

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [1]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

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897

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V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	For Sandy Berger from Nelson Drew. Subject: June 13 Deputies Meeting on Bosnia. Record ID: 9520755. (5 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)
001b. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, June 13, 1995. Record ID: 9520753. (1 page)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. cable	re: June 12 Resolution on Proposed Force. (2 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)
002. talking points	Chirac Meeting: Revised Points on Bosnia. Record ID: 9504558. (3 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)
003. draft	Chirac Meeting: Revised Points on Bosnia. Record ID: 9504558. (3 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)
004. draft	Agenda: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, June 13, 1995. Record ID: 9520753. (1 page)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)
005. cable	re: Smith: Status Quo Minus. (2 pages)	06/11/1995	P1/b(1)
006. cable	re: Guidance for 06/12. (5 pages)	06/11/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2709

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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001b. agenda	Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, June 13, 1995. Record ID: 9520753. (1 page)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)
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10:21 AM *US MISSION *POLSEC*
 JUN 13 1995

SENT BY: UN NYK HQ

: 0-12-85 : 22:18 :

2128634213-

84154418: 1/3

UNITED
NATIONS

S SS
WBW



Security Council

PROVISIONAL

S/1995/478
12 June 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

France and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions,

Reaffirming the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) as referred to in Resolution 981 (1995) of 11 March 1995 and the need for its full implementation,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 30 May 1995 (S/1995/444),

Having considered also the letter of the Secretary-General of 9 June 1995 and its annex (S/1995/470 and Add.1),

Noting that the rapid reaction force referred to in the above-mentioned letter will be an integral part of the existing United Nations peace-keeping operation, and that the status of UNPROFOR and its impartiality will be maintained,

Deeply concerned by the continuing armed hostilities in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Expressing its deep regret that the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has continued to deteriorate and that the parties were not able to agree to a further cease-fire following the breakdown of the cease-fire agreement of 21 December 1994 (S/1995/8) and its subsequent expiration on 1 May 1995,

Gravely concerned that the regular obstruction of deliveries of humanitarian assistance, and the denial of the use of Sarajevo airport, by the Bosnian Serb side threaten the ability of the United Nations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to carry out its mandate,

Condemning in the strongest possible terms all attacks by the parties on UNPROFOR personnel,

06. 13. 95 10:21 AM

*US MISSION *FOLSEC*

PO3

SENT BY: UN NYK HQ

; 6-12-85 ; 22:16 ;

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84104410:8 2

S/1995/478

English

Page 2

Condemning the increasing attacks on the civilian population by Bosnian Serb forces,

Determined to enhance the protection of UNPROFOR and to enable it to carry out its mandate,

Noting the letter of June 1995 (S/1995/...) from the Foreign Minister of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina welcoming the reinforcement of UNPROFOR,

Underlining once again the urgent need for acceptance by the Bosnian Serb party of the Contact Group peace plan as a starting point, opening the way to the negotiation of an overall peaceful settlement.

Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Reaffirming further that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a State Member of the United Nations, enjoys the rights provided for in the Charter of the United Nations,

Determining that the situation in the former Yugoslavia continues to be a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Demands that the Bosnian Serb forces release immediately and unconditionally all remaining detained UNPROFOR personnel, and further demands that all parties fully respect the safety of UNPROFOR personnel, and others engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and ensure their complete freedom of movement;

2. Emphasizes that there can be no military solution to the conflict, stresses the importance it attaches to vigorous pursuit of a political settlement, and reiterates its demand that the Bosnian Serb party accept the Contact Group peace plan as a starting point;

3. Calls upon the parties to agree without further delay to a cease-fire and a complete cessation of hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

4. Demands that all parties allow unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance to all parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in particular, to the safe areas;

5. Demands further that the Bosnian Serb forces comply immediately with the agreement of 5 June 1992 (S/24075, annex) and ensure unimpeded access by land to Sarajevo;

6. Demands that the parties respect fully the status of the safe areas and in particular the need to ensure the safety of the civilian population therein;

/...

7. Underlines the need for mutually agreed demilitarisation of the safe areas and the benefits this would bring to all parties, in terms of the cessation of attacks on the safe areas and of launching military attacks therefrom;

8. Encourages, in this context, the Secretary-General further to intensify efforts aimed at reaching agreement with the parties on the modalities for demilitarization, including its geographical scope, taking particular account of the need to ensure the safety of the civilian population, and calls upon the parties to cooperate fully with these efforts;

9. Welcomes the letter of the Secretary-General of 9 June 1995 on the reinforcement of UNPROFOR and the establishment of a rapid reaction capacity to enable the United Nations Peace Forces/UNPROFOR to carry out its mandate;

10. Decides accordingly to authorise an increase in UNPROFOR personnel, acting under the present mandate and on the terms set out in the above-mentioned letter, by up to 12,500 additional troops;

11. Authorises the Secretary-General to carry forward the implementation of paragraphs 9 and 10 above, maintaining close contact with the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

12. Requests the Secretary-General, in taking any decisions with respect to the deployment of UNPROFOR personnel, to take full account of the need to enhance their security and minimise the dangers to which they might be exposed;

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 12, 1995

MEMORANDUM TO: THE DEPUTIES COMMITTEE

FROM: The Peacekeeping Core Group

SUBJECT: Paying for Expanded UN Operations in Bosnia

The PCG proposes the following policy on the issue of the funding the expansion of UN operations in Bosnia:

1. The US will support the expansion of UN forces in and around Bosnia by approximately 10,000 forces, which will be under UN command and for which costs will be assessed as a UN operation.
2. Toward that end, the US will support a Security Council resolution to increase the ceiling of the peacekeeping force as necessary (the ceiling needs to be increased by 6000 to permit an addition to the force of 10,000).
3. The US will assist the expanded force by providing lift, equipment and support for that equipment, on a reimbursable basis with the UN. The US will also provide intelligence and close air support on a non-reimbursable basis.
4. The assessed cost to the US of the expanded UN force will be assumed by the State Department (150 account CIPA funds). Although the cost for the expanded UN force is not certain yet, it may exceed \$150 million per year above the cost of the previously existing force. There are currently no funds in FY95 of FY96 to cover this expense. State will, however, consult with Congress about ways in which to appropriate such funds.

