highest net U.S. costs (more than double the other options) of almost all options.
- U.S. pays disproportionately vis a vis other NATO allies because of the sizeable U.S. role in the withdrawal.
- Congress likely to balk at this arrangement.

30-May-95

Table 1: Financing Options for WITHDRAWAL Only from Bosnia
 (\$ in Millions: Assumes Full Reimbursement from NATO and/or U.N.)

	Option 1 Hybrid	Option 2 NATO-UN	Option 3 Allies Prefer
Total Withdrawal Costs (For 6 Months of Operations)	1,950	1,950	1,950
Financed By: NATO	1,330	1,740	110
Financed By: National Costs			1,310
Financed By: United Nations	620	210	530
Gross US Costs re Withdrawal Op'n	1,330	1,430	1,100
State	10	10	70
New Withdrawal Assessment	10	10	30
FY 1995 UN Assessment	na	na	40
DOD	1,320	1,420	1,030
Withdrawal Cost	1,000	1,000	1,000
New NATO Assessment	320	420	30
Withdrawal Cost Reimbursements	1,000	1,000	110
DOD	1,000	1,000	110
Net US Costs re Bosnia For FY95	330	430	990
State	10	10	70
New Withdrawal Assessment	10	10	30
FY 1995 UN Assessment	na	na	40
DOD	320	420	920
Withdrawal Cost	0	0	890
New NATO Assessment	320	420	30

Table 2: Total FY 1995 Potential Supplemental Requests to Congress
 (\$ in Millions)

	Option 1 Hybrid	Option 2 NATO-UN	Option 3 Allies Prefer
New Request to Congress	1,330	1,430	1,100
State	10	10	70
New	10	10	70
DOD	1,320	1,420	1,030
Withdrawal Costs	1,000	1,000	1,000
NATO Assessment	320	420	30
Reimbursements to the Treasury	1,000	1,000	110
DOD	1,000	1,000	110
Net U.S. Supplemental	330	430	990
State	10	10	70
DOD	320	420	920

Attachment: Table 1 -- Financing Options for FY 1995 Bosnia-Related Activities
Tab A -- Background on all Bosnia related costs

TAB A**Bosnia Other Costs**

In addition to the costs of withdrawal, however, the U.S. is incurring other costs for Bosnia related activities, including peacekeeping assessments, off-shore Adriatic operations and air operations over Bosnia. The Administration therefore has focussed on how we would pay for *all* costs (withdrawal, assessments, and other operations) associated with Bosnia for FY 1995. While DOD incremental costs to date have been funded by the recent supplemental (H.R. 889), the State Department's U.N. assessments have been rejected by Congress in FY 1995. Because they will require Congressional approval, the assessments (and DOD's costs) have been added to each funding option to give an inclusive picture of U.S. Bosnia commitments. All FY 1995 Bosnia-related activities are presented in the chart below:

Activities	Cost (gross)	Status
DOD initial costs for participation in NATO withdrawal OPLAN	\$1.0 billion	requires supp; depending on option, some could be reimbursed by NATO
Additional NATO and/or UN assessments for withdrawal operation	Up to \$420 million	requires supp; reimbursed depending on option.
DOD operations in Sharp Guard, Deny Flight, etc. DOD assets become part of withdrawal plan	\$310 million, of which \$200 million spent thus far in FY95	already funded in FY 95 DOD supplemental
State Dept.'s share of assessed UN peacekeeping for UNPROFOR	Up to \$510 million	supp request denied; requirement still pending

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Briefing on NATO OPLAN 40104. Record ID: 9504164. (4 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
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Bosnia - June 1995: Early [4]

2013-0687-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. report	Prospects for the Eastern Enclaves Following a UN Retrenchment. [partial] [CIA Act]. (4 pages)	06/01/1995	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2712

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Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

1 June 1995



Prospects for the Eastern Enclaves Following a UN Retrenchment

The Bosnian Serbs have long sought the elimination of the three Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia--Zepa, Srebrenica, and Gorazde, with a total population of some 120,000--because they represent a threat to ultimate Serb control in the area, are viewed as bases for Muslim guerrilla operations, and are perceived as a potential threat to foster unrest in Muslim-populated areas in Serbia.

