

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [3]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

897

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

1

Position:

2

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Drop-By on the Vice President's Meeting with Bosnian Prime Minister. Record ID: 9504430. (6 pages)	06/08/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Reply to Letter from Prime Minister Major. Record ID: 9504425. (1 page)	06/08/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. draft	Letter to Prime Minister Major. (2 pages)	06/08/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. cable	Letter from Prime Minister Major. (2 pages)	06/08/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Nelson Drew. Subject: June 6 Principals Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9520715. (4 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, June 6, 1995. Record ID: 9520708. (1 page)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)
003c. paper	Possible Contributions to UNPF. (1 page)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)
003d. cable	re: ICFY Head of Mission Intends to Return. (3 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)
004. paper	Authority for and NATO Decisions on. (5 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)
005a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Reply to Letter from Former President Carter. Record ID: 9504266. (2 pages)	06/07/1995	P1/b(1)
005b. memo	For the President from Warren Christopher. Subject: President Carter's Letter on Bosnia. (1 page)	06/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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Bosnia - June 1995: Early [3]

2013-0687-F

vz2711

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	re: Farewell Session with Milosevic. (3 pages)	06/07/1995	P1/b(1)

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JUN 08 '95 12:02PM OJC

P.1

MEMORANDUM



THE OFFICE OF JIMMY CARTER
ONE COPENHILL
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30307

404/ 331-3900 (PHONE)

404/ 331-0283 (FAX)

DATE: 6/8/95

Please deliver the following document to:

Name: President Bill Clinton

Contact: Uo NSC Advisor Tony Lake

Phone: 202/456-9491

Fax#: 202/456-9490

SENDER NAME: Jimmy Carter

CONTACT NAME: Faye Dill

PHONE: 404/331-0281

FAX: 404/331-0283

Number of pages transmitted including cover sheet: 2

If all pages are not received, please call contact number.

COMMENTS: Original will be sent by mail -



JIMMY CARTER

6/8/95
To President Bill Clinton

I have accepted an invitation from the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and from Senator Vonn to testify regarding Bosnia. As a matter of courtesy, I wanted to inform you.

I intend to be as positive & constructive as possible.

General John Galvin will be with me.

Best wishes, —

Jimmy

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 8, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*
FROM: NELSON DREW *D*
SUBJECT: Presidential Drop-by at Meeting of the Vice
President with Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President forwarding a background paper and talking points for his use during his drop-by on the Vice President's meeting with Prime Minister Silajdzic.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Biography

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *Va. Thoma* NARA, Date *6/3/2014**2013-0687-F*

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COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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
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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4425

June 8, 1995



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: NELSON DREW *ND*
SUBJECT: Reply to Prime Minister Major's Letter on the
Situation in Bosnia

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a suggested reply to Prime Minister Major's letter of June 8.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Suggested Reply to Prime Minister Major
Tab B Incoming from Prime Minister Major

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *Van Tol* NARA, Date *6/3/2014*

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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002a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Reply to Letter from Prime Minister Major. Record ID: 9504425. (1 page)	06/08/1995	P1/b(1)

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Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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FOLDER TITLE:

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. draft	Letter to Prime Minister Major. (2 pages)	06/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

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002c. cable	Letter from Prime Minister Major. (2 pages)	06/08/1995	P1/b(1)

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OA/Box Number: 897

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003a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Nelson Drew. Subject: June 6 Principals Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9520715. (4 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)

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003b. agenda	Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, June 6, 1995. Record ID: 9520708. (1 page)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)

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003c. paper	Possible Contributions to UNPF. (1 page)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)

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**REPORT TO CONGRESS OF POSSIBLE PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN SUPPORT OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION**

Pursuant to Section 407 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994-1995, P.L. 103-236, this report provides notification of the possibility that the United States will provide assistance to the United Nations in support of its peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia.

The Administration has previously discussed possible assistance to UNPROFOR with certain members and staff of the designated Congressional committees in phone calls on March 20, April 21, and May 29. Staff were also briefed on March 31 and Members on May 19 and May 26. Because of the fluidity of the situation on the ground it is not possible at this time to provide detailed information on the type or value of assistance that might be provided.

Assistance might be provided through NATO to assist in the withdrawal of UN-related personnel from Bosnia, should that be necessary. As was discussed in the phone calls to certain members and staff on March 20 and April 21 the Administration did authorize the deployment of 20 U.S. military communicators to Croatia as part of an eighty-person NATO precautionary deployment. Our senior military commanders recommended this action as an essential prepositioning step to ensure a communications network is ready to support NATO should a decision to withdraw UNPROFOR be necessary. The Department of Defense has informed us that the cost of sustaining these 20 communicators and associated equipment in Croatia for a period of six months will not exceed one million dollars. The U.S. expense for this deployment will be borne by the Department of Defense.

