

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [2]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

897

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

1

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2

Stack:

v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Croatia: How Long Can Tudjman Wait? (4 pages)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: Letter to Prime Minister Major from Bill Clinton. (2 pages)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)
003. telcon	President Chirac of France, May 27, 1995. Record ID: 9504484. (4 pages)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)
004. memo	For Anthony Lake from Nelson Drew. Subject: Partial 407 Notification Package. Record ID: 9520749. (4 pages)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)
005. map	Military Developments, Early June 1995. (1 page)	06/10/1995	P1/b(1)
006a. memo	For Addressees. Subject: Papers in Support of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia. (3 pages)	06/06/1995	P1/b(1)
006b. paper	Military Developments in Bosnia. (4 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)
006c. paper	Air Defense. (4 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)
006d. paper	The Bosnian Serbs. (3 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)
006e. paper	UNPROFOR: European Contributors. (5 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)
006f. paper	Humanitarian Update. (2 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)
007. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Drop-By on the Vice President's Meeting with Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic. Record ID: 9504430. (6 pages)	06/09/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2710

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9504446
RECEIVED: 09 JUN 95 11

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BYRD, ROBERT C

DOC DATE: 02 JUN 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA CO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR FM SEN BYRD RE GROWING CONFLICT IN BOSNIA

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE

DUE DATE: 13 JUN 95 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: DREW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
DREW

FOR CONCURRENCE
DANVERS

FOR INFO
CLARKE
SENS
SESTAK
STEPHENS
VERSHBOW

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

TED STEVENS, ALASKA
THAD COCHRAN, MISSISSIPPI
ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
PETE V. DOMENICI, NEW MEXICO
PHIL GRAMM, TEXAS
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, MISSOURI
SLADE GORTON, WASHINGTON
MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY
CONNIE MACK, FLORIDA
CONRAD BURNS, MONTANA
RICHARD C. SHELBY, ALABAMA
JAMES M. JEFFORDS, VERMONT
JUDD GREGG, NEW HAMPSHIRE
ROBERT F. BENNETT, UTAH

ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA
DANIEL K. INOUE, HAWAII
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINA
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, LOUISIANA
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT
DALE BUMPERS, ARKANSAS
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, NEW JERSEY
TOM HARKIN, IOWA
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, MARYLAND
HARRY REID, NEVADA
J. ROBERT KERREY, NEBRASKA
HERB KOHL, WISCONSIN
PATTY MURRAY, WASHINGTON

J. KEITH KENNEDY, STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES H. ENGLISH, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6025

4446

95 JUN 6 P2:34

June 2, 1995

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to express my deep concerns regarding your recent remarks on the growing conflict in Bosnia. Though there may be a role for the United States to play, as a member of NATO, in providing assistance in the evacuation of United Nations peacekeeping forces from Bosnia, such action should not be taken without an affirmative vote of Congress. The extent, duration, dangers, and cost of such an operation all point to the wisdom and prudence of getting Congress and the American people behind this type of involvement.

Beyond this specific mission, I have serious doubts that there exists the vital national interest necessary to commit American ground troops in other roles in Bosnia. Such action would surely run the risk of engaging in extended involvement with significant casualties and without the ability to support such a level of commitment. Recent history demonstrates the need for consensus-building in order to sustain the unknown consequences of a major NATO operation such as that in Bosnia. It is my sincere hope that caution will be used in the days and weeks ahead as you work to determine the U.S. mission in that troubled region.

Sincerely,

Robert C. Byrd
Robert C. Byrd

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

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001. report	Croatia: How Long Can Tudjman Wait? (4 pages)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2710

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
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June 12, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*

FROM: NELSON DREW *D*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of President's May 27, 1995
Conversation with French President Chirac

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum of the President's telephone conversation with President Chirac of France on May 27, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Conversation to the State Department.