- The Bosnian Serbs will respond to a UN withdrawal by stepping up military pressure on Bosnian Government forces in the region. They may not move immediately to eliminate the enclaves, however, depending on the military situation elsewhere, NATO threats to use airpower, and the time of year when the UN pulls out.
- Over time--probably within six months to a year after a UN pullout--the Bosnian Serbs almost certainly would move to take the enclaves. They will have to shift substantial forces, however, from other fronts to overwhelm the defenders. If the Serbs transfer these forces, we believe they could capture the enclaves, of which Srebrenica is the most vulnerable. [012]
- A successful Bosnian Serb offensive would prompt most of the 120,000 inhabitants of the enclaves--the majority of whom have already been displaced--to flee the area. The Serbs would seek to drive them into central Bosnia where they could overwhelm relief operations in Tuzla or Sarajevo. Any winter offensive would lead to substantial casualties amongst the civil population because of exposure. (b)(3)

Serbs Want the Enclaves

The Bosnian Serb leadership has long sought to eliminate the Muslim-held region in eastern Bosnia. In the winter of 1992-1993, the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) launched a major offensive that came close to capturing Srebrenica and Zepa, but was stopped by international pressure and the deployment of UN peacekeepers. In the spring of 1994, the BSA attacked Gorazde, eventually capturing about half of the enclave, but provoking NATO airstrikes. In discussions over an eventual territorial settlement to the Bosnian conflict, the Serbs frequently have offered to trade Serb-held areas of Sarajevo for the eastern enclaves.

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(b)(3)

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- The Bosnian Serbs believe the eastern enclaves pose a threat to their control of the region. As long as the enclaves are in existence, the Bosnian Government will demand that any peace agreement ensures access to the area. This access would split Serb north-south access in the region.
- The enclaves, although theoretically demilitarized as part of the 1993 UN-brokered agreement that ended the Serb offensive, have become staging areas for Bosnian Government guerrilla bands that raid into Serb-held territory. The Serbs have been unable to stop these bands, which have taken a toll on Serb forces, impeded Serb supplies, and threatened BSA positions from the rear.
- Elimination of the eastern enclaves--particularly Gorazde--would free up some 7,000 Bosnian Serb troops currently tied down in the region.
- The Bosnian Serbs have occasionally argued that the continued presence of Bosnian Muslims in the eastern enclaves is part of a long-term government plan to establish ties to Muslims in the Sandzak region of Serbia along the Serbian-Montenegrin border. (b)(3)

Serbs Face Some Constraints

[012]

The Bosnian Serbs already have begun stepping up military pressure on the eastern enclaves, launching a ground attack attempting to capture key high ground near Gorazde, pressing the frontlines at Srebrenica, and seizing UN peacekeepers. UNPROFOR Bosnia-Commander Smith believes the Serbs are embarking on a campaign to capture the enclaves. The Serbs have traditionally used their control of all access routes to limit supplies going to UN peacekeepers and civilians in the region. If the UN pulls out of the enclaves, the Bosnian Serbs will further increase their military pressure on the enclaves as a means of driving the civilian population out, as well as to gain leverage on the Bosnian Government. (In 1994, the Bosnian Government backed off from calling for the lifting of the arms embargo because of concerns that such a move would lead to a Serb drive on the enclaves, according to multiple sources.) The Serbs may not move immediately, however, to capture the enclaves.

This memorandum was prepared by (b)(3) DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Norm Schindler, Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force, (b)(3)

- Bosnian Serb forces are stretched thin defending the long confrontation line with the Bosnian Government. If the Serbs decide to capture the enclaves, they will need to reinforce their units in the area substantially, especially with artillery and armor forces. This would be difficult because Bosnian Government forces continue to launch multiple attacks, forcing the Serbs to husband their resources--especially heavy weapons--to defend threatened fronts. The Serbs may believe that the fall of the enclaves is inevitable and prefer to let them wither under siege rather than commit scarce resources in immediate attacks against them.
- If the UN withdrawal is accompanied by the threat of a NATO air campaign to deter the Serbs, the BSA may hold off on launching an attack. The Bosnian Serb military leadership may calculate that by delaying they can allow international interest to wane or allow the Serbs to point to future Bosnian Government offensives as a justification for attacks. [012]
- Serb actions also may be affected by the timing of a UN withdrawal. The Serbs may prefer to wait for winter--as they did in the 1992-1993 attack--to launch their offensive. Winter would hinder the movement of the mostly infantry Bosnian Government forces in the enclaves, although it would also hamper BSA movement. Winter weather would also inhibit NATO airstrikes.
- Over the longer term--six months to a year after the UN pulls out--the Serbs will almost certainly use whatever force is necessary to eliminate the enclaves. The Serbs would need to bring in substantial forces from other fronts to physically capture the enclaves.
- The Serbs will attempt to avoid costly house-to-house fighting to take the enclaves, preferring to rely on their traditional strategy of seizing the high ground around the main towns for artillery positions and bombarding the civilian population to drive them out. If the civilians leave, Bosnian Government forces would probably abandon the enclaves. (b)(3)

