

FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [7]

Staff Office-Individual:

European Affairs-Vershbow, Alexander

Original OA/ID Number:

897

Row:

34

Section:

2

Shelf:

1

Position:

2

Stack:

V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. draft	Paper: Unanswered Policy Questions Relating to OPLAN 40104. (4 pages)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick and Nelson Drew. Subject: Pop-UP C-P-L Item. Record ID: 9520640. (3 pages)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	Unanswered Policy Questions on NATO Support for UNPROFOR. (5 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)
002c. paper	Unanswered Policy Questions Relating to OPLAN 40104. (4 pages)	05/15/1995	P1/b(1)
003. memo	For Acting Secretary Tarnoff from Robert Frasure. Subject: Where We Are with Milosevic. (3 pages)	05/09/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [7]

2013-0687-F

vz2708

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. draft	Paper: Unanswered Policy Questions Relating to OPLAN 40104. (4 pages)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [7]

2013-0687-F
vz2708

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002a. memo	For Anthony Lake from Don Kerrick and Nelson Drew. Subject: Pop-UP C-P-L Item. Record ID: 9520640. (3 pages)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [7]

2013-0687-F
vz2708

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

002b. paper	Unanswered Policy Questions on NATO Support for UNPROFOR. (5 pages)	05/1995	P1/b(1)
-------------	---	---------	---------

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [7]

2013-0687-F

vz2708

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TAB B

DRAFT

13

BOSNIA: FORMULATING A POST-UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL STRATEGY

In carrying out planning for UNPROFOR withdrawal, NATO has worked on the very narrow assumption that it will enter Bosnia, extract UNPROFOR, and leave. Even if this turns out to be the case, we cannot state with any degree of certainty what Bosnia will look like after UNPROFOR departs. Will the UN retain a residual presence, continuing to provide assistance to the eastern enclaves and Sarajevo? If not, who will? Will we push NATO to be ready to take a more assertive role in the conflict, particularly in and around a strangled Sarajevo? If multilateralism fails, will the U.S. be ready to provide air support, humanitarian supplies and arms? These are the questions that must be examined in formulating a post-withdrawal strategy.

Humanitarian Assistance

If UNPROFOR withdrawal is carried out in a relatively permissive environment, UNHCR and other NGO's may be able to stay on the ground, continuing to provide relief supplies to the five most vulnerable areas of the country: the three eastern enclaves, Bihac and Sarajevo. Many areas of the Federation, however, would have to begin the process of distributing relief on their own.

At the moment, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the UN's coordinating agency for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the former Yugoslavia. The World Food program (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organization (UNESCO) operate in conjunction with UNHCR in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia; the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and United Nations Volunteers operate in Bosnia-Herzegovina. UNHCR's position -- and thus that of its implementing partners -- remains what it has always been: It will continue operations as long as the security situation permits.

One of the most important NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross, has said it will remain in Bosnia as long as possible. In addition, there are over 100 NGOs in the former Yugoslavia, many of them implementing partners of the UN or of bilateral donors such as the U.S., or operating on their own. The EC has several projects, among them the EU Administration of Mostar project, as well as its monitors, and these functions would presumably continue after UNPROFOR withdrawal.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

10/1/2013 v2

NATO's RoleDRAFT

OPLAN 40104 makes no provision for a NATO mission in Bosnia, such as support for humanitarian relief efforts, after UNPROFOR withdraws. Any determination of NATO's post-UNPROFOR role would therefore require a policy decision and would need to take into account several factors:

-- Conditions of withdrawal. Bosnian Serb opposition to withdrawal could lead to direct military confrontation with U.S. and NATO forces. Under such a scenario, international support might be more forthcoming for lifting the arms embargo and taking broader military actions. Such support would be less likely if the withdrawal is not contested.

-- Allied support of lift and strike. In the face of Russian opposition to lift, but possible support from key Allies, we could press for a unilateral NATO commitment to the Bosnian government to assist it obtain arms and to provide air power. If key Allies are not prepared to support us, we would have to consider building a coalition of the willing.

-- Continuation of legal mandates. Without new UN resolutions, the authorization for NATO close air support and the protection of safe areas and exclusion zones may lapse with UNPROFOR's withdrawal. The legal framework for enforcement of the No-fly zone and Sharp Guard, in contrast, would probably continue, although for the former, NATO would need new technical arrangements.

The U.S. Role

UNPROFOR's withdrawal from Bosnia will increase pressure on the U.S. to become more involved in Bosnia, diplomatically and militarily. If withdrawal is precipitated by passage in the U.S. Congress of a unilateral lift bill, the U.S. will be under great pressure to help arm and train Bosnian troops. While Congress wants to lift the arms embargo, it might try to tie our hands in using military force, seriously complicating our ability to help. If the withdrawal is the result of British and/or French exhaustion, we will still be under great pressure to support the Bosnian Government by lifting the arms embargo.

In the event of withdrawal, the U.S. will in short order be faced with the following decisions:

-- Whether to Lift the Embargo: The U.S. will be under great pressure after withdrawal to revisit the lift issue in the Security Council (assuming the withdrawal is not precipitated by unilateral lift). Since the Russians are

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

unlikely to go along with multilateral lift, we might consider the alternative of "great power lift", i.e., lift by the U.S., France and Britain (while this option would be preferable to unilateral action, it is not clear that Allies would go along, even after withdrawal). Our remaining options would be unilateral lift or doing nothing.