NATO planning for a possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR also calls for early action involving training and exercises, preparations for a possible deployment of NATO forces, and acquisition of communications equipment that would be NATO owned, but which could be used in a possible evacuation of UN forces. NATO has budgeted \$11.86 million for this, not all of which has been expended. If the full amount is expended the U.S. share would be about 24%, or approximately \$2.97 million. These expenses would be paid out of the NATO military budget and the NATO Security Investment Program.

NATO planning calls for a follow-on precautionary deployment of about 1,500 communicators and support staff. It is anticipated that the U.S. would provide about 456 of these troops. Part of the equipment and preparation costs in support of this deployment is covered by the \$11.86 million already budgeted by NATO.

-2-

As was made clear in the briefings for Congress on this subject held on May 19 and 26, and in the statement released after the May 29 meeting of the Contact Group, the Administration strongly supports UNPROFOR's continued operation in Bosnia/Herzegovina. No final decision has been made on U.S. participation in a withdrawal, beyond the initial deployment of 20 personnel. However, the President informed our Allies last December that the U.S. is prepared, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation to assist UN Peace Forces withdraw from the former Yugoslavia. We have also joined the Contact Group call for a reinforced UNPROFOR. While we do not contemplate any new U.S. role in UNPROFOR, we might join in a NATO effort, if it is requested, to make UNPROFOR more robust and more defensible. This might involve assisting UNPROFOR to redeploy to more defensible positions or providing it some of the tools it needs to defend itself better.

Should UNPROFOR withdrawal be necessary, a NATO deployment in which the U.S. would provide a substantial number of troops and other assistance could be authorized. Depending on the situation on the ground at the time of the operation, the cost of NATO support for a full withdrawal of UN forces from Bosnia could be as much as \$2 billion. We are discussing with our NATO allies how this cost would be shared. We are also discussing within the Administration how the U.S. will fund its share of the operation.

The Administration intends to continue to consult with the Congress on this issue. As the situation in Bosnia/Herzegovina develops, information in this report may change. We will provide the Congress with more detailed information about U.S. participation, cost and how the Administration would fund this operation as it becomes available.

George F. Ward, Jr.
Acting Assistant Secretary
International Organization Affairs

May 31, 1995

BOSNIA POINTS
FOR JUNE 5 APPEARANCE ON "LARRY KING LIVE"

Key Points - Basic U.S. Policy:

- Key U.S. policy goals:
 - interests clear: contain conflict, promote political solution;
 - help preserve Bosnia as multi-ethnic state within its internationally recognized borders;
 - keep faith with our NATO allies; and
 - relieve human suffering.
- To these ends, over past two and a half years, we have:
 - led NATO military responses to UN calls for assistance in protecting its forces and the safe areas;
 - brokered agreement ending war between Muslims and Croats and establishing bicomunal Federation;
 - led Contact Group efforts toward negotiated settlement;
 - deployed peacekeeping troops to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to contain spread of conflict;
 - helped keep the war out of the skies over Bosnia, as our F-16 pilot was doing on Friday; and
 - conducted the longest humanitarian airlift in history.
- Policy has produced results: civilian casualties declined dramatically (130,000 in 1992, down to 2500 in 1994); thousands have received food and medical supplies; shelling of Sarajevo has been reduced (until events of recent days); and war hasn't spread to other areas of Balkans.
- We have avoided, and will continue to avoid, committing U.S. ground forces to the conflict in Bosnia.
- But we believe Allies should know that, in the event UNPROFOR has to withdraw or if units need to be extracted in emergency situations, U.S. prepared to help through NATO.
- This commitment has helped strengthen Allies' resolve to maintain UNPROFOR. We and they agree that continued UNPROFOR presence is essential to reduce violence, deliver humanitarian aid, and preserve conditions for political settlement.
- UNPROFOR needs to be strengthened if it is to be able to carry out its mission and deal with Serb interference.
- We have been meeting with NATO allies to consider how to do this. Secretary Perry attended Paris meetings Saturday, where allies reaffirmed readiness to strengthen UNPROFOR to enable it to fulfill its mandate. We support that process.

Q: What about alternatives?

- Strengthening UNPROFOR so that it can do its job is clearly better than the alternatives:
 - quitting and withdrawing UNPROFOR, with the humanitarian disaster that would surely follow; (lifting the arms embargo unilaterally, as part of this strategy, Americanizes war and increases bloodshed;
 - continuing with status quo, which is unsustainable; or
 - sending American troops to fight in a ground war in the Balkans -- which I and the American people reject.
- Despite UNPROFOR's current problems, tens of thousands of lives have been saved and violence has been reduced.
- Our ultimate objectives--negotiated peace and stability in Balkans--more likely if the international presence remains.

Q: Will the U.S. provide ground forces to assist in this effort?