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U.S. Suggested Changes to UK/French Draft Resolution

Redraft Operative paragraphs 6 and 7 as follows:

6. Demands that the parties respect fully the status of the safe areas and ensure UNPROFOR's unimpeded access to the safe areas, and in particular that they cease attacks on the safe areas and refrain from initiating military attacks therefrom;

7. Underlines the benefit of demilitarization of the safe areas and encourages the Secretary General to further intensify efforts aimed at reaching agreement with the parties on modalities and the territorial extent of such demilitarization;

U.S. Views on the changes proposed by the Russian Federation is as follows:

preambular e: we can accept everything up to "23 December 1994 (S/1995/8)". We can not accept the last phrase.

preambular i and j: We can not accept either.

operative 1: We can accept the compromise suggested by Ambassador Hannay. The paragraph should make clear that the Bosnian Serbs are responsible for blockading or detaining UNPROFOR personnel.

operative 6: Might be able to accept mentioning both the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government.

operative 7 bis: We can not accept.

operative 7 terr: We do not want to go beyond "notes the SYG's report".

operative 8 bis: We believe this paragraph is not necessary.

**REPORT TO CONGRESS OF POSSIBLE PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN SUPPORT OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION**

Pursuant to section 407(a)(5) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994-1995, P.L. 103-236, this report provides notification of the possibility that the United States may provide assistance to the United Nations in support of its peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia.

As was briefed to certain members and staff on March 20 and April 21, the Administration has authorized the prepositioning in Croatia of 20 U.S. military communicators as part of a NATO group of 80 persons. Our senior military commanders recommended this action as an essential step to ensure that a communications network is in place to support NATO should a decision be made to assist in the withdrawal of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) from Bosnia. The Department of Defense has informed us that the cost of sustaining these 20 communicators and associated equipment in Croatia for a period of six months will not exceed one million dollars. The cost of this prepositioning did not, therefore, pass the formal notification threshold. The U.S. expense for this deployment will be borne by the Department of Defense.

NATO planning also calls for a follow-on precautionary prepositioning in Croatia of about 1,500 communicators and support staff, of which it is anticipated the U.S. would provide approximately 460 persons. The purpose of this step is to complete the preparations for the communications network begun by the earlier group of 80 persons, to be ready to be used should the decision be made for NATO assistance in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. The decision to deploy the 1500-person group has not yet been taken. We are discussing with our NATO allies how the full cost of the predeployment is to be shared. We are not seeking reimbursement from the UN. We anticipate that the costs to the U.S. government will exceed the notification threshold of \$3 million.

These precautionary steps do not represent any change in the U.S. position that UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia. Prudent planning to ensure the efficient and safe withdrawal of UNPROFOR, if necessary, can help convince troop contributors to maintain their commitment to UNPROFOR. NATO's military authorities advise that this prepositioning is essential to maintaining NATO command and control over a withdrawal operation.

A subsequent message will provide notification of other possible U.S. steps to provide assistance to UN peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia, in light of recent developments.

George F. Ward, Jr.
Acting Assistant Secretary
International Organization Affairs

June 9, 1995

**REPORT TO CONGRESS OF POSSIBLE PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN SUPPORT OF A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION**

Pursuant to section 407 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994-1995, P.L. 103-236, this report provides notification of the possibility that the United States may provide assistance to the United Nations to support peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. This could include assistance in connection with either a withdrawal of UN related personnel from Bosnia, or an emergency extraction of UNPROFOR units from positions which have become untenable to positions elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia which are safe, or the establishment of a rapid reaction force.

The Administration has previously discussed possible assistance to UNPROFOR with certain members and staff of the designated Congressional committees in phone calls on March 20, April 21, and May 29. Staff were also briefed on March 31 and Members on May 19 and May 26. We are submitting a separate notification with respect to prepositioning of communicators and support staff in Croatia as a precautionary step in case withdrawal became necessary.

NATO planning for a possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR calls in addition for early action involving training and exercises, preparations for a possible deployment of NATO forces, and acquisition of communications equipment which would be NATO owned, but which could be used in a possible evacuation of UN forces. We are discussing with our NATO allies how the full cost of the predeployment is to be shared. We are not seeking reimbursement. We anticipate that the costs to the U.S. Government will exceed the notification threshold of \$3 million.

As was made clear in the briefings on May 19 and 26, and in the statement released after the May 29 meeting of the Contact Group, the Administration strongly supports UNPROFOR's continued operation in Bosnia. No final decision has been made on U.S. participation in a withdrawal, beyond the initial deployment of 20 personnel. The President informed our Allies last December, however, that the U.S. is prepared, in principle, to commit U.S. ground forces to a NATO operation to assist UN Peace Forces to withdraw from the former Yugoslavia if the UN decides that it can no longer perform its mission and requests NATO's help in withdrawing, and if the North Atlantic Council approves acting on the UN request. This action would also extend to helping in an emergency extraction of UN Peace Forces from positions which have become untenable to positions of safety within the former Yugoslavia.

-2-

Should an UNPROFOR withdrawal or partial withdrawal be necessary, a deployment in which the U.S. would provide a substantial number of troops and other assistance could be authorized. We are discussing with our NATO allies how this cost would be shared. We are also discussing within the Administration how the U.S. will fund its share of the operation.

We have also joined the Contact Group call for a reinforced UNPROFOR. While we do not contemplate any new U.S. role in UNPROFOR, we might join and assist in a NATO effort, if requested, to make UNPROFOR more robust and more defensible.

Our allies in NATO, and in particular France and Britain, which already have troops on the ground in Bosnia and some of whose peacekeeping forces have been taken hostage by the Bosnian Serbs, have proposed the creation of a rapid reaction force that would protect and support the peacekeepers. At this time, it is contemplated that the force would be authorized as part of UNPROFOR by the Security Council in a resolution. The U.S. is prepared to provide appropriate assistance and support, short of ground forces, for such a force. This could logically include, for example, close air support to assist in the defense of the force; transfer or loan of equipment, including attack helicopters, radars, communications gear and night vision equipment; airlift support to move forces and equipment to the theater of operation; and provision of intelligence to local commanders. The modalities for creating and deploying such a force are at a formative stage, and we are now discussing this matter within NATO and bilaterally. At this time, until we have determined the precise elements of the support and the terms on which it would be provided, a reliable estimate of its cost is not available.

The Administration intends to continue to consult with the Congress on assistance to UN peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia. As the situation develops, we will provide the Congress with more detailed information about U.S. assistance and support through consultations and the monthly reports submitted under section 407.

George F. Ward, Jr.
Acting Assistant Secretary
International Organization Affairs

RESOLVED, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This resolution may be cited as the Authorization for Use of Military Force in Support of the Withdrawal or Extraction of United Nations Forces from Bosnia and Hercegovina and from Croatia Resolution".

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

(a) Authorization.--The President is authorized, subject to subsection (b), to use United States armed forces for the purpose of assisting in--

(1) the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces and other United Nations personnel from Bosnia and Hercegovina and Croatia; or

(2) the rescue or extraction of UNPROFOR forces and other United Nations personnel units or personnel from exigent circumstances that threaten their safety in Bosnia and Hercegovina and Croatia.