Attachments

Tab I Sens-Brill Memorandum

Tab A Memcon with President Chirac

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *Van Dorn* NARA, Date *6/2/2014*

2013-0687-F

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of the President's Conversation with
French President Jacques Chirac

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in France for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(C)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memcon with President Chirac

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By VaZbnd NARA, Date 6/2/2014

2013-0687-7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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003. telcon	President Chirac of France, May 27, 1995. Record ID: 9504484. (4 pages)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2710

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004. memo	For Anthony Lake from Nelson Drew. Subject: Partial 407 Notification Package. Record ID: 9520749. (4 pages)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [2]

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20750

June 10, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *h*
FROM: NELSON DREW *D*
SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Principals
Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia,
June 6, 1995

Attached at Tab A for distribution to Principals is the Summary of Conclusions from the Principals Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia held June 6, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to agencies at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the Agencies
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By *V. B. H.* NARA, Date *6/2/14*

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20750

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMBASSADOR RICK INDEFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

DR. GORDON ADAMS
Associate Director for
National Security &
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Principals Committee Meeting on
Bosnia and Croatia, June 6, 1995 ~~(S)~~

Please pass to the Principals the Summary of Conclusions attached
at Tab A. ~~(S)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By Van Thuan NARA, Date 6/2/2014

2013-0687-F

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: June 6, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 2:30 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair

Anthony Lake

OMB

Gordon Adams

OVP

Leon Fuerth

Chief of Staff

Leon Panetta

State

Secretary Warren Christopher
Peter Tarnoff

CIA

John Deutch

DOD

Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe

JCS

LTG Wesley Clark

USUN

Ambassador Madeleine Albright

White House

Sandy Berger

NSC

Sandy Vershow
Colonel Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

Negotiations with Milosevic

1. Principals decided to recall Ambassador Frasure from Belgrade meetings with Milosevic for consultations, given the lack of progress on the mutual recognition plan and Milosevic's attempt to up the ante. They agreed that, prior to departing, Frasure should meet with Milosevic to stress (a) the need for Belgrade to be more forthcoming on a workable sanctions

reimposition mechanism in return for sanctions relief; (b) the need for Milosevic to intercede to secure UNPROFOR access in order to resupply its units in the eastern enclaves; and (c) the need for Milosevic to pledge to take action to increase security of U.S. monitors operating along the Serbian-Bosnian border in light of Bosnian-Serb threats to take U.S. personnel hostage (Action: State). ~~(S)~~

Future of U.S. ICFY Monitors

2. Principals agreed to return U.S. border monitors to duty under the following conditions: (a) they must be informed of the serious nature of the threat directed toward them, based on our intelligence information, and allowed to resign and leave if they do not want to return voluntarily; (b) Frasure should obtain the security commitment from Milosevic cited above; (c) upcoming congressional testimony about the U.S. role and policy for Bosnia should ensure that Congress is aware of the participation of U.S. civilian contractors in the ICFY border monitoring mission. A message would be sent at once to inform the head of the ICFY of our decision (Action: State). ~~(S)~~

Visit of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic

3. Principals recommended scheduling a meeting of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic with the Vice President during Silajdzic's visit to Washington June 8-14, with the option of a drop-by by the President (Action: NSC/OVP). ~~(S)~~

4. Principals also agreed that a meeting should be arranged in the near future between the Secretary of State and Muhamed Sacirbey, in his new capacity as Bosnian Foreign Minister (Action: State). ~~(C)~~

Measures to Enhance Protection for Deny Flight Missions

5. Based on a CIA assessment that the current ROE for Deny Flight might not provide adequate protection for NATO/US aircraft in light of recently demonstrated Bosnian-Serb tactics, Principals agreed that CIA will review the nature of the SAM threat in Bosnia, and OSD and JCS will then determine whether a new definition of "hostile intent" or new ROE are required for further operations (Action: CIA/JCS/OSD). ~~(S)~~

6. In the interim, Principals agreed that Deny Flight operations will continue under existing ROE (considering all of Bosnia to be a high threat area, permitting attack on SAMs demonstrating hostile intent through radar illumination of aircraft), but will seek to avoid provocative action (Action: JCS/OSD). ~~(S)~~