- We will not send ground forces into the conflict or to join UNPROFOR.
- There are three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete, temporary operations:
 1. We would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the parties, to use U.S. troops as part of a NATO force to help implement a settlement that the parties were carrying out in good faith.
 2. If UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and review of military plans, we would participate in NATO operation to assist in withdrawal.
 3. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because allies in UNPROFOR have formidable capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an emergency extraction of units whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in Bosnia.
- We have not been asked to do any of these contingencies. We think that it is unlikely that we will be asked to do so, in part because our policy on this question has created a greater sense of confidence in UNPROFOR, making it less likely it will withdraw its units.
- If we do any of these operations, it will be under NATO, not UN, command, with adequate forces and robust rules of engagement.

Q: What about the role of the Amphibious Readiness Group?

-- As precautionary measure, some of our forces are relocating to assist in an emergency evacuation if necessary.

- deployment of the three-ship Amphibious Readiness Group to the Adriatic; and
- positioning the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt off the coast of Italy.

-- We have made no decision to deploy our troops further, nor has there been any request for us to do so.

Q: Will you seek Congressional authorization prior to committing U.S. ground forces to operations in Bosnia?

-- We will consult fully with the Congress and welcome their support.

Q: Did your administration misjudge the possible negative reaction to your statement on U.S. assistance to help redeploy UN forces in Bosnia?

-- No. Contingencies are limited ones, and we have made every effort over past week to make this clear.

-- Aim is to create a greater sense of confidence in UNPROFOR, making it less likely it will withdraw its units.

- Based on the discussions among our Allies in Paris over the weekend, that is exactly what has happened: policy has encouraged UNPROFOR to stay.

Q: What support will the U.S. provide to the Quick Reaction Force agreed to by our Allies in Paris?

-- Secretary Perry told our Allies we are willing to consider requests to support QRF short of providing ground forces.

- We will provide close air support as we have to UNPROFOR for past two years; this may include use of AC-130 gunships under appropriate circumstances.
- We will assist in establishment of an intelligence coordination cell and provide timely intelligence data.
- We are prepared to provide equipment such as attack helicopters, radars, communications gear and night-vision equipment (but not with U.S. personnel).
- And we will provide strategic lift to help bring allies' heavy equipment to the theater.

Q: Is there a risk of U.S. casualties in supporting the QRF?

-- We will ensure that every precaution is taken in provision of close air support and other assistance to the QRF.

Q: What is the purpose of the Quick Reaction Force?

-- The force, with ground units provided exclusively by our Allies (e.g. French, British, Dutch) will respond if UNPROFOR units come under attack.

-- It will not have the mission or the capability to impose a peace or to force the Serbs to comply with UN resolutions. However, by having greater self-defense capability, it will help assist UNPROFOR in meeting its mandate to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Q: Why not withdraw UNPROFOR and lift the arms embargo, as Senator Dole has proposed?

-- Withdrawal of UNPROFOR unquestionably would increase the humanitarian suffering.

- Much of the relief effort depends on UNPROFOR: UNHCR and other relief organizations are feeding and otherwise caring for about 2.8 million refugees, displaced persons, and others affected by the war.

-- Lifting arms embargo unilaterally would drive UNPROFOR and our allies from Bosnia immediately.

- This would Americanize the war in the Balkans, making us responsible for the supply, training, and at least some of the defense of the Bosnian government.

Q: What is your position on multilateral lift of the arms embargo?

-- If UNPROFOR withdrawal cannot be avoided, I would support a multilateral lifting of arms embargo following withdrawal, so the Bosnian Government would be able to defend itself.

-- We would expect that our allies, in the circumstances, would agree to multilateral lift.

Q: Why haven't we done more to end the fighting and suffering?

-- Look at what has been done in Bosnia:

- 130,000 people killed in '92; dropped to about 2500 in '94.
- NATO's Operation Deny Flight kept the war out of the air over Bosnia for two and a half years.
- UNPROFOR has been key to implementing Federation agreement between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats.
- U.S. airlift has delivered more than 50,000 tons of humanitarian supplies in the longest airborne relief operation ever.
- All without any involvement of American ground forces in combat or peacekeeping missions.

-- Also succeeded in containing spread of conflict to Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and other parts of Balkans.

-- Not a perfect solution -- But there are no easy or obvious choices to resolve the conflict.

-- The challenge for those critical of our policies is to come up with better alternatives that don't depend on wishful thinking.

Q: What is being done to secure release of the remaining hostages?

-- Working to secure the complete and unconditional release of the remaining UN personnel being held by the Bosnian Serbs.

-- The International Red Cross has been in contact with the Pale Serb leadership.

-- Our Contact Group representative, Ambassador Frasure, has been pressing Serbian leadership in Belgrade to intervene

Q: Will we agree to end the threat of airstrikes to secure the release of the remaining hostages?