-- Whether to Plan for and Provide Humanitarian Aid: If U.N. relief agencies retreat with UNPROFOR, we will have to make quick decisions on humanitarian issues, i.e., opening a relief corridor to Sarajevo or the enclaves, perhaps using air power to break the strangulation of the city.

-- Whether to Strike: Once the UN is removed, the U.S., as the strongest advocate of air action, will be under great pressure to retaliate for Serb violations, either through NATO or unilaterally.

-- Whether to Arm and Train: If the arms embargo is lifted, unilaterally or multilaterally, we will have to decide how to arm the Bosnians and train them in the use of weapons. This might include training in weapons left behind by departing UNPROFOR troops.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Proposed US Policy Principles
(During Withdrawal)

- Mission. NATO (and the US) will limit its mission to the withdrawal operation, and depart when that operation is finished.
- Neutrality. NATO will remain impartial and neutral during the withdrawal, and will not support Bosnian (or Croatian) military forces, or turn over territory or weapons to them.
- Use of force. NATO forces will be authorized to take the necessary measures (including lethal force) consistent with the laws of war against any threat (from any faction and including nominal civilians) to protect themselves and UN personnel (including hostage rescue) and to protect the accomplishment of the operation.
- Withdrawal priority. The withdrawal priority will be to remove UN personnel (civilian and military) first, then UN forces' weapons, and finally UN equipment. Weapons and equipment not withdrawn will be disabled or destroyed whenever possible.
- Command and control. [Once the UN asks for NATO help in a withdrawal anywhere in the theater, NATO will assume command of all current UNPROFOR units throughout FRY, subject to delegation of local authority to UN commanders in areas not being withdrawn. OSD/JCS] or [NATO will have flexibility to fully support a partial or complete withdrawal if it must, but also to remain in a supporting role if not asked and not needed by UNPROFOR.]
- No dual key. After TOA to NATO, no dual key arrangements will apply to any air operation judged by the NATO commander to be needed to support the withdrawal operation. Dual key arrangements will remain in place for areas and functions from which UN forces are not being withdrawn. The SRSO would continue to direct and be responsible for any remaining civil UN operations.
- Non defense/evacuation of civilians. NATO forces will not attempt to defend the Bosnian (or Serb, or Croatian) populations and will not undertake to evacuate civilians from the enclaves (or elsewhere).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12 May 1995

PROPOSED US POLICY PRINCIPLES DURING NATO-LED UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL

- **NATO Mission.** NATO's (and the US) mission is to conduct withdrawal operations and depart. There will be no follow-on missions. To the extent it can without adversely impacting the withdrawal effort, NATO forces will continue to conduct NATO-authorized operations, including SHARP GUARD, DENY FLIGHT, CAS, TEZ, and protection of safe areas.
- **Neutrality.** NATO forces will remain completely neutral and impartial during the withdrawal, and will not support Bosnian government or Croatian military forces. NATO will not turn over weapons or hand off territory to any warring party.
- **Use of Force.** NATO will be authorized to take necessary self-defense measures, including lethal force if required, to protect themselves and UN personnel from any faction, including civilians, regardless of location. NATO will use all necessary measures required to accomplish their mission.
- **Withdrawal priority.** The withdrawal priority will be to remove UN personnel (civilian and military) first, then UN forces' weapons, and then UN equipment. UN weapons and equipment not withdrawn will be disabled or destroyed whenever possible. To the extent it can without adversely impacting the withdrawal effort, NATO forces will be authorized to destroy warring faction weapons/equipment previously confiscated by UNPROFOR.
- **Command and Control.** NATO will continue to support UNPROFOR operations under existing UN mandates. Once the UN asks for NATO help in withdrawal anywhere in the theater and, prior to the withdrawal actually commencing, NATO will assume command and control of all current UNPROFOR units throughout FRY to conduct emergency, partial, or total withdrawal operations. NATO will delegate local authority to UN commanders in areas not being withdrawn.
 - ⇒ • **Dual-key.** After TOA, NATO Theater Command is in effect and dual key arrangements will not apply to NATO forces in theater, nor to countries in which NATO-led withdrawal operations are authorized, nor to areas within the theater from which attacks on NATO-led withdrawal operations are launched or threatened. Except as provided above, dual-key arrangements will remain in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

VZ 10/1/2013

place for areas from which UNPF is not being withdrawn as delimited by the NATO Theater Commander.

- **Civilians.** NATO forces will not attempt to defend Bosnian Muslim, Croat, or Serb civilian populations and will not undertake to evacuate civilians from the enclaves (or elsewhere). However, to the extent it can, without adversely impacting the withdrawal effort, NATO forces will be authorized to:

⇒ Respond to attacks on civilian populations in area where NATO forces are operating.

⇒ Support humanitarian assistance (aid delivery, refugee relocation, etc.) efforts of UNHCR and NGOs.

Notes:

- Dual-key statement should not be considered as the final USC policy position until agreed upon at the NAC.

TAB D

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. paper	Unanswered Policy Questions Relating to OPLAN 40104. (4 pages)	05/15/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [7]

2013-0687-F
vz2708

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. memo	For Acting Secretary Tarnoff from Robert Frasure. Subject: Where We Are with Milosevic. (3 pages)	05/09/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Alexander Vershbow)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - May 1995: Mid-Late [7]

2013-0687-F
vz2708

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]