Response to Croat Offensive near Knin

7. Principals agreed that a strong message should be sent to Zagreb and the Croatian Ambassador to the UN urging the Croatians to exercise restraint in their ongoing offensive operations near Knin lest they provoke another major clash with the Krajina Serbs (Action: USUN/State). ~~(C)~~

U.S. Support to UNPROFOR

8. Principals reviewed the results of the Paris meeting of Defense Ministers. In this regard, they agreed to await clarification from those providing forces to the UN Rapid Reaction Force to determine the exact nature of lift, air support and equipment that the U.S. might be asked to provide (Action: USUN/OSD). They agreed in principle that the U.S. would support a UNSC resolution to be drafted by France and the UK that would use the Paris decisions as the basis for UNPROFOR reconfiguration rather than any of the four options put forward by the UN SYG (Action: USUN). ~~(C)~~

9. Principals agreed that airdrops to resupply UNPROFOR units isolated in the eastern enclaves would be a high risk option that would be unlikely to provide any long-term resolution to the problem. They agreed on the need to reassess the stocks/supplies available to the Safe Areas (Action: OVP/CIA) to provide a baseline for evaluating the requirements for resupply (Action: JCS). ~~(S)~~

10. Principals agreed on the need to resolve on an urgent basis the issue of how UNPROFOR strengthening and NATO withdrawal planning will be funded. Deputies will be asked to approve a funding strategy at their next meeting, based on proposals vetted through the Peacekeeping Core Group (Action: OMB/NSC). ~~(C)~~

Policy Coordination

11. Principals expressed concern that recent announcements of military deployments to Italy had not been adequately coordinated in advance through the interagency process or with the Government of Italy. They agreed to elevate the level of participation in the daily video teleconference (VTC) on Bosnia to the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary or equivalent and to ensure that all agencies used the VTC to inform the others of any upcoming activity relating to the former Yugoslavia (Action: NSC/State/CIA/OSD/JCS). ~~(S)~~

Congressional Consultations

12. Principals reviewed requirements for upcoming Congressional testimony on U.S. policy for Bosnia, and agreed that NSC should serve as a clearinghouse to coordinate all formal testimony and Q&A responses -- which should build on the comprehensive list developed by NSC for the President (Action: NSC/All). They agreed that a concerted effort was required to explain strong administration opposition to unilateral lift measures being introduced in both houses (Action: NSC/All). ~~(C)~~

13. They also agreed that it would be prudent to provide formal 15-day advance contingency 407 notification to Congress of our intent to assist UNPROFOR in Bosnia, in the context of ongoing briefings to Congress on NATO OPLAN 40104 and USG Bosnia policy. This notification should be broad enough to cover NATO withdrawal efforts and support for the UN Rapid Reaction Force, without using potentially provocative funding estimates unless specifically required by law (Action: State/OMB/NSC). ~~(C)~~

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, SIT:, BELL, CLARKER, DREW, HARMON, KRECZKO, LAKEA, NSC, SAUNDERS, SESTAK, STEPHENS, SUM, SUM2, VERSHBOW

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED DTG:100010Z JUN 95

FM: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5597

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0010
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2549
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1319
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2608
RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 3717
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2542
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0671
RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 2763
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 8478
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 3433
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 1656
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1308
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 1069

UNCLAS SECTION 00 OF 06 USUN NEW YORK 002343

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCLANT FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER PENNER, VIENNA FOR BOSNIA

E.O.12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: UK/FRENCH DRAFT RESOLUTION ON UNPROFOR RAPID
- REACTION FORCE

1. FOLLOWING ARE DRAFT BRITISH-FRENCH RESOLUTION ON
UNPROFOR RAPID REACTION FORCE AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS,
WHICH WERE CIRCULATED TO ALL SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS ON
JUNE 9.