-- No. Their release should be immediate and unconditional.

Q: Were the airstrikes a mistake, given the subsequent seizure of UN personnel and the loss of our F-16?

-- No. Despite the subsequent actions of the Serbs, the airstrikes were a necessary decision.

-- Airstrikes were a reaction -- by the UN commanders -- to the Pale Serbs' deliberate violation of their agreements with the UN and massive shelling of Sarajevo. More than a thousand shells fell on Sarajevo in days before air strikes.

-- UNPROFOR commanders made decision that risk of inaction was greater than risk of action.

Q: What has been done to rescue the downed F-16 pilot?

-- U.S. and NATO aircraft have been conducting an aggressive search in area where F-16 was shot down, but have been unable to locate pilot.

-- His status is uncertain at the moment.

-- If he is in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs, as they had at one time indicated, he should be released, unharmed, immediately.

Q: Why has the rescue effort been unsuccessful?

-- So far, despite intensive and continuing effort, we have been unable to locate pilot.

Q: Are there plans to retaliate against the Bosnian Serbs for shooting down the aircraft?

-- It would be inappropriate to speculate.

Q: Will U.S. continue to participate in Deny Flight operations?

-- Yes.

-- Deny Flight has eliminated the use of combat aircraft by the warring parties in Bosnia, saving innocent civilians from air attack.

Q: How could the shoot-down have happened? Weren't we taking precautions in light of recent Bosnian Serb threats?

-- We have known of the SAM threat in Bosnia since before the start of Deny Flight operations, and have been taking all necessary precautions in areas where SAMs were active.

-- SAMs can be highly mobile and can appear anywhere in Serb-held areas of Bosnia.

-- We should not forget that there have been thousands of successful sorties flown in Deny Flight without loss prior to this, and we have known all along that this is not a risk-free environment.

Q: Are any new measures being taken in light of the shoot down?

-- Secretary Perry has instructed our military commanders to treat all Bosnia as a high SAM-threat environment:

Q: If the SAMs are a threat, why don't you just order our aircraft to attack and destroy them?

-- Deny Flight aircraft have always had Rules of Engagement that allowed them to act in self-defense if they came under direct attack.

-- Don't want to get into any further speculation.

Q: Where did the SAMs come from? Who is supplying them to the Bosnian Serbs?

-- The Bosnian Serbs have had surface-to-air missiles of this type since the break-up of the former Yugoslavia.

-- They were part of the air defense system of the Yugoslav Army before the end of the Cold War.

-- We have no evidence that these SAMs were brought in from any outside source, although we can't exclude that possibility.

-- That is one of the avenues of support that we are seeking to foreclose in the future, by getting the Serbian leaders in Belgrade to ensure that their borders with Bosnian Serb-held territory are closed.

Q: Given the recent behavior of the Serbs in Bosnia, why are we discussing sanctions relief with Milosevic?

-- Negotiations with Milosevic pursue two goals, both supported by the Bosnian Government:

- Belgrade's recognition of Bosnia within its internationally-recognized borders, thereby renouncing ambitions to establish a "Greater Serbia"; and
- isolation of the Bosnian-Serb leadership in Pale so they will recognize that they have no viable option other than a negotiated settlement based on the Contact Group Plan.

Q: Where are we headed with our negotiations?

- The ultimate resolution of the war must, of course, be achieved at the negotiating table.
- We are currently pursuing two tracks with our Contact Group partners:
 - strengthening the options available to the UNPROFOR commanders in the field;
 - negotiating Serbian President Milosevic's recognition of Bosnia within its internationally recognized borders, together with measures to further tighten the closure of the border, in order to further isolate the Pale Serbs.
- The real choices remain with the parties to the conflict. They can perpetuate the military standoff, or they can stop spilling blood and start making peace.

Q: Are you concerned about disagreements within your foreign policy team and the fact that you have been receiving conflicting advice?

- There aren't any disagreements among my foreign policy team on Bosnia. They all agree that our interests lie in working with our Allies to strengthen UNPROFOR in order to contain the conflict, reduce human suffering, and promote a negotiated settlement.
- The press has over-reacted in interpreting statements by me and other Administration spokesmen regarding the limited circumstances in which we would be prepared to help our Allies through the temporary deployment of ground forces.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003d. cable	re: ICFY Head of Mission Intends to Return. (3 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2711

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. paper	Authority for and NATO Decisions on. (5 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2711

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June 7, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: NELSON DREW *ND*
SUBJECT: Reply to President Carter's Letter on the
Situation in Bosnia

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President forwarding a suggested reply to President Carter's letter of June 2.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Suggested Reply to President Carter
Tab B Incoming from President Carter

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006
By *Van Zandt* NARA, Date *6/3/2014*
2013-0687-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005a. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Reply to Letter from Former President Carter. Record ID: 9504266. (2 pages)	06/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2711

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear President Carter:

I greatly appreciate your continued interest and concern for finding a peaceful solution to the crisis in Bosnia. Your efforts in bringing about a cessation of hostilities that lasted through this past winter bought us precious time in which to seek a negotiated settlement acceptable to all parties to the conflict.