(b) Limitation.--

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the authorization contained in subsection (a) shall apply only if--

(A) command and control arrangements under which United States forces are to operate call for such forces to be under NATO command and control arrangements, and not under the command and control of any United Nations forces;

(B) United States forces are to operate under effective rules of engagement, and to be of sufficient size and strength to enable them to accomplish their mission with a minimum of risk;

(C) the primary mission of such forces is the withdrawal or extraction of personnel rather than military equipment; and

(D) the President certifies to the Congress that, upon the withdrawal of the forces of other nations from Bosnia and Hercegovina, he intends to press such other nations to support the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia and Hercegovina.

(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to the extent that the President considers, and so reports to the Congress in accordance with section 3(a), that its application would interfere with his responsibilities under the Constitution of the United States, including his responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive.

SEC. 3. REPORT TO CONGRESS.

(a) Prior Report.--

(1) Prior to the use of United States armed forces under the authority of section 2, the President shall submit to the Congress a report summarizing--

(A) summarizing the status of efforts to withdraw or extract United Nations forces from Bosnia and Hercegovina and from Croatia; and

(B) in cases in which the President considers that the application of the limitations described in section 2(b) would interfere with his responsibilities under the Constitution of the United States, the reasons for this conclusion.

(b) Form of Reports.--In any case in which the President considers that exceptional circumstances prevent him from filing the report required under subsection (a) prior to the use of United States armed forces under the authority of section 2, the President shall submit the report no later than three days after the use of such forces.

(c) Subsequent Reports.--Every sixty days after United States armed such forces are deployed under section 2, and for the duration of any such deployment, the President shall submit to Congress additional reports summarizing the status of efforts to withdraw or extract United Nations forces from Bosnia and Hercegovina and from Croatia.

(d) Form of Reports.--Any reports submitted under this Resolution may be submitted in classified or unclassified form.

SEC. 4. OTHER AUTHORITIES.

The authority provided in this Resolution is in addition to any authority that may be available to the President, including his authority as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive under Constitution of the United States.

06-13-95 11:12AM

TO 96472762

P002/007

08/08/98 FRI 14:36 PAZ

2003

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DISCUSSION DRAFT

S.L.C.

104TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION**S. J. RES.** _____

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. DOLZ introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on _____

JOINT RESOLUTION

Authorizing use of the Armed Forces of the United States to assist in the complete withdrawal of United Nations forces from [Bosnia and Herzegovina] [Bosnia^{and} Herzegovina, and Croatia].

Whereas according to United Nations Security Council Resolution 743, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established in February 1992 and was authorized under chapter VI of the United Nations Charter to use only peaceful means (1) to supervise the withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army from Croatia and the demilitarization of certain areas of Croatia, (2) to assist in the repatriation of those displaced by fighting in such areas, and (3) to monitor respect for human rights in such areas;

06-13-95 11:12AM

TO 96472762

P003/007

09/95 FRI 14:36 FAX

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DISCUSSION DRAFT

S.L.C.

2

Whereas according to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 758, 761, 770, 776, 786, 807, 815, 819, 836, 844, 847, 869, 870, 871, 908, 947, 959, and 982, the United Nations Security Council extended UNPROFOR's mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and further mandated under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter that the mission (1) enable and protect the delivery of humanitarian aid, (2) use measures as deemed necessary, including air power provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deter attacks upon the six United Nations designated safe areas, (3) ensure the security of Sarajevo airport, and (4) create an environment amenable to peace negotiations;

[Whereas according to United Nations Security Council Resolution 981, the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) Mission was established in March 1995 in Croatia and was authorized under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to monitor Croatia's international borders and the internal cease-fire line;]

[Whereas UNPROFOR [and UNCRO] has [have] been unable to fulfill its [their] mandates as directed by the United Nations Security Council;]

Whereas UNPROFOR's [and UNCRO's] inability to fulfill its [their] mandates demonstrates the wisdom of withdrawing those forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina [and Croatia] as soon as practicable;

Whereas on December 8, 1994, the United States Government announced its readiness to assist in the evacuation of United Nations troops from Bosnia and Herzegovina [and Croatia]; and

6/09/98 FRI 14:37 FAX

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DISCUSSION DRAFT

J.L.C.

3

Whereas on May 31, 1995, President Clinton declared that "the United States should be prepared to assist" in the "withdrawal or reconfiguration and strengthening" of United Nations troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Now, therefore, be it

1 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*
2 *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This resolution may be cited as the "Authorization
5 for Use of Military Force in Support of the Withdrawal
6 of the United Nations Forces from [Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina] [Bosnia^{and} Herzegovina, and Croatia]".

8 **SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF UNITED STATES**
9 **ARMED FORCES.**

10 (a) **AUTHORIZATION.**—Subject to subsection (b), the
11 President is authorized, if requested by the North Atlantic
12 Treaty Organization (NATO) and if necessary for the
13 safety and success of the operation, to use the Armed
14 Forces of the United States for the purpose of assisting
15 in the complete withdrawal of United Nations forces from
16 the territory of [Bosnia and Herzegovina] [Bosnia^{and}
17 Herzegovina, and Croatia].

18 (b) **REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION ON THE**
19 **USE OF MILITARY FORCE.**—Before exercising the author-
20 ity granted in subsection (a), the President shall make
21 available to the President pro tempore of the Senate and

06-13-95 11:12AM

TO 96472762

P005/007

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DISCUSSION DRAFT

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1 the Speaker of the House of Representatives his deter-
2 mination that—

3 (1) the entire withdrawal operation will be con-
4 ducted under unified NATO command subordinating
5 any United Nations forces under NATO command;

6 (2) the NATO rules of engagement for the
7 withdrawal operation specifically provide for massive,
8 disproportionate retaliation for any attack on the
9 Armed Forces of the United States;

10 (3) the primary mission of the withdrawal oper-
11 ation is the extraction of soldiers and that the
12 Armed Forces of the United States will not be en-
13 dangered in efforts to remove military equipment in
14 a hostile environment; and

15 (4) the United States Government has made a
16 formal request to the governments of the other na-
17 tions whose armed forces are participating in or
18 being evacuated under the withdrawal operation to
19 cease participation in the arms embargo of [Bosnia
20 and Herzegovina] [Bosnia^{and} Herzegovina, and Cro-
21 atia] upon completion of the withdrawal operation.

22 [(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-
23 tion shall be interpreted as authorizing the use of the
24 Armed Forces of the United States for reconfiguration or
25 redeployment of United Nations forces for any purpose

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DISCUSSION DRAFT

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1 other than the complete withdrawal of United Nations
2 forces from the territory of [Bosnia and Herzegovina]
3 [Bosnia^{and} Herzegovina, and Croatia].]
4 [SEC. 3. TERMINATION OF ARMS EMBARGO.