2. BEGIN TEXT (1200 9 JUNE 1995):

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
A: RECALLING ALL ITS EARLIER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS,

B: HAVING CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF 30 MAY 1995 (S/1995/444),

C: HAVING CONSIDERED ALSO THE LETTER OF THE

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRETARY-GENERAL OF ... JUNE (S/.../1995),

D: DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE CONTINUING ARMED HOSTILITIES IN THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,

E: UNDERLINING ONCE AGAIN THE URGENT NEED FOR A RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT THROUGH THE POLITICAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES, AND FOR ACCEPTANCE BY THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY OF THE CONTACT GROUP PEACE PLAN AS A STARTING POINT,

F: GRAVELY CONCERNED THAT THE REGULAR OBSTRUCTION OF DELIVERIES OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, AND THE DENIAL OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND OF THE USE OF SARAJEVO AIRPORT, BY THE BOSNIAN SERB SIDE THREATEN THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA TO CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE,

G: CONDEMNING IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS ALL ATTACKS ON UNPROFOR PERSONNEL,

H: CONDEMNING THE INCREASING ATTACKS ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION BY BOSNIAN SERB FORCES,

I: DETERMINED TO ENHANCE THE PROTECTION OF UNPROFOR AND TO ENABLE IT TO CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE,

J: DETERMINING THAT THE SITUATION IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA CONTINUES TO BE A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

K: ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

-- 1. DEMANDS THAT THE BOSNIAN SERB FORCES RELEASE IMMEDIATELY ALL REMAINING DETAINED UNPROFOR PERSONNEL, AND FULLY RESPECT THE SAFETY OF UNPROFOR PERSONNEL AND OTHERS ENGAGED IN THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND THE COMPLETE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF THESE PERSONNEL;

-- 2. EMPHASIZES THAT THERE CAN BE NO MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT, STRESSES THE IMPORTANCE IT ATTACHES TO VIGOROUS PURSUIT OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AND REITERATES ITS DEMAND THAT THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY ACCEPT THE CONTACT GROUP PEACE PLAN AS A STARTING POINT;

-- 3. CALLS UPON THE PARTIES TO AGREE WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY TO A CEASEFIRE AND A COMPLETE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA;

-- 4. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES FULLY RESPECT THE SAFETY OF UNPROFOR PERSONNEL AND OTHERS ENGAGED IN THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND ALLOW THEIR UNIMPEDED ACCESS TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO ALL PARTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA;

-- 5. DEMANDS FURTHER THAT THE BOSNIAN SERB FORCES COMPLY IMMEDIATELY WITH THE AGREEMENT OF 5 JUNE 1992 (S/24075, ANNEX) AND ENSURE UNIMPEDED ACCESS BY LAND TO SARAJEVO;

-- 6. DEMANDS THAT THE PARTIES RESPECT FULLY THE STATUS OF THE SAFE AREAS AND ENSURE UNPROFOR'S UNIMPEDED ACCESS TO THE SAFE AREAS, AND IN PARTICULAR THAT THEY CEASE ATTACKS ON THE SAFE AREAS AND REFRAIN FROM LAUNCHING

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MILITARY ATTACKS THEREFROM;

-- 7. UNDERLINES THE NEED FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF THE SAFE AREAS AND ENCOURAGES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO FURTHER INTENSIFY EFFORTS AIMED AT REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE PARTIES ON MODALITIES FOR SUCH DEMILITARIZATION;

-- 8. WELCOMES THE LETTER OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF JUNE 1995 (S/.../1995) ON THE REINFORCEMENT OF UNPROFOR AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RAPID REACTION CAPACITY TO ENABLE UNPF/UNPROFOR TO CARRY OUT ITS MISSION;

-- 9. DECIDES ACCORDINGLY TO AUTHORIZE AN INCREASE IN UNPROFOR PERSONNEL, ACTING UNDER THE PRESENT MANDATE AND ON THE TERMS SET OUT IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED LETTER, BY UP TO ... ADDITIONAL TROOPS;

-- 10. AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE MEASURES REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 7 ABOVE;

-- 11. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN TAKING ANY DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF UNPROFOR PERSONNEL, TO TAKE FULL ACCOUNT OF THE NEED TO ENHANCE THEIR SECURITY AND MINIMIZE THE DANGERS TO WHICH THEY MIGHT BE EXPOSED;

-- 12. DECIDES TO REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

END TEXT.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL'S LETTER TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT DATED JUNE 9:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REFER TO THE REPORT (S/1995/444) WHICH I PRESENTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 30 MAY 1995 CONCERNING THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE (UNPROFOR) IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND OPTIONS FOR ITS FUTURE.