Unfortunately, not only have the Pale Serbs refused to join with Bosnian Government in accepting the Contact Group Plan as the starting point for further negotiations, but, following the expiration of the cessation of hostilities agreement, they have resorted to actions that defy all norms of civilized international behavior: shelling innocent civilian targets in response to reversals on the battlefield, and taking hostages and chaining them to potential military targets in clear violation of all accepted rules of war.

I am sure you must agree that, under the circumstances, we should not be initiating any course of action that could be seen as a reward for such behavior and intransigence. Unfortunately, to now abandon our insistence that the Bosnian Serbs join with the other parties in accepting the Contact Group ~~map~~ ^{plan} as a starting point for negotiations -- especially after the Contact Group has just reaffirmed its commitment to the proposal -- would be seen ~~both~~ in Pale, ^{as well as in Sarajevo} and the international community, as precisely such a reward.

Moreover, as you are aware, our policy for gaining the Pale leadership's acceptance of the Contact Group proposal as the basis for negotiations is based largely on diplomatic efforts to increase the political and economic isolation of the Bosnian Serbs and, through that effort, convince them that such negotiations in good faith are the only avenue available to them. This is not a short-term strategy, but will require consistent application over time, and patience on our part not to waver each time the Bosnian Serbs up the ante.

Therefore, I ~~must say that~~ I do not believe that it would be wise at this time either to seek to reopen the Contact Group plan by dropping the map, or to abandon the Contact Group altogether by appearing to endorse a new approach to negotiations such as you suggest. The Bosnian Serbs understand full well that adjustments to the Contact Group map can be made on the basis of mutual agreement among the parties, and that the draft constitutional principles would provide them substantial autonomy within the future Bosnian union. Thus, the real question is whether the Bosnian Serbs are prepared to negotiate in good faith, or whether they are committed to a military solution.

Thank you again for sharing your ideas on this difficult issue, and for your support for our mutual goal of restoring peace to the troubled Balkan region.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Jimmy Carter
The Carter Presidential Center
One Copenhill
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

June 2, 1995

95 JUN 2 A10:00

To President Bill Clinton

As we discussed briefly on the phone, the world is in a quandary about Bosnia-Herzegovina. Let me be presumptuous and review the situation, even though I realize that you are much better informed than I could possibly be.

The basic question is, what can be done to end the bloodshed, sustain a peace initiative, and at the same time continue the isolation of the Bosnian Serbs for their unconscionable acts?

This question itself is the root of the problem. Knowing the major players personally in Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Pale, I am convinced that there is no way to resolve the conflict peacefully without being willing to talk with both sides to the dispute -- and by this I am including the Serbs in Bosnia.

Even if we can work out a deal with Milosevic, exchanging a lifting of the embargo for his recognition of Croatia and Bosnia, this may not assuage or control the Serbs in Bosnia. In fact, it may exacerbate divisions in the area.

There is an understandable affinity for the existing 51-49 plan among those who have negotiated it, with the Bosnian government adamantly objecting to any deviation from it. However, the Serbs have made it clear that they will not accept this territorial division in advance. We know that they are tough, parochial in their concepts, and almost impervious to international condemnation.

During the four-month cease-fire, the Serbs agreed to negotiate "on the basis of" the Contact Group-Sarajevo plan, but refused to "accept" it in advance. Subsequently, they presented to me (and, I think, to the Contact Group) their own map, which reduced their existing 70% of the territory to 53%. Although short of the 49% requirement, this could be an opening proposal for negotiation.

Despite the obvious diplomatic reluctance, it may be necessary for the Contact Group to convene negotiating sessions in a neutral location without any precondition. With U.S. persuasion, the government would likely participate. During another cease-fire period, which I believe would be honored during peace talks, the international forces could reassess both political strategy and military deployments.

The final map may be somewhere between the 49% and 53% boundary lines, with some mutually agreed exchange of territory to accommodate legitimate needs by both sides. At the same time, the permanent status of Bosnia-Herzegovina can be explored, including the degree of autonomy for the three major ethnic groups and their freedom to affiliate in some way with their neighbors.


During further talks, NATO bombing can be retained as an option, all hostages released, relief routes open, and shelling of civilian zones prohibited.

With approval from State, in April we offered to explore these premises with both sides. The Serbs agreed, but the government rejected this proposal, stating that prior acceptance of the Contact Group plan was the only basis on which any talks could begin.