5 (a) TERMINATION.—The President shall terminate
6 the United States arms embargo of the Government of
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina [and the Government of Cro-
8 atia] upon the completion of the withdrawal of United Na-
9 tions forces from [Bosnia and Herzegovina] [Bosnia^{and}
10 Herzegovina, and Croatia].

11 (b) DEFINITION.—As used in this section, the term
12 "United States arms embargo of the Government of
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina [and the Government of Cro-
14 atia]" means the application to the Government of Bosnia
15 and Herzegovina [and the Government of Croatia] of—

16 (1) the policy adopted July 10, 1991, and pub-
17 lished in the Federal Register of July 19, 1991 (58
18 FR 33322) under the heading "Suspension of Muni-
19 tions Export Licenses to Yugoslavia"; and

20 (2) any similar policy being applied by the
21 United States Government as of the date of comple-
22 tion of withdrawal of United Nations forces from
23 [Bosnia and Herzegovina] [Bosnia^{and} Herzegovina,
24 and Croatia] pursuant to which approval is denied

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DISCUSSION DRAFT

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1 for transfers of defense articles and defense services
2 to the former Yugoslavia.]

3 SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

4 (a) REQUIREMENTS.—Prior to the use of the Armed
5 Forces of the United States for the purposes authorized
6 in section 2(a), and every 30 days after submitting a re-
7 port under this section, the President shall submit to Con-
8 gress a report containing a summary of the status of ef-
9 forts to withdraw United Nations troops from [Bosnia
10 and Herzegovina] [Bosnia^{and} Herzegovina, and Croatia].

11 [(b) CONTENT.—Each report under subsection (a)
12 shall include the status of measures being taken to cease
13 participation in the arms embargo on [Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina] [Bosnia^{and} Herzegovina, and Croatia] by the
15 nations whose armed forces are participating in or being
16 evacuated under the withdrawal operation, pursuant to the
17 formal request made by the United States Government.]

18 SEC. 5. FUNDING.

19 TO BE SUPPLIED

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. talking points	Chirac Meeting: Revised Points on Bosnia. Record ID: 9504558. (3 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2709

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. draft	Chirac Meeting: Revised Points on Bosnia. Record ID: 9504558. (3 pages)	06/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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BOSNIA

Senator Dole's Questions for SecDef's June 7 Hearings

Q. What is U.S. policy today. Is it to help strengthen and reconfigure UN forces, or is it to assist in "emergency extraction?"

Strengthening and reconfiguring UN forces should preclude emergency extraction.

Q. What is the difference between reconfiguring forces and emergency extraction?

Most, and we hope all, of UNPROFOR can be strengthened without emergency military action--extraction or reconfiguration--of any unit.

Q. What is the difference between emergency extraction and total UN withdrawal?

An emergency extraction could be conducted with NATO's immediate assistance for some UNPROFOR units when implementation of the full opplan is not required .

Q. Would such an extraction be a prelude to full withdrawal?

Not necessarily.

Q. What is the NATO-UN relationship?

NATO would have operational command and assist UN forces in event of full withdrawal.

Q. When does NATO command begin? How far does it extend -- to all air and ground forces in Bosnia?

While NATO's military and political leadership have yet to determine the final details of the transfer of authority (TOA) to NATO, U.S. policy is that TOA would be effected at the very start of any withdrawal operation requiring NATO's assistance--it would be led by NATO, under NATO ROE, and NATO command would be in effect throughout the theater.

Q. What is the command structure and its relationship with UN commanders?

UN commanders would be subordinate to NATO commanders.

Q. What are the ROE? Are they robust?

NATO would set the ROE.

Q. What are the threats to our forces? How will they be addressed?

All threats great or small will be addressed with appropriate force.

Q. What is the estimated duration of the operation?

General Shalikashvili can give you the planning time--the exact time would depend on circumstances.

Q. If the duration is lengthy, is this because of demands by UNPROFOR contributors to take all of their equipment -- not just lethal equipment? And will U.S. lives be risked to save equipment?

The plan has sufficient flexibility to take the equipment or leave it behind. U.S. lives would not be risked to save equipment.

Q. With respect to emergency extraction operations, how are the terms "limited" and "temporary" defined?

The U.S. would not become UNPROFOR's transportation service of first resort. We would become involved only in emergency situations to complete a very specific task and would withdraw immediately from Bosnia upon completion of that task.

Q. What will be the U.S. role in UN decisions which could lead to such emergencies, for example if Bosnian Serbs retaliate for an UNPROFOR action by overrunning Gorazde?

Gorazde is an exclusion zone. There are British UNPROFOR troops in Gorazde. The UN and NATO have long-standing policies on enforcing exclusion

zones and on providing CAS to UNPROFOR if requested to do so. The U.S. remains willing to participate in NATO operations as requested by the UN.

Q. What actions will NATO take to suppress the threats posed by surface to air missiles? When will such action be taken?

If our aircraft are illuminated by SAM fire control radar over Bosnia, our engaged pilots are authorized to act in self-defense and attack those SAM sites.

Q. What is the diplomatic strategy with respect to Serbian president Milosevic? Are we sure there is a split between Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic, or is Milosevic playing good cop and Karadzic bad cop? If there is a split how do we explain Milosevic's role in releasing some of the UN hostages? Has Milosevic been promised anything in return for his assistance in securing the release of hostages?

These questions are primarily within the purview of the Department of State. We believe there is considerable bad blood between those two dictators, but both derive benefit from releasing some hostages while Pale continues to hold on to the great majority.

Q. Are we going to agree to lift most sanctions on Serbia in return for recognition of Bosnia and what does recognition mean -- really closing the borders and cutting off supplies and military contact with the Bosnian Serbs?

We have not been able to come to closure with Milosevic for precisely that reason, i.e., we continue to insist on a prompt and effective mechanism for reimposing sanctions in the event Milosevic were to go back on his word.

Q. If we lift sanctions on Serbia now, how do we maintain any leverage over Serbian actions against the Albanians in Kosovo and Serbian support for militant separatists in Croatia?

On Kosovo, we have the December 1992 warning, which this Administration has reiterated. On the Krajina Serbs, we expect UNCRO to monitor the degree of support -- especially military -- rendered by Serbia. The UNSC would be able to address the problem if/when it surfaces.