Enclaves are Vulnerable

The three eastern enclaves are all extremely vulnerable to a concerted BSA offensive; the forces defending the enclaves have been effectively cut off from substantial Bosnian Government logistics support for at least two years--about a year in the case of Gorazde--and they lack heavy weapons. Government commanders have admitted that if the Bosnian Serbs launched a major attack on the enclaves, they would be unable to save them. On the positive side, the enclaves are in relatively rugged terrain that would hinder a Serb attack and we believe the Bosnian Government has substantial troops in the three enclaves.

- Srebrenica is probably the most vulnerable of the three enclaves. The Bosnian Serbs had virtually captured the city before the UN intervened in 1993. The large civilian population--some 40,000, mostly refugees--are defended by four Bosnian Government light infantry units with a total of 3,000 to 4,000 troops. These forces are currently opposed by some 1,800 Bosnian Serbs with three to 10 tanks, and some 20 heavy artillery pieces and mortars. [012]
- Zepa, because of high mountains on all four sides, is a natural redoubt that strongly favors the defender. Its relatively small population--an estimated 15,000--is defended by one brigade of about 1,000 to 1,250 troops. The Serbs have an estimated three light infantry battalions in the area, with a total of about 600 troops.
- Gorazde would require the largest effort by the Bosnian Serbs to capture. Gorazde officials in the enclave still have some contact with Bosnian Government forces elsewhere, maintain some local arms production, and have a sizable defending force--an estimated 7,000 to 8,000 Government troops are currently holding off some 5,300 Serbs. During the 1994 Serb offensive, however, the BSA more than doubled the number of troops in the area prior to their attack. There are an estimated 65,000 civilians still in the enclave. (b)(3)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013a. report	Bosnian Military Situation After the Withdrawal of UN Peacekeepers. [partial] [CIA Act] (8 pages)	06/01/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [4]

2013-0687-F

vz2712

RESTRICTION CODES

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Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

1 June 1995



Bosnian Military Situation After the Withdrawal of UN Peacekeepers (b)(3)



The withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from Bosnia would lead to an increase in fighting throughout the country as the Bosnian Serbs step up pressure on the Bosnian Government and the government forces attempt to seize additional territory. Under current conditions, neither side has the military wherewithal to deliver a knockout blow, and a UN withdrawal would almost certainly result in a military stalemate at a higher level of violence. Over time, however, the steady improvements in the leadership, supply, and training of the Bosnian Government forces may allow them to make major gains against the Bosnian Serbs—provided Belgrade does not step up its support. Serbia and Croatia will play a crucial role in determining the military outcome in Bosnia by controlling the amount of outside assistance available to the warring factions.



[013a]

- In the most likely scenario, Belgrade will almost certainly maintain enough support to the Bosnian Serbs to ensure that they are not defeated by the Bosnian Government. Zagreb will also allow a steady flow of supplies to the Bosnian Government to tie down much of the Bosnian Serb Army, at least as long as the Krajina issue remains unresolved.
- The military balance would decisively shift in favor of the Bosnian Government forces if Belgrade ceased all support to the Bosnian Serbs and the flow of arms to the Muslims were increased.
- A decision by Belgrade to intervene directly in the conflict could eventually overwhelm the Bosnian Government forces, but would probably require a substantial and sustained commitment by the Yugoslav Army.
- A decision by Zagreb and Belgrade to end the conflict—either by direct involvement of both countries' forces against the Muslims or a Serb attack—coupled with Croatia cutting off outside support to the government, would lead to a relatively quick military defeat for most government forces.

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- Other nations could influence the level of fighting by providing funds and supplies, but probably would not be able to change the military situation fundamentally unless they were prepared to deploy substantial forces. (b)(3)

Strategy, Goals, Strengths and Weaknesses of the Warring Factions

The warring factions in Bosnia continue to pursue conflicting war aims leaving little room for a negotiated settlement. The frontlines in Bosnia have remained relatively static since the spring of 1993. Fighting has been seasonal, with the largest clashes during the dry season in the summer and fall, tapering off during the Bosnian winter because of heavy snow in the mountains. Both the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Government, however, believe that the military balance is steadily tilting in favor of the Muslims.