If the Milosevic option does not work out and if it is not possible for the Group to explore new possibilities with both sides, we would like to make another unofficial effort to explore some common ground. We would need your approval, and some encouragement for the Sarajevo leaders to cooperate.

You have my best wishes as you wrestle with this intractable problem.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink on a white background.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005b. memo	For the President from Warren Christopher. Subject: President Carter's Letter on Bosnia. (1 page)	06/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2711

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Policy for Bosnia -- Use of U.S. Ground Forces to Support NATO Assistance for Redeployment of UNPROFOR Within Bosnia

Purpose

To provide a summary of policy conclusions reached by Principals at their meeting on Bosnia on May 28, and obtain your decision on whether agreement in principle to provide U.S. forces to assist in UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia also extends to assistance in redeployment of UNPROFOR units from the eastern enclaves to more defensible positions elsewhere within Bosnia.

Background

Principals met on May 28 to consider a range of policy options in light of the recent developments in Bosnia. They agreed on the following basic points for U.S. policy:

- **Prospects of additional airstrikes:** The U.S. will not press allies with troops on the ground for further strikes now, but (1) the possibility of further strikes will not be ruled out, (2) should strikes again become necessary, a more robust approach permitting the UN and NATO to respond at the time and place of their own choosing should be followed rather than continuing to limit options on the basis of "strict proportionality," (3) privately we will accept a pause, but make no public statement to that effect, and (4) the Secretary of State will seek allied reactions to planning a substantial contingency strike option if Serb behavior, such as killing hostages, warranted a major attack.
- **Diplomatic efforts at the UN and Contact Group:** We will (1) seek a formula with the French and UK on a sanctions suspension termination mechanism and re-engage Milosevic on that basis to seek to conclude a Bosnian-Serb recognition package, (2) press Milosevic in the context of such an agreement to push the Bosnian Serbs to release the hostages (in order to create the conditions making such an agreement workable), (3) explore the prospects for Russian assistance in control of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons, and (4) renew efforts to gain UN condemnation of Bosnian Serb leadership as the

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Declassify on: OADR

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

✓ 10/1/2013

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

principal obstacle to peace in the region based on recent events. (Per our conversation last night, Chris will be working with Hurd and others today to support the stronger U.K. position, including a private U.K./French/U.S. message to Karadzic. Shali and I just spoke with Chris and suggested he offer both U.S. airlift and equipment, if requested, to the Brits and French.)

- **Options and prospects for emergency withdrawal:** Principals noted that (1) no one is calling for that now, but that the situation could arise quickly, (2) NATO OPLAN 40104 would cover emergency withdrawal, (3) U.S. participation requires that a serious effort to complete consultations with Congress must begin at once, starting with calls to key members and staff today, and (4) non-NATO withdrawal using UK, French and U.S. assets was a possibility, but raises serious problems for NATO and for command and control of the operation (putting greater stress on the need for Congressional consultations on 40104).
- **The future of UNPROFOR:** It was agreed that UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia under the present circumstances would be seen as capitulation to Bosnian-Serb blackmail and should be avoided. Instead, Principals agreed the U.S. strongly should support French efforts to enhance UNPROFOR's ability to perform its mandate by (1) bolstering its capabilities (short of providing U.S. ground forces, but including provision of U.S. equipment if necessary), (2) application of more robust ROE and (3) "regrouping" UNPROFOR to reduce the risk. (Principals also agreed to a re-evaluation of the roles and missions of UNPROFOR to support future decisions on regrouping.)

Although the French are not at this time calling for UNPROFOR withdrawal from the eastern enclaves as part of their regrouping proposal, it is conceivable that, should the situation on the ground continue to worsen, some of our NATO allies with forces on the ground in the enclaves might make such a request.

OSD and JCS propose that such a request should be treated as a subset of NATO OPLAN 40104 withdrawal efforts, and that the U.S. commitment in principle to provide troops for a withdrawal of UNPROFOR should be extended to apply to assistance in relocation if required to safely extract allied UNPROFOR units. They note that, since redeployment of UNPROFOR to more defensible positions within Bosnia could be seen as more threatening to the Bosnian Serbs than withdrawal *in toto*, there is an increased likelihood that units attempting to redeploy would feel the need for NATO assistance. Should NATO be asked to assist, the United States could find itself facing the choice of temporarily deploying ground forces into Bosnia as part of such a NATO effort or

telling our allies that, while we are prepared to assist them leave Bosnia altogether, we are unwilling to assist them in moving to safer positions from which UNPROFOR would be more capable of performing its missions. Allies may press the U.S. on this at the Contact Group and NAC Ministerial meetings this week.