ON 7 JUNE 1995, A DELEGATION CONSISTING OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS FROM FRANCE, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM VISITED UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS IN NEW YORK TO CONVEY A PROPOSAL BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THOSE COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE MILITARY REINFORCEMENTS FOR UNPROFOR IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE VULNERABILITY OF ITS PERSONNEL AND TO ENHANCE ITS CAPACITY TO CARRY OUT ITS EXISTING MANDATE. AN AGREED SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSAL IS ANNEXED TO THIS LETTER.

IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECIDES TO ACCEPT THIS PROPOSAL, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR IT TO AUTHORIZE AN INCREASE IN THE CEILING FOR UNPROFOR'S STRENGTH.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, THE OVERALL AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF UNCRO, UNPREDEP AND UNPROFOR AMOUNTED ON 1 JUNE 1995 TO 44,870 ALL RANKS. THE ACTUAL CURRENT STRENGTH OF THOSE THREE FORCES AND OF THE SUPPORT ELEMENTS ASSIGNED TO UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES (UNPF) HEADQUARTERS AMOUNTED ON 1 JUNE TO ONLY SOME 40,000 ALL RANKS. HOWEVER, I HAVE ALREADY AGREED TO THE ADDITION OF A NUMBER OF SUPPORT ELEMENTS AND REINFORCEMENTS PROPOSED BY OTHER TROOP CONTRIBUTING GOVERNMENTS TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF EXISTING UNITS IN UNPROFOR. IT WOULD THUS NOT BE

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POSSIBLE TO ACCOMMODATE ANY OF THE ADDITIONAL TROOPS PROPOSED BY FRANCE, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WITHIN THE CURRENT CEILING.

THE TROOPS PROPOSED BY THOSE COUNTRIES TO PROVIDE UNPF/UNPROFOR WITH A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY AMOUNT TO ABOUT 15,000, OF WHOM 2,500 ARE ALREADY IN THEATRE. IN ORDER THEREFORE TO INCORPORATE THESE ADDITIONAL TROOPS WITHIN UNPF/UNPROFOR, THE COUNCIL WOULD NEED TO INCREASE THE AUTHORIZED TROOP LEVELS BY 12,500. THIS FIGURE INCLUDES THE 4,000 TROOPS IN THE FRENCH STANDBY BRIGADE BUT THESE WOULD NOT BE DEPLOYED UNLESS AND UNTIL THEIR PRESENCE IN THE THEATRE BECAME NECESSARY.

THE PROPOSED REINFORCEMENT OF UNPROFOR WOULD THUS BRING THE TOTAL AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA TO 57,370 ALL RANKS, MADE UP AS FOLLOWS:

-- UNPF-HQ	)	
-- THEATRE SUPPORT ELEMENTS...	)	43,530
-- UNPROFOR.....	)	
-- UNCRO.....		8,750
-- UNPREDEP.....		1,090
-- STANDBY FORCE IN FRANCE....		4,000

THE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY FRANCE, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD ADDRESS SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THE PREDICAMENT IN WHICH UNPROFOR CURRENTLY FINDS ITSELF. IT WOULD IN PARTICULAR PROVIDE THE COMMANDER OF UNPROFOR WITH WELL-ARMED AND MOBILE FORCES WITH WHICH TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO THREATS TO UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL. IT WOULD THUS REDUCE THE RISK THAT INCREASING CASUALTIES AND HARASSMENT MIGHT CAUSE THE TROOP-CONTRIBUTING GOVERNMENTS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL. BUT, AS THE COUNCIL HAS RECOGNIZED, UNPROFOR'S ABILITY TO CARRY OUT THE TASKS GIVEN TO IT BY THE COUNCIL DEPENDS TO A VERY LARGE EXTENT ON THE READINESS OF THE PARTIES TO COOPERATE WITH IT. THIS WOULD REMAIN THE CASE. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE THREE GOVERNMENTS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEIR INTENTION IS THAT THE REINFORCED UNPROFOR WOULD CONTINUE TO BE A PEACEKEEPING MISSION.