(2) TALKING POINTS ON ~~THE~~ UNPROFOR FUNDING

2. in advance of vote on unprofor expansion resolution, usun should draw on the following points with key permreps, and other action addressees with appropriate host-government officials, explaining our support for the rapid reaction force but our concern over the unprofor [and other peacekeeping operations] funding problem this expansion intensifies:

o the U.S. supports the establishment of a rapid reaction force within unprofor and will materially support it.

o with the deployment of the rapid reaction force, unprofor should be in a better position to fulfill its mandate. it is vital that unprofor remain, and remain effective, in bosnia.

o without diminishing our political and material support for the rapid reaction force, we must make it clear that we cannot pay the increased costs we would be assessed were this funded under the normal un peacekeeping scale of assessments.

o put simply, unprofor -- as far and away the largest and most expensive item in the peacekeeping budget -- has already strained our ability to pay to the breaking point. the additional cost would break the bank.

o we must re-examine urgently the way unprofor is funded and come up with a revised funding plan. in that way, we will be better able to rationalize payments, make our case to congress, and maximize our ability to meet our obligations in a timely matter.

o we want to make it clear that our concern about funding rests on our support for unprofor and our belief that it must continue. but without adequate funding arrangements for unprofor, political support will not be sufficient to ensure the force's survival.

**UNITED
NATIONS****SECURITY COUNCIL**Distr.
GENERALS/1995/470/Add.1
15 June 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 JUNE 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Addendum

1. In reference to my letter dated 9 June 1995 (S/1995/470), I wish to inform the Council that the estimated costs for an increase in the troop level of UNPROFOR by 12,500 contingent personnel is \$414.3 million for a 6 month period. This estimate provides also for approximately 35 international civilian staff, 363 locally recruited staff and 406 United Nations Volunteers.

2. As I had indicated, 4,000 troops in the French stand-by brigade will not be deployed unless and until their presence in the theater became necessary. Taking this into consideration, the estimated cost of the deployment of the first 8,500 contingent personnel and the civilian support staff for the 6-month period would amount to \$304.4 million.

/...

S/1995/470/Add.1

English

Page 2

3. A breakdown of the estimated financial requirements for the increases is provided by main categories of expenditure, for information purposes, in the annex to the present addendum. Should the Security Council decide to authorize the reinforcement of UNPROFOR with the rapid reaction capability, it would be my recommendation to the General Assembly that the costs relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States should be credited to the UNPROFOR special account.

/...

S/1995/470/Add.1
English
Page 3

ANNEX

Cost estimate of the additional costs to the United Nations
relating to the proposed activities of UNPROFOR

(Thousands of United States dollars)

		<u>Initial six months</u>		
		<u>Strength</u> <u>8 500</u>	<u>Strength</u> <u>4 000</u>	<u>Strength</u> <u>12 500</u>
1.	Military personnel costs	103 260.1	53 593.0	156 853.1
2.	Civilian personnel costs	7 499.8	-	7 489.8
3.	Premises/accommodation	53 652.8	6 394.8	60 047.6
4.	Infrastructure repairs	1 500.0	-	1 500.0
5.	Transport operations	23 458.7	10 164.1	33 622.8
6.	Air operations	57 108.1	28 800.0	85 908.1
7.	Naval operations	-	-	-
8.	Communications	9 546.2	1 027.3	10 573.5
9.	Other equipment	25 552.5	-	25 552.5
10.	Supplies and services	8 608.9	4 051.2	12 660.1
11.	Election-related supplies and services	-	-	-
12.	Public information programmes	300.0	-	300.0
13.	Training programmes	-	-	-
14.	Mine-clearing programmes	450.0	-	450.0
15.	Assistance for disarmament and demobilization	-	-	-
16.	Air and surface freight	12 512.0	5 888.0	18 400.0
17.	Integrated Management Information System	-	-	-
18.	Support account for peace-keeping operations	411.2	-	411.2
19.	Staff assessment	<u>560.2</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>560.2</u>
	Total	<u>304 421.2</u>	<u>109 918.4</u>	<u>414 339.6</u>

CMG

20 University Road
Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Tel (617) 354-5444 Fax (617) 354-8467

Conflict Management Group

June 8, 1995

To: Col. Nelson Drew, NSC, FAX: 202-456-9150

From: Roger Fisher and Keith Fitzgerald 

Re: The "two union" plan for The Former Yugoslavia

REPORT

1. Following telephone discussions with you and others, we flew to Geneva on the evening of June 2nd and back to Boston on June 7 without going to Belgrade or Bosnia. The attached statement puts in written form the kind of semi-public explanation that we are making to our colleagues and others.
2. After a series of poorly explained delays, we were scheduled to fly to Belgrade with Dragan Hajdukovic the morning of June 7th to talk with Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the Bosnian Serbs and, if things look reasonably safe and appropriate, drive with him to Pale. At the last minute it appeared that for some reason or other our Greece-connected financial sponsors did not want us to make the trip at that time. Rather than go against their apparent wishes or wait another day for a possible change in the situation, we decided to come back and meet other engagements in the States. Hajdukovic we know, and Buha we believe, were seriously disappointed.
3. Attached is the latest text of our proposed letter to leaders and of the two-union plan as of June 7.
4. In Geneva we met with Thorvald Stoltenberg, who reviewed that letter and plan. He commented on it and on those whom he thought would like it and those whom he thought would probably not. He took the plan as a more serious possibility than we expected, and in no way sought to discourage us from going ahead. He gave his view as being that no promising negotiations over the future of The Former Yugoslavia were underway.

DISCUSSION

1. We were told by Hajdukovic (apparently based on what Buha was telling him) that proposing the two-union plan to the parties was urgent in order to pre-empt an impending merger (perhaps as soon as the end of June) between Bosnian Serbs and Croat Serbs into a declared new single state for which they would fight and die. Croatia would surely fight to prevent such a state and there would be a major escalation of the war, difficult if not impossible to stop.
2. We were informed by others that a major weapons build-up has been proceeding on all sides looking toward a major Balkan war that would extend beyond The Former Yugoslavia. Perhaps starting with Kosovo, a major war, starting within five to eight months, was predicted to involve Macedonia, Greece, Hungary, and others. We heard from a source friendly to Croatia that Croatia is preparing to launch a major offensive in order to force the war further south.
3. The goal of proposing the two-union plan would be to start a fresh second-track negotiation over the political future of The Former Yugoslavia (one which could be seen as having something for everyone and being better for them than the present situation) while having the international community continue to cope with the ongoing situation on the ground.
4. We may go ahead and FAX our letter in the near future from Cambridge to the eight regional leaders.
5. We were unable to have open and extended discussions with the Greece-connected financial sponsors of our trip to Geneva, and they were not disclosing everything to us. Spyridon Aspiotis is said to have "more Greek ships than Onasis ever had," to be a good friend of Papandreou, and to have spent at least a couple of hours last January with President Clinton. His friend and sometimes business partner, Joseph Modal, is, I believe, a U.S. citizen born in Hungary with residence in Greece, with some Croatian family connections, who has lived in Croatia much of his life, and who indicates that he is in close and frequent contact with Franjo Tudjman. We have no reason to doubt his statements that they have multi-million (multi-billion?) dollar investments in The Former Yugoslavia and five multi-million dollar ships currently under construction in Croatia, and that an interest of theirs is peace (during which, in addition to all its other benefits, they could presumably make more money.) Joseph Modal told us that they had close connections with the U.S. Government and had acted on behalf of the U.S. in dealing with Libya (over those accused of the Pan-Am bombing) and with Iran and Iraq. He said that they had spent more than eight million dollars for their efforts in Libya for which they were still waiting for reimbursement from the U.S.