- Bosnian Government forces are now better organized, led, and trained than they were at the start of the conflict. In addition, the federation agreement between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats has reopened supply lines to outside supporters.
- Bosnian Serb forces have been stretched thin trying to defend a long confrontation line with the Bosnian Government. Their overwhelming advantage in heavy weapons at the start of the conflict has been slowly undercut by improvement in the Bosnian Government forces. Manpower reserves have probably been used up and troop morale is reportedly shaky. Moreover, Belgrade's curtailment of support has reportedly led to some supply shortages.
- Bosnian Government forces have been able to launch a series of successful attacks this spring capturing much of Mt. Vlasic in central Bosnia, some 100 square kilometers of territory around Bihac, and limited territory elsewhere. Nevertheless, as the unsuccessful and costly attack in March around Stolice northeast of Tuzla demonstrated, improvements in Bosnian Government forces have not yet offset completely the Bosnian Serb Army's (BSA) superiority in heavy weapons. (b)(3)

[013a]

¹ This memorandum was prepared by (b)(3) DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to Norm Schindler, Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force, on (b)(3)

Bosnian Serbs. Bosnian Serb leaders will accept nothing less than an independent state as an interim measure toward the creation of an ill-defined "Greater Serbia." Their military strategy over the last two years has been focused on defending territory they currently hold, launching occasional offensives to increase pressure on the Bosnian Government, and staging local counter-attacks to blunt government strikes. The Serbs consistently have sought an extended cease-fire in place that would effectively codify their territorial gains.

- Bosnian Serb forces continue to rely on their substantial advantage in heavy weapons—especially artillery—to blunt Bosnian Government attacks (see table). The Serbs are also better organized and have a more professional, experienced military leadership than their opponents in Bosnia. Nevertheless, the Bosnian Serb military suffers from a shortage of manpower and some morale problems.
- At the start of the conflict, the BSA inherited a substantial inventory of heavy weapons and ammunition from the Yugoslav Army. It has been able to use this stockpile for most of the conflict, but a variety of sources indicate that some units are now suffering from supply problems. The BSA is almost totally dependent on Serbia for fuel and some crucial spare parts for its heavy weapons, and Belgrade reportedly pays the salary of some officers. A total cutoff of support from Serbia would quickly undercut the BSA's ability to hold all of the territory that it currently occupies, but the Bosnian Serbs probably still have substantial stores of ammunition to defend areas they consider crucial. [013a]
- The Bosnian Serb military and political leadership has expressed increasing concern over the changing military balance. BSA Commander Mladic has indicated that time is not on the side of the Serbs and has called for an offensive to "win the war," (b)(1) EO 13526 1.4 (c)
(b)(1) Serb leader Karadzic reportedly is concerned that his negotiating position would be undercut if such an attack failed.
- Following a UN withdrawal, the Bosnian Serbs would almost certainly step up their pressure on Sarajevo by shelling the city, launching local attacks to capture key terrain, and attempting to cut off supplies to the 280,000 civilian population. The Serbs view the city as a crucial pressure point for the Bosnian Government and the international community. A total cutoff of supplies to the city could starve the civilian population, but we believe the Bosnian Government forces would continue to fight in the city until driven out. The loss of the city would seriously undercut Bosnian Muslim will to continue the

conflict, but the Bosnian Serbs are almost certainly unwilling to accept the high cost in casualties and destroyed equipment involved in eliminating resistance in this heavily built-up area that will almost certainly be vigorously defended.

- In other areas, the Serbs would shell and probably launch infantry attacks on the three eastern enclaves of Gorazde, Zepa, and Srebrenica in a move to drive the 120,000 Muslim civilians out of the region. The Bosnian Serbs, with assistance from the Krajina Serbs, would also attempt to break Muslim resistance around Bihac. (b)(3)

[013a]

Bosnian Government. Bosnian leaders firmly believe that they can regain territory from the Bosnian Serbs and preserve the concept of a unified Bosnia within its internationally recognized borders only by military pressure. Their military strategy has been to fight a war of attrition, launching multiple small-scale attacks along the confrontation line to seize key territory from the Bosnian Serbs and facilitate future attacks. Government leaders have indicated that they are prepared to fight on for several more years to achieve their goals.

- After three years of fighting, Bosnian Government forces have substantially improved their organization and training. They rely most heavily on high morale and manpower advantage in attacks on the Bosnian Serbs. Government forces remain hamstrung by a lack of heavy weapons, inexperienced leadership, lack of command and control systems, and a weak supply system that remains dependent on the willingness of Croatia to allow the transshipment of ammunition and equipment.
- After three years of fighting, the Bosnian Government has developed an extensive supply system to sustain their war effort. The government continues to operate a number of domestic defense industries to produce ammunition and some weapons. As stockpiles at these factories have declined, the government has received ammunition and raw materials from a number of outside supporters, especially Iran, Turkey, and Malaysia. The government has also been very active on the international arms market, purchasing weapons, uniforms and other supplies with funds provided by Bosnian Muslims in Europe, private Islamic organizations, and some official government-to-government funds provided by Saudi Arabia and others.

- The Bosnian Government leadership is increasingly confident--probably over-confident--in the capability of its armed forces. EO 13526
Government commanders believe they can defend their core area 1.4 (c)
against the Bosnian Serbs, or even a combined Bosnian Serb/Yugoslav
Army attack, (b)(1)
They believe that they were able to withstand the Bosnian Serbs when
the government forces had virtually nothing, and are now confident
that improvements in their forces and their manpower advantage
would allow them to defeat any combined Serb attack. This is based
on the assessment of government planners of the military balance and
their assumption that an attacker needs a substantial manpower
advantage--perhaps as high as nine-to-one--to carry out a successful
offensive.
- A UN pullout would not substantially alter the Bosnian Government's
strategy in the short term. Government forces would launch an
offensive to break the siege of Sarajevo and continue their attacks
elsewhere along the confrontation line with the Bosnian Serbs.
Government military commanders realize that they could not,
however, defend the eastern enclaves. After a UN withdrawal, the
government would quickly push for lifting the arms embargo and make
calls for NATO intervention, but would continue to rely on their own
forces to achieve their goals in Bosnia. (b)(3) [013a]

Bosnian Croats/Croatia. The Bosnian Croats have essentially achieved their goals, but their overall strategy is subservient to Croatia. Zagreb's primary goal remains the reintegration of Serb-controlled territory in Croatia. It views the fighting in Bosnia as a useful means of tying down Bosnian Serb forces, otherwise available to reinforce the Krajina Serbs. To support its efforts in the Krajina, Zagreb has allowed a controlled flow of arms to the Bosnian Government forces, fostered some local cooperation between Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Government units, and even launched an attack in the Livno valley to threaten the Krajina Serb "capital" at Knin. The withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from Bosnia would not fundamentally alter this strategy.

- The Bosnian Croat army is a mediocre force hampered by poor morale, lack of effective leadership, and a shortage of manpower. The Bosnian Croats are wholly dependent on Zagreb for resupply, heavy equipment, and even military forces to defend their current holdings or launch local attacks. (b)(3)

War Without the UN

The withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from Bosnia would not substantially alter the military balance, but would lead to an increase in fighting. We do not believe that either the Bosnian Serbs or the Bosnian Government have the military wherewithal to decisively defeat its opponent in the next several years. This would change, however, if there were substantial outside intervention. The attitudes and actions of Serbia and Croatia would have the most significant impact on the intensity and length of continued fighting in Bosnia. (b)(3)

[013a]

If the UN withdrew, the Bosnian Serbs would almost certainly be able to eliminate the eastern enclaves, but the BSA does not have the forces available to defeat Bosnian Government forces in central Bosnia. The Serbs have been hampered by the curtailment of supplies from Serbia--although they almost certainly have not been completely cut off from Yugoslav logistics support. Over time--probably several years--the improvements in Bosnian Government forces may allow them to make substantial gains against the Bosnian Serbs, but only if Serbia continues to constrain material support. High government troop morale, continued access to outside supplies, and a manpower advantage would probably allow Sarajevo's forces to wear down the Bosnian Serbs and seize additional territory, but not retake the entire country.

- Lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Government would accelerate the improvement in the government forces, but would not substantially alter the military balance in the short term. The Bosnian Army would require at least three to six months to acquire, distribute, and train on any new weapons and would still be hampered by an untrained leadership and a supply system dependent on Croatia. Over time, however, Bosnian Government forces would be able to use these weapons to make substantial territorial gains from the Bosnian Serbs. Whether they could defeat the BSA would be contingent on Belgrade's level of support to the Bosnian Serbs.
- The Bosnian Serbs have frequently stated that if the arms embargo is lifted they will launch an offensive to "win the war." The Serbs will attempt to eliminate the Bosnian Government military before the additional weapons and training can make a difference on the battlefield and further shift the military balance. We believe the BSA no longer is capable of defeating the government forces but could inflict significant damage on Sarajevo, the eastern enclaves, and other UN-declared safe areas.

- It is unlikely that any Islamic country, especially Iran and Turkey, would be willing and capable of deploying substantial forces to Bosnia. If they were, however, the intervention by 5,000 to 10,000 relatively well-trained and equipped forces could speed up the Bosnian Government's reconquest of territory. (b)(3)

Serbia's actions after a UN pullout will largely determine the future of fighting in Bosnia. If the Serbs substantially curtailed the shipment of supplies--especially ammunition and fuel--to the Bosnian Serbs, government forces could make substantial gains more quickly, perhaps within a year.

- We believe, however, that Serbia would almost certainly ensure that enough supplies are delivered to the Bosnian Serbs to stave off a major defeat leading to several years of continued fighting. A substantial increase in assistance would probably allow the Bosnian Serbs to increase offensive operations and defend more of its territory because the BSA would no longer have to husband resources. If the BSA appeared near collapse, Belgrade probably would send some forces to bolster the Bosnian Serbs.

[013a]

- In a less likely scenario, Belgrade may decide to send substantial forces to Bosnia to end the war. Such a move would require a major portion of Serbia's military--especially its air force and armored units--to deliver such a blow. We believe that if Belgrade was prepared to send a large force it could compel the Bosnian Government to accept an unfavorable settlement--possibly in six months--although this would be contingent on the size and equipment of the units deployed and the time of year they were committed. The size of the force sent to Bosnia probably would also be constrained by the prospects for a conflict in Croatia. (b)(3)

Croatia's attitudes are almost as crucial as Serbia's in determining the outcome of the conflict in Bosnia. Zagreb remains focused on its goal of reintegrating the Serb-controlled regions of Croatia and views the fighting in Bosnia as subordinate to achieving this aim. At the same time, Croatia does not want to see a vastly improved Bosnian Government army that could threaten Bosnian Croat regions. Because any supplies to the Bosnian Government must transit Croat territory, Zagreb has ultimate controls over the Muslims' access to outside world and will use this control to prevent any actions that it considers threatening.

- Zagreb will allow enough support through to the Muslims to ensure that they can continue to tie down the maximum number of Bosnian Serb forces, thereby maintaining the conflict for several years or until Croatia has retaken the Krajina. It will probably continue to urge Bosnian Croat forces to support the government in retaking territory of mutual interest.
- Croatia would block any major shipment of heavy weapons to the Bosnian Government because of concern over a substantially strengthened Muslim force. In addition, Zagreb is not likely to allow the deployment or resupply of major Islamic forces to Bosnia.
- A UN pullout would seriously threaten the survival of the Bosnian Croat/Muslim Federation. UN peacekeepers have played a crucial role in maintaining the cease-fire between the two factions and old animosities could quickly flare following a withdrawal. Renewed Muslim versus Croat fighting coupled with a shut-off of outside support would undercut the government's ability to take the war to the Serbs and over an extended period—perhaps a year—could weaken government forces to the point they could not stave off major Serb attacks. [013a]
- In an extremely unlikely scenario, Croatia, especially if it had already retaken the Krajina, could accelerate the defeat of the Bosnian Government by cutting off outside support completely or through direct intervention against the Muslims. Senior Croat officials continue to worry about the long-term effects of Islamic influence in Bosnia, and a variety of reporting indicates that Serbian leader Milosevic and Croatian President Tudjman have discussed dividing Bosnia. A complete cutoff of supplies, and the intervention of the Serbian Army could lead to the collapse of Bosnian Government resistance in less than six months. If the Croatian Army joined in this assault, Bosnian Government forces could be quickly overwhelmed.

(b)(3)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013b. chart	Post-UN Scenarios in Bosnia. (2 pages)	c. 06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [4]

2013-0687-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013c. chart	Forces. (1 page)	c. 06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [4]

2013-0687-F

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