THE PROPOSED REINFORCEMENTS WOULD NOT ALTER THE FACT THAT UNPROFOR CANNOT BY ITSELF END THE WAR IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. ITS ROLE IS TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH PROGRESS CAN BE MADE TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, TO HELP IMPLEMENT AGREEMENTS THAT ARE REACHED AND TO SUPPORT EFFORTS TO RELIEVE THE HUMAN SUFFERING CREATED BY THE WAR. IT IS ESSENTIAL, THEREFORE, AS IS RECOGNIZED BY THE THREE GOVERNMENTS, THAT THE REINFORCEMENT OF UNPROFOR SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A DETERMINED EFFORT TO REVIVE THE PEACE PROCESS. IN PARTICULAR, IT REMAINS MY VIEW, AS STATED IN PARAGRAPH 67 OF MY REPORT OF 30 MAY 1995, THAT DECISIONS BY THE COUNCIL ON THE FUTURE OF UNPROFOR SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A SIGNIFICANT NEW POLITICAL INITIATIVE, POSSIBLY IN A NEW FORMAT.

IN CONSIDERING WHETHER TO RECOMMEND TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT IT ACCEPT THE PROPOSED REINFORCEMENT OF UNPROFOR, NOT WITHSTANDING THE SUBSTANTIAL COSTS AND RISKS INVOLVED, I HAVE HAD IN MIND THE FACTORS MENTIONED IN THE CLOSING PARAGRAPHS OF MY REPORT OF 30 MAY. FIRST, THERE IS THE HUMANITARIAN IMPERATIVE. DELIVERY OF RELIEF SUPPLIES HAS FOR NEARLY THREE YEARS BEEN THE MAIN FOCUS OF THE UNITED NATIONS' EFFORTS IN BOSNIA AND

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HERZEGOVINA AND A VERY GREAT DEAL HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. SECONDLY, THERE IS THE PARAMOUNT NEED, REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED BY THE COUNCIL, TO ENSURE THE SECURITY OF UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL WHO FIND THEMSELVES, I HOPE ONLY TEMPORARILY, IN A HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. AT THE SAME TIME THERE IS, THIRDLY, THE NEED TO PROTECT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND AVOID GIVING IT TASKS IT CANNOT DO OR RAISING EXPECTATIONS THAT IT CANNOT FULFILL.

ON BALANCE, AND AFTER CAREFUL REFLECTION, I BELIEVE THAT THE PROPOSED REINFORCEMENT OF UNPROFOR WILL ENHANCE THE FORCE'S ABILITY TO CONTINUE ITS HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS, WITH LESS DANGER TO ITS PERSONNEL THAN AT PRESENT, AND IT IS ON THIS BASIS THAT I RECOMMEND THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY FRANCE, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM. I WILL SHORTLY TRANSMIT TO THE COUNCIL PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF THE COST OF IMPLEMENTING THE PROPOSAL.

I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD BRING THESE MATTERS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, THE ASSURANCES OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

(SIGNED)
BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI

END TEXT.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF PROPOSED RAPID REACTION FORCE FOR UNPROFOR - SUMMARY OF A PROPOSAL BY FRANCE, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM:

THE FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES THE PRINCIPAL POINTS THAT EMERGED FROM DISCUSSIONS CONDUCTED AT UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS IN NEW YORK ON 7 JUNE 1995 ON A PROPOSED RAPID REACTION FORCE (RRF) TO BE PLACED AT THE DISPOSAL OF UNPF AND UNPROFOR.