We would prefer not to see a withdrawal from the eastern enclaves, with the associated potential for a humanitarian nightmare for the civilians in the safe areas currently under the promise of UN protection. Moreover, Congressional support and approval for U.S. participation in a redeployment operation may be more difficult to obtain than for an UNPROFOR rescue and extraction. As noted above, a redeployment may meet more Serbian resistance. Moreover, many in Congress (e.g. Dole) have linked U.S. participation in UNPROFOR extraction to subsequent lift of the arms embargo; in the context of assisted redeployment we would be compelled to resist lift, which will make Congressional approval harder. A hard sell would be required based on agreement that the redeployment was a precursor to far more aggressive action against the Bosnian Serbs.

Such difficulties notwithstanding, U.S. credibility among NATO Allies would be seriously damaged if we were to turn down a request for assistance in extracting themselves from positions that had become untenable in the eastern enclaves and redeploying to central Bosnia. This would be especially so since such a redeployment would be presented as supporting of two U.S. goals: maintaining an UNPROFOR presence in Bosnia, and making that presence more robust in its ability and willingness to confront Bosnian Serb violations.

RECOMMENDATION

That since it is not in our interests to see the eastern enclaves abandoned, and since we would be hard pressed to turn down a request for assistance if it came to NATO, we should work bilaterally with the French and other troop contributing nations to ensure that adequate forces remain available to sustain a UNPROFOR presence in the enclaves, and discourage them from seeking NATO assistance for redeployment;

But since I agree with Bill and Shali that we should provide such assistance if we can bring Congress along, that briefings to Congress on OPLAN 40104 include the option of using the withdrawal plan to redeploy UNPROFOR to more defensible positions, should such redeployment become inevitable.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20727

June 6, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: NELSON DREW *ND*
SUBJECT: Memo to the President on June 6 Principals' Decisions

The attached memorandum to the President summarizes the key decisions of this afternoon's Principals' meeting on Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *Van Zandt* NARA, Date *6/3/2014*

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Principals Review of Bosnia Policy

Principals met Tuesday afternoon to review a range of policy issues associated with the situation in Bosnia. Key decisions included:

1. Recall Bob Frasure from Belgrade for consultations, given the lack of progress on the mutual recognition plan and Milosevic's attempts to up the ante. Prior to departing, Frasure will meet with Milosevic to stress: (a) the need for Belgrade to be more forthcoming on a workable sanctions reimposition mechanism in return for sanctions relief; (b) the need for Milosevic to intercede with the Bosnian Serbs to permit UNPROFOR to resupply its units in the eastern enclaves; and (c) the need for Milosevic to pledge to take action to increase security of U.S. monitors operating along the Serbian-Bosnian border in light of Bosnian Serb threats to take U.S. personnel hostage.
2. Agree to return U.S. border monitors to duty under the following conditions: (a) inform them of the serious nature of the threat directed toward them, based on our intelligence information, and allow them to resign and leave if they do not want to return voluntarily; (b) obtain the security commitment from Milosevic; (c) inform the head of the international mission of our decision; and (d) ensure that Congress is aware of the participation of U.S. civilian contractors in the border monitoring mission.
3. Schedule a meeting of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic with the Vice President during Silajdzic's visit to Washington beginning on Thursday. Principals thought it would be politically desirable for you to drop by.
4. Based on a CIA assessment that the current ROE for Deny Flight might not provide adequate protection for NATO/US aircraft in light of recent Bosnian Serb tactics, CIA, OSD and JCS will review the nature of the SAM threat in Bosnia and determine whether a new definition of "hostile intent"

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

VZ 10/1/2013

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

or new ROE are required for further operations. In the interim, Deny Flight operations will continue under existing ROE (permitting attacks on SAMs demonstrating hostile intent through radar illumination of aircraft), but we will seek to avoid provocative action.

5. Urge the Croatians to exercise restraint in their ongoing offensive operations near Knin lest they provoke another major clash with the Krajina Serbs.

Principals also reviewed the results of the Paris meeting of Defense Ministers and the kinds of support we will provide to the Quick Reaction Force, depending on the requests of the force contributors. They also agreed that it would be prudent to provide formal notification to Congress of our intent to assist UNPROFOR in Bosnia, in the context of ongoing briefings on NATO OPLAN 40104 and USG Bosnia policy.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	re: Farewell Session with Milosevic. (3 pages)	06/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [3]

2013-0687-F
vz2711

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

EMERGENCY EXTRACTIONQuestion:

What is the U.S. policy on emergency extractions of UN units in Bosnia? What is the difference between reconfiguring forces and emergency extraction? What is the relationship between emergency extraction and total UN withdrawal?

Answer:

- o An emergency extraction of UN forces is one of only three contingencies in which we might use U.S. troops in limited, temporary operations in Bosnia. (The other two are helping monitor a peace settlement and supporting an UNPROFOR withdrawal.)
- o As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because Allies in UNPROFOR have formidable capabilities themselves -- we would be prepared to assist NATO in an emergency extraction of units whose positions had become untenable. The operation would seek to bring them to points of safety in Bosnia.
- o We have not been asked to assist in such an operation, and we think the chances are remote that we will be. If we are, we would consult with Congress while considering the request.
- o Any emergency extraction would be under NATO, not UN, command, with adequate forces and robust rules of engagement.

- o (If pressed) The question of the distinction between "extraction" and "reconfiguration" is not germane. Our stated intent is to be responsive if our NATO allies need assistance in getting out of a situation where their safety is threatened and they cannot respond on their own. The additional capabilities now being added to UNPROFOR make it less likely that outside assistance would be required. Again, the point is that if a UN unit needs emergency assistance that UNPROFOR cannot provide, the U.S. will stand with them if they need help to move to safety.

U/S Tarnoff Q & A; Emergency Extraction

Drafted: EUR/RPM: FBurton
6/6/95 7-1563 SERPMS 8353

Cleared: EUR/RPM: JCunningham, DMcElhaney
EUR/SCE: JZetkusic
H: TRobertson
NSC: NDrew

06/07/95

07:59

202 647 1369

EUR/RPM

→→→ EUROPEAN DIR

001



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED FAX

BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS
OFFICE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS
FAX NUMBER (202) 647-1369

FROM: F. Burton EUR/RPM 7-1563
NAME Office Symbol Extension Room

DELIVER TO	OFFICE SYMBOL	EXTENSION	ROOM
<u>Col. Nelson Drew</u>	<u>NSC/EUR</u>	<u>456-9150</u>	
<u>Fred Beauchamp</u>	<u>OSD/NATO</u>	<u>(703) 614-8478</u>	
<u>John Roberti</u>	<u>JCS</u>	<u>(703) 614-0573</u>	

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION:

Q & A for U/S Tarnoff on Extraction

REMARKS: This will be a key question on the Hill
today and tomorrow. If NSC clears, we
suggest this (or similar) language be the
standard response.

Thanks,

Fletcher

FAX SENT BY

DATE:

PAGES

UNCLASSIFIED FAX

S, D, P, SS, EUR, WHSR

Copy to State Dept.

June 2, 1995

To President Bill Clinton

As we discussed briefly on the phone, the world is in a quandary about Bosnia-Herzegovina. Let me be presumptuous and review the situation, even though I realize that you are much better informed than I could possibly be.

The basic question is, what can be done to end the bloodshed, sustain a peace initiative, and at the same time continue the isolation of the Bosnian Serbs for their unconscionable acts?

This question itself is the root of the problem. Knowing the major players personally in Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Pale, I am convinced that there is no way to resolve the conflict peacefully without being willing to talk with both sides to the dispute -- and by this I am including the Serbs in Bosnia.

Even if we can work out a deal with Milosevic, exchanging a lifting of the embargo for his recognition of Croatia and Bosnia, this may not assuage or control the Serbs in Bosnia. In fact, it may exacerbate divisions in the area.

There is an understandable affinity for the existing 51-49 plan among those who have negotiated it, with the Bosnian government adamantly objecting to any deviation from it. However, the Serbs have made it clear that they will not accept this territorial division in advance. We know that they are tough, parochial in their concepts, and almost impervious to international condemnation.

During the four-month cease-fire, the Serbs agreed to negotiate "on the basis of" the Contact Group-Sarajevo plan, but refused to "accept" it in advance. Subsequently, they presented to me (and, I think, to the Contact Group) their own map, which reduced their existing 70% of the territory to 53%. Although short of the 49% requirement, this could be an opening proposal for negotiation.

Despite the obvious diplomatic reluctance, it may be necessary for the Contact Group to convene negotiating sessions in a neutral location without any precondition. With U.S. persuasion, the government would likely participate. During another cease-fire period, which I believe would be honored during peace talks, the international forces could reassess both political strategy and military deployments.

The final map may be somewhere between the 49% and 53% boundary lines, with some mutually agreed exchange of territory to accommodate legitimate needs by both sides. At the same time, the permanent status of Bosnia-Herzegovina can be explored, including the degree of autonomy for the three major ethnic groups and their freedom to affiliate in some way with their neighbors.


During further talks, NATO bombing can be retained as an option, all hostages released, relief routes open, and shelling of civilian zones prohibited.

With approval from State, in April we offered to explore these premises with both sides. The Serbs agreed, but the government rejected this proposal, stating that prior acceptance of the Contact Group plan was the only basis on which any talks could begin.

If the Milosevic option does not work out and if it is not possible for the Group to explore new possibilities with both sides, we would like to make another unofficial effort to explore some common ground. We would need your approval, and some encouragement for the Sarajevo leaders to cooperate.

You have my best wishes as you wrestle with this intractable problem.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in dark ink on a light background.