6. We have been led to believe that Aleksa Buha, the Bosnian Serb "Foreign Minister" is a relative dove within the ranks of the Bosnian Serb leadership. Dragan Hajdukovic has apparently kept Buha informed about our work on the two-union plan. We have been told by Hajdukovic that our working on the plan with Buha and others could increase the chance of averting the apparently imminent declaration of a single State by Bosnian and Croatian Serbs. We would like to invite Buha and Hajdukovic to the States to work together and establish the kind of personal relationship with Buha that we were unable to on this last trip. Our invitation would be either from the Harvard Negotiation Project (a part of Harvard University) or from Conflict Management Group (a non-profit firm based in Cambridge).

7. Would it be possible to arrange a visa for Professor Aleksa BUHA? Some additional data is attached.

8. With respect to the potential of the two-union plan to form a basis for useful negotiations, even among the Bosnian Government and others who will not "accept" it, someone there might want to talk with Stoltenberg.

Reactions, suggestions, and advice welcomed but not required.

MEMO FOR THE BOSNIA FILE

8 June 1995

Roger Fisher and Keith Fitzgerald were invited to Geneva by Swiss-based Greek business people with heavy investments in The Former Yugoslavia. Our purpose was to help clarify, and if things worked out, facilitate political negotiations over a "two union" plan (that is a union of states within Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a larger union of all states within The Former Yugoslavia) as a possible long-term solution to the conflicts there. The UN and other international parties would continue to cope with the situation on the ground while such political negotiations, if they could be started, would take place.

The plan was created by Dragan Hajduković, a prominent Montenegrin physicist with whom we worked in Geneva. Our role and potential role is as neutral professionals in conflict resolution.

On short notice an opportunity presented itself in Geneva for serious discussions of the plan, and we went to Geneva on the evening of June 2. As it turned out, the possibility of discussions of a long-term plan during the first week of June was limited because of the amount of attention being devoted to NATO air strikes, the detention of UN personnel by Bosnian Serbs, and the shooting down of the U.S. F-16. We returned to Boston on June 7.

The plan is still a live possibility which we are continuing to explore.

Senior Advisor
Member of the Board
Conflict Management Group
20. University Road
Cambridge, Mass. 02138
USA

Roger Fisher
Williston Professor of Law, *Emeritus*
Harvard Law School

Director
Harvard Negotiation Project
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, Mass. 02138
USA

Geneva, Switzerland
June 5th, 1995

This letter is being sent to the following leaders:

To: Mr. Momir Bulatovic, of Montenegro
Mr. Kiro Gligorov, of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, of Bosnia-Herzegovina
Mr. Radovan Karadzic, of the Bosnian Serbs
Mr. Milan Kucan, of Slovenia
Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, of Serbia
Mr. Jadranko Prelic, of the Bosnian Croats
Mr. Franjo Tudjman, of Croatia

Your Excellency,

1. Attached dated today is "A Proposal for a Global Solution for the Former Yugoslavia". This is a plan developed over the past several months by Dr. Dragan Hajdukovic as a basis for a comprehensive settlement of conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia.

2. Dr. Hajdukovic has asked me to initiate and facilitate a process of offering a sequence of decisions to parties in the conflict that would enable you, leaders of the local people most directly involved, to convert this locally developed proposal into legally binding documents. On the basis of the attached document, I have agreed to try and do so. This version of Dr. Hajdukovic's Plan incorporates modest interpretations and clarifications that I have worked out and discussed with him in order, in my view, to have the plan more readily understood by all of you and, when appropriate, by members of the International Community.

3. The first step is to determine if there is sufficient interest in the plan to justify your undertaking on an urgent basis the work needed:

3.1 To convert this plan into operational documents; and

3.2 To negotiate and establish the necessary ground rules to govern military and other activities in the meantime to permit that political work to go forward.

4. I would like to ask each of you, as soon as you are able to do so, to send me a message by fax, indicating that you have sufficient interest in the plan to attend (or to send a representative of yours to attend) a meeting in Europe. The goal of that meeting is to produce a joint statement that participants in the meeting can recommend be signed by you accepting the plan as a basis for a comprehensive settlement and committing your government to try to reach agreement:

4.1 On documents to implement it; and

4.2 On ground rules to govern activities in the meanwhile.

5. As you may know, I am a private third party whose ability to help resolve international conflicts comes not from any official status in which I speak **FOR** the United States or for some other government. In such a case I would be constrained by official policies and instructions. Rather, as illustrated by 35 years of experience, including work with the FMLN guerrillas and the Government in El Salvador, and with the ANC and the Government of South Africa, I am most

effective in speaking TO governments. I am able to give them information, ideas, suggestions, and advice which they have an interest in hearing. The contribution to a successful outcome that I have been able to make by acting outside of official channels has tended to increase my effectiveness as a neutral third party. The more impact I have abroad, the more I have at home. Conflict Management Group, our non-profit firm engaged in neutral conflict resolution work, now has some twenty-five full time staff.

6. If I receive what I consider sufficient support for the attached plan to justify convening a meeting, I will schedule a meeting at which I will facilitate your reaching prompt agreement on the text of a document that you could sign committing your government to go forward toward implementation.

7. You are hereby invited to attend such a meeting.

8. An appropriate response to this letter could be in the following form:

“Professor Roger Fisher
Harvard Negotiation Project
Cambridge, Mass 02138 USA

Fax: 617- 495-7818

We have received your fax from Geneva dated 5th June, 1995 and on the basis of that letter accept your invitation. Please notify us of the time and place for the first meeting. I or a representative will be there.”

9. In view of the deteriorating situation in the Former Yugoslavia I urge your acceptance. I do not know when, if ever, a better opportunity for a locally developed peaceful solution will arise.

10. To maximize the chance of success and to avoid public debate, I would like to request that this letter, the plan, and the proposed meeting be kept private and confidential until such a meeting has been held and produced a completed document that has been signed and released with an agreed joint statement, or until you have heard from me that effort on this behalf has been abandoned.

11. Finally, I would humbly suggest that each of you may wish to consider such steps on the ground that you could take to improve the atmosphere and to permit greater attention to be given to producing the kind of peaceful situation in which all of you will be able to work together to improve the lives of your people.

Professor Roger Fisher
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, Mass 02138

Phone: 617-495-1684
Fax: 617-495-7818

or C/O Conflict Management Group
20. University Road,
Cambridge, Mass 02138

Phone: 617-354-5444
Fax: 617-354-8467

Residence

Phone: 617-876-5722

A Proposal for a Global Solution for the Former Yugoslavia:

A plan put forward by local people

As of June 5th, 1995

A. Bosnia-Herzegovina Union (BH)

A.1 Borders

The borders of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia Hercegovina [BH] will be preserved in the sense that none of its neighbours can take a piece of its territory. However, "BH" will be transformed into a "BH Union" of independent states (modeled similarly to the European Union [EU]). One state will be a state of Serbs in "BH", and the Croat and Muslim groups would decide to form one or two additional states of the "BH Union".

A.2 Allocation of Land in "BH"

The land allocated to Bosnian Serbs shall be 49% of "BH" as proposed by the Contact Group. Starting with the map proposed by the Contact Group, and preserving the 49:51 proportion, the parties can agree on exchanges totaling up to 10% of the total territory of "BH" to provide a configuration that they consider better for the long-term interests of all.

A.3 Access to the Adriatic

All states of "BH" shall have fair and equal access to the Adriatic coast of "BH".

B. Global Union

B.1 Members

Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia (if it so desires), all as independent states within their present borders, and Serbia and Montenegro (either as one independent state or two within their present borders, as they may desire) will join together with the "BH Union" into a larger Global Union. This may well be in a similar manner to the "E.U."

B.2 Autonomous Region

Serbs in Croatia shall have a designated autonomous region. The "Z-4 Plan" shall be taken as the starting point for reaching agreement on this region.

B.3 Human and Minority Rights

All states of the Global Union shall seek and accept international protection of human rights and assurances of autonomy from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the OSCE High Commissioner on national minorities.

B.4 Constitutional Changes after Five Years

After the Global Union has been established for a period of five years, any two or more states that are members of that Union may, on the basis of a democratic referendum within each state, establish such special legal arrangements between or among them as they may decide, provided only that an action which would diminish the legal rights of another state shall be subject to its approval.

B.5 The Name "Global Union"

The name "Global Union" is provisional and may be replaced by such other name (perhaps "Yugoslav Union" or "Balkan Union") as may later be agreed upon.

RESUME

Professor BUHA Aleksa

DOB: 21st November, 1939. in Gacko, Bosnia-Hercegovina (BH).

Present Position: Minister of Foreign Affairs, of Bosnian Serbs, from 1992

Previous Post: Professor of Philosophy, Sarajevo University (before the outbreak of war)

Qualifications: Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, Sarajevo University

Education: Before going to university he had lived in Gacko, Mostar, and Beograd. He studied at University of Sarajevo, obtaining a degree in Philosophy, and linguistics (German). He obtained a Ph.D. at the same university, preparing a part of his dissertation at the Berlin University. He speaks fluent German, and has some linguistic skills in French.

Western Travel Experiences:

1. As Professor of Philosophy at Sarajevo University, he visited and took part in various professional international meetings in :- **GERMANY, FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND, AND -----**
2. As foreign minister he was a member of the Bosnian Serb delegation at the various official "Peace Talks" in the early days, mainly taking place in Geneva, and has thus visited Geneva on a number of different occasions. He has also latterly been a participant at various Contact Group Meetings:- **SWITZERLAND**

PASSPORT DETAILS:

Valid Diplomatic Passport Number: **D-013917**

- Issued April 14th, 1992,
- Valid until April 14th, 1997.

NB:

This resume has been prepared by Professor Dragan Hajdukovic, to save time, as Mr. Buha is currently traveling. In the opinion of Dr. Hajdukovic he is not a ultra-nationalist, and for instance, still maintains strong personal ties with : Mr. Jadranko PRLIC, Prime-Minister of Bosnian-Croats.

June 7th, 1995

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20727

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

6/12/95

INFORMATION

June 7, 1995

95 JUN 7 PI2 : 34

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Principals' Review of Bosnia Policy

Principals met Tuesday afternoon to review a range of policy issues associated with the situation in Bosnia. Key decisions included:

1. Recall Bob Frasure from Belgrade for consultations, given the lack of progress on the mutual recognition plan and Milosevic's attempts to up the ante. Prior to departing, Frasure will meet with Milosevic to stress: (a) the need for Belgrade to be more forthcoming on a workable sanctions reimposition mechanism in return for sanctions relief; (b) the need for Milosevic to intercede with the Bosnian Serbs to permit UNPROFOR to resupply its units in the eastern enclaves; and (c) the need for Milosevic to pledge to take action to increase security of U.S. monitors operating along the Serbian-Bosnian border in light of Bosnian Serb threats to take U.S. personnel hostage.
2. Agree to return U.S. border monitors to duty under the following conditions: (a) inform them of the serious nature of the threat directed toward them, based on our intelligence information, and allow them to resign and leave if they do not want to return voluntarily; (b) obtain the security commitment from Milosevic; (c) inform the head of the international mission of our decision; and (d) ensure that Congress is aware of the participation of U.S. civilian contractors in the border monitoring mission.
3. Schedule a meeting of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic with the Vice President during Silajdzic's visit to Washington beginning on Thursday. Principals thought it would be desirable for you to drop by.
4. Based on a CIA assessment that the current ROE for Deny Flight might not provide adequate protection for NATO/US aircraft in light of recent Bosnian Serb tactics, CIA, OSD and JCS will review the nature of the SAM threat in Bosnia and determine whether a new definition of "hostile intent"

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10/1/2013

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

or new ROE are required for further operations. In the interim, Deny Flight operations will continue under existing ROE (permitting attacks on SAMs demonstrating hostile intent through radar illumination of aircraft), but we will seek to avoid provocative action. Any proposed changes will be subject to review by Principals. We will ensure that UNPROFOR and Bosnian Serbs are aware that NATO aircraft are authorized to respond to demonstrations of hostile intent.

5. Urge the Croatians to exercise restraint in their ongoing offensive operations near Knin lest they provoke another major clash with the Krajina Serbs.

Principals also reviewed the results of the Paris meeting of Defense Ministers and the kinds of support we will provide to the Quick Reaction Force, depending on the requests of the force contributors. They also agreed that it would be prudent to provide formal notification to Congress of our intent to assist UNPROFOR in Bosnia in the context of ongoing briefings on NATO OPLAN 40104 and USG Bosnia policy.

~~SECRET~~

20727

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 6, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: NELSON DREW *ND*

SUBJECT: Memo to the President on June 6 Principals' Decisions

The attached memorandum to the President summarizes the key decisions of this afternoon's Principals' meeting on Bosnia.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *Va Tbm* NARA, Date *6/2/14*

2013-0687-F

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Declassify on: OADR

Attachments may have
been edited for format
by Exec Sec

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 12, 1995

Dear President *Timmy* Carter:

I greatly appreciate your continued interest and concern for finding a peaceful solution to the crisis in Bosnia. Your efforts in bringing about a cessation of hostilities that lasted through this past winter bought us precious time in which to seek a negotiated settlement acceptable to all parties to the conflict.

Unfortunately, the Pale Serbs refused to join with the Bosnian Government in accepting the Contact Group plan as the starting point for further negotiations. Moreover, since the expiration of the cessation of hostilities agreement, they have resorted to actions that defy all norms of civilized behavior: shelling innocent civilian targets in response to reversals on the battlefield, and taking hostages and chaining them to potential military targets.

I am sure you must agree that, under the circumstances, we should not be initiating any course of action that could be seen as a reward for such behavior and intransigence. Unfortunately, to now abandon our insistence that the Bosnian Serbs join with the other parties in accepting the Contact Group plan as a starting point for negotiations -- especially after the Contact Group has just reaffirmed its commitment to the proposal -- would be seen in Pale, as well as in Sarajevo and by the international community, as precisely such a reward.

Moreover, as you are aware, our policy for gaining the Pale leadership's acceptance of the Contact Group proposal as the basis for negotiations is based largely on diplomatic efforts to increase the political and economic isolation of the Bosnian Serbs and, through that effort, convince them that such negotiations in good faith are the only avenue available to them. This is not a short-term strategy, but will require consistent application over time, and patience on our part not to waver each time the Bosnian Serbs up the ante.

Therefore, I do not believe that it would be wise at this time either to seek to reopen the Contact Group plan by dropping the map, or to abandon the Contact Group altogether by appearing to endorse a new approach to negotiations such as you suggest. The Bosnian Serbs understand full well that adjustments to the Contact Group map can be made on the basis of mutual agreement among the parties, and that the draft constitutional principles would provide them substantial autonomy within the future Bosnian union. Thus, the real question is whether the Bosnian Serbs are prepared to negotiate in good faith, or whether they are committed to a military solution.

Thank you again for sharing your ideas on this difficult issue, and for your support for our mutual goal of restoring peace to the troubled Balkan region.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ron". The letters are cursive and fluid, with a large "R" and a stylized "on".

The Honorable Jimmy Carter
The Carter Presidential Center
One Copenhill
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

copy: ND
net AV

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6/1-

SANDY -

I briefed the
president orally,
then handed him
this. He was very
impressed by NG's
statement - said
this was perfect,
he would use it
to set the record
absolutely straight.

Amey

Gingrich quoted in Saturday's WPost as saying O'Grady escaped because Reagan-Bush defense capabilities had survived in spite of three years of Clinton's budget cuts.

TRUTH IS:

--Def budgets coming down since 85; this Administration has proposed the defense budgets we need to carry out our post cold war strategy.

--This Administration in December 94 asked for a \$25 billion add-back in defense funds, a decision that would produce a 1 % increase in real terms in the defense budget in the years 2000 and 2001.

--Moreover, last year our real defense needs were threatened by the Republican Exon/Grassley amendment that called for a 26% cut in federal spending. One half of discretionary federal spending is defense related, as we warned Republicans in letters to key players in the Congress.

--House Republicans instructed conferees to accept Exon/Grassley; this Administration fought the Amendment on the floor, and defeated the Bill. Speaker Gingrich voted for it.

NOTE: Gingrich will say that Exon/Grassley did not mandate defense cuts but we warned Hill that Bill could not be implemented without threat to defense budget. Proportional cutback would have produced a \$13 billion reduction in defense spending over three years.

MORE:

WP this morning says NSA did not pass new information on SA-6's located in Bosnia on to commanders in the area. If raised, suggest you respond that DOD and DCI John Deutch looking into all circumstances of O'Grady's shoot down and escape. Don't want to comment while review under way, but remember that we have seen some 40 thousand succesful sorties under operation Deny Flight. One mishap in 40 thousand flights is a pretty good record.

NYT notes today that Serbs and Belgrade government still supporting Bosnian Serbs, and asks why we are negotiating a lifting of the sanctions on Serbia. You might note in reply that we have seen a substantial reduction in the flow of supplies to the Bosnian Serbs since the imposition of sanctions, a development that is affecting the Bosnian Serbs' capacity to attack the Bosnian government and the people who support it. That is why negotiating with Serbian leader Milosevic to further tighten border controls, as well as require Serbian formal recognition of Bosnia, as a condition of suspension of sanctions. We also insist that sanctions on Serbia be suspended, not lifted, so we can reverse decision if Serbia does not honor its commitments.

WP and NYT report a statement by UN officials in Sarajevo that UN role in Bosnia "strictly peacekeeping." Your answer is that we know some allies have doubts about a firm stance vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs but our efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR to defend itself against Serb harassment will enhance its ability to perform its humanitarian mission.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. draft	Agenda: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, June 13, 1995. Record ID: 9520753. (1 page)	06/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [1]

2013-0687-F
vz2709

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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20753

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 12, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: NELSON DREW *ND*

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia, June 13, 1995

Attached at Tab A is the agenda for the Deputies meeting on Bosnia to be held June 13, 1995. The memorandum to the agencies is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the meeting and authorize Andy Sens to sign the memorandum to the agencies at Tab I.

Approve *mr* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies

Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines,

September 11, 2006

By *Vin Bond* NARA, Date *6/2/2014*

2013-0687-F

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20753

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 12, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. ROBERT P. MCALEER
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

AMBASSADOR RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the UN


DR. GORDON M. ADAMS
Associate Director for National
Security and International
Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

MR. DOUGLAS F. GARTHOFF
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. F. C. WILSON
Secretary, Joint Staff
Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia (S)

There will be a Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia and Croatia on June 13, 1995, 4:45 p.m. - 5:45 p.m., conducted by way of the Secure Video Teleconference System (SVTS). Attendance will be principals plus one. The agenda is attached at Tab A. (S)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Agenda

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines,
September 11, 2006

By W. T. [Signature] NARA, Date 4/2/04

2013-0687-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. cable	re: Smith: Status Quo Minus. (2 pages)	06/11/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [1]

2013-0687-F

vz2709

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	re: Guidance for 06/12. (5 pages)	06/11/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - June 1995: Early [1]

2013-0687-F
vz2709

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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