FRANCE, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM WOULD PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING AUGMENTATION TO THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF UNPF AND UNPROFOR:

- A. A MULTINATIONAL BRIGADE CONSISTING OF TWO BATTALION GROUPS: ONE TO BE PROVIDED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE WITH AN APPROXIMATE STRENGTH OF 2,000 AND ONE TO BE BASED UPON THE CURRENT UNPROFOR RESERVE, WITH A STRENGTH OF 2,500, WHICH WILL CONSIST OF A BRITISH BATTALION GROUP INCLUDING THE RECENTLY ARRIVED ARTILLERY, AVIATION AND ENGINEER ELEMENTS FROM THE UK, AS WELL AS A MORTAR COMPANY OF MARINES INCLUDING A MORTAR LOCATING RADAR GROUP PROVIDED BY THE NETHERLANDS. THE BRIGADE TOTAL WILL BE IN THE REGION OF 4,500, OF WHOM SOME 2,500 ARE ALREADY IN THEATRE.
- B. A BRITISH AIRMOBILE BRIGADE CONSISTING OF 2 INFANTRY BATTALIONS, 2 AVIATION REGIMENTS, ENGINEERS, ARTILLERY ELEMENTS AND THE NECESSARY LOGISTIC SUPPORT, INCLUDING 800 TEMPORARY PERSONNEL, WHICH WOULD PRODUCE A TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 6,300.
- C. AN ADDITIONAL FRENCH BRIGADE, AMOUNTING TO ABOUT 4,000 TROOPS, WOULD BE PLACED ON STANDBY IN FRANCE SHOULD FURTHER REINFORCEMENT PROVE NECESSARY.

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THEIR MISSIONS COULD INCLUDE:

- EMERGENCY ACTIONS/RESPONSES TO ASSIST ISOLATED OR THREATENED UN UNITS;
- HELP REDEPLOYMENT OF ELEMENTS OF UNPROFOR;
- FACILITATE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WHERE NECESSARY.

THE DELEGATIONS OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS STATED THAT:

- THE RRF WOULD BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE EXISTING UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION (UNPF/UNPROFOR);
- IT WOULD THEREFORE REQUIRE A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION EXPANDING THE AUTHORIZED LEVELS OF THE FORCE, AND WOULD BE FINANCED THROUGH NORMAL UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING ASSESSMENTS;
- THE RRF WOULD BE UNDER THE EXISTING UN CHAIN OF COMMAND, IT WOULD OPERATE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE UN MILITARY COMMANDERS IN THE THEATRE WHO WOULD CONTINUE TO BE UNDER THE OVERALL DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE;
- THE RRF WOULD ACT IN SUPPORT OF UNPROFOR, FUNCTIONING WITHIN ITS EXISTING MANDATE;
- THE RRF WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO UNITED NATIONS MILITARY COMMANDERS FOR THE DEFENSE OF UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL; THE TASKS ASSIGNED TO IT WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE UN COMMANDERS ON THE GROUND;
- THE RRF WOULD OPERATE UNDER NATIONAL UNIFORM, UNDER THE UN FLAG AND INSIGNIA BUT WITHOUT BLUE HELMETS AND WITHOUT PAINTING ITS VEHICLES WHITE. IT WOULD OPERATE UNDER EXISTING UN RULES OF ENGAGEMENT;
- THE PURPOSES OF THE RRF WOULD BE TO GIVE THE COMMANDER A CAPACITY BETWEEN "STRONG PROTEST AND AIR STRIKES"; IT WOULD INCREASE TACTICAL OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY AND WOULD BE INTENDED TO HAVE A DETERRENT EFFECT BUT IT WOULD NOT CHANGE THE UN'S ROLE TO PEACE-ENFORCEMENT; THE STATUS OF UNPROFOR AND ITS IMPARTIALITY WOULD BE UNAFFECTED;
- ALL FORCES COULD BE DEPLOYED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE NECESSARY SECURITY COUNCIL AND HOST COUNTRY APPROVALS;
- THE THREE GOVERNMENTS RECOGNIZED THAT THE RRF WAS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR AN ENERGIZED PEACE PROCESS WORKING TOWARDS AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT.

DPKO
8 JUNE 1995

END TEXT.

5. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

ALBRIGHT

FROM:
SITREPT

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BOSNIA GUIDANCE
SATURDAY, JUNE 3, 1995
3:00PM EDT

Our policy about the use of U.S. ground forces in Bosnia is clear. We will not send ground forces into the conflict or join UNPROFOR. There are three circumstances in which we might use U.S. troops in discrete, temporary operations:


First, we would be prepared, after consulting with Congress and if asked by the parties, to use U.S. troops as part of a NATO force that would help implement a peace settlement that the parties were carrying out in good faith.

Second, if UNPROFOR decided to withdraw, after consultation with Congress and reviewing the military planning, we would participate in a NATO operation to assist in that withdrawal.

Third, in the course of that planning, a new contingency arose. That is the question of emergency movement of UNPROFOR units within Bosnia.

We are consulting with Congress about contingency planning on that issue. As a last resort, if needed -- and that is an open question because our allies in UNPROFOR have formidable capabilities themselves -- we should be prepared to assist NATO in an emergency extraction of units whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in Bosnia.

We have not been asked to do so. We think that it is unlikely that we will be asked to do so, in part because our policy on this question has created a greater sense of confidence in UNPROFOR, making it less likely it will withdraw its units.



*whose position has become
untenable to other
areas.*

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. map	Military Developments, Early June 1995. (1 page)	06/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
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Bosnia - June 1995: Early [2]

2013-0687-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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006a. memo	For Addressees. Subject: Papers in Support of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia. (3 pages)	06/06/1995	P1/b(1)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006b. paper	Military Developments in Bosnia. (4 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [2]

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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006c. paper	Air Defense. (4 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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006d. paper	The Bosnian Serbs. (3 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [2]

2013-0687-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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006e. paper	UNPROFOR: European Contributors. (5 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006f. paper	Humanitarian Update. (2 pages)	06/05/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [2]

2013-0687-F
vz2710

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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**POLICY STATEMENT:
BOSNIA**

U.S. Policy for Bosnia: Our current policy reflects a coherent multi-pronged approach to our objectives:

- Our ultimate goal is to achieve a negotiated end to the conflict based on the plan developed by the Contact Group (U.S., Russia, France, UK and Germany). That plan would preserve Bosnia's political independence and territorial integrity, providing for a reasonable division of territory among its ethnic groups;
- To put pressure on the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the Contact Group plan already accepted by the other parties, we are, with the consent of the Bosnian government, negotiating with Serbian President Milosevic to obtain his recognition of Bosnia and Croatia and a tightening of his cut-off of support for the Bosnian Serbs in return for gradual sanctions relief for Serbia;
- To help prevent an explosion of fighting that would result in a resumption of all-out war, increasing casualties and humanitarian suffering while ending the prospect for a negotiated settlement, we support continuation of UNPROFOR's mission. Toward that end, we are:
 - supporting efforts of the troop contributing nations in the UN, short of providing our own ground forces, to reinvigorate that mission so that it can fulfill its mandate, most notably through creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF);
 - working with our NATO allies to bolster the confidence of those with forces on the ground by ensuring that, should the position of UNPROFOR become untenable, an adequate plan and forces are available to relocate or withdraw trapped units; and
 - continuing to provide support for NATO Deny Flight and Close Air Support missions to protect those on the ground.
- We are taking additional steps to support the Bosnian Federation, which has helped end the fighting in central Bosnia, promoted reconciliation among Bosnia's Muslims and Croats, and improved the prospects for an overall settlement; and
- We are continuing to work for a renewal of the cessation of hostilities agreement in order to establish the conditions under which a negotiated settlement becomes more likely.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. memo	For the President from Anthony Lake. Subject: Drop-By on the Vice President's Meeting with Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic. Record ID: 9504430. (6 pages)	06/09/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [2]

2013-0687-F
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~~SECRET~~

4430

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 8, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: NELSON DREW *ND*
SUBJECT: Presidential Drop-by at Meeting of the Vice
President with Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President forwarding a background paper and talking points for his use during his drop-by on the Vice President's meeting with Prime Minister Silajdzic.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Talking Points
Tab B Biography

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *VZ* NARA, Date *7/2/2014*
2013-0687-F

Attachments may have
been edited for format
by Exec Sec

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR